LCCC ENGLISH
DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
July 7/07
Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 9,9-13. As Jesus passed
on from there, he saw a man named Matthew sitting at the customs post. He said
to him, "Follow me." And he got up and followed him. While he was at table in
his house, many tax collectors and sinners came and sat with Jesus and his
disciples. The Pharisees saw this and said to his disciples, "Why does your
teacher eat with tax collectors and sinners?"He heard this and said, "Those who
are well do not need a physician, but the sick do. Go and learn the meaning of
the words, 'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' I did not come to call the righteous
but sinners."
Opinions
Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and
Egypt. By: Prof. Barry
Rubin - 7/6/2007
Islam's Global War against Christianity.By
Patrick Poole. American Thinker site. July 7/07
Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and
Egypt.Global Politician. July 7/07/07
Lebanon's proxy war-Al-Ahram Weekly -
July 7/07
Lebanon's
long history of puppets masquerading as leaders.The
Daily Star. July 7/07
Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources
for July 07/07
Maronite Archbishop
Accuses Government of Wanting to 'Islamize' Lebanon-Naharnet
Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC Played a Role in The
Gemayel Killing-Naharnet
Hezbollah to send ex-minister to Paris Lebanon meeting.European
Jewish Press
Arms, Ammunition Seized from Sheikh Fathi Yakan's
Apartment-Naharnet
19 Firefighters Injured in Lebanon While Battling Huge
Blaze-Naharnet
100,000 Pirated CDs and DVDs Destroyed-Naharnet
South Korean troops arrive in Lebanon to join UNIFIL.International
Herald Tribune
Gaza/Israel/Lebanon: Release the Hostages.Reuters
Eitan slams IDF for 'failing to deliver' in Lebanon.Jerusalem
Post
Iran pulling strings to create Mideast turmoil.The
Jewish Journal of greater L.A
De-miners say clearing Nahr al-Bared of UXOs will take
at least a month-Daily
Star
US spells out conditions for $250 million in promised
aid-Daily
Star
Lebanon shelves summer festivals for second year-Daily
Star
Moussa, Assad to discuss Lebanese crisis-Daily
Star
Conference raises awareness on use of minors in armed
conflict-Daily
Star
Luxembourg's defense minister demands more from UNIFIL-Daily
Star
AUB alumni elect board of directors-Daily
Star
Efforts under way to protect innocents at battered camp-Daily
Star
Palestinian Red Crescent evacuates three civilians from
Nahr al-Bared-Daily
Star
Fire destroys
electronics warehouse in Jnah-Daily
Star
Come what may, Lebanese keep coming home-Daily
Star
Many youth are seeking greener pastures abroad-Daily
Star
Lucky '777' wedding fever sweeps Beirut,
despite instability-Daily
Star
Arms, Ammunition Seized
from Sheikh Fathi Yakan's Apartment
Lebanese authorities seized weapons and ammunition during a raid on an apartment
that belongs to Sheikh Fathi Yakan, a Sunni Islamist leader who is close to
Syria, state-run National News Agency reported Friday. It said members of the
state security apparatus busted Yakan's apartment in Abi Samra neighborhood in
the northern port city of Tripoli at mid-night Thursday. NNA said machine guns,
ammunition as well as binoculars were confiscated from the apartment Yakan had
used as an office as well as an arts institution. Authorities also seized guns
and ammo during overnight raids on a school in Tripoli's Abi Samra neighborhood
and on a house in Qalamoun, An Nahar newspaper reported Friday. Meanwhile,
security sources told the daily As Safir that a Fatah al-Islam ringleader in the
May 20 killings of Lebanese army soldiers has been arrested. They said Walid B.
was detained Thursday evening in north Lebanon and handed over to the Lebanese
army intelligence for interrogation. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 07:45
Maronite Archbishop
Accuses Government of Wanting to 'Islamize' Lebanon
Maronite Archbishop Beshara Raii accused Prime Minister Fouad Saniora's
government of wanting to Islamize Lebanon, two days after the Council of
Maronite Bishops slammed the cabinet. Raii, in an interview with As Safir daily
published Friday, urged the government to retrieve a draft law submitted to
parliament that would allow Lebanon to join the "Children's Rights in Islam"
treaty.
He accused the Saniora government of wanting to "Islamize" Lebanon and
"eliminate" Lebanon's trademark of peaceful coexistence among its various sects.
Raii's fiery stance came after the Bishops on Wednesday expressed fears that
canceling of the contest for recruiting new staff at the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) puts the performance of the institution at risk. The bishops also
criticized the acquisition of foreigners of more than seven million square
meters of land.
"We fear that there will come a time where the Lebanese will feel they are
outsiders in their own country," they said in a statement.
Raii said what concerns the Christians is that the ongoing political power
struggle gripping Lebanon is in fact a "regional conflict" and not one between
Sunnis and Shiites. "The conflict in Lebanon has taken the shape of a
Sunni-Shiite power struggle over who takes charge of what has been termed as the
Maronite politics," he explained. "So if the Sunnis and Shiites agree,
their agreement would come at the expense of the Christians," Raii told As Safir,
adding: "And if they disagree, the Christians become their victims.""What
worries Christians most is that the current government is taking Lebanon towards
Islamization," he said.
He lamented the government's decision to remove Great Friday from the official
holidays' list without consulting Christian authorities.
Raii said he hoped the government would retrieve such a decision. He said the
"Children's Rights in Islam" accord disregards the Christian presence in the
country and makes Lebanon an "Islamic state and an Islamic society." "We reject
this and we condemn the government's move which is working on dividing (Lebanon)
rather than uniting the country," he said. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 12:39
Ahmed
Jibril's PFLP-GC Played a Role in The Gemayel Killing
Reliable sources informed on the investigation in ex-minister Pierre Gemayel's
assassination told Naharnet Friday that Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command played a role in the crime. The sources
said a vehicle used in the assassination, a Honda VRC, was stolen from the
mountain resort of Brummana in October 2006 and taken to an area in the northern
sector of the eastern Bekaa valley where car bandits operate. Shortly after
that, a member of Jibril's Syrian-backed PFLP-GC approached the gang and
bartered the car for a quantity of weapons, the sources added. The car was used
in the Nov. 21 assassination of Gemayel in Suburban Jdaideh, almost a month
after it was stolen from Brummana, the sources added. The vehicle was later
driven to Syria, which turned it back to Lebanon in Dec. 2006 in line with a
warrant issued by the Interpol, they explained. One source said lab tests showed
that the car was used in the Gemayel assassination and two of the gunmen who
used it were killed later in clashes between Lebanese Forces and Fatah al-Islam
terrorists in Tripoli's Mitein street on May 20.
