Body of Lebanese Man Transferred to Lebanon from Israel
Naharnet /The body of 46-year-old Lebanese Fouad Elias Abou Murad was transferred from Israel into Lebanon on Monday through al-Naqoura border crossing. Fouad's body was handed over to his family, who hail from the town of Jdeidet Marjeyoun. The man, according to NNA, entered Israel in 2000. The transfer occurred under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and in the presence of the Lebanese Red Cross. According to a statement issued by the ICRC, “the operation was carried out upon the request of the family of the deceased and with the approval of concerned authorities in Lebanon and Israel.”Head of the ICRC delegation in Lebanon Jurg Montani stressed that the role of ICRC “is strictly humanitarian and part of our ongoing work to restore and maintain contact between people detained or separated in connection with armed conflict and their families.""The ICRC is acting in its capacity as a neutral intermediary at the request of the families and the Israeli and Lebanese authorities, and with the full consent of all parties concerned," the official added.

Report: 5,000 Hizbullah Fighters Joined Assad's Forces in Damascus Fighting
Naharnet /Some 5,000 Hizbullah members have been fighting alongside Syrian regime troops against rebels in the restive suburbs of Damascus, the Saudi al-Watan daily reported. The newspaper quoted sources as saying that the fighters crossed the border into Syria last month. But they said that around 300 of them were killed in the fighting in the past few days. Battles have flared in areas around Damascus as rebels seeking to topple President Bashar Assad try to push into the city itself. The rebel advances in the suburbs threaten the government's grip on its seat of power, prompting a punishing response from the military on rebel areas skirting the capital. Media reports have said several Hizbullah commanders and fighters have been killed in Syria since the revolt that erupted with peaceful demonstrations in March 2011 turned violent. The party, which is backed by the Syrian and Iranian regimes, has long been accused by the Syrian opposition of assisting Damascus in its crackdown on the uprising — a claim Hizbullah repeatedly has denied.

Pope Benedict XVI Says Syria Conflict 'Will Know No Victors' without Peace
Naharnet/Pope Benedict XVI called Monday for a ceasefire and "constructive dialogue" in Syria, warning that there will be no victors should the violent conflict drag on further. "I think first and foremost of Syria, torn apart by endless slaughter and the scene of dreadful suffering among its civilian population," 85-year-old Benedict told ambassadors to the Holy See gathered at the Vatican. "I renew my appeal for a ceasefire and the inauguration as quickly as possible of a constructive dialogue aimed at putting an end to a conflict which will know no victors but only vanquished if it continues, leaving behind it nothing but a field of ruins," he said. The pope asked the ambassadors representing the 179 countries accredited at the Holy See to pass the message on to their governments "so that essential aid will urgently be made available to face this grave humanitarian situation." Benedict has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Syria. He used his Christmas message to call for an end to the bloodshed in the country, whose people have been "deeply wounded and divided by a conflict which does not spare even the defenseless and reaps innocent victims."Agence France Presse

Schools in Lebanon to Close Tuesday, Wednesday due to Storm
Naharnet/Schools throughout Lebanon will be closed on Tuesday and Wednesday due to the fierce storm lashing Lebanon, announced Education Minister Hassan Diab in a memo on Monday. The memo said: “Due to our keenness on the students' safety, all private and official schools will be closed on January 8 and 9.” “Lebanon is witnessing rare weather conditions that it has not experienced for tens of years whereby the snowstorm and heavy rain are expected to hit the whole of Lebanon,” it explained. The storm, which began on Saturday, has been wreaking havoc throughout the country with roads being flooded, people being stranded in their cars, and material damage being incurred due to the heavy rain, flooding, and strong winds.

