LCCC ENGLISH NEWS BULLETIN
NOVEMBER 21/06

Biblical Reading For today
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 18,35-43.
Now as he approached Jericho a blind man was sitting by the roadside begging, and hearing a crowd going by, he inquired what was happening. They told him, "Jesus of Nazareth is passing by." He shouted, "Jesus, Son of David, have pity on me!"The people walking in front rebuked him, telling him to be silent, but he kept calling out all the more, "Son of David, have pity on me!" Then Jesus stopped and ordered that he be brought to him; and when he came near, Jesus asked him, What do you want me to do for you? He replied, "Lord, please let me see." Jesus told him, "Have sight; your faith has saved you." He immediately received his sight and followed him, giving glory to God. When they saw this, all the people gave praise to God.

Free Opinions & Studies

On Iraq: Listen carefully to General Abizaid.By: Walid Phares-World Defense Review columnist- November 21/06
A Symbol of Division or Unity?By: Elias Harfoush Al-Hayat - 19/11/06
Wars and Fundamentalisms. By: Zuheir Kseibati - Al-Hayat   21.11.06
Suicide Bombers and Iraq's Complaints!By: Jamil Ziabi Al-Hayat - 21/11/06
Hizbullah: pragmatic but not reformist -By Emile El-Hokayem 21.11.06
Nasrallah wants to lead, but where does he propose to go? Daily Star 21.11.06

Latest New from the Daily Star for November 21/11/06
US says 100 fighters a month enter Iraq from Syria-Reuters
PM sends Mitri to shepherd Hariri court through UN
March 14 Forces accuse rivals of risking 'a crisis, and a big one'
Armed groups move house to make way for army in Taamir
Nasrallah tells followers to prepare for street protests
UNIFIL details weapons seizures in South
Conference wraps up with call for peaceful resistance
FPM candidate, independent top field in Bar Association vote
Zaki: Palestinian factions agree on unity Cabinet
Turkish peacekeepers await first assignment in South Lebanon
March 8 students cite evidence that they won AUB student elections
Marathoners get ready to race for the love of Lebanon
Ahlouna provides for the less fortunate by arming women with culinary skills to better fend for themselves
Kissinger urges summit on Iraq, talks with Iran
Iran and Syria: possible allies?Bowling Green News
Dems: 'We need to talk to Iran and Syria'-United Press International
Syria plays Iraq card against US-BBC News

Latest New from miscellaneous sources for November 21/11/06
Jumblatt: Lebanon on verge of coup by Hezbollah and allies-Ya Libnan
Political crisis deepens in Lebanon-United Press International
Confusion clouds use of cluster bombs in Lebanon-Ha'aretz
Campus vote mirrors Lebanon-Toronto Star
Mubarak Urges Israel to Stop Its Lebanon Overflights-Naharnet
Nasrallah and Lebanon / For now, just arm wrestling-Ha'aretz
Hezbollah calls for protest-Scotsman
LEBANON: Seasonal typhoid fever cases on the rise-Reuters
Time for Madrid talks, part II?Monsters and Critics.com
Aoun: We have to break the circle of fear-Monsters and Critics.com

