LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

Bible Quotation for today/
Matthew 24/1-24: " Jesus went out from the temple, and was going on his way. His disciples came to him to show him the buildings of the temple. But he answered them, “You see all of these things, don’t you? Most certainly I tell you, there will not be left here one stone on another, that will not be thrown down.” As he sat on the Mount of Olives, the disciples came to him privately, saying, “Tell us, when will these things be? What is the sign of your coming, and of the end of the age?” Jesus answered them, “Be careful that no one leads you astray. For many will come in my name, saying, ‘I am the Christ,’ and will lead many astray. You will hear of wars and rumors of wars. See that you aren’t troubled, for all this must happen, but the end is not yet. For nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom; and there will be famines, plagues, and earthquakes in various places. But all these things are the beginning of birth pains. Then they will deliver you up to oppression, and will kill you. You will be hated by all of the nations for my name’s sake. Then many will stumble, and will deliver up one another, and will hate one another. Many false prophets will arise, and will lead many astray. Because iniquity will be multiplied, the love of many will grow cold.3 But he who endures to the end, the same will be saved. This Good News of the Kingdom will be preached in the whole world for a testimony to all the nations, and then the end will come".

Will Hezbollah Manage?
Zuheir Kseibati/Al Hayat
Israel's rush to link the explosion crime in the Southern Suburb of Beirut to what it dubbed "the Sunni-Shiite conflict" sets off suspicions regarding the Hebrew state's wish to fuel the sectarian tensions in Lebanon and raises doubts about its desire to "Iraqize" this country. Moreover, the promotion of the Israeli concerns over the possible collapse of the Jordanian regime could reveal the horrific scenarios of anarchy being concocted for the region. Is Israel innocent from what happened in Bi'r al-Abed? It is worried about Sinai and Jordan and mobilized in the Golan, but in light of all the killing waves in the region, it is reassured about its border and watching – after it tackled the possibility of seeing wide-scale war with the Islamists – the new leaders produced by the Arab spring. Would it harm Israel if Hezbollah were to drown in the Syrian blood swamp and if the conflict between the regime in Damascus and the Takfiri groups accused of following Al-Qaeda's ideology were to extend for a longer period of time? Would it harm Israel if the party's involvement triggers sectarian strife in Lebanon and transfers the war with the Takfiris to it, thus forcing Hezbollah to focus on this fight and stop supporting President Bashar al-Assad's regime, consequently causing its collapse after all this destruction?
Would it bother Israel to seize what it perceives as being a golden opportunity represented by the Jordanian option, thus promoting the faltering of the Hashemite Kingdom after having completely undermined the two-state solution with Palestine? Would its high morals and commitment to the Camp David Accords prevent it from attacking Sinai that is suffering from the mayhem caused by the gangs and Jihadists and the inability of the Egyptian army to eradicate them? The explosion crime in the Southern Suburb of Beirut is not the only one provoking numerous questions which may generate fear. But at the end of the day, it might shed light on the allocation of the roles between Israel and the West, in parallel to the massive earthquake sweeping the region, the instigation through statements and the planting of mines of mutual suspicions between the parties fighting on the arenas of the Arab spring.
And while Lebanon has become an arena prone to host the excess rounds of the confrontation with the Takfiris, it is also the loose element on the outskirts of the destructive war in Syria. And as soon as Hezbollah recognized its intervention in it, the talk about the dissociation policy dissipated and all the Lebanese became besieged by the unknown. What is constant however is that while they all agree over the rejection of the targeting of whichever Lebanese region with Grad missiles or booby-trapped cars, they are aware that Hezbollah alone holds the keys of salvation from Lebanon's possible dissolution, after the country was tied to the course of war to enhance Al-Assad's regime steadfastness.
In reality, the core of the chronic predicament affecting the Lebanese is still the rescuing of their remaining state institutions, at a time when the speculations surrounding Syria's division are provoking other presumptions related to another Lebanon whose map is not yet drawn and whose collapse into the abyss of strife is yet to be determined.
It is strife because the Syrian war has removed all the windows and doors of the neighbor, and because the defense of Al-Assad's regime under the headline of the Alawites' interests and rights has deepened division in Lebanon. Indeed, the "rifle of the resistance has shifted," as it was stated by head of the National Struggle Front Deputy Walid Jumblatt, who also harshly criticized the March 14 camp after it raised the ceiling of escalation extremely high.Following the series of warnings against vacuum inside the institutions and the mourning of these institutions, the nightmare of security mayhem and mobile clashes is emerging. Nevertheless, if the booby-trapped car in the Southern Suburb was the last alarm bell placing Lebanon before the costly possibilities of the bloody Syrian and Iraqi scenes, what is certain is that a small window is still available for Hezbollah to resume a dialogue extending beyond the complications of the governmental shares, appointments and even the system of governance, and solely focusing on the salvation of the entity from the flames of the Syrian war and the conflicts of the superpowers.
And regardless of the divergence affecting the calculations of the March 8 and March 14 forces – or their remnants – most of them are likely aware of the fact that the post-July war and post-May 7 calculations have collapsed to the beat of the earthquakes in the region, and that all the fundamental tendencies will merely shorten the distance towards the fire of strife. If this happens, rounding the corners to get a big share in the government and practicing outsmarting while linking Lebanon's fate to the epic cosmic confrontation between the major projects will not do any good. But will Hezbollah manage to undertake the salvation task if it wants to?

Dahieh Blast: Who is Responsible?