Man killed, baby missing in Lebanon winter storm
January 07, 2013/By Mohammed Zaatari, Rima S. Aboulmona/The Daily Star             
BEIRUT/SIDON, Lebanon: Strong winds and floods killed a man and washed away a baby boy and caused travel misery as it swept across Lebanon for a second day Monday, in what the Meteorological office described as a "rare storm." The Education Ministry announced the closure of all public and private schools Tuesday and Wednesday. Police identified the fatality as Joseph Antoine Sfeir. They said the 69-year-old man was killed when his car skidded due to heavy rain on the Zhaima-Mansourieh road in the Metn region north of Beirut. Meanwhile, Civil Defense said rescue teams were still searching for seven-month-old Youssef al-Fadel who was washed away by heavy rain overnight. The boy is the son of a Lebanese shepherd family that lives in a tent on the foot of Jadra, in the Iqlim al-Kharroub region east of Sidon, south Lebanon. “There has been a decrease in floods since midday [Monday] which will allow our teams to go down to the valley and search for the baby,” one official told The Daily Star. The boy’s brother, Abdo, said the family of 10 was sleeping when their tent flooded. “We were sleeping in our tent when we heard a strange sound and a few seconds later rain flooded our tent,” Abdo, 11, told The Daily Star. “We all fled and my mother carried Youssef, but he slipped from her arms as she ran and was swept away by the rain,” Abdo added. The violent storm uprooted nearly a dozen tents in the hills of Jadra overnight. The tents had been set up by Lebanese shepherds who hail from the Bekaa town of Deir Zannoun in east Lebanon.The Civil Defense was able to rescue all three families stranded by flood water in Jadra. However, at least 300 goats perished in the storm. Strong winds and rain also tore down several billboards along the coastal highway that links Beirut with Sidon. The road at the Awali River, just north of Sidon, was closed after heavy rainfall choked the portion of the drainage channel near the river. Powerful winds at 100 km/hour toppled several trees and ripped up agricultural greenhouses along the coastal highway between Sidon and the rest of south Lebanon. In the coastal town of Rmaileh, a giant tree fell onto the road, disrupting traffic, particularly school buses. An old tree fell near Rizk hospital in the Beirut neighborhood of Ashrafieh overnight, severely damaging two parked cars. Scores of homes in Wardanieh in Iqlim al-Kharroub have flooded due to the heavy rains. The harsh winter storm, which began late Saturday, left behind a mess in Beirut and surrounding areas. Motorists were stuck in traffic after torrential rain turned many roads and tunnels across Lebanon into a quagmire. "It was terrible. The trip from my house in Sin al-Fil to [Beirut] airport, which normally takes 10 minutes at this time of the night, took me one whole hour," said a citizen who had to drop his daughter off to catch a 2 a.m. flight.
Many parents did not send their children to school and many of those who did go arrived late. Beirut’s Karantina road was turned into a river Sunday night after pouring rain battered the city over the previous 24 hours. The Beirut Fire Department said in a statement Monday it had rescued scores of people stranded late Sunday and early Monday in the capital’s flooded streets, mainly in the Karantina area. It said rescue squads have worked since Sunday to suck out rainwater from a “huge number of flooded homes.” A landslide turned the main road of Nahr al-Mot, north of Beirut, into a muddy swamp, that left drivers stuck for hours. In nearby Antelias, the first floor of a building was flooded after the Antelias River water level rose. Many roadside walls have collapsed due to the storm, including a concrete wall along the Champville College, a private French-language school in Metn. No one was hurt.
Several cars were damaged when a concrete wall collapsed in the northeastern Beirut suburb of Hazmieh, causing massive traffic jams. Further up, in Mansourieh, the main road was cut as the floods continued to rise. Rain caused disruption throughout the country as pools of water closed many roads, mainly Shweifat-Aramoun and Beiteddine-Baakline roads in Mount Lebanon. Floods also impeded traffic in east Lebanon, resulting in cars breaking down on the Ablah-Riaq, Firzil-Zahle and Bar Elias-Masnaa roads. On the Chtaura highway that links Beirut with Damascus, members of the Internal Security Forces prevented motorists from crossing toward Dahr al-Baidar if their cars were not equipped with snow chains. In the north of the country, the picture was similar with floods forcing road closures, particularly the road linking Koura with Tripoli and that leading to Akkar. Public and private schools, including vocational and technical colleges, were ordered to close Tuesday and Wednesday. A statement issued by Education Minister Hassan Diab attributed the closure to the ongoing storm which the Meteorological Department said will continue for the next two days.
“This is a rare storm. Lebanon hasn't witnessed such a storm in decades,” a source at the Meteorological office told The Daily Star. The source said the storm, coming from Russia, reached its peak strength Sunday and Monday. “However, it will continue Tuesday and Wednesday with heavy rains and thunder storms and lower temperatures,” the source added. He said snow is expected to fall as low as 500 meters and below above sea level between Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning. The source said the storm is expected to dwindle late Wednesday to early Thursday to showers. President Michel Sleiman kept a close watch on the storm Monday. He discussed measures to cope with the blizzard with Transportation Minister Ghazi Aridi, Interior Minister Marwan Charbel and Lebanese Army Commander Gen. Jean Kahwagi. A statement from the presidential palace said Sleiman urged the cooperation of the concerned ministries as well Civil Defense, Lebanese Red Cross, municipalities and local authorities in opening roads, removing barriers and providing assistance to citizens.

Geagea: FPM Must Convince Allies of Orthodox Gathering Law or Adopt Small Districts
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Monday called on the Free Patriotic Movement to seek its allies' approval of the electoral law proposed by the Orthodox Gathering -- under which each sect would elect its representatives -- or else endorse the electoral law proposed by March 14's Christians, which is based on 50 small electorates. “We were among those who suggested amending the electoral law because the current law does not ensure proper representation and this is what several parties are saying,” Geagea said at a press conference he held in Maarab. “The law that ensures proper representation is the Orthodox Gathering law, which is in line with the Taef Accord that stipulated equal power-sharing between Christians and Muslims. But this proposal was met with fierce objections, that's why we discussed a better system, which is the small electorates law because it also ensures proper representation,” Geagea added. During a meeting held under Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi on Sunday in Bkirki, the Christian four-party committee on the electoral law agreed to endorse the electoral system proposed by the Orthodox Gathering. The panel comprises representatives from the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalange Party and the Marada Movement. “The FPM agreed with the government on a law based on proportional representation and the government approved it, but it does not ensure proper representation at all. Yesterday at the meeting of the Bkirki subcommittee we discussed the Orthodox Gathering law and said we would support it if the FPM managed to convince its allies of it,” Geagea declared. “If for a certain reason the FPM couldn't obtain its allies' approval of the Orthodox Gathering law, we must immediately endorse the small electorates law,” he stressed. “Yesterday, they pledged that there is no return to the 1960 law and we were the first to reject it. We also agreed to go to the parliamentary committees and seek an agreement on the electoral law and if we fail to reach an agreement, we will go to parliament's general assembly,” the LF leader added, noting that the March 14 coalition is willing to “breach” its boycott of meetings attended by government “only for the sake of passing a new electoral law.”Geagea called on Speaker Nabih Berri to resort to a vote in parliament should the parties fail to agree on an electoral law. “I remind him that he had said he would support any law the Christians agree on, and we have reached an agreement,” added Geagea. Asked about the stance of his allies in the March 14 coalition, especially the Mustaqbal Movement, Geagea said: “The electoral law is a process that has to do with proper or improper representation, not with political agendas, and we're in constant contact with our allies, which enabled us to agree with them on the small electorates law, and the FPM must convince its allies (of the Orthodox Gathering law) or else endorse the small electorates law.” “There are several viewpoints in the March 14 camp, but so far we all support the small electorates law,” he noted. Answering another question, Geagea stressed that March 14 will not accept the postponement of elections under any circumstances.

