LCCC ENGLISH NEWS BULLETIN
September 27/06
Biblical Reading For Today
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 8,19-21.
Then his mother and his brothers came to him but were unable to join him because of the crowd. He was told, "Your mother and your brothers are standing outside and they wish to see you." He said to them in reply, "My mother and my brothers are those who hear the word of God and act on it."
New Opinion
Lebanon: The risks of intervention-ISN - Zurich,Switzerland
Peretz on Syria: Threats won't be ignored-Ynetnews
Latest New from the Daily Star for September 27/06
Israelis settle in for long stay in village of Ghajar
Syria, Lebanon praise latest UN report into Hariri killing
Israel says 'snags' may delay withdrawal a few more days
Jezzini feud is too much for Cabinet - health minister
Lahoud spreads sour grapes as Francophone meet approaches
Former PMs offer formula for Hizbullah to disarmFor want of a map: how not to track down a shopkeeper in the Bekaa
Bankers warn government to get its act together soon
Approach of winter presents fresh hurdles for de-mining
Hospital owners threaten strike over NSSF billsCaptains of American industry say they want to help Lebanon rebuild after war
A cautious report, but lots between the lines -By William Harris
Latest New from Miscellaneous sources for September 27/06
U.N. Official: Lebanese-Israeli Talks on Withdrawal from South 'Inconclusive'Naharnet
Lahoud Boycotts Francophonie Summit, Saniora Sends Envoy-Naharnet
U.N.: a Million Unexploded Cluster Bombs Could be in the South-NaharnetForces in Lebanon have 'robust' mandate, Rice says-International Herald Tribune
Hizbullah moving rockets to Palestinian camps-Ynetnews
UN Inquiry Into Death of Lebanon's Ex-Premier Focuses on Killers-New York Times
Rice Evokes Possible New Sanctions Against Syria for DestabilizingNaharnet
Israeli army delays full withdrawal from Lebanon-People's Daily Online
IDF says 90% of S. Lebanon in hands of UN, Lebanese army-Ha'aretz
Lebanese Forces and Druze say no to Hezbollah's demands-AsiaNews.it
New York Times Mangles Hezbollah and Sheba Farms IssueCommittee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in AmericaRussia's upper chamber approves sending sappers to Lebanon-RIA Novosti
UN forces face terror threat in LebanonKuwait Times
A lasting quiet in south Lebanon could bring a new orderBoston Herald
UN experts say a million unexploded cluster bombs could be in south LebanonInternational Herald Tribune
Syria frees critics of its Lebanon strategy-Reuters
Italy's lower chamber to vote on Lebanon peacekeeping mission-International Herald Tribune
Lebanon, Syria welcome UN commission's report on Hariri's crime-International Herald Tribune
A cautious report, but lots between the lines
By William Harris
Commentary by
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
In his brilliant book "April Blood: Florence and the Plot Against the Medici," the Renaissance historian Lauro Martines dissects the April 1478 murder plot against Lorenzo de Medici and his brother Guillermo, which involved the rival Florentine Pazzi family and implicated Pope Sixtus IV and the King of Naples.
In contrast to the fate of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Lorenzo survived the assassination attempt. However, events later forced him to make a humiliating visit and obeisance to the pope who had encouraged his would-be killers. In today's Lebanon, only the determination of the international community expressed in the continuing progress of the United Nations inquiry into Hariri's murder stands between Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and similar humiliation, if he is forced to reconcile himself with Hariri's assassins.
The third interim report of the UN commission's chief investigator, Serge Brammertz, released on Monday, continues the cautious, highly professional approach characteristic of his two earlier reports. He has already indicated reluctance to identify prime suspects or provide other information that might prejudice inquiry activities before finalization of the prosecution case for an international tribunal. Nonetheless, the latest interim report demonstrates significant further consolidation of evidence since the report of last June, despite the recent fighting in Lebanon.
First, the inquiry firms up the scenario of an elaborate bombing team, including multiple sub-contractors. It refers to "a complex network of telecommunications traffic between a large number of relevant individuals," as well as "direct and indirect linkages between significant individuals in disparate groups." The example of the suspension of contacts among members of the "alleged bombing team" while Hariri made an impromptu cafe stop en route to his rendezvous with death gives a telling glimpse of the thoroughness of the investigation. Similarly, "knowledge of the activities of the 6 SIM card holders ... alleged to have been part of the bombing team ... has become clearer and more detailed." Obviously, this is not a depiction of a small Islamist cell, operating alone.