Bodies of the gunmen and samples taken from the car were under lab tests to
determine identities of all the culprits who gunned down Gemayel, the source
added.
He said all details related to the investigation in Gemayel's killing and the
Fatah al-Islam link have been relayed to the U.N. committee investigating the
2005 killing of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri and related crimes. Beirut, 06 Jul 07,
16:19
Hizbullah
Assigns Two-Man delegation to Paris Meeting
Hizbullah will send a former cabinet member to participate in multi-party talks
in France aimed at breaking Lebanon's political deadlock, the Shiite opposition
group said Friday. The group has assigned senior official Mohammed Fneish to the
two-member team, along with foreign affairs chief Nawaf Moussawi, the party
said.
Fneish was energy minister in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Saniora
before resigning along with five other pro-Syrian ministers in November.
After talks with a French envoy who delivered invitations for the mid-July
dialogue, Moussawi said on Wednesday that Hizbullah welcomes the initiative,
which showed France was "standing alongside the Lebanese without taking sides."
The meeting will take place on July 14-16 with between 30 and 40 delegates
taking part, the foreign ministry in Paris announced on Friday, rather than July
14-17 as announced by the envoy while in Beirut. Two members of the
Western-backed Saniora government, Telecommunication Minister Marwan Hamadeh and
Youth Minister Ahmed Fatfat, are also to take part in the meetings outside
Paris. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner is to play the role of moderator
in a bid to ease the worst political crisis in Lebanon since the civil war came
to an end in 1990.(AFP-Naharnet)Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 18:36
100,000 Pirated CDs and DVDs Destroyed
Lebanese security forces have destroyed around 100,000 pirated CDs and DVDs as
part of a crackdown on violators of intellectual property rights, An Nahar daily
reported Friday. It said the ISF and judicial police carried the pirated CDs to
Aley municipality square Thursday and smashed them by small bulldozers under the
glare of representatives of software companies. The newspaper said police seized
the CDs during raids in several Lebanese regions.
Business Software Alliance (BSA) representative Ali Harakeh lauded the
government, saying it is serious in cracking down on those who violate
intellectual property rights. "The Lebanese government has stressed its
determination to continue this campaign," he said. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 08:51
19 Firefighters Injured While Battling Huge Blaze
Nineteen firefighters sustained burns and suffered suffocation while battling a
huge blaze that ripped through an electronics warehouse in Beirut's Jnah
neighborhood.
A statement issued by Beirut's fire department said 12 tenants were rescued by
fire crews shortly after the blaze broke out around 7 am Thursday near BHV mall.
It said firefighters used ladders to reach occupants on the upper floors of the
apartment building. It was not immediately clear what caused the fire that tore
apart the Dalbani electronics depot in basement level-4 of a four-storey
apartment building that also houses Byblos bank as well as an LG electronics
store. The daily An Nahar said firefighters fought to contain the extensive
blaze for several hours. By late Thursday night, the fire, which inflicted heavy
material damage, was fully contained, according to An Nahar. Beirut, 05 Jul 07,
10:04
Islam's Global War against Christianity
By Patrick Poole _ American Thinker site
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/07/islams_global_war_against_chri.html
July 05, 2007
From Nigeria to Indonesia, Christians are under siege in virtually every single
country in the Muslim world, the victims of countless acts of discrimination,
depredation, brutality, and murder that are so widespread and systematic that it
can rightfully be called the new Holocaust. This time, however, the perpetrators
of this Holocaust aren't wearing swastikas, but kufi skull caps and hijabs.
Some of the oldest Christian communities in the world are subject to relentless
attack and teeter on the brink of extinction at the hands of the "Religion of
Peace": Palestinian Christians in Gaza and the West Bank; Assyrian, Syriac and
Chaldean Christians in Iraq; Coptic Christians in Egypt; Evangelical and
Orthodox Christians in Eastern Ethiopia and Eritrea; Armenian Orthodox
Christians in Turkey; and Maronite Christians in Lebanon.
Several of these communities date back to the beginning decades of Christianity
and all have weathered wave after wave of Islamic persecution for centuries and
more, but in the very near future some will simply cease to exist. In our
lifetime, the only trace of their past existence will be in footnotes in history
books (and probably only Western history books at that).
Meanwhile, we in the West hear much from radical Islam's apologists how the US
is engaged in a war against Islam citing of our military actions in Afghanistan
and Iraq. We are lectured on the inviolability of the Muslim ummah and
justifications of defensive jihad.
But an extensive search this past weekend of the websites of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic
Circle of North America, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim Student
Association, the Fiqh Council of North America, and the Muslim Public Affairs
Committee - the most visible institutional representatives of Islam in America -
found not a single mention or reference of the religious persecution of
Christians by their Islamic co-religionists, thereby making them tacit
co-conspirators in the Final Solution to the Christian problem in the Muslim
world.
The global war on Christianity by Islam is so massive in size and scope that it
is virtually impossible to describe without trivializing it. Inspired by Muslim
Brotherhood ideology and fueled by billions of Wahhabi petrodollars, the
religious cleansing of Christians from the Muslim world is continuing at a
break-neck pace, as the following recent examples demonstrate.
Iraq: In the current issue of the American Spectator, Doug Bandow observes that
centuries of dhimmitude have left Christians in the war-torn country without any
means of self-defense. Washington policymakers have refused to lend assistance
for fear of showing partiality, despite the murder of hundreds of Iraqi
Christians, the kidnapping and torture of Christian clerics, the repeated
bombings of Christian churches, the torching of Christian businesses, and the
flight of close to half of the entire Iraqi Christian population since April
2003. Those who remain have been subject to the imposition of shari'a by the
Shi'ite Mahdi Army and Sunni militias (al-Qaeda doesn't bother with such
niceties, preferring to murder them immediately instead), including the recent
published threat in Mosul of killing one member of every Christian family in
that city for Christian women not wearing the hijab and continuing to attend
school. (Be sure to remember that the next time an Islamist apologist claims
that the hijab is a symbol of women's liberation.)