Christians agree to prioritize Orthodox Gathering law: source
January 07, 2013 /By Jana El Hassan/The Daily Star/BEIRUT: Lebanon’s rival Christian parties agreed to prioritize the Orthodox Gathering draft law for the coming 2013 parliamentary elections, a source from the Kataeb Movement told The Daily Star Monday. “Christian parties agreed to give priority and voice support for the Orthodox Gathering law during the meetings of the subcommittee discussing elections’ law,” said the source, which spoke on condition of anonymity. The decision comes after an expanded meeting between the country’s four main Christian parties was held in Bkirki Sunday to address the electoral law and seek approval for the suggestion put forward by the Maronite Church which advocates that each sect elects its own lawmakers. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party and the Marada Movement. Meanwhile, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea voiced Monday rejection of the 1960 law and said his party supports the Orthodox Gathering law, provided that the FPM gets approval from its allies on endorsing it. “The FPM said it was able to secure his allies’ approval of the Orthodox Gathering law. We hope what it declared is real,” said Geagea. Geagea said that the LF has always supported the Orthodox Gathering proposal, arguing that it secures the best representation for Christians despite disagreements on it. According to the LF leader, alternatives for the Orthodox gathering were sought when it was opposed by other political groups. “That’s when we went for supporting the small electoral districts law after the Future Movement agreed on it,” said Geagea.
Geagea also addressed House Speaker Nabih Berri, reminding him that he once said his Amal Movement will support any electoral law agreed on by Christians. “Berri used to always say let the Christians agree on an electoral law and we are with them. Well, we just agreed on one,” said Geagea. Also on Monday, Cardinal Beshara Rai urged members of the parliamentary subcommittee to agree on a new law for the coming 2013 elections. “I hope you work hard to issue a new law for the elections because the 1960 law marginalizes a large number of Lebanese,” said Rai. Rai’s remarks came as the parliamentary subcommittee is set to resume Tuesday meetings over a new law for the elections. “We want a law that ensures the right representation of lawmakers, a law that makes everyone feel there is real partnership in the country,” said Rai. The cardinal has repeatedly voiced rejection of the 1960 law, arguing that the winner-takes-all system used in the 2009 parliamentary elections would threaten Lebanon’s sectarian coexistence and diversity. Rai who advocates the Orthodox Gathering suggestion says such law would ease concerns about the representation of Christians However, civil society has criticized this law saying it would encourage sectarianism in an already much-divided country.

Al-Rahi Urges Electoral Subcommittee to Speedily Set Stage for Parliamentary Session
Naharnet /Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi urged on Monday the members of a subcommittee to agree on a new draft-law and put it on parliament's agenda. In a message to the MPs, who are scheduled to revive the subcommittee meetings in parliament on Tuesday, al-Rahi said: “You should work hard to produce a new electoral law and overcome the 1960 law that marginalizes a large segment of the Lebanese.” The law that is based on a winner-takes-all system and was adopted in the previous elections prevents the Lebanese from participating in their public duties, he said. “The Lebanese want a law that reflects true representation and leads to real national partnership,” he said. The patriarch also urged the head of the committee and the MPs from the rival March 8 and 14 camps to comfort the Lebanese that the state is based on their cooperation and understanding among each other. He said they should speedily set the stage for a parliamentary session to vote on a new draft-law, warning the lawmakers would be held responsible for their choices and stances. The subcommittee that is made up of lawmakers from the majority and the opposition is set to discuss during intense meetings starting Tuesday the electoral system and the type and size of districts. During a meeting held under al-Rahi on Sunday, the Christian four-party committee on the electoral law agreed to endorse the electoral system proposed by the so-called Orthodox Gathering, under which each sect would elect its own lawmakers. The panel comprises representatives from the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalange Party and the Marada Movement.

U.S. gives Lebanon 200 armored vehicles
January 07, 2013/The Daily Star/BEIRUT: The United States has given 200 armored vehicles to Lebanon, part of the U.S. military assistance program, the Lebanese Army said Monday. The M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) arrived in Beirut port late Sunday, the army said. A Lebanese security source said the army now had 1,200 APCs. “The shipment of vehicles will support the Lebanese armed forces’ capabilities and their mobility and ability to respond to crises. It is also to protect borders and internal stability,” said a U.S. diplomat source. The diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the vehicles were used but were all in “very good working order and will be refurbished in Lebanon.”More than $140 million in equipment and assistance were provided to Lebanon’s army by the U.S. in the past six months. The equipment included six Huey 2 Helicopters, a 42-metre coastal security craft, more than 1000 guns and 38 million rounds of ammunition. – With Reuters.

U.S. senator calls for gradual cut in aid to Israel
January 07, 2013/By Aron Heller
JERUSALEM (AP) - U.S. Sen. Rand Paul on Monday called for a gradual reduction of American foreign aid, delivering the message in an unlikely venue - since Israel is among the top recipients of American assistance. Paul, a Republican from Kentucky, told reporters that the U.S. can't afford to keep borrowing money and then handing it out to others, even to allies like Israel. "It will harder to be a friend of Israel if we are out of money. It will be harder to defend Israel if we destroy our country in the process," he told the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, an Israeli think tank. "I think there will be significant repercussions to running massive deficits ... you destroy your currency by spending money you don't have." Paul, a longtime opponent of foreign aid, acknowledged he was expressing a "minority opinion" and doubted Congress would end foreign aid in his lifetime. "It's unlikely anything changes, but I think it is worth discussing," he said during his first trip to Israel. Israel gets about $3 billion a year in military aid from the U.S. Paul insisted Washington should first cut aid to countries with strained ties to America, such as Pakistan and Egypt, and only later wean Israel off aid. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously stated he was interested in doing that. Paul said the aid, used in large part by Israel and Egypt to buy U.S. weapons, was creating an arms race in the Middle East that could ultimately harm Israel, not help it. "I'm concerned that some of the weaponry that we are currently giving to Egypt may one day be used against Israel," he said. Most American military assistance to Israel must be spent on U.S.-made equipment, providing a boost to the military industry there. Paul suggested Israel would actually benefit from less aid, saying it would enhance its sovereignty by not having to approach the U.S. "on bended knee" when making its own decisions. "I don't think you need to call me on the phone to ask permission for what you want to do to stop missiles from raining down on you from Gaza," he said. Paul, the son of former presidential candidate Ron Paul, is mentioned as a potential presidential contender in 2016. A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Paul is scheduled to meet with Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres and other Israeli leaders before heading off for meetings in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

