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June 04/08
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Exploiting Hezbollah’s Coup-By Tariq Alhomayad-Asharq
Alawsat - 04/06/08
Riyadh Versus Damascus. By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed 04/06/08
A One Package Deal. By Mamoun Fandy, Ph.D. 04/06/08
Hezbollah army arises as a potent force under Lebanon's peace deal-Christopher
Torchia, 04/06/08
A One Package Deal
01/06/2008
By Mamoun Fandy, Ph.D./senior fellow for Gulf security and director of the
Middle East programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
in London. Before joining IISS
Anyone that tries to understand the Doha agreement between the Lebanese
adversaries from a Lebanese perspective would be making a mistake because the
correct perspective to understand this agreement is not Lebanon but Iraq. First
of all, the Doha agreement between the Lebanese adversaries is a diplomatic
package deal by all standards. But the issue is not in Doha nor is it in
Lebanon. The issue is that of two battles, two camps, two states, and two
operation theaters. As the countries of moderation in the region thought that
Lebanon was the principal theater for diplomatic action, the eyes of the United
States, Iran, and Turkey were on another playground; namely, Iraq. Iraq is the
true arena for diplomatic action. Iraq is where everything is taking place and
is the large strategic playground that is full of diplomatic prizes. That is why
all the steps taken by these three states [United States, Iran, and Turkey] and
all their energies were on this playground rather than on Lebanon as the Arabs
imagined. While Arab diplomacy -represented by the Arab League and Arab League
Secretary General Amr Musa were busy in the Lebanese playground, the
US-Iranian-Turkish diplomatic game was about to end on the Iraqi playground.
As the Arabs were expecting US President George W. Bush to announce the
establishment of the Palestinian state - in his speech in Sharm al-Sheikh during
his recent visit to Egypt - the United States, Iran, and Turkey (the other team
in the other playground) were seeking to end the dream of the establishment of
the Kurdish state. A Kurdish state is the common threat to each of Iran, Turkey,
and Syria; they are obsessed with this threat. No doubt, the dream of
establishing the Palestinian state is not a concern for the Turks and the
Iranians. Their concern is the establishment of a Kurdish state. As everyone
knows, the Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] is a thorn in the side of the modern
Turkish state. This party that is known for its radicalism and its activities in
northern Iraq and southern Turkey has forced the Turkish forces to enter Iraqi
soil several times in order to chase the PKK Kurdish rebels. There are more than
20 million Kurds in Turkey, that is, more than 40% of the entire population, and
about six million Kurds in Iran that are concentrated in four provinces in
northwest Iran. They represented a real threat to the Iranian state before and
during the reign of the former Shah and even after the establishment of the
Islamic Republic although the Kurds initially supported this republic. It is the
joint Kurdish threat to both Iran and Turkey that drove the Iranians and the
Turks to sign an agreement during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran. This agreement provides for cooperation between the
two countries to confront the Kurdish fighters and prevent them from
establishing an independent Kurdish "entity" in northern Iraq that may lead to
strengthening the Kurdish secessionist movement and establish a Kurdish state in
the region.
In Syria, the Kurdish problem may assert a lower presence than in Turkey and
Iran; however, this problem does exist. The riots in Al-Qamishli in northeastern
Syria in the past few years attest to this presence. There are about two million
Kurds in Syria. They are to be found inmost of the major Syrian towns and
regions and they are concentrated in most of the towns and villages of the
Province of Al-Hasakah. Syria's Kurds have always been influenced by the Kurdish
activities in the neighboring countries. Syrian Kurds have volunteered to serve
in the ranks of the Peshmerga in northern Iraq and the almost public presence of
the PKK in the Syrian arena revived the spirit of Kurdish nationalism. The
revival of this spirit of nationalism drove the majority of the Kurdish youths
to fight in the mountains of Kurdistan.