Hizbullah: pragmatic but not reformist
By Emile El-Hokayem -Daily Star
Monday, November 20, 2006
Serious thinking about reforming Lebanon's fragile and inefficient system of governance has been among the casualties of the recent war. Political reform has never topped the agenda of Lebanon's leaders, including the one actor most people believe would benefit most: Hizbullah. A closer look at the reasoning behind Hizbullah's political strategy can explain why it is unenthusiastic about amending Lebanon's confessional system, and how it uses its special status to justify resistance against Israel and avoid disarmament.
Hizbullah realizes that Lebanon's sectarian nature will not allow it to dominate the country's consensus-based politics. This sets the party apart from other Islamist organizations in the region, some of which can realistically hope to come to power if free elections were held. Hizbullah has recalibrated its ambitions accordingly. It lifted its initial opposition to the 1989 Taif Accord (which ended Lebanon's Civil War and redistributed power among sects) and gradually integrated into Lebanese political and social life.
Hizbullah's pragmatism, however, should not be mistaken for genuine acceptance of Lebanon's confessional system and the constraints that come with it. Since Hizbullah cannot tear down the formal sectarian power-sharing structure and impose its preferred system of governance, the party has worked around this obstacle by formally accepting the Taif state while developing ways to remain, in effect, above the system.
Hizbullah has done so by considering itself purer and more principled than other parties, which are dismissed as incompetent, corrupt, and perfidious. Furthermore, Hizbullah has always called for political and social reform in its electoral platforms, and it has been rightly praised for its good management practices, which stand in stark contrast to the corrupt and nepotistic ways of Lebanon's traditional elite. Because of this contrast, Hizbullah is able to avoid sharing the blame for Lebanon's ills, even though it is the country's pivotal party and holds considerable sway over domestic and foreign policies. It is also able to cultivate the notion that some of its policy choices, including perpetual resistance against Israel, cannot be questioned.
Hizbullah, according to conventional wisdom, exists in part to right the wrongs of political under-representation and economic disenfranchisement of Lebanon's large Shiite community. It would therefore make sense to expect Hizbullah to champion political reform; after all, more institutionalized Shiite power would translate into more Hizbullah power. But to believe that Hizbullah seeks to advocate Shiite rights within the state framework is to fundamentally misread its objectives. Reform would actually undermine the political strategy that has enabled Hizbullah to maintain its special status and impose its objectives on the rest of the country. Hizbullah has built parallel quasi-governmental structures that provide its followers with a sense of empowerment in lieu of advancing their interests within the framework of the Lebanese state; not because Hizbullah cannot, but because it prefers not to. In other words, Hizbullah by far prefers being a state within a state to any alternative, barring perhaps a complete (and unlikely) domination of Lebanon's political scene.
In Lebanon's consensus-based politics, monopolizing Shiite representation guarantees that no combination of political forces can compel Hizbullah to abide by rules or principles it deems contrary to its interests, unless its opponents are willing to risk civil war. By promoting the belief that its disarmament would be tantamount to turning back the clock on Shiite progress, Hizbullah has built a sectarian shield for its weapons.
Thus, Hizbullah has exploited Lebanon's openness and democratic inclinations. To be fair, the rest of Lebanon's political elite is also not serious about political reform. Yet the difference between Hizbullah and Lebanon's other politicians is fundamental; the former hijacks the system for ideological reasons and the latter abuse it to promote parochial political and economic interests.
Hizbullah cannot be a reformist force in Lebanese politics so long as it seeks to remain inside and above the system at the same time. Reform should rank high on the list of Lebanese politicians' priorities, because calling Hizbullah's bluff by pointing out that it does not seek institutional reform provides an opportunity to undermine one of Hizbullah's main levers of power and influence. Such an emphasis on reform is unlikely, however, because after the recent conflict, Lebanon has entered a new era of political paralysis and brinksmanship.
The failure of the dialogue initiative launched recently by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri shows Lebanese politicians' lack of commitment to addressing the fundamental issues plaguing the country. Such initiatives actually feed the deadlock by turning the focus of Lebanese to details such as timing, topics, participants, and format. The reverberations of the tense regional environment will only exacerbate this sad state of affairs by providing more opportunities for grandstanding and finger-pointing at the expense of a much-needed dialogue over reform.
**Emile El-Hokayem is a research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington DC. This commentary is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 4, issue 9 (November 2006) www.CarnegieEndowment.org/ArabReform (c) 2006, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Nasrallah wants to lead, but where does he propose to go?
Monday, November 20, 2006
Editorial-Daily Star
Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has asked his followers to "psychologically" prepare themselves for mass demonstrations in the event that demands for a unity government are not met. But how can the Lebanese ready themselves for a journey when they have no clear picture of the destination toward which they are being led?
Nasrallah has rightly pointed out that a growing number of Lebanese are dissatisfied and frustrated with the performance of the current government. The majority coalition borrowed its name from the massive demonstration on March 14, 2005, when a record number of citizens took to the streets to demand that then-Premier Omar Karami's government step down. It was widely believed then that a new Cabinet would start a process of reform and usher in a new era of democratic and accountable governance.
Now that over a year has passed without any sign of movement in that direction, we are being asked to topple another government. But for most Lebanese, the question of who is or is not in Cabinet is of little relevance; what matters it what the government manages to achieve. The problem is that in the absence of any clearly articulated proposals, nobody really knows which direction the March 14 Forces or the opposition wants to lead the country, once in office.
How can the Lebanese decide which side to support when neither coalition has outlined an agenda or offered up a concrete plan or a course of action? Neither group has produced a proposal for an electoral law, or an initiative to stem corruption or implement judicial reform. Neither camp has defined its stances on issues such as social welfare, defense strategy or diplomacy. Without any clearly stated priorities or objectives, the current political arm-wrestling is a competition of soundbites, not substance.
Both camps have contributed to a glaring absence of debate on issues that matter to the citizenry. The Lebanese people want serious structural changes and a radical overhaul of the outdated political process. And Lebanon's dilapidated institutions cannot be repaired with mere cosmetic changes or the arrival of a new face in the government. Even the simplest renovation of the system will require a carefully designed plan.
One hopes that before calling for demonstrations, Nasrallah and his allies will take the time to outline a full political program, so that if and when the Lebanese do go to protests, they will be doing so for more than just slogans and rhetoric. The Lebanese people deserve to be treated as more than just pawns who can be called to the streets to bring down a Cabinet - only to see it replaced by a government that is equally aimless and ineffective.

Armed groups move house to make way for army in Taamir
By Mohammed Zaatari -Daily Star staff
Monday, November 20, 2006
SIDON: About a dozen members of Palestinian armed groups have moved their residences from the western sector of Taamir, outside Sidon, to homes near the southern entrance of Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp as the Lebanese Army prepares to deploy in the area, a Taamir official said on Sunday.
"They either rented or bought homes near the southern entrance of Ain al-Hilweh," said Abou Ahmad Fadl, a member of the Taamir Follow-up Committee and the Hamas representative in Ain al-Hilweh. Fadl said the withdrawal paved the way for "a gradual deployment of the Lebanese Army in the Taamir neighborhood."
The Lebanese judiciary and security forces have been trying to resolve potential points of conflict in Taamir, also known as Khat al-Sikkeh, before the army's deployment. Military sources previously declared that the Lebanese Army would not deploy in the area "before it has been cleared of all armed groups."
Local and national leaders have held several security meetings this month to discuss the army's deployment to put an end to violence in the area.
The evacuees have received financial compensation to help them settle down elsewhere "after they were forced to leave their houses behind," a source told The Daily Star. The meetings in the past weeks discussed the possibility of setting up Palestinian checkpoints on streets where the members of militant groups relocated, the source said. This, the source added, "would serve as a shield for the army when it deploys in Taamir."
The source said the plan has not yet been finalized. In a related development, a number of Taamir youths with minor offenses on their criminal records surrendered to the Lebanese authorities.
The legal records of the groups in Taamir are currently being examined by the Lebanese judiciary. Mediation efforts have been under way to clear the records of some of the youths, who were forced to join armed militias there in order to escape justice. The youths turned themselves in in exchange for an unspecified one-time amnesty agreement on the part of the government, sources said.

