LCCC ENGLISH NEWS BULLETIN
October 10/06
Biblical Reading For today
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 10,25-37.
There was a scholar of the law who stood up to test him and said, "Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?"Jesus said to him, "What is written in the law? How do you read it?" He said in reply, "You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your being, with all your strength, and with all your mind, and your neighbor as yourself." He replied to him, "You have answered correctly; do this and you will live." But because he wished to justify himself, he said to Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?" Jesus replied, "A man fell victim to robbers as he went down from Jerusalem to Jericho. They stripped and beat him and went off leaving him half-dead. A priest happened to be going down that road, but when he saw him, he passed by on the opposite side.Likewise a Levite came to the place, and when he saw him, he passed by on the opposite side. But a Samaritan traveler who came upon him was moved with compassion at the sight. He approached the victim, poured oil and wine over his wounds and bandaged them. Then he lifted him up on his own animal, took him to an inn and cared for him. The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to the innkeeper with the instruction, 'Take care of him. If you spend more than what I have given you, I shall repay you on my way back.' Which of these three, in your opinion, was neighbor to the robbers' victim?" He answered, "The one who treated him with mercy." Jesus said to him, "Go and do likewise."
Free Opinions
The Taef Agreement: The Curse of Lebanon.By:Etienne Sacre “Abu Arz”10.10.06
Berri and Siniora survived one crisis, but can they prevent more of them? Daily Star 10.10.06
Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination Stage-Dr.Walid Phares 10.10.06
Latest New from the Daily Star for October 10/06
Ghajar: a nice place to visit, but you wouldn't want to be shot there
Higher Judicial Council approves appointments of 500 judges
Lahoud says government 'monopolizing' authority
Israel finally hands over mine maps to UNIFIL
Berri says Saudi clout is key to facing Lebanon's challenges
Prodi to arrive today forgoodwill visit
Why should Siniora go but Lahoud stay?
Cabinet: no funds for illegal structuresVandals target vehicle belonging to ISF officer in Horsh Tabet
French tour group visits Lebanon to support ailing tourism sector
Beirut 'has to help itself' to encourage donor countries
Staff at one Southern school refuse to give in
Ahmadinejad vows to counter UN sanctions with retaliatory measures
Latest New from miscellaneous sources for October 10/06
UN: Israel provides maps of minefields in Lebanon-Jerusalem Post
Lebanon: UN commander in Lebanon discusses speedy IsraeliUN News Centre
Sfeir: time to turn the page to tackle new situation-AsiaNews
Hizbullah Miscalculated Israeli Response-Arutz Sheva - Israel
Ready for Syria, just in case-Jerusalem Post
Will Turkish Troops in Lebanon Fall Under French Command?Zaman Online
Hariri Wants Tribunal to Try Corrupt from Present and Past-Naharnet
Saniora-Lahoud Meeting Over Diplomatic Appointments Broke the Ice-Naharnet
Hariri Wants Tribunal to Try Corrupt from Present and Past-Naharnet
UNIFIL in Talks with Israel on Completing Pullout from Ghajar-Naharnet
Second Teenager Dies from Wounds in Police-Rioters Clash in Beirut-Naharnet
Construction, Repair Delay Return of Students to Public Schools-Naharnet
Casualty Toll from Israeli Bomblets on the Rise-Naharnet
Berri Seeks to Stunt Shiite-Sunni Clash on Landmark Visit to Saudi Arabia-NaharnetSyria: Establish Arab defense alliance-Ynetnews - Israel
Israel would react harshly if attacked by Syria: report-People's Daily Online
Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination Stage.
Walid Phares
Source: The Family Security Foundation, Inc
October 9, 12006
Identification of the Threat
Your concerns about “radicalization” as a threat to U.S. Homeland Security are warranted. For after twenty five years of studying the ideology and the evolution of the doctrines that produced the self-declared Jihadist movement which has declared, waged and continues to conduct war against the United States and other democracies, I conclude along with a number of colleagues in this field of expertise that the Terrorism America and its allies are facing in the War on Terror is a direct product of this radical ideology.
The 19 men, who massacred 3,000 US and other citizens on September 11, belong to al Qaeda and the latter is a self declared Salafist-Jihadist organization. Every single case of Terrorism uncovered on U.S. territory, since 9/11, was motivated by this ideology. To name a few: The Virginia Paintball gang, the dirty bomb case, the shoe bomber case, al Qaeda's John Walker, Azzam al Amriki AKA Adam Gadahn, the Oregon case, the Virginia multiple cases, the Jihadi charities, etc. This ideology was omnipresent in the cases than ended with court sentences and those which didn't; in the Sheikh Abdel Rahman case of 1993; in the statements made by the Zarqawi networks while assassinating innocent civilians; in all speeches by Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri from 1998 till now; and on all Jihadi web sites in all languages: one global common thread is always omnipresent: The Jihadi ideology.
