Is ‘Paris II’ really the solution?
By: General Michel Aoun
Is ‘Paris II’ really the solution?
France’s efforts to help Lebanon in its economic crisis are laudable and are consistent with the centuries-old friendship between the French and the Lebanese peoples. No one doubts the good intentions of France as well as that of the other countries gathering at the “Paris II” donors’ conference with the stated objective of rescheduling Lebanon’s public debt, which has soared to catastrophic levels.
However, we all know that good intentions don’t always make for good deeds. By dodging much-required political reforms, Paris II is yet again endorsing the status quo of the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the disastrous rule of the team at the helm. Previous experience over the last several years leaves no room for any hope whatsoever that funds allocated to Lebanon will be used wisely. Any economic relief package in the absence of prior political reform aiming at the recovery of national sovereignty would simply be an exercise in futility. It is ludicrous to think that there could be an economic solution to a problem that is political at the core.
There is no question that Lebanon is under Syrian control, and history has amply demonstrated that no prosperity is possible under such a situation. President de Gaulle said it, and politicians and economists have oft repeated it. It is imperative for any reconstruction program to begin with the re-establishment of democracy and the rule of law. No one is oblivious to the fact that the unprecedented economic crisis has placed a terrible burden on the Lebanese people. It is one thing to help alleviate this burden, but it is another to endorse the mismanagement of public affairs and the collaboration with the Syrian presence.
There is no point discussing Syrian control over the economic institutions of Lebanon. It is simply a logical consequence of this presence. The allocation of public bids and the contracting of large projects are funneled first and foremost to the benefit of Syrian officials who handle the Lebanese file. Agreements have been signed between Lebanon and Syria that legitimize economic and trade exchanges that grossly favor the Syrian side.
Successive governments since 1990 are largely to blame for the economic collapse of the country. Bad bets, squandering of strategic resources, nepotism, cronyism, corruption, and discretionary powers have been the distinguishing features of the Taif regime. So much so that the policies of that regime have been the antithesis of a liberal economic model.
The Lebanese regime is seriously derelict in fostering or protecting public freedoms and democracy, both prerequisites for development and economic growth. Abuse of human rights is rampant. Violations of the basic values of democracy are daily occurrences in the life of the Lebanese people. The latest chapters include the shutdown of MTV, a national TV station that had the impudence of opposing official government positions, and the annulment of the election of Gabriel Murr, an opposition member who won a seat in Parliament in a popular poll last June.
The restoration of an impartial judiciary is also a precondition for an economic recovery. It is no secret that without checks and balances, and a system of controls and penalties, any political system can get off track. Imagine those conditions in a country that has lost all the attributes of sovereignty. Reports from human rights organizations provide ample evidence that the Lebanese judiciary has become an instrument of oppression in the hands of an authority uniquely obsessed by its hold on power. The concentration of power and the stifling of the private sector have been the modus operandi of economic policies that run against sound economic management practices. Hariri has become the symbol of the “all-government” policy, using irresponsible spending practices that do not take into account any productivity or balanced growth criteria.
Excessive debt has taken the country down an irreversible path that burdens future generations, resulting in very high interest rates. The tapping of monetary reserves and their recycling in the form of Treasury bonds had the inevitable outcome of paralyzing the private sector, itself the economic engine that had always been the basis of the Lebanese miracle.
The tax-exempt status of Solidere, the firm with a monopoly over the reconstruction of downtown Beirut, the dispossession of rightful owners, and a law on foreign investments that enshrines favoritism, all speak loudly of the violations of the private property principle and the laws of free competition, both pillars of a liberal economic system.
The Lebanese government has had a history of making false promises to the IMF. Its administrative reforms program is dead in its tracks, since a purge of the administration would undermine the very foundation of the client system upon which rests the legitimacy of a regime under Syrian tutelage.
Privatization is nothing but a hollow slogan. Privatization of the telecommunications sector has resulted in a pure and simple nationalization of that sector. Once again, nepotism and a lack of transparency in the decision-making process are behind the failure of such programs. The people at the helm have taken credit for the stabilization of the Lebanese pound. However, that stability is at best artificial since it is not based on any basic economic data such as growth in the GNP or an improvement in exports.
My conclusion is a fairly simple proposition. The Syrian presence cannot and should not be endorsed. Bad management should not be rewarded. Any economic aid to Lebanon must be accompanied by political reforms aimed at reinstating sovereignty and democracy. Any aid offered short of these two principles will be for naught, and indeed increases the risks of a further deterioration of the crisis and a sidetracking from the real underlying problem.

23/11/02

Paris