For Immediate Release Lebanon

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
September 15/07

Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint John 3,13-17. No one has gone up to heaven except the one who has come down from heaven, the Son of Man. And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, so that everyone who believes in him may have eternal life." For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him might not perish but might have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him.

Opinions.
The Future Of Lebanon.Global Politician. September 14/07
Third time unlucky.Al-Ahram Weekly. September 14/07
Bush is running out of time to give his peace conference a fighting chance.The Daily Star. September 14/07

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for September 14/07
Feltman: Evidence on Hizbullah's Army Smuggling. Naharnet
US says it wants fair election in Lebanon.AFP
Sfeir Disappointed at 'Foreign Meddling' in Lebanon. Naharnet
Berri Slams Majority Over Response, Vows to Move Initiative Forward. Naharnet
Israel's Air Strike on Syria Targeted Weapons Destined for Hizbullah.Naharnet
Influx of Foreign Diplomats to Beirut to Tackle Lebanon's Power Struggle.Naharnet
Nassib Lahoud announces run for Lebanese presidency.Daily Star
French foreign minister urges Lebanese rival factions to work ...International Herald Tribune
French FM voices hope of Lebanon breakthrough.AFP
Israel stays on high alert along northern border.AFP
Kouchner hails 'renewed dialogue' in Lebanon-Daily Star
Berri touts broad support for latest proposal, warns March 14 to accept-Daily Star
British envoy backs Berri plan to break deadlock-Daily Star
Rizk appoints Saqr to head Hariri probe-Daily Star
Sfeir condemns foreign meddling-Daily Star
America the generous or America the stingy?-Daily Star
Haddad vows to get tough with merchants who gouge customers-Daily Star
UNRWA 'running out of cash' to care for Nahr al-Bared displaced-Daily Star
Is Beirut ready for a memory museum yet?-Daily Star
Iran's foreign minister in Beijing for talks on nuclear dispute.Daily Star

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2300 M Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC, USA 20037
Phone + 1 202 416 1819, Fax + 1 202 293 3083
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14th September 2007
Media Release
Beware of the Enemy Within
- Former US Senator James Abourezk, On The Terrorist Group Hezbollah TV Al-Manar.
The son of Lebanese migrants rises through the ranks to become a US Senator. Now in his after Senate life, he finds it difficult to remain loyal to the Nation that embraced and elevated him to a revered position in American Politics.
In a recent interview with Al Manar TV on Aug 30th, 2007, a subsidiary of terrorist organization Hezbollah, and consequently is banned from broadcasting in the US, James Abourezk accused the US of being a racist country living under the control of the Jewish Lobby.
http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=26956&only&rss
Either by design or by accident Abourezk seems to be giving support and impetus to the sworn enemies (Hezbollah) of the Nation he represented as a Senator. His reckless provision of political comfort to the enemies of the US is by no means less than aiding and abetting in the killing of loyal Americans wherever they may find themselves within striking distance by the ruthless terrorists. Surely he must realize that in so doing, he has come dangerously close to committing treason.
Such behavior cannot be glossed over and allowed to pass without comment or even punishment. Abourezk is treading a path of treason. He is either in the palm of terrorist organizations or he is canvassing the possibilities of a rewarding relationship. Either way this can only be considered to be at the expense of loyal Americans who have previously paid his salary and who are currently providing a comfortable retirement for him.
Just what drives a man to such reckless acts?
- What kind of benefit could be achieved by his attack, against his own American people on a TV network run by Hezbollah?
- Has he sold out to Hezbollah and their terrorist sponsors Syria and Iran?
- Has he become an enemy of the USA?
His responses to the interviewer seem child like. His attacks have rendered his credibility virtually non existent. Perhaps James Abourezk should take a deep long look into his soul and rediscover his position and priorities in life. Gratitude and loyalty, especially in a time of war, to his former constituents and the Nation that gave him the privilege to represent it in the US Senate would be a good start.
S. John Hajjar, National Director

Feltman: Evidence on Hizbullah's Army Smuggling
The U.S. ambassador to Lebanon said Friday that there is clear evidence the Shiite group Hizbullah is still smuggling weapons across the Syrian border in violation of U.N. resolutions. "We find the evidence to be strong that arms smuggling is continuing across the Syrian-Lebanese border," Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman told Agence France Presse, without giving any specific details. "We are concerned by the reports and by the public statements by Hizbullah that Hizbullah has actively rearmed."
He added: "In our view this poses one of the biggest dangers to Lebanon and it is a violation of the spirit and the letter of a number of Security Council resolutions."
Hizbullah, which is backed by Syria and Iran, is considered a "terrorist" group by the United States. It had one minister in the Lebanese government until he and five other pro-Syrian colleagues resigned last November. Hizbullah, which claimed its resistance against Israel forced the Jewish state's 2000 withdrawal from south Lebanon, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, sparking last year's devastating 34-day war with Israel. This led subsequently to the reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the tense border zone with Israel for the first time in decades. The militant group, however, was not disarmed and recently said it still had weapons that could reach Israel. Feltman said there were several initiatives under discussion with the Lebanese government on how to halt the smuggling of weapons. Saying that the international community would respond favorably to any Lebanese government request to help in border security, Feltman said "there are several initiatives under discussion with the government about how best to prevent smuggling, most importantly arms smugglings." He also rejected arguments that controlling Lebanon's border with Syria would amount to interfering in the country's sovereignty.
"Controlling borders is an assertion of sovereignty," he maintained.(AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 14 Sep 07, 18:48

