LCCC NEWS BULLETIN
APRIL 29/2006

Below news fromthe Daily Star for 292/04/06
Lahoud or not Lahoud? That is the question
U.S. heaps more pressure on Syria
March 14 Forces set on ditching Lahoud
Conference tackles role of ethics in the modern world
Husband, brother beat Zahrani woman to death
Lahoud heads calm Cabinet session
Solidere strikes back at 'smear campaign'
Campaign seeks to pull the plug on capital punishment
Siniora: Leap in science and technology is at hand
Solution to Lahoud remains elusive
Below news from miscellaneous sources for 292/04/06
United Nations and Washington Heighten Pressure on Syria and its Allies on Eve of Talks-Naharnet
Welch: U.S. Disapproves of Syria's Cooperation with Hariri Investigation-Naharnet
Watering Lebanon's cedar revolution-Christian Science Monitor
Thesis Submitted for the degree of Doctor of philosophy Interdisciplinary Center (ICT) - Israel
United States Highlights Continued Syrian Interference in Lebanon-Washington File
Lebanon talks resume with no breakthrough in sight-Reuters
Military court convicts IDF tracker of Hezbollah espionage-Ha'aretz
MI: Syria poised to spend petrodollars on arms-Ha'aretz
UN official pushes along probe into killing of Al-Hariri-KNA
Lebanon president poised to stay in power barring 'miracle'Middle East Times - Cairo,Egypt
Syria Closing Doors-Walid Choucair Al-Hayat
The Lebanon Proxy-Journal of Turkish Weekly
Shariah nations-Washington Times
Hamas on a tightrope-Middle East North Africa Financial Network
Intel chief says Syria to buy more arms-UPI - USA
US: Relations with Syria worse-Monsters and Critics.com
Interview: US-Syria relations going from bad to worse-World Peace Herald
Iran vs. UN: Tehran Ups the Ante-Yahoo! News
Dayton's Maronite community now 13 years old-Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph
Murky scandal threatens to topple French prime minister-Monsters and Critics.com
Analysis: UN resolution seeks to assure Lebanon's independence-World Peace Herald

Dayton’s Maronite community now 13 years old
By Lenore Christopher-Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph
DAYTON DEANERY - In 1993, the number of parishes in the Diocese of St. Maron increased by one with the consecration of a new church for the Maronite community in Dayton.
The dedication was the culmination of an effort that had begun nearly five years before by Daytonians who wanted to return to their Lebanese church roots.
"Now, we are under Our Lady of Lebanon of Los Angeles Diocese," after the diocese divided, said Father Pierre Bassil, current pastor and originally from Lebanon. Founded in the early fourth century of the Christian era, the Maronite rite is based on the spiritual legacy of a Syrian monk named Maron, a contemporary of St. John Chrysostom of the Byzantine church. Maronite Catholics trace their origins to ancient Syriac, Mesopotamia and Mount Lebanon. The Divine Liturgy, similar to that of the Roman rite, is said in ancient Aramaic (Syriac), modern Arabic and English. Maronite Catholics are members of the Roman Catholic communion and are in union with Pope Benedict, whom they regard as head of the universal church. However, the leader of the Maronite church is Patriarch Nessrallah Peter Sfeir.
As Catholics, Maronites share the same faith and sacramental life as those who belong to the Latin rite. As an Eastern church, however, they follow a similar but different liturgical calendar, have a unique spirituality that stems from their Lebanese ancestry and are governed by particular church laws established by the Synod of Lebanese Bishops.  "We first began in Northern Syria, where St. Maron lived on Mount Taurus, near the banks of the Orontes River," said Father Bassil, a bi-ritual priest in the Roman Catholic tradition as well and who is also the spiritual leader of a new mission church in Columbus, Our Lady of Lebanon Church, which uses St. Margaret of Cortona Roman Catholic Church for worship.
"After the Moslems' invasion in the eighth century and the heavy persecution by many groups, the Maronites were forced to flee into the mountains and valleys of Lebanon, where they established themselves as a church, with their own spirituality, Liturgy and identity," he said.
In Lebanon, "the Maronites were called to fight for the preservation of Christianity in the country where Jesus walked with his apostles and Mother, in the cities of Tyre and Sidon, and where, in accordance to the newest study, he performed the first miracle by changing the water into wine in the town of Cana in South Lebanon.
"Since that time, the Maronites have existed in Lebanon, giving life to the church there and witnessing to Christ in the midst of persecution," said Father Bassil. "They have offered thousands of martyrs, and they have given us dozens of saints who have sanctified the Middle East through their holiness," including, in this century, "St. Sharbel, St. Rafka, St. Hardini, the Massabki Brothers, Brother Estephan . . . We have over 25 saints in our church, among them four women."
Today, there are more than 25 million Maronites. "While our mother church is in Lebanon headed by our patriarch, we are a church that touches the four corners of the world," he said. "They say, 'The sun never sets on the Maronites.' "The origin of the Dayton Maronite parish of St. Ignatius of Antioch can be traced to the continuing support from the Cincinnati Maronite community at St. Anthony of Padua and by Msgr. Joseph A. Abood, retired St. Anthony pastor, who traveled frequently to the Dayton community to meet the initial spiritual needs for baptism, marriages and funerals. Growing support, especially from younger parishioners, prompted a weekly liturgy at local Latin-rite churches that offered their hospitality. Social events and fund-raising events also became part of the community.
In 1992, the Dayton Maronites acquired a building formerly used by a Jehovah Witness congregation and began renovating the facility to meet their needs. St. Anthony also continued to support the fledgling community; and neighboring churches donated liturgical items.
In March 1998, Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk joined Bishop John Chedid from the Maronite Eparchy Our Lady of Lebanon of Los Angeles, Calif., and about 120 families for the Divine Liturgy to celebrate the parish's fifth year.
Father Bassil is included in the Dayton Deanery meetings of priests. "We are close," he said. "We never separated ourselves from Rome."
To accommodate steady growth, St. Ignatius parishioners recently purchased the former St. Barbara Byzantine church and are in the process of remodeling, and hoping to add onto, the building for use by more than 135 active families. "This is a big achievement," he said. "It shows how the (parishioners) are close to their tradition." What is eventually completed, he said, will "not be just a building but will show the spirit of the people."
Parishioners gather from as far away as Lima, he said, to attend liturgy, educate their children and support the activities that "generate money to keep the church alive and strong."
Additional information
For additional information about St. Barbara the Great Martyr Church, contact Franciscan Father Kapitan by calling 937-223-8306. Those interested in knowing more about the Maronite rite and the building project for Dayton's Maronite community may contact the church office at 727 Beckman St., Dayton, Ohio, 45410, or by calling 937-256-3134. Email requests can be made to ptbassil@aol.com. Information about St. Anthony's Maronite Church in Cincinnati is available at its Web site: www.stanthonycincinnati. org.

Lahoud or not Lahoud? That is the question
Berri insists border issue has been settled, says presidency will be discussed again in mid-may
By Majdoline Hatoum and Nafez Qawas -Daily Star staff
Saturday, April 29, 2006
National dialogue: round 6, only session
BEIRUT: Participants in Lebanon's national dialogue held their first official discussion of potential replacements for President Emile Lahoud on Friday, bridging what had been a psychological barrier before adjourning until a follow-up session on May 16. Although the names of the four individuals under consideration - MP Michel Aoun, MP Butros Harb, former MP Nassib Lahoud and Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad - had been among the country's worst-kept secrets for months, this was the first they had been publicly acknowledged.
At a press conference after the talks, Speaker Nabih Berri said the entire session had been dedicated to the presidency but that it would have to be revisited in the next round of talks. He told reporters that regardless of whether or not a decision was reached on presidency issues on May 16, participants would move on to another subject of considerable contention, that of Hizbullah's arms. Speaking with The Daily Star immediately after the talks, Harb confirmed that the names discussed were those made public earlier in the day by Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea. Geagea had mentioned the four names during a visit to Bkirki to see the Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir.
Asked if Aoun had put his own name forward as a candidate, Berri said: "We've always said that Aoun is a very serious candidate for the presidency, but other names were put forward as well."
Asked if the next session would deal with the subject of border demarcation and the Shebaa Farms again - a source of much disagreement between Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and Hizbullah's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, - the speaker tried to change the subject.
"Does it look like we're playing here?" he asked. This decision has been taken."
Asked whose version - Nasrallah's or Jumblatt's - had been agreed upon, Berri was non-committal.
"Go back and re-read exactly what I announced after the last session," he said. "We won't be discussing that again."
Nasrallah has said that previous talks had failed to achieve unity on the subject of demarcating the border with Syria. He argued that the agreement had been to define the frontier everywhere except in the Shebaa area, as this was still under israeli occupation.
Jumblatt had accused Nasrallah of backtracking from his commitments, insisting that participants had agreed to demarcate the entire border. Berri said each of the leaders at the table had reiterated his commitment to decisions taken at earlier sessions, adding that all agreed to fully support Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his Cabinet in their quest to achieve implemention.
"All decisions taken are going to be implemented as soon as possible, and all those present ... stressed the need to do this," he said. Asked how full implementation could be possible if Syria refused to cooperate, he argued that relations between Beirut and Damascus "have to go back to normal before establishing diplomatic relations and demarcating borders."
Shortly before the session began, several key side meetings took place, including one between Siniora and Geagea at the Grand Serail. Another meeting, this one between Nasrallah and Berri, took place at Parliament.
Geagea repeated one of his favorite refrains after his talks with Siniora, telling reporters that "if Lahoud stays in Baabda Palace, it will be a loss for the whole country." Speaking earlier in the day, Aoun told Nour radio that he would continue to present himself as a presidential candidate, regardless of the results of the national dialogue.
"The presidential campaign will be open for the next year-and-a-half," the former general said, "and I am a candidate."
LF MP Tony Zahra had asserted during the day that failure to agree on ousting Lahoud would not mean the failure of the process. "This dialogue has already accomplished a lot of things and secured Lebanese unity over a number of crucial issues," he said in a statement.
But Zahra added that one major issue, that of dealing with Hizbullah's weapons, remained a major concern.
"This issue will remain for discussion," he insisted, "and will not be raised from the table until there is an agreement over it."
The leader of the majority bloc in Parliament, Future Movement chief Saad Hariri, spoke only briefly with reporters on his way out of the session, stopping just long to quip to reporters who were interviewing Harb: "I second everything that Harb said."
Earlier, his party had issued a statement commending Siniora for his recent visit to Washington and asserting that decisions agreed upon in previous sessions were "fixed ... and cannot be retracted or abandoned."

Fadlallah warns of U.S. trickery
Daily Star 29/4/06: BEIRUT: Senior Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah said "the United States is using Lebanon as a bargaining card against Syria." In his Friday sermon, delivered from the Imamein al-Hassanayn Mosque in Haret Hreik, Fadlallah said: "We do not want Lebanon to be tricked by the U.S., which is pretending to be interested in its sovereignty and independence while plotting to take hold of our country." The cleric added: "The U.S. policy is not working toward rescuing the Lebanese economy and finding a good basis for Lebanese-Syrian relations." Fadlallah urged the Lebanese people to "examine" past experiences in order to know that "hostile Israel exposes Lebanon and the region to danger."
In this regard, the cleric added: "The Lebanese people should preserve the resistance's weapons, which are the only things capable of standing up to Israeli threat."
On the occasion of Labor Day, Fadlallah called on the government to assume its responsibilities regarding workers in all fields. He also urged it to tackle the reform plan and the corruption and debt files. "We want the Lebanese to feel their officials are working on resolving their problems and promoting their country's position," he said. - The Daily Star

Initiative to regulate pharmaceuticals launched
Daily Star 29/4/06: U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, French Ambassador Bernard Emie and the head of the delegation of the European Commission Ambassador Patrick Renauld, accompanied by representatives of the pharmaceutical industry launched a joint initiative Friday with Premier Fouad Siniora. The initiative includes the protection of medicine patents, which would be favorable to investors, the effective implementation of the law pertaining to medicine registration and importation, as well as the law for avoiding unfair competition. The ambassadors said that the efforts deployed to improve Lebanon's economy would be in vain if the government did not ensure true security to merchants and investors as well as conditions of equitable competition.