The main point here is that the largest strategic arena in which the United
States invested its diplomatic efforts was in Iraq not in Lebanon. The United
States wants to stop the attacks on its forces in Iraq and its basic goal in the
region is to score an acceptable victory. Meanwhile, Iran wants to have
strategic influence in southern Iraq and wants an Iraqi government in Baghdad
that is close to Tehran. It also wants to crush the dream of a Kurdish state in
northern Iraq. The United States is ready to negotiate with Iran to obtain what
is mentioned above in return for ceasing its nuclear enrichment activities,
ending its confrontation with the United States in Iraq, and ending its support
for the military religious parties such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and others. Turkey wants the same thing but in return for Iran's
influence in southern Iraq, it wants to have its influence in northern Iraq. In
addition to its wish to end the dream of the Kurdish state, Syria wants the
Golan in return for Lebanon, as I said in a previous article.
The interests of all these states intertwine with those of the United States in
the Iraqi playground. The three countries (Iran, Turkey, and Syria) are key
players in the Iraqi arena and Iran and Syria are also key players in the
Lebanese arena. Since the main concern of the US Administration is to score a
modest face-saving victory in Iraq, it has concluded that it should negotiate
with these three countries despite all the differences and the reciprocal
animosity. Thus, the Doha agreement to solve the Lebanese conflict constitutes
part of a deal to appease the Iranian and Syrian players for the sake of US
interests in Iraq not in Lebanon. We should also not forget that the United
States is well aware that it is Hezbollah that has the military power in
Lebanon. This was demonstrated in two recent events: The July 2006 war with
Israel and the military control of Hezbollah's men on Beirut during the recent
Lebanese crisis.
Naturally, Qatar has a very important side issue with Iran concerning the
northern oil field [Haql al-Shimal] that sits on a quarter of the world's gas
reserve. This field may cause tension in international relations and a serious
problem similar to that of Saddam's against Kuwait on the Al-Rumaylah oil field
that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Furthermore, Qatar has
important diplomatic relations with the United States. The two major military
bases of the United States are on its soil. This is what brought the Qatari role
and made Qatar the diplomatic mediator of the United States with the countries
in the region. The interconnected interests of the United States, Iran, Turkey,
Syria, and Qatar drove Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa AlThani to visit
Syria, Tehran, and southern Lebanon. These interests also led to issuing an
invitation to Iranian President Ahmadinejad to attend the recent Gulf
Cooperation Council [GCC] summit that convened in the Qatari capital Doha.
It is these intertwined interests that also brought in the Turks and the
Israelis in the person of Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to attend the
activities of the Doha Forum for Democracy, Development, and Free Trade in Doha
following Qatari and Turkish visits to Syria and Syrian visits, on the level of
the head of state, to both Turkey and Qatar. These intertwined interests cooked
a joint peace deal in one package and led the Doha agreement on Lebanon, the
announcement on the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, and the secret negotiations
between Hamas and Israel to coincide with one another. It is perhaps the US
Administration's reassurance that the success of this diplomatic deal - that
solved several thorny files - is imminent that drove US President George W. Bush
to take a hard-line stance with Egypt in his speech in Sharm al-Sheikh. When the
United States sensed that the camp of moderation in the Arab world is not docile
and is not open with it as it wishes, it decided to deal with the original
hard-liners - Iran, Syria, and the radical movements - believing that if it has
the chance to deal with the original hard-liners, why should it deal with
conventional ones?
What happened simply is that while the Arab League was playing with the Lebanese
teams on the Lebanese playground, the United States and the countries that have
similar interests were running the game in the Iraqi playground. It was a
professional ploy that "resolved" all the issues in one package deal.
Exploiting Hezbollah’s Coup
02/06/2008
By Tariq Alhomayad
the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat
Amidst the blaze of forming the Lebanese government, numerous statements have
emerged here and there from the conflicting factions with each group justifying
its position by relying either on the Taif Accords or the outcome of the recent
Doha meetings. However it is evident that the opposition; Hezbollah
specifically, is only relying upon the May 7 coup and the occupation of Beirut.