Second, the UN commission has gathered more data on individuals who apparently had "substantive information in varying degrees of detail about the attack prior to its execution." Together with the reference to a number of people who "were informed of some aspect of the attack," this gives a clear impression of a significant group of plotters that can hardly have been independent of the Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus. Certainly the commission's concern with "the political environment" of the Hariri assassination, including UN Security Council Resolution 1559, the 2005 Lebanese parliamentary elections, and the Al-Madina bank scandal, suggests that investigators are principally thinking in such terms.
Third, the report notes tangible progress in exploring six other "targeted attacks" in 2004-2005, seen by many as integrally linked to the Hariri case, from the attempted murder of Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh to the killing of An-Nahar publisher Gebran Tueni. "One individual using multiple [telephone] numbers has been preliminarily linked ... to a number of the attacks," and "four other people have been linked to this person in some of those attacks." The commission is now becoming confident that these attacks "were not commissioned and executed by ... unconnected persons." Again, coordinated assaults point to a substantial group likely to involve the apparatus of a state, most likely, given Lebanon's context, Syrian-commanded security elements.
Fourth, as in the June 2006 report, the commission does not name any state or organization apart from Syria, but takes care not to accuse the latter. Brammertz still wants more evidence from the Syrians, and does not wish to give Damascus excuses not to comply. The chief investigator describes "generally satisfactory" cooperation in the latest reporting period, but indicates that senior Syrians only behave appropriately when their feet are put to the fire. He reiterates verbatim his steely remarks in the June report: "The Syrian Arab Republic is required to cooperate fully" under the coercive provisions of "Chapter VII of the UN Charter."
The commission also plainly suspects Syrian officials of evasion: "In terms of the qualitative cooperation of Syrian officials being interviewed, the Commission ... finds it necessary to undertake corroborative interviews ... the Commission has found the level of cooperation to be variable."
Otherwise, the report makes several tantalizingly cryptic observations. Perhaps significantly, it refers to "the properties and impacts of various controlled explosions," presumably conducted under commission auspices, for which there was a need for Syrian "documentation." It is difficult to interpret the phrasing as other than a requirement for data on Syrian explosives and associated equipment. This could have damning implications, given the nature of the crime.
As regards the person who "most likely" detonated the presumed truck bomb, the report mentions a tooth with "a feature rarely seen among people from Lebanon." Brammertz avoids referring to a suicide bomber, implying that the truck driver may not have died voluntarily. He even inserts "a new hypothesis" about "an aerial delivery means as a method of causing the explosion." The estimated quantity of explosives is revised upwards toward 1,800 kilograms, though the final assessment of the explosives capacity awaits a determination of the height at which the detonation took place. Whatever the amount of explosives, it is obvious from the report that Hariri was killed in a large, sophisticated conspiracy.
Once again, the main track of the Hariri inquiry in the UN commission's fifth interim report is the same as in preceding reports issued since June 2005 - two by former chief investigator Detlev Mehlis and two by Brammertz. Once again, there is no suggestion that the four senior Lebanese security officials arrested in August 2005 for involvement in the assassination should not continue to languish in prison, and the old Syrian-Lebanese security machine remains the chief object of interest.
The procession of unanimous Security Council resolutions associated with the Hariri inquiry means the credibility of the international community is committed to the uncovering and punishment of the murderers. Events are still headed toward the "tribunal of an international character" and a probable political earthquake in the Levant. Fouad Siniora, hopefully, will need not bow like Lorenzo de Medici.
**William Harris, a professor of politics at the University of Otago, New Zealand, is author of "The Levant: A Fractured Mosaic" (Markus Wiener, 2005), which won a Choice Magazine Outstanding Academic Title award, and "The New Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge" (Markus Wiener, 2005). He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
Lebanon: The risks of intervention
The conflict between Israel and Hizbollah has garnered enough respect for the latter that some believe the relationship between militant group and UNIFIL should be closely watched.
Open Source Commentary by Peter K Forster for ISN Security Watch (25/09/06)
As a fragile cease-fire holds in Lebanon, the predominant issues confounding peace are Hizbollah’s increased prestige and its relationship with the newly reconstituted UNIFIL. The current conflict has strengthened the militant group's role as a quasi-state actor, its integration into Lebanese society, and its increasing popularity in the greater Middle East. These successes raise greater concerns regarding regional and potentially international security.