Parallel to al Qaeda’s radical doctrine, another ideology of Jihadism follows the teachings of Ayatalollah Khomeini and is embodied by the public speeches of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad and Hezbollah. Hence, the ideologies that produce “Radicalization" are the Jihadist ones. They are of two main "trees," the Jihadi Salafist and the Jihadi Khomeinist. These doctrines, taught and disseminated worldwide and in America, are the producers of the "Jihadists" who have declared war and waged it against the United States both overseas and in the homeland. Jihadism is the ideological common identity of terror groups al Qaeda, Salafi Combat Group of the Maghreb, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya of south Asia, the Taliban of Afghanistan, Laskar Taiba of Pakistan, the Mahakem Islamiya of Somalia, and other Salafi-Wahabi groups internationally, in addition to Hezbollah. Jihadism was the inspiration for the 1990s attacks, 9/11, Madrid, London, Beslan, Mumbai, Riyadh, Casablanca, the Sunni Triangle in Iraq and other violence associated with Terrorism. Hence at this stage of the War on Terror, the ideology behind the threat has been identified and thus should be addressed.
Development of the Threat
Prior to 9/11, the spread of Jihadism was operated by Salafi, Wahabi, Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), Tablighi, Deobandi and Takfiri schools of thought around the world, mostly by the means of religious schools known as Madrassa. Moving into the United States gradually as of the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1990s, Jihadi cadres took the control of existing religious schools funded by foreign support and formed their own indoctrination networks, often in and around Mosques and other social and cultural centers. In about twenty years of militant activities, the Jihadist ideology produced three generations of radicals, a pool which Terrorists have and continue to recruit from. The perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks are foreign Jihadists. But most of the other arrested Terrorists (or alleged Terrorists) claiming the same ideology and who identify with al Qaeda or its allies, are "American Jihadists," citizens or permanent residents, U.S.-born or naturalized. Hence the most dangerous dimension of the ideology of Jihadism is the fact that it has already recruited and inspired Americans to wage war against their own nation. Therefore Jihadism is a direct threat against Homeland Security
Components of the threat
This threat against national security and against the foundations of civil society and democracy are embodied by a set of ideas and concepts that reject the legitimacy of citizens’ free choice, their natural liberties, pluralism, and the rule of secular law. The Jihadi ideology is not another social or political way of thinking within Democracy, nor is it a political alternative to one particular party or a specific policy in domestic or foreign affairs. Jihadism rejects the American constitution, the bill of rights, the international declaration on human rights, the United Nations and international law. Jihadism aim at destroying democracies and installing a totalitarian regime named Caliphate. And to do so, Jihadism creates the conviction in the minds of its adherents that war against the Government, people and constitution of the United States is the path towards achieving the universal goal. The beginning of the threat starts with the "click" that transforms a citizen into a Jihadist. From there on, the constant objective of the Jihadi recruit is to strike against the national security of the United States. The Terrorist can be a member of al Qaeda if s/he is successful in establishing the contact, as for example with the case of Adam Gadahn and Jose Padilla, or they could operate under an al Qaeda like Jihadism, without having established a link with the mother ship.
Strategic penetration
The strategic penetration operated by the Jihadists before and since 9/11 is based on three models: One are the Jihadists who originate overseas and move to the United States, either legally (visa, lawful immigration, marriage, political asylum) or illegally. In either of these cases the Jihadis ends up operating on the inside of the country, using its laws and facilities. The estimate of Jihadists who have infiltrated the country over the past two decades is certainly in the hundreds, possibly close to a thousand. This "first generation" Jihadist has organized itself to perform two activities: One is to grow its own strength for "future Jihads." Two is to produce the second generation of American-born Jihadists. If you analyze the average age of U.S. born Jihadists, you would conclude that the production of the second "generation" has begun in the late 1980s and mostly since the early 1990s. The formation of this "second generation" can only happen through two methods. First is to indoctrinate, then recruit within the Muslim community using a variety of methods and already penetrated institutions. Second, is for them to take the control of the religious conversion of non-Muslims and indoctrinate the converts during the process or after the process: Hence a first generation of radical Salafists-Wahabis has already processed a radicalization and the recruitment of American-born Muslims or converts. The issue is not conversion: This is a free and pluralist society. Certainly there is and would be a problem with the radicalization taking place within a particular community. But the real issue affecting Homeland Security is the systematic penetration of a religious community and the recruitment of Jihadists to perform acts of Terrorism and aggression against national security.
And once the "Pool" of indoctrinated individuals is formed, mostly of younger persons, then the Terror organizations can recruit from this pool. However, Jihadists in the West in general and in the U.S. in particular, are of two types once they are formed: Either they join an organization and move into a cell, or they form their own cell, without connecting with a larger organization or al Qaeda. The most dangerous Jihadists, both on the individual level or as self-formed cells are those who have been able or are in the process of penetrating the defense-security system of the United States. In this realm, the Jihadists can harm the most the national security of the Homeland, and analytical indications project that one of their ultimate goals is to penetrate and weaken U.S. Homeland Security.
Threat shield
There are several shields that "protect" the U.S.-based Jihadists from containment. Among these shields are
a. The little ability of the public to identify them since their ideology hasn't officially been identified by the Government.
b. Without the public, Law Enforcement and Homeland Security cannot mobilize on a large scale to identify and isolate the Jihadists activities. Furthermore, by not identifying the ideology and its strategies, the U.S. Government cannot direct its agencies and resources against the threat.
c. The ideology of Jihadi-Terrorism unfortunately, enjoy the political freedoms of the country. It is "protected" by advocacy groups, legal defense and is funded both domestically and by foreign regimes and organizations.