FPM candidate, independent top field in Bar Association vote
LF, Future movement also win new seats on council
By Mira Borji -Daily Star staff
Monday, November 20, 2006
BEIRUT: The General Assembly of the Beirut Bar Association elected four new members to its 12-seat council and five members to its Mutual Assistance Fund on Sunday in a political battle par excellence between the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the March 14 Forces. FPM lawyer George Baroud received the most votes, with 1,512 out of around 3,600 total.
Independent candidate Nader Gaspar came in second with 1,509 votes. Lebanese Forces (LF) candidate George Jreij came in third with 1,488 votes, while Future Movement candidate Ahmad Safsouf came in fourth with 1,316 votes. Progressive Socialist Party candidate Bassam Halabi finished fifth, with 30 votes, ahead of FPM candidate Tarek Khatib. Halabi will serve as an alternate council member. A dispute broke out when security personnel blocked FPM lawyer Fadi Barakat from entering the room where the ballot boxes were gathered. Bar Association president Boutro Doumit intervened and restored calm.
Thirteen candidates competed for the four open council seats. The five new Mutual Assistance Fund members were elected unopposed.
Former President Amin Gemayel and several former ministers and MPs participated in the General Assembly, which was held at Beirut Justice Palace.
Reform and Change bloc MP Ibrahim Kenaan, LF MP George Adwan, Future Movement MP Serge Toursarkissian, Democratic Gathering bloc MP Elie Aoun, Loyalty to the Resistance bloc MP Nawwar Sahili and Phalange party leader Karim Pakradouni also took part in the vote. After casting his vote, Gemayel praised the association's "pioneer democratic experience" and said that it needed to cling to "right" democratic practices and abide by the Constitution.
"We will waylay anyone who tries to violate the Constitution," Gemayel said.
Gemayel lashed out at parties calling for early parliamentary elections, indirectly referring to the FPM and its allies, including Hizbullah and the Amal Movement.
"If all parties respect constitutional and legal periods, they save the country many tragedies," Gemayel said. He also voiced his opposition to the use of street protests and "burning periods" as a mechanism for political change. In his annual statement, Doumit praised the association's achievements over the past year in raising its national profile and for its support of Lebanon during the July-August war.

March 8 students cite evidence that they won AUB student elections
Confusion abounds as opposing camp still claims victory
By Nour Samaha -Daily Star staff
Saturday, November 18, 2006
BEIRUT: In an attempt to clarify the American University of Beirut's contested student election results, the university's March 8 coalition held a news conference Friday to provide evidence of their claimed victory. The conference was held by the leaders of the student chapters of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah, Amal and the People's Movement, represented by Mario Chamoun, Bilal Lakis, Ali Hamdan and Bilal Tay, respectively.
Chamoun began the conference with a brief overview of previous student elections at other universities, most notably this year's contest at Saint Joseph University (USJ)."We had a sweeping victory at USJ, but [Lebanese Forces leader] Samir Geagea and the March 14 Forces publicly announced that they had won," he said. "In order to disprove them, we gathered all the students who were running with us and who won to give their signatures confirming they were with us, thus proving the March 14 wrong, and that we had, in fact, won."
The March 8 student leaders said they had been forced to employ the same strategy due to similar claims of victory by the March 14 Forces concerning this week's Student Representative Council elections at AUB.Chamoun produced a list containing the signatures of all candidates who ran with the March 8 coalition, as well as those "independents" who aligned with the group. According to the list, the March 8 won the AUB elections with 41 seats (including two members from the No Frontiers Party), while the March 14 was said to have won 38.
However, in the latest twist of an already complicated affair, the March 14 coalition earlier Friday distributed its own list of victorious candidates - again, both members and allied independents - with the final result putting the March 14 and all four No Frontiers members on top with 47 seats, and the March 8 with 31.
Shown their opponent's tally, the March 8 members pointed out that some of the independents claimed by the March 14 had signed their allegiance to the March 8.
But the March 8 coalition said it could not release the list to the public "at this time," as some independents named wished to remain officially non-affiliated until University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) elections in two weeks.
Makram Rabah, the sitting USFC vice-president and head of the March 14 coalition at AUB, said in a telephone interview that the true victor would be proven in the coming elections. "The independent candidates that they are claiming are with them are actually still independent," he said. When asked how both lists could contain the same names as allies, he replied: "Some of the independents are going with both sides because they are afraid to lose support from either side."
During the March 8 news conference, Chamoun reiterated his coalition's allegations of voting irregularities. "While we are not accusing anyone of cheating or tampering with the ballot boxes, evidence has proven that something did occur," Chamoun said. "For example, within the ballot boxes of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences there were 147 registered votes, but the counting came out to 152 papers. How is this explained?""With this in mind, we reserve the right to challenge the elections," he added.

Kissinger urges summit on Iraq, talks with Iran
By Agence France Presse (AFP)
Monday, November 20, 2006
LONDON: Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called Sunday for an international conference to thrash out the future for strife-torn Iraq. The 83-year-old political heavyweight said that a collapse of control in Iraq would lead to disastrous consequences that would drag the West back into the Middle East.
The former diplomat also called for America to open dialogue with Iran, warning that a confrontation would occur without negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program."We have to move at some early point to some international definition of what a legitimate outcome is - something that can be supported by the surrounding states and by ourselves and our allies," Kissinger told BBC television from his Connecticut home.
"At some early point an international conference should be called that involves neighbors, perhaps the permanent members of the [United Nations] Security Council and countries that have a major interest in the outcome like India and Pakistan," the Nobel Peace Prize laureate said.
Kissinger was asked whether there was any hope left of a clear military victory in Iraq.
He replied: "If you mean by clear military victory an Iraqi government that can be established across the whole country that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that a political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible." He said the international coalition with troops deployed in Iraq had to redefine their course in the country.
"A dramatic collapse of Iraq, whatever we think of how the situation was created, would have disastrous consequences for which we would pay for many years and which would bring us back in one way or another into the region," he said.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran have been frozen since 1980 and the United States is leading a campaign to impose harsh UN Security Council sanctions on the country.
"I believe America has to be in some dialogue with Iran," Kissinger said. "It seems to me the fundamental problem is this: does Iran conduct itself as a crusade or as a nation? If Iran is a nation it should be possible to define a relationship in which Iran, together will all interested parties, contributes to stability in the region and plays a respected role." - AFP