Berri Slams Majority Over Response, Vows to Move Initiative Forward
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri lashed out at the "much-delayed" response of the ruling majority on his proposal to resolve the country's political impasse, dubbing it a "death notice," but vowed to move forward with his initiative, calling on all Lebanese to pitch in and help out.
"March 14 Forces' statement was not a response to my initiative," Berri told Thursday's Kalam el-Nas talk show on LBC TV. "It was a death notice."
"I will keep calling for sessions to elect a new president even if I had to spend the nights in Parliament," he stressed.
"My proposal will stay as is. I will not change anything in it.
He pledged to continue calling for sessions even after October 24, which marks a deadline of 10 days before President Emile Lahoud's term expires. "I have the right!"
Stretching out a hand to all Lebanese, Berri said: "This initiative will continue until its objectives are reached. If you like to meet me … you are welcome."
Berri stressed that the Lebanese army will remain "united" in the face of feared chaos if Lebanon's warring lawmakers failed to elect a new head of state, but warned that Internal Security Forces might split. He also expressed disappointment at remarks by U.N. Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen for saying that if a two-third vote was not secured, a president should be elected by a simple majority and ought to carry out all U.N. Security Council resolutions, particularly 1559.
"The Lebanese are in great disagreement over 1559, so why raise that controversial point at this crucial time?" Berri asked.
He said that he received a phone call from U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who voiced support for his initiative and assured him that what Roed-Larsen said will be "discussed and examined."Berri also warned that "if Christians leave Lebanon, Lebanon's existence is threatened."
Beirut, 14 Sep 07, 07:33

Sfeir Disappointed at 'Foreign Meddling' in Lebanon
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir voiced disappointment over foreign meddling in Lebanon and said he hoped the warring sides would agree over presidential elections and a consensus candidate.
"Foreign interference in Lebanon's internal issues is the worst thing happening to Lebanon," Sfeir told the Italian news agency.
"Lebanon's neighbors are constantly meddling in our domestic issues and this is an unhealthy sign," he declared, adding that Lebanon's neighbors "constitute a threat to the country's stability."
"We all hope that warring Lebanese groups will start considering their country's interests rather than their own interests and reach an agreement about the identity of Lebanon's next president," Sfeir said from the Vatican.
A meeting between Sfeir and Pope Benedict XVI scheduled for Thursday was postponed until the weekend. Sfeir said "we must resort to elections" if Lebanese leaders did not agree on a consensus presidential candidate. He said any Presidential runner "should win the majority of the deputies' votes so as to be elected as president and in order to be a true representative of the Lebanese." There has been controversy over the quorum issue, with Sfeir insisting the vote needed to elect a new head of state is two-thirds, as stated by the Constitution. While the Hizbullah-led opposition pushes for a two-thirds vote, the ruling March 14 alliance advocates a simple majority of half-plus-one. Under Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution, the president should be elected by a two-thirds quorum of the MPs. After a first ballot, a simple majority vote will be adequate to elect a new president. Sfeir reiterated that the next president "should be at an equal distance from all the Lebanese and more importantly be able to solve Lebanon's pending crises especially that of the economic one." On the future of the Christians in Lebanon, Sfeir said he was not worried since "both Muslims and Christians in Lebanon are emigrating to seek better opportunities, not only Lebanese Christians." Sfeir on Wednesday said that "if each Lebanese faction stands by its stance without trying to reach common ground, this would lead to a blatant division among the Lebanese." Beirut, 14 Sep 07, 11:13

Mysterious happenings
Sep 13th 2007 | JERUSALEM
From The Economist print edition
Talk of war, talk of peace
“I CAN'T remember a time when our interests and theirs converged like this,” says a former Israeli defence man. For several days after Syria complained that Israeli aircraft had penetrated its airspace, neither country wanted to talk about what had happened. The unaccustomed silence was broken first by Syria's foreign minister, Walid Moallem, who apparently complained to European diplomats that Israel had bombed targets in Syria; and then by unnamed American sources, who confirmed to CNN and the New York Times that Israel had carried out air strikes.
What Israel bombed and why is still unclear. The American reports suggest that it was weapons destined for Hizbullah, the Iran-backed Islamist Shia movement that dominates southern Lebanon, but these have been passing through Syria for years. One theory is that it was suspected nuclear material from North Korea (apart from Iran, North Korea was the only country to leap indignantly to Syria's defence); another, that Israel was trying out flight paths for a possible war with Syria or attack on Iran, or testing out new Syrian air defences that were reportedly recently supplied by Russia. Syria's own muted response and failure to retaliate suggest that whatever happened, it was most embarrassing.
Certainly, Israeli air force officers are said to be jubilant about the mission's success, though officials have stayed tight-lipped, and those Israeli journalists who hint that they know what happened aren't telling. Whatever the target, it must have been something special for Israel to launch an attack now, at a time when both countries have been building up their forces for a possible war while trying to reassure each other publicly that they do not want one. Indeed, having the leaks come from America rather than Israel may have been an attempt to avoid further escalation.
That attempt may be working: despite unconfirmed reports that Syria was calling up its reserves, no firm promise of military retaliation has come. And the raid will certainly have given Syria pause. Though both countries have been building up their defences since Israel's war with Hizbullah last summer, Syria has for a while been calling for new peace talks over the return of the Golan Heights, which Israel occupied in the 1967 war. A number of prominent Israelis echoed that call this year, after a former Israeli diplomat and an expatriate Syrian-American revealed that they had had a series of meetings to talk peace.
Proponents of talking to Syria argue that doing so would encourage it to reduce its involvement in Lebanon, loosen its ties with Iran and stop letting insurgents cross its border into Iraq. Sceptics, who predominate in the Israeli and American governments, argue that Syria merely wants peace talks with Israel as a way to ease the pressure on it, and should show it is serious about relinquishing its influence in Lebanon first. The latest raid may have weakened Syria's hand. If Israel can slow Hizbullah's arms supply or foil Syrian air defences, then, so the theory goes, it dents Syria's ability to use either its influence in Lebanon or the threat of a war with Israel as bargaining chips.