Obama posts top intel official to Cairo before Chuck Hagel, John Brennan nominations
DEBKAfile Special Report January 7, 2013/As Washington prepared for new appointments to the Obama cabinet, the US president dispatched US Undersecretary for Defense Intelligence Michael Vickers to Cairo Sunday, Jan. 12 on a two-day mission to try and revitalize the counter-terror war on two key fronts: post-Qaddafi Libya and Egyptian Sinai. debkafile’s Washington sources report that President Barack Obama hastened to address these fronts, because he expected the five-month old murder of US Ambassador Christ Stevens in Benghazi by al Qaeda to come up at congressional hearings and hamper the endorsement of ex-Senator Chuck Hagel as defense secretary and John Brennan as Central Intelligence Director. Their appointments were to be announced Monday, Jan. 7.Hagel faced a preliminary storm over his attitudes on Israel and Iran, whereas Brennan, as counterterrorism adviser to the president, has been responsible for shaping administration policy in this sphere in Libya, Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. The United States has still not taken steps against the Libyan Ansar al-Sharia group, which assassinated the ambassador and three US staffers on Sept. 11. 2012, and numbered Egyptian al Qaeda jihadis who came in from Cairo. This cross-alliance still functions with impunity as the Libyan group enforces its control over large areas of Benghazi and eastern Libya, funded by the smuggling of arms from Libya and pumping them into the big smuggling pipelines running through Sinai via Egypt. Jihadist terror is also rampant in Sinai.  On Nov. 21, President Obama, in a phone call to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, pledged the immediate deployment of US troops for leading a comprehensive Egyptian campaign against the al Qaeda and Salafist Bedouin extremists who have settled in northern and central Sinai after driving the Egyptian administration out. This pledge was part of the ceasefire deal which ended Israel’s Gaza Strip operation. But so far, according to our military and counterterrorism sources, very little has been done except for a visit to Sinai by a small study group of American officers and servicemen. The delay is accounted for mainly by the weighty challenges confronting Egyptian President Mohamed Mors in the last couple of months. Morso is practically the only office-holder in Cairo ready to endorse an covert military US operation in Sinai for eradicating the terrorist bane. Egyptian Defense Minister Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Sissi was his only ally, but in recent weeks the Egyptian army has come out against an anti-al Qaeda expedition in Sinai.The security situation there is constantly deteriorating as Egypt struggles to retain some grip on the territory. In mid-December, the defense minister in Cairo quietly issued an order, with made hardly a ripple outside Egypt, “restricting the right to buy property in Sinai to second-generation Egyptian citizens.”This prohibition was made necessary, our sources disclose, by the land grab in force by partnerships of Persian Gulf tycoons, mainly Qatar, and Gazan Palestinian, mostly Hamas adherents. They were quietly snapping up choice coastal strips of Sinai to gain control of the peninsula’s Mediterranean and Gulf of Aqaba shores, as well as the western and eastern regions. The Egyptian military passed the new law to save the territory from slipping out of its hands to Palestinian Hamas and Gulf oil interests.  Hamas is also believed to be in cahoots with allies in the armed terrorist groups of Libya and Sinai.
Delayed American action in Sinai has produced three results:
1.  The Sinai arms smuggling route (which also serves Iran) is thriving as never before. The expanded earnings of Ansar al-Sharia are bolstering its grip on power in Libya;
2.  Sinai has been allowed to evolve into al Qaeda’s primary operational-logistical hub for Africa and the Middle East, its jumping-off base for action in Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen;
3.  In the absence of any resistance, al Qaeda is bringing its positions close to the Israeli border. All Egyptian military efforts to curtail the terrorist creep into the northern Sinai towns of El Arish and Rafah have had no effect.
Sunday, Jan. 6, a band of Salafist Bedouin came up to a parked car on the El Arish main street and shot the driver dead. debkafile reports that the victim, one of the top men in Egypt’s counter-terror campaign in northern Sinai, was on a surveillance mission in civilian dress. The terrorists knew who he was – indicating they have established a clandestine presence inside Egypt’s security services.

Report: Christian Four-Party Panel Agrees to Adopt Orthodox Gathering Law
Naharnet /The Christian four-party committee on the electoral law on Sunday agreed to endorse the electoral system proposed by the so-called Orthodox Gathering, under which each sect would elect its own lawmakers, LBCI television reported. The committee took its decision during a meeting held in Bkirki. The four-party panel comprises representatives from the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalange Party and the Marada Movement. LF MP George Adwan has revealed that a meeting was recently held between the LF, Mustaqbal Movement and Phalange Party to coordinate their stances ahead of the meeting of the electoral subcommittee on Tuesday. He said: “The three parties will propose an electoral draft law based on 50 districts, but they will openly discuss all draft laws.”“According to the contacts we held, the circumstances are appropriate to reach an agreement over a law other than the 1960 law,” he added. “We may not reach this agreement during the subcommittee meeting, but I am certain that a new law will enjoy the support of the majority of lawmakers,” Adwan stated. He stressed that the LF will do “all it can to get rid of the 1960 law,” noting that the whole purpose of the resumption of the subcommittee meetings is to push parliament to convene “as soon as possible for each camp to vote for the electoral draft law of its preference.” “Each camp will then be made to assume its responsibilities once the vote is done,” he said. “The people will soon be able to judge the officials based on their actions, not their intentions,” remarked the MP. The electoral subcommittee is scheduled to convene on Tuesday after the March 14 opposition agreed to Speaker Nabih Berri's proposal of residing in a hotel near the parliament building in downtown Beirut, as a safety precaution. The opposition alliance had announced following the assassination of Internal Security Forces Intelligence Bureau head Brigadier General Wissam al-Hasan on October 19 that they will be boycotting the national dialogue sessions and the government's work, awaiting Prime Minister Najib Miqati's resignation. The government approved in August an electoral bill based on proportional representation and 13 districts, but it was met with the opposition's rejection, which deemed it as being tailored to the March 8 majority camp's interests.