Hassan Haidar/Al Hayat
Hezbollah shares responsibility for the bombing in Bir Al-Abed with those who planned and carried it out. Indeed, when the party decided to reduce all of Syria to the Assad regime, to consider its people in revolt to be mere “takfiri groups”, and to assume unjustly and unjustifiably that any new regime in Damascus would certainly be against “the Resistance”, it was making an enemy of not just the Syrian Revolution, but also of the overwhelming majority of Lebanese and Arabs, who support it and hope that it will change this blood-spattered regime and put an end to its evil forever.
And when Hezbollah complied with Tehran’s orders – being no stranger to them and not having in the first place the ability to refuse them – by sending its men to fight in defense of its only ally in the region, it publicly opened up a front it had long claimed to make sure to keep closed: the front of Shiite-Sunni strife – with what this means in terms of implicating its own helpless “nurturing environment” in a cycle of action and reaction of the kind that occurred two days ago, in which innocents pay the price for its stances in their safety and their lives, as did before them Syrian civilians who happened to be in the areas where the party was carrying out its operations.
Hezbollah of course knew that going to war in Syria would later mean bringing the Syrian war to its home soil. It also knew that the killing in which it implicated itself in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus, under pretexts that convince no one but itself, would not remain confined to the geographical limits it had chosen, inviting the Lebanese who objected to its intervention to confront it there, and would surely move to reach “its own areas”. Yet this is the conscious and irrevocable decision Hezbollah has taken, choosing to fight its battle to the end and to cling to its suicidal wager on complete victory or complete defeat, without a care for the consequences this would have even on its own sect itself.
This is why the calls of Lebanese politicians, directed at Hezbollah after the bombing, to reconsider its stances and its decision to get implicated in a war beyond the border will only end up as empty talk that will neither be heard nor have any influence on the party’s fateful ties to the Assad regime. Indeed, it had in the past been among those who fiercely defended the notion of removing the borders between Lebanon and Syria, has previously acted and is currently acting in such a way as to in effect do away with these borders, opening them up to thousands of its fighters. There is also talk of a “Plan B” that would connect a hypothetical “Alawite State” on the Syrian coast to the Southern Suburb of Beirut (Dahieh).
Hezbollah chose to bring down the Mikati government and with it the slogan of “dissociation”, which it had been violating in secret, after having become forced to breach it openly. This is why it will not allow a new government to be formed, as it might raise the same slogan again and seek to apply it, if it were to be represented in it, just as it will not allow a government to be formed without its participation. This means that the vacuum in Lebanon will be maintained, and will spread to the country’s constitutional institutions one after the other, as long as it serves a further purpose connected to the fate of the Lebanese state itself and to its sovereignty over its territory in general, and its borders in particular. As for security there, it is connected not to how fortified its “perimeters of defiance” are, having already proved possible to breach, but rather to reduced foreign regional interference, especially from Iran, in the affairs of the Arabs and in their revolutions, and to Hezbollah reaching the tangible conclusion that it has entered a war it will not win on the long run, even if it does achieve temporary and inconsequential “victories”.

Israeli green light for big Egyptian Sinai offensive, after Islamists fail to assassinate Egyptian general
DEBKAfile Special Report July 11, 2013/Israel Thursday July 11 approved a major Egyptian offensive for curbing the mounting aggression in Sinai of armed Salafis gangs, Muslim Brotherhood raiders and Hamas terrorists. A day earlier, Egypt’s Second Army commander, Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Wasfi, who is assigned to lead the offensive, escaped unhurt from an attempt on his life. Some of his bodyguards and soldiers were killed.
Maj.-Gen. Wasfi arrived in Sinai just four days ago to set up headquarters in the northern town of El Arish. He was targeted for the first attempt by radical Islamists to murder a high-ranking Egyptian general. As a close associate of Defense Minister Gen. Fattah El-Sisi, Wasfi took part in the military coup which ousted President Mohamed Morsi in Cairo on July 3.
Around 30 Islamist gunmen laid in ambush for his convoy Wednesday, debkafile's sources report. As the cars drove past Sheikh Zuwayed, southwest of El Arish, they came under a hail of RPG anti-tank rockets and explosive devices. A minivan then drove the length of the convoy shooting heavy machine guns and armor-piercing bullets, trapping the Egyptian troops and officers in the blazing vehicles and gunning down those who tried to escape.
A fierce shootout ensued in which a number of attackers suffered losses, Egyptian military sources say. The minivan’s driver was captured and is under interrogation.
Tuesday, at the same location, two buses carrying Colombian peacemakers serving with the multinational force-MFO at the Sheikh Zuwayed base were also waylaid and shot up.
Of deep concern to the Egyptian and Israeli high commands is the Salafist assailants’ prior knowledge of the timing and route taken by Gen. Wasfi’s convoy in Sinai, because it means that Islamist terrorists have penetrated Egypt’s military apparatus in Sinai and gained an inside track on its activities.
With Israel’s consent (in line with the 1979 peace treaty), the Egyptian army last week withdrew substantial strength from the Suez Canal towns of Port Said and Ismailia and deployed the troops in Sinai ahead of the offensive.
On the other side of the Sinai border, Israeli Defense Forces are heavily deployed along the Sinai and Gaza border fences and in the southernmost sector of Eilat.
They are on high alert on intelligence that the armed Islamists plan to retaliate for an Egyptian assault by attacking Israel.
There is also concern that such attacks would draw in radical Palestinian Hamas fighters. They have nothing to lose after their Muslim Brotherhood patrons in Cairo were overthrown and have little to expect from the army. Indeed, the generals in Cairo suspect Hamas of abetting the Brotherhood’s declared “uprising” by organizing a center of armed resistance in Sinai as its launching base for a combined Islamist revolt against the new regime in Egypt. Their suspicions were confirmed by the placards of Mohamed Morsi alongside black al Qaeda flags affixed to the armed minivans used by the Salafists.
