LCCC ENGLISH DAILY
NEWS BULLETIN
November 19/2013
Bible Quotation for today/Children
of God
01 John 03/01-10:"
See how much the Father has loved us! His love is so
great that we are called God's children—and so, in fact,
we are. This is why the world does not know us: it has
not known God. My dear friends, we are now God's
children, but it is not yet clear what we shall become.
But we know that when Christ appears, we shall be like
him, because we shall see him as he really is.
Everyone who has this hope in Christ keeps himself pure,
just as Christ is pure. Whoever sins is guilty of
breaking God's law, because sin is a breaking of the
law. You know that Christ appeared in order to
take away sins,[a] and that there is no sin in him. 6 So
everyone who lives in union with Christ does not
continue to sin; but whoever continues to sin has never
seen him or known him. Let no one deceive you, my
children! Whoever does what is right is righteous, just
as Christ is righteous. Whoever continues to sin
belongs to the Devil, because the Devil has sinned from
the very beginning. The Son of God appeared for this
very reason, to destroy what the Devil had done. Those
who are children of God do not continue to sin, for
God's very nature is in them; and because God is their
Father, they cannot continue to sin. Here is the
clear difference between God's children and the Devil's
children: those who do not do what is right or do not
love others are not God's children.
Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources For November 19/13
Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources For November 19/13
November 18, 2013/The Daily Star /BEIRUT: A Syrian helicopter gunship raided Monday the Bekaa Valley border town of Arsal, killing two of the mayor’s relatives, security sources said. The sources told The Daily Star that “according to information obtained by police” Youssef Hujeiri, 31, and his brother Khaled, 33, were killed in a helicopter gunship raid over Wadi Mira on Arsal’s outskirts. They said the brothers are relatives of Arsal’s mayor, Ali Hujeiri. The bodies were taken to a hospital in Arsal, the sources added. Arsal, a northeastern town on the border with Syria, has in the last couple of the days seen a significant influx of refugees fleeing villages in the Qalamoun, a mountainous region roughly north of Damascus which is expected to be the next front between rebels and forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Charbel Considers Security Situation in Tripoli
'Priority', Says Security Forces to Maintain Stability
Naharnet Newsdesk 18 November 2013/Caretaker Interior
Minister Marwan Charbel stressed on Monday that the
Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese army will
enter the northern city of Tripoli and take its role in
maintaining the city's security and stability.
He pointed out in comments published
in As Safir newspaper that the security situation in
Tripoli “is a priority.”“We will not raid any areas but
we will detain those who are wanted if they passed on
checkpoints,” Charbel told the newspaper.
Charbel reiterated calls on the
residents of Tripoli to support the Lebanese army.
On Saturday the caretaker Minister
launched stage-two of a security plan to be implemented
in the inflamed city of Tripoli that has been witnessing
frequent Syria-linked battles, that pits Sunnis from Bab
al-Tabbaneh against Alawites in Jabal Mohsen. However,
hours after Charbel's conference clashes flared up
between gunmen and a security checkpoint in the Old
Saraya vicinity in Tripoli, marring stage-two of the
security plan. Most Sunnis
support Syria's revolt against President Bashar Assad,
while Alawites, who belong to the same Shiite-offshoot
sect as Assad, support his regime. The latest fighting
ended when the army deployed along Syria Street, which
separates the two districts and acts as the makeshift
frontline. Tripoli suffered horrific car bomb explosions
near two mosques in August, killing 45 people.
ISF Begin Deployment in Rival
Neighborhoods in Tripoli
Naharnet Newsdesk 18 November 2013/Internal Security
Forces units began deploying in the neighborhoods of the
northern city of Tripoli on Monday to implement phase
two of a security plan that aims at maintaining
stability in the city. Units
will be deployed in various neighborhoods of the city,
including the rival neighborhoods of Bab al-Tabbaneh and
Jabal Mohsen. According to the
state-run National News Agency police chief of the
northern city of Tripoli Brig. Gen. Bassam al-Ayyoubi
supervised the deployment of the forces, which will be
accompanied by armored personnel carriers. “We will
establish fixed checkpoints in Jabal Mohsen and Bab
al-Tabbaneh and mobile patrols between the two
neighborhoods,” Ayyoubi said.
He also pointed out that all parties welcomed the
security plan. On Saturday the
caretaker Interior Minister Marwan Charbel launched
stage-two of a security plan to be implemented in the
inflamed city of Tripoli that has been witnessing
frequent Syria-linked battles, that pits Sunnis from Bab
al-Tabbaneh against Alawites in Jabal Mohsen.
He called on the resident of the northern city of
Tripoli to cooperate with security forces to maintain
security in the city, urging officials to resolve their
political disputes during a national dialogue session.
However, hours after Charbel's conference clashes flared
up between gunmen and a security checkpoint in the Old
Saraya vicinity in Tripoli.
Most Sunnis support Syria's revolt against President
Bashar Assad, while Alawites, who belong to the same
Shiite-offshoot sect as Assad, support his regime.