Jumblatt says Assad speech detached from reality
January 07, 2013/The Daily Star/ BEIRUT: Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt Monday described the recent speech by Syrian President Bashar Assad as detached from reality. “Away from the classy atmospheres in the Opera House, Assad’s speech was completely detached from reality,” said Jumblatt in his weekly stance to the PSP-affiliated Al-Anbaa website. The PSP leader also said Assad’s Sunday speech was repetitive and reminiscent of the speech he made at the beginning of the conflict. “The major difference Assad has missed between his two speeches is the death toll in Syria,” said Jumblatt. “The number of casualties when Assad gave his first address was 3,000 while latest estimates place the figure at over 60,000 dead,” added the PSP leader. Jumblatt also mocked the “so-called political initiative” put forth by Assad to end his country’s conflict and said the Syrian president’s suggestion shows “his detachment from reality has reached advance stages.” Jumblatt argued that the proposal put forward by Assad was nothing more than a number of steps that were suspiciously implemented in the past. “The new constitution, superficial reform, and illusory elections were carried out during the previous phase over the bodies of the Syrian people,” said the PSP leader. Assad's speech was supposed to declare a new peace plan but the president offered no concessions and dismissed the prospect of negotiations with Syrian opposition groups. “Assad’s proposals are now nothing more than soap bubbles because they are no longer address the core of the problem,” said Jumblatt, echoing Assad’s description of the Arab spring as “soap bubbles.” The PSP leader also called on Lebanese rivals to resume communication among each other and seek a way out of Lebanon’s crisis, instead of waiting for the outcome of Syria’s conflict. “It might be useful for Lebanese rivals to start thinking about meeting instead of waiting for the outcome of the Syrian crisis and bet on it,” said Jumblatt.

A Lebanese pattern of selective hatred
By Eyad Abu Shakra
Monday, 07 January 2013
The stance of the Free National Movement on Syrian refugees as expressed by minister Jibran Bassil, also the brother-in-law of the movement’s head and founder Michel Aoun, seems normal and expected for everyone who is familiar with the movement’s ideologies. Some entities that use “national” titles like Aoun’s “movement” in Lebanon and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s “front” in France as well as Adolf Hitler’s “party” adopt two approaches: first, hating a particular group and second, regarding the leader as infallible. That is why it is not surprising to hear what Bassil said about Syrian refugees, rendered homeless by the same regime that persecuted Aoun before it allied with him to undermine Lebanese unity. Bassil’s statements demonstrate hatred for a people that, whether Aoun likes it or not, have very strong ties with their Lebanese brethren. It is strange, however, that while the supporters of Aoun are waging this campaign against Syrian refugees, his ally Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, displayed a much wiser stance on the matter.
Despite his unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which constitutes an extension of Iranian influence, he is a man who knows his limits and is aware that some things ought not to be said. He realized that he had lost a large portion of the support he used to enjoy in the Muslim world because of his subordination to Iran and his support for the sectarian and familial “mafia” that is the Syrian regime and which derives its power from the brutal suppression of its people.
Aoun and hatred
Aoun’s movement is taking advantage of the flow of Syrian refugees to play on the fears of Lebanese Christians and who are made to think they will be crushed by the growing number of Muslims  
Eyad Abu ShakraWhy then is the Aoun movement adamant on inciting hatred? And for how long will Hezbollah stand still while its ally is doing so?
To answer the first question, it is important to remember that elections will be held in Lebanon within a few months and during such times, “national” movements that belong to Le Penn’s school start investing in fears and igniting prejudice. The hatred card is in many cases a winning one whether this hatred is directed against a Muslim Arab, Amazigh, Kurdish, or Turkish group, a black group from Africa or the West Indies, a dark group from the Indian Subcontinent, or even a white Christian group from East Europe.
Aoun’s movement is taking advantage of the flow of Syrian refugees to play on the fears of Lebanese Christians and who are made to think they will be crushed by the growing number of Muslims. The problem with this approach, however, is that it overlooks the demographic and security expansion of Hezbollah in many regions in Lebanon including predominantly Christian ones under the nose of the Aoun movement. Encouraging Christians to antagonize Sunni Muslims also creates a state of sectarian polarization that can have extremely dangerous repercussions on the region.
Answering the second question about Hezbollah’s stance on Bassil’s statement is closely related to local electoral considerations. In a speech published on al-Nahar newspaper on November 6, 1989, Nasrallah described Aoun as a “confrontational and destructive Israeli case who only cares about his and his sect’s interests” and described his approach as “typical racist Maronite.” The only reason why Hezbollah is still supporting Aoun despite describing him as such is the fact that the former is badly in need of the latter’s representatives in the parliament to pass an election law that allows it to seize control of Lebanon’s institutions in a legal and constitutional manner that is through ballot boxes. *This article was published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on Jan. 7, 2013. Here’s the article’s link: http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=12459&article=711986
(Eyad Abu Shakra (also written as Ayad Abou-Chakra) began his media career in 1973 with An-Nahar newspaper in Lebanon. Joined Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper in the UK in 1979, occupying several positions including: Senior Editor, Managing Editor, and Head of Research Unit, as well as being a regular columnist. He has several published works, including books, chapters in edited books, and specialized articles, in addition to frequent regular TV and radio appearances
*Active in academic, social and charity work, and a former active member of the Labour Party in the UK)

Syria conflict ‘will know no victors’ without peace: Pope
Monday, 07 January 2013 /(AFP)  inShare.0 By AFP /Pope Benedict XVI called Monday for a ceasefire and “constructive dialogue” in Syria, warning that there will be no victors should the violent conflict drag on further.“I think first and foremost of Syria, torn apart by endless slaughter and the scene of dreadful suffering among its civilian population,” 85-year-old Benedict told ambassadors to the Holy See gathered at the Vatican. “I renew my appeal for a ceasefire and the inauguration as quickly as possible of a constructive dialogue aimed at putting an end to a conflict which will know no victors but only vanquished if it continues, leaving behind it nothing but a field of ruins,” he said. The pope asked the ambassadors representing the 179 countries accredited at the Holy See to pass the message on to their governments “so that essential aid will urgently be made available to face this grave humanitarian situation.” Benedict has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Syria. He used his Christmas message to call for an end to the bloodshed in the country, whose people have been “deeply wounded and divided by a conflict which does not spare even the defenseless and reaps innocent victims.”