For some days, Egyptian troops have been working non-stop to block the smuggling tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip used hitherto to secrete weapons and fighters into Gaza. But now, the Egyptians are concerned to cut down the traffic of fighting men and weapons moving in the opposite direction to reinforce the Sinai Salafists.
A senior Egyptian official said Thursday that at least 150 Ezz a-Din al-Qassam operatives (members of the Gaza-based Hamas military wing) were seen heading into Sinai via the tunnels. Over the past few days, Egyptian security forces have killed and arrested around 200 militants in the Sinai Peninsula, killed 32 Hamas operatives and arrested another forty-five.
By joining up with fellow Islamists, debkafile reports, Hamas hopes to salvage something from its debacle in Cairo. An attack on Israel or even the threat of terrorist operations may be used as the Palestinian radicals’ bargaining chip with the Egyptian army for improving their position.
By joining up with fellow groups, Hamas hopes to salvage something from its debacle in Cairo. An attack on Israel - or even the threat of terrorist operations - may be used as the Palestinian radicals’ bargaining chip with the Egyptian army for improving their position.

Report: CIA Informs Security Agencies of al-Qaida Groups Plotting Attacks in Lebanon
Naharnet /The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has warned Lebanese security agencies two days ahead of the blast that targeted Bir al-Abed neighborhood in Beirut's southern suburbs that al-Qaida has plotted to carry out an attack in the area, a report claimed on Thursday. According to al-Akhbar newspaper, al-Qaida-linked group transported a huge amount of explosives into Lebanon to be used in the country.
Security and political sources told the newspaper that a CIA official in Lebanon provided the army intelligence and the ISF Intelligence Branch with “delicate information” regarding the matter.
The CIA report pointed out that an al-Qaida-linked-group prepared two bombs, each weigh 7 tons, to target buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs using suicide bombers. The report said that the group is also active in Syria. At least 53 people were wounded in an explosion that was caused by a booby-trapped vehicle in the Hizbullah stronghold neighborhood of Bir al-Abed on Tuesday. Another report said that another al-Qaida-affiliated group transported around 2,000 kilograms of explosives into Lebanon to target the Lebanese army, Hizbullah, Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awadh al-Asiri and Kuwaiti Ambassador Abdul al-Qinaai in addition to Russian and Chinese diplomats. A third CIA report included detailed information on the head of an armed group that is responsible for firing rockets on the Bekaa city of Baalbek.
According to the last report, the head of the group is a Syrian national, who is leading the operations from the region of Reef Damascus.
The Baalbek region and several border areas have been targeted by dozens of rockets from the neighboring country Syria. Al-Akhbar pointed out that the heads of the Lebanese security agencies didn't inform politicians of the matter but rather stressed on the importance of obtaining the full telecom data. Officially neutral in Syria's conflict, Lebanon is deeply divided into pro- and anti-Assad camps.
Lebanon has suffered an escalating spillover of Syria's more than two-year conflict and Hizbullah's role in Syria has set off a mounting backlash from the rebels who threatened to target the group's bases in Lebanon if it does not withdraw its fighters.

Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai calls for ‘positive neutrality’
The Daily Star /BEIRUT: Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai reiterated appeals Thursday that Lebanese remain neutral from regional and international conflicts, urging the adoption of “positive neutrality.” In his speech at the American University of Science and Technology, Rai also spoke about the rise of radical movements which he said replaced the so-called Arab Spring in the region.
“Lebanon took a distinguished step in the East when it created a secular state which separated religion from the state by recognizing all religions and freedom of religion,” Rai said. “Lebanon needs to continue on the path of secularism and needs a declaration of positive neutrality in accordance with what was agreed upon in [the National Accord of] 1943, which does not include dependency on the East or West or involvement in confrontations and regional and international alliances.” He also said that the first ministerial statement issued by the government of the late Prime Minister Riad al-Solh stipulated Lebanon’s commitment to Arab issues such as the Palestinian conflict as well as justice and dialogue with the international community. “This is what the Baabda Declaration renewed,” he said, referring to the agreement reached by rival leaders last year to keep Lebanon at a distance from events in the region. Lebanon is being dragged into the Syria conflict given the presence of Hezbollah fighters fighting alongside regime forces.The involvement of Hezbollah in Syria has led to intermittent fighting in Tripoli and clashes in Sidon between the Army and Salafist gunmen. During his speech, Rai also spoke about the uprisings in the Arab region, reiterating his stance that reforms should not be imposed by foreign powers but rather implemented internally. “When the peaceful, popular demonstrations started in the Arab region, they were promising ... but the Salafist, radical and jihadist movements suddenly replaced them,” he said. “It has become necessary for the sons of the nation, as an authority and people, to drop arms and sit together in a national dialogue table to search for peaceful solutions and implement reforms.”

Mustaqbal, Hizbullah in Heated Parliamentary Debate on Army Operation in Abra
Naharnet/A heated debate took place on Thursday between MPs belonging to Hizbullah and the Mustaqbal Movement during a meeting for the defense and interior parliamentary committee, during which Mustaqbal's MPs demanded clarifications on the army's role in the Abra clashes. "We are the army, well-known for our discipline and professionalism, we only act according to the requirements of the security situation and our only objective is to protect the country and prevent civil strife," caretaker Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn told reporters after taking part in the meeting at Nejmeh Square.
"I call on the parliament and on the specialized committees that want to ask us questions about the Sidon incidents to summon us so that we discuss how we can provide the army with the unavailable assets, as it is the only force that is protecting all the Lebanese, uniting them and proventing the spread of strife," Ghosn added. Asked whether the ministry was being called to account over what happened in Abra, Ghosn angrily replied: “I reject the term accountability, as the army cannot be called to account and it is performing its duties with all due professionalism and discipline.”
