Fox News team release

Hezbollah, proxy in someone else’s fight, says Sfeir
by Youssef Hourany - 14 September, 2006
For the Maronite patriarch, the recent conflict was a war imposed on Lebanon by the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Iran and Syria on the other. Most Shiites are not with Hezbollah when it places itself outside the state, says mufti of Tyre.
Beirut (AsiaNews) – Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir today called for “Lebanese solidarity” to put the country back on its feet whilst slamming Hezbollah. He said that through a Lebanese “proxy”, the country was subjected to a war between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Syria and Iran on the other.
In meeting the press, Sayyed Ali el-Amin, mufti of Tyre and Jabal, distanced himself from Hezbollah. In his opinion, whilst “most Shiites are with Hezbollah against Israel,” they are “not with it when it becomes an obstacle to the state”.
Openly criticising those who want to remain outside plans to rebuild the Lebanese state, he said that it was a mistake not join the process. “We want to be in [this process]. There is no shame for Hezbollah to hand in its weapons and fully turn itself into a political party if the purpose is to protect the country.”
This morning Cardinal Sfeir met US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman as well as the chief editors of Lebanon’s major dailies. He pointed out that in the last two months the situation in the country was getting worse and that more and more people were falling into abject poverty. Given the rising tide of emigration among the young—more than 200,000 with many still waiting for their visa—something has to be taken right away.
Responding to criticism directed at the Maronite bishops’ seventh appeal for not openly naming Israel, he said: “We have already expressed what we think of Israel, which remains Lebanon’s enemy, in the final communiqué released at the end of the last meeting of religious leaders held in Bkerke in late July. We have condemned Israel’s actions against Lebanon and the Arabs.”Patriarch Sfeir finally reminded the country’s political leaders of the need to inaugurate a new historical phase, one that plants the seeds of trust between the authorities and the people.In addition, he made an appeal to the Lebanese living abroad to come home and make their contribution in this phase of Lebanon’s history “because we cannot wait for outside help to restart living.”

Lebanon PM warns army will seize weapons
By HENRY MEYER Associated Press Writer
© 2006 The Associated Press
BEIRUT, Lebanon — The Lebanese prime minister warned Thursday that his army will seize all weapons shown publicly in southern Lebanon, offering a sharp retort to a boast from Hezbollah's leader that his fighters are on the border with Israel and won't leave.
A month into the U.N. cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, the United Nations said the truce is holding well, but the comments underscored growing friction between the Islamic militant group and the Lebanese government, which is led by opponents of Hezbollah's patron Syria.
"I intend for the Lebanese army to prove its presence in the area south of the Litani River," Prime Minister Fuad Saniora told reporters after talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo."We want this area to be under the army's and the Lebanese state's control. The army has all the authority to ban any armed appearances and confiscate those weapons," Saniora said. Some 15,000 Lebanese soldiers, backed by an equal number of U.N. peacekeepers, are deploying in the zone between the Israeli border and the Litani, about 18 miles to the north, to enforce the truce and a ban on Hezbollah weapons.
Saniora made clear his troops will not actively hunt for hidden Hezbollah arsenals. But he insisted his Western-leaning government will no longer allow the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hezbollah to dominate the south.
The U.N. cease-fire calls for the guerrillas to eventually be disarmed, but neither the Lebanese army nor U.N. soldiers want to provoke a confrontation with Hezbollah. Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah said in an interview aired late Wednesday that Israel's monthlong offensive had failed to dismantle Hezbollah or push the guerrillas north. "There is no demilitarized zone south of the Litani. The resistance (Hezbollah) is present south of the Litani and is present in all of south Lebanon," Nasrallah told Al-Jazeera television. Hezbollah fighters, who have controlled parts of south Lebanon for years, are believed to be lying low and blending in with the local population _ as they did before the war. Hezbollah's senior political officer in the south, Sheik Hassan Ezzeddine, said the group was exercising "self-restraint" in the face of what he called Israel's "flagrant violations" of the U.N. truce. Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev said Israel was not violating the cease-fire.
Regev instead alleged continued violations on the Lebanese side, in particular the failure to release two Israeli soldiers whose capture by Hezbollah on July 12 sparked the war. The U.N. cease-fire called for their unconditional release, and the world body is to send an envoy next week to broker indirect talks between the two sides.The U.N. has asked Israel to pull down a barbed-wire fence Lebanon claims encroaches on its territory and said it would file a complaint with Israel's military about its jets flying in Lebanese airspace. The Lebanese army said Israel carried out 12 overflights Thursday. Similar incidents have occurred regularly in violation of the cease-fire, which went into effect Aug. 14.
Still, U.N. officials expressed optimism.
"The good news is that the cessation of hostilities is holding up very well," said Alexander Ivanko, spokesman of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. "The situation is still tense, but it is stable."
Israel's army, which at its peak had 30,000 soldiers across the border up to 18 miles into Lebanon, has largely pulled back to a band 2 to 3 miles deep, Ivanko said. Maj. Gen. Alain Pellegrini, commander of the U.N. peacekeepers, said he expected the Israeli withdrawal to be completed by the end of the month.
The 34-day war killed more than 850 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and almost 160 Israelis.
Along with targeting Lebanese infrastructure, Israeli warplanes and artillery pounded Hezbollah strongholds south of Beirut and in eastern and southern Lebanon in an attempt to destroy the group's rocket arsenal. Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 rockets at northern Israel. On Thursday, Amnesty International accused Hezbollah of breaking international humanitarian law by targeting Israeli towns. It previously issued a similar condemnation of Israel's offensive.
The human rights group has called for a U.N. inquiry into possible war crimes committed by both sides, but Thursday's report focused on the actions of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah rejected Amnesty's charges. Hezbollah legislator Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged his group targeted civilians in Israel, but said it was in response to Israeli attacks that killed Lebanese civilians. "We do not deny that we have bombarded Israeli cities, settlements and infrastructure. But this was always a reaction," he said in an interview by telephone with Al-Jazeera.

Bush: US committed to Israel's security
Yitzhak Benhorin Latest Update: 09.14.06, 10:19
President George W. Bush said during a meeting with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at the White House that he "is deeply committed to Israel's security."
American sources who attended the meeting reported that talks focused on Iran's nuclear threat. Livni refused to comment on the meeting but aides said Livni discussed a series of issues with her host in a meeting that was described as "warm."
Senior administration officials lately relayed similar messages to other Israeli officials who visited Washington.
After talks with Vice President Dick Cheney in Washington last week, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu said the Bush administration is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.Washington is discussing with world powers a draft for a United Nations resolution calling for sanctions on Iran over its defiance of a Security Council deadline to halt uranium enrichment. In talks with Livni on Wednesday, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the US is working Germany, Britain, France, Russia, and China on a draft resolution calling for the imposition of sanctions against Iran.
American officials said Bush and Livni also discussed an initiative by Arab states to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Arab countries are pushing for a debate on the Middle East at the Security Council. US officials said the initiative hit a dead end. Livni said peace talks should be based on the road map peace plan, which was endorsed by the Quartet – the US, UN, Russia and the EU. Lebanon aid frozen Speaking of UN Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting between Israel and Hizbullah, Livni said she is optimistic the resolution will be implemented. France, Germany, Spain, and Italy have agreed to send troops to Lebanon as UN peacekeepers. Livni said the peace forces' main task will be to halt arms shipments to Hizbullah from Iran via Syria. The US House of Representatives froze USD 10 million in aid to Lebanon, saying Beirut failed to observe the embargo as weapons are being smuggled from Syria to Hizbullah.
Democratic Senator Tom Lantos told Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Defense Minister Elias Murr that funds will be funneled once UN peacekeeping forces are deployed along the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Pope invites Muslims to dialogue, slams 'holy wars'
REGENSBURG, Germany - Pope Benedict invited Muslims on Tuesday to join a dialogue of cultures based on the premise that the concept of an Islamic "holy war" is unreasonable and against God's nature.
In a major lecture at Regensburg University, where he taught theology between 1969 to 1977, Benedict said Christianity is tightly linked to reason and contrasted this view with those who believe in spreading their faith by the sword.
The 79-year-old Pontiff avoided making a direct criticism of Islam, packaging his comments in a highly complex academic lecture with references ranging from ancient Jewish and Greek thinking to Protestant theology and modern atheism.
In his lecture, the Pope quoted, among others, the 14th century Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologos who wrote that Mohammad had brought things "only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."
The Pope, who used the terms "jihad" and "holy war" in his lecture, added in his own words: "Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul."Benedict several times quoted Emperor Manuel's argument that spreading the faith through violence is unreasonable and that acting without reason -- "logos" in the original Greek -- was against God's nature.
At the end of his lecture, the Pope again quoted Manuel and said: "It is to this great 'logos', to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures."
"Just an example"
Papal spokesman Father Federico Lombardi said Benedict used Emperor Manuel's views on Islam only to help explain the issue and not to condemn all of the Muslim religion as violent.
"This is just an example. We know that inside Islam there are many different positions, violent and non-violent," he said. "The Pope does not want to give an interpretation of Islam that is violent."
Many Islamic leaders have denounced Muslim radicals for using violence, saying this perverts their faith, but a minority of extremists says the Koran commands them to use it.
Last week, the Pope said no one had the right to use religion to justify terrorism and urged greater inter-religious dialogue to stop the cycle of hate and revenge from infecting future generations. On Monday, he prayed for the victims of September 11 on the fifth anniversary of the attacks against the United States.
At an open-air mass earlier in the day, Benedict told about 260,000 faithful that Christians believed in a loving God whose name could not be used to justify hatred and fanaticism. Organizers had expected 350,000 to attend.
Regensburg is the medieval city where the Pope taught theology from 1969 to 1977 and hoped to return in retirement from Vatican service to write one last major theological work.
As Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, he twice asked Pope John Paul to let him retire from his job as the Vatican's top doctrinal official, but John Paul refused.
At his university lecture, Benedict, a leading theologian who has always drawn clear lines between Roman Catholicism and other faiths, also appeared to criticize Protestant churches and contemporary Third World theologians for not stressing the link between faith and reason clearly enough.
Benedict stressed that his criticism of modern empirical reasoning "has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age."
"The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application," said Benedict, who told the audience it was a moving experience for him to give a university lecture again. Reuters