On Iraq: Listen carefully to General Abizaid
Walid Phares, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist
As the debate in the United States is still raging on the Iraq War – and as many believe that the last legislative elections were a message from the American public to change the course in that conflict – the question remains, how.
American politicians and their academic and activist advisors are rushing in all directions to search for that magic answer with most of the debaters parroting basically two main theses advanced by very few authors.
One militant doctrine – connecting the radical left and the isolationist right, to (ironically) the Jihadists around the world – calls for immediate withdrawal from Iraq, let alone from the War on Terror. The radical ideologues do not discuss a rational policy in the region they essentially want no U.S. policy at all. So, we'll discount their position.
The other quasi doctrine says, we need to win the war in Iraq so that we can pull the troops back home. Apparently, this projected equation is becoming the rallying cry for legislators and diplomats from both parties in the U.S. Congress: In short, feeling what they believe is a pressure from the voters, the winners and losers in the last elections agree that it is going to take one more deep push before beginning the big gradual withdrawal. While the backbone of this consensus is very logical by itself, and should have been applied to the entire War on Terror to begin with (we will come back to this issue in January), most politicians seem not to capture the very essence of the "turning point" in Iraq, let alone in the region as a whole. I would strongly recommend they listen carefully to the analysis of General John Abizaid, particularly his last testimony to the Senate.
In classical military teaching, you win the war if you destroy the enemy in a particular geographical space. Examples abound in world history. But in the War on Terror, the enemy is not identifiable within a particular space. The supreme commander of U.S. forces in the region often stated that the global foes are the complex networks of Salafi Jihadists on the one hand and the operatives of the Khumeinist regime in Iraq on the other. Hence, may I add, the measurement of success against them is the enabling of the region's peoples to resist them.
Unfortunately, the debaters in America and the West have been deprived (by their own academic elites) from the understanding of that enemy. Huge efforts are underway in Europe and North America to convince legislators and media that this is not an ideological war but rather a foreign policy matter. This leads decision-makers to measure in statistics not in concepts, hence the failures in design and policies.
Let's take Iraq as an example:
General Abizaid was asked by a panel of well informed Senators last week, how to "measure" the need to send in additional U.S. forces or to begin withdrawal from Iraq.
In short military sentences, the CENTCOM boss told them it will all depend on the ability of U.S. forces to train, support and direct Iraqi units in their confrontation with the terrorists. The Senators didn't seem the get Abizaid's very accurate point. Both Republican and Democrat legislators wanted a quantitative answer:
"How many additional troops do you need so that we can pull out lots of troops after," they repetitively asked with hints at past and future electoral promises to end the conflict.
Sticking with his analysis, Abizaid (who speaks the language of the region and has studied its ideologies) said the question is not to bring in more troops to Iraq, but to have Iraqi forces begin to win their war. This was the first key in the whole hearing. The man was trying to tell the Senators that more important than bringing in additional 20,000 Marines and soldiers, was to train an additional 50,000 Iraqi troops.
Indeed, the ultimate objective in this war (at least the counter-terrorist part of it) is to help the Iraqis help themselves. Surely with half a million boots on the ground you can saturate the whole country, but from what? There is no standing army the U.S. is fighting against.
The fight is against a factory that is producing Jihadists, both external and internal. The answer is to build the counter-factory: i.e. an Iraqi military and intelligence force. And to do so, you have to allow it to fight the battle, with all the sacrifices and setbacks that come with it. U.S. forces cannot keep fighting instead of the Iraqis, and win the war for them.
Aware of this reality, General Abizaid (along with his colleagues) was trying to explain to Congress that – in the historical context of it – the war against terrorism in Iraq is one of the centers of the global conflict. Even the seasoned U.S. diplomat David Satterfield, who was also testifying on behalf of the State Department, asserted the inescapable reality: it is about the Iraqis' political will. And in addition to the General and the diplomat, may I stress as an academic, that the matter at the end is psychological.
If Iraqi citizens "see" their army engaging the terrorists and winning, the tide will turn. It is not about how many new troops or about the statistics of death. It is between al Jazeera convincing Iraqis that the U.S. is defeated and that former Secretary of State Jim Baker (co-chair of the Iraq Study Group) is supposedly negotiating the terms of the surrender, and between al Hurra TV showing Iraqi commanders fraternizing with Shia and Sunni villagers after encounters with terrorists and sectarian militias. It boils down to this: who would the Iraqis send their sons to fight with: The Jihadists of all types or the multiethnic Army?
Without this understanding of the conflict, advocated by Abizaid, decision-makers are left with mostly political calculations: how to cut deals, how to get out, how not to suffer more losses, and how to be reelected or super-elected in 2008. General Abizaid instead recommended moves that make sense only if we can see the bigger picture:
Insert U.S. forces within Iraqi units: Reduce the presence of American (and Coalition) military in the "Jihadi zones" and instead deploy more Iraqi-American solidified forces. Call on U.S. units to strategically support Iraqis when the Jihadists are rebuilding other "Fallujahs." Let the sons and daughters of Iraq take the fight to the terrorists, should they be Salafists or Khumeinists. This is their time to face off with their enemy (who happens to be our enemy). Let them engage and test their will and the will of the people they are protecting and liberating. Let al Jazeera and al Hurra (their media and ours) and the Iraqiya TV (Iraqi national TV) show the panache or the setback of their own forces. It is fine if we don't take all the credit for all the battles. It is fine if the Iraqi military takes the front row for the good and the bad. Let their generals, commanders, soldiers be in the media and lash out against the Jihadists. And at the core of each unit, let's place the best of our U.S. support. The bottom line, Iraqis needs victories in Arabic language (and also in Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkic). Audiences in Baghdad need to hear Iraqi commentators evaluating the conflict, not talking heads from New York to Los Angeles. This is not our exclusive war in Mesopotamia; this is also Iraq's war against terror and fascism, whether our intellectual elites like it or not.
U.S. and Coalition forces should redeploy inside Iraq not away from it at this point in time. The actual need for ground, sea, and air forces should be designed by those who are waging the war in the realm of reality; not by those who are managing domestic politics at home. For lovers of debates, televised war-rooms and partisan labyrinths we suggest another arena of talents: engage the Iraqi people, politicians, youth, women, and mobilize them. Visit Iraq and meet with them or invite them to your cities, towns and campuses back at home. Be a part of the international mobilization, not the global demobilization. Strategically, large chunks of the expeditionary force should be deploying on or about the Iraqi-Iranian and Iraqi-Syrian borders. Use the weight of American might to deter the two regimes who are at real war with Iraq's emerging democracy. Don't let the agents of Damascus and Tehran killing the guys and gals in convoys and patrols inside urban areas. Fulfill the strategy of liberation with smarter moves instead of self-collapsing.
One good question at that hearing, though, was the ability of the Iraqi government to fulfill its obligations of grooming its own army and disarming the various militias. That indeed is a legitimate question. Why isn't Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki moving fast enough to clamp down on the Shia militias? Why isn't his government supporting the Iraqi army with enough energy? Plenty of relevant questions can be asked. The answer resides in the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Remember, politicians are politicians, from Montana to Basra: They all want to see their interests as a part of the global interest. When the U.S. shows leadership in the region, Iraq's leaders will function better. Let's take our gloves off: If we send the units to deploy on the Iraqi Iranian borders, Iraqi Shiite politicians will become bolder in rooting out Iranian operatives from Sadr City. This is how it works. But if in response to a full month of Iranian military maneuvers, we send former diplomats to "negotiate a role for Ahmedinijad" in Najaf's security, don't expect Maliki or even Sistani to stop Muqtada al Sadr. One massive mistake the U.S. government and the political establishment has committed and continues to practice is to squeeze too many cooks into the Iraq kitchen.
Last but not least, I was stupefied that instead of asking General Abizaid to comment on books and literature produced by the enemy, he was grilled on paragraphs from a best-seller by an American journalist. With all my respect to Mr. Bob Woodward and his many journalistic achievements, State of Denial is not a military manual or a book on Jihadism, Baathism, insurgencies, or the memoirs of Bin Laden and Khomeini. It is a chilling reminder of American domestic politics, but not an analysis of al Muhajer and al Sadr strategies in Iraq. What we need to have in the center of our debate is a state of strategy not just gossip thrillers.
In the end, and as the nation is looking desperately for ways to "solve" Iraq, it is crucial that we dissipate the foggy vision of that conflict: Concentrate on reading the enemy, understand your allies and focus on the big plan; the rest is cacophony. In Iraq, it means analyze the speeches of the Jihadists and Ahmedinijad, listen to the Iraqis and talk with them, and let them have victories over their enemies. This is the recipe of the centurions and their chief, John Abizaid. I hope the new Rome's Senate will hear.
**— Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future Terrorism Project of the FDD. He is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. His most recent book is Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West.
Dr Phares holds degrees in law and political science from Saint Joseph University and the Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in international law from the Universite de Lyons in France and a Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the University of Miami.
He has taught and lectured at numerous universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut , and served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek International. He has taught Middle East political issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University until 2006.
Dr. Phares has written seven books on the Middle East and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications such as Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, the Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies and the Journal of International Security. He has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, BBC, al Jazeera, al Hurra, as well as on radio broadcasts.
Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittees on the Middle East and South East Asia, the House Committees on International Relations and Homeland Security and regularly conducts congressional and State Department briefings, and he was the author of the memo that introduced UNSCR 1559 in 2004.
**Visit Dr. Phares on the web at walidphares.com and defenddemocracy.org. 2006 Walid Phares