Bekaa inhabitants protest halt in road works
Daily Star 29/4/06: The inhabitants of the Bekaa region of Qasernaba held a sit in Friday demonstrating against the halt in road works being carried out on the area's highway. The protesters gathered at the highway that links Qasernaba with Zahle from one side and Baalbek on the other and shut it down before the army and the Internal Security Forces patrols were called in to reopen it. They issued a statement urging the government to "quickly intervene" to resolve their problem and pave the road as soon as possible. "Otherwise we will shut it down once and for all," read the statement. - Morshed Ali

LAU appoints new member to board of trustees
Daily Star 29/4/06: The Lebanese American University (LAU) announced Friday the election of Dr. Charles Achi as a new member of the university's board of trustees. In a statement issued Friday, the LAU said Achi was born in 1947 in Lebanon and received diplomas and Ph.D. degrees from universities in France and the U.S. "Achi is the director of the jet propulsion laboratory at NASA and vice president of California Institute of Technology," the statement said. It added that he was "principal investigator on numerous research and development studies and flight projects sponsored by NASA." The statement also said that Achi would be visiting Lebanon next month.

PFLP-GC slams Roed-Larsen's 'interference'
Daily Star 29/4/06: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command spokesman Anwar Raja said Friday the Palestinians "reject lessons by Terje Roed-Larsen on Palestinian-Lebanese dialogue." "Larsen's interference is diplomatically shameful and impudent," he added. The PFLP-GC representative was speaking during a ceremony held by the group in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp to honor journalists. Concerning the nuclear bomb which MP Walid Jumblatt claimed the PFLP-GC is in possession of, Raja said: "The bomb is made up of our people's mind and creativity." As for the dialogue with the Lebanese government, Raja stressed the need to hold such a dialogue in order to reach "political, social and security results." With regard to the Lebanese government's time limits for the dialogue, Raja said: "It does not befit the government to give time limits as if it is putting a steel barricade between Lebanese and Palestinians."

Seminar focuses on employment for disabled
Daily Star 29/4/06: Social care institutions in Lebanon participated in a seminar about "Development and the Employment of the Disabled" at the Abdel-Hadi Debs Installation for the Development of Intellect in Bir Hassan Thursday. Dr. Hussein Ismail said there are no reasons to justify the unemployment of the disabled, saying that when someone disabled wishes to pursue vocational studies, they must be helped. Ismail also called on the relevant associations to cooperate to offer better educational facilities for the disabled. Dr. Ghazi Freij said on the occasion of deaf awareness week, which coincides with the seminar, society needs to aid the deaf in their silence and assist them to take part in everyday activities.

Stray dogs kill sheep in Sir al-Dinnieh
Daily Star 29/4/06: Stray dogs attacked a herd of sheep Friday in the northern region of Sir al-Dinnieh. The dogs killed around 20 sheep and wounded others. Nasser Fatfat, the shepherd, said that the dogs attacked the pen at night and inflicted severe damage. He added that the number of stray dogs has increased lately, which "exposes citizens to danger." Fatfat also said the municipality was asked to resolve the problem but it had made no efforts in that direction.

Watering Lebanon's cedar revolution
The Monitor's View
A year ago this week, the Middle East saw a rare display of freedom. Syria, under UN pressure and after an uprising in Beirut ("the cedar revolution"), withdrew its troops from Lebanon. That wasn't enough, however. Lebanon's revolution still needs help.
The tiny country's continuing woes remain overshadowed by bigger crises in the region - Iran's nuclear ambitions, Iraq's violent struggle for democracy, and a hardened Israeli-Palestinian standoff. Those conflicts have spillover effects in Lebanon, long a pawn of foreign powers. The reverse is also true: Establishing a fully independent and democratic Lebanon could help the entire Middle East.
Despite the pullout of troops, Syria still has spies in Lebanon, which are widely believed to be behind assassinations that keep anti-Syrian politicians in check. The UN has already charged Syria with a role in the 2005 killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. That event helped put Syria on the defensive after years of occupying its neighbor.
Iran, too, keeps a meddling hand in Lebanon, a fact which the United Nations officially noted only for the first time this week. In a report, UN chief Kofi Annan linked Iran to instability in Lebanon, citing the close ties between Shiite Iran and Lebanon's Shiite guerrilla band Hizbullah.
Financed by Iran and largely in control of southern Lebanon, Hizbullah is being slowly coaxed by other Lebanese political parties to cement itself as a democratic, nationalist political party, and not continue as an armed tool of Iran or Syria, or as a radical anti-Israel, Islamic militant group. (Hizbullah's leader acknowledged this week that the group helps fund militant Palestinian factions.)
Hizbullah needs to make a choice on whether to blend its forces with Lebanon's Army. Last year's legislative elections saw a victory for the anti-Syria, anti-Iran parties. Since then, a national dialogue between all parties to reconcile long-standing differences - while difficult - is moving along. That slow reconciliation needs more help from the US and the UN.
This week, the US pushed for a resolution by the UN Security Council that would highlight Syria's failure to abide by a 2004 UN resolution that demanded Syria respect Lebanon's sovereignty (and that demanded a disarming of all militias such as Hizbullah).
President Bush also turned the screws tighter on Syria this week by issuing an order that would freeze the international assets of anyone involved in the Hariri assassination.
The US can do more. Mr. Bush met with Lebanon's new prime minister, Fouad Siniora, last week, and heard his requests for more economic assistance and for US pressure on Israel to withdraw from a parcel of land called Shebaa Farms. Israel's occupation of that land, a result of the 1967 war with Syria, is used by Syria as an excuse to avoid delineating its border with Lebanon.
As Mr. Annan said, "A united Lebanon has offered an outstretched hand to Syria." But Syria, like Iran, shows no signs of abandoning its covert influence in Lebanon. They both ignore the popular will of the Lebanese and the will of the UN.
The revolution is unfinished.

Shariah nations
By Diana West
April 28, 2006
No one has ever adequately explained why the jihadist "insurgency" fights on in Iraq. Really. It's not enough to say these Islamic fanatics want to drive "infidel" American forces out of Iraq, or that they want to bring down the Iraqi government. It is by remaining in Iraq that the United States has built up a democratically elected but Islamic government — and an Islamic government is the goal of every good jihadist. In other words, our Islamic enemies should be at peace with the Iraqi government because its constitution makes Islamic law supreme. "No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established," says Article 2. That single line contains the blueprint for a Shariah state, and if there's one thing a jihadist likes, it's a Shariah state.
Recently, Sayyed Ayad, a liberal member of the Iraqi parliament who favors the separation of church (mosque) and state, spoke in Washington. When I asked him what could be done under Iraq's constitution to foster democracy, not Shariah, his answer was chilling. Pointing out that Iraqi voters chose this Shariah-supreme document, he said: "They have to try it for 10 or 20 years, and then change it." Maybe.
Which leads me to another point no one has adequately explained: why exactly Americantroops fight on in Iraq. Sure, the objective is to destroy the hellions of the insurgency — a killing machine more aptly and derisively described by the late journalist Steven Vincent as "paramilitary death squads." And I still believe the goal of killing jihadists "there," not "here," is entirely commendable. But even after their destruction, does an American victory lie in making Iraq safe for Shariah?
The same question applies to Afghanistan, where another democratically mandated Shariah state has been established thanks to the U.S. of A — as the world finally noticed when an Afghan Christian "apostate" named Abdul Rahman had to flee to Italy rather than face Islamic "justice" in the courts or on the street.
Maybe this all proves that Islam and democracy don't mix. Then again, maybe they mix just fine; it's the mixture itself — Shariah for the people — that clashes with liberty as defined in the Western world. This is the lesson we seem determined not to learn. But in making such ignorance inviolate, we end up making the world safe for Shariah.
Certainly, we didn't put up all those ballot boxes across the Middle East to mandate a rollback of freedom. But in failing to assess the ideology central to Islam that makes Western notions of liberty fatally heretical, this is increasingly what is happening. Which gives a head-hurting circularity to our policy. Maybe such dizzying confusion should make us welcome the advent of the Iraq Study Group, a presidential advisory council created, as the New York Times put it, "to generate new ideas on Iraq."
But new ideas on "Iraq" are the last thing we need, particularly as generated by a bipartisan snooze of a group that includes James Baker, Vernon Jordan, Charles Robb, Sandra Day O'Connor, Alan K. Simpson and Lee Hamilton — I can hardly tap out the other names because they're so solidly and venerably uninspiring (with the notable exception of Rudy Giuliani).
Framing their study around "Iraq" reveals how blinkered government thinking is. Iraq is only a small piece of our troubles in this period of resurgent Islamic jihad, from Osama bin Laden's cave to downtown Tehran, from worldwide Danish cartoon protests to Tel Aviv falafel stands, from Paris banlieus to Zacarias Moussaui's courtroom hot seat. Squeezing big brains for "new ideas" about winning Iraq is sort of like planning the Normandy invasion to win France. We need something bigger. We need new ideas about Islam.
My list of idea men and women would include Hirsi Ali, Bat Ye'or, Bruce Bawer, Andrew G. Bostom, Walid Phares, Daniel Pipes, Robert Spencer, Wafa Sultan, Ibn Warraq and other experts and observers unbowed by the strictures of political correctness that strangle debate on Islam — its teachings, its demands, its history.
Iraq would figure into such a curriculum, but from a broader perspective that would allow us to size up the global battlefield in terms of the two great threats to the Western way of life: the spread of shariah through active jihad (war, terrorism), and the spread of shariah through Islamization (demographics, multicultural correctness). Of the two, the second — quiet jihad — is the more serious threat, as the continuing Islamization of Europe shows.
We need an Islam Study Group.

Hamas on a tightrope
Jordan Times - 28/04/2006
George S. Hishmeh
It is the tradition here that any new government be given a grace period of 100 days before judgement is voiced about its direction and effectiveness. But this has not been the case with the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.
For a start, hardly a month has passed since the Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, came to office, much to the surprise of everyone, when many Palestinians and others elsewhere, were looking for ways to undermine the democratically elected group. And in good part, Hamas has no one to blame but itself because of its clumsiness and failure to live up to its new and serious responsibilities.
There were some critical missteps taken that underlined its seemingly sophomoric outlook and undermined its promising potential. Hamas' earlier pronouncements upon taking office, it is generally recognised, seemed to give mixed messages, yet giving hope that the group can in a short while manage to weave a reasonable mid-course. But other pronouncements of late sounded extreme, thus giving ammunition to those who did not believe that Hamas can rise to the occasion; consequently they were bent on crushing the new Palestinian leadership.
The confusion about Hamas' potential has been widespread and hotly debated. Even such an influential analyst as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman seemed ill at ease explaining the options ahead. He told a CNN interviewer last Sunday: "I think it is not smart for Israel and the United States to create a situation where, if Hamas fails, they can blame the failure on Israel, the United States, or Europe."
He continued: "At the same time, a suicide bombing happens, and what does Hamas do? It basically applauds. And so, what do you deal when you are dealing with a democratically elected terrorist organisation? This is a hard problem, I don't have a simple answer for it?"
No doubt Hamas here rushed to judgement in condoning the recent Tel Aviv suicide bombing that killed several Israelis and there it could not shake off the terrorist label. After all, any responsible government — and Hamas ought to understand that — cannot justify the killing of innocent lives, whether the action has been taken by Palestinian fighters or the Israeli army which earlier this month killed, among others, six Palestinian children in the Gaza Strip.
Although many Palestinians do not subscribe to Hamas' ideological bent, they believe that it should be given a chance to succeed since the Israeli occupier, and its Western supporters, have not been more accommodating to the Fateh-led Palestinian Authority in the past 10 years.
A case in point was evident last week when Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora visited Washington where he was warmly received at the White House and showered with US support. When discussing the case of Hizbollah, the well-spoken Lebanese prime minister explained to his American hosts that his government cannot attempt to disarm the Islamic militia group, which is supported by both Syria and Iran, before Israel withdraws from the Shebaa Farms, a strip of land bordering both Lebanon, Syria and Israel. The Israeli occupation was enough justification for Hizbollah to insist on keeping its arms after the l975-90 civil war in Lebanon.
What's good for the goose must be good for the gander. If the Lebanese position makes sense to some in the Bush administration, the Palestinian leadership, be it Hamas or Fateh, should not be treated differently. Furthermore, it is high time that the Israeli government declare its own vision for peace in the region. The days ahead will be replete with serious problems. The fighting among Palestinians needs to be curtailed and not encouraged. If anything, the new Palestinian leadership, as well as all the outside financial backers, should concentrate on finding ways to tackle the looming humanitarian crisis should financial assistance be denied the Palestinian man in the street.
A lot will depend on the Bush administration and Prime Minister-elect Ehud Olmert when he comes visiting in Washington in late May, after choosing his new Cabinet that has to be approved by a just-elected Knesset where the Israeli right wing has been routed. Although he has threatened to follow in the footsteps of his mentor, Ariel Sharon, and pursue a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank, such an approach will not placate the new Palestinian leadership — and Washington should not encourage this shortsighted step.
The defeat of Hamas will only prolong the conflict, a development the region cannot tolerate much longer now that the Israeli occupation is about to begin its 40th year (next June) — the longest occupation in modern times.