Commenting on the videos displayed during the meeting, the minister said: “We offered clarifications and documents that prove that the operation conducted by the army was of a purely security nature and was conducted with all due professionalism and discipline, and we stressed that our first and main objective during that operation was to keep civilians out of the fighting and spare them any injuries and this is what happened.”Asked whether Hizbullah members had taken part in the operation, Ghosn said: "No one participated other than army troops and when the army is present it would be in charge of all things."
Meanwhile, Mustaqbal bloc MP Khaled al-Daher said the MPs of Hizbullah and the March 8 forces "insisted on wasting time and rejecting the principle of holding such sessions that are aimed at clarifying things to the public opinion.""In their opinion, it is unacceptable to raise any questions, interrogations or clarifications and they believe that the army is sacred and we must support it," Daher added. And as the lawmaker underlined his "support for all state institutions, the army, the Internal Security Forces and all security and political institutions," he emphasized that “the ultimate sovereignty must be for the security and military institutions over all Lebanese regions and no party or militia must possess arms with the aim of practicing any form of autonomy.”
Daher also raised questions over pictures and videos circulated in the wake of the Abra battle about alleged “executions” and “artillery that took part in the shelling of Abra and Sidon's neighborhoods, the deployment of Hizbullah gunmen and the shooting that targeted MP Bahia Hariri's residence in Majdelyoun.”
“How could citizens be killed at the bases of Lebanese army intelligence? Do they want us to refrain from holding accountable those who commit a crime? Is there anyone who is above the law? Is the president of the republic himself above the constitution and above the law?" Daher added. "There are regions that are not under Hizbullah's control and they want to use the Lebanese army to hit the Sunni and Christian regions," Daher claimed.
On June 23, gunmen loyal to Sheikh Ahmed al-Asir attacked an army checkpoint near the Islamist cleric's mosque in Sidon's Abra. Eighteen soldiers were martyred and 20 others were wounded in the attack and in the fierce clashes that ensued. At least twenty of Asir's gunmen were also killed in the battle that ended when the army stormed Asir's headquarters on June 24. In the wake of the clashes, two videos showing army troops abusing detainees allegedly linked to Asir were circulated on social networking websites. Human Rights Watch has also urged an independent investigation into claims that a man identified as Nader al-Bayoumy had died under torture while in the custody of the army. The army has referred the troops who appeared in the videos to the Military Court and launched a probe into the alleged abuses. Daher's remarks drew a response from MP Qassem Hashem, member of the Baath bloc and the Development and Liberation bloc, who said "there is someone trying to attack the army and to carry on with the campaign that has been waged against it, while this session should have been dedicated to supporting and embracing the army."
For his part, Loyalty to Resistance bloc MP Ali Ammar hit back at Daher, saying "it's about time for the camp of sedition, the camp of violations that preaches virtue and practices the total opposite – after it lost all its bets – to draw lessons and stop undermining the country's unity, civil peace, national unity, the Lebanese army and the Lebanese state."
"We want to protect this institution (Lebanese army) and we will not tolerate this political aggression against the army. I call on this camp (March 14) to review its calculations very well as the Lebanese army institution is an institution that is protecting civil peace and the national dignity," Ammar added.
LBCI television said the video displayed by the Army Command during the meeting “documents the beginning of the clash between al-Asir and the army and shows him changing his outfit and wearing military fatigues before opening fire.” OTV said the army showed the MPs footage proving that "Asir had created an operations room in Abra and installed surveillance cameras that filmed him giving orders to kill army troops."
The fighting in Abra was among the worst in Lebanon since the outbreak of conflict in neighboring Syria 27 months ago deepened sectarian tensions.
It highlighted widespread Sunni resentment against the army, accused of siding with Hizbullah and being selective in its crackdown on armed groups.

Jumblatt warns bombing could be repeated
July 11, 2013/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Progressive Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblatt warned that the bombing of Beirut’s southern suburbs could be repeated in other areas across the country, while blaming Hezbollah and all political parties for obstructing the formation of a new Cabinet, according to remarks published Thursday. “The situation in the country is not reassuring, and the car bomb in Bir al-Abed should be a message to everyone. What happened in the southern suburb can happen anywhere else,” Jumblatt told As-Safir newspaper. Over 50 people were wounded in a car bombing in the Beirut suburbs Tuesday. Jumblatt slammed all political forces for getting involved in petty disputes over their authorities and said he hoped that the blast in Bir al-Abed would be an alarm that leads to a serious dialogue among political forces. The PSP leader said that country’s rift between supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad requires forming a Cabinet as soon as possible to prevent tensions from boiling over. “There is a serious disagreement regarding the Syrian crisis between those who support and fight alongside the regime, like Hezbollah, and those who support the Syrian people and send [fighters] or aid from Lebanon or from elsewhere to some factions of the opposition,” he said. “Should not we hurry up and organize the political conflict between us in a government or do we keep trading fiery statements from Sidon and Tripoli?” Jumblatt also reiterated that the only kind of Cabinet he would accept is a national unity one and assured he is ready to help in the task of forming the body. “I will not accept anything other than a national unity Cabinet, a Cabinet that gets Parliament’s confidence,” he said.Jumblatt blamed Hezbollah for obstructing the government's formation and said that he trusts Prime Minister–designate Tammam Salam to oversee a Cabinent where no single group has veto power. “What is obstructing the Cabinet formation is that Hezbollah wants to be represented politically, and [it is calling] for having veto power inside the Cabinet,” said Jumblatt. Lebanon’s Cabinet formation have been stalled for more than three months over contradicting demands by parties in the March 8 and March 14 camps who want control over the form and role of the new government. Hezbollah’s March 8 have called for a political Cabinet in which it is granted veto power, a demand strongly rejected by both Salam and the March 14 group.