Lebanon Left to Face Most Basic of Issues
War Exposes Deep Conflicts About the Nation's Identity and Its Future
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 10, 2006; Page A20
BIKFAYA, Lebanon -- From the terrace of former president Amin al-Gemayel's ancestral mansion, Lebanon appeared so beautiful that it seemed it should go on forever. Traditional houses of ocher stone huddled far below in close-knit villages, and churches with tiny domes stood sentinel along the twisting roads. In the distance, the Mediterranean gleamed under a warm Middle Eastern sun.
But the recent 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah has raised fundamental questions about Lebanon's future and its identity, straining the political institutions on which the country was built, perhaps to the breaking point. In Bikfaya, Gemayel's tranquil little town in the hills behind Beirut, and across the rest of Lebanon, people have begun to think that their country and its historic melding of Christians with Muslims may not prevail after all.
"Lebanon is at a crossroads," said Gemayel, who was president during wars from 1982 to 1988. "Either we draw the lessons from the war and build a Lebanon that is genuinely democratic and liberal, and an example of intercommunal coexistence, or we are headed for the disintegration of Lebanon."
In their own ways, Israel and the Bush administration have grappled with the same problem in Lebanon. In parallel policies, they have insisted that Hezbollah disarm and fully join in the Lebanese political process. But because Lebanon's political institutions do not reflect Hezbollah's wider support in the population, the militant Shiite Muslim movement has made it clear that greater changes will be needed before it lays down its arms.
The Gemayel family, Maronite Christians, had a lot to do with the creation of Lebanon's old landscape, a place where Christians and Muslims coexisted and business flourished while the tax man looked the other way. Amin al-Gemayel's father, Pierre, was a pharmacist who became a leader of the independence movement. His elder brother, Bashir, was president briefly in 1982 before being assassinated at the behest of the Syrian government.
The Lebanon most foreigners think of -- tolerant, easy-living, Western-oriented -- bore the imprint of Maronite families such as the Gemayels, and not by accident. France, the mandate power here until just after World War II, originally carved Lebanon off from Syria to provide a place for the Maronites in the predominantly Muslim Middle East. They made it into a "hinge country," linking East and West.
To rule the new country and preserve its unusual personality, France left behind a system under which the president and the army commander must be Maronites, giving decisive power to what was then the major community. The prime minister was to be Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shiite.
Lebanon's demography has changed drastically since then. No official census has been taken, a reflection of how delicate the issue is here. But academics said that over the past two decades, Shiites have become a plurality -- estimates range from 32 percent to 45 percent of the population -- and Maronites a minority of less than a quarter. With Sunni Muslims and other sects counted, the overall balance has changed to more than 60 percent Muslim.
Hezbollah's emergence as a political party and armed militia was in large measure a response to that shift. In effect, the organization stepped in to represent Shiites because many of them felt the government did not, particularly in the southern hills along the border with Israel.
"We are not a replacement for the state," Hasan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, said in a recent televised interview. "But where the state is absent, we have to take up the slack."
The war with Israel further dramatized the gap between Lebanon's institutions and its new political demography. Communal strains had been swept under the rug for years under the leadership of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was assassinated in 2005. But in the crucible of a destructive, bloody war, those strains suddenly seemed glaring.
Lebanon's official, Maronite-led army sat out the conflict, for instance, while Hezbollah's militia, which was better armed, did the fighting and dying. President Emile Lahoud, the other Maronite pillar of power, was also on the sidelines because of his association with Syria, an ally of Hezbollah.
As a result, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, a Sunni economist, spoke in the name of Lebanon and received foreign visitors such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for negotiations about the war. But he had to check with Nasrallah regarding important decisions, because Hezbollah was the seat of Lebanon's real power of war or peace.
"What institutions do we have?" asked Social Affairs Minister Nayla Moawad, a Maronite and the widow of assassinated president René Moawad. "We have inherited a non-administration. The Lebanese government is like this box," she said, holding up a silver coffee-table decoration. "There is nothing in it. It is empty."
Moawad and other Christians, along with Sunni Muslims, have stressed that the right response is strengthening the Lebanese government. Hezbollah must recognize that only the state can have the power of arms, they said, and it must turn away from Iranian-style theocracy to become part of the relaxed mix that has made Lebanon so attractive over the years to investors and Arab vacationers.
"It is up to Hezbollah to make this decision," Gemayel said. "Unfortunately, Lebanon is hanging on the choice."
Although the country's Sunni establishment fought the Maronites in the 1950s and again in the 1970s in the heyday of Arab nationalism, it has recoiled at Hezbollah's politically charged brand of Islam and its ties with Iran. In the debate over Lebanon's identity, conducted before the war in a round of meetings called the National Dialogue, most Sunnis opted for alliance with the Maronites and endorsed their demand for Hezbollah's disarmament.
"Nasrallah has been lying to us all along," sneered a Sunni minister in describing Hezbollah's participation in the National Dialogue.
Nasrallah has gone out of his way to reassure fellow Lebanese that Hezbollah has no intention of remaking Lebanon to look like Iran. In his recent interview, he pledged loyalty to the Lebanese tradition of religious and social tolerance.
"Lebanon is a pluralistic country," he declared. "It is not an Islamic country. It is not a Maronite country. It is not an Orthodox country. It is not a Shiite country. It is a country of consensus. You have nothing to fear from anybody from Hezbollah."
But Nasrallah's pledge was not well received by many Sunnis and Maronites. Hezbollah only weeks ago went to war without consulting the government, they noted, and moved as soon as the cease-fire took effect to help refugees without reference to government agencies charged with the same task.
Perhaps more important, they noted, was Nasrallah's postwar assertion that Hezbollah must be taken into account in government deliberations from here on out. The party ran for office in the last elections, gaining seats in parliament and two ministers in Siniora's cabinet. But Nasrallah seemed to be saying his group will be seeking more power now that, in his words, it has fought a war on Lebanon's behalf.
A share of power that reflects the Shiites' true place in the population would probably change Lebanon's orientation significantly, the Sunni and Maronite observers predicted. But a refusal to acknowledge the demographic change and Hezbollah's enhanced status after the war, they said, would be a recipe for more intercommunal conflict. As a result, the timeless view from Gemayel's terrace may be in for a change.
"I don't see Lebanon surviving as it is today," said Dori Chamoun, leader of the Maronite-based National Liberal party and son of a former president and longtime political figure, the late Camille Chamoun. "It is inevitable that the Christians will have a smaller share of the country. I only see one solution, cantonization. Everybody wants it. Nobody says it out loud."
In a recent book, Gemayel proposed abandoning Lebanon's current system and replacing it with election of the president by popular vote and decentralization along the geographical lines that largely define where Muslims and Christians live in any case. "The institutions of Lebanon are tired," he said. "They are drained of their blood."
The losers in such a change would largely be Sunni Muslims, Chamoun pointed out, because by and large they have not carved out sections of the country as theirs. Public Works Minister Mohamad Safadi, a Sunni who lives in Beirut, said he was discussing the problem with his wife recently and reassured her that, if worse comes to worst, they could always live in their weekend house -- in the quintessentially Christian port of Byblos.

Nasrallah condemns invitation to Blair as 'a national disaster'
By Nada Bakri -Daily Star staff
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
BEIRUT: Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah held Tony Blair partly responsible on Tuesday for the deaths of Lebanese civilians, saying the British premier had not done enough to help end the war with Israel. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah also lashed out at the government for welcoming Blair to Lebanon. Blair visited Beirut on Monday, promising $75 million in aid and assistance for Lebanon's armed forces. "This Tony Blair is an associate in the murdering," Nasrallah said in an interview with Al-Jazeera television. He also criticized Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "You bring him [Blair] home to me and to my family and you give him a great reception?" Nasrallah said. "If there was an invitation extended to Tony Blair to visit then this is a national disaster." Siniora said he had sent an invitation during the war for Blair to visit Beirut once the fighting ended. Nasrallah said his group has been practicing self-restraint against what he described as "back-stabbing and provocation" by politicians. However, any such restraint was noticeably absent Monday night during Hizbullah's first public rally since the start of the war. During a speech made to the crowd from the devastated southern suburbs of Beirut, Hizbullah MP Ali Ammar said the anti-Syrian coalition had sided with the enemy.
"The March 14 Forces aligned themselves with the Israeli enemy from the start" of the conflict that ended on August 14, he said. "They planned the assassination of the resistance in collaboration with the Americans and the Israelis." "This government must go," he added, calling for the formation of a national unity government embracing factions outside the current Cabinet, including MP Michel Aoun and former MP Suleiman Franjieh.
Hizbullah presently holds two seats in Cabinet. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Hizbullah's Christian political ally, said that although it would "not allow anyone to impose the timing for a change of government," the movement would work to achieve a more balanced representation.
"We want to change the government in order to straighten the imbalance in the political representation," FPM MP Ibrahim Kanaan said. "Everything within the framework of the Constitution and democracy and that can be beneficial to Lebanon is subject to discussion, but we will not let anyone impose on us the timing."
Kanaan also lashed out at the parliamentary majority for "intimidating" anyone who contradicts its political agenda.
"The majority intimidates the opposition whenever something that contradicts its agenda is proposed and they immediately accuse us of treason or link us to Syria and Iran," he said. "Why don't we accuse the majority of serving American and Israeli interests in Lebanon? We don't want to accuse anyone of treason and we don't want to let anyone dictate to us our agenda; we want to work for national unity."
The Amal Movement, the resistance's intra-sect ally, said there was no serious plan to topple the government and that any comments from Hizbullah were in reaction to a March 14 Forces statement issued last week that blamed the resistance for the war and described the party's weapons as "incapable of defending and protecting the Lebanese and their land."
"Hizbullah's comments were a reaction to the March 14 Forces statement," Health Minister and Amal member Mohammad Khalifeh told The Daily Star. "There isn't any real discussion to topple the government; there were accusations followed by counter-accusations."
Lebanese Forces leader and prominent March 14 member Samir Geagea said the coalition had never targeted Hizbullah.
"All we did is express our point of view on the situation and the rise of the country and the obstacles that are hindering it, and we have expressed it during the national dialogue and in the presence of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah himself," Geagea said Tuesday. "Our statements are being paraphrased incorrectly. It seems that no one is allowed to express his opinion without being accused of treason."
Khalifeh said that "even if there is to be a change in government, it will be a smooth change. We cannot bear another conflict following this devastating war."
Ammar's speech came on the heels of a Hizbullah statement released earlier Monday that also slammed March 14.
"The repeated calls by these forces for the disarmament of Hizbullah aim to serve the interests of their Western masters, at the head of which are the United States and its ally, Israel," the statement said.
"We appeal to those forces to prove their nationalism and not put Lebanon under foreign tutelage, the object of which is to make Lebanon unable to defend itself against Israel."
Geagea on Tuesday reiterated his call for the party to hand in their weapons.
"The principle of a country and the principle of a resistance cannot live together. It is either a country or it isn't. There are no half-countries," Geagea said.
"We urge Hizbullah to remove the last obstacle before the creation of the country which is their weapons."
As The Daily Star went to press, Al-Jazeera aired new comments by Nasrallah in which he said a UN "facilitator" appointed to mediate a prisoner swap with Israel would arrive in Lebanon next week.

Should we bet on militant Islam's waning with time?
By David Ignatius -Daily Star staff
Thursday, September 14, 2006
During Monday's commemorations of the fifth anniversary of Sept. 11, 2001, I found myself wondering what the world will look like on the 10th anniversary, or the 20th. Will the catastrophe that began five years ago become a permanent feature of life - a "long war" that won't end for many decades? Or will it gradually wane with time?
President George W. Bush made an emphatic case for the long war in his speech to the nation Monday night. In his account, America is locked not simply in a war, but a meta-conflict, "the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century and the calling of our generation." He described a global enemy of Muslim fanatics that imprisons women in their homes, beats impious men and attacks Americans at will. I admire Bush's toughness, but I disagree with his analysis.
As it happened, I spent the hours before Bush's speech moderating a discussion of the meaning of 9/11, which was hosted by the World Affairs Council in Washington, DC. One of the panelists was Marc Sageman, a man who comes to these issues with an unusual background - he was a CIA case officer in Pakistan and then became a psychiatrist. I found in his comments a similarly unusual clarity.
Sageman argues in his book, "Understanding Terror Networks," that we are facing something closer to a cult network than an organized global adversary. Like many cults through history, the Muslim terrorists thrive by channeling and perverting the idealism of young people. As a forensic psychiatrist, he analyzed data on about 400 jihadists. He found that they weren't poor, desperate sociopaths but restless young men who found identity by joining the terrorist underground. Ninety percent came from intact families; 63 percent had gone to college; 75 percent were professionals or semi-professionals; 73 percent were married.
What transformed these young Sunni men was the fellowship of the jihad, and the militant role models they found in people like Osama bin Laden. The terror training camps in Afghanistan were a kind of elite finishing school - Sageman likened it to getting into Harvard. The 9/11 hijackers weren't psychotic killers; none of the 19 had criminal records. In terms of their psychological profiles, says Sageman, they were as healthy as the general population.
The implication of Sageman's analysis is that the Sunni jihadism of Al-Qaeda and its spin-off groups is a generational phenomenon. Unless new grievances spawn new recruits, it will gradually ebb over time. In other words, this is a fire that will gradually burn itself out unless we keep pumping in more oxygen. Nothing in Sageman's analysis implies America should be any less aggressive in defending itself against terrorism. But he does argue that we should choose our offensive battles wisely, and avoid glamorizing the jihadist network further through our rhetoric or actions.
Sageman's focus on the generational arc of violence got me thinking about my recent trip to Iran. The revolutionary intensity hasn't disappeared there, but it is certainly further down the curve than is the Sunni world. When I attended Friday prayers at Tehran University, I was struck by how old the people shouting "death to America" were. I would guess the average age was well over 40. The generation of the Iranian revolution is getting long in the tooth. The only sure way to ignite revolutionary zealotry in the younger generation would be for America to go to war with Iran - something I dearly hope we can avoid.
There's another small detail about Iran that strikes me as relevant, now that I'm back home. As I explained in an earlier column, Tehran is a city of crazy drivers who nearly collide at every intersection. But the police are quite strict about requiring seat belts - something I don't often see in the Muslim world. Even fatalistic taxi drivers buckle up.
Another surprise: When I was traveling last week from Tehran to the holy city of Qom, there were actually police on the highway with radar guns, stopping pilgrims who might be tempted to speed. And I'm told the new mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, who succeeded the rabble-rousing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has created a special hotline so people can call and get potholes filled and trash collected. Now I submit to you: A nation that is wearing seat belts is probably not a mortal enemy of the United States.
This is a week when we remember, with horror, that there are dangerous killers in the Muslim world. But unless we make big mistakes, we should not find ourselves condemned to a permanent war, much less a clash of civilizations.
Syndicated columnist David Ignatius is published regularly by THE DAILY STAR.