Egypt: Journalist Magdi Khalil chronicles in a new report ("Another Black Friday
for the Coptic Christians of Egypt") the campaign of violence directed against
Christian Copts almost weekly immediately following Friday afternoon Muslim
prayers. Inspired by Islamist imams preaching religious hatred in mosques all
over the country and protected by government officials willing to look the other
way, rampaging mobs of Muslims set upon Christians churches, businesses and
individuals, from Alexandria to cities all the way up the Nile. Coptic holy days
are also favorite times for Muslim violence, which the Egyptian media likes to
describe as "sectarian strife" - as if it were actually a two-sided affair.
Gaza: Ethel Fenig recently noted here at American Thinker ("More Gaza
Multiculturalism") the systematic destruction of churches and desecration of
Christian religious objects by Jihadia Salafiya following the HAMAS takeover of
the Gaza Strip from their Fatah rivals and the imposition of Islamic rule. The
head of Jihadia Salafiya told reporter Aaron Klein that any suspected Christian
missionary activity in the area will be "dealt with harshly". (Ynet News)
Saudi Arabia: According to the Arab News, a Sri Lankan Christian man barely
escaped with his life in late May when he was found working in the city of
Mecca, Islam's holiest city, which is officially barred to non-Muslims. In
December, an Indian man had been sentenced to death for accidentally entering
the city, but was spared after the Indian embassy made an urgent appeal to the
Saudi Supreme Court.
Pakistan: In Islamabad, Younis Masih was sentenced last month to death under the
country's frequently invoked blasphemy laws, which were also used against six
Christian women suspended from a nursing school after they were accused of
desecrating a Quran. And as protests against Salman Rushdie's knighthood raged,
a Muslim mob armed with guns, axes and sticks attacked Christians worshipping in
a Salvation Army church in Bismillahlpur Kanthan. (Associated Press; United
Press International; Mission News Network)
Bangladesh: Almost a dozen Christian converts in the Nilphamari district were
beaten last week by Muslim villagers wielding bricks and clubs, and threatened
with death if they did not leave town immediately. Local hospitals subsequently
refused them treatment. Christians in the area have also been prevented from
using the only potable water well in the area after a pronouncement by religious
authorities at the mosque in Durbachari. This came after 42 former Muslims were
baptized as Christians in the local river on June 12. (Compass News Direct)
Malaysia: Government authorities demolished a church building on June 4th in
Orang Asli settlement in Gua Musang in Ulu Kelantan, despite prior government
approval of the project. The church was built on donated property after the
entire village had converted to Christianity just a few months ago. Also in late
May, the Malaysian high court ruled that Muslims who convert to Christianity
must appeal to the religious shari'a courts to officially be deregistered as
Muslims and reregistered as a Christians. (Journal Chretien; Associated Press)
Indonesia: Agence France Presse reported last month on an attack by the Islamic
Anti-Apostate Movement, who stormed a church service in a Protestant church in
the West Java town of Soreang. The AFP report notes that more than 30 churches
have been forced to close in West Java and dozens more throughout the country in
recent years due to Muslim violence, churches which were among the few spared
during the outbreak of hostilities during 1997-1998, where hundreds of Christian
churches were burned to the ground and never rebuilt.
Turkey: The Christian community is still reeling from the torture and ritual
slaughter of three Protestants at a Christian publishing house in Malatya in
April by an armed Islamist gang, which was preceded by the murder last year of
Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in Trabzon and the assassination of Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul in January. An additional six men allegedly
associated with the same Muslim gang were arrested on May 30th for plotting an
attack on a Christian pastor in Diyarbakir. (Lebanon Daily Star; ADKNI)
Cyprus: The Cyprus Mail reports that during a meeting last month in Rome the
Archbishop of the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church pleaded with the Vatican
Secretary of State for the Pope's assistance to pressure Turkish authorities in
restoring and repairing Christian sites and churches in areas occupied since the
invasion of the island nation by Turkey in July 1974 and the ethnic cleansing of
160,000 Greek Christian Cypriots.
Lebanon: More than 60,000 Christians have left the country since last summer's
war between Hezbollah and Israel, fearing the rise of both Sunni and Shi'ite
extremism and terrorist activity. The Sunday Telegraph recently revealed the
results of a poll finding that at least half of Lebanon's Maronite community
were considering leaving the country. More than 100,000 have already submitted
visa applications at foreign embassies.
Algeria: In what is considered one of the more "moderate" Muslim regimes, Al-Quds
Al-Arabi announced that the Algerian government has just issued regulations
requiring advance permission for non-Muslim public events, following a 2006 law
aimed at limiting Christian evangelism in the Kabylia region and the Sahara. (MEMRI
)
Morocco: In the country that The Economist magazine in 2005 anointed "the best
Arab democracy", all Moroccans are considered Muslims at birth and face three
years in prison if they attempt to convert. They are also prohibited from
entering any of the few churches permitted to operate for the foreign
inhabitants of the country. Moroccan Christians must operate covertly for fear
of imprisonment by the government and attacks by Islamists. They cannot bury
their dead in Christian cemeteries, and they must be married by Islamic
authorities or face charges of adultery. Late last year, a 64 year-old German
tourist, Sadek Noshi Yassa, was sentenced to six months in jail and fined for
missionary activity. (Journal Chretien)
Nigeria: Police in Gombe arrested sixteen suspects after a Muslim mob stoned,
stripped, beat, and finally stabbed to death a Christian teacher, Christiana
Oluwatoyin Oluwasesin, after she caught a student cheating on an exam in March.
Her body was then burned beyond recognition by the mob who falsely accused her
of desecrating a Quran. The suspects were released last month without any
charges being filed, prompting Christian leaders to accuse government
authorities of a cover-up and raising concerns about additional attacks.
(Christian Today)
Eritrea: Just a few weeks ago, the Islamic government installed a new Orthodox
Patriarch after they removed the previous Patriarch and placed him under house
arrest for no stated reason. Compass News Direct reported in February the death
of Magos Solomon Semere, a Christian who had been imprisoned in a military jail
for four and a half years for illegal Christian worship, the third Christian to
die in government custody since October. Authorities have also cracked down on
unapproved churches, jailing at least two thousand Protestants and members of
the Medhane Alem Orthodox renewal movement since the beginning of the year and
publicly burning confiscated Bibles. (Christian Post; Compass News Direct ;
Journal Chretien)
It is not an exaggeration to say that I could extend this brief list ad
infinitum with additional Islamic countries and news items from just the past
few weeks' worth of incidents of violence, discrimination, intimidation and
murder targeting Christians in the Muslim world. In many instances, the
government and religious authorities in these Muslim countries work hand-in-hand
in their campaign of religious persecution.