The latest fighting ended when the
army deployed along Syria Street, which separates the
two districts and acts as the makeshift frontline.
Tripoli suffered horrific car bomb explosions near two
mosques in August, killing 45 people.
As Safir newspaper reported on Monday
that Army Chief General Jean Qahwaji informed officials
that army checkpoints and stations in Tripoli, in
particular on the entrances of Bab al-Tabbaneh, will not
be moved. “The army will be
ready to act, when needed, to support the Internal
Security Forces,” Qahwaji said according to As Safir.
Nuclear deal may sink in Geneva
between hardline pressures in Tehran and tough
Franco-Israel demands
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report November 18, 2013/Washington
and Moscow may sound upbeat about the prospects of a
signed interim deal at the next round of nuclear
negotiations between Iran and the six powers in Geneva
Wednesday, Nov. 20. However, according to debkafile’s
intelligence and Iranian sources, the way ahead is still
bristling with mines, more so even than the first round.
Both sides have toughened their
positions. In Tehran, President Hassan Rouhani and
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif face threats against
yielding to Western demands. On the other side,
Washington accuses France and Israel of obstructionism
to get its proposal removed from the table.
Our Iranian sources have obtained
exclusive access to the decision reached early Monday,
Nov. 18, at an all-night conference in the bureau of
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This meeting
delineated Iran’s ultimate line in Geneva as being
consent to idle for six months the few thousand new
extra-fast IR2 centrifuges enriching uranium up to 20
percent, after which work would resume in full. Tehran
draws the line completely at halting construction of the
heavy water plant in Arak.
Iran’s leaders are convinced that the “modest’ sanctions
offered by Washington – and which the US denies are
worth $40 bn as Israel has calculated – can be
substantially sweetened when it comes to the point. The
ayatollah, after seeing that the country is broke from
the figures shown him by Rouhani and Zarif, accepted the
urgency of relaxing banking and financial restrictions,
as Zarif had demanded of the Americans. This relaxation
alone would put $100 bn in Iran’s coffers. This amount
would keep the economy ticking over for a year and give
the Islamic regime another lease of life to calm a
populace ready to kick back over economic hardships.
About to mark his first 100 days in office, Rouhani
badly needs to show he can make good on his pre-election
pledges of economic improvements. Responding
to the complaints of hard-liners at home, Foreign
Minister Zarif took up a tough negotiating stance in a
comment he made Sunday, Nov. 17: “Not only do we
consider that Iran’s right to enrich is non-negotiable,”
he said, “but we see no need for that to be recognized
as a right” because this right is inalienable and all
countries must respect that.
Both he and Rouhani fear their own heads will roll if
they are shown yielding to the West on uranium
enrichment or the reduction of stocks.
Zarif therefore tried his hand at a formula that would
not require Iran to renounce enrichment while at the
same time obtaining sanctions relief: The two sides will
announce an interim accord has been reached in Geneva
that covers certain issues and leaves some disputed
items unresolved. Implementation must go forward without
delay on the agreed items. The
Iranian foreign minister explained to the Obama
administration in the quiet bargaining leading up to the
formal Geneva conference that a deal must be struck and
implemented without delay to head off domestic
opposition to any understanding he might conclude with
Washington. Administration
officials were about to concede on this point to the
Iranian negotiators when they ran into French
resistance. Sunday, Nov. 17,
the day he arrived in Israel for a three-day state
visit, French President Francois went into conference
with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, after which he
laid out four points, “which for us are essential to
guarantee any agreement:" 1) All of Iranian nuclear
installations must be placed under international
supervision right now.
2) 20-percent enriched uranium enrichment must be
suspended.
3) Existing stocks must be reduced.
This can only be done by exporting a part of this stock
or placing it under international control.
4) Construction of the Arak (heavy water) plant to be
halted.
Netanyahu, for his part, criticized the emerging deal,
without citing the US role, as a permit for Iran to
continue manufacturing enough fissile material for
assembling a nuclear bomb at three weeks to 26 days’
notice. A good deal, in his view, would dismantle Iran’s
capacity to achieve this quantity of fissile material.
He repeated that Israel would not be bound by a bad deal
and reserved the right to self defense, by itself.
Yakov Amidror – until recently Netanyahu’s national
security adviser - said that the Israeli Air Force had
for years been practicing long-range flights in
preparation for covering the 2,000km distance to Iran
for a potential air strike on its nuclear facilities.
In an interview run by the Financial Times Monday, he
said that these drills must show up on any Middle East
radar screen. Amidror went on to say: We aren’t America,
which obviously has greater capabilities than we do, but
we still have sufficient to stall the Iranian program
for a long time.
debkafile’s military sources add: Amidror’s remarks
followed the latest US intelligence report which
evaluates Israel’s capacity in a lone attack on Iran to
stall Iran’s nuclear program for seven to 10 years.