The indomitable illusion of a peace process
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, September 14, 2006
Institutions looking for new recruits often promise, "we offer more than a job, we offer a career." As British Prime Minister Tony Blair realized before his trip to the Middle East last weekend, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is a choice career in town, granting restorative powers even to politicians on the slide. But as all solemnly talk about the need for that process to resume, the fact is that neither Israelis nor Palestinians are in a condition to carry through with serious negotiations.
For the foreseeable future, Israeli-Palestinian peace is a mirage sustained by diplomats enamored of process. Somehow, these professionals believe, the problem is one of finding the right dose of concessions, triggering the right mutually reinforcing perceptions of security, so that everything can smoothly fit into place. With each new failure, the calculations start anew, amid an enduring conviction that the lead of Israeli-Palestinian relations can yet be transformed into the gold of permanent amity.
Those on either side of the divide see a solution as relatively easy, on condition that the other side fully embraces their views. But for now, both within the Palestinian territories and Israel, there is no convincing consensus on the contours of a final deal, let alone a consensus that could satisfy the other. Add to that a reality that has been played down by the professional peace peddlers: Both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government lack the domestic public support and confidence to make the sacrifices that would be required in a final settlement.
Much will be made of the fact that Palestinians are preparing to establish a government of national unity, in which Hamas would accept a vague formulation suggesting the movement recognizes Israel. The new government should mean that the spigots of foreign aid are reopened for the Palestinians. It may even bring Hamas closer to accepting a state in the West Bank and Gaza, though just how close remains a big question. But one thing it will not do is make peace talks any easier, because the rubric "national unity" is likely to hand Hamas veto power over conditions that Fatah would be more amenable to accepting. And the Islamist movement, armed with a majority in Parliament, would have ample justification to defend its choices as being in line with Palestinian preferences.
Take a key stumbling block of any Israeli-Palestinian arrangement: the Palestinian right of return. Even at his strongest, Yasser Arafat was never willing to cut a deal that could be interpreted as surrendering the right of refugees to return to their homes inside Israel. Yet for the Israelis any thought of such a return is a non-starter. The weak Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, is not about to challenge Hamas, let alone his own population, by reinterpreting that right in Israel's favor; nor will Israel be receptive to what it regards as a demographic Trojan horse. In that disagreement alone lies irresolvable deadlock.
On the Israeli side, the recent Lebanon war was devastating to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert not because of Hizbullah's pyrrhic "victory" amid the shambles of South Lebanon; but because Olmert's principal electoral platform, the reason he had any legitimacy as head of government, namely his promise of unilateral Israeli withdrawals in the West Bank, collapsed. Hizbullah showed that no matter how high Israel builds its walls, rockets can be fired over them. That's one reason why Olmert was initially so keen to be vicious in Lebanon, to deter future attacks by the Palestinians and salvage his strategy. In that respect he failed. His plan has been put on hold and it isn't easy to see how it will soon be revived.
So, with the Palestinian and Israeli governments unable to move very much forward on peace, is continued diplomacy advisable? The knee-jerk answer has been yes. But a good case can be made that because mediation is pointless today, it would be better to let the conflict fester until Israelis and Palestinians have no choice but to begin negotiations that do work. Diplomacy may actually end up killing the patient, not saving him.

As the Camp David meeting between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in July 2000 showed, any effort to force a solution on parties not ripe for it can lead to worse outcomes. At the time, Arafat was unhappy with Barak's effort to go to a final settlement before the Israelis had fulfilled several intermediate commitments to the Palestinians. Arafat felt, legitimately, that he was being railroaded, and his reaction was to be more rigid at the summit and in subsequent diplomatic endeavors than was good for the Palestinians. By the end, he thought he could improve his hand by launching the intifada, and lost everything.
Similarly, Barak was never secure enough about domestic Israeli backing for a final deal to fulfill the interim promises Israel had made to the Palestinians. Yet, like a gambler, he conceived of Camp David as a double-or-nothing moment. A radical final package deal, he thought, could bring Israelis around, regardless of their initial doubts. This might have worked with his countrymen, but Barak never considered whether Palestinian leaders or society would go along. He, too, ended up losing everything.
For now, keeping alive the illusion of a peace process might only invite similar haste, as diplomats at some stage try to show something for their efforts, while also keeping expectations unrealistically high of an encouraging outcome. With such expectations will come sharper frustration, particularly on the Palestinian side. Yet on a daily basis it's being made plain that the minimal Palestinian conditions for an acceptable settlement are miles away from the minimal Israeli ones.
The diplomats would respond that only perseverance can eventually bring Palestinians and Israelis together. But what is more likely to bring them together is the parties' being denied a peace process, so that they can face alone the starkness of their choices. When both see that they must deal with each other rather than through a battery of professional illusionists, negotiations might have a better chance of working. Peacemaking would then turn into just a job, but for once it might be a job well done.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.

Hizbullah 'committed war crimes' during conflict
Thursday, September 14, 2006
Report Amnesty International
Hizbullah committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes, in its deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians during the recent conflict, according to a briefing published today by Amnesty International.
During the month-long conflict, Hizbullah fired nearly 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, killing 43 civilians, seriously injuring 33 others and forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to take refuge in shelters or flee. Around a quarter of all rockets were fired directly into urban areas, including rockets packed with thousands of metal ball bearings.
In meetings with Amnesty International, Hizbullah argued that its rocket attacks on northern Israel were a reprisal for Israeli attacks on civilians in Lebanon and were aimed at stopping such attacks.
"The scale of Hizbullah's attacks on Israeli cities, towns and villages, the indiscriminate nature of the weapons used, and statements from the leadership confirming their intent to target civilians, make it all too clear that Hizbullah violated the laws of war," said Amnesty International secretary general Irene Khan. "The fact that Israel has also committed serious violations in no way justifies violations by Hizbullah. Civilians must not be made to pay the price for unlawful conduct on either side."
The briefing is based on Amnesty field research in Israel and Lebanon, interviews with victims, official statements, discussions with Israeli and Lebanese government officials and senior Hizbullah officials.
Amnesty International's briefing includes evidence of: Hizbullah's firing of some 900 inherently inaccurate Katyusha rockets into urban areas in northern Israel in clear violation of the principle of distinction between civilian and military targets under international law; Hizbullah's use of modified Katyusha rockets packed with metal ball bearings, designed to inflict maximum death and injury; one such rocket killing eight railway workers; statements from Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and other senior Hizbullah leaders that the group intended to target civilians as a form of reprisal, violating the prohibition on direct attacks on civilians as well as the prohibition on reprisals against the civilian population; the flight of civilians from northern Israel and the existence of shelters preventing a higher death toll than the 43 civilian fatalities recorded.
"The suffering of civilians on both sides has been repeatedly ignored with those responsible escaping all accountability. Justice is urgently needed if respect for the rules of war is ever to be taken seriously - and that means accountability for the perpetrators of war crimes and reparations for the victims," said Khan.
Amnesty International is calling for a comprehensive, independent and impartial inquiry to be urgently established by the UN into violations of international humanitarian law by both sides in the conflict. It should examine in particular the impact of this conflict on the civilian population, and should be undertaken with a view to holding individuals responsible for crimes under international law and ensuring that full reparation is provided to the victims.
Further aspects of the war, including charges that Hizbullah used Lebanese civilians as a cover and attacks by Israeli forces that resulted in heavy civilian casualties, will be addressed in future publications.