A scene in the Academy Award-winning movie Schindler's List gives us some
insight into what is happening all across the Muslim world with respect to
Christianity. As the SS Commandant Amon Göth and his Nazi Stormtroopers prepare
to liquidate the Jewish ghetto in Krakow, Poland, Göth (played in the movie by
Ralph Fiennes) gives his men a peptalk:
For six centuries there has been a Jewish Krakow. Think about that. By this
evening, those six centuries are a rumor. They never happened. Today is history.
This scene is being repeated in the Friday sermons in mosques and on Islamic
satellite TV all over the world, only this time it is the Christians in addition
to the Jews who are targets. Great efforts are being made to make the
two-thousand year history of Christianity in North Africa, the Middle East and
Southeast Asia a blasphemous rumor. Soon students in Turkey will be taught that
the Hagia Sophia, the greatest architectural structure in the Muslim world,
wasn't built by the Christian Emperor Justinian in the Sixth Century, but by the
Sultan Mehmed II a thousand years later after the Ottomans seized the Byzantine
capital. That Christians lived at all in the Muslim world, let alone that much
of the territory occupied by Muslims used to be Christian lands before the
Islamic Wars of Conquest, will be nothing but a rumor by the end of this century
punishable according to the precepts of shari'a.
President Bush announced last week that he will be sending a special envoy to
the 57-member Organization of Islamic Countries. Hopefully, the systematic
persecution of Christians and other religious minorities will be the first and
primary item in the new envoy's portfolio, with the 2007 annual report of the US
Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State Department's Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom, which name virtually every single
country in the OIC for its human rights abuses and religious cleansing, as
evidence for our country's concern.
The fact remains that not a single Christian or Jew lives in peace in the Muslim
world, and if it is truly our nation's foreign policy to spread democracy around
the world, this issue is the perfect topic for us to press. Back at home,
raising Islam's global war on Christianity should be the immediate response to
the seemingly endless media grievance machine of radical Islam's Western
apologists. Until they begin to address the new Holocaust perpetrated in the
name of Islam, their complaints and denials are nothing but bald hypocrisy.
**Patrick Poole is an occasional contributor to American Thinker. He maintains a
blog, Existential Space.
Mexican
tycoon passes Bill Gates as planet's richest person
Wed Jul 4,
MEXICO CITY (AFP) - Mexican telecom tycoon Carlos Slim Helu has overtaken
Microsoft founder Bill Gates as the richest person on the planet, the Mexican
financial website Sentido Comun reported.
Sentido Comun said the Mexican billionaire's wealth had rocketed past Gates
following the red-hot performance of his telecommunications firm, America Movil.
US-based Forbes magazine, renowned for its rankings of the world's wealthiest
individuals, updated its listings in April to rank Slim as the second richest
individual in the world, as he bested the legendary US investor Warren Buffett.
The Mexican financial website said Slim's lead over Gates amounted to billions
of dollars.
"Thanks to a 26.5-percent rise in the shares of America Movil during the second
quarter, Slim, who controls a 33-percent interest in Latin America's largest
mobile phone company, is substantially richer than Gates," Sentido Comun said.
"The difference between their two fortunes is around nine billion dollars in
favor of Slim," the financial website claimed.
It said it had based its calculations largely on the share price movements of
companies controlled by Slim.
The website said soaring performances from Slim's other business interests had
also helped propel him past Gates.
Aside from America Movil, Slim controls the INBURSA financial group and the
Grupo Carso industrial firm with interests spanning retail stores, coffee shops
and restaurants.
One reason for Slim's meteoric rise might be because he is also still working.
Gates stepped aside as Microsoft chief in 2000 to devote his energies to the
philanthropic foundation he runs with his wife, Melinda.
Forbes in April had pegged Slim's wealth at a staggering 53.1 billion dollars,
and said Gates was sitting on a 56-billion-dollar fortune.
Slim, the son of Lebanese immigrants, has had business in his blood from his
early days when he helped out in his father's shop, "The Star of the Orient."
The 67-year-old started out in real estate and was already affluent enough when
he graduated from university with an engineering degree to buy stakes in a stock
brokerage and a bottling firm.
During the crippling Latin American economic crisis of the early 1980s, Slim
snapped up and reformed a number of distressed businesses, banking massive
profits for Grupo Carso.
Carso gained its name from the first three letters of Slim's name and the first
two of his late wife's, Soumaya Gemayel.
Analysts say one of Slim's smartest and most lucrative deals occurred when he
took control of Telefonos de Mexico (Telemex) in 1990 as the then government
moved to privatize the sprawling monopoly.
Slim oversaw a 1.8-billion-dollar investment to take over Telemex, but he then
overhauled the company and expanded its service as the telecom firm became the
star of the Mexican stock exchange and more than returned Slim's initial
investment.
The Mexican billionaire has also made some savvy stock picks.
In 1997, he bought about three percent of Apple Computer at 17 dollars a share
shortly before the company launched its hit iMac computer. Twelve months later,
Apple's shares topped 100 dollars.
Despite his vast riches, Slim reportedly shuns corporate jets and flashy offices
and sported a plastic watch during the 1990s.
Widowed in 1999, Slim has boosted his philanthropic presence and overseen his
three sons' careers within his business empire.
Like Gates, he has developed a strong profile on the philanthropic front.
Earlier this month he allied himself with the foundation of former US president
Bill Clinton and with Canadian mining magnate Frank Giustra to launch an
anti-poverty campaign in Latin America.
Fifty-three percent of Mexico's population of 104 million live in poverty, which
is defined as living on less than two dollars a day, World Bank data show.
Comparing Three Muslim
Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and Egypt
Prof. Barry Rubin-Global Politician
- 7/6/2007
The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely
passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This
article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood
groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of
course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.
The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely
passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This
article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood
groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of
course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.
First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood's policy toward and
relations with both jihadist groups (al-Qa'ida, the Zarqawi network, and others
such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).
The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir--which is
regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in
Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.