July 11, 2013/By Michael Young /The Daily Star
If it is proven that the explosion in Bir al-Abed Tuesday was caused by the Syrian enemies of President Bashar Assad, then Lebanon could be in for a very difficult time. But what is more disturbing is that such attacks only reinforce Assad’s narrative that his regime is the last line of defense against Salafist jihadists, who are destabilizing the countries around Syria.
Assad did everything to bring about precisely this violent outcome; and had his Hezbollah allies not intervened militarily in the Syrian conflict, it is unlikely that we would have seen car bombs in Lebanon. But as we assess the balance of forces, the Syrian regime and its backers have gained the upper hand, while the Syrian opposition is now viewed with uneasiness because of its association with the jihadists.
Observers warned of this two years ago, when the Americans and Europeans were fiddling over what to do in Syria. They still are and the vacuum they helped perpetuate only facilitated the emergence of jihadist groups that Western governments had feared bolstering.
At the same time, the lack of credibility of the opposition in exile and the fact that armed opposition groups inside Syria remain divided thanks to political rivalries between their foreign sponsors has handed Assad a decisive advantage. The Syrian army has been rearmed and reorganized under the supervision of Russia and Iran, who early on decreed that Assad’s survival was a strategic objective.
In contrast, U.S. President Barack Obama has embraced the politics of evasion, while France and the United Kingdom have produced much sound and fury signifying nothing on Syria. Obama has subcontracted Syria to America’s regional allies such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who have become a major part of the problem there. The mishmash of clashing interests and priorities among Assad’s foreign adversaries has allowed the Syrian regime to reverse the tide, with no sign that Arab states and the West are any closer to an integrated strategy for removing Assad and controlling the aftermath.
Even if Assad makes decisive military gains, Syria will nevertheless remain unstable for a long time as rebels resort to guerilla warfare. The jihadists will surely contribute to this rearguard action, perhaps by planting more car bombs. Yet all this will do is strengthen Assad further, as he portrays himself as the purveyor of tranquility. And the Syrian people, exhausted and bloodied, many of whom have no desire to remain refugees forever, may agree. Though they may detest Assad, two years of war has only brought them ruin, but also little to enhance their faith in the governing capacity of the opposition.
And now, if the opposition begins destabilizing Lebanon, all this will do is alienate Lebanese who are unwilling to see their country descend into war because of Syria. Hezbollah’s forays into Syria are more acceptable to many of them, because the impact is felt elsewhere. But if Assad’s foes seek to undermine Lebanese security, this will further turn the national mood against the rebels, making the lives of Syrian refugees in Lebanon even grimmer than they already are.
In light of this it may be useful for Lebanese Sunni representatives to issue a joint statement, under the sponsorship of Dar al-Fatwa, telling the armed Syrian opposition that the community rejects efforts to exacerbate sectarian relations in Lebanon and target the Shiite community, regardless of what Hezbollah is doing. This may have no impact, but it will allow Sunni representatives to distance their community from future violent acts justified in its name.
The shifting alignment of regional forces has played in Assad’s favor. In Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced challenges to his rule, reflecting a secular-religious rift in Turkish society that will not be easily repaired. Moreover, this rift defines Erdogan’s differences with the armed forces, a bastion of secularism in the Kemalist state. The prime minister must also contend with a lack of support for his stance on Syria in southern Anatolia, where the population sympathizes with the fate of the Alawites next door.
In Qatar, the emir has stepped down and handed over power to his son. While this may not mean far-reaching changes in Qatari policies in the near term, the process led to the removal of Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani, the person most closely associated with the emirate’s approach to Syria. It is conceivable that Syria could become less of a priority for Qatar as the new monarch, Emir Tammim bin Hamad, focuses on consolidating his rule domestically.
In Egypt, the removal of President Mohammad Mursi has allowed Assad not only to cheer the downfall of an adversary, but also to revive the narrative that Islamists in the Arab world are on the run and that he, Assad, best embodies a secular alternative. This account may seem laughable when Assad heads a deeply sectarian regime and once assisted jihadists making their way to Iraq, but it is surprisingly effective in a region increasingly mistrustful of Islamists in power.
And Jordan, though no great friend of Assad, worries that militant Islamists will triumph in Syria and inspire Jordanian Islamists. Now that King Abdullah has secured American military protection, he finds it easier to limit aid to the Syrian rebels, while their reversals around Damascus have made a rebel offensive launched from the south, which would implicate the kingdom, less probable than ever.
While some might argue that the Syrian opposition had little choice but to accept the assistance of jihadists against Assad, because no one else was helping them, this association is proving fatal. For their own sake, Assad’s opponents have to break this link, and the Arab states must help them. Assad understandably feels confident today as his adversaries, near and far, make one error after the other.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.

Can the ousted president return?
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Alawsat
The Muslim Brotherhood is aware that Egypt’s Mohammad Mursi will not return to the presidency. But through their protests demanding his reinstatement, they want to confirm what they consider to be their legitimate right to the presidency, presenting themselves as victims in order to make political gains. They also want their opponents to pay a huge price.
Other than that, they have three options for the post-Mursi phase. The first is to participate in the next elections, which would most likely take place under different names and come from independent Brotherhood members or young candidates that would not embarrass the parent organization.
The second option is to increase activities such as demonstrations and sit-ins, in order to obstruct political process of forming a new government.
The third and most dangerous option is to go into hiding and adopt the language of violence; much like extremist Islamists in Algeria when they took refuge in mountains and turned to terrorism in the 1990s. With a jihadist ideology, they sought to topple the regime. The result of this act was that the widely hated regime managed to increase its authority as it became the protector of the people.