Lebanon poised for ‘most dangerous’
juncture in its history
November 18, 2013/By Antoine Ghattas Saab The Daily Star
The next six months could prove to be the most dangerous
in Lebanon’s rather tumultuous history. The period may
witness the repositioning of political forces on the
extremely complex Lebanese geography with a view to
reaching the stage to reconstitute the Lebanese ruling
system according to new foundations that would not
replace the old constitutional principles, according to
a Western diplomatic report.
The report, received by government officials, said that
the apparent political escalation in the attitudes of
internal parties, at the forefront of which is Hezbollah
and its Secretary-General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, is
viewed as a pre-emptive war for the much-anticipated
Qalamoun battle (near Lebanon’s border). The signal for
this battle came last week when the Bekaa Valley town of
Arsal and the valley of Nabi Sheet were targeted by the
warring factions in Syria.
This development increased the worries of the Lebanese
over dragging Lebanon into the Syrian crisis.
The report links Nasrallah’s
escalatory tone to the ongoing negotiations between
America and the P5+1 group on the one hand, and Iran on
the other, over Tehran’s nuclear program.
The Western-Iranian discussions will
not be confined to Tehran’s nuclear drive, but will also
cover the war in Syria, the situation in the region, as
well as the issue of Hezbollah’s arms, the report said.
It added that the downhill trend in
the work of state institutions, along with its
administrative, economic and social issues, had reached
an alarming rate that is threatening the foundation of
the Lebanese entity. Arab and
Western countries will work to establish an external
safety net designed to prevent the collapse of the
Lebanese state, the report said. It described the latest
political escalation between the Future Movement and
Hezbollah as a storm before the lull.
The report hinted at a positive
atmosphere that is emerging on the horizon of
American-Iranian negotiations, whereby Tehran might soon
present proposals pertaining to divisive issues with the
West, a development that would impact the region and
change political alliances in it.
Taking into account U.S. expectations
to reach an American-Iranian agreement within two weeks
at the latest, the report stressed that America would
not abandon the Arab Gulf states and the Gulf region
which is vital for U.S. interests.
American-Western attempts are
underway to bring about a sort of Saudi-Iranian
understanding at least to manage the divisive issues
between them in the region, the report said.
This matter (Saudi-Iran
understanding) is not ruled out following the resumption
of contacts between Iran and the United Arab Emirates
over the three disputed islands.
The report warned that allowing
paralysis and vacuum to hit state institutions, a state
of affairs that might reach the presidency, portends big
dangers that could undermine the foundations of the
Lebanese entity and civil peace, already affected by the
Syrian crisis, especially with the influx of over 1
million refugees into Lebanon.
Nevertheless, the region and Lebanon appear to be
heading toward peaceful solutions, the report said,
despite the escalatory rhetoric of some parties.
Political sources linked the
diplomatic report to the recent stances of Speaker Nabih
Berri and Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun.
Berri had said the Lebanese ruling system had become “a
creator of strife,” while Aoun launched the most
blistering attack on the 1989 Taif Accord, describing it
as “an accord of fraud to consolidate foreign grip over
Lebanon.” What was a taboo –
talking about the Muslim-Christian coexistence formula
and the Lebanese system – has become a topic of
criticism by a wide spectrum of the Lebanese, the
sources said, recalling repeated calls by Maronite
Patriarch Beshara Rai for “a new social contract.”
The sources said that internal and
external groups have information about a scenario being
promoted by Hezbollah’s power center that would prevent
the formation of a new Cabinet and try to keep caretaker
Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s Cabinet in place with the
aim of using “the Mikati Cabinet” card as bargaining
chip in next year’s presidential election.
With this card, Hezbollah and its
March 8 allies can present the March 14 coalition and
the country with two choices: Either an agreement on a
comprehensive political deal that includes a consensus
on the name of the next president, the shape of the new
Cabinet, and a new election law, or total vacuum.
If the country were faced with total
vacuum, Hezbollah, backed by Berri, would smoothly
propose the idea of a constituent conference, the
sources added.Meanwhile, developments in Lebanon, Syria
and the region will be discussed by a delegation of
March 8 parties during a meeting with Syrian President
Bashar Assad this week.
American Regression and Arab Weakness
Abdullah Iskandar/Al Hayat
The Americans are regressing, deliberately and openly,
in the Middle East. This comes after decades of active
and hegemonic presence, reaching its pinnacle in an
American monopoly on the region’s affairs following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Such regression will not
be compensated by cooperation agreements that seek to
salvage a few economic interests, as well as a few
military locations within the framework of the war on
terror.
There is a visible and increasingly clear outcome to
such regression, regardless of the reasons for it,
whether they spring from the impact of the tremendous
economic burden borne by the United States in its recent
wars, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, or from a
decision made by the current administration, with its
new approach to America’s interests in the world.
The outcome is the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the
United States – a vacuum that is seeking sources to fill
it, from outside the region and from within it, and is
thus giving rise to a complex struggle and a new
intertwinement of interests. Positions of traditional
rivalry with the United States seem to be the ones most
actively seeking to inherit its waning role. This is
especially true as Europe, with the relations it has
traditionally had in the region, no longer has the means
to restore its past role, having lost it to American
expansion after World War II – especially as its
economic and military situation is suffering from a
series of structural crises, even if it is trying to
preserve a minimum of markets and economic interests,
particularly in the field of energy supply.
