Hezbollah's private war
By Zvi Bar'el (Haaratz 8.10.2000)
In the aftermath of
the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah has now set three objectives for its renewed
struggle against Israel: the return of Havat Shiva to Lebanon, the release of all Lebanese
prisoners imprisoned in Israel, and the furnishing of assistance to the Palestinians (not
the PA) in their campaign to liberate their lands.
Hezbollah had to put its demand concerning the 10 square kilometer Havat Shiva area on
hold when Syria accepted the UN's judgment that Israel had withdrawn fully from southern
Lebanon. By accepting this UN ruling, Syria agreed that Resolution 425 (concerning
withdrawal from Lebanon) does not apply to Havat Shiva; disputes about the area, the
Syrians held, would be resolved in negotiations with them held under the terms of
Resolution 242 (concerning withdrawal from occupied territories). Hezbollah, which had
vowed not to act in contravention of decisions reached by the Lebanese government, was
forced to hold its Havat Shiva objectives in abeyance when the Lebanese government
assented to Syria's dictates on the matter. Hezbollah ceased its military activity in the
area.
Instead of Havat Shiva, the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli facilities
turned into the main focus of Hezbollah's military planning. Hezbollah's normally strict
compartmentalization of information (a secret-keeping tactic which had in the past stopped
Israel from learning about the organization's military plans in advance) lapsed in this
instance. Israel received intelligence information about Hezbollah's plans to kidnap IDF
soldiers in order to use them as bargaining leverage in a bid to effect the release of the
Lebanese prisoners.
Planning for the kidnapping appears to have deviated from Hezbollah's habit of deploying
small, compartmentalized cells of operatives. Hezbollah appears to have informed a
relatively large military contingent about the plan - and these forces, in turn, carried
out the camouflage activities around the IDF's Zarit outpost, along with the military
attack against the Har Dov outposts. Using these operations as a smokescreen, the
Hezbollah group was able to carry off the kidnapping. Due to the large scale of this
kidnap action, and the ploys which accompanied it, the IDF received information about
Hezbollah's designs, and disseminated warnings to the public about the possibility of
kidnap attempts against soldiers.
What price will Hezbollah try to exact from its success? It could choose to be satisfied
with a demand for a swap - the kidnapped soldiers in exchange for Lebanese prisoners held
in Israel. Or, it could try to pull Lebanon and Israel into another military
confrontation, a conflict which would resurrect Hezbollah's role as a fighting force. Or,
Hezbollah might decide to demand that Palestinian prisoners be released by Israel along
with Lebanese ones, thereby damaging Arafat's stature (Hezbollah has long loathed the PA
Chairman).
Under any of these scenarios, negotiations will be protracted, and Hezbollah is likely to
wage a private diplomatic struggle, without the help of Syria, or the Lebanese government.
In view of public debates concerning the future of Syria's presence in Lebanon, Syrian
President Bashar Assad has been very cautious when it comes to intervening in Lebanese
matters. And Lebanon is ruled by a transitional government which could choose to regard
the kidnapping affair as a private matter to be resolved between Hezbollah and Israel.
Released from pressure applied by Damascus or Beirut, Hezbollah could notch a number of
successes - or it could raise the stakes in talks and insert new demands, knowing that
Germany, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States are likely to get involved in
the talks.
Well-versed in negotiation dynamics with Israel, Hezbollah's Sheikh Nasrallah refrained
yesterday from setting a price to be paid in return for the three soldiers. He didn't even
say whether he demands the release of Lebanese prisoners only, or whether he's including
the release of Palestinians. Maneuvering to ensure that Hezbollah, and not Syria or the
Lebanese government, conduct negotiations with Israel, Nasrallah is waiting for various
international officials to come knocking at his door. Nasrallah has managed to open up a
private diplomatic front, one which now buffers his organization against any IDF reprisal
actions, against Israeli military strikes that could eradicate the success marked by the
Party of God this weekend.
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