The "Israeli war on Lebanon" and its Repercussions
Thursday, September 14, 2006
Khair El-Din Haseeb
Director-General, Centre for Arab Unity Studies
Today, after the cessation of "hostilities", it is necessary to think about the possible repercussions of the Israeli aggression on various parties involved, in one way or the other, on both sides of the conflict: Hezbollah, as a resistance movement, and Lebanon on one side, and Israel on the other, as well as its long term effect on the Arab world. For practical and space considerations, this article will deals with Hezbollah and its resistance movement, the repercussion on Israel, and on the Arab World. Effects on Lebanon's internal political and economic situations and its relations with the Arab World and International Community has already been exhaustively discussed.
Hezbollah deserves to be looked at in detail on account of its present and future impact on areas beyond Lebanon, including Israel, the Arab neighbours of 1948 Palestine, and the regional and international situation. These can be summarised as follows:
1. The national resistance in Lebanon has effectively scored a "strategic and historic victory" as Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah himself has said in the speech he delivered immediately after the "cessation of hostilities" was declared, and as many in Israel and the West have since recognised. On the other hand, Israel has demonstratively failed to achieve any of its declared objectives in this war.
The national resistance's objective was to liberate the Chebaa Farms, affect an exchange of prisoners, obtain maps from Israel indicating the location of the land mines it planted in Lebanon, and prove its ability to "deter" any Israeli attack on Lebanon. As for the debate regarding whether Resolution 1701has effectively addressed the issue of the Chebaa Farms, in my opinion a significant step forward has been taken in this regard. The Chebaa Farms were not covered by the United Nations' Resolution 425 regarding Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon after the "Litani Operation" of 1978, but by Resolution 242 regarding territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Now, however, Chebaa is once again on the Security Council's agenda and the latter has in fact asked the Secretary General, through Resolution 1701, to submit within one month a report about his talks with relevant parties regarding this particular issue. During recent debates regarding the text of Resolution 1701, the United States prevented the inclusion of clearer text on Chebaa so as not to give the impression that the resistance and Hezbollah had scored a victory. This, however, did not prevent the issue from being placed once again on the Security Council's agenda, and no doubt, the outcome will be in favour of returning the Farms to Lebanon, especially now that Syria has recognised that they are indeed part of Lebanon. When asked in an interview with the Lebanese "Al-Akhbar" newspaper "if Lebanon asks Syria to sign on a document recognising the Lebanese identity of the Farms, will it do that?" Mr Walid al-Moallem, Syria's Foreign Minister, replied: "We sent an official letter to the United Nations confirming that fact and it is already in their files. They, however, want us to sign on maps and we cannot do that while the occupation persists. The issue is very clear...
As for the issue of the prisoner exchange referred to in Resolution 1701's preamble, (the issue of releasing the two Israeli prisoners in return for Lebanese prisoners) it is now a forgone conclusion. Resolution 1701 was adopted under Chapter Six and, not Seven, of the United Nations Charter and therefore there is nothing that the latter can do to force Lebanon, through the resistance, to release the two Israeli prisoners without exchanging them for Lebanese, and/or other, prisoners. This exchange is expected to take place soon given Israel's urgent need to ensure its own prisoners' release. Israel has also declared five of its soldiers "missing in action" and it could very well be that they are, dead or alive, in the hands of the resistance; which will further accelerate Israel's urgency to deal with the issue.
As for the issues of the map of Israeli mines in Lebanon and the deterrence ability of the resistance, the map has already been submitted to the United Nations following the end of hostilities, thus the deterrence power of the resistance has already been made evident. The Lebanese resistance has therefore achieved, or will soon achieve, all its aims. If this is not a victory, then what is?
On the other hand Israel has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives in the war, as I will explain later.
2. Hezbollah's resistance, from the point of view of planning and execution, was highly effective, making it a "very good example" for the Arabs to follow. It demonstrated that the Lebanese resistance has been diligently planning and preparing for some time to do battle with Israel 3 in order to liberate the Chebaa Farms, force an exchange of prisoners, obtain the maps of Israeli land mines in Lebanon, and prove its deterrence ability to stop Israeli violations of Lebanon's territorial integrity, air space, and territorial waters.
The performance of the Lebanese resistance during the war stunned the Israelis not only as far as planning and readiness were concerned, but also the high technical and moral standards 4 of its fighting force. The resistance itself explains this as the result of a "marriage between brains and faith" that provide the Lebanese resistance fighter with the capacity to undergo a high level of training, and the faith to keep on fighting until martyrdom. This has resulted in an overall ability superior to that of the Israeli fighter, a fact bitterly recognized by the enemy.
The Lebanese resistance has achieved a similar feat on the media campaign front which demonstrates its keen awareness of the fact that "a successful publicity is half the victory in the battle". It managed its media campaign very effectively, a fact also recognised by the enemy 5. Its credibility increased as the war progressed due to the already integrity credibility of its leadership. Not only did this serve to bolster its media campaign and help repel the enemy who took its words and warnings seriously, it further reinforced the movement's ability to "deter".
The Lebanese resistance has also prevented Israeli intelligence from infiltrating its ranks and the leaderships of Hezbollah's and the resistance, and its operations room was able to continue leading the battle against Israel until the very end of the war.
3. What further increased Lebanese and Arab support for the resistance is the fact that Hezbollah waged its war with Israel under the banner of "Arabism and Islamism" and adopted an "Arab-Islamic" discourse 6.
4. It is difficult to understand the feat achieved by the Lebanese resistance without first understanding the nature of the party that stands behind it; that is Hezbollah. In light of available published and unpublished information, we can say with some confidence that on the internal organisational, operational, and democratic levels, Hezbollah is the best organised and most democratic among all other Arab parties. It performs at a high level because it relies on modern technology and informatics, and on their various usages, and is the best informed among all the Arabs about what goes on inside Israel 7.
An Iraqi social scientist describes Hezbollah as follows: "Hezbollah is an ideology and a political party and, above all, a social movement (which makes it larger than a party). It is a social organisation closely involved with the Shiite community; it manages a series of service-oriented institutions, ( ) and is part of a large regional front. This multi-layered identity puts it in a unique position that allows it to survive". He ends by saying: "Hezbollah cannot be destroyed except by means of a crazy solution, namely either the destruction of the entire Shiite community, or the annihilation of Syria and Iran or the elimination of their political will 8 ".
5. It is difficult to address Hezbollah and its resistance movement without focussing attention on the role of its secretary general and head of its resistance movement, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah plays a distinguished role in both the Party and the resistance, in spite of the collective nature of that Party. For, in addition to his charismatic personality, which could not have allowed him by itself to play his current role, he possesses the relevant intellect, political acumen, and organisational ability, and holds the title of Sayyed, meaning that he is a descendent of Prophet Mohamed. Very few people know how Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah thinks; however, his life story, as he himself recounted it, 9 sheds light on this aspect of the man. The few who possessed both intellect and political acumen, such as Lenin, Nehru, Jamal Abdel-Nasser, and Nelson Mandela, are the ones who were able to leave their imprint on history.
Those who read his biography, and know his background as he was growing up, the various stages of his education, and the organisational abilities he acquired starting from the bottom up until his election as secretary general of the Party, and those who followed his television appearances during the war, could not but have noticed his calm demeanour, humility, and the very civilized nature of his discourse. He is the first Arab leader to tell his fighters that he "kisses their hands and feet". His speeches were free of fillers and repetitions and each contained separate messages for both the home front and beyond that, depending on which stage the war was at, which only added to the credibility he is renowned for among both his admirers and detractors. Thus, we not only have here an "exemplary party", we also have an "exemplary leader".
6. Hezbollah ability to realistically and successfully "Arabise" its resistance movement raises two questions: first, whether it can, if it really wanted to, transform itself into a Lebanese national party that transcends its own religious community to embrace the Lebanese national community and, second, to what extent is it able, if it wanted, to transform its ideology along similar lines? This is, after all, what Lebanon really needs in order to successfully extricate itself from the prevalent "one community - one party" system. This is a challenge that needs some time to mature given the need for a dose of "party education" for the movement and its members. If successful, this would allow it to enter history from the main door and have considerable impact that goes beyond Lebanon's borders to the Arab world at large.
7. The Hezbollah-led "exemplary resistance" will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the Palestinian and Iraqi resistance movements. For in spite of its different circumstances, capabilities, freedom of operation, and financial resources, given those at the disposal of the Lebanese resistance in the past six years, the latter's experience will be of much benefit to the resistance in Palestine and Iraq. However, they all need to coordinate their efforts, exchange expertise, undergo training, and learn some humility".
If the resistance in Palestine and Iraq need to learn from the experience of the Lebanese national resistance in managing, planning, and executing resistance operations, in addition to the use of anti Israeli armour missiles 10 (various types of Merkava tanks) which are one of Israel's military prides, the Lebanese resistance, on its part, needs to learn from the experience of the Iraqi resistance in the development of Road-Side Bombs, also known as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). These are currently the object of a technological race between the Pentagon and the Iraqi resistance, given that half of the American deaths in Iraq, and 70% of all injuries, are the result of IEDs11.
8. There remain important issues related to Hezbollah, its resistance, and its responsibility for the war, chief among which is the extent to which Hezbollah can be held responsible for triggering the war, i.e. Israel's attack on Lebanon.
- Question one: Does the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers from inside Israel, and the killing of eight others, constitute an attack on Israel and therefore gives Israel the right of self defence?
Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter, relevant to the right of self defence, states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter- national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Some legal experts believe that such actions are not unusual between neighboring countries, which means that the incident does not constitute an armed attack on Israel; they also base their opinion on similar practices by Israel in the past. Israel has indeed at times kidnapped and assassinated a number of Hezbollah leaders 12 without the Security Council considering these incidents as armed attacks on Lebanon or adopting resolutions condemning Israel or ascribing blame to it.
- Question two: To what extent was Israel's barbaric attack on Lebanon the result of the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and not a pre-planned operation that would have taken place regardless of whether the kidnapping had occurred or not? There is a lot of information indicating that an Israeli attack on Lebanon had already been planned for and agreed upon by Israel and the United States, and that the kidnapping had surprised Israel and forced it to attack earlier than planned. This means that the attack would have occurred regardless of the kidnapping 13.
- Did Hezbollah know or expect that the kidnapping would lead to an Israeli all-out war on Lebanon? It is clear from Sayyed Nasrallah's press conference on July 12, 2006, the day of the two soldiers' kidnapping 14, that his intention was to exchange them for Lebanese prisoners through indirect negotiations. Had he expected Israel's ensuing reaction, he would not have held an open news conference that same night. It was also clear from Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's appearance in a pre-recorded message on al-Manar Television on July 26, 2006, that Hezbollah was not aware of the Israeli-American plan to wage war on Lebanon until it actually happened. For he said in that speech: "When the arrest took place, and without knowing it, the resistance foiled a more dangerous plan and a worst war scenario on Lebanon, on the Lebanese resistance, and on the people of Lebanon. The humiliation suffered by the Zionist enemy as a result of the kidnapping operation made it impossible for it to absorb this coup, and therefore moved up the attack for which it was already preparing 15..."
Furthermore, the Party had undertaken similar kidnappings in the Chebaa area since 2000, and Israel had not responded with a military attack on Lebanon; this confirms the fact that Hezbollah did not expect a war on Lebanon in response to the soldiers' kidnapping. In 2004, an exchange of had taken place involving Israeli soldiers detained by Hezbollah, including an officer who was lured to Lebanon and then arrested, in return for a large number of Lebanese prisoners, including some whom Israel, as previously indicated, had kidnapped from inside Lebanon.
- As to ascribing blame for the losses incurred by Lebanon, such as civilian deaths, destruction of infrastructure, and other 16 on the resistance, the following can be said:
Lebanon's material losses, estimated at seven billion dollars 17, could be totally covered by the over $800 million pledged by various Arab Governments to compensate for the open or secret collusion by some of them, and the silence and fear of others, and by pledges from the international community. A Lebanon capable of taking care of itself in the face of Israeli aggression is much more attractive for Arab and foreign investments after, rather than before, its victory over Israel. The displaced have in fact started returning to their homes and Hezbollah, since the first day after the cessation of hostilities, has put in place an urgent and feasible programme to deal with the problem of partially or totally destroyed homes, and several Lebanese personalities and private institution have undertaken to repair or rebuild most of the country's destroyed bridges.
The human losses are but the price that any country has to pay in order to repel an enemy attack on it and safeguard its sovereignty. Enough to know that the number of those killed in Iraq during July 2006, i.e. in the span of a single month, was 3438, or twice the number of those killed in both Lebanon and Palestine during that same period 18. Liberation from occupation was never without its concomitant human sacrifice, and at a later stage I will address Israel's losses.
9. There are other outstanding questions such as the relationship between the resistance and the Lebanese state, how long the resistance can be expected to last 19, and whether it is a resistance movement or a militia.
In relation to the first issue, the Lebanese Government's statement on which it obtained the vote of confidence at the National Assembly, states the following:
"The Lebanese resistance is a true and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate its territory, defend its integrity, face up to Israeli aggression, threats, and designs on Lebanon, and liberate the remaining occupied Lebanese territories 20".
- Is there anything clearer than mandating the Lebanese resistance with the defence of Lebanon's integrity in the face of Israeli aggression and the liberation of its territory?
- Was the Lebanese State able to stop Israel's repeated violations of the country's air space, territorial waters, and often the "Blue Line", by relying on the means available to it or on the Security Council?
- And was there a way, other than resistance, to liberate Chebaa, recuperate the prisoners, obtain the mine maps, and confront Israeli aggression?
10. Regarding popular support for the resistance within Lebanon, we can say the following:
At the beginning of the war, and for a very brief period of time, opposition voices were heard against Hezbollah's unilateral move to arrest the two Israeli soldiers and the unleashing of the ensuing war on Lebanon. These, however, lasted only a few days and soon a near total national consensus in support of the resistance prevailed; this in turn generated an unprecedented degree of national unity which lasted until the end of the war. But, how long will this near total national consensus last now that hostilities have ceased? It is not an issue one can address in total confidence; however, the displacement of large numbers of residents from the south of the country, from Beirut's southern suburb, and from the Beqaa Valley, and their seeking refuge in other areas of the country further reinforced national unity. This encounter, the first of its kind among Lebanon's various communities, saw the refugees received with open arms by all sectors of the Lebanese population and provided with all necessary means of livelihood.
Nothing is more indicative of this national unity than the results of a survey, conducted by the "Beirut Centre for Research and Information", to gauge the popular mood regarding various aspects of the war, between July 24-26, or two weeks after the onset of the Israeli aggression 21. With minor differences between the country's various religious communities which did not significantly impact on the survey's results, the responses revealed the following general trends:
a) In response to the question: "Do you support the resistance's operation to detain Israeli soldiers in order to exchange them for prisoners detained by Israel?" a little over 70%, or over two thirds of all communities, except for the Druze, and with differing percentages, said "Yes".
b) In response to the question: "Do you support the resistance's performance during the Israeli aggression on Lebanon?" about 87%, from across the religious spectrum, gave a positive answer.
c) In response to the question: "Do you believe that the resistance will be beaten by Israel?" over 63%, or around two thirds, said "No".
d) In response to the question: "Do you think that Israel and the United States will succeed in imposing their conditions on a seize-fire agreement?" around 67% of all respondents, or over two thirds, except for two religious communities, said "No".
e) To the question: "Do you believe that the United States is an honest broker in this war?" 90% of respondents from all religious communities said "No".
f) In response to the question: "Do you think the United States took a positive stance towards Lebanon in this war?" an overwhelming majority, or around 86% from among all religious communities, said "No".
g) In response to the question: "Do you believe that the Lebanese Government's political and diplomatic efforts would have been enough to repel this aggression?" almost two-thirds of the respondents from all religious communities, or 64%, said "No".
h) To the last question in the survey: "Do you think the Government did its duty to assist the displaced?" a simple majority of 54%, with varying percentages among the religious communities, said "No"
11. Regarding the future role of the resistance in Lebanon once the liberation of the Chebaa Farms and the exchange of prisoners have been achieved, and once the United Nations hands Lebanon the authentic map of the mines planted by Israel, as Resolution 1701 stipulates, the main remaining issue will be that of defending Lebanon against any future attacks by Israel. It will require the parties to reach an understanding on the development of an overall "national defence strategy" for Lebanon based on national consensus. This national strategy would delineate the exact and realistic role of the resistance according to what will be agreed upon among the parties. Thus, once the liberation role of the resistance comes to an end, its defensive role will be delineated by the terms of a national defence strategy.
12. Regarding the fear by some that Hezbollah might at some point use its weapons internally, it is important to note that since its establishment in 1982, Hezbollah has never used its resistance force domestically, but only for the purpose of liberating and defending Lebanese territory.
13. As for the relationship between the Lebanese resistance and regional powers, mainly Syria and Iran, numerous reliable studies by American strategic studies centres, and others such institutions, confirm Hezbollah's "non-dependence" on these powers. This, however, does not prevent it from benefiting from these countries' assistance in matters of armament and experience 22. It also does not prevent these powers from benefiting from the results of the Lebanese resistance's actions, for although the resistance's raison d'etre is purely Lebanese, the impact of its actions extends beyond Lebanon to the region as whole 23.
II
Regarding the effects of the war on Israel, the following can be said:
1. According to comments by observers within the country, Israel has failed to achieve its stated objectives, objectives which gradually became more modest as the war with the Lebanese resistance turned gradually to its disadvantage. In an interview Anthony Cordesman's conducted in Israel with a senior official, the latter summarised the five main objectives for which Israel went to war as follows: 24
a) The destruction of the "Iranian Eastern Command"25 before Iran becomes a nuclear state.
b) Reinstating Israel's deterrent capability after its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and from Gaza in 2005, and countering the impression that Israel was forced to withdraw due to its weakness.
c) Forcing Lebanon to become and act like a responsible state, and ending the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state in Lebanon.
d) Damaging or destroying Hezbollah while keeping in mind that it could not be totally destroyed as a military power and would continue to exist as a main political force in Lebanon.
e) Recuperating the two Israeli soldiers detained by Hezbollah alive without having to exchange them for a large number of prisoners in Israel - or for the thousands requested by Nasrallah and Hezbollah.
Many Israeli observers and military officials were of the opinion that Israel had failed to achieve all or most of these objectives 26.
2. The war's outcome had considerable impact on the "Israeli Defence Strategy" since, for the first time ever, Israel had to fight a war on its own territory; all Israel's other wars were fought outside its borders. Furthermore, all regions of Israel were now within reach of the Lebanese resistance's rockets and, before that, of the Palestinian Qassam rockets and, before that in 1991, of Iraq's scuds which rained on Haifa and Tel Aviv. Rockets launched by the Lebanese resistance were, however, the most effective and destructive. This in fact means that neither geography nor the Israeli separation wall are enough now to protect Israel.
3. One of the war's effects on Israel and its strategy is the abandonment of the unilateral withdrawal policy; the Israeli Prime Minister told his ministers after the cessation of hostilities that "as a result of the war in Lebanon and the extreme harm that befell the citizens in the north of the country, plans for unilateral withdrawal are no longer at the top of my Government's agenda...". This is contrary to what he had previously stated, namely that the Israeli Army's achievements in the war would help implement plans for unilateral withdrawal 27.
4. The idea of possible negotiations with Syria started being heard; Akiva Eldar wrote in Haaretz that "Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni a week ago appointed Yaacov Dayan (Yaki), who until recently was head of the diplomatic desk in the Foreign Ministry, as "project manager" to draw up a document dealing with the Israeli-Syrian relationship. Dayan has been asked to "present Livni and Foreign Ministry officials with a document detailing the chances for resuming the diplomatic dialogue with Syria in the light of Syrian and Israeli positions on substantive issues such as borders, security and normalization." He goes on to say: "Associates of Peretz say he has become convinced of the need to examine Assad's intentions. They say he views the Syrian president as an important factor in preventing a renewal of fighting on the northern border and in enforcing the arms embargo on Lebanon." However, Akiva Eldar continues by saying that "Prime Minister Ehud Olmert opposes any deviation from his strict policy of boycotting Syria..." 28
Regardless of the divergent views within Israel, this door has now been open while, before the war on Lebanon, it had been frimly closed for some time.
5. Voices were heard saying that Israel has to conduct itself like a part of this region rather than as an agent of the United States 29.
6. For the second time ever, the first being when Iraqi rockets were launched at Tel Aviv in 1991, more than a million Israelis were forced to abandon their homes and move southwards in search for refuge, while in major cities many more hunkered down in underground shelters. Besides causing a great deal of commotion, this had quite a psychological effect on many Israeli citizens and skewed their attitude towards the Arabs.
7. The losses which Israel admitted incurring in this war are as follows:
Statistics from Israel's war on Lebanon
Source: Gad Lithor and others, "The War in Numbers" Yodiot Ahronot, 15/8/2006. Remarks in brackets were added by us.
Killed 156
Billion Shekels in losses 25
Days of fighting 33
Rockets launched at Israel 3970
Soldiers killed 117
Civilians killed 39
Number of those injured 5000
Number of those hospitalised 311
Destroyed homes 12000
Burned trees 750,000
Terrorists killed (resistance deaths) 500
Number of soldiers who took part in the fighting 30,000
Air raids (launched by Israel against Lebanon) 15000
Hours ships sailed 800
Targets bombed (in Lebanon) 7000
Rocket launchers destroyed (in Lebanon) 126
Crashed helicopters and aircrafts 4
Helicopters downed 1
Meals distributed to the fighters (Israeli) 700,000
Loaves of bread the soldiers ate (Israeli) 780,000
Note: One U. S. dollar equals 4.3515 Shekel
According to figures by business owners, the total financial damage incurred by the country's economic sector as a result of the war (the industry, tourism, agricultural and commercial sectors in the north of the country) is estimated at 11.5 billion Shekels, or 1.9% of the gross national product. Damage to the industrial sector in the north alone was estimated at 4.7 billion Shekels, and economic experts estimate the cost of rebuilding all business concerns and factories in the north at 11 billion Shekels. 30
8. Contrary to the good performance of the Lebanese media campaign, the Israeli media campaign did not perform well at all. Jackie Hoji says: "We are able to say with certainty that from the point of view of the media campaign directed towards Lebanon and the Arab world, Israel has suffered a glaring defeat. It is glaring because the State cannot destroy a neighbouring country and not tell its citizens the reason why it did it..." 31
9. As for the impact of the war on Israeli public opinion, an opinion survey conducted in Israel recently 32 to gauge public views concerning the outcome of the war, reveals the following note-worthy indicators:
a) In response to a question about public satisfaction with Olmert, Peretz', and Haluts's performance during the war, support for Olmert dropped from 78% on 19/7/2006 to 40% on 15/8/2006; support for Minister of Defence Peretz went down from 61% on 19/7/2006 to 28% on 15/8/2006, and support for Joint Chief of Staff Haluts dropped to 44%.
Conclusion: these low numbers indicate general public disappointment in Israel with its political and military leaders.
b) In response to a question about who bears responsibility for the military failure; 40% blamed the Joint Chief of Staff (Haluts), 41% blamed Minister of Defence (Peretz), and 49% blamed Prime Minister (Olmert).
Conclusion: Israeli public opinion blames first and foremost the political establishment.
c) In response to the question about how Israelis will vote if elections to the Knesset were held today; Kadema got 29 seats (the same number it currently holds), Labour got 15 seats (today it holds 19 seats which means it lost 4 in the survey), and the Likud coalition got 20 seats (while today it holds 12, which means it gained 8 seats in the survey).
Conclusion: The survey's results shows punishment to the two parties in the ruling coalition, (Kadema and Labour), and favours the Likud right wing opposition (which includes Migdal and Ha Torah).
d) In response to the question concerning whether Israel should have agreed to a cease fire without first securing the return of the two captive Israeli soldiers; 70% said that Israel should not have agreed (as opposed to 27% who did).
Conclusion: 70% of Israelis believe that Israel did not achieve its objectives in the war (the return of the two soldiers).
e) In the response to the question about who won the war; 30% said that Israel won, while another 30% said Hezbollah had won.
Conclusion: i- the Israelis no longer believe that their state is always the winner in the war, and ii- Israeli efforts to convince the public that its army had won have come to naught.
III
The repercussions of the war on the Arab world could be manifested as follows:
1. There will be considerable moral repercussions, at both the Arab official and public levels, as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned. The focus would be on the fact that a resistance movement, led by a single Lebanese Party, was able to repel Israel, behind which stands the might of the United States, and to prevent it from occupying Lebanon. This resistance movement had inflicted heavy losses on Israel, both in the south of Lebanon and within Israel itself and forced it to reconsider its defensive strategy. The question on everyone's mind would be: if the Lebanese resistance was able to achieve all this on its own, what would happen if the resistance in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq pooled their efforts? In the same vein, what would happen if Arab regimes developed a policy of confrontation and pressure vis-ˆ-vis Israel instead of their current policy of submission to the U.S. and Israel? 33 The considerable achievement of the Lebanese resistance will impose, on both the Arab regimes and the people, the re-evaluation of the way they dealt so far with Israel and the means of achieving the just demands of the Palestinian and Arab people. Arab regimes would be at pain to justify their present policies.
2. The considerable achievement of the Lebanese resistance has already had a big impact on the Arab people, both spiritually and morally, by pulling them out of their depression and desperation, and dispelling their feelings of incapacity. It reinstated their optimism and jolted them out of their long hibernation; this was evidenced by the large demonstrations organised in most Arab capitals in defiance of the ban, imposed by some Arab regimes, on demonstrations.
3. The Lebanese resistance also imposed on some of these Arab Governments the re-evaluation of their positions regarding events unfolding in Lebanon. For after having at first accused the Lebanese resistance of "adventurism" and blamed it "for the destruction in Lebanon and posing a threat to peace in the region" 34, four days later on July 16, 2006, Arab Foreign Ministers at the end of a meeting in Cairo, and in light of the civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure inflicted by Israel, issued a statement in which "adventurism" and "threats to peace in the region" were conspicuously absent. They, however, confined themselves to supporting the position of the Lebanese Government and avoided any reference to the resistance itself. 35 The success and steadfastness of the Lebanese resistance changed the thrust of Arab propaganda, and Arab Foreign Ministers holding another emergency meeting, this time in Beirut on 8/8/2006, endorsed the seven point plan advanced by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Saniora in Rome and adopted by the Lebanese Government. Once again, their statement failed to support the Lebanese resistance by name and used general terms to express support for the Lebanese people and its endurance. It stated, among other, "the total rejection of all plans to turn Lebanon into a theatre of open confrontation to advance regional or international objectives at the detriment of the national interests of the Lebanese people, its security and stability. It expressed its total support for the steadfastness of the Government and people of Lebanon in the face of Israeli aggression and the policy of destruction and ruin pursued by Israel against the country's infrastructure and people. 36
4. Based on the wrong assumption that Israel, with support from the Untied States, will quickly overrun the South of Lebanon and destroy the resistance and Hezbollah, the war has once again brought to light, especially during its first week, the true identity of some Arab journalists and intellectuals who were either "sympathisers" or "collaborators" with the American publicity drive to market its view of the war. Their subsequent retractions, after the strong performance of the resistance and once it was too late, did not help them at all for their true colour had already become a matter of public knowledge.
5. Israel's failure to achieve its objectives in the war and the steadfastness of the resistance helped decrease American pressure on Syria, although this was not one of the aims of the confrontation between the resistance and Israel per se.
6. Israel's defeat in Lebanon will undoubtedly give the resistance in Palestine a needed boost. This is all the more undoubtedly interesting in light of the recent development, mentioned above, that the Israeli Government has abandoned its policy to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza and the West Bank to previously specified borders. This means that it, or any other government, will have to search for a new policy regarding the Palestinian issue. At the same time, various Palestinian resistance groups would greatly benefit from looking at how Hezbollah managed to prevent Israel from infiltrating its ranks and how they instead infiltrated Israel and obtained a lot of information about its weapons. Ominously, Israel has in fact managed to infiltrate all the Palestinian resistance groups and liquidate their leaderships, especially high officials in Hamas
7. There is also no doubt that the results achieved by the Lebanese resistance in the war will also have positive moral and tangible effects on the resistance in Iraq, for the following reasons:
a) The Lebanese resistance has proven right those who say that "resistance is the only means of liberation" and that no matter how strong the occupier is, the resistance will be capable of achieving miracles if it executes its plans well through "marriage of brains and faith."
b) The Iraqi resistance can benefit from the moral support and expertise of the Lebanese resistance. From the moral point of view, the speech by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's at the opening session of the Forth Arab Conference in Support of the Resistance" held in Beirut on 30/3/2006of view, marked an important development in the attitude of the Lebanese resistance towards its Iraqi counterpart. In his speech Nasrallah referred, among other, to the Iraqi resistance saying: 37
"Regarding the Iraq issue, we believe that armed resistance is the right and genuine option to bringing the American occupation to an end. We, as a resistance force that draws on its cultural and intellectual background, and based on our experience in the field, strongly believe in and openly endorse the Iraqi resistance and the need to support it and stand by its side. At the same time, we have to help strengthen it because the biggest challenge it faces now is internal strife. The resistance in Lebanon never got involved in internal civil strife, neither did the resistance in Palestine. I cannot conceive of an Iraqi hand that fights the American occupier turning against a fellow Iraqi. We have confirmed information that there are murderous gangs killing Sunnis and Shias that operate under direct orders from the Americans, the Zionists, and the British. However, this does not mean that there are no criminals and murderers also involved. We therefore have to bolster the resistance in Iraq which should now turn its focus on the occupation. Only then can it achieve victory over the occupier and not allow itself to be dragged into domestic sectarian machinations. The Iraqi resistance should also be cleansed to avoid mixing the blood of innocents with that of the occupiers. Engaging in a peace process only becomes acceptable when two conditions are met:
* Never giving up the option of resistance, and
* Tying the hands of the occupier by drawing a timetable for its departure.
This was the first time that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, expresses in such clear terms his support for the Iraqi resistance.
c) The display of national unity behind the Lebanese resistance and the absence of major sectarian disagreements in Lebanon during the war could help diminish the current sectarian and religious infighting in Iraq. It could also encourage some Iraqis, who have so far not joined the resistance, to do so.
d) The fact that the United States, who supported Israel's war on Lebanon, has failed to achieve its stated objectives in the war, namely the destruction and disarming the Lebanese resistance, has forced it to gradually retreat from its original demands on Lebanon. It evolved successively from its entrenched position during the G8 Summit in Russia which included, among other, a demand for the "immediate release of the two Israeli prisoners by Hezbollah", to the Rome conference, the first draft of the American-French resolution at the Security Council, to the final text of Resolution 1701. The fact that the Americans were forced to accept fundamental alterations to the text of the first resolution has led to the adoption of the much improved Resolution 1701, even if its terms are not entirely satisfactory. This evolution would not have taken place had it not been for the changing balance of power on the ground in Lebanon. The Lebanese resistance has thus proven that its achievements on the ground, and the launching of around four thousand rockets on Israel, could force the United States to change its policy, a fact that further confirms the all-important "pragmatism" at the heart of American policies. The Iraqi resistance can draw the right lessons from that, namely that what it achieves on the ground can impose fundamental changes to America's policies in Iraq and even force it to withdraw from the country.
e) This experience has also proven that other major powers in the world, such as the European Union, China, and Russia, who at first went along with the American position at the G8 Summit in Russia which eventually culminated in the first American-French draft resolution, can change their positions given the right conditions. For although the five permanent members had approved the first draft resolution, they soon changed their attitude and approved all the changes introduced to it. This again would not have taken place had it not been for the changing balance of power between Israel and the resistance on the ground in Lebanon.
The Iraqi resistance can also draw from that the valuable lesson that it should not rely on the initial and principled positions of the big powers, and that only its achievements on the ground and the personal interests of these countries, can bring about a significant change in attitude.
In light of this war's impact on the Lebanese resistance, Hezbollah, Israel, and the Arab world, we can arrive at two major conclusions:
1. If there is a will, and if brains and faith in one's cause coincide, victory can be achieved no matter what the obstacles are.
2. We are on the threshold of a major Arab upheaval that could usher in the many changes we were so far unable to achieve. The road is wide open to those who believe in the justice of their cause and are ready to make the necessary sacrifices.
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, of which he is Director-General.
1 The Repercussions on Lebanon È is the subject of a seminar which the Centre for Arab Unity Studies has held in Beirut from August 31 to September 1, 2006. Over fifty intellectuals and activists from inside and outside Lebanon were invited to attend in order to ensure that various points of view were represented in the seminar, which is one of the Center's main concerns.
2 See al-Akhbar, 15/8/2006. (in Arabic)
3 See for example: Robert Fisk, Hizbollah's Response Reveals Months of Planning, the Independent, 167/2006.
4 No one imagined that the Lebanese resistance had built an interconnected network of tunnels, supplied 24 hours with electricity and air-conditioning, and dug so deep that Israeli heavy missiles, including those supplied by America during the war, could not reach. Edward Cody and Molly Moore, the Best Guerilla Force in the World, Washington Post, 14/8/2006. p. A 01.
5 See for example: Ethmar Akher, ÇHezbollah's Secret Publicity Weapon È Yediot Ahronot, 18/8/2006 (translation from the source: 'Ata al-Qomeiry-Jerusalem).
6 Faleh Abdel-Jabbar: Ç Papers of Madness and the Pain of a Lebanese-Iraqi Memory (2-3) È, al-Nahar, 20/8/2006, p. 13. (in Arabic)
7 For more information about Hezbollah, see: Abdel-Ilah Balqaziz, ÇThe Resistance and the Liberation of the South Lebanon: Hezbollah from the Religious Hawza to the Front È (Beirut: Centre for Arab unity Studies 2000) (in Arabic), and ÇWho is Hezbollah? What are its Aims? (2-2): educational, propaganda, social, and religious institutions have made it the strongest on the Shiite scene bar noneÈ Report by Marlene Khalifeh, al-Nahar, 13/8/2006. (in Arabic)
8 Abdel-Jabbar, Ibid, p. 15.
9 ÇSayyed Hassan Nasrallah: a BiographyÈ published on page ... of this issue.
10 See Zeev Schiff, ÇSurprise of the WarÈ Haaretz, 18/8/2006; he says in his article that "the surprise of the second war in Lebanon was the anti tank weapons and the way Hezbollah used them. This indeed came as a surprise to the Israeli Army". He goes on to say: "most Israeli army casualties in the war this time were the result of anti tank weapons..."
11 In light of these casualties, the Pentagon had to set up a special section to develop an antidote to this weapon, after all other attempts have failed, and allocated a budget of over $3.3 billion for this purpose; there are no positive results so far. In Iraq the Pentagon is avoiding using land routes and is instead transporting as much as possible of its troops, equipment, weapons, and supplies by air, in spite of the added cost. See: Joseph L. Galloway, Supply Lines, and Iraq War Effort at Risk, Detroit Free Press, 4/8/2006; Michael R. Gordon, Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker, Insurgent Bombs Directed at GI's Increase in Iraq, New York Times, 17/8/2006; Renate Merle, Fighting Roadside Bombs: Low-Tech, High-Tech, Toy Box: Pentagon Seeks New Approach to a Deadly Problem in Iraq, Washington Post, 29/7/2006; Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Widens Program to Foil Bombings in Iraq, New York Times, 6/2/2006, and David Charter, US Blames New Bombs fro Rising Death Toll, Times, 27/10/2001.
12 Israel has assassinated Sheikh Ragheb Harb in 1984 and kidnapped Sheikh Abdel-Karim Obeid in 1989; in 1992 is assassinated Sayyed Abbas Mousawi who at that time was Hezbollah's Secretary General, and in 1994, kidnapped Mostapha al-Dirani (abu Ali). All of the above were members of Hezbollah's leadership, and the kidnappings were carried out by Israel inside Lebanese territory. Israel used car bombs to kill Jihad Jibril (2002), Ali Saleh (2003), and Ghaleb 'Awaly (2004). Why can Israel to kidnap, assassinate, and blow up leaders and members of Hezbollah without its action being considered an armed aggression, while Hezbollah's kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers is considered as such and gives Israel the right to defend itself and perpetrate barbaric acts from the air that killed over a thousand civilians and destroyed the infrastructure of Lebanon including bridges, roads and more...?
Not to mention the kidnappings that the Israeli authorities are carrying out in Gaza and the West Bank in occupied Palestine; it kidnaped members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a number of the PNA's ministers who came to power through democratic election recognized as such by the United States and Israel itself. No condemnations by the United Nations were heard in spite of the fact that these acts violate the 1949 Geneva Convention and its articles concerning the responsibilities of occupying powers.
13 See: Seymour Hersh, Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interest in Israel's War, New Yorker (21 August 2006), and Matthew Kalman, Israel Set War Plan More than a Year Ago: Strategy was Put in Motion as Hezbollah Began Increasing its Military Strength, San Francisco Chronicle, 21/7/2006.
14 See: al-Safeer, 13/7/2006. (in Arabic)
15 See the text of the speech in al-Safeer, 26/7/2006, p. 7. (in Arabic)
16 Marwan Iskandar, "the Renaissance Tomorrow or the Day After", al-Nahar, 20/8/2006, p. 1 and 12 (in Arabic); he estimates the material and financial losses from the war at around seven billion dollars including the cost of absent profits from the stunted growth estimated a $1.4 - 1.5 billion and costs due to the damage to the infrastructure which he estimated at around $1.2 billion. He further estimates the cost of destroyed houses at $2.25 and losses of the state treasury from fees and taxes, emergency relief costs, closure of the airport and port, and retreat of income from added value taxes at no less than $600 million. Finally, he estimates losses from the lost tourist season and the retreat of investments at $1.5 billion.
17 Ibid
18 See: Jihad al-Khazen, "Eyes and Ears", al-Hayat, 19/8/2006, p. 20 (in Arabic), and "The Options Narrow", the Guardian, 19/8/2006.
19 About this subject, see for example, the distinguished positions of President Salim al-Hoss regarding the issue, and the distinguished article by Bishop George Khader. See: George Khader "the Resistance and the Future Lebanon", al-Nahar, 12/8/2006. (in Arabic)
20 See the current Lebanese Government's ministerial statement on Ühttp://www.pcm.gov.lbÝ
21 See: Poll Finds Support for Hezbollah's Retaliation, Daily Star, 9/7/2006.
22 This is also what Egyptian researcher Naser Hamed abu Zeid says, namely that those who say that Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into a war to the advantage of third parties - specifically Iran and Syria - have to reconsider their positions. There is a clear difference between accepting assistance and subservience; subservience does not achieve victory. See: Naser Hamed abu-Zeid "For the Sake of a better Future: Don't Allow Politics to Turn Victory into Defeat", al-Safeer, 18/8/2006. (in Arabic)
23 See for example Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's interview with the Turkish Labor Party "Evrensel" on 12/13/2006, also published in Counterpunch News Service on 17/8/2006, in which he denies that Hezbollah is led by Tehran, says this is a big lie, and that the Party is an independent Lebanese organization that receives orders from no one. Also see Hersh, Watching Lebanon: Washington Interest in Israel's War; Anthony Cordesman: Lebanese Security and the Hezbollah, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Revised Working Draft, 14 July, 2006; and Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon, CSIS, 15 July, 2006. Also see the report by Anthony Cordesman about the Israeli war on Lebanon in which he bases his findings on information in the media and that supplied by Israeli and Arab information and research centers, and on his visits to Israel and to the front during the war during which he spoke to senior Israeli officers and experts in: Anthonly H. Cordesman, Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollar War, CSIS, Revised Working Draft, 17 August 2006, pp. 15-16, in which he says that no Israeli serviceman, intelligence or military officer, felt that Hezbollah had acted (in this war) under orders from Iran or Syria. As to the issue of who was using whom, the unanimous answer was that all sides - Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria - were very happy to benefit from one another.
24 Cordesman "Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War", p. 2.
25 Reference to Hezbollah and Syria.
26 See Alexei Fishman, "Why didn't we Win", Yediot Ahronot, 18/8/2006; Zeev Schiff: "The Surprise of the War", "The War on Lebanon: Failed Strategy Management", Haaretz, 1/8/2006, and "The War in Lebanon: the Time that Remains", Haaretz, 3/8/2006; Akiva Eldar, "This is how we Fell into the Iranian Trap", Haaretz, 20/7/2006.
Stratfor, Special Report: The Battle Joined, 21 July, 2006; Guy Chazan, Karby Leggett, and Neil King, Why Israel's Plans to Curb Hezbollah Went so Poorly, Wall Street Journal, 19/8/2006, p. 1; and Uri Avnery, From Mania to Depression, 16 August, 2006.
27 See Yosi Firter "Impact of the war in Lebanon: the Prime Minister to the ministers: unilateral withdrawal is not longer on the agenda", Haaretz, 18/8/2006.
28 See: Akiva Eldar, "After the War: Livni appoints official in charge of potential negotiations with Syria", Haaretz, 20/8/2006.
29 Martin Jacques, American Support May no Longer be Enough: Israel's Long-term Future Lies in Connecting with its Arab Neighbors, not a Western Superpower Thousands of Miles Away, the Guardian, 14/8/2006.
30 Ronit Morgenstern, Ç The Cost of Rebuilding is 11 billion Shekels È, Maariv, 15/8/2006.
31 See Jackie Hoji , Ç Failure of the Media" Maariv, 25/7.2006; Jonathan Cook, Lebanese Deaths, and Israeli War Crimes Kept off the Balance Sheet, Information Clearing House, 16 August, 2006.
32 Maariv, 16/8/2006.
33 See: David Hirst, Hizbullah Has Achieved What Arab States only Dreamed of, the Guardian, 17/8/2006.
34 A Saudi official had declared on 13/7/2006 that the "Kingdom clearly believes that there should be a difference between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventurism on the part of elements from within a state, or from behind its back, undertaken without coordination or the knowledge of the legal authorities and without any consultation or coordination with Arab countries".
Later on, a joint statement was issued at the end of a visit undertaken by King Abdullah II to Egypt on 14/7/2006 and his meeting with President Husni Mubarak. The statement warned of the "danger of the Middle East region slipping into a war that would thwart efforts leading to peace and opening the door for a new round of violence and tension the extent of which no one can predict." The statement also condemned the "the wide-scale Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories... etc.), and insisted on the "need to resolve the current dangerous situation on the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts that would involve the release of prisoners as a way to ending the current deteriorating situation." The statement underlined the "need for all parties in the region to exercise maximum restraint and responsibility and not undertake any irresponsible actions that would lead to an escalation and drag the region towards unpredictable confrontations the consequences of which would be borne by the states and people of the region." They emphasized the "need to maintain stability in the Middle East and prevent a deterioration of the situation in a manner that makes it difficult to reverse." The two leaders warned against "dragging the region into adventures that do not serve Arab interests and causes" and expressed their total support for the Lebanese Government... and the establishment of its authority on the entire country. See: "the Rulers of Egypt and Jordan Join the Saudi Position: the adventures of the resistance do not serve Arab interests", al-Safeer, 15/7/2006 (in Arabic), quoting news agencies. It is worth noticing that the very first statements by some Arab leaders were made after telephone calls by Mr. Bush on them to that effect. See: Richard Walffe. Backstage At The Crisis. Newsweek, July 31, 2006, pp 18-31, and specially the top column of p. 24, in which he reveals Mr. Bush's telephone contacts with King Abdullah of Jordan, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora of Lebanon, with the presence of Condalica Rise and Hadley (his security advisor).
It was also later reported in Newsweek about the involvement of Saudi Arabia, when it was mentioned that "Even the few countries that she ]Condalica Rise[ and Bush had pointed to as supporters, like Saudi Arabia, were now bitterly criticizing Israel's part in the war. And the Saudis were incensed that Washington publicized their initial statement blaming Hezbollah, using Riyadh to legitimize Israel's air campaign. See Michael Hirsh. Pounding The Keys. Newsweek, August 7, 2006, pp. 21.
35 The Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Cairo on 15/7/2006 and issued the following statement:
1. Condemn the Israeli aggression on Lebanon that contravenes all international resolutions, laws and regulations, and salutes the spirit of martyrs and the steadfastness of the Lebanese people and their unity and solidarity which is essential in the face of aggression.
2. Express total solidarity with Lebanon and support its steadfastness in the face of this unjust aggression to which civilians are subjected, including the killing of innocent people and causing large-scale material and economic destruction.
3. Totally endorse Lebanon's complaint to the Security Council and in turn, requests the Security Council to adopt an immediate cease-fire resolution and raising the embargo on Lebanon.
4. Express their support for Lebanon's declared intention to adhere to and respect international legitimacy and the Blue Line.
5. Confirm their total support for the Lebanese Government in its determination to exercise its responsibility of protecting Lebanon and the Lebanese people and ensuring their safety, and reaffirm its right and duty to spread its authority over its entire territory and exercise its sovereignty inside and outside the country.
6. Consider Israel's ongoing destruction and killing of the Lebanese people makes the current situation even more difficult and complicated and leads to the undermining of stability, peace and security in the region.
7. Believe that Israel should bear the responsibility of compensating Lebanon for all the losses and destruction resulting from its aggression on the Lebanese territory.'
36 See the closing statement in al-Nahar, 8/8/2006, p. 5. (in Arabic)
37 See the complete text of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech in al-Anwar, 31/3/2006. (in Arabic)