Despite a pledge to liberate Palestinian lands, a refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and a willingness to use terrorism to achieve its goals, Hizbollah has gained a modicum of international recognition that implicitly condones its principles thus increasing its viability as a quasi-state. The organization is a paradox that illustrates the ambiguity surrounding terrorism in the international system. Although listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel, it is not so designated by the European Union, which is positively disposed to its socio-economic development achievements. Its representation in the Lebanese government establishes it as a political party, further enhancing its legitimacy. In the wake of the 2006 conflict, much of the Arab and Shi’a community view it as a heroic and lawful resistance movement. Furthermore, Hizbollah’s military capability is a further characteristic attributed to a state.
Although supported by Iran and Syria, Hizbollah operates outside of the relationship with sponsoring states and pursues independent interests. A pseudo-credible political actor in its own right, Hizbollah has a legitimate constituency among the south Lebanese population. Unlike the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s and early 1980s, Hizbollah is the “political party” of Lebanon’s Shi’a population. Thus, with its enhanced public stature following its “divine victory” over Israel, its participation in Lebanese politics and its ability to promote a radical agenda will increase. How it leverages its new legitimacy remains to be seen but its anti-Semitic policies do not auger well for a lasting peace.
It is unlikely that Hizbollah is willing to abrogate its increased status to the current Lebanese government, its Syrian or Iranian benefactors, or an international force. Most critical to a sustainable ceasefire's ultimate longevity is Hizbollah’s willingness to disarm and pursue a political agenda. This assumption is fraught with disillusion and fallacy.
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are not prepared to disarm Hizbollah nor do they have the prerequisite capability. Moreover, the LAF does not have the will to execute such a policy. These views are supported by comments made by Mohamad Chatah, senior adviser to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. During an August interview with US-based National Public Radio, Chatah said that no armed group in the south would be tolerated but that the LAF would not perform "search and seizure" and would only confiscate "any weapons found.” The lack of government motivation may be further curtailed by Hizbollah’s influence in and support from the LAF. Finally, it is not clear that the Shi’a population of south Lebanon wants Hizbollah to disarm.
With the LAF unprepared to implement the disarmament portion of the UN resolution, the task falls to the more robust UNFIL that is being deployed. Unfortunately, such a mission must overcome a daunting history. First, there are precious few examples of successful moves to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR), which eventually will become the new UNIFIL’s mission.
Second, the record for Middle East interventions is less than stellar. Upon Egyptian President Gamal Nasir’s demand, the Sinai-deployed United Nations Emergency Force departed shortly before the Six-Day War. Although remaining after the 1978 deployment, UNIFIL proved ineffective at stopping conflict. By far the most costly in terms of human life and political capital was the Multinational Force (MNF) deployed in 1982 –83.
The planners and policymakers deploying the current force would be well advised to explore the pitfalls of the MNF deployment. In The US, NATO, and Military Burden Sharing, it is explained that local circumstances and the expansion of a project beyond its original goal dramatically influence the burden of international intervention. This affects cooperation and sustainability among multinational forces and jeopardizes the force’s neutrality. Both the MNF and the forthcoming UN force assume that the Lebanese government will exert meaningful control of territory. This did not occur in 1982 and is questionable today.
Second, the MNF, despite rules of engagement intended to maintain its neutrality, failed to do so in Lebanon’s highly sectarian population. It was drawn into the conflict and became a target.
Third, the lack of coordination among the MNF’s participants allowed national interests to corrode the collective mission. Although the PLO did leave, Israel remained for 18 years and sectarian violence intensified.
Finally, increasing casualties destroyed the MNF's sustainability, while its failure to bring peace to Lebanon resulted in the country's government approaching Syria to guarantee security and stability.
Unfortunately a similar fate may await the new UNIFIL. First, the force is confronted with the difficulty of defining objectives. Is it the mission's purpose to temporarily keep the peace by separating combatant forces? This, at best, is sustainable only as long as the UN forces remain. Or, is it the mission's goal to establish a lasting peace that can only be accomplished by disarming Hizbollah? The former commits the international community to a long-term force deployment to separate potential combatants and does not address Hizbollah’s military capacity. No effort to disarm or, at a minimum, ensure that Hizbollah does not re-arm would severely erode UN legitimacy with Israel and may be a catalyst for future conflict.
However, the latter may be even more destructive and less achievable. Any international attempt to disarm Hizbollah also will erode the perception of UN neutrality and probably bring the UN into direct conflict with Hizbollah.
Second, to what extent and under what circumstances is UNIFIL willing to accept casualties is an issue? Initial French response indicates the tolerance for casualties is quite limited.