Russia makes no secret of its aspirations to fill some
of the vacuum left by the United States, or even all of
it, especially after the disappearance of the
ideological factor, which had prevented the spread of
Soviet influence during the Cold War. Putin’s Russia
believes itself to have the ability and the right to
have such aspirations, in view of its geopolitical
position and economic capabilities, especially in the
fields of energy and military industries.
While Turkey has begun receding as well, after a phase
of expansion, Iran is renewing its diplomatic assault
with its new government lineup headed by President
Hassan Rohani. Even more, Tehran sees an irreplaceable
opportunity for it to benefit from America’s regression.
On the one hand, it considers itself to be responsible
for this regression, as a result of the role it has
played in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, and on the
other is prepared to negotiate with Washington, in order
to facilitate the process of regression, as it did with
the military withdrawal from Iraq.
There is another party that also seeks to ascribe to
itself forcing the United States to withdraw from the
region, and that is Al-Qaeda and its various branches
spread across the region from Pakistan to Morocco. And
with increased American regression in the region, the
group will turn increasingly towards the interior,
making it less of a threat to the United States, which
is in turn restructuring its policy on combating
terrorism on the basis of this new factor.
On the background of such a struggle,
as it witnesses a heated race to fill the vacuum left by
the Americans, the Arabs seem to be most prominently
absent. Indeed, the Arabs have no solid core with a
clear strategy for self-preservation, nor is there a
regional Arab force with a serious political project
that could form a polarizing element, despite the
presence of elements similar to such a force at both the
economic and human levels.
The fate of filling the space left by America’s
regression thus remains connected to the limits of the
simultaneous negotiations between the United States and
Russia and between the United States and Iran – the
former having resulted in preparing for Geneva II in
order to reach a solution in Syria, and the latter being
aimed at resolving the crisis between Iran and the West.
In other words, it is a matter of attempting to reach an
understanding on resolving the issues in the region that
are most pressing and of the greatest interest.
Thus, if the Arabs are concerned about such
negotiations, their concerns are justified, even if
these negotiations are tortuous and their results
unguaranteed in any one direction. But it would be more
useful to wonder about the reasons why the Arabs have
been excluded from them – in other words, to wonder
about the weaknesses of the Arabs and how they can be
addressed, instead of lamenting about friends stabbing
each other in the back. And if a regional Arab force and
a new Arab order, with the ability to take action and to
fill some of the vacuum left by America’s regression,
fail to take shape, the debate will remain restricted
between Iran’s diplomatic and field assault and its
counterpart from Al-Qaeda. The two may clash at times
and collaborate at others, but the trend towards
fundamentalism remains dominant.
Prominent Syrian rebel group says its
leader has died of shrapnel wounds sustained last week
By Diaa Hadid, The Associated Press | The
Canadian Press – BEIRUT - The leader of one of Syria's
most prominent rebel units died early Monday of shrapnel
wounds sustained during shelling by government troops
last week, his group said. The
death of Abdul-Qadir Saleh, founder of the Tawhid
Brigade, was another blow to the rebels, reeling from a
series of recent battlefield losses to President Bashar
Assad's forces.
Government troops have made headway against the rebels
on two key fronts, capturing a string of opposition-held
suburbs south of Damascus and taking two towns and a
military base outside the northern city of Aleppo.
The Tawhid Brigade is one of Syria's better-known and
stronger rebel groups, with an estimated 10,000
fighters. It's one of the main rebel groups in Aleppo
province. Under Saleh's command, the group last year
pushed into the provincial capital, Aleppo, seizing
large sections of the city for the rebels.
On Thursday night, government forces
targeted its command post in Aleppo province. The
34-year-old Saleh was severely wounded and later died in
a hospital in Turkey, said a brigade spokesmen who goes
by the name of Akram al-Halaby. Many rebels do not use
their real names, fearing they or their families would
be identified and targeted by security forces
The shelling also killed the brigade officer, Abu Tayeb,
and wounded another spokesman, Saleh Anadan.
Saleh's body was quickly returned to
Syria and he was buried in his hometown of Marea in
Aleppo province, al-Halaby said. The brigade's political
chief, Abdul-Aziz Salameh, who was lightly wounded in
Thursday's shelling, was appointed to succeed Saleh, the
spokesman said.
The Tawhid Brigade was once a part of the Free Syrian
Army, considered to be the military wing of Syria's
exiled Western-backed opposition. But in September, the
brigade broke away and later formed the Islamic
Authority, a coalition of Islamic rebel groups,
including one linked to al-Qaida.
Saleh's death was also confirmed
Monday by Rami Abdurrahman of the British-based Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights, which collects information
from a network of activists on the ground.
Saleh's trajectory reflected that of
many rebels who joined the armed uprising against
Assad's rule. He was a married merchant who took part in
peaceful demonstrations that began in March 2011. After
a violent crackdown by security forces, Syria's conflict
became an armed uprising and Saleh turned to guns.