Resistance to “radicalization”
To establish a national resistance to "radicalization" following are 6 suggestions:
Identification of the ideology of Jihadism by Government, media and experts.
Mobilization against the ideology of Jihadism by the public and educational institutions
Ban of the ideology by the U.S. Congress
Mass education of the public about it
Working with domestic NGOs, with the general public and specifically with the Muslim communities
Working with international INGOs and particularly with liberal, democratic and humanist Muslims
Looking at the future
In summary, Terrorism is threatening Homeland Security and Jihadism is a main root cause of Terrorism. The U.S. capacity of protecting Homeland security and defending national security will depend largely on developing policies and laws that would identify, ban, isolate and shrink Jihadism, with the help of the American public in general and the Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in particular. Such a shift in Homeland security must be based on a comprehensive strategy of containment of the Terror ideology within the framework of civil and democratic rights of society.
In closing, I would like to thank you and the committee members and staff for the opportunity to present this testimony today. I look forward to responding to any question that you might have.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Walid Phares is the author of Future Jihad and a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC.
© 2003-2006 FamilySecurityMatters.org All Rights Reserved
Note -- The opinions expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, views, and/or philosophy of The Family Security Foundation, Inc.
If you are a reporter or producer who is interested in receiving more information about this writer or this article, please email your request to Miramx1@aol.com.
Sfeir: time to turn the page to tackle new situation
9 October, 2006 -LEBANON
The cardinal steered clear of controversies surrounding the bishops’ indirect backing of the Siniora government, but evoked the threat of new destruction that could arise from division.
Beirut (AsiaNews) – Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir has pointed to the need to “turn the page with regard to the past” and to tackle “seriously the new situation facing us”. Meanwhile, he steered clear of controversies arising from criticism levelled at the Maronite bishops for their indirect support of the Siniora government.
The bishops defended the current Lebanese government in their meeting last Wednesday. Their stand was prompted by fears that the possible overthrow of the government may lead to the indefinite postponement of the international process into the murder of the ex-premier Rafic Hariri. The bishops therefore criticized those who, in their bid to bring down the government, would end up serving the interests of other countries.
During Mass at Bkerke yesterday, Cardinal Sfeir said: “No one can escape from his responsibilities, especially those who have been placed by the people in positions of responsibility.” The patriarch compared Lebanon to one big family. “If its children become distant from one another for reasons that are not a secret for anybody, the result will be more ruin and destruction. No one in this country is ignorant of the extent to which we need to turn the page of a hateful past, to tackle new circumstances seriously and with solidarity, and to adopt effective measures capable of bringing Lebanon out of its torpor and of stopping the emigration of youth, who represent the future of the country.”
The MPs Boutros Harb and Georges Adwan, who were received by the patriarch after mass, defended the bishops’ intervention and their “equidistance”. Harb insisted that the stands taken by Bkerke were “national”. “Without the appeal of the Maronite bishops in 2000, the revolution of the Cedars would never have happened,” said Adwan. “Without the reconciliation of the Mountain with Walid Joumblatt, agreement would not exist in this region; without the stand taken on the electoral law of 2000, the elections would never have been what they were.” When the patriarchate took a stand, he added, it was “to avert danger”.
Lebanon: UN commander in Lebanon discusses speedy Israeli withdrawal from final post
9 October 2006 – The senior United Nations commander in Lebanon held talks with Lebanese and Israeli officers today over a speedy withdrawal by Israel from the last position it still occupies in the south of the country after this summer’s conflict with Hizbollah.
“The meeting was productive and the main focus was to finalize the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) withdrawal,” UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Acting Commander Brig.-General J.P. Nehra said in a statement.
“The situation around Gadjar was discussed with a view of ensuring a speedy withdrawal of IDF from the area,” the statement added, referring to the village straddling the line separating the two countries, the only position Israel still holds following its final withdrawal from all other positions on 1 October.
During the meeting, the IDF provided UNIFIL with the maps of minefields in South Lebanon as of June 2000, when it withdrew after an earlier 18-year occupation of a band of Lebanese territory. UNIFIL handed the maps over to the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre and to the Lebanese armed forces for review. A complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, together with Lebanese army deployment in the area, is a key clause in UN Resolution 1701 that ended the 34 days of fighting in August. The Resolution also mandates strengthening UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops. At present it has some 5,000 troops on the ground, but the second phase of deployment may be delayed by up to a month due to problems of logistics and capacity, the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) said in it latest update.
Hizbullah Miscalculated Israeli Response
16:00 Oct 08, '06 / 16 Tishrei 5767
(IsraelNN.com) Dialogue during a meeting between Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and senior Hizbullah official Hussein Khalil, makes it evident that the terror organization miscalculated Israel’s response, the Washington Post reports. The meeting was held on July 12th, coinciding with the breakout of the war which was sparked by a major Hizbullah border attack against Israel. When questioned by the Lebanese prime minister, who expressed grave concerns regarding Hizbullah’s actions and the resulting Israeli consequences, Khalil is quoted as saying “it will calm down in 24-48 hours.”While Siniora expressed his fears that Israel would respond militarily as the IDF has in the past in Gaza, Khalil stated with confidence, “this is not Gaza.”