How should we interpret Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah’s warning to the majority
in parliament that, “If it [the majority] is convinced and follows the correct
path then we will walk with it down this long road and together we can build a
state and society and live with happiness and pride. If it does not accept the
past experience, then it will be incapable of changing or achieving anything.”
But even graver were the comments made by Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan, Deputy
President of the Higher Islamic Shia Council in Lebanon who stated: “The absence
of the Shia signature from the government will not be permitted,” and called for
“creating a vice presidential post to be filled by a Shia so that the Shia may
take part in the decision-making process, in the case of them not getting the
Ministry of Finance.”
Sheikh Qabalan did not stop there; he continued to speak about [the ministries
of] justice and interior and the necessity of having neutral judges and officers
as it is not right for innocent people to be imprisoned without having recourse
to a fair trial, he said.
What Sheikh Qabalan seeks is the release of the four officers embroiled in the
case of Rafik Hariri’s assassination. This matter is shrouded in suspicion and
it foreshadows bigger things to come in near future. Moreover, it is clear that
there are roles being doled out by Hezbollah and its followers.
Sheikh Qabalan launched an attack on Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, the Grand
Mufti of the Lebanese Republic the day that he warned against the sedition of
the May 7 coup. Sheikh Qabalan said, “If some leaders are happy to become tools
in the hands of Israel so that it may achieve its goals, then is it conceivable
for those in religious positions to be dragged behind them and cover them
[leaders] with their evocative speeches?”
But Sheikh Qabalan took it even further when he defended Iran in response to
Walid Jumblatt’s call for the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon. He
said that such questionable demands “fall under the framework of Israeli and
American incitement.”
All of the above suggests that Hezbollah and its supporters act based on the
coup that they carried out and their occupation of Beirut and not in accordance
with the Doha Agreement.
Hezbollah and its supporters want the sovereign ministries and want to create a
vice-presidential post to be filled by a Shia and they brag about what happened
in Beirut rather than apologize for what they have perpetrated. And why not? In
his most recent speech to his supporters, didn’t Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah say “I
have promised you victory” in reference to his martyrs in comparison to the
victims on the other side? So this means that his affiliates are martyrs while
others rank lower in life and death!
The danger of all of the aforesaid is that it can only aggravate matters, in
addition to firmly establishing the belief amongst some that accumulating
weapons and preparation are necessary – whilst there is nothing to guarantee
that Hezbollah will not repeat its actions, especially since the party’s
supporters continue to remind their opponents of the Beirut coup.
The gravity does not lie in the fact that this comes from a Hezbollah MP but
rather that it comes from a man of considerable status and who occupies the
position of Deputy President of the Higher Islamic Shia Council in Lebanon.
Riyadh Versus Damascus
02/06/2008
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
the general manager of Al -Arabiya television.
A battle is taking place between Riyadh and Damascus.
It is a silent battle on the part of Riyadh, but noisy on the part of Damascus.
Damascus rejected the Arab League secretary general's proposal to reform the
Arabs' relations with Iran. Syria rejected the idea in its capacity as president
of the Arab summit. It holds the view that no one is in disagreement with Tehran
and, therefore, let the Saudis alone deal with the problem. Damascus leaked its
views to the Lebanese press. Even though it officially denied these views,
everyone knows that they are literally Syrian, not Iranian, statements in spite
of Damascus's attempt to imply that they are Iranian. For some time now,
Damascus has been trying to convince the Gulf leaders that Iran is behind the
statements and reports that come out of Beirut and behind the events that take
place there and that Damascus has nothing to do with them.
Surely, Iran plays a large role in the crises of the region. However, we cannot
hold it responsible for everything happens and said in the region, even if they
were attributed to an Iranian news agency, such as Fars, or others, which were
lately used a lot in publishing statements of Syrian origin to keep suspicions
away from Damascus and fasten them on Iran, or even if they were attributed to
the Iranian Television Network.