A Symbol of Division or Unity?
Elias Harfoush Al-Hayat - 19/11/06//
The task undertaken by Speaker Nabih Berry as the remaining, or perhaps the sole, nexus between the two conflicting parties in Lebanon, was supposed to be taken up by the Lebanese President, not only in his capacity as the head of State, but also in accordance with the exceptional prerogatives the Taif Constitution gave him, which is different from the roles played by the former presidents before the 1990 amendments.
One of the most important points in the new version of the Constitution is that the President of the Republic is the "head of State and the symbol of the unity of the nation, who observes the Constitution and preserves Lebanon's independence, unity and territorial integrity…" (Article 49) The objective of this formula was precisely to avoid the crisis experienced by the president today, as a direct party in the internal conflict, and which, therefore, makes him unable to be "the symbol of the unity of the nation." Indeed, his role has become one of the most important contentious issues in the simmering crisis of disagreement.
This constitutional formula came in the wake of a bitter controversy well-remembered by the Lebanese. It was represented by Gen. Michel Aoun's control of Baabda Palace, which he entered as a passing visitor (as prime minister) to prepare for the presidential elections.
Although half the members of Aoun's government resigned, he remained in Al-Shaab Palace issuing decrees, dismissing lawmakers and calling for elections. He had even rejected the results of the parliamentary consensus that crowned the Taif meetings. He had then dismissed the poll results, which installed a new president whose assassination constituted the beginning of a new era that had set the stage for a new function for the president. This has not occurred to the minds of the participants in the Taif conference, in light of the circumstances under which they held their meetings.
We are still experiencing the last chapter of that decade: A President that is considered a party in the internal conflict. The extension of his term has raised constitutional and legal questions at home and abroad. This has caused an almost complete boycott of the president from abroad and a feeling of disinterest among parties at home, who are forced to meet with the president.
The president has ministers in the government. When those ministers, who were considered to be affiliated with the president, shifted their loyalties, he and his allies considered the move as a governmental imbalance that needs to be redressed by gaining control of third of the ministerial seats.
Had the President been outside the conflict, he would not have had ministers. Ministers are members of the government, which has its political platform for which it is given parliamentary confidence. This prompted the authors of the constitutional amendments not to give the President of the Republic a voice during the voting in the Council of Ministers when he attends its meetings, with the aim of keeping him neutral, because voting in favor of a certain side will turn him into a partisan president.
Transferring the House of Representatives to the government and distributing the seats among the loyalists and the opposition, so that it represents all political currents in the country, is a constitutional heresy unheard-of in any part of the world. It is a heresy indeed that only aims at signing the death warrant of the Constitution and replacing it with 'state demonstrations', which are frequently called for by its advocates.
What about the 'illegitimacy of any authority that does not respect the rules of co-existence' and considers the withdrawal of Shiite ministers from the government a violation of this rule that strips the government of its legitimacy?
Those who criticize the government's continuation in office despite the resignations ignore the fact that the ministers do not represent their communities in government, but rather their political trends. The same team, which now laments 'coexistence', forgets that it used to incorporate ministers from the previous governments, despite their sects' objections that these ministers have low sectarian representation.
Notwithstanding, 'coexistence' continued unblemished for 15 years