Regarding al-Qa'ida--both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure--the
Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and
ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival. An example of this
kind of thinking comes from Rajab Hilal Hamida, a Brotherhood member in Egypt's
parliament, who said:
From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi are not terrorists
in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities, since they are a
thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists.... [On the other hand,] he
who kills Muslim citizens is neither a jihad fighter nor a terrorist, but a
criminal and a murderer. We must call things by their proper names![1]
His final sentence is intended to show the difference between the Brotherhood's
and al-Qa'ida's views of strategy and tactics.
Al-Qa'ida has a growing presence in Syria, and it is trying to grab militants
who would otherwise be Brotherhood supporters. In Jordan, it has operated
independently as a small group carrying out terrorist operations--which have
been condemned by the Brotherhood there, since a number of Jordanians and
Palestinians have been killed in bombings.
In Egypt the story is somewhat different, since the jihadist group is an al-Qa'ida
affiliate, and many leaders--in fact one might argue the principal influence--of
the organization come from Egypt.[2] Again, though the factors of rivalry and
concern over government reactions would make the Brotherhood keep its distance
from al-Qa'ida, individuals, wanting more immediate revolutionary action, have
furnished recruits in the past.
In considering the relationship of the Brotherhood groups with al-Qa'ida three
key factors must be kept in mind. First, the Brotherhood and the jihadists are
the two main Islamist streams today. They are not enemies, and there has been no
violent conflict between them, nor has there been a great deal of ideological
battle. Yet at the same time they are rivals, following different strategies and
knowing that one or the other would gain mass support and perhaps state power.
Thus, it would be misleading to speak of cooperation, except in the special case
of Iraq, as discussed below.
Second, a critical difference between the two groups is that the jihadists--except
in Saudi Arabia and Iraq--focus on attacking what is called the "far enemy,"
that is, Israel, the United States, the West in general. The Brotherhoods, in
contrast, while strongly anti-Israel (and supporting Hamas, see below) and
anti-Western, focus on the "near enemy," that is, Arab governments. Thus, for
them, while al-Qa'ida is fighting for the cause, it is also undermining it
(except in Iraq) by pulling resources out of the struggle for change within the
Arab world.
Third, while the Brotherhood groups are tactically flexible (as has been shown
above), al-Qa'ida is exclusively focused on armed struggle. The Brotherhood
groups view the revolutionary process as a long-term one, involving such things
as providing social services, educating and indoctrinating young people through
institutions, using elections, compromising at times with Arab governments,
showing restraint to avoid government repression, at times allying with
non-Islamist groups, and so on. Thus, while al-Qa'ida is far more of a danger in
terms of terrorism, it is far less likely to seize state power because of what
would be called in Leninist terms, its "infantile leftism."
The best example of this is the use of elections. In Jordan and Egypt,
Brotherhood groups embraced opportunities to run candidates in elections even
when they knew that the regime would not count the votes accurately or let them
win. Al-Qa'ida has condemned elections as putting human voters and
parliamentarians in the place of God in terms of making laws. Contrast here the
views of the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and the influential
Brotherhood ideologue Qaradawi. In a January 23, 2005 statement, Zarqawi
condemned the upcoming Iraqi elections and threatened to kill those running and
voting.[3] In sharp contrast, Qaradawi endorsed elections, arguing that the
majority of voters would back an Islamist party, while liberals would get little
support. If truly fair elections were to be held, he insisted, Islamists would
win by a landslide.[4] This analysis correctly predicted the results of the 2005
Egyptian and 2006 Palestinian elections.
In institutional terms, all the above points apply in discussing the Iraqi
insurgency if one looks at it as a struggle led by al-Qa'ida. However, in terms
of the insurgency itself, while the Brotherhood groups strongly support it and
view it as an important struggle, there is no institutional involvement, as
there has been in backing Palestinians in the past.
Additionally, the Syrian Brotherhood has a problem, because the government it is
fighting is a major patron of the Iraqi insurgency and uses it to strengthen its
support among the Islamists who function publicly in Syria. They support it
enthusiastically, but in the short run, at least, it does not benefit them; the
Syrian Brotherhood would be happier if the leadership did not come from al-Qa'ida.
If one wants a parallel to past experience, one might compare the Brotherhoods'
attitude to revolution and armed struggle to the official Communist parties and
al-Qa'ida's to Maoist groups in the 1960s and 1970s. The former argue that the
time is not ripe for revolution and that a variety of methods be used; the
latter are for all-out revolutionary struggle now.
Thus, the Brotherhood groups have a profile of their own, self-consciously quite
different in strategy and tactics--though very parallel in ideology and
goals--from the jihadist groups.
To what extent are the Brotherhood groups coordinating among themselves in the
International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood? Does it provide strategic
orientation, tactical coordination, and financial and/or operational support?
The Brotherhoods operate in parallel rather than collectively, and there is
virtually no coordination between them. If asked, Brotherhood leaders in Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria would of course say that they support each other, but in
practice it is surprising how little practical backing is offered. For one
thing, they are all internally oriented rather than internationalist, except on
the Palestinian and Iraq issues, though some funds raised by Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood-controlled institutions are donated to Islamist struggles abroad.
Aside from their daily focus and largely "national revolution" goals, there are
other reasons for this orientation. Conditions in each country are very
different; Abd-al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, controller-general of the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood, said in an interview that the groups in Egypt and Jordan make their
own decisions based on local conditions. Indeed, he denied that any
international organization existed and said that this was an idea put forth by
the Brotherhood's enemies.[5]
At the same time, however, Dhunaybat admitted that the leader of the Egyptian
Brotherhood--elected only by that group--is seen as being the supreme guide of
the movement as a whole. In his words:
The brothers in various countries... try to standardize the understanding,
ideology and positions regarding the world events involving all the groups.
Meetings take place every now and then... without there being any obligation to
a certain policy on the domestic level. In other words, each country has its own
exclusive organizational and political nature and relations with the state in
which it exists. This gathering has no binding capacity regarding any domestic
decision.[6]
The individual Brotherhoods have a specific problem with coordinating too openly
or extensively. The regimes in Egypt and Jordan would not appreciate a vocal
stance of calling for the overthrow of other Arab governments, while in Syria
the movement is too harried to help anyone else and--except from
Jordan--receives little assistance in its life-and-death struggle. For all
practical purposes, while these groups respect the same ideologues--for example,
Yusuf Qaradawi--they operate independently and in response to local conditions.