Bashar addresses his international gang
By Dr. Hamad Al-Majid/Asharq Alawsat
The only positive aspect of Bashar al-Assad’s speech yesterday was that this time he avoided the usual rhetoric. He did not bombard his audience with the ridiculous and loathsome comments that he gave in his speeches at the start of the revolution, at a time when he was seeking to establish his self-confidence. Today is different because the revolutionaries are surrounding Damascus and the noose is tightening around its neck. The airports have become in range of the rebels and the revolution is growing steadily, whilst al-Assad’s rule is clearly in decline. Bashar before anyone else realizes that his dictatorial regime encompasses all the reasons for its own downfall, from the bloodthirsty and brutal acts, the assassinations, torture, sectarianism and corruption, and the looting of the country’s wealth. This was all before the outbreak of the revolution. As for afterwards, the courageous popular revolution has added to the regime’s unsightly CV more than 60,000 dead, millions displaced and massive destruction in Syrian towns and cities. By logical calculation it is impossible for it to escape from collapse, so what is Bashar clinging on to in the hope of remaining Syria’s president? Given the facts on the ground that are working against him and his regime, we can only presume that al-Assad is gambling on two possibilities; one the very slight possibility of the survival of his rule, and two the destruction of his country. Let’s speak in all honesty; President al-Assad with his vile sectarian agenda does not care about plunging Syria into hell. He is more like a foreign occupier, resisting only against Syria’s revolutionaries and patriots and fighting them with all kinds of destructive weaponry. He will win in any case, either the popular revolution will be destroyed or he will destroy a country that seems to mean very little to him. “The criminal will wish that he could be ransomed from the punishment of that Day by his children. And his wife and his brother. And his nearest kindred who shelter him. And whoever is on earth entirely [so] then it could save him” [Surat al-Ma’arij, Verses 11-14]. Bashar, like his father, only sees Syria as an extension of the Safavid Crescent, and either Syria will continue as that or he will hand it back to its people in ruins. However, it must be noted that Bashar does not have power over that decision purely himself; the Syrian lock is one with many keys. One key is held by the figures of the Alawite sect close to him, another by the key pillars of his rule who benefit from it, and there are also keys in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow. In short, Bashar is like the leader of a gang and even if he tried to change now or take regressive steps, his loyalty lies first and foremost with the members of his gang because he carries all their secrets and is their partner in crimes of murder, torture, smuggling and rape. This is one of the reasons for his insistence to remain in power despite the fact that land is falling all around him. Bashar the gang leader believed that the Arab Spring was like soap bubbles that would soon disappear, but the reality is that his regime is the biggest bubble, now in danger of bursting as its grip on the country loosens. The rebels first struck a blow to his inner circle through the famous “security cell” operation, and have now made advancements in every region. They control a number of border crossing points, making it easier to smuggle in sophisticated weaponry enabling them to down al-Assad’s aircraft, whereas in the past the regime would have stopped even an insect crossing from a neighboring country.  Thus, in al-Assad’s latest speech he did not provide anything new, his sole purpose was to reassure the rest of the gang in Tehran, Moscow, Beijing, Baghdad and southern Lebanon that the “code of honor” will be observed until the end.

Syrian opposition, West reject Assad ‘peace plan’
Monday, 07 January 2013 /The opposition Syrian National Coalition noted that Assad had ruled out any dialogue with the rebels, making negotiations impossible. (AFP)  inShare.0 By AFP
Damascus
A defiant speech by President Bashar al-Assad calling for peace in Syria on his terms has met rejection by the opposition and internationally, with only his ally Iran on Monday backing his stance. Assad’s plan was “detached from reality,” a U.S. State Department spokeswoman said, while Britain said Assad’s address was “empty”. The office of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said Europe’s position remained that Assad should step down to permit a political transition. And Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi told CNN he would endorse any decision by the Syrian people to put Assad on trial before the International Criminal Court for war crimes. The opposition Syrian National Coalition noted that Assad had ruled out any dialogue with the rebels, making negotiations impossible. Only Iran, which is supplying money, military advisors and, according to the United States, weapons to Assad’s regime threw its weight behind its ally. “The Islamic republic... supports President Bashar al-Assad’s initiative for a comprehensive solution to the country’s crisis,” which rejects “foreign interference,” Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said in a statement on his ministry website. Assad, in his first speech in seven months, on Sunday outlined his vision for a way out of the 21-month conflict that has shattered his country, killed more than 60,000 people according to the U.N., and created a well of instability exploited by Islamic jihadists and fuelled by regional rivalries. Any resolution of the conflict had to be purely Syrian, Assad said -- though he called those Syrians ranged against him “not a loyal opposition but a gang of killers.” He stated that most of the anti-regime fighters were foreigners, and said: “The one thing that is sure [is] that those who we face today are those who carry the Al-Qaeda ideology.” But while his plan calling for an end to violence, dialogue with opposition elements he deemed acceptable, and a vow to stand fast against those he branded “terrorists” and their foreign backers drew wild applause from his Damascus audience, it offered little realistic prospect of ending what has become a civil war. It was “yet another attempt by the regime to cling to power and does nothing to advance the Syrian people’s goal of a political transition,” U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in Washington. “His initiative is detached from reality,” she said. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said Assad’s first speech since June was full of “empty promises” and would “fool no one”.
The United States and Europe, which have declared the National Coalition the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people, are pressing Assad to leave power as the first step to any process to restore peace in Syria. “We maintain our position that Assad has to step aside and allow for a political transition,” a spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said in Brussels. But with Russia and China blocking any U.N. Security Council-approved international action against Assad’s regime, the Syrian war is slipping ever deeper into bloodshed with fears of lasting sectarian fractures. The United Nations estimates more than 60,000 people have been killed since a brutal crackdown by Assad’s forces on peaceful protests 21 months ago stirred the violence. Although the toll has climbed sharply in the past six months, and the rebels have grabbed swathes of territory in Syria’s north and east, the war has become a grinding impasse punctuated by shelling, regime air strikes and by car bombs set off by an increasingly radicalized insurgency. Efforts by the joint U.N.-Arab League peace envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, have made no more headway than those of his predecessor, Kofi Annan, who resigned in frustration. Brahimi has said he is working on a plan he hoped would be acceptable to all major powers that envisaged a ceasefire, a transitional government and parliamentary and presidential elections. Crucially, though, it left unspoken whether it conceived Assad remaining in power.