Third, to contain Hizbollah’s capabilities, the Lebanese government must create meaningful sovereignty in the south. Failure to do so would permit the militant group to continue to act as a quasi-state and allow Iran, in particular, to alter the environment by re-supplying weapons. The Islamic Republic could also provide Hizbollah with the reconstruction dollars that would only strengthen its domestic support.
Although far from guaranteeing success, there are steps the international community can take to avoid the MNF fate. The international community needs to apply collective pressure on Syria and Iran to curtail their negative influence in Lebanon. This may include the threat of sanctions for not complying with an arms embargo.
The intervention force must retain collective objectives including robust rules of engagement. It needs to maintain its neutrality wherever possible but also make clear that its operations are UN- and Lebanese government- supported. This may be partially achieved by appealing to the population’s Lebanese nationalism rather than sectarian loyalties.
Third, the force must be prepared for long-term deployment. Under these circumstances, it may contribute to confidence building and reconstruction that ultimately combine with war weariness to create the foundation for peace. The odds for success are long but these options offer the possibility for sustainable peace.
While Hizbollah’s increased capacity to act as a state has ramifications for long-term regional stability, its success in surviving Israeli furor leaves it at a crossroads. Its growing popularity ironically could threaten al-Qaida's preeminent position as leader of the Islamic extremism. It may embolden Hizbollah to unleash a wave a terrorist attacks striking not only at Israeli but American interests. The ability to strike at interests outside of the region would undoubtedly further its reputation in some corners. Thus, what you have in Hizbollah is a religious extremist group acquiring the attributes of state and a political constituency that may ultimately legitimize its violent platform.
**Peter K Forster teaches political science at Penn State and helps coordinate the University's homeland security initiatives. He is the co-author of The US, NATO, and Military Burden Sharing (2005, ISBN: 0-415-35607-5)
UN Force in Lebanon is defined more by what it cannot do than what it can
NY Times. Israeli troops stand by as Hizballah rearms
September 26, 2006, 12:01 PM (GMT+02:00)
The United Nations force created to police southern Lebanon faces not only a threatening al Qaeda presence cheek by jowl, but endless handicaps in performing its mandated functions.
The New York Times correspondent reports: One month after a UN Security Council resolution ended a 34-day war… the international force members say “they cannot set up checkpoints, search cars, homes or businesses or detain suspects. If they see a truck transporting missiles, for example (in violation of the UN arms embargo), they cannot stop it… because under their interpretation of the Security Council resolution (1701) that deployed them, they must first be authorized to take such action by the Lebanese army.”
And whereas the Security Council allocated 15,000 troops to expanded UNIFIL, only 5,000 are deployed.
According to the NYT, the UN commanders repeat as a mantra that their job is to respect Lebanese sovereignty by supporting the Lebanese army. “They will only do what the Lebanese authorities ask.”
DEBKAfile adds: More than 40% of the Lebanese army consists of Shiites. Their loyalty goes first to Hizballah or their Shiite commanders rather than the Lebanese government. Israeli officials and commanders have their own mantra which is that there is no Hizballah activity on the ground. The last Israeli forces can therefore pull out of South Lebanon by the end of the month. DEBKAfile notes that the Olmert government continues to cover up the failure of its war objectives by polishing up its aftermath. The truth is that Hizballah activities are intense but do not figure in the reports of UNIFIL’s European contingents, which have their own agenda. This agenda has whittled down most elements of the mission assigned the UN force by Resolution 1701, which was approved in the first place to prevent Hizballah from continuing its attacks on Israel and destabilizing the area.
As for the demand to disarm Hizballah, the paper quotes local Shiites as making it clear “they will fight anybody who tries to take Hizballah’s weapons away. For the forces to remain welcome they must demonstrate they are there to protect the Lebanese from Israel – not to police the Lebanese on behalf of Israel.” DEBKAfile adds: Hizballah would not need to fight the international force. Al Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri stated in his last videotape this month that UNIFIL in Lebanon is a target for terrorist attack. Hizballah’s hands can therefore stay clean. US Intelligence Director John Negroponte reported last week that Qaeda’s expansion into Lebanon, exploiting the conflict there, is being taken seriously. The chasm between the Sunni Muslim al Qaeda and Lebanon’s Shiite Hizballah is no bar to collaboration.