The Lebanon Proxy
Michael Young
Over the past few weeks, Lebanese politicians from groups as diverse as Hezbollah and the Christian Lebanese Forces have been meeting intermittently in what has been dubbed a “National Dialogue.” Their primary objective is to forge a consensus for Lebanon’s future in the wake of the withdrawal of Syrian forces last year. But what their dialogue has exposed is how much Lebanese politics continues to be shaped by external forces.
The Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad retains huge influence over key levers of the Lebanese state, including the security and intelligence apparatus, the army, and the judiciary – not to mention an alliance with the militarily powerful Hezbollah. Though Syrian soldiers may have withdrawn a year ago, Assad’s regime never got over its departure from Lebanon, and it seeks to re-impose some form of hegemony over the country.
Syria’s stance is complicated by an ongoing United Nations investigation that accuses it of involvement in the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. While Syria’s Lebanese allies have called for improved ties between the two countries, the Hariri murder makes this doubtful. For the moment, the Lebanese parties have agreed not to allow their territory to be used as a base for any presumed threats to the Syrian regime.
At the same time, Egypt and Saudi Arabia want desperately to avoid the downfall of Assad’s regime. Publicly, they support the UN’s investigation, but privately they have encouraged, even pressured, the Lebanese government to lower the heat on Syria. Lebanese adversaries of Syria have resisted such demands, but the Egyptian and Saudi stance highlights how, for reasons of self-interest, Arab regimes rarely like to see fellow despots fall.
Indeed, the Egyptian and Saudi attitude contrasts starkly with that of two Western powers with extensive influence in Lebanon, the United States and France, which support the UN inquiry wherever it might go. Nevertheless, all four states agree that Syrian influence in Lebanon must be curbed, and all, in theory, approve of Hezbollah’s disarmament – required by UN Security Council resolution 1559 – even if they differ over how to bring it about.
Another regional issue shaping Lebanese domestic politics is the ongoing violence between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. Lebanon’s Sunnis and Shiites – the country’s two most powerful communities, owing mostly to their demographic weight and the backing they enjoy from elsewhere in the region – are nowhere near the point of mutual violence, but there has been palpable political tension recently. Hariri was the leading Sunni politician, and after his murder both communities found themselves in opposing corners with respect to Syria.
Within Lebanon, the Sunni-Shiite divide reflects broader regional frictions between the Sunni-majority Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which backs Saad Hariri, the late prime minister’s son, and Iran, which supports Hezbollah. The Saudis fear that Sunni-Shiite discord, spreading from Iraq across the Arab world, might harm the kingdom, whose Shiites are concentrated in the oil-rich eastern part of the country. That is why Riyadh has encouraged Hariri to keep lines open to Hezbollah, the leading Shiite force.
Their sectarian anxieties aside, the Saudis and Egyptians fear that a nuclear Iran might secure Shiite dominance in the region. Grafted onto this is America-Iranian enmity, fed by the nuclear issue, but also by disagreement in Iraq. The Arab states have found themselves uncomfortably caught in the middle, as have the Lebanese, who are alarmed that they may pay the price for any American or Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, because in either case, Hezbollah may retaliate against Israel from South Lebanon.
Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah has interpreted UN demands for its disarmament as a plot by the Bush administration to weaken the party, and as a means of affirming American supremacy in the region. Hezbollah has refused to disarm in the face of what it has called the Israeli threat, although its definition of this threat has shifted frequently enough to cast doubt on whether it would ever be willing to surrender its weapons. More recently, Hezbollah agreed to place the issue on the domestic negotiating agenda – perhaps because Iran doesn’t want it to be a source of national dissension – but it is doubtful that genuine disarmament will ensue, at least for now.
Finally, as they maneuver around the shoals of regional and international affairs, the Lebanese must also consider domestic American politics. Whatever one thinks about the war in Iraq, the US presence there has helped Lebanon to ward off Syrian efforts to reverse its withdrawal, as well as Arab efforts to compel the Lebanese to compromise with a regime that loathes Lebanese sovereignty. A US administration in full withdrawal from Iraq would likely become indifferent to what happens in Lebanon. Who but Syria and Iran would benefit from that?
Such an outcome might satisfy some parts of Lebanese society, particularly Hezbollah. But most Lebanese remain committed to seeing their country living in peace, free from the isolation and militancy that are the hallmarks of Iran and Syria. Unfortunately, Lebanon has always been buffeted by its surroundings, and the country could once again become an arena for destructive regional conflicts, regardless of what the Lebanese prefer.
***Michael Young is an analyst of Middle East affairs, based in Beirut.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.
www.project-syndicate.org

Syria Closing Doors
Walid Choucair Al-Hayat - 28/04/06//
While Lebanon seeks to open doors to solve its problems, especially those concerning its relations with Syria; Damascus closes them.
The first anniversary of the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26, last year, concurrently takes place with the resumption of the national dialogue of the country's 14 mainstream political powers who worked to reach a minimum consensus on main issues, including relations with Damascus.
Although Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is relying on the motions passed in the conference to initiate dealings with Syria, the latter continues to obstruct and reject his attempts. Such attempts include his request to visit Damascus to instigate relations with President Bashar al-Assad, and PM Siniora's call for Israel to withdraw from Shebaa Farms during his visit to Washington and New York after finalizing an agreement with Syria stipulating that Shebaa Farms were in fact Lebanese.
Even though the March 14 Forces (which supports PM Siniora and is a majority in the cabinet) believes that dissociating the investigation into the assassination of former martyr PM Rafik Hariri from the bilateral relations and its problematic issues is an adequate price for Damascus to accept normalization of relations. However, the Syrian leaders do not agree with this concept. Moreover, the Syrian regime has not taken any steps since April 25, and yet believes that it has the right to re-form policies of the Lebanese government and its balances, and have a hand in its decisions.
Syria's insistence on maintaining President Emile Lahoud, whose term in office was blatantly extended, reveals to what extent Syria strongly desires ruling Lebanon with a remote control.
In spite of the Lebanese consensus that Syria does in fact have an influence in Lebanon and plays a role in its domestic affairs (whoever its president is), Syria exceeds this given fact. The Syrian leaders had informed those who were pressurizing it into withdrawing from the country in 2004, that even though its military had pulled out, it would not leave Lebanon alone.
Syria was present in the attempts of reaching compromises in the Lebanese national conference, which clearly denotes the Syrian role in Lebanon as 'accepted' and 'familiar' among the Lebanese, including Syria's old and new opponents. But Syria has breached the compromises reached by the conferees regarding bilateral relations, the Palestinian presence and Shebaa Farms.
The Syrian regime breached these compromises because they would establish a new status of Syrian influence in Lebanon; a status different from the one established by Damascus throughout the last three decades. Demarcating the borders of Shebaa Farms also demarcates the limits of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, as these farms stand as a strong and national pretext of this intervention.
Breaching the compromises reached by the conferees does not only include Damascus's reluctance to receive Seniora, its rejection to draw borders of Shebaa Farms, its condition to set up diplomatic relations later, or the promise of removing Palestinian arms outside the camps by giving 'civil rights' to refugees, as Palestinians (Syria's allies) call it; but also Lebanese groups that support Syria in the conference (i.e. Hezbollah) that provide excuses for resolutions which only mean drawing back from the compromises that were agreed upon.
In brief, the situation in Lebanon witnesses a renewed counter-attack which aims to block the attempts made by PM Siniora, leader of the Future Movement (Al Mustaqbal), current MP Saad Hariri, and Head of the parliamentary 'Democratic Gathering' Walid Jumblatt to break the siege of the government. Damascus succeeded in imposing this siege as a result of the mistakes committed by these leaders in their response to Arab efforts.
When it became evident that these poles had gained some Arab support, Syria's allies found it necessary to obstruct the possibility of reaching a compromise for which the conference has revived hopes, though meager.
It means that the Lebanese situation has entered a stage where it needs to be protected from the possibility of moving backwards, stemming from the belief of Damascus's allies that they can recuperate further initiative. This protection seems only possible through an Arab or international stance.
The international community and the acting Arab party are the ones that called for Lebanon to reach an understanding and agreement. Therefore, the two parties face the challenge of protecting the Lebanese compromises from Syria's attempts to undermine them.Once again, Syrian interference calls for further international intervention.

Lebanon president poised to stay in power barring 'miracle'
April 28, 2006
BEIRUT -- Lebanese leaders resume political roundtable talks on Friday over the fate of embattled pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, with the international community ratcheting up the pressure on Damascus.
But Lebanese politicians, deeply divided since the April 2005 end of Syria's 29-year military presence and domination of its smaller neighbor, are widely expected to maintain Lahoud in power, despite calls for his resignation.
"The departure of President Lahoud will require a miracle," admitted leading anti-Syrian Christian leader Samir Geagea.
MP Mohammed Kabbani, another member of the anti-Syrian bloc, has also acknowledged that "cohabitation will be forced on us at the end of the talks on Friday".
The parliamentary majority will have to cohabit with Lahoud until his term expires in September 2007, said Hassan Nasrallah, head of the main pro-Syrian Shia movement Hizbullah.
Lahoud's term was extended by three years in late 2004 under strong Syrian pressure, triggering a political crisis.
The talks aimed at ending the country's political paralysis resume with Syria back in the international firing line, facing a new UN resolution over its fraught relations with Lebanon and a US asset freeze against suspects in the murder of Lebanese ex-premier Rafiq Hariri.
US President George W. Bush on Tuesday ordered an asset freeze for suspects found to be involved in Hariri's February 2005 assassination, in which several top Syrian and Lebanese officials have been implicated by a UN probe.
Bush's ambassador in Beirut, Jeffrey Feltman, called on Thursday for the Lebanese president to quit, expressing his hope that "lingering Syrian interference in Lebanon - both direct and through its proxies - will end".
France also said that it was preparing a new UN Security Council resolution to urge Syria to answer Lebanese calls for better ties, which have deteriorated markedly since Hariri's killing and elections that brought an anti-Syrian majority to power.
At the last round of talks on April 3, Lebanese leaders decided to discuss calls for Lahoud to resign one last time before moving on to the issue of disarming Hizbullah's militia, in line with a UN resolution.
Lebanese leaders are divided over the disarmament of the military wing of Hizbullah, whose fighters were widely credited for bringing about Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 after 22 years of occupation.
The group has vowed to carry on a guerrilla war to free the disputed Shebaa Farms border area, which Israel seized from Syria along with the Golan Heights in 1967 but is claimed by Lebanon with Damascus' approval.
Lahoud, who has been boycotted by Washington and Paris, has made support for Hizbullah a priority of his political agenda. He has rejected UN calls for integrating Hizbullah's military arm into the regular Lebanese army.
The anti-Syrian camp faces problems as its parliamentary majority hinges on a narrow margin, with 71 seats in the 128-member house. It has been hit by the defection of popular Christian leader Michel Aoun.
In five rounds of national talks since March 2, leaders reached agreement on the establishment of an international court to judge those responsible for Hariri's killing.
Lebanese leaders have also agreed to dismantle Palestinian military bases in Lebanon, to work to normalize relations with former powerbroker Syria and to define borders between the two countries.
But the last three points have yet to be implemented as they require the cooperation of Damascus, which has rejected calls to define the border in the Shebaa Farms area before Israel pulls out of the territory.
Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, a former close aide to Hariri who was warmly received by Bush last week, has said that he wants to visit Damascus to mend ties, but that door has not yet been opened.
Damascus insists that before receiving Siniora, the agenda of the talks in Syria should be officially adopted by the Lebanese government, which includes a number of pro-Syrian figures, including Hizbullah and Lahoud allies.