The Future Of Lebanon
Panel Discussion - 9/15/2007
The U.S. Department of State's International Information Programs (IIP) in Washington D.C., the Public Affairs Office at the U.S. Embassy in Israel, and the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center jointly held an international video conference seminar focusing on both domestic and foreign affairs in Lebanon. Israeli and U.S. experts examined the balance of and struggle for power in the country, external factors, and future prospects.

Brief biographies of the participants can be found at the end of the article. This seminar is part of the GLORIA Center's Experts Forum series.
Dr. Paul A. Jureidini: Hizballah will have to decide whether it will remain within the country's framework; or whether it wants to pull another "Hamas," seize the territories it controls, and run them as a quasi-independent state. This could happen as a fact which is formally ignored or as part of a situation in which Lebanon has two governments. There is no question that Hizballah represents the Shi'a on two counts only: It is the protector of all the gains that the Shi'a have made from 1975 until now, and the Shi'a are determined to maintain these gains. Two, there is no question that when it comes to Hizballah vs. Israel, the Shi'a community will back Hizballah. But Hizballah, in my opinion, has lost a lot of prestige in Lebanon--and in the Arab world--since the summer of 2006, due to its war with Israel as well as later events in which there have been clashes between communities.

As a result, everybody in Lebanon now views Hizballah as a Shi'a militia interested only in protecting Shi'a and Iranian interests. They no longer see Hizballah as "The Liberating Movement." They are not liberating anything. An attempt by Hizballah to bring down an elected and representative Sunni prime minister is not accepted anywhere in the Sunni world. Statements have also been made by well-known Shi'as who violently disagree with Hizballah.
Hizballah, however, can wait. Seventeen years from now they will double in numbers, whereas the other Lebanese communities will not. But I think that the decision is not entirely for Hizballah to make. Iran and Syria are also involved in it. Syria in particular has less patience, since it wants to undermine Lebanon's current government to get rid of the possibility that an international tribunal will try Syrian leaders for assassinations in Lebanon. But I continue to say that the decision is really in the hands of Hizballah.

Dr. Omri Nir: The strengthening Shi'a community in Lebanon is not merely a matter of political mood or tactics, but also reflects the country's real situation. Given the demographic shift, I believe this is a kind of slow social and political revolution, which will eventually make the Shi'a the leading community in Lebanon. Neither the West or Israel is likely to have any influence on this process, though the Syrians could. Equally, it does not seem likely that there will be a serious alternative Shi'a leadership to Hizballah in the near future.

Prof. Barry Rubin: I hope, though, that no one underestimates the forces opposed to Hizballah within Lebanon. Clearly, the government coalition was not deterred by assassinations or other attacks, and the fact is that this side could well represent 60 to 65 percent of the population. They are not going to give up and may well be able to resist a Hizballah takeover or letting that group have veto power. This will be especially true if the Lebanon government gets a sufficient amount of external help, which, after all, would only balance out the external help Hizballah is getting from Iran and Syria.

Lee Smith: A majority in Lebanon has stood up to Hizballah and seems willing to do so even at the risk of civil war.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Again, I want to stress the importance of not considering a Hizballah takeover to be inevitable. Here are some mistakes made by Hizballah:
First, it threw away the chance to build an alliance with the Sunnis. By siding with the Syrian army's continued presence and being a client of Damascus--at a time when Syria was almost certainly involved in killing Rafiq Hariri, the most important Lebanese Sunni leader--Hizballah put itself up as an enemy of the Sunnis. Discarding the possibility of a Muslim front and pushing the Sunnis, most Christians, and Druze together made it far harder for Hizballah to manifest power over a Lebanese government.

Second, the 2006 war against Israel is less popular in Lebanon--at whose cost it was fought--than anywhere else in the Arabic-speaking world. There are deep and bitter resentments, enhanced by Hizballah's lack of follow-through regarding the reconstruction program. Another war with Israel is not going to promote Hizballah's domestic agenda.