He founded the Tawhid — or Unity — Brigade some 10 days
before rebels seized parts of Aleppo, al-Halaby said.
A video uploaded to social media
networks in 2012 shows Saleh flinching as a bomb drops
near his headquarters in Aleppo province. His comrades
call on him to rush inside a building for protection,
but he insists on standing outside, saying: "Nobody dies
until God gives him his life, and his date of death."
Syria's rebels are currently on the defensive in a
high-stakes battle in the mountainous region of Qalamoun
on the Lebanese border. There, government forces are
trying to cut off a supply route for rebels, centred
around the town of Qara. But
the rebels are still capable of carrying out large
attacks and the opposition remains firmly entrenched in
other areas around Damascus. A massive explosion Sunday
levelled a government office in the northeastern suburb
of Harasta, killing at least 31 soldiers, according to
the Observatory. Three
brigadiers and one major general were among the dead,
according to the Observatory's Abdurrahman. There was no
confirmation from government officials or state media on
the attack.
Iran unveils aircraft claimed to be biggest drone yet developed, capable of 30-hour flight
Libya: Serial deadlines
November 18, 2013/The Daily Star
A weekend of bloodshed in the Libyan capital represents
merely the latest wake-up call for that country’s
authorities, and officials elsewhere, that the situation
is rapidly getting out of hand.
There is no need to spell out what is
going wrong; anyone who’s read anything about Libya over
the past year will be fully aware of the problem: a lack
of strong state security institutions and an effective
national army. Statement after
statement by Libyan and non-Libyan officials point to
these serious challenges, but no one appears to have
come up with a feasible solution. It isn’t that the
Libyan authorities have done nothing to bring the
situation under control – they have announced deadline
after deadline for militiamen to return to the fold of
the state, but the fact that they have had to announce
deadline after deadline means the policy hasn’t worked.
The only thing new in the situation
in Libya is the brazen and horrific sight of militiamen
gunning down dozens of people – who had come out to
peacefully protest against the militias Friday – in cold
blood. The rest of the weekend
saw more violence, as well as the disappearance, and
presumed kidnapping, of a senior state security
official, at the hands of a militia.
Libya’s post-Moammar Gadhafi
political class is in the grip of these militias, which
means that it’s easy to understand how politicians have
failed to rein them in. But Friday’s explosion indicates
that while politicians might prefer to stall and hope
for the best, the Libyan people have reached the end of
their rope.
The other “newsworthy” event in Libya these days is the
country’s growing infamy for being a launching pad for
desperate migrants willing to risk their lives to travel
to the other side of the Mediterranean, and again,
Libya’s unscrupulous militias are involved.
Libyan officials aren’t in an
enviable position. They face the threat of
Al-Qaeda-inspired militants active in North Africa and
African countries bordering the region, as well as their
own, long-standing national problems of how to
incorporate feuding regions, tribal groups and the
Berber minority into a durable national political
system. But if they are to
continue in office, they must find a solution, and
quickly, or else step aside for others to do the job.
One point of view in the Middle East holds that there is
a “plot” underway to divide countries like Libya into
smaller entities; many people might dismiss the
conspiracy-theory brand of analysis, but the performance
of Libyan officials raises serious doubts as to whether
this trend isn’t actually underway already.
The international community offered
either verbal or material support to the rebels who
ended the Gadhafi era, and it should also do everything
possible to halt and reverse the state of affairs in
Libya today, because conditions there will have
repercussions for a whole range of anxious neighbors.
The
Failure of U.S. Policy toward Damascus
by Eyal Zisser/Middle East Forum
Middle East Quarterly/Fall 2013, pp. 59-65
http://www.meforum.org/3673/syria-policy-failure
The failure of the Bush and
the Obama administrations to topple Syria's president Bashar al-Assad goes a
long way to explaining Washington's declining Middle Eastern position. United by
a distinct lack of vision, as opposed to hopes and wishful thinking, as well as
determination and a coherent plan of action, these otherwise very different
administrations helped erode America's stature in the region. Widely seen as a
declining superpower that has lost belief in itself and its leading role in the
world, Washington earns neither fear nor respect in the Middle East.
Bush vs. Assad
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 was a decisive moment in the
history of the Middle East. True, George W. Bush acquired a demonic image in the
eyes of many, both in the region and beyond, but there is no doubt that history
will prove that the stand he took against the region's dictators, including some
long-standing U.S. allies, was an important factor in creating significant
cracks in the Middle East's dictatorial walls and in encouraging the calls for
justice and freedom that began to be heard there. In this sense, the Bush
administration's Middle East policy, which set as its aim the promotion of
democracy, was an important preparatory factor, even an accelerator, for the
developments that led to the outbreak of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The Iraq
invasion made a strong impression on the region's inhabitants, strengthening
Washington's standing in their eyes as a leading world power, politically,
economically, and especially, militarily and technologically. At the same time,
this image of the United States was accompanied by fear and awe—and unconcealed
resentment, jealousy, and even hatred. Nevertheless, the routing of Saddam
Hussein's army convinced even Iran's ayatollahs to pause in their mad dash to
achieve nuclear power.[1] Only later, after Iraq became a treacherous swamp for
Washington because of its failed policies there, did the halo of the initial
victory lose its shine. Over time, the historical significance of the Saddam
regime collapse lost much of its impact.