UN official pushes along probe into killing of Al-Hariri
BEIRUT, April 27 (KUNA) -- UN Secretary General's Personal Representative in Lebanon Geir Pedersen averred here on Thursday the importance of continuing the international probe into the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Al-Hariri. After meeting with former prime minister Omar Karami, Pederson lauded in a statement to reporters the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference's decision to support the international investigation and the unanimous decision to establish an international court. The UNSC resolution 1664 tasked UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to hold talks with the Lebanese authorities about the establishment of the international court for Al-Hariri's court.
The Lebanese government said yesterday that it would ask the UN to extend the international investigation for another six-month period. Last December, the UN Security Council extended the investigation, which started June 15, 2005, for a six-month period.

Hizballah: From Revolutionary and Pan-Islamism to Pragmatism and Lebanonization.
Eitan Azani -ICT
Thesis Submitted for the degree of “Doctor of philosophy”
Abstract
The last three decades of the 20th century witnessed the rise of Islamic movements in the Middle East and their transformation into a leading power, opposing the existing social and political order. This Islamic wave is noteworthy for its scope, strength and the violence perpetrated by the extremists on the fringes. In Islamic culture, Islam plays a central and important role in political and social struggles. Islamic ideals constitute the basis for the creation of a joint political and social identity as well as a source of inspiration and legitimacy for the struggle. The success of the Iranian Islamic revolution became a source of inspiration and simulation for the revolutionary movements, particularly the Shiite movements, which sprang up in the 1980s. They were led by religious militants, under the leadership of Khomeini, who promoted the vision of an Islamic nation. The Hezbollah movement in Lebanon is one of the torch-bearers of this goal.
The growth of revolutionary social movements, which publicly criticized the existing regimes, engaged many researchers and regimes. Their composition and characteristics differ from society to society and from era to era and they are influenced by the relationships between state and society, the social, economic and internal political situation and the regional and international systems. There is an internal dynamic in these movements that is characterized by a transition from spontaneous and informal modus operandi, usually based on the charisma of a leader or group, to an institutionalized and organizational system based on formal rules and norms.
In the literature that deals with the research of social movements there are three main approaches to the rationale for their formation:
The “collective behavior” approach. The “collective behavior” approach is based on psychological and social theories of group behavior and contends that the existence of structural and ideological opposition to the regime on the one hand and a significant rise in the personal distress characteristics on the other hand are essential conditions for the development of revolutionary social movements.
The “management of resources” school of thought. The “management of resources” school of thought is based on conflict and economic theories according to which the important factors in the development of social movements are, in particular, the accessibility of resources and the existence of a formal organizational infra system.
The “integrated” school of thought. The “integrated” school of thought combines principles from both approaches according to which the growth of social movements results from both the organizational system conditions and the psychological social conditions.
The development of a revolutionary social movement is possible, therefore, only when a number of conditions exist: the transmission of feelings of alienation and distress from the individual level to the group level, the creation of a new system of concepts and ideals, the development of an ideological framework and organizational enlistment. The escalation of these processes leads to the development of conflict between the revolutionary movement and the regime.
Researchers of terror organizations contend that in societies where such religious or ethnic revolutionary movements grow, the violent activity stems from feelings of frustration and alienation and from religious motivations. These motivations lead to rigid religious bigotry and the growth of radical religious terror organizations whose aims and method of operation differ from the goals of the “mother-movements” from which they sprang.
Researches dealing with revolutionary movements in their first stages point to their tendency to rally round the charismatic leadership of an individual or a group. The identifying marks of this pattern are: the existence of a special moral and revolutionary zeal amongst the members of the movement, the absence of a formal organizational system and a strong tendency to demolish existing institutions. This method of operation, based on the centrality of the charismatic leader, tends to eventually undergo a change to a mode of operation based on institutions. This stems from the reciprocal activity of individuals and groups in the movement inspired by the leader. Institutions have a tendency and sensitivity to change, arising from the differences which the individuals and groups reveal when interpreting the ideals and values upon which these institutions are based. In the institutional model, complex reciprocal relationships of “give and take” and of conflicts develop. They often balance and block the initiatives of the charismatic leadership. The transition to an institutional method of operation is the result of internal processes and external coercion. It stems from the need to safeguard the accomplishments achieved so far, defend the movement from external threats and enable it to exist and operate in a changing environment for a long period. The transition to the “institutional method of operation” indicates the ability to adapt and the existence of pragmatism in the movement.
The background and the conditions and processes that enabled Hezbollah to develop in certain ways are similar to those which influenced the development of other revolutionary movements. Nevertheless, the model that developed in Lebanon is different and unique due to the Lebanese ethnic system, Lebanon’s special geopolitical situation and the movement's Islamic Shiite character. Hezbollah emerged at the height of the crisis in the Lebanese system. It is a product of internal and regional political and social Lebanese processes, from the 1970’s and onwards, that prepared the ground for the growth of radical foundations within the Shiite community who opposed the Amal movement’s Lebanese national approach and the moderate view which it took towards the Israeli occupation. In the latter part of 1982, Iran's representatives in Lebanon succeeded in helping the radical groups organize themselves within the framework of “Hezbollah”, (the Party of God), and around its Pan Islamic vision. They recruited them to carry out violent operations against the West in general and Israel in particular.
The movement burst into international consciousness in 1983 after a series of terror attacks against the multi-national forces and the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and it remained in the center of the international stage for a decade owing to its terror attacks, which included: kidnapping Western citizens in Lebanon, hijacking aircrafts and attacks against Western targets and Jewish and Iranian dissidents abroad.
These attacks were innovative, radically violent and had significant results in the regional and international arenas. They resulted in the departure of the multi-national forces from Beirut (February 84), the retreat of the IDF to the Security Zone (May 85) and Western governments’ “surrender” to Iranian demands in the negotiations for the release of hostages. The changes in the internal, regional and international systems at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s presented the movement with three challenges:
The first challenge was the end of the civil war and the bolstering of the Lebanese government's status. The second challenge was the establishment of Syria's hegemony in Lebanon versus the decline in Iranian support of the movement. The third challenge was the peace process in the Middle East.
The argument which took place regarding the movement's direction, in light of these challenges, was influenced by processes and internal tensions in the movement resulting from organizational changes (transition from the charismatic modus operandi to the institutional modus operandi), the results of the fighting between the movement and the “Amal” movement for control of the Shiite community and from different viewpoints in the Iranian leadership regarding the movement's direction, as well as Syria's determination to base the stability in Lebanon on the “Taif Accord” understandings. The movement decided to change its policy, preferring pragmatism over revolutionism and the decisions were translated into deeds. The movement's representatives presented their candidacy and were elected to the Lebanese Parliament and immediately started to promote the resistance and the movement's interests. Revolutionary principles were distanced from centers of influence and power and from its institutions. The movement's leadership and its spokesmen initiated a publicity campaign in order to resolve the tension created between their supporters and the movement's goals, as they appeared in their political platform, and the new pragmatic approach which clearly negated these goals. Upon the movement's representatives entry into Parliament in the 1992 elections a new era opened in the movement's history, which they believed would guarantee better survival chances as a political movement even if a peace agreement was signed with Israel and they were disarmed.
Two different approaches can be discerned in the literature dealing with the Hezbollah movement: The first characterizes the writers of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. It was influenced by the fanatical and demonic image that stuck to the movement as a result of the terror attacks it perpetrated against Western targets during this period in Lebanon and abroad. This image, and the secrecy which characterized its operations alongside the profusion of general, tendentious, and unsubstantiated information, which was published about the movement in the media, harmed the reliability of the publications regarding the movement. The research of the movement was more of an interpretation of the image created. It dealt with the analysis of its operations in terms that characterize terror and guerilla research, (modus operandi, casualty characteristics, casualty statistics, counter terrorism.) The exceptions are the articles that were written during that period on the ideological change and the historical roots of the movement.
The second approach characterizes the 1990s (from 1992 onwards). It deals with the pragmatic Hezbollah and endeavors to find explanations for the change in the movement's behavior. Most of the researchers believed that the changes in the movement were a result of the influences of the international and regional systems in which it operates. During this period, conditions were created which enabled more in-depth reliable research of the movement due to the transparency which characterized the movement from the time it entered the political system and the expansion of its ties to the Shiite community, as well as the termination of the hostages crisis and the new conditions which were created after the Taif national reconciliation accord. The movement's spokesmen expressed themselves openly and, on occasion, made close contact with Western journalists regarding various current topics. Also, a great deal of information, more reliable than in the past, was published in the media, including the movement's own media channels. Most of the research and articles were written about the movement in the 1990s. Some of them dealt with the changes that occurred within the movement and the resulting consequences. They pointed to a number of central factors which brought about the changes: The Peace Process, Iranian influence and Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. A number of researchers dealt with the tensions that arose between the movement's platform and its new direction, which went against the platform, and the publicity line taken by its leaders on this issue.
There were also researchers who researched chapters in the movement's history following the awareness created in the 1990s. The most prominent research in this sphere dealt with the kidnappings of Western hostages in Lebanon, which outraged the West during the 1980s. It is noteworthy that the researchers of the 1990’s dealt more with the social activity of the movement and its influence on developments in the Shiite community.
Hezbollah is a fundamentalist social movement that developed from the extreme fringes of the wider Shiite social (ethnic) movement– the Amal movement, against the background of intra-community, intra-Lebanese and regional processes. Despite its evolutionary development, certain stages and strategic turning points can be emphasized that constitute milestones in the movement's development and stress the nature of the changes and their direction. The first was in 1982 when it was established with Iranian aid. The motives for its establishment can be found in the processes and events which took place from the 1970’s and onwards, in Lebanon in general and in the Shiite community in particular. The second turning point was in February 1985 and it indicated the movement was in a state of consolidation. During that month, it published its ideological platform, goals and operational policy. The third turning point occurred between the years 1988 and 1990 during Hezbollah’s expansion stage. An analysis of the events and developments during this period, which constitute the meeting point between the expansion stage and the institutionalization stage, explains the fourth strategic turning point, the most significant of all, since its inception. This turning point occurred in 1992 when the movement joined the Lebanese political establishment while accepting its conditions on the one hand, but not abandoning its goals to topple the present regime and establish an Islamic republic, on the other. This change indicates rational pragmatism and adaptability. It is noteworthy that Hezbollah perceives its integration into the political system as an additional stage on its way to accomplishing its long-term goal of gaining power in Lebanon not by revolutionary violent methods, but rather through a step-by-step manner, through its institutions from above, and its wider social activities from below.
The hypothesis of this work assumes that Hezbollah is a Lebanese revolutionary social movement that has undergone change. These processes of change (the dependant variable) are expressed by the transition from a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement to a pragmatic Lebanese movement. The research examines the influence of the systems (the non-dependant variables), the Lebanese, the regional and the international, where Hezbollah operates, on the direction of its development.
The Lebanese System
The Lebanese system is divided into three sub-systems:
The internal administrative system (the movement) - The internal administrative system is based on civilian and military institutions that exist within the movement. They influence political behavior and the decision-making processes and its ability to bridge internal differences and to control conflicts. The Hezbollah movement was established as an umbrella organization that consists of a number of radical groups that were organized to act jointly in advancing Pan-Islamic revolutionary goals under the leadership of charismatic leaders dispatched by Iran, in accordance with Iran's interests. The organizational system is based on the military and the civilian branches that sustain each other. It is a hierarchical system and includes a decision-making council, an operational council, regional councils, intelligence and security bodies and an operational arm. The movement, as with many Islamic movements, excelled in building a wide organizational network within the community through which it supplied, and still supplies, social and religious services which the central government did not wish to or could not supply to the lower classes. In certain areas in Lebanon, the movement supplies the community’s needs in every material (employment, health, nursing care, economics, agriculture, welfare) and spiritual (education and religion) sphere of daily life and operates an alternative services mechanism to the central government. In the initial period, the movement worked towards implementing Islamic law in Lebanon from above, in a revolutionary manner. However, as the movement opened up to the Lebanese establishment and its organizational system and civil institutions, they drew nearer to the “Muslim Brotherhood” and adopted the pragmatic reformist approach that simultaneously combines activity from the top downwards on the political plane and from the bottom upwards in the socio-organizational plane. The change in the movement's status from the beginning of the 1990’s necessitated the expansion of its organizational network and its ties to the community in order to build a broad public support base. This led to the exposure of decision-makers in the movement to influences from the “bottom” through the institutions and bodies that made up the movement and to the creation of a balancing and braking system for the initiatives of the charismatic leadership. The movement's messages are comprised of a system of Islamic symbols and values taken from Khomeini's teachings, but well adapted to the Lebanese reality. The movement's tension and contrast-filled operations, which are frequently influenced by the changes in the Lebanese and regional systems, create challenges for the movement's leaders in decision-making procedures and for its spokesmen in implementing them. The movement's spokesmen are required to have a high standard of rhetoric in order to bridge the gap between the new approaches and the existing normative conceptions that guided the movement for many years. The movement's operational network enables it to spread its messages via a number of channels simultaneously and it increases the level of the citizen's exposure to the messages. The methods of doing this are varied, and they include sermons in mosques, speeches at mass assemblies, comments in the media and education in the schools. The spokesmen, who are well acquainted with the target population and the reality of their lives, adapt the manner and style of their messages to the Lebanese reality, environment and the type of audience. The central question to be examined in this context is: what are the explanations, justifications, motives and religious interpretations employed by the leaders of the movement and its spokesmen and what symbols and Islamic motifs are used in order to explain their decisions (the goals and new modus operandi) as well as the change and deviation from the normative commands that guided the movement for over a decade.
The community system – The community system consists of the Shiite community residing in Lebanon and abroad. In Lebanon, they are concentrated in three geographical areas: South Lebanon, the Bek'aa valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. The geographical separation and different living environments created varied living patterns, behavior and needs in the community, which influenced the nature of the community's solidarity and thus causing splits in the support of the various sectors and movements that developed within the community. Feelings of discrimination, which developed within the community over the years and were the basic common denominator that connected them, were the foundation upon which the new social movements grew from the 1970’s and onwards. Amal and Hezbollah pushed the representatives of the old Shiite establishment (the Zuaama), who had controlled the community ever since Lebanon's independence, aside. The community's involvement and support of the movements that operated in its midst is characterized by change and dynamism, which arose from the realization of personal, familial and tribal interests. These characteristics are the basis for the development of, sometimes violent, power struggles between the movements. In this respect, Hezbollah is significant for having succeeded in recruiting many activists who previously belonged to the Amal movement and thereby expanding its power base within the Shiite community. It also became a significant factor in the Lebanese establishment, mostly through donations to movements and institutions that operated within the community.
The Lebanese establishment – the reference is to the Lebanese state, which has suffered from disturbances and instability from the day it was founded and thus resulting in two civil wars (in 58 and 75) and the continuing incapacity of the central government and the state's governing branches. The crux of the problem is in the multi-sect polarized Lebanese system, in the political power distribution key, that favors the Maronite sect as well as unequally distributing the country's resources for many years and thus resulting in the ongoing blatant and significant discrimination of the Shiite sect vis-à-vis the other communities. The vulnerability of this system turned the country into a playground for internal players (political parties, powerful players and militias of the various sects) as well as regional player who worked to advance their interests in the Middle East. In this context, the Palestinians gained control of Lebanon in the 1970s. The Syrians, Iranians and Israelis should also be mentioned in this respect. The end of the civil war and the establishment of the Taif Accord, under the leadership of Syria, created conditions for rebuilding the Lebanese system while strengthening the central government under full Syrian control and supervision. Changes in the Lebanese system's power, status and characteristics over the years influenced both the modus operandi and development of the internal Lebanese forces, as well as the operational characteristics of the regional players.
The Regional System
The regional system includes four players that directly and indirectly influenced the process of change Hezbollah went through. The influence of each player on the changes in the movement is derived from the character and nature of the relationship between the player and the movement and the stage of its development at the time. (establishment, consolidation, expansion, institutionalization). Within the regional system, two sub-systems can be identified:
The regional Arab subsystem – the regional Arab system includes Syria, Lebanon, Hezbollah (as a non State actor) and also Iran, although it's not Arab country. Iran’s influence on this system is very important so it is analyzed within the framework of the regional Arab system. The common denominator of these actors is their conflict with Israel. Iran and Hezbollah share an additional common denominator of Shiite Islam, which separates them from the other players in this system and influences the way in which they relate to the Israeli-Arab conflict.
The Israeli subsystem – The struggle between the two regional systems is conducted along two tracks: The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Islamic-Shiite conflict. Hezbollah, which operates as a player in both tracks, took advantage of its connections with Syria and Iran to expand its activities and establish itself as an internal and regional Lebanese player of significance. Simultaneously, it utilized its relations with Iran in order to reduce Syrian pressure or thwart Syrian moves that could endanger its status.
The International System
The involvement of the international system and its key players in the complex arena of the Middle East is influenced by limitations and international and regional pressures that make it difficult to restrain Hezbollah or limit its power. In the absence of a basic agreement on whether or not Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, the influence of the international system on the movement is marginal.
The central question to be examined in this paper is: What explains the changes in the movement's approach and what was the influence and relative weight of the non-dependant variables detailed above on the character and direction of these changes. For this purpose, in addition to the theoretical debate dealing with the development of movements and social revolutions, I developed the model of “the development of fundamentalist movements” according to which there are five stages in the development of a movement (hereunder referred to as “the five-stage model”). The transition from stage to stage in the proposed model is not self-evident and is dependent on the development of internal processes – in the movement and the community- in a development supportive operational environment, (internal Lebanese and regional) and in the availability of resources and financial sources.
The first stage – the establishment. The establishment is a result of influential internal factors and social processes during which a social political mobilization occurs.
The second stage – the formation. The formation is that of consolidating the ideological platform, the goals and the aims during which the initial organizational stages develop and the enlistment of activists commences.
The third stage – the expansion. During this process recruitment is expanded and the movement spreads to additional territories and “emerging” institutional, military and civilian systems are formed. It is characterized by pragmatism and sensitivity to internal and environmental processes and the tightening of central control on the movement's operations.
The fourth stage – the institutionalization. During the institutionalization, new reciprocal ties are developed between the movement and its supporters and between the movement and the regime. Also, the institutions expand and their influence increases and military organizational systems develop. Pragmatism guides the decision-making processes and the central control and supervision of the movement's activities are limited.
During the fifth stage, one of two things happens: either the government is overthrown, if and when conditions allow for it, or the movement “disintegrates” and is incorporated into the existing political establishment.
The Research assumptions
The research was written with an integrated approach comprising of a debate and historical analytical analysis based on the model of “The Development of Fundamentalist Movements” alongside a thematic approach dealing with the influence of the non-dependant variables (the Lebanese, the regional and the international systems) on the changes in the movement. The research assumptions are therefore:
The establishment of the Hezbollah movement in 1982 is the result of social processes in Lebanon, in general, and in the Shiite community, in particular, from the 1970s onwards.
The chaotic conditions, which characterized the internal Lebanese establishment from the middle of the 1970’s (1975 – breakout of the Civil War), increased with the entry of the regional players into the Lebanese arena, which enabled the Hezbollah movement to develop, with its violent uncontrolled activity, as a revolutionary movement.
The formation of the movement and its expansion were the direct results of the continuation of the chaotic situation in the internal and regional systems, the successes of the movement's violent activities and the availability of resources for its operations.
The more the movement expanded and became institutionalized, the more it became sensitive to processes and influences of the internal and regional systems. This manifested itself in a change of strategy from uncontrolled violence and terror attacks, as the leading strategy, to controlled violence and guerilla warfare and the beginning of a dialogue with the Lebanese political establishment.
The change in the intra-Lebanese operational environment following the Taif and Damascus Agreements and the consolidation of the central Lebanese government with Syrian support resulted in changes in the movement's method of operation and its institutionalization. The movement demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism on the internal and regional levels, where it was incorporated into the renewing Lebanese establishment while accepting the establishment's rules of the game. On the regional level, it conducted controlled guerilla warfare against Israel while taking into account “cost/benefit” considerations.