Third is Hizballah's repeated showing of more loyalty to Syria and Iran than to Lebanon. For example, Hizballah did not walk out of the Lebanese government in order to demand better living standards for the Shi'a or more state investment in their neighborhoods but rather to kill the tribunal on Syria. While it might not be primarily an Islamist revolutionary movement, it also does not act as a Lebanese patriotic one. Hizballah acts as a Shi'a communal movement that is highly responsive to the interests of Damascus and Tehran.

Finally, after a long effort coupled with many threats, Hizballah did not succeed in expanding its power over the government. In other words, while Hizballah might do better in the future, its strategy and tactics have not been brilliantly successful.

Dr. Paul A. Jureidini: This brings us to a "wild card" development that greatly worries me. As a result of Hizballah's efforts to bring down the government, many jihadists and terrorists have been infiltrating Lebanon; not only the Nahr al-Barad clash, but also in Beirut, Sidon, and the north. All these are coming in with the supposed support of NGOs and money from the Gulf. The Sunnis, as we all know, never had a militia. What worries me is that if this threat continues, these jihadists may take the street away from Hariri and Siniora. I'm sure Hizballah is aware of this. That is why I say that the key is in their hands. Either they find a way to stop undermining the government or have two governments, which I really think is the beginning of partition.

Dr. Omri Nir: Regarding the situation in Shi'a politics, there are some new opposition voices to Hizballah. But these rivals don't have mass popular support. The only potential alternative is AMAL, which seems will continue to be weak in the short term. Still, AMAL controls 15 seats in the Lebanese parliament while Hizballah controls only 14. In south Lebanon, AMAL controls 84 village councils while Hizballah controls 87, which isn't much more.

The question is, what is preventing AMAL's leader Nabih Berri from being the alternative? There are reasons for such. The current political crisis is actually helping Hizballah. It prevented the possibility of the government, which had traditionally identified with AMAL, from leading a reconstruction effort, and thus left all projects to Hizballah and its Iranian funding. In contrast, Hizballah is the second largest employer in Lebanon after the government. More than 35,000 families receive salaries directly from Hizballah.

The other reason is that Berri has taken on a role as a mediator among factions, a situation that Hizballah accepts as benefiting itself. This is both his power and his weakness.
Dr. Jonathan Spyer: Israel's immediate concerns vis-a-vis Lebanon focus on what it considers excessively limited and partial implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war, with regard to preventing arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanon border and strengthening the mandate of UNIFIL to enable it to take an active role in preventing Hizballah from rearming in the south.

It is now generally accepted that large-scale smuggling of arms from Syria to Hizballah has taken place since the ceasefire. A UN assessment team submitted its report to the Security Council to this effect. The Lebanese army, according to this report, lacks the experience, equipment, and unity necessary. And UNIFIL has failed even to deploy on this border. Thus, Hizballah has been rearmed contrary to the UNIFIL mandate.

There is also considerable evidence that Hizballah has largely rebuilt its military infrastructure from the damage suffered in the war, despite the presence of 8,800 UNIFIL and 12,000 Lebanese army forces ostensibly to prevent this. Israel wants to see UNIFIL deploy on the Lebanese-Syrian border and acquire rights to raid and inspect urban areas in the south--with a mandate under Chapter 6 instead of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter--enabling UNIFIL to engage Hizballah more forcefully. Whether or not this is feasible, without this happening, we can expect more crises and cross-border attacks in future.

Israel views events in Lebanon through the prism of its larger regional threat assessment, which sees Iran and its clients as the main regional threat. Lebanon, from the Israeli standpoint, is one of a number of regional theaters in which Iran and its clients are seeking to increase their power, with the threat of violence against Israel growing as their strength grows. Israeli officials consider that none of the actors in this Iranian-led alliance want to initiate an immediate conflict with Israel. But this alliance has a strategic goal of opposition to Israel's existence, and the building of its strength in Lebanon is seen as a part of this stage in the long war and strategy. With Hizballah rearmed, it is therefore possible that renewed conflict is only a matter of time.

Regarding UNIFIL, it seems that its forces have accepted an extremely limited role, and a cynic could describe them as under the protection of Hizballah to an extent. It is not a question of them collapsing, but of them not doing anything. An Italian official told us that the UNIFIL forces were engaged in a number of laudable activities such as distributing toys to children, but when it came to Hizballah, he was very open: "We don't have the political will in Italy to have body bags come home."
If it comes to war again, the possibility of a deeper Israeli incursion is realistic. That means the possibility of Israel clashing with Syrian forces is very real.
Lee Smith: There is another problem with UNIFIL. If it proves ineffective, it will increase Syria's belief that the UN resolutions that pushed its army out of Lebanon and mandated an investigation of alleged Syrian terrorist attacks inside Lebanon can be disregarded. And European fear of having their forces in UNIFIL come under attack could also undermine European resolve regarding Middle East issues. This is a very dangerous situation.

Turning to U.S. policy, Lebanon is an extremely important example of how we can help a Middle East state behave like a state. A parallel--or contrast--should be drawn between the Lebanese government and the failed Fatah rule, through the Palestinian Authority, over Gaza.