What makes the disagreement with the Iranians different is that it is obvious
and can be defined. The Iranian regime's desire to dominate the Arab region from
the Gulf and Iraq to Lebanon is now public. They [the Iranians] told the
Americans "we have a role to play in Iraq and the Gulf" and said to the Saudis"
come let us reach an understanding on Lebanon" and so forth. However, it is
difficult for one to imagine that the Iranian regime's desire would be fulfilled
without causing dangers and extremely serious sectarian conflict. Thus, the
situation suffers a political and security tension. Besides, there is the
nuclear issue, and Iran does not hide its intentions to make nuclear weapons.
The Gulf region is more affected by this danger than by Israel, the name of
which is used to justify the making of weapons, as Saddam used to do in the
1980s. Afterward, he used his deadly weapons against Iran and his Kurdish
compatriots and occupied Kuwait. The six Gulf states are collectively convinced
that the Iranian weapons target them. The Iranian weapons will subject these
Gulf states to Iran's blackmail in the future, if not directly used against
them. These disagreements with Iran are clear. Even though they are serious,
communication between Riyadh and Tehran never ceased. In fact, it has been said
that this communication saved the region during some periods of tension, even
though it failed during the crisis of Hezbollah's recent coup. For the first
time, this crisis led to a public verbal altercation between the Saudi foreign
minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad.
That is why Damascus's leaked press statements were exciting. They show a state
of tension and fury and a desire to invent a clash. They complement statements
that were made early this year by Syrian Vice President Farooq al-Sharaa who
predicted the downfall of the Saudi oil regions. The Syrian statements that were
recently leaked to the press said Saudi Arabia was conspiring to overthrow the
Syrian regime. What a charge! I am sure the Syrians know very well that if Saudi
Arabia adopted a plan to topple their regime, the plan would not be impossible
and would be carried out in a "legitimate" way. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is
not like Syria in dealing with crises. The severest penal action that that Saudi
Arabia takes in such situations is to reduce or sever its contacts. On the other
hand, Saudi Arabia supported stability in Syria throughout the past 30 years,
not necessarily because it loved the regime, but because it is against chaos in
the region. Saudi Arabia believes that disagreements, no matter how bad, can be
resolved in the end. It held the view that if regimes do not rectify their
behavior, they do not livelong, no matter how many alliances they establish.
Currently, the Syrians are persistently engaged in a campaign of various forms
through many parties with the aim of insulting, provoking, and intimidating the
Saudis, out of their belief that this campaign will force their adversaries to
submit to their demands. Anyway, let us wait and see.
Hezbollah army arises as a potent force under Lebanon's
peace deal
Christopher Torchia, Associated Press
Sunday, June 1, 2008
Hezbollah fighters have pulled back since seizing parts of Lebanon's capital,
but their brazen display has made one thing clear: A private army blamed for
terrorist attacks on Western interests and dedicated to the destruction of
Israel will be a fixture in this weakened country for a long time.
Lebanon is an ideal incubator for Hezbollah's military clout, just as
Afghanistan served al Qaeda. Lebanon's U.S.-funded military doesn't interfere
with the thousands of rockets and missiles that militants are believed to have
hidden in basements and bunkers throughout Shiite Muslim areas of the tiny
country.
Hezbollah's refusal to discuss disarmament at talks with Lebanese factions in
Qatar recently means it has formidable firepower to unleash at will. This could
have wider implications, given Hezbollah's summer war with Israel two years ago,
though some Lebanese suspect Hezbollah's main objectives include local power
grabs and settling ethnic scores.
"Hezbollah's mask has dropped," said Ayman Kharma, a Sunni Muslim cleric whose
fourth-floor apartment in the northern city of Tripoli was blasted during
fighting this month with a militia allied to Hezbollah. "We were in favor of
Hezbollah when it was fighting Israel. Now we see it from the inside."
Kharma was talking about the sectarian tone of the violence, with Shiite
militants from Hezbollah targeting Sunnis tied to the government. He spoke in
the blackened wreckage of what was his living room, littered with fragments of
rocket-propelled grenades.