President Obama (left) meets with Jordan's King Abdullah II (right) at the White
House, April 26, 2013, where they discussed the Syrian crisis. Obama's initial
tough talk about Syrian use of chemical weapons being a "red line" that would
evoke a strong U.S. response has become something of a joke even among the
war-weary Syrian citizens. In April, the president walked back his pledge
demanding instead a "chain of custody" to prove who used which weapons where.
At the same time, the war in Iraq placed the Bush administration on a collision
course with Assad, who perceived the U.S. attack as being directed not only
against Iraq but also against Syria. In the eyes of Damascus, the war was part
of a joint U.S.-Israeli campaign directed at breaking up the Arab world and
debilitating its might in order to strengthen Israel—or so the Syrians convinced
themselves. It also seems that the Assad regime really believed that Washington
would find it difficult to overthrow Saddam and assumed that the Vietnam war
quagmire would be repeated in Iraq.[2]
In their memoirs, both George W. Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair
testify that Washington had entertained the idea of carrying the military
campaign from Baghdad to Damascus and overthrowing the Assad regime.[3] However,
the initial shock experienced in the region, including by Syria, eventually wore
off, especially as the U.S. administration found itself entangled in a morass of
Shiite-Sunni violence in Iraq. Damascus thus concluded that it was in its
interest for the United States to suffer total defeat in Iraq. As a result, the
Assad regime began to turn a blind eye and even to assist the Muslim jihadis who
crossed Syria on their way to fight the Americans in Iraq. Ironically, these
same fighters were destined to return to Syria a decade later when the March
2011 revolution broke out there, leading a jihadist war against Assad's
"heretical" regime.
In light of this hostile course, the Bush administration came to the conclusion
that the Syrian president was a clear and present danger to U.S. interests in
the Middle East. However, Washington decided not to adopt a straightforward
military option. Instead, U.S. leaders tried to exploit a series of
opportunities that emerged in order to push Assad into a corner or even
overthrow him. The steps taken were essentially political in character, but
there is no evidence that they were part of an orderly or planned-out policy.
Missed Opportunities
The first such prospect came in spring 2005 when Bush sought to exploit the
murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri to bring about Bashar's
political demise. Alongside the exodus of Syrian troops from Lebanon, Washington
acted together with Jacques Chirac's France to bring about the creation of an
international investigating commission, and in its wake, an international court,
in the hopes of implicating Assad in the Hariri murder. This would then enable a
political, or perhaps even a military, campaign to be undertaken against Assad
with international backing, not to mention the possibility of bringing him
before the International Court of Justice in the Hague. However, in the end it
appeared that Hezbollah, rather than Assad, was the main actor behind Hariri's
murder.[4]
Almost a year later, the Bush administration tried to convince Israel to open a
second front against Syria during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war; Israel, for its
own reasons, did not agree to this.[5] Later, when Israel bombed the nuclear
installation Syria was attempting to build with North Korean aid in September 6,
2007, the administration backed the Israeli action. Characteristically, Bush had
refrained from acting himself against Syria in this matter.[6]
Finally, Washington acted selectively against al-Qaeda training camps and
logistic centers in Syria. The various actions undertaken did not interlink in a
way to constitute a genuine overall campaign, and they never posed a serious
threat to the Syrian regime.[7]
Beyond these more energetic actions, the Bush administration settled for a
diplomatic campaign, the main aim of which was the political isolation of the
Assad regime. However, the partial isolation in which Damascus found itself
brought no real results. Damascus was less impressed with the carrot it was
being offered—the potential profits it might reap from drawing closer to
Washington—and was more focused on the stick, or to be more precise, the absence
of any real stick. Washington had simply failed to create any effective means of
leverage against Syria. Thus, the era of George W. Bush ended in complete
failure insofar as the administration's Syrian policy was concerned: Bush left
the White House while Assad remained more solidly entrenched in power than
ever.[8]
Obama and Bashar
The Obama administration was determined, like any new U.S. administration, to
distinguish itself from its predecessor. This effort to embark on a new course
meant replacing any perceived sticks with carrots, that is, jettisoning threats,
the sporadic use of force, or the more aggressive stance of previous years and
employing dialogue, conciliation, and flattery. Indeed, Damascus hastened to
welcome the change in policy. However, the Obama administration was soon to
learn that, contrary to its expectations, speaking softly without carrying a big
stick had no effect whatsoever on the Assad regime.