Note the difference between the Lebanese government's performance now and what happened there in the 1970s. At that time, the Sunnis would not act against radical forces but rather took for granted that these groups and ideologies had to be treated as allies. In dealing with the Fatah al-Islam group, today, however, a Sunni-led government in Lebanon--with the backing of the Gulf States and with general approval of Egyptians and Jordanians--went into the camps and took on a Palestinian militant group.

Prof. Barry Rubin: There may not be any country in the world where external forces play such a major role as in Lebanon. My view is that Syria's number one priority is to get rid of the tribunal, and the number two priority is to regain control of Lebanon. We can discuss this in strategic, historic, and ideological terms, but we shouldn't forget economic terms. The asset of Lebanon is what has made up for failed Syrian policy to develop a workable economy.

Therefore, if Syria wants to get control of Lebanon, what strategies does it use? Syrian has many instruments in Lebanon, including Hizballah, Aoun, and a number of veteran politicians. There are also assets for violent actions including Hizballah, the Syrian National Party, Fatah al-Islam, and Syrian intelligence itself.

The approach has been to say to the Lebanese: "As long as Syria is not playing a principle role in Lebanon, you will know no peace; assassinations and acts of terror will show you that only under Syria's wing can you have quiet." In political terms, they have really pushed forward in support of Hizballah, and that may have been a major mistake. Perhaps they should have put more emphasis on traditional mainstream politicians they could control. After all, the president of Lebanon is a pro-Syrian politician. If they had played it that way, they could say to the Lebanese, "Look, we're not going to bring Shi'a control or an Islamist state that will threaten your way of life or communal interests." Instead, they have become entangled with a revolutionary movement belonging to one particular community. Yes there is Aoun, yes there are the old Sunni politicians, but they have really pinned their strategy on one sector.

For Syria, as for Hizballah, fighting Israel and taking over Lebanon can be very contradictory strategies. How much emphasis does Syria want to put on turning Lebanon into a point of military pressure against Israel? Here we have this very interesting series of developments on the Syrian diplomatic front. Using a diplomatic instrument, the Syrian regime goes to Europeans and the United States, telling them, "We will talk about getting the Golan Heights back but if you really want to buy us off, if you don't want another war with Israel or our making trouble for you in Iraq or instability in Lebanon, then give us the primary roles of Lebanon and in exchange get rid of the tribunal. Let us come back into Lebanon and become the hegemonic power, and then we can do things for you in other areas."

U.S. policy for the present has basically rejected that, but people are playing with the engagement idea. If there is a Democratic president in 2009 who wants to try that, we will see what happens. But I don't think the United States is going to hand Lebanon over to Syria. That is why I think talks with Syria would ultimately break down. The Syrians went to the Saudis and demanded too much in Lebanon, and the Saudis would not accept it. Then they went to the Europeans. In some cases, there are hints that they would accept such a deal though ultimately I don't think anything like that would happen.

So Syria is playing on violence, diplomacy, and internal Lebanese politics to promote its hegemony there.

In political terms, Iran is less important then Syria. The Iranian role in helping Hizballah through arms and money may be more important, but Iranian interests are more general regarding Lebanon itself. Sure they want a strong Hizballah to hit Israel, partly as a threat if anyone hits their nuclear program. We should never forget that Mr. Nasrallah is the official representative of Iran's supreme guide in Lebanon. But what does Iran want Hizballah to do in Lebanon?

Finally, in discussing external factors, it is absolutely essential to ask what sort of international support the Lebanese government has. Are the Europeans, is the U.S., going to stand with Lebanon to counter Iranian and Syrian influence?

The Lebanese government is the most reliable U.S. ally in the Arab world. Despite what they say, the Egyptians and Saudis are not so willing to stand up to Iranian influence. But by the nature of their situation, the Lebanese government doesn't have a choice. It is on the front lines, and it has to combat them in order to survive. The importance of the Lebanese government from a U.S. policy point of view is extremely important and, I think, much unappreciated.

Dr. Paul A. Jureidini: Let me begin by saying there is a distinct difference between Hizballah and AMAL. As far as the Shi'a community as a whole, they look at Hizballah as a religious link with Iran. It has that kind of legitimacy. AMAL is seen basically as purely a Syrian instrument and nothing more. There is no doubt that Nabih Berri has been able to use his position to get many Shi'a employed in the government, in big business. There isn't a single hotel, airline, or casino, and whatnot that have not been forced to hire Shi'a employees. But the Shi'a community as a whole has no great respect for Nabih Berri.

In contrast, the Syrians have full trust in Nabih Berri, because he is their man. They created him, they continue to support him, they are the architects of the electoral alliance between AMAL and Hizballah that allowed Nabih Berri to get the number of votes that he got. It was imposed on Hizballah. The Syrians, on the other hand, do not trust Hizballah, because they see its loyalty to being with Iran much more than Syria.

As for the Lebanese army, it held together in recent years, because everybody in Lebanon wanted it to. The minute a Lebanese party like Hizballah decides it doesn't care about whether the Lebanese army unravels, the Lebanese army will unravel. It's as simple as that.

The army does not have the training or equipment to control the border and stop arms smuggling. They are stretched between Nahr al-Barad, the south, and keeping order in Beirut. There is no way the Lebanese army is going to take on Hizballah in order to disarm them, because aside from the lack of political will to do so, it would lose. The Lebanese army doesn't know how to fight insurgency. It took them a whole month to get rid of 300 jihadists in Nahr al-Barad. It is not going to be able to go down into the strongholds of Hizballah.