RADIO-CANADA
Guy Fournier dans l'embarras
Caroline Touzin
Hugo Dumas
La Presse
Le président du conseil d'administration de Radio-Canada, Guy Fournier, a enragé la communauté libanaise du Québec en écrivant une fausseté sur la sexualité au Liban dans le magazine populaire 7 jours publié la semaine dernière. Ses propos ont aussi causé un malaise à la société d'État.
« Au Liban, la loi permet aux hommes d'avoir des relations sexuelles avec des animaux à la condition qu'il s'agisse de femelles! Faire la même chose avec des bêtes mâles peut entraîner la peine de mort! » a-t-il écrit dans le magazine le plus vendu au Québec.
Chaque semaine, M. Fournier remplit deux pages de faits cocasses, statistiques et blagues sous forme de capsules. Ce fait erroné se trouvait dans sa capsule hebdomadaire Bizarre? Mets-en!.
Des membres de la communauté libanaise, tant chrétiens, musulmans que juifs, sont insultés. «Aucune loi au Liban ne permet une telle chose. Une loi interdit une relation sexuelle avec un être de même sexe, mais il n'est pas question d'animal», explique l'avocat Joseph Daoura de la société d'avocats montréalaise Ferland, Marois, Lanctôt.
Me Daoura compte envoyer une mise en demeure ce matin à TVA publications, propriétaire du 7 jours et filiale de Quebecor media, lui demandant de se rétracter. La mise en demeure est au nom d'Alain-Michel Ayache, chargé de cours en science politique et spécialiste du Moyen-Orient à l'UQAM. «C'est inacceptable de publier une fausseté pareille au Québec. C'est choquant pour tous les Libanais», a dit M. Ayache, lui-même d'origine libanaise.
Guy Fournier n'a pas écrit la source de son information dans le 7 jours. Interrogé par La Presse, il s'est amusé de la controverse. «Il ne faut pas partir en guerre pour rien. Je ne comprends pas que ça puisse insulter des gens. Dans n'importe quel contexte, c'est plutôt drôle», a-t-il dit. Sa source est un courriel envoyé par un ami de Los Angeles qui s'intéresse aux «bizarreries du monde». M. Fournier, aussi ancien directeur des programmes de TQS, n'a pas contre-vérifié l'information.
«Ce n'est peut-être pas dans la loi actuelle du Liban. C'est peut-être une vieille loi qui date du Moyen Âge. Si c'est faux, je ferai un rectificatif», a-t-il ajouté. La directrice de la rédaction du 7 jours, Hélène Fleury, dit n'avoir reçu aucune plainte, hier. Elle n'a pas non plus vérifié l'information. «J'ai déjà lu que ce genre de pratique se faisait dans certains pays musulmans d'Afrique. Ça ne m'a pas frappé que Guy parlait du Liban», a-t-elle affirmé.
Ce genre de fausseté ne fait qu'attiser la colère et la mauvaise conception d'une religion dans une société, croit Patrice Brodeur, titulaire de la chaire Islam, pluralisme et globalisation de l'Université de Montréal. «Sur Internet, il y a des tas de rumeurs pour discréditer l'islam», explique-t-il.
Un musulman libanais arrivé au Québec il y a trois mois abonde dans le même sens. «La loi islamique indique que les hommes musulmans peuvent avoir des relations sexuelles uniquement avec les femmes qui leur sont de droit. Ça m'a fait mal au coeur de lire qu'on avait des relations sexuelles avec des animaux», a dit Omar Abou-Zaher.
Un autre Québécois d'origine libanaise, de religion juive celui-là, souhaite que le consul du Liban à Montréal porte plainte au nom de sa communauté. «Nous sommes un peuple civilisé et instruit, c'est insultant de tenir de tels propos», a dit Moïse Moghrabi.
Malaise à la SRC
Les maladresses de Guy Fournier irritent de plus en plus les employés de la SRC qui travaillent à Montréal, selon nos informations. «On commence à être un peu gênés d'avoir un gars comme ça comme président. Il perd beaucoup de crédibilité dans l'industrie. Et on commence à se poser de sérieuses questions sur son leadership», confie une source à la direction qui souhaite garder l'anonymat.
Le 9 mai, sur les ondes de CBC à Saint-Jean, au Nouveau-Brunswick, Guy Fournier a déclaré que Radio-Canada a nui à la cause de l'unité nationale en manquant parfois d'objectivité dans l'information qu'elle a diffusée. Plusieurs journalistes ont été heurtés par ces propos, dont la correspondante Sophie Langlois. «On n'en revenait pas que le président du conseil d'administration puisse avoir cette incompréhension de notre travail», avait-elle répliqué.
Peu de temps après, Guy Fournier a accordé une longue entrevue à une radio communautaire de Toronto sur le plaisir qu'il éprouve à déféquer. Pendant 12 minutes, l'auteur de Jamais deux sans toi a causé d'excréments.
Hier, la dernière chronique de Guy Fournier dans le magazine 7 Jours a provoqué un malaise à la SRC. «Nous n'avons pas de commentaires à faire. Il a dit ça en son nom propre et non au nom de Radio-Canada», soutient Pascale Montminy, directrice des relations publiques institutionnelles de la SRC, à Ottawa.