The outbreak of revolution in Syria in March 2011 was met with silence in
Washington. Instead of issuing a resolute call to the Syrian ruler to step down,
as in the pressure exerted on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February, the
administration took several long weeks to articulate its policy toward the
Syrian revolution. On March 27, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
declared that Syria was different from Libya since "there's a different leader
in Syria now. Many of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to
Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad]'s a reformer. What's been
happening there the last few weeks is deeply concerning, but there's a
difference between calling out aircraft and indiscriminately strafing and
bombing your own cities and then police actions, which, frankly, have exceeded
the use of force that any of us would want to see."[9]
Only in May 2011 did U.S. spokespersons, joined in the end by President Obama
himself, begin to declare that the most appropriate solution to the crisis was
for Assad to step down.[10] However, the statements issuing from Washington were
not accompanied by any concrete actions. Some economic sanctions were imposed,
albeit to no avail. Washington also roused itself to extend some limited aid to
the opposition forces. For a good many months, it worked—without any real
success—to unify the various opposition groups abroad and even those forces
operating inside Syria with the aim of creating a military force with an
effective and legitimate leadership and command capable of acting against the
Syrian army. Simultaneously though, U.S. spokespersons repeatedly emphasized
that Washington was not considering any military intervention that would tip the
scales decisively. In the beginning of 2013, there were even reports that the
State Department and the CIA had recommended supplying weapons to the rebels but
that Obama opposed the idea. Having initially called Syrian use of chemical
weapons, a "red line"[11] that would incur a strong U.S. response, in April
2013, the president walked back his tough talk, demanding a "chain of custody"
to prove who used what and where. Later, in June 2013, the White House
eventually confirmed that "our intelligence community assesses that the Assad
regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small
scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year … The intelligence
community estimates that 100 to 150 people have died from detected chemical
weapons attacks in Syria to date; however, casualty data is likely incomplete.
While the lethality of these attacks make up only a small portion of the
catastrophic loss of life in Syria, which now stands at more than 90,000 deaths,
the use of chemical weapons violates international norms and crosses clear red
lines that have existed within the international community for decades."[12]
However, no action has been taken as a result of this confirmation.
The excuse given for Washington's inaction was a lack of an international
consensus that would confer legitimacy on any muscular undertaking in Syria. In
the U.N. Security Council, Russia, a chief arms supplier to the Damascus regime,
repeatedly blocked the adoption of any decision connected with the situation,
thereby eliciting toothless denunciations from U.S. spokespersons.[13] However,
Russian and Chinese vetoes on Security Council resolutions vis-à-vis the Syrian
question also served as a convenient alibi for an administration wary of Middle
Eastern entanglements. What might have happened if President Vladimir Putin had
removed his opposition to an international operation against Damascus?
Despite having publicly concluded that the Assad regime must go, there were a
number of distinct reasons for Washington's reluctance to act. To begin with,
U.S. leaders were well aware of the weaknesses of the Syrian opposition,
especially the divisiveness and fragmentation within the forces in the field.
Furthermore, some of these militias consisted of radical elements, such as the
Supporters of the al-Nusra Front (Ansar Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sha'm),
considered the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Thus, any intervention in Syria would
likely end up with Washington being drawn into a bloody civil war, similar to
the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, from which the Obama administration was
only just extracting itself with great effort and fanfare.[14]
Had the U.S. administration been more determined in its approach to Syria, it
could have taken a number of steps short of a land operation that would have
dramatically altered the balance of forces between the regime and its opponents.
Washington could have imposed an effective sea and air blockade on Syria or
decreed flight-restricted or no-fly zones for the Syrian air force. The
administration could also have given more significant aid to the opposition,
especially military aid, if not directly, then via their allies in the region.
The distance between active intervention and complete inaction is great, and in
between, there was much room for maneuver had the will been there.
U.S. Business as Usual
Two U.S. administrations, though quite different in character, found themselves
conducting almost identical policies vis-à-vis Syria. Both began by trying to
open a dialogue with the Syrian regime, assuming that Damascus had an interest
in becoming a U.S. ally. Enticements were offered in areas of special interest
to Damascus: recognition of its role in Lebanon and the return of the entire
Golan Heights to Syria as part of a peace agreement with Israel.[15] Both
administrations undertook actions against Assad only after despairing of any
positive results to their conciliatory efforts. Even then, these efforts to act
against the Syrian regime came to naught.
What can be learned from the Syrian experience of these two very different U.S.
administrations? Perhaps the most important lesson is that failure is an assured
result in the absence of a vision with well-defined goals and objectives.
Undergirding such a policy, Washington needs to have a genuine conviction that
it can achieve its goals, alongside a determination to follow through on them.
Ironically, it was Assad himself who complained, according to a cable sent by
the U.S. embassy in Damascus, that "the American administration has no clear
vision about the region."[16]
The policy failure in Syria underscores the limits of the U.S. ability to play a
leading role in the Middle East. It is an example of how a superpower should not
conduct itself in such a sensitive region. Indeed, the message Washington is
sending, to allies and foes alike, is one of weakness and spinelessness. U.S.
leaders currently seem to lack the sense of a superpower mission. They do not
seem to be guided by a clear strategy and appear to lack a sincere commitment to
the U.S. role in the region and even a belief in U.S. abilities to play one.