As far as Israel and Hizballah, I am very convinced that Israel cannot beat Hizballah without first taking on Syria. Period. Israel can go all the way to Beirut and push back Hizballah, and Hizballah will fall back and fall back and end up in the Christian areas with nobody being able to stop them. But ultimately, Israel has to withdraw. And ultimately, Hizballah will come back. The only way to change the equation in Lebanon is to change the equation in Syria. Without that, any war with Hizballah is a losing war as far as I am concerned. It produces temporary results, but gets you nowhere.

Now everybody is convinced that if there will be a coup in Syria it is going to be the Sunni Islamists who take over. Well, maybe. But I am convinced that if there is a successful coup in Syria, it would lead to a civil war in the country between Alawites and Sunnis, which could last ten to 20 years. And it may give the region time to organize some peace while this is going on. But I see no way that anybody can win in Lebanon without first attacking Syria, one way or the other. And I don't see the Syrians changing. As far as I am concerned, as long as George W. Bush is in the White House, and as long as there are 160,000 soldiers in Iraq, the Syrians will feel threatened. So they will continue the game they play.

I do not believe that Iran has the same interests in Lebanon that Syria has. And I am sure the last thing the Iranians want at this stage is for Hizballah to engage Israel in another war, because they would prefer to save this card for a situation in which Israel attacked the nuclear sites in Iran. Then, I believe, Hizballah will start launching its missiles at Israel. And I don't think the Iranians want a wasted war again, as last summer's war was from their standpoint.

I very much appreciate the efforts of the U.S. government to back the Lebanese government, and it certainly helps a great deal. But in the end, I don't think the United States has a policy as to whom and how there might be a president of Lebanon who is not pro-Syrian. We are hoping somehow that the March 14 alliance can somehow put it together and come up with something, and I think the March 14 alliance is sending us a lot of hot air on that issue because they keep telling us, "Wait until mid-November, and by then the March 8 alliance will give in and we will elect the person we want." I don't see Hizballah giving in. Why should they give in?

Dr. Omri Nir: I believe that right now most Shi'as see Hizballah as the best platform to promote their social and political ambitions. We saw that in a very short period of time in the mid-1970s, many Shi'as moved from supporting Communists to supporting AMAL, which had strong Shi'a religious elements and a very Lebanese orientation; and within a few more years, most of them had moved on to support Hizballah, which ideologically is the opposite of the Communist party.

Hizballah had to water down its Islamist ideology from where it was at the beginning, in the mid-1980s. There is hardly a difference between Hizballah's official statement to the Lebanese public and the AMAL ideology, which hasn't changed since the mid-1970s on domestic issues, internal Palestinian issues, its attitude toward Israel, and on many other points. Hizballah moved toward "Lebanonism" and adopted most of AMAL's ideology while most of the Shi'a public moved from AMAL to Hizballah.

Prof. Rubin said that Lebanon is perhaps the state that has been most interrupted by international forces in modern history. There is a reason for that. The political balance brings Lebanon to a situation in which the central authority has to be weak. Otherwise, there will not be a balance. And because it is so weak, it is actually inviting outside intervention.

The process in which the Shi'as will become the hegemonic group in Lebanese society and politics is unavoidable. And in light of this assumption, the only way that the West, the United States, and Israel can assert a certain degree of control over this natural process is through Syria. The paradox here for the Americans, as Mr. Smith said, is that some day, the regime in Syria will become Sunni. Thus, you are supposed to put your money on a regime that at some point in the future will no longer exist. Lebanon is also a battlefield in this struggle between the Iranian challenge and American hegemony.

In addition, it is involved in the greater regional struggle between Sunni and Shi'a Islam. And again, the United States is faced with a dilemma here. If it supports the Sunnis, it has to deal with the fact that most Islamist groups in the region are Sunni; and if it backs the Shi'a, this is taking the side of Iran. So it is not a choice between good and bad, but rather a choice between bad, very bad, and very, very bad.

Lee Smith: That is an interesting way to end it, between bad and very bad, but I wanted to comment on a couple of things in Dr. Nir's presentation. Lebanon is important to Syria, it is important to Saudi Arabia, it is important to Iran, but it is not any of those places. This is why Lebanon is a somewhat hopeful place in the region, although as Dr. Spyer said, it is a theater for a very dangerous war. One of the things we saw is that the United States began to understand that although it was trying to balance different interests, it finally came to the realization that the Iranians were fighting very hard throughout the region.

Prof. Barry Rubin: I think the central point in this discussion has emerged. What we ought to focus on is, whether or not the fall of the current government and the replacement by the hegemony of Hizballah, however tight or loose, take place. I'm not convinced it is going to happen. I'm not convinced their victory is inevitable. But clearly this is the most important issue and an essential one for policymakers to focus on, because if Hizballah were to become the main factor in the government of Lebanon, this would be a tremendous triumph for radical forces, Iran, Syria, and the Islamists.