Wars and Fundamentalisms
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 20/11/06//
Despite the crushing defeat in the Congressional elections that finally rubbed the noses of the Republicans in the dirt, it does not seem that President George Bush has renounced his ideological recitals that have always come in handy to rationalize his administration's foreign policies and his conquests. In Vietnam, he forgot that his slogans, especially the 'ideology of freedom in the face of hated', have become jaded in the US itself, let alone in the rest of the world. He is the one who used the veto to prevent the Security Council's condemnation of Israel's massacre in the Palestinian city of Beit Hanoun. And by doing this, he is the one who is encouraging Ehud Olmert's government to commit more atrocities, so long as punishment is handed out on only party: an international siege of the Palestinian people under the pretext that their government is 'terroristic', while they are being deprived of the ideology of freedom.
A week had not passed since the veto, when Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli minister responsible for strategic affairs, discovered that the shortest way to deal with the Palestinians' firing their rockets on the Hebrew State is to 'send' the leaders of the Palestinian factions to Heaven, in other words, liquidate them through a campaign of assassinations. And that includes Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. What is for certain is that there is little need to ask again which standard we should use to condemn the act of killing, whether Palestinian or Israeli, although this does not eliminate the differences between resistance against the occupation and the massacres committed in the name of security between legitimate resistance and between organized terrorism that is never held to account because it is of an Israeli nationality.
What is also certain is that Lieberman, who the Jews themselves describe as fascist and racist, provoked the feelings of Muslims as he belittled martyrdom, adding a despicable dimension to the conflict: transforming the conflict into a religious one between Jews and Muslims. Contrary to what he claims, in everything he has done since he entered the White House, Bush and his creed have been the mentors of dozens of the likes of Lieberman, since he gave terrorism an exclusively Islamic 'identity', relying on the services provided by al-Qaeda and its pupils. He unsheathed the 'sword of blind force' to the point of being besieged by its 'victories', unleashing panic in the world over everything that is Islamic and toward anyone who is a Muslim.
It must be said that John Abizaid, the Commander of the American Central Command, does not describe all Muslims as terrorists, but is nonetheless worried about the fate of the world. He is confident that the spark that will light a world war will come from Islamic extremism's use of nuclear or germ weapons. Abizaid, like President Bush, once again diverted attention from the Americans' major predicament in Iraq. They led a war based on the lie concerning weapons of mass destruction, and extremism and apostatizing have spread like a cancer that is almost killing the country's unity and its delayed independence, and is proliferating in the region.
Assuming such organizations or cells, which claim to be dedicated to defending the interests of Muslims, seek the possession of such nuclear weapons, there is no debate that this would not be in their interest. When these groups hijacked the security of the world and held it hostage, falsely in the name of Islamists, the dilemma that remains is that the policies of the West are still pushing many of the Islamists into the corner of the extremism, making them easy prey for the true extremists, as the currents of ignorance grow stronger. Every disaster becomes an advantage to the 'Islamist', and every progression is an advantage to his opponent.
The West itself is condemned, since it makes every Muslim feel besieged by a feeling of treason, outwardly portraying what he does not hold within himself, pictured as someone ready to pounce on the security of society when the moment of vengeance is upon him for the 'humiliation of Muslims in the world'. It is obvious that being spied on continuously, even at university, will only raise the walls of isolation around him, along with the winds of hatred.
The situation is that the world in which Bush's strategy has succeeded in creating an 'Islamic enemy' to worry about, following the Communist enemy, is now surrounded by the terrible failure in the standardization of justice. Or, more likely, it is the inability to see the causes of injustice and strangle it at the source, and also the inability to refuse being led according to all the standards set by the Americans. Add to this his being unable to raise the voice of recognition that there are terrorists in the US, Europe and Russia and everywhere, and his failure to reject Israeli 'hooliganism' in Palestine and Lebanon, since terrorism is Israeli with distinction, where no one is asked about obligations toward international resolutions except for his enemies.
The West has wasted years covering up for the 'Big Brother', without taking a single opportunity to correct its absurd course. Tens of years of rapprochement between the Muslim East and the Christian West have been lost under the blows of extremism and extremist retaliation. Security is not the first victim, but the dialogue of interests, which alone can restore balance and equilibrium to the global system.
In the event that the 'Big Brother' regains its rationality, after the arrogance of the Republicans and their defeat in the congressional elections, the seniors at the Security Council will be invited to redefine the priorities of the system that was first grabbed by US monopolization and hopefully develop a new international partnership. Without it, Washington alone will remain to determine the enemy, fabricate it, and exaggerate it, and mobilize the world to pursue that enemy. Without this, the whole 'democratic' West will slide into a dangerous confrontation with the Islamic World. The features of this confrontation will be confused with a religious war whose flames will be fed by all the fundamentalists in the East and West