Hezbollah says its chief goal is to fight Israel, and its combat record -
burnished by the 2006 war - has earned it respect throughout the Arab world. The
attire of a Shiite fighter in the recent fighting in Lebanon testified to past
and present conflicts: an Israeli helmet, green fatigues with a "U.S. Army"
stamp, a black T-shirt and an American-made M4 carbine with a telescopic sight.
Witnesses say Hezbollah fighters used automatic rifles and rocket-propelled
grenades, but refrained from shelling parts of Beirut with mortar rounds, which
would have threatened civilians for minimal military gain.
The witnesses said militants handed out cell phone numbers to shopkeepers,
telling them to call if anyone attacked their stores. Hashim Jaber, a former
brigadier general in the Lebanese army, described many Hezbollah combatants as
"grade C, grade B" operatives who acted like military police officers,
supervising unruly fighters from allied militias.
Unlike Sunni al Qaeda, Shiite Hezbollah is a social and political movement
inspired by Iran's Islamic revolution. It has stepped back from the spectacular
bombings, kidnappings and hijackings in which it was implicated in the 1980s and
1990s, but praises Palestinian suicide bombers and helps the Palestinian group
Hamas, which has repeatedly fired rockets into Israel from Gaza.
The United States lists Hezbollah as a terrorist group and denounces suspected
aid by Iran and Syria. Washington also says Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda
have taken advantage of instability to infiltrate Lebanon, where extremism
breeds in Palestinian refugee camps.
Hezbollah says it doesn't have a foreign branch, but it is believed to have
operatives and fundraisers as far afield as Latin America, and among other
Shiite Muslim communities in Lebanon's diaspora of more than 10 million.
In 2006, Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets at Israel, and intelligence
experts believe it now has a longer-range arsenal.
Gen. Amos Yadlin, Israel's chief of military intelligence, says Hezbollah
maintains a "massive" presence close to Lebanon's southern border with Israel,
including rockets, combat forces and observation points, in violation of a
U.N.-brokered cease-fire that ended the 2006 war. U.N. patrols in the area have
not reported similar claims, though the United Nations has complained of illicit
arms shipments to Hezbollah and Israeli overflights.
"If there is a future flare-up, Hezbollah will try to attack Israel not only
from the area south of the Litani (River) but from deep inside Lebanon as well,"
Yadlin said in an interview with Israel's Haaretz newspaper.
He said Hezbollah has munitions that "now cover large areas of Israel" in
contrast to rockets that mostly hit only the north during the war. The comments
match claims by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
Hezbollah has built a private telephone network to shield operatives from
eavesdropping and be more resistant to aerial bombing. The government reversed a
decision to ban the fiber-optic system after Hezbollah's fighters and allies
overran parts of Beirut and other areas earlier this month, killing dozens in
scenes reminiscent of Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war.
A purported map of the phone network, released by a government ally, shows links
that stretch from Hezbollah's base of Dahiyeh in the southern suburbs of Beirut,
through the coastal cities of Sidon and Tyre to areas near the Israeli border
and up the entire length of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon's interior. It follows
Lebanon's sectarian divide, connecting virtually all Shiite Muslim areas but not
Sunni Muslim and Christian areas.
Jaber, the former military commander, said the network was designed for military
rather than commercial use, and should be included in any discussion of
Hezbollah's weaponry.
The best Hezbollah fighters are believed to have trained in Iran, others at
camps in northeast Lebanon, near Syria.
Shlomo Brom, former head of strategic planning on the Israeli military's general
staff, said Israeli intelligence estimated that Hezbollah lost 500 to 600
fighters in the 2006 war.
"The only area where it is not clear whether they were able to reconstruct
successfully since the war is the training of new cadres, because they had quite
a large number of casualties," he said. "It is not easy to replace them, because
those were people who were trained for the past 10 years."
**This article appeared on page A - 11 of the San Francisco Chronicle