The Egyptian Brotherhood leadership knows that the third option is the worst of all. As well as uniting them with their rivals, this would give the army more reason to pursue them and shut down their institutions. Their vast network—which they built during the reign of former president Hosni Mubarak, when there was a long period of truce—would be threatened.
What is also certain is that the Egyptian public will reject the Brotherhood if they resort to violence—especially given that the ruling regime possesses a huge media influence that is capable of mobilizing public opinion against them. The Brotherhood considered Mursi to be the embodiment of “legitimacy,” and they are requesting the return of legitimacy as a condition to their return to political participation.
They were prepared for a deal that consisted of early elections in which Mursi would be removed from his duties, but the proposal came too late. Nine days before June 30, the Brotherhood requested fewer concessions. But after protesters gathered on a previously unobserved scale, Mursi’s resignation became a necessity.
Mursi could have presented a plan that kept him in office for a few months before early elections. But the situation now is more complicated. There is a president, a prime minister, a transitional government, an army protecting it and a huge electorate supporting it. Mursi’s return has therefore become impossible—except in the event of an unforeseen miracle.
The Brotherhood sought to gain the support of its allies in Islamic groups, but the Salafist Al-Nour Party—considered to be the biggest in number and the most influential after the Brotherhood—let them down and adopted a neutral stance. The Egyptian Brotherhood resorted to their Islamist colleagues in Tunisia, Turkey and Sudan. Such groups, however, lack influence inside Egypt or in the Arab world.
Meanwhile, big states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan supported the new arrangement politically and economically. At the same time, they realized that chaos in Egypt is a threat to the entire region. By heading towards Iran and Russia at a time when the Middle East has been hit by violence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, Mursi and the Brotherhood caused concern within the Gulf states. In this context, it is only normal that the Gulf should support Egypt’s new transition, without getting involved in the change itself. And everyone knows that it is impossible for anyone to bend the will of millions of Egyptians who took to the streets demanding Mursi resign.
Regardless of the reasons, Egyptians expressed real anger against the results of Mursi’s administration. Therefore, it is everyone’s right—whether Egyptian or not—to reach new conclusions and politically benefit from them.

Canadian Statement on 10th Anniversary of Kazemi Murder in Iran
July 11, 2013 - Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement:
“On behalf of all Canadians, I offer my sincere condolences to Ms. Zahra Kazemi’s family and friends on this difficult day.
“Her memory strengthens our resolve to seek long-awaited justice in her case. It reminds us of all those still languishing as political prisoners in Iranian jails and compels us to keep exerting pressure on the regime in Tehran to take concrete steps to address the egregious state of human rights in Iran and to face the Iranian people’s desire for change.”
A backgrounder follows.
Backgrounder – Kazemi Case
On June 23, 2003, Zahra Kazemi was arrested for taking photos outside of Evin Prison in Tehran. According to an Iranian government report, Ms. Kazemi was interrogated by a variety of security officials for approximately 77 hours following her arrest. Four days later, Ms. Kazemi was admitted to the Baghiatollah hospital in Tehran. Family members in Iran were not notified of her hospitalization by Iranian authorities until several days later. At that time, family members in Iran contacted the Canadian embassy, seeking help. Consular officials from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada visited Ms. Kazemi in the hospital three times over the next several days and sought information surrounding the circumstances that led to her injuries and hospitalization.
On July 11, 2003, 18 days after her arrest for simply taking photographs, Ms. Kazemi died as a result of the injuries she sustained while in custody. Two days later, under pressure from Canada, Iran’s president announced a ministerial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Ms. Kazemi’s death. On July 16, Canada’s prime minister called for a transparent investigation into Ms. Kazemi’s death and for those responsible to be brought to justice. Reports indicate that Ms. Kazemi was buried later that month in her home town of Shiraz, against the wishes of her son in Montréal. The Canadian ambassador to Iran was recalled to Canada.
In the fall of 2003, Canada sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly condemning human rights abuses in Iran. Canada has subsequently led in sponsoring this resolution every year since. The sponsoring of this resolution is one of many multilateral interventions Canada has engaged in regarding Iran’s human rights record and the case of Ms. Kazemi.
In the summer of 2004, the Iranian official charged in Ms. Kazemi’s death was tried and acquitted. Iran’s judiciary stated that her death was the result of an accident. Canada’s ambassador was again recalled, to protest Iran’s decision to bar Canadians from observing the trial. In April 2005, the Iranian judiciary rejected Canadian demands that Ms. Kazemi’s body be returned to Canada and that an independent autopsy be performed, arguing that Ms. Kazemi was Iranian and that only the Iranian judiciary had jurisdiction in the case. The following month, Canada tightened its controlled engagement policy with Iran by limiting contact with Iranian officials to four issues: the case of Zahra Kazemi, human rights in Iran, Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s regional role.
For the last 10 years, Canadian prime ministers, foreign affairs ministers, ambassadors and officials have pressed Iranian authorities to conduct a credible investigation into Ms. Kazemi’s murder and to hold those responsible to account. The Iranian regime has instead continually made excuses, lied and taken steps to obscure the truth about Ms. Kazemi’s murder. Furthermore, reports persist of torture and abuse in Iran’s prisons and detention facilities.
One of the lawyers that represented Ms. Kazemi’s family after her murder, Abdolfattah Soltani, was arrested after criticizing the Iranian authorities’ investigation into her death. He is currently being held in detention in Iran for his continuing courageous efforts to defend human rights in that country. Canada continues to call for justice for victims of the regime’s abuses.