Marriage or rape? 90-year-old Saudi weds 15-year-old girl
Monday, 07 January 2013 
Close friends of the bride’s family said she was frightened on the wedding night, and locked herself in the room for two successive days. (Photo courtesy of www.youm7.com )  inShare.5 By Reem Hanbazazah
Al Arabiya
The recent marriage of a 90-year-old Saudi man to a 15-year-old girl has sparked condemnation from human rights and social media activists in the kingdom.  A member of the Saudi National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), urged authorities to intervene to save the child. On Twitter especially, activists criticized the parents of the girl for giving her to a man decades older than her. In an interview, the groom insisted that his marriage was “legal and correct,” and that he paid a $17,500 (SAR 65,000) dowry to marry the girl, who is the daughter of a Yemeni father and Saudi mother. The 90-year-old told the story of his first night with the bride. He said she entered the bedroom before him, and she locked the door from inside so he could not enter. This, he said, made him “suspicious about some kind of conspiracy” by the girl and her mother. He vowed to sue his in-laws to give him back the girl or return him the expensive dowry. Close friends of the bride’s family said she was frightened on the wedding night, and locked herself in the room for two successive days before fleeing back to her parents’ home. The member of the Saudi National Association for Human Rights (NSHR), Suhaila Zein al-Abedin, urged authorities to intervene “as soon as possible to save this child from tragedy.” Abedin noted that marriage in Islam must be based on mutual consent, and this was not satisfied, as demonstrated by the girl’s move to lock herself in the room.  She said the girl’s parents were also to be held responsible for marrying their daughter to a man the age of her great grandfather. Abedin urged the establishment of a minimum age of 18 for marrying girls, saying this would pave the way for punishing violators, according to a report by al-Hayat newspaper. Jamal al-Toueiki, a psychologist, said forced marriage may subject girls to abuse and violence, and this could lead to their suicide if nothing is done to save them.

Egyptian army foils bid to bomb Rafah church as Copts celebrate Christmas
Monday, 07 January 2013 
Another car carrying masked men sped away as the patrols seized the explosives-packed Toyota vehicle, MENA said. (Al Arabiya)  inShare.0 By Al Arabiya with agencies Egyptian army forces stationed in the Sinai Peninsula foiled an attempt early on Monday to bomb a church in Rahaf, a city in the border with Gaza Strip, according to a military statement. Col. Ahmed Mohammed Ali, a spokesman for Egypt's armed forces said, “the armed forces managed to stop two cars, a Toyota Doble Cabina and a Daewoo Lanos with no plates, in an area between Rafah church and a military unit under construction.” The military spokesman added that one of the vehicles carrying “masked elements” was able to escape. He said weapons seized in the other vehicle included sacks of TNT, two automatic weapon, 50 rounds, five electric detonators and an RPG launcher. Earlier, Egypt’s official MEAN news agency reported that “army units foiled an attack against the Rafah church at 1:00 am (2300 GMT Sunday) and seized a car packed with explosives and weapons near the church.”Egypt's Coptic minority celebrates Monday its first Christmas under Islamist rule and amid a climate of fear and uncertainty for their future, although President Mohamed Mursi has pledged to be the “president of all Egyptians.”In September, residents and officials reported that several Coptic families from Rafah had fled from the Sinai peninsula town that borders the Gaza Strip after receiving death threats from Islamists. Egyptian security sources suggested, meanwhile, that the planned attack could have been aimed at a military camp under construction near the church which has been targeted in the past by Islamist militants. They said the church has been lying abandoned for the past two years after it was torched in the aftermath of the countrywide uprising that toppled the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. It was not immediately clear who was behind the planned attack but one security source said the perpetrators were “probably radical Islamists whom security forces have been tracking for months.” Mursi, who hails from the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, visited the Sinai peninsula in October to meet with and reassure Coptic families, telling them that “your security is our security”. Egypt's Copts, who make up six to 10 percent of the country's population of 83 million, have regularly complained of discrimination and marginalisation and have also been the target of numerous sectarian attacks. One of the worst incidents of violence occurred on January 1, 2011 when 23 people were killed in an attack on a Coptic church in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria. Sinai, a scarcely populated peninsula home to lucrative tourist resorts in the south and shadowy Islamist militants in the north, is a major transit point for arms smuggling to Gaza which is ruled by the Islamist Hamas group. Security in the desert and mountainous region collapsed after the uprising that toppled Mubarak. Since his downfall, several militant attacks have targeted police and soldiers, including a brazen August 5 ambush on an army outpost that killed 16 soldiers. The military launched a wide-ranging campaign after that attack to flush out militants, but drive-by shootings have continued. And on Friday security officials announced the seizure in Sinai of US-made anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles destined for Gaza, where militants have said they would acquire more weapons to use against Israel.