The paper deals with the Hezbollah movement from a structural angle and a broad historical perspective that integrates an analytic and thematic approach explaining the reasons for the changes that occurred in the movement from its inception to the present day. This is even more important because no comprehensive research has been carried out on the movement since the 1990’s. It will examine, explain and analyze Hezbollah’s approach as a socio-political movement that underwent change from a revolutionary group working towards universal goals (Pan-Islamism) to a pragmatic group working towards achieving local goals (Lebanese).
The research paper is comprised of nine chapters. The first chapter deals with the consolidation of the theoretical foundation of the development of social revolutionary protest movements. This is a complex social phenomenon that does not operate according to a single model. They appear as a result of political opportunities and are influenced by relations between state and society, the social, cultural, economic and internal political situation and by the regional and international systems. There is an internal dynamic in these movements manifested by transition from a spontaneous and informal method of operation, usually based on the charisma of a leader or a group and revolutionary zeal, to an institutional and organizational system based on norms and formal rules that blunt the revolutionary zeal and manifest themselves in pragmatism and a system of equilibrium and constraints. Despite the differences that exist between varied cultures, there are many similarities between the protest movements that sprang up in various places.
The second chapter analyzes the development of social revolutionary movements within Muslim societies. Islamic fundamentalist movements have similar traits and development processes as other revolutionary social protest movements have in other cultures. However, they also have a certain uniqueness as a result of the operational environment in which they grow. This uniqueness stems from Islamic cultural behavioral codes and constant social, political and religious tensions within Muslim countries between the ruling elite and wide sections of the population. This tension leads to the development of social and political struggles and to the fundamentalist movement's outspoken criticism of the existing regime. However, here too, the reciprocal ties between these movements, the systems around which they operate and the processes that occur there, result in dynamic patterns of behavior based on cost-benefit analysis. The movements tend to “walk a tightrope” in their relationship with the regime. Some adopt a pragmatic approach and integrate into the institutionalized establishment while some continue to operate in a revolutionary manner outside the system. It is noteworthy that the pragmatists are striving to realize the Islamic vision in stages and follow a strategy of combining religious fundamentalism with political realism. These movements, which developed after the appearance of the modern state, have learned to appreciate in recent decades the strength of the systems in the areas in which they operate: the state, the regional system and the international system. However, they are also aware of their limitations and they navigate their operations accordingly within a framework of constraints and possibilities in order to advance their cause.
The third chapter deals with processes and changes within the Shiite sect in Lebanon as an explanation for the establishment of the Hezbollah movement and its development during its initial stages. The discussion in this chapter deals with the processes that occurred within the Shiite sect before the appearance of Hezbollah, from the 1960s until the 1980s, and the reciprocal relations and mutual influences between the movement and the sect between the years 1982 to 1987. These changes and transformations brought about the establishment of the Shiite movements Amal (1974) and Hezbollah (summer of 82), who fought for control of the community. The reciprocal ties between the two movements, their method of operation and their leaders' declarations correctly reflect the changes in Shiite public opinion that occurred during the 1980’s and the scope of the movements' influence within each of the three Shiite communities. From the mid-1980s and onwards, the movement became a central player within the community's system due to the strong influences of the regional and international systems. Its militant operational stance against foreigners and the IDF in Lebanon, which brought about instant results, helped the movement garner the Shiite community's sympathy and support.
The fourth chapter deals with the influences of the communal system on the way the movement developed during one of the most critical stages of its development, between 88-92, from the time of the civil war within the Shiite community until its entry into Parliament. The movement decided to integrate into the Lebanese political system in the middle of 1992. The decision was a result of the understandings reached by the movement during the two year war of survival it waged against the Amal movement and after a rigorous examination of the pros and cons expected from this move. “Control of the street”, or in other words control of the Shiite community's public opinion, was, and remains, the real reason for the movement’s struggles, both violent and by means of dialogue. Hezbollah’s attempts to escalate its conflict with Amal in April 1988 reflected its conviction (mistaken in retrospect) regarding the scope and strength of its support within the Shiite community in Lebanon. The end of the war enabled it to invest its resources in advancing its status within the community's public opinion and in expanding its popular network in preparation for the forthcoming competition over influence and power bases within the community and the right to represent it when dealing with the Lebanese establishment. Its impressive success in the Parliamentary elections helped the movement consolidate its image as a transformed movement but, at the same time, presented a joint challenge: To prove to its Islamic followers that the price it had paid on its way to Parliament was only semantic and that the movement had not abandoned its ideology and the path of resistance. In order to earn the community's public opinion, it had to prove itself and provide clarifications regarding the authenticity of its pragmatic image it hoped to instill in the public's consciousness and regarding the fundamental nature of its relationship with the Lebanese government against the backdrop of its special relationship with Iran.
The fifth chapter deals with the relations between the community and the movement during the nineties from the movement’s entrance into parliament until the radical faction succeeded from the movement. Hezbollah’s leadership, at least so it seems, internalized the inter-community and Lebanese processes that occurred towards the end of the civil war in Lebanon and formulated a political strategy that suited the transformed Lebanese establishment. The change, which was backed with widespread publicity and propaganda, was intended to consolidate the movement's status within the community and the Lebanese establishment and take advantage of the resources existing within the institutional system in order to advance the movement's goals and increase the exposure of the Islamic message. However, the change demanded too high a price for the radicals on the fringes, as it required them to renounce their extra-institutional pan-Islamic revolutionary approach and operate within the limitations of the Lebanese political system. In the last third of the 1990s, Hezbollah assumed that it had succeeded in persuading the community's public opinion of its sincerity and new image and it proceeded to translate this into political power and laying the foundations for its activity in the era following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. It is difficult to decide if Hezbollah succeeded in persuading its various audiences that it had indeed gone through a sincere metamorphosis and to what extent and whether the sophisticated propaganda and continuous repetition of its messages in the media did indeed achieve its goal. However, no one disagrees that the community's public opinion is of utmost importance to the movement's leadership. A sympathetic community public opinion was vital to the movement's existence and even more so from the 1990’s onwards, from the time it was judged by the voters. Therefore, the movement's moves within the Lebanese political arena were intended, in many cases, to serve its goals within the internal community and consolidate its position as a popular patriotic movement acting to advance and improve the situation of the deprived within the Shiite community while conducting a war against Israel.
The sixth chapter deals with the influential relationship between the Lebanese regime and Hezbollah. The Lebanese establishment influenced the development of Hezbollah as a movement. The chaotic situation which characterized the political system from the mid-70’s until the beginning of the 90’s created an optimal environment for the movement's growth and afforded it abundant political opportunities to expand and advance its interests. The Lebanese regime in the 1980s and 90’s existed in the shadow of powerful regional players that manipulated the Lebanese establishment, in one way or another, or the players who influenced the Lebanese regime. At the beginning of the 1990’s, Syria became the player most influential on the Lebanese regime and consolidated its status as the de-facto landlord of Lebanon. Within this system of constraints and dynamic changes, the Lebanese government tried to restrict Hezbollah’s steps and subject its policies to the government's policies.
The application of the Taif Accord created a strategic change in the Lebanese government's method of operation that also influenced Hezbollah. It was forced to adapt itself to the transformed establishment, but it did not conform as the other power factors did and it continued to develop its military capabilities and conduct a war of attrition against Israel. This “independence” constituted a source of friction between the movement and the Lebanese government and led to escalation and waves of violence that disrupted the normal Lebanese way of life and, particularly, the government's plans to advance its strategy. The movement's policy of “walking on the edge” enabled it to make progress on the resistance level, but created friction between the movement and the government on the internal Lebanese level. The government's decisiveness on internal matters formed the boundaries in this sphere and the movement was forced to operate within this framework.
On the other hand, the government was not able to subjugate the movement's policies and could not compel it to take national interests into account. In the absence of its ability to do so, against the background of external and internal constraints, the government adopted a flexible stance towards the resistance activities (at least declarative-wise) on the one hand, but on the other, it tried to restrict the movement's operations as much as possible. It prevented the movement from entering the administrative establishment and distanced it from involvement and influence in the regional relations system. In areas critical to the movement, such as Beirut, it was persistent in enforcing its authority, but in the south and the Bek’aa region it avoided applying its sovereignty and directly confronting the movement while enabling it to operate against Israel. Personnel changes within the Lebanese government at the end of the 1990s improved the movement's position with the political establishment and its actions were received more supportively. In fact, the government did not disarm the movement even when the IDF withdrew from Lebanon.
The seventh chapter deals with the relations between the regional system and Hezbollah. The existence of a multi-player regional system fraught with conflicts whose players had conflicting interests during most of the period in respect to the Lebanese establishment in general and Hezbollah in particular brought about a situation where the regional system's level of influence on the movement was relatively small in relation to the capabilities and strength of the players. Each player in the system tried to advance its own interests and neutralize the influence of the other players. During periods or points when there was agreement between two regional players, they succeeded, not without effort, in influencing the movement's development and in imposing their authority to a certain extent. In one way or another, the regional players’ conflicting trends of influence and constraints that prevented taking action against the movement enabled the movement to maneuver its way between its patrons and its adversaries in accordance with its own needs and policies, which did not always suit all the players in the regional system. This maneuvering between its patrons’ interests was based on the assumption that as long as the movement's activities served the interests of one of the patrons, it would do everything in its power to maintain the movement’s operational environment, let alone if it served both of their interests. The movement made it clear that, above all, it has its own independent policy and it operates accordingly in a determined and consistent manner.
The eighth chapter deals with the relations between the international system and Hezbollah. The system's influence on the movement's development trends was extremely marginal. The players in this system found it difficult to formulate an operational policy due to differences of opinion regarding the definition of Hezbollah as a terrorist movement. In effect, the US was the only country that endeavored, from the 1980’s and onwards, to eliminate the movement as a terrorist entity. Europe, which increased its involvement in the Middle East during the latter half of the 1990s, actually made it more difficult for the US to achieve its goal.
For over two decades, the US worked to create conditions that would bring about the disarming of the movement and its elimination. The chances of achieving this were slim from the onset. During the early 1980’s, the international system, including the US, found it difficult to identify the organizations and movements that operated under Hezbollah’s umbrella and attack them. In the second half of the 1980s, international activity, particularly that of the Americans, was characterized by mediation. During this period, the Lebanese militias, including Hezbollah, strengthened their status in the internal arena at the expense of the ruling establishment that was on the verge of collapse.
A number of opportunities arose to disarm Hezbollah in the 1990s, but even then the US did not succeed in achieving its goal. Furthermore, it stopped being the only influential player in the international arena and was forced to take the positions of other international players into account.
Following the collapse of the peace process in the latter part of the 1990s, most of the international system's efforts were invested in solving crises in Lebanon and even the IDF’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon did not create the conditions that would allow for the disarming of the movement.
The ninth chapter summarizes the research.
The research is based on a wide range of substantial information from primary sources obtained from various databases. The information includes statements and declarations made by leaders, speeches and interviews. Hezbollah spokesmen and leaders make considerable use of the media for internal and external propaganda, for psychological warfare and for disseminating their opinions on current issues. Hezbollah’s media apparatus constitutes an important and central primary source of information through which it is possible to follow the processes inside the movement, identify changes and understand the movement's decision-making process. The importance of this source of information is due to its widespread use by the movement's senior leadership and field commanders and the significance they attach to it.
The research is also based on my firsthand in-depth knowledge of the Lebanese experience obtained during many years of service in Lebanon and from many discussions, meetings and conversations I conducted with Lebanese figures from all sects, including the Shiite system, during the entire period. I received a great deal of help from the rehabilitated former Southern Lebanese Army soldiers residing in Israel in order to complete the picture and for purposes of clarification.
Summary
Hezbollah’s development was influenced by the relationships between the state and society, by the social, cultural, economic and internal political situation and by the regional and international systems as well. Each of these systems influenced the development of the movement in a different manner and the extent of their influence stemmed from their proximity to the movement and the amount of pressure which they were able to bring to bear on it. The sophisticated maneuvering by the movement's leadership between the players of the various systems and their ability to adapt themselves to the changing conditions enabled the movement to survive within the transformed Lebanese system and continue to act within the Lebanese political arena while operating independently outside the framework of the Lebanese establishment.
The movement was established at the height of the internal Lebanese crisis as a revolutionary Shiite movement with a universal Islamic vision that had three central goals: implementing Islamic law in Lebanon as part of the universal Islamic revolution, expelling all foreign forces from Lebanon and liberating Jerusalem. In its early years, Hezbollah used violence in order to achieve its goals. Its activists perpetrated suicide attacks and bombings against the headquarters of the multi-national forces and the IDF in Lebanon. They hijacked aircrafts, civilians of Western nationality and carried out attacks against Israeli and Western targets abroad. At the same time, the movement worked to expand its support base for its violent methods within the Shiite community.
The Hezbollah movement of 2005 is a pragmatic terror movement far more dangerous than the revolutionary Hezbollah of the 1980’s. In fact, the movement has not abandoned its goals, rather it only changed its pace. It simultaneously operates within and outside the Lebanese political system, a fact that enables it a wide range of action in both arenas. The pragmatic front it presents misled, and still misleads, researchers and players in the international system. The movement's entry into the Lebanese political system was perceived by many as the first important step indicating a level of pragmatism and a change in the movement's radical ideological policy. Hezbollah even carried out a number of actions to strengthen this approach. Since the 1990’s, it invested, and is still investing, considerable effort in order to blur its pan-Islamic terrorist image and emphasize the fact that it is a legitimate Lebanese movement fighting against an occupying army. In the 1990s, it scaled down its terror attacks it had been perpetrating against Western targets in Lebanon and abroad and carried out “quality” attacks only, mostly under a heavy cloak of secrecy. For example, the attacks in 1992 and 1994 in Argentina against Israeli and Jewish targets and the attack in 1996 in Saudi Arabia against an American target.
The movement's entry into the Lebanese Parliament strengthened Hezbollah’s claims that it is a legitimate Lebanese movement acting within the political establishment and in accordance with its laws and that it had changed its radical revolutionary policies it had held in the 1980s. The April 1996 understandings gave the movement a “green light” to use guerilla tactics against Israel and its activities were considered legal by the Lebanese and international communities so long as it did not fire at Israeli civilians. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the meeting between UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan and Nasrallah in June 2000 gave the movement international legitimacy and many of the players in the international arena began meeting with the movement's leadership. Hezbollah succeeded in “convincing” the public that its activities now focus on the Lebanese socio-political arena and on protecting the country from Israeli aggression. In September 2004, Nasrallah stated that his movement was operating in Southern Lebanon alongside the Lebanese army within a joint strategic framework in order to protect Lebanon.1
However, when one examines in depth the movement's activities, institutions and method of operation within the regional and international systems, a completely different picture emerges from the one the movement is trying to project. The Shura Council, which is the body that governs the movement, is responsible for its military terrorist operations on the one hand and its social and political activities on the other. Imad mugniyah, who is also responsible for the movement's secret terrorist arm in Lebanon and abroad and is wanted by the Americans for planning and perpetrating terror attacks and kidnappings in the 1980’s and 1990’s, serves on the Shura Council. Moreover, the movement's leaders slip up from time to time and expose their real opinions. For example, in January 2002, contrary to the declared approach that stresses the movement's socio-political arm and plays down the military arm, Mohamed fanish, one of the movement's representatives in Parliament, stated that “there is no difference between the military and political arms of Hezbollah“.2 The idea of an Islamic state in Lebanon has also not been shelved, rather it will resurface when the right political climate comes along.
Hezbollah is not sitting on its laurels and over the past two decades it has established a network of international terrorism in over forty countries that is operated by the Shura Council and the Jihad Council headed by Nasrallah and Imad mugniyah. This international terror network, whose cells have already perpetrated attacks and attempted attacks from the 1990’s and onwards, is considered to be the most organized terrorist network in the world and constitutes a threat to the interests of the US and Western countries who have defined the movement as a terrorist organization.3 The terror network, which the movement established abroad, is used to gather information, carry out attacks against Israeli, Jewish and Western targets abroad, purchase and smuggle arms and as a financing source for the movement's activities.
Even after the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000), the movement continues to initiate terror attacks against Israel, including placing explosive charges, artillery bombardments and kidnapping Israeli soldiers and civilians. Simultaneously, it finances, trains and activates Palestinian cells and terror organizations in order to perpetrate attacks against Israel so as to prevent any progress being made in Israeli–Palestinian relations. Hezbollah is also active in enlisting and activating Israeli Arabs to perpetrate terror attacks inside Israel. In addition, Hezbollah also utilizes its international network in order to launch attacks against Israel via Europe while using forged European passports. The mutual deterrence that exists between Israel and the movement following the withdrawal as a result of the movement's deployment of thousands of rockets and artillery guns in Southern Lebanon influences the operational policy of both sides who are careful not to digress from the “rules” developed between Israel and the movement following the withdrawal.
Hezbollah is also active in the arena of Iraqi Jihad. It is one of the leading elements in the media battle against the American involvement in Iraq. Moreover, Hezbollah finances radical Iraqi Shiite elements, established a secret network in Iraq and its activists, in collaboration with local and Iranian elements, are involved in perpetrating attacks against American targets.
Hezbollah is a non-state actor and does not have the capacity to become a genuine threat to the existence of one of the actors in the international arena. However, its sting is still dangerous. The movement is aware of its limitations and therefore it cautiously navigates its way between the various players. Nevertheless, it did not hesitate to confront its patrons or adversaries and display a significant amount of independence when its leaders felt that conceding its position was in contrast to its policies and the operational principles that guide the movement. In reality, the movement succeeded in surviving all the crises and even rehabilitated its relationship with its patrons, Lebanese public opinion in general and the Shiite community in particular. Nasrallah, the leader of the movement since 92, adopted a policy of “walking on the edge” in his relations with the Lebanese and regional systems and he derived the maximum from both worlds. He plays the internal Lebanese political game and works towards assuaging the Lebanese people’s suspicions regarding the application of Sharia in the country. This political activity is part of the movement's method of operation that separates religious Shiite thinking, which is based on the principle of the rule of the religious sage and Pan Islam, from the daily activity within the existing establishment in order to achieve the movement's goals. This separation enables the movement to simultaneously operate within the political establishment and continue to develop the Shiite belief without one interfering with the other.
The Research's conclusion versus its assumptions
The research examined the influence of the systems (the Lebanese, regional and international) on the establishment of Hezbollah and its developmental trends. The conclusions derived from the research are that the above systems influenced, and are still influencing, the movement. Differences exist in the extent of the influence of the various systems and actors on the movement during various periods. The movement is a product of the environment in which it operates and of the system of influential and reciprocal relationships between the actors surrounding it. Hezbollah, as can be seen from the research, is a Lebanese Shiite movement with a deep affiliation and connection to the Iranian establishment. However, it was established as a result of the development of socio-political processes within the Lebanese system in general and the Shiite community in particular. The chaos that characterized the intra-Lebanese system from the mid-1970s facilitated Hezbollah’s growth as a revolutionary social movement and its violent and uncontrolled activity. The consolidation of the movement and its expansion during the 1980s were made possible due to the continuation of the chaotic situation in Lebanon and the regional system, the movement's successes, which enticed many Shiite youngsters into its ranks, and the availability of resources for its operations.
The research also reinforces the following two claims: The first asserts that the more the movement expanded and became institutionalized, the more sensitive it became to the systems' internal and regional processes and influences. It changed its modus operandi from uncontrolled violence and terror attacks as its leading strategy to controlled violence and guerilla tactics and entered into dialog with the Lebanese political establishment.
The second claim asserts that the changes in the intra-Lebanese operational environment, as a result of the Taif and Damascus Accords and the consolidation of the central Lebanese government supported and sponsored by Syria, resulted in changes in the movement's operational pattern and its institutionalization. It demonstrated a high level of pragmatism on the internal and regional levels and it became integrated into the new Lebanese establishment while accepting its “rules of conduct”. On the regional level, it carried out controlled guerilla warfare against Israel, taking into account “cost and benefit considerations.” Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 strengthened Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon and the Arab world and it became a model for emulation for the Palestinian terror organizations.
[1] An interview with Nasrallah on Al Manar, September 4, 2004.
[2] Mohamad Fanish, Al Manar, January 18, 2002
[3] p://www.defenselink.mil/policy/speech/oct_8_02.html