This is another distinction between them and al-Qa'ida, whose effort to create
an Islamist International is in sharp contrast to Brotherhood practice.
Even when the Brotherhoods influence the movement in other places, these
contacts are bilateral. For example, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is related to the
Egyptian Brotherhood, while Hamas in the West Bank has its links to the
Jordanian Brotherhood. Furthermore, to make matters even more complex, the Hamas
external leadership is located in Damascus, where the Syrian Brotherhood is
outlawed, and its patron is the regime that persecutes the Brotherhood. At
times, in discussing the Hamas victory, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood sources have
said that the "Muslim Brotherhood" won the Palestinian elections. Yet, again,
these are parallel and fraternal movements, not truly branches of a
transnational organization.
Next, the strategic and tactical orientation of each national branch
(objectives, alliances, organizational forms, attitudes toward the political
system in the country where it operates, etc.) should be considered.
What is truly remarkable in discussing the Muslim Brotherhoods of Syria, Jordan,
and Egypt is how three groups so parallel in origin, ideology, and goals have
developed so differently due to the local situations they face. This fact also
reflects the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa'ida groups. The
former have proven tactically flexible; the latter committed to armed struggle
as the only proper strategy.
One might sum up the conditions in this way: The Muslim Brotherhood groups are
as anti-American and extreme in their goals as the bin Ladinist ones. However,
they almost always put the emphasis on gaining power within the context of a
single country, compared to the international jihadist policy of al-Qa'ida.
Equally, Muslim Brotherhood groups are far more likely to seize power than the
bin Ladinist ones, but as long as they do not govern countries, they are also
less dangerous in terms of terrorist violence. It also should be noted, however,
that many violent revolutionary groups--especially in Egypt--have emerged from
the more militant end of the Muslim Brotherhood spectrum.
Briefly, the distinction between the Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian groups may
be summarized as follows:
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is a revolutionary underground group, because it
has been outlawed by the government there. Law Number 49 of 1981 declares mere
membership in the group to be punishable by death. In 1982, the regime unleashed
a huge wave of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood, destroying much of its
infrastructure and driving it into exile. The Brotherhood has unsuccessfully
tried to regain from the regime the right to operate in Syria. Thus, for
example, in 2001, it supported a manifesto backed by a broad spectrum of
oppositionists urging the end of single-party rule and holding democratic
elections.[7] Given the failure of these efforts, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
today is part of a broad coalition of anti-regime groups, which include the
former vice president of the regime. In political terms, it functions as a
leading group--perhaps in the future, the leader--of the Sunni Arab community,
which comprises roughly 60 percent of the population. Thus, it can be
characterized as revolutionary (though not necessarily through its own
preference) and communalist. Yet while the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods
are in an optimistic mood and are arguably gaining ground, their Syrian
counterpart is frustrated and prevented from exploiting a trend toward Islamist
thinking in Syria. In recent years, the regime has cultivated Syrian Islamists
by building new mosques, allowing radicals to be preachers, and supporting the
Islamist insurgency in neighboring Iraq. For obvious reasons, these cultivated
activists have not adhered to the Muslim Brotherhood and may build rival groups,
including al-Qa'ida affiliates.
As for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, it is a legal group that uses peaceful
methods and participates in elections through its political wing, the Islamic
Action Front. It has at times cooperated with the monarchy, though recently
relations have been strained by its show of sympathy for al-Qa'ida's leader in
Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which led to a regime crackdown on the Brotherhood
in July 2006. It is restrained due to fear of repression but also moderated by
having a share of authority. It controls professional groups and other
institutions. However, it also knows that the regime will never let it win
elections. Thus, the key element of its strategy is a willingness to remain
permanently a group that enjoys benefits and privileges but cannot take power or
change the country. While it appeals to many Palestinians, the Jordanian
Brotherhood also has a considerable East Bank membership and thus is not a
communalist organization. Given the decline of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Fatah (that is, Palestinian nationalism), the Brotherhood
could become the main organization gaining loyalty from Jordanian Palestinians.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is somewhere in between its two counterparts. It
is not technically legal, but is allowed to function normally most of the time.
Leaders and activists are periodically arrested by the government to remind the
Brotherhood that it functions only if the regime finds its behavior
satisfactory. Denied the right to have a party of its own, however, the Muslim
Brotherhood has found it easy to work with or even virtually take over other
parties, notably the Wafd in the 1980s, and is even willing to work with
liberals to press the regime for concessions. In the 2005 elections, when
allowed to run what amounted to its own slate, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of
the seats in parliament.[8] While it is incorrect to say that the Egyptian
Brotherhood has not been involved with violence--and many factions have also
left to form terrorist groups--the movement generally avoids it.
To gain a sense of how the Brotherhood can conduct a cultural war, the case of
Faraj Fawda is indicative. Fawda was a liberal critic of the Islamists. In 1992,
Fawda debated Brotherhood leader Muhammad al-Ghazali at the Cairo Book Fair.
Brotherhood members in the audience heckled Fawda. When Fawda was murdered five
months later by an Islamist, Ghazali testified at the killer's trial, saying
that he had acted properly in killing an "apostate" like Fawda. After being
sentenced to execution, the defendant shouted: "Now I will die with a clear
conscience!"[9]
The Brotherhoods also played a key role in the Danish cartoon controversy.
Qaradawi was a key person in spreading the protest movement. The Egyptian
Brotherhood demanded an apology for the publication and urged a boycott of
Danish products.[10] The Islamic Action Front organized a protest demonstration
in Amman.[11] They clearly saw this as a good issue on which to build a broad
base, as defending Islam against alleged attacks on it in the West. Abu Laban
himself has strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, so he connected into this
network on his visit in an attempt to get an active response on the issue.
To carry out their operations, the Brotherhood groups are reasonably
well-funded. Their money seems to come from four major sources. First, rich
adherents to the movements give donations. This is especially true of Egyptians
who emigrated to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and became rich there. One of the main
Islamist Egyptian businessmen is Hisham Tal'at Mustafa, who is a partner of the
Saudi billionaire Prince al-Walid ibn Talal al-Sa'ud. Second, the Brotherhoods
in Jordan and Egypt control professional and other associations from which funds
can be drained for their cause. Third, in Egypt at least, there are Islamic
banks and enterprises--sometimes involved with major corruption scandals--which
are a source of money. Finally, there is international funding, including Saudi
state and Kuwaiti or Saudi charitable foundations, in some cases passed through
the international organization. The Saudis and Kuwaitis involved are not so much
trying to use the Brotherhoods as state sponsors but rather merely ensuring that
they do nothing inimical to Saudi or Kuwaiti interests.