IDF prepares for possible Syrian attack
By YAAKOV KATZ
One thing is for sure: Israel's response to a Syrian attack will be nothing like its reaction to the July 12 kidnapping of reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser in a cross-border Hizbullah attack. The retaliation, defense officials interviewed for this article warned, would be harsher, fiercer and far deadlier.
Analysis: Watch the Syrians, very carefully
The Golan heresy - better than peace
The first difference would be the bank of targets. On the night of July 12, hours after the kidnapping, the cabinet convened to approve a list of targets for the IAF to strike. None of them included government or Lebanese armed forces sites. The closest the IAF got to striking at the Lebanese government during the month-long war in Lebanon was the bombing of the runway at Beirut International Airport. The Syrian bank of targets would be different. It would not only include military infrastructure, such as bases, rocket launchers and silos, but also government buildings, headquarters, power plants, electricity grids and water reservoirs. "We will shut down the entire country" was how one defense official described the potential response.
While most officials claim there is a slim possibility for a war with Syria, Israel is still preparing just in case. Military Intelligence assessments for 2007 presented recently to the General Staff indicated that war with Syria is closer than it was in 2006.
Israel is concerned that Syria might consider adopting the Egyptian model from the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Then, Egypt launched a surprise attack against Israel and, while it lost the war, obtained a major diplomatic victory. The war led to peace talks between the two countries and the eventual return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Syria, officials warn, might be thinking it can do the same. While aware he will lose the war, President Bashar Assad might be thinking that even a loss would force Israel into peace talks and the eventual return of the Golan Heights, captured during the Six Day War in 1967. On the other hand, officials say Assad's warlike and threatening comments should not be taken at face value. They could just be attempts to grab the world's attention and force Israel into peace talks despite strong American opposition.
While Israel has uncontested air superiority over Syria - the IAF boasts F-16s and F-15s while the Syrian air force's newest jet is the MiG-29 from 1987 - the Syrian military has built up a strong array of missiles including some that are capable of carrying warheads filled with nerve gas, such as Sarin and VX. Damascus is currently in a race to build up its army and has recently drastically increased its defense budget after some $14 billion in loans it owed were erased. According to the Middle East Military Balance, published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Syria has several hundred Scud missiles, some of which it received in 2002, and close to 100 ballistic missile launchers.
On the ground, the IDF infantry and Armored Corps would face 12 Syrian ground divisions, equipped with 3,700 Russian tanks, including 122 T-72s upgraded by an Italian firm in 2003. Syria also has more military personnel than Israel - 290,00 soldiers compared to almost 180,000.
At the moment, the IDF is at a heightened state of alert along the border with Syria and has deployed additional forces in the North in case of a surprise attack. Israel will have to prepare for the possibility that the IAF will not succeed in destroying all of Syria's ballistic missiles and that some might get through. In that case, as a first line of defense, the IAF has the Patriot 3 and the Arrow anti-ballistic missile defense systems that are supposed to intercept the incoming threats. If, however, those don't function, it will be up to Home Front Command to ensure citizens of northern and central Israel have the necessary means of protection.
Hariri Wants Tribunal to Try Corrupt from Present and Past
Parliament's majority leader Saad Hariri has expressed support for Gen. Michel Aoun's calls to set up a court to try the corrupt, but said such a tribunal should make rulings on present and past corrupt practices.
"I support Aoun's call to set up a tribunal to try the corrupt in this country on condition that the present (corrupt) files and those of ancient times be opened," Hariri said at an Iftar in Koreitem on Sunday. "Then we'll see who will go to jail and who won't," he added. On Monday, the FPM snapped back in a statement, wondering what was keeping Hariri from "opening corruption files and setting up the court." Hariri also accused those who bring up the issue of corruption in the country of being the ones who encouraged the Syrian regime to practice corruption during its 30-year tutelage.About calls by Hizbullah and Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement for a national unity government, Hariri said such a demand cannot be met as long as President Emile Lahoud is in power. "A national unity government should be formed only after the election of a new president in a democratic way," Hariri said. "Then we could talk about such a government," he said. In an indirect reference to Hizbullah and the FPM, Hariri said the two groups had personal interests in their calls for a unity government. The March 14 Forces have been accusing the opposition of seeking to hamper the establishment of a tribunal to try ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's suspected assassins. "I promise you today that this court will see the light despite all the campaigns that are being launched against the government and that are aimed at disrupting the court," he said. He also expressed his full support to Prime Minister Fouad Saniora."Premier Saniora's government is staying in power and we will be its line of defense," he said. Beirut, 09 Oct 06, 09:15
Saniora-Lahoud Meeting Over Diplomatic Appointments Breaks the Ice
Prime Minister Fouad Saniora said his meeting with President Emile Lahoud to discuss diplomatic appointments was part of a framework to restore "normal life," An-Nahar daily reported Monday. Saniora met Sunday with Lahoud in Baabda in an effort to resolve a dispute over diplomatic appointments, which cannot be passed without the president's signature. It was the first time that Saniora visited Lahoud at the presidential palace since the Israeli offensive on Lebanon July 12. Saniora told An-Nahar after the meeting that "life has to go back to normal." "We have a lot of crises that require negotiation, including the diplomatic appointments," Saniora said. An-Nahar said that Saniora and Lahoud have reached "a semi-agreement" on the issue of the diplomatic reshuffle that has been stalled for several months over disputes between political forces on the appointments.