United States Highlights Continued Syrian Interference in Lebanon
Ambassador Bolton calls for U.N. Security Council resolution
By Judy Aita-27 April 2006
Washington File United Nations Correspondent
United Nations -- U.S. Ambassador John Bolton wants the Security Council to consider a resolution on Syria's failure to stop interfering in Lebanon.
"The U.S. has concluded [that] another resolution by the Security Council is warranted to highlight the continuing Syrian failure to comply with the requirement of [Resolution] 1559, possibly also to take into account its obligations in connection with the Hariri assassination under [Resolution] 1595," Bolton said April 26 after a briefing by U.N. special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen. (See related article).
Such a resolution, the ambassador said, "would be important to show the council's continuing resolve on the question."
In a recent report to the council written by Roed-Larsen, Secretary-General Kofi Annan urgently called on Syria to take measures to stop the illegal movement of weapons and people into Lebanon. He also called on all parties who have influence with the Lebanese militia Hizballah and other militias to support their disarmament and disbanding.
Annan said that Hizballah "maintains close ties, with frequent contacts and regular communication" with Syria and Iran.
IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON
Bolton said that Iran's involvement in Lebanon and support to terrorist groups in the region is an issue that also might be considered by the council.
Bolton has called the secretary general's report "an important step forward in demonstrating the importance of Iranian interference in Lebanese internal affairs." (See related article.)
"We all know that Iran supplies Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Bolton said. That activity coupled with "the alliance that Syria and Iran seem to have formed in recent months" has implications for peace and security in the region.
"We now see the effect of the financing by the Iranian Government of terrorist organizations and their effort to disrupt what we think should be progress toward a sovereign and democratic Lebanon," the ambassador said.
Bolton said that Syria's failure to accept Lebanon's offer to negotiate the border delineation and demarcation is "a continuing indication by Syria that they really don't think Lebanon is an independent country."
Delineation of the Syria-Lebanon border "goes to the fundamental reality that we're trying to create, which is a free, independent, sovereign Lebanon," the ambassador said.
Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, calls for withdrawing all foreign forces from Lebanon; disbanding and disarmament of all militias; extending the government's control over all Lebanese territory; and respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon.
Resolution 1595, passed in 2005, authorized the U.N. investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and called on all countries to cooperate with the probe. (See related article.)
For additional information, see Middle East and North Africa.
(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov

Lebanon talks resume with no breakthrough in sight
27 Apr 2006
By Lin Noueihed
BEIRUT, April 28 (Reuters) - Rival politicians resuming talks on Friday to end Lebanon's political crisis are unlikely to decide to dismiss the pro-Syrian president or to agree on the fate of Hizbollah's weapons, political sources say.
The "national dialogue" conference, the first top-level political gathering since Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, was adjourned on April 3 with a promise to finally lay to rest a dispute over whether Emile Lahoud should stay or go.
Lahoud has been under pressure to resign from anti-Syrian politicians, who see him as the last vestige of Syrian tutelage that ended a year ago.
The president, who has appeared relaxed and assertive on television in recent weeks, has so far refused to step down.
Parliament chooses the president in Lebanon, but political sources say that even the anti-Syrian bloc, which won a majority in the 128-seat house in May-June elections, has been unable to agree on a replacement candidate.
That being the case, the sources say, politicians will agree to disagree and move onto the last and most complex issue: what to do about Hizbollah, which the United Nations wants disarmed.
Hizbollah, which is backed by Syria and Iran, has refused to give up the arms it used to help end Israel's 22-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, but says it is keen to reach a negotiated deal on how best to defend the small country.
DIVISIVE ISSUE
The future of Hizbollah's arms is a deeply divisive issue in a country already fractured along sectarian lines. Some Lebanese believe Hizbollah should keep its guns as a deterrent to their powerful enemy Israel, while others say it is time the Shi'ite Muslim group laid down its guns and stuck to politics.
Political sources said the negotiators were unlikely to reach a decisive agreement on Hizbollah's weapons, but would probably set up a committee of military and political experts to devise a strategy to defend Lebanon against Israel.
That would delay a final decision over Hizbollah, the only Lebanese group to keep its weapons after the civil war, while allowing politicians at the table to save face.
In its last report on progress in implementing Security Council resolution 1559, which demands foreign troops leave Lebanon and all militias in the country disarm, the U.N. praised the talks as positive step.
The rival leaders have so far agreed to disarm Palestinian fighters outside the country's 12 refugee camps and to seek normal diplomatic ties with Damascus, which ended its 29-year military presence in Lebanon last year.
They have also agreed that the disputed Shebaa Farms border area, occupied by Israel, is Lebanese land. The United Nations considers the area Syrian and its report, issued this month, urged Syria and Lebanon to set that border one way or the other, as well as disarming Hizbollah.
Syria also says the Shebaa Farms is Lebanese but has refused to officially set the border or exchange embassies with Lebanon.

Military court convicts IDF officer of spying for Hezbollah
By Amos Harel, Haaretz Correspondent
An Israeli military court on Thursday convicted Lieutenant Colonel Omar al-Heib on three counts of contacting a foreign agent, espionage and drug trafficking.
The court exonerated al-Heib of two other counts, another drug-related offense and treason. he will receive his sentence at a later date.  Al-Heib, 43, was in charge of recruiting Bedouins to the military, Israel Radio reported.
He was arrested three and a half years ago under suspicion of selling sensitive information to Hezbollah and involvement in a drug deal. After the military court adjourned, al-Heib continued to pledge his innocence, claiming he was done a great injustice.
"How is it possible that I, who was injured by Hezbollah, would give it information?" al-Heib said. Al-Heib was unanimously found guilty on two counts. On the charge of espionage, he was found guilty by two out of three judges.

