The Threats that Could: Assad Now Wants
Peace!
By: Dr. Joseph HITTI
NEAL - USA
11/12/03
Over the past several weeks, and as the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA) was moving through Congress with flying
colors, there was a noticeable change in the language coming out of Damascus. In response
to the October 5 Israeli attack against training camps inside Syria a first in 30
years the Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Sharaa first said his country would
strike back against Jewish settlements in the annexed Golan if Israel attacked again. No
sooner had he made these threats that the Syrian Information Minister, Ahmad al-Hassan,
was rowing back saying Sharaa's comments were "exaggerated, taken out of context, and
mere chit-chat to journalists".
In an interview with the New York Times published on December 2, Bashar Assad expressed his readiness to resume peace negotiations with Israel and establish "full normalization of relations with Israel", and stated that Syria and the US would be the best of friends were it not for the bad boy in the neighborhood, Israel.
That same week (and as reported by the AFP on December 4), Syria agreed in principle to a moratorium on hostilities in south Lebanon in which Syria pledged that "no violence against Israel will come out of its territory or from Lebanon'', meaning Hezbollah would cease attacks on Israeli targets. In exchange, Israel would agree to halt its military flights over Lebanon, and not attack any target in Syria. The Syrian regime also delivered 22 suspects in the Istanbul bombings to Turkey, and publicly advertised its cooperation with the FBI in their investigation of Al-Qaida's terror network in Syria, even as it said it could not stem the flow of anti-US fighters across its border into Iraq.
Why the sudden U-turn? Why the signals and messages of goodwill at this very specific time, when in the past several months Syria did not mince its words in wishing the US failure in Iraq and ratcheted up both its virulent rhetoric and Hezbollah military threats against Israel? The fact is that the Syrian Baath leadership feels that the brewing upheavals spawned by the US liberation of Iraq are getting closer and closer to Damascus. The thugs in Damascus know that their end is near and are trying to rescue their hides before it is too late. Increasingly isolated by an explosion of peace initiatives on the Palestinian track, and facing stiff US determination in Iraq and US sanctions if Syria does not "make the right choices" in Lebanon, the Syrian regime has nowhere to go but down the dustbin of history, like its Iraqi sibling. SALSA, among other instruments of pressure and in the prevailing political context, is indeed bearing fruit even before President Bush signs it into law.
First of the factors behind Syria's retreat is that the US is adjusting and making sound corrections in its handling of Iraq, from an early surrender of sovereignty back to the Iraqis to military adjustments on the ground. As a result, US casualties are on the decrease, and the prospect of success has now replaced the gloom and doom of the past few months. The US is persistent in bringing the international community to assume its share of responsibilities in Iraq, and is indeed negotiating the modalities of a joint management of Iraq. Attacks against non-US members of the international community in Iraq, far from scaring away potential allies, have actually opened the eyes of the international community to the serious consequences of a US failure there, which in turn is making cooperation on Iraq urgent and likely. There is the realization that, for all its problems, the Iraqi case is truly a test case, and obstacles and violence not withstanding, Iraq is the best hope and a platform for change in the Middle East. Syria initially betted on a US failure, but now that the tide has turned and the "Arab masses", a term dear to Baathist demagogues, failed to rise up, Syria is reviewing its calculations and is softening its vitriolic virulence.
Second, the unofficial peace initiative the so-called Geneva Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians has received the blessings of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell. While perhaps only symbolic, this gesture is a significant departure from the Israeli-American platform of maintaining military pressure to force Arafat to deliver. The support by the US of any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians sends chills down the spine of the Syrian regime because it reinforces the notion that Syria is really irrelevant to the peace process. In fact, the US is clearly focused on the Palestinian track, and Syria, who chose to prevent progress by backing anti-peace extremist groups, knows that if there is a breakthrough in Palestine, it will be the loser of the end game. Interestingly, not only is Syria turning the other cheek, but even Sharon's hawks are now saying that they should withdraw from all the West Bank and dismantle the Jewish settlements.