Sources close to Lahoud said the meeting was constructive, adding that the president had no personal interests as long as the right man was named for the right position and the diplomat-to-be enjoyed full loyalty to the state. An-Nahar said that the appointments included 52 posts. It said that five Sunni Muslim names to be appointed from outside the diplomatic cadre would create an equilibrium among the Shiites and the Maronites.
An-Nahar said the issue would be discussed during Thursday's Cabinet session.
Beirut, 09 Oct 06, 08:03
German Magazine: Hizbullah's Rockets Could Reach Turkey
A German magazine has said Hizbullah possesses middle-range rockets that could reach Turkey and the Greek island of Crete, according to Al-Balad newspaper Sunday. "Fox" magazine said a classified German Foreign Intelligence (BND) agency report reveals that the rockets are Iranian-made and were smuggled to Hizbullah by land via Syria. However, the department said the report was out of context and as such could not be considered reliable.
According to Al-Balad, "Fox" said in its article that the 1000-km range rockets were handed over to the group based on a request from the Iranian government. It said Hizbullah has also received rocket launchers and various arms and ammunition.
The magazine quoted BND experts as saying that the group boosted its arms capabilities after the end of the Israel-Hizbullah war on August 14.
It said the group is now stronger that it was before the conflict that erupted on July 12 after a deadly Hizbullah cross-border raid during which 2 Israeli soldiers were kidnapped and three others were killed. Last month, Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said at a "divine victory rally" in Beirut's southern suburbs that his group is now stronger than ever. He also claimed that it has more than 20,000 rockets. "Fox" also quoted a top German intelligence official as saying that the deployment of a naval force off the Lebanese coast to stop alleged arms transfers to Hizbullah "is no more than a parade." Beirut, 08 Oct 06, 08:16
How Iraqi Oil Smuggling Greases Violenceby Bilal A. Wahab
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2006
http://www.meforum.org/article/1020Oil is the lifeblood of Iraq. As Iraqis work to emerge from years of war and sanctions, oil exports are the government's greatest source of revenue. Since 2003, the new Iraqi government has exported US$33 billion in oil.[1] But rather than just fund reconstruction, oil has become a primary commodity on the black market and a central component of the web of corruption, terror, and criminality in Iraq. Oil smuggling has led to a convergence of crime and terrorism that increasingly destabilizes the country.
Background
Iraq is an oil-rich country with perhaps the world's second largest reserves—estimated to be 115 billion barrels.[2] Such assets and resources have contributed to Iraq's wealth but have also created incentives for corruption and mismanagement.
Corruption precedes the current regime. The Baath Party initially enjoyed a reputation for integrity. But Iraq's wars with Iran and Kuwait took their toll, as did sanctions. As Iraqi author Kanan Makiya explained, "Once the Baathist elite began to shed ideology, Iraqi officials began to use the powers of the state for personal benefit through criminal activities of one kind or another. State institutions became riddled with corruption."[3]
Because the Baath Party nationalized the oil industry in 1972,[4] any corruption involving the industry became a state matter. Baath officials became the proverbial wolf guarding the henhouse. The Revolutionary Council of the Baath Party allocated 5 percent of oil revenues to a party slush fund for use if ousted. According to Muhammad Zini, a former consultant at the Oil Ministry, this fund grew to $17.4 billion by 1990.[5] What private oil enterprises remained were part of Hussein's patronage system and hardly independent.[6] Favored regime individuals could use their position in the oil industry to enrich themselves far beyond their nominal salaries.
Corruption grew exponentially during the 1990s. Saddam's regime siphoned off billions from the U.N. Oil-for-Food program.[7] U.N. inspectors and the international community turned a blind eye to smuggling operations.[8] The black market thrived, and informal business networks grew. Between 1991 and 2002, Iraq smuggled nearly 900 million barrels; between 1997 and 2003, Saddam's regime reaped more than $8 billion in illicit oil sales.[9] The smuggling network was huge, involving thousands of vessels, vehicles, and trucks.[10] In one recent account, Abbud Karim Abbas, an Iraqi expert on manufacturing and modifying oil tankers, described how the Baath party would smuggle oil in ships carrying wheat.[11]
During this period and despite enmity between their governments, oil smuggling networks grew between Iraq and both Syria and Iran, which continue to this day.[12] Both governments benefited. The Iraqi government found a market in which it could bypass U.N. demands to spend revenue on humanitarian projects while the Iranian and Syrian regimes found both a cheap source of fuel and kickback income. The Pentagon estimated in 2000 that of the $205 per metric ton cost for smuggled Iraqi oil in the Persian Gulf, $95 went back to the Iraqi government, $50 went to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp's navy while the smugglers kept the remainder.[13]
There was no shortage of market for smuggled oil. The official, government-controlled State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) opened offices in Jordan and struck agreements with the governments of Iran, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates to facilitate oil sales. Buyers included organized crime networks from Somalia, Pakistan, and India, as well as brokers purchasing oil for coalition naval vessels patrolling in the Persian Gulf and enforcing the sanctions.[14]
Oil and the Insurgency
Smuggling networks persisted into the post-Saddam period. Rather than disrupt the network, the collapse of Saddam's government only drove it underground.