Small wonder that the U.S. embassy in Damascus summarized the failure to contain
Assad after the Hariri assassination in the following words:
Given a year of sustained U.S.-led international pressure that forced it [Syria]
to withdraw its troops under nearly humiliating circumstances, we might have
expected the SARG [Syrian government] to be back on its heels and in a
defensive, cautious posture. The short-term success of its current
confrontational stances have instead boosted regime morale and made it likely
that it will continue to seek appropriate opportunities in the coming months to
demonstrate its willingness to respond to external pressure with pressure of its
own. Wherever possible, it will use its proxies to assert that defiance, in
order to avoid being dragged into any unwanted, direct confrontation with the
U.S.[17]
Altering Attitudes
What subsequent administrations have failed to understand is that what Arabs
resent most is not the U.S. invasion of Iraq or even support for Israel: The
Arabs are most angry at the United States because, for them, it is the most
recent and convenient "other." To the Arabs, Washington's international state of
success and status is, despite whatever current economic problems it faces, a
constant reminder of Arab decline from its glorious past. The United States is
seen as the successor to Britain and other colonial powers and, therefore, shall
be an enemy forever. As long as there is no introspection among Arabs regarding
the causes of their decline; as long as the only explanation offered for this
decline remains a U.S.-Zionist conspiracy to break and weaken the "Arab world,"
this rejection of good-faith efforts by the West will remain as it is. What
might alter the situation is not necessarily a change in U.S. policy toward
Israel but rather a change from within. Curiously, although America remains the
quintessential enemy to the Arab world, the dream of the average Arab individual
is to immigrate to the States or experience the American way of life. As long as
such schizophrenia persists, it is unlikely the patient will be cured.
Some changes could improve Washington's standing in the Middle East. Its efforts
to send conciliatory messages to the Arabs would be a positive move only if
based on a sober and realistic approach. If the world's leading superpower does
not believe in its power and looks regularly for excuses not to exercise it, it
is bound to be perceived as a paper tiger lacking the ability to advance any
particular course in the region. In this regard, it would seem that the negative
results of the Obama administration's conduct are more severe than those of its
predecessor. For if George W. Bush was not liked, he was at least feared to one
degree or another: Barack Obama is neither liked nor feared.
Eyal Zisser is dean of the faculty of humanities and the Yona and Dina Ettinger
Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University.
[1] The New York Times, Dec. 3, 2007; The Washington Post, Dec. 4, 2007.
[2] David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 176-97.
[3] George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. 407-15;
Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow Books, 2010), pp. 387, 407; Max Abrahms,
"When Rogues Defy Reason: Bashar's Syria," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2003, pp.
45-55; CNN News, May 4, 2003.
[4] "A Year After Hariri's Assassination: Asad Strikes a Tougher Pose," U.S.
Embassy, Damascus, Wikileaks, Feb. 2, 2006; "Report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1595 [Mehlis report]," United Nations, New York, Oct. 20, 2005; The
Guardian (London), June 30, 2011.
[5] Israel Hayom (Tel Aviv), Nov. 10, 2010; Ynet News (Tel Aviv), Aug. 13, 2012.
[6] Channel 10, Israel, Aug. 26, 2010; Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 10, 2010;
Elliot Abrams, Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.
57-9.
[7] See, for example, Reuters, Oct. 27, 2008; Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA,
Damascus), Oct. 28, 2008.
[8] David W. Lesch, Syria, The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2012), pp. 20-37.
[9] Face the Nation, CBS, Mar. 27, 2013.
[10] "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa," White House
Press Secretary, May 19, 2011.
[11] Bloomberg News Service (New York), Aug. 21, 2012; The Guardian, Feb. 8,
2013; Ha'aretz, May 4, 2013; Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2013.
[12] CBS News, Apr. 30, 2013; The New York Times, June 13, 2013.
[13] See, for example, Arutz Sheva (Beit El and Petah Tikva), May 1, 2011; ABC
News, Feb. 4, 2012; USA Today, July 19, 2012.
[14] Aron Lund, "Holy Warriors: A Field Guide to Syria's Jihadi Groups," Foreign
Policy, Oct. 15, 2012; Joseph Holliday, "Syria's Maturing Insurgency," June
2012, "Syria's Armed Opposition," Mar. 2012, "The Struggle for Syria in 2011,"
Dec. 2011, Syria Project, Institute for the Study of War, Washington, D.C.
[15] YNet News, Oct. 12, 2012; Daniel Pipes, "Netanyahu Again Offers the Golan
Heights to Syria," DanielPipes.org, Oct. 14, 2012.
[16] "Asad Warns that Striking Iraq Would Create Chaos," U.S. Embassy, Damascus,
Wikileaks, Feb. 2, 2002.
[17] "Asad Strikes a Tougher Pose," Feb. 2, 2006.
Related Topics: Syria, US policy | Eyal Zisser | Fall 2013 MEQ
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