Third, SALSA is beginning to have its impact. After near unanimous votes in both houses of Congress and after giving President Bush the flexibility he asked for, the bill made it to President Bush's desk for his signature on Monday Dec 1 according to informed sources in Washington. In private conversations at a Detroit fundraiser last week, the President confirmed his intentions to sign the bill into law. The Syrians initially said that the sanctions allowed in the bill are irrelevant to its economy, but as true as that may be, the real fear for Assad is the public humiliation of his country now tangibly confirmed as the top terrorist state for the US. The victory of the American Lebanese community in changing the Bush White House policy from one of support for Syria (in the previous decade) to one of publicly punishing Syria for its occupation of Lebanon is the real problem for Syria. The Syrian sudden change of heart should be seen as a desperate attempt by a desperate regime to counter SALSA. The Syrian regime also knows that, unlike past administrations, President Bush will not fall this time in the Syrian trap.
Fourth, Israel and America behind it have finally understood that their past policies in Lebanon have failed. No longer will Lebanon be punished for Syria's bad behavior, and Syria will be directly responsible for Hezbollah's actions. The first direct Israeli attack on Syria in 30 years - including low jet flights over Bashar Assad's own bedroom - puts Syria directly to account. Which is why Hezbollah does not seem interested anymore in liberating the Shebaa Farms. In fact, Israel dropped hints it will unilaterally withdraw from the Farms. There are increasingly loud rumblings among Hezbollah's Shiite base of Southern Lebanon. Ordinary Shiite villagers are saying they have had enough with Hezbollah's liberationist hyperbolae that have brought them nothing but devastation, and they are no longer willing to bear the brunt of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. Outspoken moderate Shiite leaders, such as Ahmad Al-Assaad, are emerging among the Shiites to counter the destructive policies of Amal's Nabih Berri and Hezbollah's Nasrallah.
Fifth, President Bush's determination to seeing the US succeed in Iraq and in the Middle East at large is making Syria very nervous. In speeches delivered in October and November before the British Parliament and the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush persisted in emphasizing two major points: He renounced past US policy of backing autocratic regimes for the sake of short-term stability, and he stated his conviction that Arab peoples, like humans anywhere, want to, and can live in democracy and freedom, and anyone who thinks otherwise is condescending. Both points strike fear in the hearts of Syria's dictator and his henchmen who thrived for decades on US backing and on dictatorial rule to amass fortunes, occupy Lebanon, sow hatred and violence, and wreck havoc in the peace process. At the end of the day, US determination is really the only factor behind a successful outcome to the impasse in the Middle East because it gives the US the credibility it sorely lacks. Bush has learned from the mistakes of the past, particularly that short-term deals deprive the US of the credibility it needs to wield influence and direct US policy to its long term strategic objectives.
In 1993 Turkey massed its troops on the Syrian border threatening to attack Syria if the Syrian regime did not hand over Abdullah Ocalan. Syria complied within 48 hours. Syria today is in the same quandary, and it will respond "positively" to threats and sanctions. Those who continue to call for continued engagement and appeasement policies of the past are out of synch. The failed policies of the past are probably very likely to fail again, and the only tangible instruments right now that are consistent with stamping out the immediate terrorist threat is a credible threat against those who practice or support terrorism. For all appearances, and up to a few weeks ago, the Syrian regime did not seem to have understood the fundamental shift in US policy. It could very well be that its declarations of good will and desire for peace are again vintage tactical retreats by Syria's Baathists in front of what they think is temporary and non-credible threats.
In fact, while Assad was making nice and begging the Americans and the Israelis, his dogs in the Lebanese media were barking at high pitch against the American-Lebanese lobby and General Michel Aoun as pro-Zionist traitors. The goal is to maintain fear in the hearts and minds of the Lebanese people and to ward off any defection by the Syrian lackeys in the Lebanese regime. It also sends messages to the late-comers to the pro-sovereignty crowd on the Lebanese scene. Any Lebanese who exercise their right to plead with the United States Congress or the United Nations for the liberation of Lebanon is branded a traitor who is "betting" on the Americans against the sacred Arab World while Mr. Assad, the Imperial Wizard of Baathist Doom, has a right to say he is "a friend of America", to engage in secret negotiations with the Israelis, and to express his desire for "full normalization with Israel".
In the final analysis, Syria is playing nice because it is afraid. It is losing the
game. Now is not the time to retreat and have a change of heart. The threat of peace
between Israel and the Palestinians, the US success in Iraq, President Bush's
determination, and the humiliation and sanctions of SALSA are making the Syrian Baath
regime tick to a different clock. The clockmaker has to keep the ticking going in order to
bring about the desired outcome: peace, justice, and freedom for everyone.