Is the Muslim Brotherhood conducive to dialogue with the United States, and if
so, over what specific issues? If by dialogue what is meant is to talk to
American officials, the answer is generally yes. However, if what is meant here
is the ability of American officials to change Brotherhood positions through
explanations and mutual understanding or to engage in negotiations that would
lead to any cooperation, the answer is generally no.
The Islamic Front in Jordan says that holding such a dialogue is a decision that
might be taken by any individual group. Dhunaybat has no objection to his
Egyptian colleagues doing it, but:
We in Jordan, however, believe that in terms of the situation in the Arab and
Islamic world, particularly with regard to Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and its
role in the region, America does not want a dialogue in which it can listen to
others and change its policies. What we see is that it wants to dictate certain
terms by promoting this so-called dialogue, which is like giving instructions.
Therefore, I believe that there is no benefit in holding a dialogue with the
people in charge of the U.S. policy.[12]
Yet Dhunaybat also has no objection to the Islamic Action Front in Jordan--which
his group largely controls--from having a dialogue with the United States. This
approach is clearly a division of labor in which the Brotherhood maintains the
stance of an internationalist revolutionary group, while the Front, as a
political party, can have such contacts if it aids its own interests.
There are some specific points on which the Brotherhoods both want to influence
the United States and think that doing so would be possible. These include the
Egyptian Brotherhood's desire that the United States push harder for democratic
elections and more civic rights in Egypt. While they would denounce such things
publicly as imperialistic, the Brotherhood wants to widen its sphere for public
action. If elections were freer, the Brotherhood could win more seats. Indeed,
some leaders believe it would win outright in free elections, though this is
more doubtful. Of course, another goal of the Brotherhood is to win legal status
as an organization.
Syria is clearly the most interesting case. Both the United States and the
Syrian Brotherhood view the regime as an enemy. Would this be a case of the
adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend? The answer is likely, yes. The
Syrian Brotherhood might well be willing to talk about U.S. covert support.
Indeed, since it is participating in a wider coalition also, it could more
easily excuse such a policy as going along with its partners.
It should be stressed, however, that this is a dangerous game. A stronger Syrian
Brotherhood might be able to seize leadership of the 60 percent Sunni Arab
population and take over the country, transforming Syria into an Islamic
republic. Such an outcome could create far worse crises and threats to U.S.
influence in the region. In addition, it should be noted that while the Muslim
Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan are the largest Islamist factors in their
respective countries, this is no longer necessarily true for their counterpart
in Syria.
The Brotherhoods' view of the United States and its allies is profoundly
hostile. They view the United States as extremely hostile, trying to take over
the Middle East and destroy Islam. While they are passionately opposed to U.S.
support for Israel, they are no happier with American support for the Egyptian
and Jordanian regimes.
In terms of their analysis of and hostility toward the United States, there is
not much difference between the Brotherhoods and al-Qa'ida, though their
responses to this analysis are very different. One difference in analysis is
that al-Qa'ida argues that American support is the main reason why Arab regimes
survive. This legitimates their priority on attacking the United States. The
Brotherhoods have a more sophisticated understanding of the sources of power and
support for regimes, though they overstate American influence and responsibility
in their own countries.
The preceding analysis may seem to apply mainly to Egypt and Jordan. The Syrian
Brotherhood has to deal with the fact of American hostility toward Damascus,
though it no doubt has some belief in conspiracy theories that they are secretly
allied. At any rate, this does not make them any less anti-American. One
response may be to argue that America is a great threat to Syria but that the
Ba'thist regime is incapable of handling it and that only an Islamist government
could do so victoriously.
Given these positions, the Brotherhoods' support for the Iraqi insurgency is not
surprising. All three, including their top leaders, have attacked the U.S.
presence in Iraq in the most extreme terms and have called for supporting the
insurgents. It should be remembered that even if the Brotherhood groups do not
have institutional links to the insurgency leadership (which largely comes from
al-Qa'ida), they are all Sunni Arab Islamists and in this case seem undisturbed
by this distinction.[13]
When Zarqawi, himself a Jordanian, was killed, Zaki Sa'd, the leader of the
Islamic Action Front, praised him but also distinguished the Brotherhood from
al-Qa'ida regarding their tactics. Zarqawi, he said, was acting not only
legitimately but as a Muslim must act in fighting the American forces in Iraq,
and the Islamic Action Front supported these actions. Yet it also denounced
operations targeting innocent civilians. He did not specifically mention Iraqis
in this context but used as his examples the bloody bombing of hotels in Amman
by al-Qa'ida forces. [14]
The Brotherhoods have not directly organized units or sent members to Iraq,
though it is probable that some of the Jordanians (but fewer of the Egyptians or
Syrians) who go there might be rank-and-file members. After all, the leaders of
all three groups have told them that fighting the Americans is an Islamic duty.
It should also be noted, however, that contrary to al-Qa'ida, the Brotherhoods
focus on fighting the American forces rather than the Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds. For
them, the battle in Iraq is against non-Muslims rather than an attempt to take
over the country and defeat non-Arabs or non-Sunni Muslims there.[15]
In what direction, then, are the Brotherhood groups evolving? Each Muslim
Brotherhood group faces a key question regarding its evolution. For the
Egyptians, it is whether to continue in the phase of da'wa--recruiting,
propagandizing, base-building, and accepting the limits the government places on
it--or to move into a more activist phase, demanding political changes and being
willing to confront the regime. Given the organization's current high level of
confidence, as the younger generation takes over and the government perhaps
appears weaker--especially during the transition to a new president--it could
well push harder.
In Jordan, the movement faces the same options, but is probably even more skewed
to the side of caution. Its choice is whether to accept the limits of its
current operation or to push harder on elections and on a real parliamentary
system in which the legislature can affect the monarch's policies and decisions.
Especially important--and delicate--here is the communal relationship. The
Brotherhood could become more dependent on Palestinian support, which would
broaden its base while also making it more suspect to the regime. It seems
likely that caution will prevail.