Suicide Bombers and Iraq's Complaints!
Jamil Ziabi Al-Hayat - 20/11/06//
Iraq's complaints about extremist Saudis, who carry out suicide operations in markets, among crowds of people, or through launching terrorist operations that claims the lives of innocent civilians, or in other ways, have increased recently. According to available information, Saudis infiltrate into Iraq through neighboring countries. How can they infiltrate? Who helps them? Which roads do they take? All these aspects are still unclear. It is scary, especially in light of confirmations from Saudi security services that the Saudi border with Iraq is 'safe' and is monitored with infrared thermal cameras.
The presence of Saudis in Iraq is not surprising to those who have followed the Iraq situation since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. However, it has become worrying and terrifying; especially in light of the increasing numbers of hard-liners who go to Iraq have an extremist ideology and mentality that is inspired by terrorist acts.
The Saudis are sentimental by nature. They often believe others spontaneously. That is why they are easy prey for 'takfiri' and violent groups, who persuade them to blow themselves up in Iraq after crossing the borders of neighboring countries, and their passage is facilitated, just like what happened in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
The Saudis have become the common denominator and the available fuel in terrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are attracted and recruited by suicide groups. This is the product of their intellectual and psychological emptiness, without using logic to reach the obvious truth.
Thus, some Saudi people, who were brought up in a peaceful society, have become the fuel of human incinerators. They are like puppets, controlled by black minds that have nothing to do with the teachings of the faith of Islam. Such minds are good at the art of deception and misrepresentation, to the extent that they have become able to grant indulgences to win the Hereafter and enter Paradise, as the leaders of the Catholic Church did when they exploited the ignorance of people and their faith in myths.
The Saudi youth are still a valuable prey for terrorist organizations, and are a renewable resource to provide these organizations with prospective suicide bombers, thanks to extremists who support 'two-faced' violence.
Saudis must be afraid that these human bombs will be brought home, as terrorism may be born again, as was the case with some of the returnees from Afghanistan, who lost the ability to survive peacefully in their homelands without acts of violence. Many of those who participated in such wars were those who masterminded terrorist operations.
Saudi Arabia has the longest border with Iraq. Precautionary and security measures have been taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to maintain the security of its borders through infrared thermal cameras and to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and smugglers to and from its territory, in addition to the huge barrier project, which it intends to implement alongside its border with Iraq. However, in spite of this, there are still some groups who recruit these youths to export them to Iraq via other countries to kill innocent people. More important, how can the minds of these young people be fortified against such criminal groups, which are capable of penetrating the minds of these young people, disrupting their thinking, deceiving them, and turning them into human bombs willing to detonate themselves in order to achieve their destructive objectives?
If we consider that the problem is related to social and behavioral issues that need time and effort to be resolved, how can Iraqi borders, through which Saudis and others infiltrate into Iraq, be secured? The Iraqis have the right to wonder: when will the security agreements that were reached on the sidelines of the Conference of the Interior Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries, which was recently held in Jeddah, be put into effect? The conference emphasized the security and territorial integrity of Iraq. It was endorsed by Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Kuwait.
The scourge of terrorism, which has become the greatest threat to our young people and future of our country, is the result of wrong interpretations and narrow-minded views adopted by some people, who use faith as a means to attain personal goals. The matter has become an intellectual, psychological and social dilemma that needs every effort to address and isolate these ideas and separate them from the community. This is, in fact, the way that we can use to treat and iron out such distorted ideas. In this respect, I cite an excerpt from a speech by the Saudi Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al al-Sheikh, who explained the Islamic stand toward terrorism, saying: "Those are the enemies of you, your creed, nation, solidarity, leadership, and good. They ignorantly want to transform this society from security, stability and affluence to a scourge of schism and plight, but God and the faithful stand against this. The faithful are all asked neither to condone criminals nor approve of their error, or cover up an enemy. Rather, the faithful should be united to combat all crimes, and cut the ground from under criminals' feet

Aoun: We have to break the circle of fear
By Claude Salhani Nov 20, 2006, 14:45 GMT
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BEIRUT, Lebanon (UPI) -- Former Lebanese Army Gen. Michel Aoun is one of two leading candidates vying for the presidency in what is gearing up to be a heated race between Lebanon`s pro- and anti-Syrian forces.
From his heavily secured hilltop borrowed residence just outside the Lebanese capital, Aoun, who rejects the 'pro-Syrian' label, told Claude Salhani, International Editor with United Press International, one of the main reasons he was running for president was to battle corruption. Aoun, however, said it would take a miracle. The following are excerpts.
Claude Salhani: Many people in Lebanon find your alliance with Hezbollah a bit strange. Can you clarify your political philosophy?
Aoun: When I returned from France there was a real problem on the Lebanese (political) scene. I supported (U.N. Security Council Resolution) 1559 (calling for Hezbollah to relinquish its weapons). But I was confronted by a political class, which included (Druze leader) Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri (son and political heir of slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) who said Hezbollah should hold on to their weapons. I found myself alone, against Hezbollah and everyone else, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalanges, Hariri, Jumblatt, Amal; all were in an electoral political alliance. I was isolated. I found that there was cheating going on. Jumblatt and Hariri were promising the French and Americans that they would disarm Hezbollah while they were promising Hezbollah they would protect them.
Given this ambiguous situation I felt we were heading for a confrontation and not a solution of the problem. Knowing the nature of Hezbollah, knowing the nature of the others and knowing the U.S. and French position on the issue I imagined how to resolve the problem since no one had the necessary force to resolve the problem by force.
We engaged in dialogue with Hezbollah and agreed to a memorandum of understanding. Once the paper was published there erupted a political explosion against Gen. Aoun.
We managed to get Hezbollah to limit their demands to purely Lebanese issues. They stopped talking about Jerusalem, a global Middle East solution ... we got them to focus on purely Lebanese issues, such as the Shebaa Farms, an area I know very well having served there as a young lieutenant. Yes, the Farms belong to Lebanon.
As soon as the (Lebanese) territory (occupied by Israel) is liberated, Hezbollah`s weapons should become defensive weapons and become integrated in a defensive strategy under Lebanese Army command. And from the moment the Shebaa Farms are returned to Lebanese sovereignty, Hezbollah`s weapons would no longer be used against Israel.
Q: What did you think when Hezbollah kidnapped the three Israeli soldiers in July, sparking Israel`s devastating retaliation?
A: It was a military action to which we were used. This (type of operations) has been going on since 1982. Just two weeks earlier Lebanese security forces broke up a Mossad (Israeli intelligence) cell that was responsible for the killings of five people in Lebanon.
Q: Do you think Hezbollah should have kidnapped those three soldiers?
A: (Hezbollah Secretary-General) Hassan Nasrallah always said you have to take (Israeli) prisoners in order to obtain the release of Hezbollah prisoners. It was part of the game. The surprise was Israel`s reaction. And the second surprise was Hezbollah`s readiness.
Q: But when Hamas kidnapped one Israeli soldier near Gaza just a week earlier, the response from Israel was overwhelming.
A: We didn`t receive the message.
Q: So how do you go about convincing Hezbollah to hand in its weapons?
A: That can only happen through 'trust building.'
Q: How would you apply that in Lebanon?
A: We have to break the circle of fear in which we live in today. If there is no exchange of trust, we remain wary of one another and it offers a permanent source of conflict. One of the first questions I asked Hezbollah was 'Tell me your fears? Tell me about your fears?
Q: What was their reply?
A: They said that they lived first for about 15 years under Palestinian control and suffered a lot. Then came the Israeli occupation. The Lebanese army and government were unable to offer security. We (Hezbollah) succeeded through our resistance to liberate a part of our territory. All solutions should take into account all those fears.
Q: What is your opinion on the Taif peace accords (which put an end to the Lebanese civil war)?
A: Taif was not a choice, it was a dictat. However, we managed to shape a constitution. We have to respect these accords, though they have to become firmer. But much of what was agreed in Taif was never implemented, such as the voting law, decentralization.
Q: Suppose that tomorrow you are president of the Lebanese Republic. How would you go about removing Hezbollah`s weapons?
A: I would put the state in charge of the defense of the country and ensure calm along the border. And integrate the weapons into the army`s defensive system.
Q: Some people say your attitude towards Syria has changed. They accuse you of shifting policy from anti-Syrian to pro-Syrian. How do you reply to that?
A: My attitude has not changed. I always said if the Syrians leave Lebanon we would try to have very good relations with Syria. And I have no links with Syria. There will be no return to (Syrian) tutelage. There should be full diplomatic relations and exchanges of ambassadors.
Q: Do you believe the Syrians have withdrawn from Lebanon?
A: (Laughter) They withdrew militarily, but they still try to impose their influence. The Syrians left, but left behind two explosive situations: Hezbollah and the Palestinians,
Q: How do you feel when accused of being pro-Syrian?
A: First I was raging mad. Later it had no effect on me.
Q: It`s been said that you have a short temper.
A: I lose my temper over small things, such as over breaking a cup of coffee, but I stay calm under fire.
Q: You threatened of taking to the street and organizing demonstrations if the government does not resign. Would you still do that?
A: That is a means, not the only means to resist this government.
Q: If you could ask President Bush one question, what would it be?
A: I don`t think that he would listen to me. We have to use a correct process to install democracy and then to safeguard the values of democracy in the fight against corruption. If we can get rid of corruption in Lebanon it would be a miracle ... And I would merit going to heaven.
(Comments may be sent to Claude@upi.com.)Copyright 2006 by United Press International