Egypt/The Return of Mohamed El-Baradei
Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat—Mohamed El-Baradei has returned to the Egyptian political scene once more today, following the ouster of the unpopular Mohamed Mursi from the presidency. This political comeback looked increasingly unlikely earlier this week, after Baradei’s nomination for the post of prime minister was blocked by Egypt’s Salafists. Nonetheless, he now finds himself a heartbeat away from the Egyptian presidency after interim president Adly Mansour appointed him vice-president.
Mohamed El-Baradei found himself at the center of events following nationwide protests on June 30 that ultimately ousted Egypt’s first civilian, Islamist and democratically elected president from power. Although Mursi’s presidency broke a number of important barriers in post-revolutionary Egypt in this respect, the president’s performance was deemed sub-par by a majority of Egyptians, who took to the streets in their millions to topple him.
Baradei lined up behind Egyptian defense minister and army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to back Mursi’s ouster. They were joined by a broad range of Egyptian secular, political and religious forces. The well-respected Egyptian political figure backed the political roadmap put forward by the military, describing this as “rectifying the course of the January 25 revolution and a response to the will of the Egyptian people.”
How did this man transform from a former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an advocate of the Egyptian democratic movement, ultimately becoming a leader in the opposition National Salvation Front (NSF) that spearheaded Mursi’s ouster?
When asked, Baradei responded: “I did not plan this, but really it was a smooth and natural transition. Both paths essentially seek to achieve security and human dignity.” Mohamed El-Baradei was born in Giza near Cairo in June, 1942. He obtained a law degree from Cairo University in 1962, and his diplomatic career began in 1964 when he served in Egypt’s diplomatic mission to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva. He later served as special assistant to Egypt’s foreign minister before leaving governmental service to join the IAEA. He rose through the ranks, eventually becoming IAEA director-general in 1997. He served in this position until 2009, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to support worldwide nuclear nonproliferation. He returned to Egypt on January 27, 2011, when the country was in the midst of seismic political change. The well-respected secular leader received a warm welcome in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and many Egyptian politicians called on him to form a transitional government following Mubarak’s ouster. Baradei and others adopted the slogan “Building the Second Republic,” in a reference to a new era to follow the “First Republic” that was established following the 1952 revolution. However it was Egypt’s Islamist forces, not the secularists, that emerged to lead the transitional period, securing a parliamentary majority, and then the presidency. Over the past three years, Baradei acknowledges that a broad section of the Egyptian people have become immersed in revolutionary activity in order to guarantee democracy in the hopes of “supporting human rights, sound governance, equal economic opportunities and social justice.”However, Baradei is not loved by all Egyptians. Many people criticize him for his frequent travels abroad, as well as his long absence from the country. His secular position has also caused him grief, with the Salafist Al-Nour party strongly opposing attempts to name him as Egypt’s prime minister earlier this week. Others criticize the NSF leader’s use of Twitter to communicate directly with the Egyptian people. However, his appointment as Egypt’s vice president for foreign affairs seems to be a very good fit, particularly given his connections abroad.
Baradei announced his opposition to Mursi’s policies and, along with hundreds of politicians, intellectuals, and revolutionaries, established the Constitution Party. His party began by presenting a coherent vision for the future of the country, seeking to ensure a “bright economic and political future.” According to Baradei himself: “Since my return to Egypt, my partners have been the Egyptian youth, who could not see any future in the shadow of the old regime, especially regarding education, employment opportunities and standards of living.”Baradei played a prominent role in first Mubarak’s ouster and now Mursi’s ouster. He has also contributed to the military roadmap, which he described as “a new beginning for the great January 25 revolution.” He also acknowledged that “it was easy to unite against Mubarak, but it was extremely hard to unite after he left. . . . There was a Plan A, how to get rid of the old regime, but there was no Plan B [about] how will we govern after the success of the revolution.”He added: “Following Mubarak’s ouster, the revolutionaries were swept up in the euphoria of freedom and ultimately broke up along traditional lines: right, left and center. From that moment, political Islam, which had been suppressed for decades, began to work out in the open. Every group began looking towards the political scene through their narrow lens, which led to a lack of focus on the primary goals and losing sight of the big picture.” However, Baradei once more finds himself at the center of events in Egypt. Will the post-Mursi era be just as difficult as the post-Mubarak one? What lies in store for Mohamed El-Baradei, who returned to Egypt on the cusp of the January 25 revolution, and who now finds himself a heartbeat away from the Egyptian presidency?

Egypt: PM refuses to rule out Brotherhood ministers
London, Asharq Al-Awsat—Egypt’s prime minister said Thursday that he will not rule out posts for the Muslim Brotherhood in his cabinet, even as Egyptian security forces sought the arrest of Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie. Speaking to AFP on Thursday, Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi revealed that he has yet to approach anyone to join the cabinet.
“I haven’t talked to anyone, because I want to have a clear idea of who I want to compose the government,” he said. The newly appointed Egyptian prime minister stressed that he is not taking “political association” when choosing ministers, saying that he may appoint officials from the Freedom and Justice party—the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood—if they are qualified for the post. “I’m taking two criteria for the next government: efficiency and credibility,” he said.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood has already rejected offers from Beblawi to join the new government, calling for a mass rally on Friday to protest against what it deems “a bloody military coup.”
Egypt’s state prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie and a number of other senior figures yesterday. Badie is accused of inciting the violence in Cairo on Monday in which more than 50 people were killed when Brotherhood supporters allegedly tried to storm the Republican Guard barracks were ousted president Mohamed Mursi is being held.