As for Syria, the Brotherhood there faces the possibility of beginning an active
revolutionary armed struggle to overthrow the regime, trying to use the
unpopularity of the Alawite-dominated government (the Alawites are not even
Muslims) to rouse the Sunni Arab majority to jihad. Given the weakness of the
current Syrian leadership, its international isolation, and multiple
problems--far greater than its counterparts in Egypt and Jordan--it is quite
possible that a major crisis would be seen by the Brotherhood as creating such a
revolutionary situation. Yet newer groups with stronger bases in Syria, or at
least able to operate more freely there, might be the ones who gain most from
this situation.
In terms of their stands on different issues, especially regarding international
affairs, the Brotherhoods are fairly candid. Inasmuch as they conceal anything,
it is to downplay their goal of an Islamist state in which they rule or specific
points such as the likely treatment of non-Muslims in a country they would rule.
The cautious rhetoric of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood concerning domestic
politics, the Syrian Brotherhood's willingness to participate in a broad
anti-regime front, and the Egyptian Brotherhood's professions of support for
democracy all conceal their objectives of monopolizing power and transforming
their societies.
Yet this does not mean that these goals are not often discussed, even publicly.
Sometimes this is done indirectly. For example, such key Egyptian Brotherhood
leaders as Salah Abu Isma'il and Muhammad al-Ghazali, and then-head of the
organization Omar al-Tilmisani praised Sudan at a time when it had temporarily
become an Islamist state.[16] They certainly endorsed the application of Muslim
law, Shari'a, as the law of the land and have advocated this continually.[17]
In its March 2004 platform, the Egyptian Brotherhood stated:
Our mission is to implement a comprehensive reform in order to uphold God's law
in secular as well as religious matters.... Our only hope, if we wish to achieve
any type of progress, is to adhere to our religion, as we used to, and to apply
the Shari'a (Islamic law).[18]
In order to achieve this goal, the Brotherhood's "mission is to build a Muslim
individual, a Muslim family and an Islamic rule to lead other Islamic states."
On specific points, it explains, this means that the media should be censored to
coincide with Islam, and the economic and political system should also be
structured in this vein. Equally, the "focus of education," at least in the
early years of schooling, "should be on learning the Qur'an by heart," and
"women should only hold the kind of posts that would preserve their virtue." In
parliament, Egyptian Brotherhood members have focused on trying to control the
culture, with a great deal of indirect success.
The Brotherhood's former leader and guide, Mamun al-Hudaybi, explained that its
purpose is to establish Islamic unity and an Islamic Caliphate, while former
Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashur stated: "We accept the concept of pluralism for the
time being; however, when we will have Islamic rule we might then reject this
concept or accept it."[19]
Within the Brotherhood groups, there are also examples of pluralism, most
obviously in the Egyptian case. Like parties based on Marxism, from the start,
the Brotherhood had a strategy built on the notion of stages. The first stage is
base-building. Individuals and families are indoctrinated with proper thought
and behavior, coming to constitute a society within the society based on Shari'a.
This is the phase of da'wa, a historic Muslim word meaning spreading the faith
but which here can be likened to mass- and cadre-organizing. As with Communist
parties, the key question is when this phase should be turned into a
revolutionary stage, where active measures are taken to seize state power.
The older leadership, which has a better memory of the massive regime repression
during the period from the 1950s to 1980s, is more cautious. An example is the
current guide, top leader Muhammad Mahdi Akif, who joined in 1948 and was
imprisoned in the 1950s and 1960s.
Some of the younger and middle-aged members want a more energetic policy, not
using violence but pushing harder for elections, being more aggressive in
demanding legalization, and eventually running a candidate for president. Their
experience often comes from involvement in the Jama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic
Group) in the 1970s, a more militant organization that did extensive student and
community organizing, after which some of its members joined the armed struggle
of the 1990s.[20] Examples here include such Brotherhood leaders as Isam
al-Aryan, head of the political bureau, and Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh.
One issue on which there are disputes is how to deal with the likely succession
from President Husni Mubarak to his son, Gamal. One view is to make a deal with
the government in which the Brotherhood accepts this transition in exchange for
legalization, an end to the emergency laws, and fairer elections.
In Syria, there are not any clear major differences within the Muslim
Brotherhood. This, however, does not just reflect strength. Those who have
different views are instead operating as independent Islamists or perhaps even
thinking of turning to al-Qa'ida rather than joining the Brotherhood and
expressing their positions in its ranks. It should be emphasized that for a
Syrian Islamist to join the Brotherhood today is a questionable decision,
because he could organize for Islamism far more freely as an independent who
conceals his ultimate goals. In other words, the Syrian Brotherhood might come
to be seen as an outdated organization of a previous generation, a phenomenon
that is clearly not happening in Egypt (where the Brotherhood outlasted its
younger rivals) or Jordan.
REFERENCES
[1] Ruz al-Yusuf, January 28-February 3, 2006.
[2] For a history and analysis of Islamist movements in Egypt, see Barry Rubin,
Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, Second Revised Edition (Palgrave
Press, 2002).
[3] http://www.islah.300.org/vboard/showthread.php?t=120471, January 23, 2005.
[4] Al-Jazeera television, February 6, 2005. View this statement at: http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=534.
[5] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 10, 2006.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Al-Hayat, January 16, 2001.
[8] On the Brotherhood's participation in the debate over elections, see A.
Shefa, "Towards the September 7 Presidential Elections in Egypt: Public Debate
over the Change in the Electoral System," Middle East Media Research Insititute
(MEMRI) Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 237, September 2, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA23705.
[9] On this and other issues in the struggle between Islamists and liberals, see
Barry Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the
Middle East (NY: Wiley Press, 2005), pp. 1, 23-24.
[10] Times of London, January 31, 2006.
[11] Gulf News, February 11, 2006.
[12] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 10, 2006.
[13] For examples, see the documents translated in "The Muslim Brotherhood
Movement in Support of Fighting Americans Forces in Iraq," MEMRI Special
Dispatch Series, No. 776, September 3, 2004.
[14] MEMRI TV, June 14, 2006, http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1169.
[15] See for example the interview with Humam Sa'id, assistant controller
general of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, in al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 7,
2004.
[16] On these issues and on the Muslim Brotherhood as a parliamentary party, see
Magdi Khalil, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy
Survive?" Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (June 2006), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a3.html.
[17] This point is discussed in Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian
Politics.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] For a detailed history of this era and group, see Rubin, The Long War for
Freedom.
***Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary university. His new book is The Truth About
Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).