Time for Madrid talks, part II?
By Laura Heaton Nov 20, 2006, 16:48 GMT
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WASHINGTON, DC, United States (UPI) -- Renewed Israeli incursions into Gaza have sparked a bout of Qassam rocket fire from Palestinian militants that threatens to dash any lingering hopes for a return to the negotiating table. But some experts with experience on the diplomatic front say aspects of the status quo present a singular opportunity. 'Weakness is the name of the new game,' said former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin at a recent forum in Washington, D.C., to assess the current stagnation of high-level peace talks. 'In Lebanon you have Fouad Siniora who is a weak prime minister. In Palestine you have (Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas), who is confronting a government of Hamas and is considered by everybody -- maybe including himself -- as a weak leader,' he said. 'A new member of this club of weakness is (Israeli Prime Minister) Ehud Olmert.'After hostilities broke out between Israel and Hezbollah following the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June, Olmert and members of his Cabinet were accused of mishandling a military campaing that yielded paltry results. Hezbollah survived in tact, while vast swathes of Lebanon were destoryed and public opinion in Israel soured.
Since Israel`s military offensive resumed in Gaza, around 350 Palestinians have been killed -- about half of them civilians -- and four Israelis, three of them soldiers, have been killed. Qassam rocket fire from Gaza last week killed one woman and wounded two others in the southern town of Sderot and sporadic launches continue. Noting that the apparent lack of strong leadership has allowed the situation to unravel, Beilin nonetheless argued present leaders may have an advantage over their predecessors.
'One may say that strong people can take (peace negotiations) upon themselves. But, maybe a weak leader can do it because he has much less to lose,' he said. 'How can we convince this club of weak leaders to move towards peace? It might be their chance for legacy, for strengthening themselves politically.'
Beilin, an architect of the Oslo Peace Accords, was also highly critical of boycotting tactics employed by the United States against Syria and Iran.
'What is the wisdom of boycotting? What is the wisdom of not having an ambassador? What is the wisdom of not talking?' Beilin asked. He went on to cite secret negotiations directed by then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in 1981 that established an 11-month cease-fire between Israel and PLO forces in Lebanon.
With the current strategy of isolating regimes opposed by the United States and Israel, Beilin suggested there is a missed opportunity to negotiate even a temporary peace. 'We lost in the administration this ability, despite being the only superpower in the world today,' he said. 'It (the United States) in many ways neutralized its own power by boycotting so many forces in the world that when we need mediation, we have to get other third parties in this world because the Americans are not available.'
Judith Kipper, a Mideast specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, finds that the lack of U.S. engagement in a peace process remains the primary obstacle.
'This administration has been reluctant to get involved in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians ... especially when Americans are dying in Iraq. They are very distracted and have let this slip,' Kipper told United Press International.
Kipper recommended the Bush administration 'use full persuasive powers of the U.S. to get this done.' Even in light of the current surge of violence in the Middle East, she called a U.S.-sponsored negotiation process 'utterly do-able.' Beilin, for his part, called for a second round of negotiations modeled after the Madrid Conference of 1991.
'The wisdom of Madrid I was that in the conference itself there were no votes taken, and there was no real debate ... It was a media event. But everything had been agreed upon before in the invitation letter ... Everybody knew exactly what was expected in the conference,' Beilin said.
The conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the former Soviet Union, brought together government representatives from Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Palestinians attended as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
Beilin posits that a Madrid-style international conference held today would be especially conducive to improving Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian relations.
'I think that we can try and repeat the same logic, write the right invitations, deal with the parties and see whether it is possible to have such a conference in order to launch a process of negotiation in the region,' he said.
Other experts were more skeptical.
'Madrid is a nice window dressing. If (a Madrid II) would help to improve the atmosphere, make people feel more included, it`s a good thing. But in and of itself (Madrid I) accomplished nothing,' Council`s Kipper said. Instead, she recommended current players take another look at the final settlement ideas that emerged during former U.S. President Bill Clinton`s diplomacy efforts of 2000 and the culminating Taba summit in January 2001.
Abuznaid similarly doubted the merits of a second round Madrid conference. He cited preconditions for Madrid I, which included a threat from then-President George Bush to withdraw aid from Israel if Israel did not agree to the conference.
'The conditions today are different,' Abuznaid told UPI. 'Olmert knows that there may be stipulations which he does not want to agree to. He knows that the mood in the whole world and even in the U.S. is that there should be a two-state solution.'
He suggested, however, that a media event modeled after the Madrid I could 'break the ice,' and lead to more meaningful negotiations. 'You need to start somewhere,' Abuznaid said.
Copyright 2006 by United Press International