That the U.S. government did not use its postwar administration to lay an infrastructure which would facilitate accountability enabled the problem to fester. The Coalition Provisional Authority did not award oil industry contracts transparently.[15] In addition, its failure to install metering systems on oil flow facilitated corruption.[16] Absent such metering, the real amount of crude oil either exported or smuggled remains subject to speculation.
The security vacuum following Iraqi liberation further bolstered opportunities not only for the existing mafia but also for new criminal gangs. Just as Saddam used oil revenue to finance violence against the Iraqi people, so too have insurgents.
Open borders facilitated smuggling, especially along the sparsely-populated Iraqi-Syrian frontier. On July 26, 2004, the new Iraqi government signed a deal to export crude oil to Syria in exchange for oil products. Over a three-week period in April 2006, Iraqi police seized 400,000 barrels of crude oil that was being smuggled into Syria.[17] Within twenty-four hours, police at the Rabiyah border crossing confiscated 1,200 smuggling tanker trunks whose drivers carried forged documents.[18] The scale of smuggling suggests the complicity of both Syrian and Iraqi government officials. Indeed, Dawud al-Baghistani, head of the Commission on Public Integrity in Mosul, told reporters that while the ring was connected to insurgents, the parties involved in the Rabiyah smuggling included officials from customs and the ministries of oil, interior, and finance, as well as some private companies. Smugglers offered Baghistani, who coordinated the sting operation, $1 million to release the $28 million shipment.[19]
In another case demonstrating the confluence of officials, oil smuggling, and the insurgency, insurgents bribed government officials in order to access oil routes. Hazem al-Shaalan, who served as defense minister during the interim administration of Ayad Allawi, tasked Mish'an al-Juburi, a former parliamentarian and leader of an influential tribe in Iraq, to secure oil pipelines between Baiji and Kirkuk, an area which falls within the Al-Juburi tribal territory. Subsequently, Juburi was indicted for theft of several million U.S. dollars. Iraqi officials also suspect that he knowingly hired insurgents to infiltrate oil pipeline protection forces and shared profits with the insurgents.[20] It appears likely that Juburi, insurgents, or both bribed Shaalan to offer the original contract. The Iraqi government subsequently accused him of both massive corruption and provision of Saddam loyalists with intelligence and requested that Interpol arrest both Shalaan and Juburi.[21]
The profits insurgents reap from the oil trade are significant. Some estimate that insurgents pocket 40 to 50 percent of oil smuggling-generated revenue.[22] Government complicity in oil smuggling has continued. "Oil and fuel smuggling networks have grown into a dangerous mafia, threatening the lives of those in charge of fighting corruption," the former oil minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, told reporters. Saying that Iraq is losing at least a billion dollars each year to corruption, Ulum did not deny that corruption has inflicted SOMO as well.[23] ‘‘It's clear that corruption funds the insurgency," a U.S. official added.[24] In mid-2005, the Oil Ministry fired 450 employees on suspicion they were stealing fuel and selling it abroad.[25]
Many Iraqis have come to accept corruption. According to Judge Radhi al-Radhi, the commissioner for Public Integrity in Iraq, many Iraqis justify their own complicity with the question, "How can you ask a human being to have integrity when he lives under tough circumstances?"[26] Each day, Iraqis face high unemployment, low salaries, kidnappings, and murder. Many turn to the illicit economy to supplement income and provide for their families. In the absence of functional law enforcement, lucrative oil smuggling has replaced many small businesses.[27] Not surprisingly, the public advertising campaign financed by both the government and some nongovernmental organizations to educate the population about the harms of oil smuggling has had only limited success.
Oil and the Militias
Corruption has also compromised Basra, Iraq's second largest city and southern hub. Close to the Rumayla oil fields and linked by the Shatt al-Arab waterway to the Persian Gulf, it is a natural outlet for smuggling. A chief node in Saddam's oil smuggling operations, oil smuggling in Basra has only grown more overt since his fall. One resident, Hussein as-Sabti, told a reporter that the brazenness of smugglers has "prompted the population of Basra to ask whether or not smuggling of petrol is an illegitimate act at all."[28] Salim Hussein, director of Basra Oil Products, said, that "influential political people and parties are running these smuggling operations."[29]
The rivalry among various Shi‘ite parties has compounded the problem. The Fadhila Party controls the governor's office as well as the oil industry in Basra. When new prime minister Nuri al-Maliki decided not to give the oil ministry to the Fadhila party when he announced his new cabinet in May 2006, the party threatened to stop oil exports.[30] Had they not received benefits from their position, such drastic action would be unnecessary. A senior Iraqi oil official said that Fadhila sought kickbacks, and he blamed the unrest in Basra on the corruption and "power struggle between militias and mafias" within the ruling Shi‘ite coalition.[31] A Shi‘ite political source told a reporter, "He who owns Basra owns the oil reserves … It has a strategic position so why would anyone give it up?"[32]
Abdul Kareem Li'aibi, the Oil Ministry's fuel distribution project manager, said that smugglers in one province had tapped a pipeline more than twenty times to siphon off oil. He blamed "organized gangs"[33] although others say that the large smuggling operation—involving everything from tanker and pickup trucks to small boats and large ships—could only operate with government approval.[34] An auditing report by KMPG International suggested that a comparison of production and official sales in the final two quarters of 2004 suggested a discrepancy of nearly $70 million.[35] An oil industry official estimated that two million liters of oil products are smuggled every day through Iraq's poorly guarded borders.[36] Oil ministry data suggests that some 60 million barrels of oil went missing in 2005.[37]