Benoît XVI plaide pour que l'on associe foi et raison
Rome, MERCREDI 13 SEPTEMBRE 2006 - Dans une très longue intervention en allemand, intitulée "Foi, raison et Université - Souvenirs et réflexions", Benoît XVI a ainsi proposé une réflexion sur la conception chrétienne de Dieu et sur la vision de l’islam à son égard.
Benoît XVI dans l'Aula Magna de l'Université de Ratisbonne
"Foi, raison et Université - Souvenirs et réflexions"
Pour un véritable dialogue des cultures et des religions
C’est seulement en réconciliant foi et raison "que nous serons capables d’un véritable dialogue" des cultures et des religions, un dialogue dont nous avons un besoin urgent. C’est ce qu’a déclaré Benoît XVI, le 12 septembre 2006, en fin d’après-midi, lors de sa rencontre avec les représentants du monde scientifique, à l’Université de Ratisbonne. Citant l'exemple de la guerre sainte de l'islam, le djihad, le pape s'est opposé à "la diffusion de la foi par la violence".
Dans une très longue intervention en allemand, intitulée "Foi, raison et Université - Souvenirs et réflexions", Benoît XVI a ainsi proposé une réflexion sur la conception chrétienne de Dieu et sur la vision de l’islam à son égard. Devant plusieurs centaines d'invités, dans l'Aula Magna de l'Université de Ratisbonne, il a aussi critiqué la société occidentale moderne qui a écarté la foi de la raison.
Même devant "un scepticisme radical" sur l’existence de Dieu, il reste "nécessaire et raisonnable de s’interroger sur Dieu au travers de la raison", a d’abord affirmé le pape, "et cela doit être fait dans le contexte de la tradition de la foi chrétienne". Il s’est ainsi penché sur l’articulation entre foi et raison, offrant aussi une réflexion sur l’Islam et le christianisme, l'Orient et l'Occident.
Se fondant sur un texte publié par le prêtre et universitaire Théodore Khoury, il a proposé un regard chrétien sur le djihad, la guerre sainte, contenue dans le Coran. Pour les chrétiens, "la diffusion de la foi par la violence" est "déraisonnable", a affirmé le pape en citant l’empereur byzantin Manuel II Paléologue, au 14e siècle. Car "la violence est en contraste avec la nature de Dieu et la nature de l’âme". La foi étant "le fruit de l’âme", celui qui "veut conduire quelqu’un à la foi a besoin de la capacité de bien parler et de raisonner correctement, et non de la violence et de la menace", a poursuivi le pape, citant les propos de l’empereur byzantin.
La société occidentale moderne a écarté la foi de la raison
"L’affirmation décisive dans cette argumentation contre la conversion par la violence est: ne pas agir selon la raison est contraire à la nature de Dieu". Pour l’empereur byzantin, ayant grandi dans la philosophie grecque, cette affirmation est "évidente". "Pour la doctrine musulmane, au contraire, Dieu est absolument transcendant" et sa volonté "n’est liée à aucune de nos catégories", fût-ce celle même "de la raison", a expliqué le pape.
"C'est là que s’ouvre, dans la compréhension de Dieu et donc dans la réalisation concrète de la religion, un dilemme qui nous défie aujourd’hui de façon très directe", a alors estimé Benoît XVI: "la conviction qu’agir contre la raison est en contradiction avec la nature de Dieu est-elle seulement une pensée grecque ou vaut-elle toujours, et pour elle-même ?". Et le pape de répondre: "je pense que, sur ce point, se manifeste la profonde concordance entre ce qui est grec, dans le meilleur sens du terme, et ce qu’est la foi en Dieu sur le fondement de la Bible". En effet, d’après lui, "Dieu agit avec logos", avec "raison et parole", une raison "qui est créatrice et capable de se communiquer".
Le pape a alors opéré un développement sur l’articulation entre le message biblique et la pensée grecque. Ce rapprochement, "engagé depuis longtemps" entre la foi biblique et l’interrogation philosophique de la pensée grecque est "une donnée d’importance décisive non seulement du point de vue de l’histoire des religions, a-t-il estimé, mais aussi de celui de l’histoire universelle, une donnée qui nous engage encore aujourd’hui".
"Il n’est donc pas surprenant que le christianisme, malgré son origine et ses développements importants en Orient, ait finalement trouvé sa marque historiquement décisive en Europe", a aussi commenté le pape. Cette rencontre "a créé l’Europe et reste le fondement de ce qu’on peut appeler l’Europe".
Benoît XVI a regretté ensuite que l’ethos et la religion "tombent dans l’environnement de la discrétion personnelle", ce qui est "une condition dangereuse pour l’humanité". "Nous le constatons dans les pathologies menaçantes de la religion et de la raison, a estimé le souverain pontife, pathologies qui nécessairement doivent éclater quand la raison est réduite au point que les questions de la religion et de l’ethos ne la regardent plus".
Ce qui dans le développement moderne est "valide" doit néanmoins "être reconnu sans réserve", a poursuivi le pape. "Nous savons tous gré des grandioses possibilités qu’il a ouvertes à l’homme et pour les progrès dans le champ humain". "L’ethos de la scientificité" est d’ailleurs "volonté d’obéissance à la vérité" et donc "expression" d’une attitude chrétienne, a-t-il souligné.
Le pape Benoît XVI a seulement appelé à un "élargissement de notre concept de raison et de son usage". "Parce que, voyant les menaces qui émergent des possibilités de l’homme, nous devons nous demander comment les dominer". Nous y réussissons seulement "si raison et foi se retrouvent unies de façon nouvelle", si nous "dépassons la limitation auto-décrétée de la raison à ce qui est vérifiable dans l’expérience, et si nous lui ouvrons à nouveau toute son amplitude", a-t-il estimé.
"Seulement ainsi, nous devenons aussi capables d’un vrai dialogue des cultures et des religions – un dialogue dont nous avons un besoin si urgent", a-t-il encore insisté. En effet, une raison qui devant le divin "est sourde et repousse la religion dans le cadre des sous-cultures, est incapable de s’insérer dans le dialogue des cultures". C’est donc à "la grandeur de la raison que nous invitons nos interlocuteurs dans le dialogue des cultures", a conclu le pape sous les applaudissements nourris des enseignants et des élèves de l'Université de Ratisbonne où il enseigna dans les années 70. Dans "sa leçon" donnée à ses pairs, le pape a confié que c’était pour lui un moment "émouvant" que de se tenir à nouveau sur la chaire de l’Université.
Texte intégral du discours du saint Père, dès traduction