However, from the Israeli side of the border, yellow-clad, Hizballah flag-waving demonstrators are photographed day by day, throwing rocks at Israeli vehicles and moving into the former locations of the destroyed Hizballah positions. DEBKAfile’s military sources report that just a month after the ceasefire went into effect, Hizballah’s arsenals are filling up again as trucks head south from central and northern Lebanon unimpeded by Israeli or international troops. Israel has still not appointed a new head of the IDF’s Northern command to replace the war commander Maj.-Gen Udi Adam who stepped down last week. As for the international force, its “robust” policing operations have more or less been relegated to the archives of the UN Security Council.
Nasrallah's popularity climbs
By HAMZA HENDAWI
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
BINT JBAIL, Lebanon -- Reem Haidar was so impressed by Hassan Nasrallah that she begged for one of the Hezbollah leader's robes as a keepsake. Last week, her dream came true; his aides delivered one to her home in Beirut. Nasrallah's popularity among Lebanese Shiites has exploded into something approaching cult status - expanding well beyond the following he had prior to Hezbollah's 34-day war with Israel. That could bolster Nasrallah's position within Lebanese politics and make it difficult for international peacekeepers to control his guerrillas if they try to reassert their position along the Israeli border.
But the adulation is also driving tensions between Hezbollah and rival political groups that see his group as a threat. These critics say Hezbollah is seeking to divert attention from Nasrallah's decision to order the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, the catalyst for a war that left nearly 1,000 people dead and much of south Lebanon in ruins. "The majority of the Lebanese people do not feel victory," Christian leader Samir Geagea told tens of thousands of his followers at a rally on Sunday. "Rather, they feel that a major catastrophe had befallen them and made their present and future uncertain." The gathering in the town of Harissa, about 15 miles north of Beirut, was their answer to a Hezbollah rally two days earlier that attracted hundreds of thousands.
Druse leader Walid Jumblatt said the blind loyalty showed to Nasrallah by his supporters reflects the group's "authoritarian" climate.
"Those who live inside an authoritarian regime lose the ability to think for themselves," Jumblatt said in a recent television interview.
Nasrallah, a fiery orator who can whip audiences into a frenzy or move them to tears, has long been among the most popular Lebanese politicians. His appeal transcends both his Shiite community and Lebanon itself. And by fighting the Israeli army last summer, Nasrallah won a following throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. In Egypt, for example, the biggest and most succulent dates, widely sold during the holy month of Ramadan that began this week, have been nicknamed "Nasrallahs." "His enemies want to take away the respect he commands by talking about idolizing him," chief Hezbollah spokesman Hussein Rahal said recently. "The love of the sayyed (an Arabic honorific) won the hearts of the people, so what can we do?"
But in Lebanon, many dispute Nasrallah's claim to victory and are unhappy about the personality cult being built around him. "This campaign to idolize Nasrallah and glorify his party is too much," added Sateh Noureddine, managing editor of the leftist Beirut daily As-Safir, who is a Shiite Muslim. "People are disappointed and some are disgusted. Many have told Nasrallah to stop it." Nasrallah's crowd skills were on display Friday when he made his first public appearance since the war broke out July 12, addressing hundreds of thousands at Beirut's bombed-out southern suburbs. He had no prepared notes and spoke in impeccable classical Arabic, breaking into the Lebanese vernacular only to deliver a jibe or make a point.
He electrified the crowd with a brief account of how he and his aides debated until the last moment whether he should appear in person, given Israel's past attempts to kill him. "My heart, soul and mind would not allow me to speak to you from afar or from a screen," he said to thunderous applause.
There is perhaps no place in Lebanon where Nasrallah's personality cult is stronger than in southern Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold that was hit the hardest by Israel during the war. Across the region's villages and towns, Nasrallah, who has led Hezbollah since 1992, stares down from thousands of portrait posters on light poles, store fronts, cars and homes. Some of the posters cast Nasrallah as a leader who monopolizes decisions, a charge often made by his critics but denied by Nasrallah. "We wait for your signal," declares one poster bearing an image of Nasrallah imposed on a rocket.
South Lebanon's mainly Shiite residents rarely criticize Nasrallah or Hezbollah in public and even the region's scattered communities of Christians, Druse and Sunni Muslims are reluctant to do so. "We are caught between Hezbollah and the Israelis," sad a farmer from the Sunni border village of Yarin who refused to give his name. "No one is saying that Nasrallah is infallible," said Hassan Fardous, a 38-year-old car mechanic from the Shiite village of Bint Jbail. "But he does so many good things that we can easily forgive him."