Much of the oil smuggled from southern Iraq ends up in Iran. On January 16, 2006, Iranian naval vessels attacked two Iraqi coastal guard ships that had seized a steamer smuggling oil. The Iranian captain of the steamer had summoned Iranian assistance upon his contravention. The mayor of Basra, Muhammad al-Wai'ili, complained of several dozen similar incidents in which Iranian coast guardsmen protected Iranian smugglers in exchange for payment.[38] New Iraqi oil minister Hussein al-Shahristani blamed the Iranian coast guard for allowing Iraqi smugglers to seek refuge in Iranian waters. A Basra customs officer said, "This is the main obstacle to our work," adding that corruption among Iraqi police exacerbates the problem.[39] Iran is not the only destination. Boat smuggling operations take Iraqi oil as far away as the United Arab Emirates.[40]
Iraq's economy takes a second hit when Iraq buys refined oil. Because Iraq sells the imported fuel with huge subsidies, much of the refined product is exported back to the refining countries. The Oil Ministry's inspector general gave an example: throughout 2005, the Iraqi government has been selling diesel at the subsidized price of less than three cents a gallon, which could be sold for at least a dollar a gallon on the black market. Hence, a smuggler bringing fuel in a 9000-gallon truck from a neighboring country could make as much as $7,450 even after paying generous bribes.[41] Because the pipelines in no way benefit the insurgents, the lines have frequently been attacked to force the government to rely on trucks—a business already controlled by smugglers. Smuggling in fuel may have cost Iraq between $2.5 billion and $4 billion in 2005 alone.[42]
The Oil Industry in Iraqi Kurdistan
While its administration is separate, the northern Kurdish Regional Government shares many problems with Baghdad in the administration of its oil revenues. Despite continued disputes between Kurdish officials and the central government over the legality of separate deals,[43] in June 2004, the Kurdistan Democratic Party which controlled the Erbil and Duhok governorates negotiated its own oil exploration deal with the Norwegian oil company Det Norske Oljeselskap (DNO) to drill for oil in Zakho, near the Turkish border. Under terms of the deal, the Kurdish party would receive 30 percent of the profits while DNO would retain 70 percent.[44] Two years later, DNO struck oil at the Tawke No. 1 field, which it estimated held a reserve of 100 million barrels which could be pumped at a rate of 5,000 barrels a day.[45]
The Kurdish government continues to expand its oil exploration. In May 2006, the united Kurdistan Regional Government, which included both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, awarded another contract to develop the Shiwashok oil field to the Turkish company Genel Enerji and the Swiss firm Addax. [46] Together, they plan to produce some 20,000 barrels per day by the end of 2006.[47] A memorandum from Lebanon's Make Oil Company indicates that the region should have refining capacity within two years.[48]
While exploitation of the fields is popular among Kurds long deprived of such opportunities, nationalist thrill has blinded many locals to the complexities of becoming an oil-exporting region. Contracting mechanisms remain opaque, as do the divisions between government and political party property. There are few guarantees that the government will use oil revenue for the good of the local population rather than to fill the coffers of the ruling parties and further tighten their grip over power, as the Baath party once did. The Kurdistan Regional Government's recently passed investment law[49] must allow for project oversight from the nongovernmental sector. That civil war broke out between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1994 out of a dispute over revenue sharing does not build confidence.
The Road Ahead
The exploitation and diversion of oil resources hurts Iraq's economic, social, and political development. Oil smuggling places an enormous burden on state revenue and Iraq's economy. Up to 30 percent of Iraq's imported gasoline has been lost to smuggling networks,[50] half of which is pocketed by the Iraqi insurgency.[51] Had the Iraqi government invested this lost revenue in refineries, it might not need to import 60 percent of its refined oil needs.[52] Not only have funds for vital projects been lost,[53] but a portion of the missing revenue helps fund insurgency. Terrorism, in turn, hampers foreign investment. Attacking the oil pipelines could be a criminal enterprise[54] but, regardless, insurgents benefit by extorting protection money from oil trucks.[55] Terrorists and criminals have established a dangerous symbiosis.[56]
All these developments perpetuate instability and violence in Iraq. Still, there have been a few positive, albeit not very successful, steps taken to address the problems related to oil smuggling. The Coalition Provisional Authority established the Commission on Public Integrity, tasked with fighting corruption and organized crime. It has issued warrants and fired many officials in the Oil Ministry and elsewhere. However, instability coupled with the absence of political support has seriously jeopardized the functioning of the commission. Violence has also undercut the commission's work. Fifteen judges who have investigated issues of corruption and criminality have been murdered.[57]
How, then, can the Iraqi government break this cycle? First, the government needs to secure its borders. While the Coalition Provisional Authority and subsequent Iraqi governments have hired 22,000 border guards since 2003, this level is still below that needed to ensure security.[58] Competence must also supplant sectarian, tribal, and political patronage.