Tous les articles concernant le voyage du Saint Père en Bavière: Benoît XVI
Sources: Vatican - © Ctb/apic/imedia/ar/ami/be
Eucharistie sacrement de la miséricorde - 13.09.2006 - BENOÎT XVI
Benoît XVI redoute un choc des civilisations avec l'islam Hervé Yannou . Publié le 13 septembre 2006Actualisé le 13 septembre 2006 : 08h16 Benoît XVI, lors d'une messe en Pologne.
Benoît XVI, lors d'une messe en Pologne.
(AFP/V. Pinto).
En complément
Le 11/09 dans Le Figaro: Benoît XVI préfère l'évangélisation à «l'activisme social»
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AVANT de se recueillir aujourd'hui sur la tombe de ses parents, Benoît XVI est, hier, redevenu le professeur Ratzinger. Après une plongée, lundi, dans la Bavière de son enfance, au sanctuaire marial d'Altötting, le Pape a célébré la dernière grande messe de son voyage en Bavière à Ratisbonne, où il a autrefois enseigné. S'il n'avait fait aucun commentaire personnel pour le cinquième anniversaire des attentats du 11 Septembre, hier il a pour la première fois livré une réflexion sur l'islam.
Il a surtout mis en garde l'Occident contre un choc de civilisations qui pourrait lui être fatal.
Devant les «pathologies et les maladies mortelles de la religion et de la raison» qui détruisent l'image de Dieu «à cause de la haine et du fanatisme», il a ainsi demandé à 260 000 fidèles de dire «en quel Dieu ils croient» et de professer «le visage d'un Dieu humain». C'est, selon lui, le seul moyen de se libérer de «l'athéisme moderne». Mais c'est aussi dans ce diagnostic que réside la différence fondamentale entre le christianisme et le monde musulman.
Une vision différente de Dieu
C'est dans l'après-midi et dans l'atmosphère familière du grand amphithéâtre de l'université de Ratisbonne, que le Pape a livré sa démonstration devant un aréopage d'universitaires. Il a conduit sa réflexion sur le rapport entre religion, raison et science, en partant de l'Islam. Filant la métaphore à partir d'une controverse qui a bien eu lieu au XIVe siècle entre un empereur byzantin prêt à céder aux assauts de l'Islam ottoman et un lettré musulman, le Pape a rappelé que «la violence est contraire à la nature de Dieu» et à la raison, à laquelle est liée «la compréhension de Dieu et donc la réalisation concrète de la religion». Si ceci est évident pour un chrétien, en revanche la conception musulmane de Dieu «n'est liée à aucune de nos catégories, fusse-t-elle celle de la raison».
Pour Benoît XVI, chrétiens et musulmans ne partagent donc ni la même philosophie et surtout pas la même vision de Dieu. Le christianisme héritier du monde grec antique est, lui, lié à la raison. C'est cette rencontre entre chrétienté et philosophie antique qui «demeure le fondement de ce que l'on peut appeler avec raison l'Europe», a ainsi déclaré le Pape, qui doit se rendre en Turquie à la fin du mois de novembre.
Ainsi, si le monde occidental qui «domine largement la pensée» veut conserver sa suprématie, il ne doit pas croire que «Dieu est superflu» et opposer science et foi chrétienne. En effet, «les cultures profondément religieuses du monde voient dans l'exclusion du divin une attaque contre leur conviction les plus intimes». L'Occident chrétien «repoussant la religion dans le champ de la sous-culture» serait incapable «de s'insérer dans le dialogue des cultures». Le Pape en concluant sa journée par une rencontre avec des représentants orthodoxes et protestants dans la cathédrale de Ratisbonne, leur a ainsi demandé de constituer une sorte
Le pape a célébré la dernière grande messe de son voyage en Bavière à Ratisbonne devant 260 000 fidèles.
AVANT de se recueillir aujourd'hui sur la tombe de ses parents, Benoît XVI est, hier, redevenu le professeur Ratzinger. Après une plongée, lundi, dans la Bavière de son enfance, au sanctuaire marial d'Altötting, le Pape a célébré la dernière grande messe de son voyage en Bavière à Ratisbonne, où il a autrefois enseigné. S'il n'avait fait aucun commentaire personnel pour le cinquième anniversaire des attentats du 11 Septembre, hier il a pour la première fois livré une réflexion sur l'islam.
Il a surtout mis en garde l'Occident contre un choc de civilisations qui pourrait lui être fatal.
Devant les «pathologies et les maladies mortelles de la religion et de la raison» qui détruisent l'image de Dieu «à cause de la haine et du fanatisme», il a ainsi demandé à 260 000 fidèles de dire «en quel Dieu ils croient» et de professer «le visage d'un Dieu humain». C'est, selon lui, le seul moyen de se libérer de «l'athéisme moderne». Mais c'est aussi dans ce diagnostic que réside la différence fondamentale entre le christianisme et le monde musulman.
Une vision différente de Dieu
C'est dans l'après-midi et dans l'atmosphère familière du grand amphithéâtre de l'université de Ratisbonne, que le Pape a livré sa démonstration devant un aréopage d'universitaires. Il a conduit sa réflexion sur le rapport entre religion, raison et science, en partant de l'Islam. Filant la métaphore à partir d'une controverse qui a bien eu lieu au XIVe siècle entre un empereur byzantin prêt à céder aux assauts de l'Islam ottoman et un lettré musulman, le Pape a rappelé que «la violence est contraire à la nature de Dieu» et à la raison, à laquelle est liée «la compréhension de Dieu et donc la réalisation concrète de la religion». Si ceci est évident pour un chrétien, en revanche la conception musulmane de Dieu «n'est liée à aucune de nos catégories, fusse-t-elle celle de la raison».
Pour Benoît XVI, chrétiens et musulmans ne partagent donc ni la même philosophie et surtout pas la même vision de Dieu. Le christianisme héritier du monde grec antique est, lui, lié à la raison. C'est cette rencontre entre chrétienté et philosophie antique qui «demeure le fondement de ce que l'on peut appeler avec raison l'Europe», a ainsi déclaré le Pape, qui doit se rendre en Turquie à la fin du mois de novembre.
Ainsi, si le monde occidental qui «domine largement la pensée» veut conserver sa suprématie, il ne doit pas croire que «Dieu est superflu» et opposer science et foi chrétienne. En effet, «les cultures profondément religieuses du monde voient dans l'exclusion du divin une attaque contre leur conviction les plus intimes». L'Occident chrétien «repoussant la religion dans le champ de la sous-culture» serait incapable «de s'insérer dans le dialogue des cultures». Le Pape en concluant sa journée par une rencontre avec des représentants orthodoxes et protestants dans la cathédrale de Ratisbonne, leur a ainsi demandé de constituer une sorte de front commun, «d'être les témoins d'un mode de vie» dans «un monde plein de confusion».