Military Intelligence: Syria poised to spend petrodollars on weaponry
By Amos Harel, Haaretz Correspondent
Syria is poised to begin talks on major arms purchases in light of expectations of increased revenue due to rising oil prices, Military Intelligence chief Major General Amos Yadlin hinted at a lecture at the intelligence community's heritage center in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv. Yadlin said larger oil producers like Iran and Saudi Arabia were also channeling their oil revenues into arms deals.
Some of the Syrian arms purchases are expected to go toward refitting its air force, which stopped buying new planes in the 1980s. Yadlin also said that the Syrians continued to focus their arms production on rockets and longer-range SCUDS. Production, he said, was continuing on 200 to 300 millimeter rockets with a range of dozens of kilometers. Some of these weapons are apparently being transfered to Hezbollah, including the array Hezbollah has deployed along the border between Lebanon and Israel.
Israel detects a hardening of the Syrian line after a long period during which Damamscus was on the defensive, following the French-American initiative to push its forces out of Lebanon, and the United Nations investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Syria reportedly has pinpointed a weakness in the U.S. because of its complications in Iraq and is urging Hezbollah not to give in to the demand to disarm.
Meanwhile, the defense establishment is closely following tensions between Jordan, Syria and Hamas. Jordanian accusations against the Hamas leadership in Damascus reached a new high after the capture of a Hamas cell operating in the Hashemite kingdom.
A spokesman for the Jordanian government said the cell was poised to carry out a series of attacks including attacks on a senior Jordanian official. The spokesman said the cell was operating on orders of a leader of Hamas' military wing in Damascus.
The Jordanians also reported that their security services had uncovered a major Hamas stockpile of weapons near the Syrian border, including rockets, TNT and detonators.
A spokesman for the Syrian foreign minister said Jordan's allegations were groundless. Damascus-based Hamas leader Musa Abu-Marzuk said they reflected confusion in Jordan following the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections.
It is unclear how reliable the Jordanian reports are. Israeli intelligence officials say Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas' political wing in Damascus, has "accounts to settle" with Jordan after he was expelled from the country at Israel's request, following a failed attempt on his life.
It is also believed that the Hamas cell may have been working under orders from the Syrian regime. Yet another scenario is that Hamas is cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and this has Amman very worried.
Jordan's accusations against Hamas may also be a way of justifying the cold shoulder it has given the organization since its election victory in the PA.
 

UALM HOLDS FORTH ANZAC DAY COMMEMORATION IN PRESENCE OF LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARIAN IN AUSTRALIA AND AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON
UALM: ANZAC’S FOUGHT FOR OUR FREEDOM.
For Immediate release
Brisbane, Queensland – The United Australian Lebanese Movement (UALM) in conjunction with the Australian Lebanese Association of Queensland held an ANZAC Day service in Tarragindi in honour of those who gave their lives and fought for the freedom of this great country of ours.
Present at the ANZAC Day remembrance was senior member of the Change and Reform bloc in the Lebanese parliament Mr Ibrahim Kanaan MP, accompanying Mr Kanaan on his visit to Australia is Dr. Pierre Raffoul, Secretary-General of the Free Patriotic Movement in Lebanon of which Mr Kanaan is also a member and President of the Free Patriotic Movement – United Kingdom Chapter Mr Amin Khoury.
ANZAC Day is a very special day not only for Australian’s but also for the Lebanese in Lebanon and every year the Free Patriotic Movement in Lebanon holds an ANZAC Day ceremony in Lebanon, to remember the Australian service men and women who served in Lebanon. This year had an added significance as Australian Ambassador Ms Lyndall Sachs joined the FPM to commemorate the occasion in the presence of hundreds of FPM Supporters and members of its leadership.
The ANZAC Day commemoration continues to grow stronger each year and this year was no different. The Australian-Lebanese community in Queensland turned out in high numbers to witness this solemn event.
Also attending were a large number of dignitaries:
• Minister Gary Hardgrave representing the Prime Minister John Howard
• Senator Claire Moore representing the leader of the opposition Kym Beazley
• State MP Simon Finn representing the Premier Peter Beattie
• Lord Mayor Campbell Newman & Family
• Local Councillor Steve Griffith
• Sergeant Jim Bellos, Cross Cultural Liaison Officer for Queensland Police Metropolitan South Region
• Lebanese Member of Parliament Mr Brahim Kanaan
• National Coordinator of the FPM in Lebanon Dr Pierre Raffoul
• Leader of the FPM in Great Britain out here from London Mr Amine Khoury
• UALM National Chairperson Bashar Haikal
• Representing UALM NSW President Mohamad Derbas – Mr Nassib Hashem
• Representing UALM VIC President Charbel Radi- Mr Salem Haddad
• UALM ACT President Nakhle Aoun
• WLCU Victoria President Antoine Hosri
• Honorary Consul of Lebanon Anthony Torbey
• Liberal Candidate for Yeerongpilly Marie Jackson
• Liberal Candidate for Mt Gravatt Nick Monsour
• Liberal Candidate for Strettont Scott Furlong
• Liberal Candidate for Mt Omany Bob Harper
• On behalf of the Annerley 7 Neighbourhood Watch Group June McNicol
• Mr Freddy Touma – President of the Lebanese Cultural Union of Queensland
• We also welcome the delegation form the Australian Middle East Christian Association
• Representatives from the Maronite Church of Brisbane
• Representatives from the Orthodox Church of Brisbane
• Representatives from the Melkite Church of Brisbane
• Representatives of the Middle East Christian Association
Wreaths were also laid on behalf of all levels of government, organisations and institutions:
Federal Government: Minister Hardgrave and Rania Alexander
Federal Opposition: Senator Moore and Freddy Touma MBE
State Government: Mp Simon Finn and Salam Hanna
Brisbane City Council: Lord Mayor Newman and Lord Mayor's Family
Local Council: Steven Griffiths and Pauline Ghanem
Lebanese Parliament: MP Brahim Kanaan and Bashar Haikal
WLCU: Antoine Hosri and Therese Karam
UALM: Labib Abraham and Dr Pierre Raffoul
ALAQ: Antoine Ghanem Maha Khoury
St Pauls Antiochian Orthodox Church: Mr Antoine Chebib and Hind Tabet
Lebanese Maronite Church: Peter Torbey and Micheline Haddad
Melkite Church: Sami Ammar and Georgette Rizk
Lebanese Community Youth: Maya Aoude and Steven Habchi
Neighbourhood Watch: June McNicol and Hamid Tabet
Middle East Christian Association: Mo Alexander and Suzie Smerdon
The UALM will continue to commemorate this special day and we will never forget those who sacrificed themselves for the sake of freedom.

European Parliament Meets Assyrian Politician on Assyrian Question
GMT 4-28-2006 17:1:22
Assyrian International News Agency
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An official meeting of European Parliamentarians headed by Mr A.J. Maat, representative of the European Human Rights Commission, and Ms Attiya Gamri (Dutch Provincial Parliamentarian) and other members of the European Parliament took place on 18-19 April 2006 in Europe's capital Brussels, Belgium. The meeting dealt particularly with the situation of the Assyrian (also known as Chaldean and Syriac) people in Iraq. After her visit at the beginning of April, Ms Gamri was able to highlight in detail the obstacles and oppressive circumstances that limit the freedom of the Iraqi Assyrians' ethnic and political rights. This is happening especially in northern Iraq, where there is relative peace. However, the Kurdish political parties -- by means of Kurdish soldiers and militiamen -- are manipulating the political climate very aggressively, especially in regards to the Christian Assyrians who have always been peaceful and have been seeking for political and ethnic rights without the use of violence.
Mr A.J. Maat will present and discuss the fieldwork report made by the Assyrian Delegation who visited the Assyrian regions of northern Iraq this April at the upcoming European Parliament meeting. Mr A.J. Maat asked about the percentage of money that has been donated to for the reconstruction of Iraq by the European Community that's has directly reached the Assyrian minority. Ms Gamri promised to present him the facts on this as soon as possible.
Besides the Iraqi issue also the worrying situation within Syria was on the agenda of this two-day meeting. Of particular interest was the issue of Mr Yacoub Hanna Shamoun, an Assyrian detainee in Syria for more than 20 years without trial (in violation of all international human rights conventions signed by Syria). On this case in the near future an official request by the European Parliament will be sent to the Syrian government. Ms Gamri discussed the situation of the Assyrian people in Syria in general. She gave a brief report on the past decades and the worrying future of the Assyrian presence in Syria. The third main point that was on the agenda of this meeting between the European Parliament and the Assyrian politician is the Turkey File and the European Union. Mr C. Eurling has been requested officially to include the recognition of the Assyrian Genocide next to the Armenian Genocide whenever the debates mention this critical point regarding the Human Rights Situation of Turkey and their eventual succession to the European Union. This request was immediately accepted by the European Parliament members.

Murky scandal threatens to topple French prime minister
By Siegfried Mortkowitz Apr 28, 2006, 17:10 GMT
Paris - As if French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin didn't have enough to worry about, just weeks after his humiliating climbdown over an unpopular youth jobs law he has become embroiled in a complex scandal that is threatening to topple him.
After seeing his popularity plunge to historic lows for a French prime minister because of the jobs law, Villepin is now suspected of involvement in a shadowy scheme to discredit his bitter rival, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy.
The tale currently being revealed layer by layer by feverish French media has all the makings of a John le Carre novel, involving shady global business dealings, French spies, a shadowy computer genius with ties to French and Lebanese leaders and the suggestions of a settling of scores at the highest levels of government.
Specifically, French investigating magistrates are currently looking for the informer who in June 2004 sent one of their colleagues a list of 800 people and companies holding secret accounts at the Luxembourg-based financial clearing house Clearstream.
Included on the list were four former or current candidates for the French presidency, the neo-liberal Alain Madelin, former interior minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement, former finance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Sarkozy.
The four men were all accused of having foreign bank accounts into which illegal funds had been channelled via Clearstream.
The judicial inquiry into the smear campaign was initiated after an investigation revealed that Sarkozy and the others were not guilty of the allegations. However, that raised the question of who sent the list and why.
Several French newspapers and the author of a controversial book about Clearstream, Denis Roberts, have suggested that the man who compiled the list and sent it to the magistrate was a 40-year-old Franco-Lebanese computer whiz named Imad Lahoud.
Lahoud is related to the pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and, through his father-in-law, reportedly has close ties to French President Jacques Chirac.
More significantly, he once worked for the French intelligence service DSGC and also collaborated with one of France's most successful spies, General Philippe Rondot.
Rumours carried by French media connected Villepin to the murky affair and the scheme to discredit Sarkozy, to damage his chances for the 2007 presidential elections.
The noise grew so loud that the prime minister was forced to react in public after the daily Le Parisien reported that magistrates were considering searching his office and computer for traces of the list.
In an interview published Friday in the daily Le Figaro, Villepin said he was 'deeply shocked, as prime minister, by certain associations and allegations concerning the state and its services.'
However, he admitted that he initiated an investigation that led to the 'Clearstream Affair,' as it is being called here.
He told the newspaper that on January 9, 2004, he asked Rondot to look into rumours that French politicians and businessmen had received large payoffs in the sale of six Lafayette-type frigates to Taiwan by the French state-owned concern Thomson.
Nothing came of that investigation, Villepin said, and declared that he knew nothing about Sarkozy's name on any list.
However, the ink was scarcely dry on the Le Figaro interview when Villepin's version of the facts was contradicted in the daily Le Monde (which is published several hours after Le Figaro) by Rondot himself.
The newspaper divulged what it described as extracts from Rondot's testimony on March 28 to the magistrates investigating the libel case.
According to the former spy's statement, it was not Villepin who charged him with investigating the Taiwan frigate sale, but Defence Minister Michele Alliot-Marie, in November 2003.
Rondot said that he was given a computer printout at that time, by Villepin confidante Jean-Louis Gergorin, a top manager in the European aerospace conglomerate EADS, that supposedly contained a list of Clearstream clients, including the names of French politicians, whom he was told by the Defence Ministry to ignore.
However, Rondot said he was summoned by Villepin to a meeting on January 9 at which Gergorin was also present.
Rondot said that at this meeting Villepin, then foreign minister, 'informed me of instructions he had received on the subject of the Clearstream list from Jacques Chirac.'
Villepin then told him to go beyond the original instructions and investigate the politicians on the list.
'Mr Sarkozy's name was mentioned,' Rondot was reported to have told the magistrates, clearly contradicting Villepin's public statements.
More than that, notes Rondot made during the meeting suggested that Villepin was obsessed with Sarkozy.
'Political stakes,' Rondot's notes read. 'N Sarkozy. Fixation on N Sarkozy /re J Chirac/N Sarkozy feud.'
On Friday, both Chirac and Villepin categorically denied having asked for an investigation of Sarkozy.
However, coming so soon after the youth jobs law embarrassment, the growing scandal could be enough to put Villepin's position at the head of the French government at risk.
With one year to go in his presidency, Chirac may simply decide that he cannot afford to have his legacy tarnished by a prime minister that has no credibility.
© 2006 dpa - Deutsche Presse-Agentur