While the Iraqi government, as demanded by the International Monetary Fund,[59] has taken steps to lessen its subsidies, the continued discrepancy between the price of oil in Iraq and in neighboring countries[60] provides the financial incentive for smuggling.
Maliki's government must also tackle the problem of bribery. Corruption permeates the Iraqi government from the top echelon of ministers to tribal chieftains and border patrol officers.[61] Often, officials are the smugglers and are fully involved in the operation. If the new government can control bribery, then the incentive to turn a blind eye disappears at multiple points in the smuggling process.
While problems associated with subsidies and oil industry corruption may seem mundane amidst continued kidnapping and car bombs, until U.S. and Iraqi authorities manage to constrain Iraqi oil smuggling, violent crime and insurgency will continue to flourish.
***Bilal A. Wahab is a Fulbright fellow from Iraqi Kurdistan enrolled at American University.
[1] Development Fund for Iraq, International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), KPMG International, Bahrain, reports from Dec. 2003 to June 2005.
[2] "Iraq Facts and Figures," Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), accessed June 21, 2006.
[3] Kanan Makiya, "All Levels of the Iraqi Government Were Complicit," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 81-7.
[4] Michael E. Brown, "The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Feb. 1979, p. 107.
[5] Al-Hayat (London), June 2, 2005.
[6] "Country File: Iraq," The Economist Intelligence Unit (London), July 13, 2004.
[7] Claudia Rosett, "How Corrupt Is the United Nations?" Commentary, Apr. 2006.
[8] The New York Times, Apr. 26, 1999; The Telegraph (London), Apr. 17, 2005.
[9] "Report on the Management of the Oil-for-Food Programme," Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (The Volcker Commission), Sept. 7, 2005, pp. 40, 185-259.
[10] Ibid., p. 31.
[11] Abbud Kareem Abbas, "Sariqat an-Naft al-Iraqi," Ath-Thaqafa al-Jadida (Baghdad), Nov. 2005, no. 316.
[12] The New York Times, Apr. 26, 1999.
[13] Kenneth H. Bacon, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, "Department of Defense News Briefing," Apr. 20, 2000.
[14] Ibid.
[15] "Report of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq: Covering the Period from the Establishment of the DFI on May 22, 2003 until the Dissolution of the CPA on June 28, 2004," pp. 5-6.
[16] Ibid., p. 2.
[17] The Washington Post, Apr. 15, 2006.
[18] United Press International, Apr. 17, 2006.
[19] The Washington Post, Apr. 15, 2006.
[20] The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2006.
[21] Associated Press, Sept. 20, 2005; Voices of Iraq, May 28, 2006.
[22] The Telegraph, Feb. 7, 2006.
[23] Al-Hayat, Nov. 30, 2005.
[24] The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2006.
[25] Iraqi Crisis Report, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London, Apr. 19, 2005.
[26] Radhi al-Radhi, head of the Commission on Public Integrity, Iraq, "Crime and Corruption in Iraq," speaking at American University, Washington, D.C., Apr. 17, 2006.
[27] The New York Times, June 3, 2006.
[28] Iraqi Crisis Report, Apr. 19, 2005.
[29] Reuters, June 26, 2006.
[30] The Peninsula (Doha), May 27, 2006.
[31] The Peninsula, May 27, 2006.
[32] The Peninsula, May 27, 2006.
[33] Iraqi Crisis Report, Apr. 19, 2005.
[34] Ibid.
[35] "Report of Factual Findings in Connection with the Oil Proceeds Receipts Account for the Period from 29 June 2004 to 31 December 2004," Development Fund for Iraq, IAMB, KPMG International, Bahrain, Apr. 6, 2005.
[36] Iraq Business News (Baghdad), Feb. 10, 2006.
[37] Platts Oilgram Price Report, May 9, 2006.
[38] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Jan. 18, 2006.
[39] Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), United Nations, June 26, 2006.
[40] Iraq Business News, Feb. 10, 2006.
[41] The New York Times, June 4, 2006.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Energy Intelligence Group, June 15, 2006; BBC News, Dec. 1, 2005.
[44] DNO petroleum company, Oslo, Norway, press release, June 29, 2004.
[45] DNO, press release, June 12, 2006.
[46] "KRG Prime Minister Inaugurates Oil Drilling Operation," Kurdistan Regional Government, press release, May 15, 2006.
[47] Energy Intelligence Group, June 15, 2006.
[48] Radio Nawa (Mosul), July 7, 2006.
[49] Kurdistan Regional Government, news release, July 11, 2006.
[50] The Telegraph, Feb. 7, 2006.
[51] The Telegraph, Feb. 7, 2006.
[52] The New York Times, Aug. 21, 2004.
[53] The Guardian (London), Aug. 16, 2003.
[54] Lt. Gen. John Vines, former commander of the Multinational Corps–Iraq, Special Policy Forum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Apr. 13, 2006.
[55] The New York Times, June 3, 2006.
[56] Louise Shelley, et al, "Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism," National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2005.
[57] Radhi, "Crime and Corruption in Iraq."
[58] The New York Times, Mar. 27, 2005.
[59] International Monetary Fund, press release, Dec. 23, 2005.
[60] Oil and Gas Journal, May 2, 2005.
[61] "Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005," Transparency International, London/Berlin, Oct. 18, 2005. Iraq ranked as the 19th most corrupt country out of 159.