Dr. Paul A. Jureidini: Barry, I agree with you. I don't think Hizballah is going to become the dominant force in the next year, or even the next three or four years. There is no question that if Hizballah wanted to take Beirut, it could do so tomorrow. Sixty percent of the Lebanese army is Shi'a, half of them owe allegiance to Hizballah, and moreover it has its own forces, of course. But trying to seize power and holding it means civil war with the Sunnis, Christians, and Druze united on the other side. Even Michel Aoun would have to abandon Hizballah.

With Hizballah representing Shi'a interests in Lebanon, it is attempting to have a stronger voice in Lebanese affairs, to consolidate the gains they have made, and to make sure they are enshrined in a new understanding. I think the Shi'a would like a new political formula for Lebanon: one-third Shi'a, one-third Sunni-Druze, and one-third Christian. I think Syria would love to come back and play a role. But Syria knows that 90 percent of the Lebanese, including the Shi'a, don't want them physically back in Lebanon.

My concern is basically that when November arrives, there is no way to get out of that crisis. I worry about the threat of having two governments. That to me is the beginning of partition. I very much worry about the emergence of private security services all over Beirut and other Christian places. That is the beginning of militias. There is also the arrival of jihadists from all over the Arab world. I am beginning to worry that maybe one tactic for Syria and Hizballah is to create partition with the army acting as a neutral force, preventing them from fighting each other. That is where I see we are going.

Lee Smith: To say a few quick things on the Shi'a role in Lebanon, Dr. Nir says that he believes it is inevitable that at a certain point the Shi'a will constitute the majority and dictate the future direction of Lebanon. That is not the way the Lebanese system works. I don't think that the Lebanese will permit that to happen. Certainly it is prevented by the constitution. I don't see that happening, because the rest of Lebanese society wouldn't permit it.

Dr. Jureidini says that he believes what the majority of the Shi'a want is for their rights to be enshrined in Lebanese politics and Lebanese society, as Hizballah and AMAL have helped do in the last 20 years. I don't know that is what a majority of the Shi'a want. I think Hizballah just wants to block the tribunal. They want veto power.

*PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
Dr. Paul A. Jureidini is a consultant to a number of corporations and private business enterprises. He is also director and senior associate of Jureidini & McLaurin. From 1975 to 1995, Dr. Jureidini served as Vice President at Abbott Associates. From 1961 to 1975, he was at the American Institutes for Research, where he filled the positions of director of the Middle East Center in the Center for Research in Social Systems as well as chief of the Middle East/Africa Branch in the Cultural Information Analysis Center. In addition to articles and research studies, Dr. Jureidini has authored seven books on the Middle East and has been a substantial contributor to six others.

Dr. Omri Nir is a lecturer at Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University, and Ben- Gurion University of the Negev. His fields of expertise are Lebanese politics, Lebanese Shi'as, and Shi'as in the Arab world. Among his publications, he has written "The Shi'ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November 2004). Forthcoming publications include "Shi'ite Politics in Lebanon: Between Arabism, Shi'ism and Lebanonism", and a political biography of Nabih Berri.

Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research for International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. He is editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal and of Turkish Studies journal. His books include The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan), Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography, and The Tragedy of the Middle East. He has been a Fulbright and a Council on Foreign Relations/National Endowment for the Humanities International Affairs Fellow; a U.S. Institute of Peace, Harry Guggenheim Foundation, and Leonard Davis Center grantee; a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute, and Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Lee Smith is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC and a journalist who contributes to a number of different publications on Arab and Islamic affairs, including The New York Times, Slate.com, The Boston Globe and Wired. Smith, who has been based in the Middle East most of the last six years, covered Israel's war against Hezbollah last summer and has extensive first-hand knowledge of the Lebanese political arena, having lived there for two years. Smith's book on the Middle East, A Wilderness of Tigers: Politics, Society, Culture and the Clash of Middle Eastern Civilizations, is forthcoming from Doubleday in the Fall of 2008.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel. He is a former adviser on international affairs at the Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructures, and a former official of the Israeli Government Press Office. His commentary and analysis on Mid-East affairs has been published widely in a variety of journals, including The Guardian, Haaretz, the Jerusalem Post, and other publications.

Third time unlucky
By: Dyab Abou Jahjah
Al-Ahram Weekly
After Israel and FAI failed, the scheme to disarm Hizbullah is likely to fail again, figures Dyab Abou Jahjah
After the murder of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafiq El-Hariri, a process that was already on track picked up steam: the desire to disarm Hizbullah. Since then the whole political scene in Lebanon can be read and understood in the light of this process, and the political and sometimes military steps undertaken by the various actors on the ground are acting out one of two scenarios: either disarming the resistance or preserving and strengthening it.

In its political debut after the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, the "party of god" made an electoral pact with the Future movement of Hariri and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Walid Jumblat aimed at thwarting the American/ Israeli agenda of disarming Hizbullah, and it provided these two parties in exchange with a clear electoral victory and a majority in parliament. Hizbullah and its other Shia ally the Amal movement also joined the Siniora government that was the result of these elections as a junior partner in the coalition. But with the wave of political assassinations targeting figures of the 14 March anti-Syrian coalition the alliance that came to be known as the quadruple alliance weakened and eventually collapsed.