Compte rendu
Benoît XVI souligne les limites du dialogue entre les confessions
LE MONDE | 06.09.06 | 15h21 • Mis à jour le 06.09.06 | 15h21
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our la première fois, le pape Benoît XVI s'est prononcé sur le sujet sensible du dialogue entre les religions, dans un message lu devant l'assemblée annuelle de la communauté de Sant'Egidio qui s'est tenue, lundi 4 et mardi 5 septembre, à Assise (Ombrie).
C'est à Assise, la ville de Saint-François (1181-1226), qu'il y a vingt ans, le 27 octobre 1986, Jean Paul II avait réuni les 200 plus hauts responsables de toutes les confessions du monde, invités à prier ensemble (chacun dans son rite) pour la paix. Cet événement était resté comme l'un des plus marquants du pontificat du pape polonais. Il avait donné un coup de fouet au dialogue entre les religions. Mais à l'enthousiasme d'il y a vingt ans a succédé, devant la montée des fondamentalismes religieux, surtout depuis le 11-Septembre, un profond scepticisme.
Après la fin de la guerre froide et l'"échec du rêve de paix", le troisième millénaire s'est ouvert, observe Benoît XVI, "avec des scénarios de terrorisme et de violence qui ne semblent pas devoir disparaître". Et, dans la carte des conflits, "les différences culturelles et religieuses constituent des motifs d'instabilité et de menace". D'où la confusion entretenue entre religion et violence.
Pour lui, l'"esprit d'Assise" - la concorde entre les autorités spirituelles de la planète - est plus nécessaire que jamais. Il salue l'initiative prise par son prédécesseur, en 1986, dans la cité de Saint-François, qu'il qualifie de "prophétie d'actualité". Et, avec la même fermeté, il répète qu'"il n'est permis à personne de prendre argument de la religion comme présupposé ou prétexte à une attitude belliqueuse à l'égard d'autres êtres humains". La religion doit unir, et non diviser.
RECENTRAGE NÉCESSAIRE
Le pape allemand propose donc une "pédagogie efficace" de la paix centrée sur "l'amitié, l'accueil réciproque, le dialogue entre les hommes de diverses cultures et diverses religions". Car le chemin de la paix, comme celui du conflit, se trouve dans le "coeur" de l'homme : "Malgré les différences qui caractérisent les diverses traditions religieuses, la reconnaissance de l'existence de Dieu (...) ne peut pas ne pas disposer les croyants à considérer les autres êtres humains comme des frères".
Là s'arrêtent les similitudes avec Jean Paul II. Car, plus que son prédécesseur, le pape s'inquiète de l'inefficacité de ce dialogue, de ses risques et de ses limites. Dans son message, il met en garde contre toute fausse interprétation de l'esprit d'Assise : "La rencontre interreligieuse de prières (ne doit pas) prêter à des interprétations syncrétiques, fondées sur un relativisme qui nierait le sens même de la vérité et la possibilité de l'atteindre." Un recentrage est donc nécessaire : oui au dialogue entre les confessions ; non à la confusion et à la dilution de l'identité chrétienne.
Ce n'était pas un mystère que le cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, chargé de la doctrine sous Jean Paul II, n'appréciait que modérément ces assemblées d'Assise, auxquelles il refusait de participer. Il avait pris ses distances avec des célébrations interreligieuses dans lesquelles il craignait un certain syncrétisme. Les catholiques traditionalistes allaient plus loin que lui, qualifiant Assise de "carnaval insupportable".
Devenu pape, il a marqué sa différence sur ce sujet. Il a rappelé à l'ordre les franciscains d'Assise, promoteurs de manifestations interconfessionnelles devenues des rendez-vous pacifistes, écologiques et altermondialistes. Il a aussi écarté de la Curie Mgr Michael Fitzgerald, président du conseil pontifical pour le dialogue interreligieux.
Et, au nom d'une conception plus culturelle que théologique de la relation avec l'islam, il a fusionné les deux "ministères" de la culture et du dialogue interreligieux sous l'autorité du cardinal français Paul Poupard. Juste après l'affaire des caricatures de Mahomet, le meurtre de prêtres en Turquie et des émeutes antichrétiennes dans quelques pays musulmans, cette double décision avait valeur de signal. Le dialogue avec l'islam en particulier serait placé sous le signe d'une plus grande fermeté.
Henri Tincq
Article paru dans l'édition du 07.09.06

http://eucharistiemisericor.free.fr/index.php?page=1309069_foi_raison_benoit_xvi

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20060913.FIG000000090_benot_xvi_redoute_un_choc_des_civilisations_avec_l_islam.html

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-810023@51-810140,0.html