The Brotherhood denounced the arrest warrants and detention of its leadership, viewing this as a return to the Mubarak-era approach. Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Ahmed Araf told the Associated Press: “This just signals that dictatorship is back,” adding, “We are returning to what is worse than Mubarak’s regime, which wouldn’t dare to issue an arrest warrant for the general leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Gehad El-Haddad said that the charges against Badie and other senior leaders were “nothing more than an attempt by the police state to dismantle the Rabaa [Al-Adawiya] protest.”
Security agencies have already arrested a number of senior Brotherhood leaders, reportedly including Badie’s powerful deputy, Khairat El-Shater. Egypt’s prosecutor-general’s office announced that senior Brotherhood figures Mohamed Badie, Mahmoud Ezzat, Mohammed El-Beltagy and Safwat Hegazy are suspected of inciting violence. However, on Thursday Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood vowed to continue “peaceful” resistance to the military’s ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Mursi. Muslim Brotherhood supporters have remained a fixture outside Rabaa Al-Adawiya mosque in eastern Cairo, denouncing the military’s ouster and pledging to remain in the streets until Mursi is returned to the presidential palace. The Brotherhood also issued a statement distancing themselves from an attempted assassination of a senior army commander in the Sinai Peninsula on Wednesday.
Unknown gunmen in northern Sinai attempted to assassinate the commander of the Second Field Army, General Ahmed Wasfy, late Wednesday. A bystander was killed in an exchange of fire between the gunmen and the convoy guarding the senior military official. Wasfy was not hurt. The assassination attempt is just the latest violent incident to have taken place in the Sinai Peninsula, where the security situation is steadily deteriorating. A Coptic Christian man was found decapitated in the area five days after he was kidnapped by gunmen, security officials reported on Thursday. An Egyptian security official revealed that “extremist groups” had captured the man on Saturday, the same day that a Coptic priest was also killed. Religious extremists in the Sinai Peninsula are believed to be exploiting tensions and unrest across Egypt since the military ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Mursi last week.

Opinion: The Ultimate Downfall of Political Islam
Yousef Al-Dayni/Asharq Alawsat
“Islamist” models, or the political parties that use religion to serve political purposes, should not be viewed from a domestic perspective. This will not help us understand this globalized phenomenon, which is currently fighting for its life. The latest of such battles took place following the corrective revolution in Egypt, the stronghold of the main group, as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt prefer to be called. Members of the Brotherhood and those who sympathize with the concept of political Islam have flocked from everywhere. In fact, the statement issued in Saudi Arabia by academics and preachers linked to the Brotherhood to express support and to acknowledge the legitimacy of the deposed president is nothing but a sign that Islamists have lost control over the post-Arab Spring political scene.
In fact, the Brotherhood managed to hijack the Arab Spring in different locations, but failed to maintain their control over it for several reasons, the weakest of which is represented by their opponents. The most important reasons are, however, the group’s failure to get rid of the mentality of acting as an underground organization, as well as the organization’s claims of religious legitimacy for its policies, which Gilles Kepel, the French thinker, termed as the ‘dualism of the Prophet and pharaoh.’
Rather than get involved in a fruitless argument of agreeing or disagreeing with what happened in Egypt, let’s take a more comprehensive look at the scene. This argument is important and has been heavily circulated on social networking websites. But arguments about the right description of the corrective revolution and whether it is a smooth coup or not, as well as the military’s interference, death of protesters, use of violence and the shutting down of sectarianism-inciting TV channels, will not help us understand the acute crisis we are currently going through, and which might continue for decades to come.
Perhaps what happened in Egypt marks the eventual downfall of the “Islamist” ideology, which started as an emerging political phenomenon after the failure of the Arab renaissance. The discourse of the Arab nationalist renaissance, which arose in reaction to imperialism, eventually lost its mass appeal. Moreover, Islamist ideology managed to replace the “traditional Islam” represented by major historical schools that are affiliated with traditional sects, as well as the Salafist and Sufist trends. Despite the fact that they were fighting for representation, these various components of Islam did not put social peace in jeopardy or were separated from authority.
“Islamism” has stumbled on several occasions, but its ultimate downfall is yet to come. The use of violence by the Brotherhood, and later on by the supporters of Sayyid Qutb, represented the first obstacle. By targeting tourists and the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian jihadist groups came into the spotlight after they broke ranks with the Brotherhood.
Later, Islamism became involved in the political process by representing the opposition in more politically pluralistic countries that allowed the formation of political parties, be they secret or public.
In the Gulf States, however, Islamism remained to represent the silent opposition until it managed to separate itself from the institutions and trends of “traditional Islam,” particularly during the Gulf crisis and the attacks of 9/11. Although 9/11 marked the end of attempts at forcing change by violence in the West, it produced a violent backlash inside the Islamic world—even in countries such as Saudi Arabia.
The end of armed struggle revived hopes for effecting political change and forming opposition especially after the West, particularly the US, was shaken by the activities of Al-Qaeda.
The West tried to contain “Islamism” and considered it as a moderate alternative to Al-Qaeda; the West contained Islamist groups and made them assume authority without taking into account the political consequences ensuing from these groups’ failure to run the state. Islamist groups, however, acted like dultans, depending on their public support and the cadres that deify them. At this point, it was expected that this will lead to failure and violence and chaos will prevail. Unable to imagine that their dream of “Brotherhood government” has come to an end, the Brotherhood gathered their supporters in Egypt.
However, the Brotherhood’s narrow political program, along with the ability of the unpoliticized masses in the Arab and Islamic worlds to differentiate between religious slogans and political activity on the ground, signaled the ultimate downfall of the idea of “Islamism.”There is every indication that this downfall will be final, particularly if the Brotherhood continues to sing the same tune of the return of chaos. In fact, this is a distortion of reality and history, a thing we have suffered from for so long.