The Americans were not going to let their Lebanese allies strike a deal with one of their arch- enemies. They want Lebanon in their sphere of influence in an uncontested way and want to get rid of Hizbullah so that Israel can again have the upper hand and to avoid the scenario of a Hizbullah rocket attack against Israel in case the US were to strike Iran.

The American agenda can also be placed within the wider polarisation in the region between two blocs, the pro-American "moderate" bloc and the pro-resistance bloc. Jordan's King Abdullah has assisted the US by deepening the divide within the resistance bloc itself on sectarian grounds and helping shift the perception of the enemy of the Arab people from Israel to Iran. These theories fuelled by the reality of sectarian strife in occupied Iraq and the reality of a negative Iranian role there have provided the necessary material for the Saudi-controlled Arab media to promote the American/Jordanian policies.

This has resulted in a widening polarisation between the pro-American 14 March coalition and the Lebanese opposition and an alliance between Hizbullah and Amal and their nationalist and leftists small allies on the one hand and the National Free Current of Michel Aoun that renegated from the 14 March coalition and joined the opposition after an understanding memorandum was signed between it and Hizbullah marking the beginning of a new political era in Lebanon. This strengthened opposition that includes the largest Christian party is now in a position to claim that it represents the majority of the Lebanese people.

The Lebanese government of Siniora cannot enforce the American agenda and disarm Hizbullah or lead the country into a civil war by trying to. It is still bound by its declaration drafted within the context of the quadruple alliance and cannot change it without resigning and forming a new government. But this would necessitate the signature of the president of the republic, General Emile Lahoud, who will not give that signature to a government that doesn't include his allies in the opposition. So without a president who is loyal to the 14 March coalition, the goal of disarming Hizbullah cannot be obtained.

This is the context in which we have to read the forthcoming presidential elections today. If the 14 March coalition succeeds in electing a president from within its own ranks and loyal to its agenda and subsequently to the American agenda, this will lead to steps aiming at disarming Hizbullah and will obviously force the opposition and the resistance into a desperate fight in defence of its existence and arms. The potential of civil war in such a situation is not to be underestimated.

Nevertheless, the Americans and their regional allies have also been pursuing other strategies to obtain their aim of destroying the Lebanese resistance. The war of July/August 2006 was a direct attempt to disarm Hizbullah by military force and we all know how that ended. Another attempt was the introduction into Lebanon of Sunni Salafi jihadis who were supposed to clash with the Shia Hizbullah, dragging it into a sectarian civil war and away from its role of facing Israel and weakening it militarily, but also making it lose its wider Arab credentials.

After the failure of the Israeli aggression, the Lebanese opposition felt the necessity to tackle a government that had elements within its ranks that were compliant with the US agenda. And while the opposition succeeded in paralysing the government and stopping it from pursuing its agenda, the sectarian tension and the fear of a Sunni-Shia clash kept the government alive and the options of the opposition limited. The Saudi role in throwing a life line for this government was crucial in its survival.

But the plans of the American and some Arab secret services to create a clash between Sunni jihadis and Hizbullah also did not go as desired. The group known as Fatah Al-Islam (FAI) started pursuing its own agenda instead of complying with that of their financers. It developed its own version of Al-Qaeda and had the illusion of creating an Islamic mini-state in the north of Lebanon where the Salafi movement is widely represented. When the money that was regularly being transferred to it through the Hariri-owned Mediterranean Bank stopped, they robbed the bank and clashed with the police. Stunned by the treason of its former allies and financiers who were now unleashing the police on their heals and surrounding and killing its cell members in Tripoli, FAI unleashed an attack on the Lebanese army, slaughtering several soldiers and officers. This led to the tragic Nahr Al-Bared siege.

The Lebanese army defeated FAI in a very intelligent and efficient manner. It took a lot of time but the results cannot be contested. The whole Lebanese people were united behind the army and that is why it kept its unity and fought till the end and prevailed. However a few Lebanese who belong to the Salafi might see in this a reason to unleash vindictive attacks against the state and the army reminiscent of Waco, Texas leading Timothy McVeigh to execute the Oklahoma City bombing. Many voices are demanding a full investigation to know the reality of what happened and who was involved in financing and supporting Fatah Al-Islam.

All attempts to disarm Hizbullah have failed till now and the only possibility remaining is the election of a pro-American president who will force the army to execute that mission. But this is unlikely to happen, first of all because the opposition will not provide the two-thirds majority required by the constitution to elect a new president and will not recognise a president elected without this requirement being met. So the only president that can govern is a president elected after a consensus between the opposition and the 14 March. The only way forward in Lebanon is to agree on the name of a president but this means that the 14 March needs an American and a Saudi green light.

The other scenario is that the majority will elect a president without the two-third of deputies present which will make that president unconstitutional and lead the current president to declare a state of emergency and form another government. In such a scenario division in the country and even in the army seems inevitable and civil war is almost a sure outcome.
The remaining scenario is that no president is elected and that the current government will claim the presidential powers. This is also very unlikely since President Lahoud has made it clear that he will not deliver power to this government that he considers unconstitutional after the resignation of the opposition ministers from its rank. So the scenario of two governments and a division in this case is also present.
Lebanon is heading towards a show down, between the American project and the project of Arab resistance. The only way to avoid a clash that can escalate into a war is to elect a consensus president. All other scenarios will lead to disaster.
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