Obama set to nominate Chuck Hagel as defense secretary
Monday, 07 January 2013 /Alarabyia/Since his name emerged last year as a candidate for the Pentagon, some Republicans contend that Hagel has at times opposed Israel’s interests. (AFP)Al Arabiya with agencies U.S. President Barack Obama is expected to nominate Chuck Hagel as his new defense secretary on Monday, and Republicans are signaling a fierce fight, even though he is one of their own. Obama, putting together his team for his second term, is poised to choose the intensely independent thinker to run the Pentagon. If Hagel is confirmed by the Senate, he will have to oversee the withdrawal of U.S. troops from another war zone - Afghanistan - and grapple with spending cuts.
The formal announcement of Hagel’s nomination could come as early as Monday, Democratic Party sources said. Obama is also expected to announce who he has chosen to replace David Petraeus at the helm of the CIA, with acting director Michael Morell and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan seen as the frontrunners, CNN said. Since his name emerged last year as a candidate for the Pentagon, some Republicans contend that Hagel has at times opposed Israel’s interests. His critics note that he voted against U.S. sanctions on Iran, and made disparaging remarks about the influence of what he called a “Jewish lobby” in Washington. The top Republican in the Senate, Mitch McConnell, praised Hagel when he left his Nebraska seat in 2009 for his “clear voice and stature on national security and foreign policy,” but his tone was markedly different on Sunday. “He ought to be given a fair hearing like any other nominee, and he will be,” McConnell told ABC. “I’m going to wait and see how the hearings go, and whether Chuck’s views square with the job he would be nominated to do.”But on CNN, leading Republican Senator Lindsey Graham did not shy away from a full-frontal attack, saying Hagel would be “the most antagonistic defense secretary towards the state of Israel in our nation’s history.
“Not only has he said you should directly negotiate with Iran, sanctions won’t work, that Israel must negotiate with Hamas, an organization, terrorist group, that lobs thousands of rockets into Israel. “He also was one of 12 senators who refused to sign a letter to the European Union trying to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization,” Graham said. Four years ago, Obama said Iraq was not the only matter where he held similar views with Hagel, a decorated Vietnam veteran who was also once touted as presidential material. “He’s a staunch Republican, but Chuck and I agree almost on every item of foreign policy,” Obama said in August 2008, a month after taking Hagel with him on a tour of Iraq. Hagel has also been critical of the size of the American military, telling the Financial Times in 2011 that the Defense Department was “bloated” and needed “to be pared down.” Hagel served two terms in the Senate, representing the state of Nebraska, and left in 2008. He is now a professor at Georgetown University, but also serves as co-chairman of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, and a member of the Secretary of Defense’s Policy Board.

Egypt’s Mursi backs calls for Assad war crimes trial
Monday, 07 January 2013 
Alarabyia/Mursi said Syrian people are the ones to decide what they want to do against those who committed crimes against them. (Reuters)  inShare.0 By Al Arabiya with AFP
Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi told CNN on Sunday that he backs Syrian calls for President Bashar al-Assad to be tried for war crimes, and predicted that Assad’s regime would fall.
“The Syrian people, through their revolution...will, when the bloodshed stops, move to a new stage where they will have an independent parliament and the government of their choosing,” Mursi said, according to excerpts released by CNN. “And then they will decide what they want to do against those who committed crimes against them. It is the Syrian people who decide.”Mursi spoke through a translator after being asked if he believed Assad should be tried by the Netherlands-based International Criminal Court. “This phase is the phase of the people. Similar to what the Egyptian people wanted, the Syrian people want it, and we support the Syrian people. They are going to win, and they have the will to win,” he said. In October, a statement about Arab military intervention in Syria made by the Mursi on a visit to Turkey issued controversy. The Egyptian president’s political adviser Seif Abdul Fattah later said the statements were taken out of context, and denied that Mursi had mentioned military intervention when he was in Turkey. “The president called for doing what our conscience and ethics dictate for the Syrian people,” Abdul Fattah added. It is important, he reportedly said, for Egypt to know the extent of this intervention and its exact goals.  Over the past 21 months, the Assad regime’s crackdown on anti-government protests has ballooned into a bloody civil war that the United Nations says has claimed more than 60,000 lives. Earlier Sunday, Assad gave his first public speech in seven months, in which he branded the opposition “slaves” of the West, and told foreign powers to stop backing the rebels. In Washington, the US State Department reiterated its call for Assad to resign. The European Union also called on him to step aside.

Israel's Arabs: Deprived or Radicalized?
by Efraim Karsh/Middle East Forum
Israel Affairs/January 2013, pp. 1-19
http://www.meforum.org/3423/israel-arabs-deprived-radicalized
October 1, 2000, was a watershed in Arab-Jewish relations in the state of Israel. On that day, as most Israelis were celebrating the Jewish new year, their Arab compatriots unleashed a tidal wave of violence in support of the 'al-Aqsa intifada', an all out war of terror launched by Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority a couple of days earlier.
For full ten days, Israeli Arabs blocked several main roads, cutting off Jewish localities and forcing some of them to defend against armed assaults by neighbours with whom they had maintained cordial relations for decades. Scores of Jewish families spending the holiday season in the Galilee found themselves attacked by frenzied Arab mobs wielding Molotov cocktails, ball bearings in slingshots, stones, even firearms. Stores, post offices, and other public places were ransacked as rioters clashed with police. Forests were set ablaze. In Nazareth, thousands of Arabs marched in the streets chanting, 'With our souls and our blood we will redeem Palestine'. Jaffa and Haifa, the showcases of Arab-Jewish coexistence, were rocked by violence and vandalism.
Shaken to the core, the Israeli government headed by Ehud Barak, who only days earlier had hosted Arafat in his private residence for what he described as 'a very good, warm, and open meeting',[1] apologized to the thirteen rioters killed in violent clashes with the police and appointed an official commission of inquiry headed by deputy chief justice Theodore Orr to investigate the events. Submitting its official report at the end of August 2003, long after Barak had been swept from power, the commission acknowledged the riots' strong chauvinistic impetus, noting grimly that 'Jews were attacked on the roads merely for being Jewish and their property was destroyed. In a number of incidences, they were just inches from death at the hands of an unrestrained mob'. And it rebuked Israeli Arab leaders not only for failing to direct their grievances into democratic, rather than violent, channels but also for having worked over the years to delegitimize the state and its institutions in the eyes of their constituents:
Messages transmitted prior to and during the October disturbances blurred and sometimes erased the distinction between [on the one hand] Israel's Arab citizens and their legitimate struggle for civil rights and [on the other hand] the armed struggle against Israel by organizations and individuals in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. More than once, the two struggles were presented by leaders of the Arab community as a single struggle against one adversary, if not an enemy. The concept of citizenship is incompatible with the presentation of the state as the enemy; with practises that treat the state and its legitimate institutions as an enemy; or with praising violent activities by the state's enemies against the state and its citizens.[2]
Yet even while denouncing such actions as 'incompatible with the loyalty owed by citizens to their country', the Orr commission refrained from proposing disciplinary measures against Israeli Arab leaders who had incited their constituents to violence. Instead, it attributed the volcanic eruption to something else entirely - namely, a longstanding callousness on the part of the Israeli establishment itself towards the state's Arab minority:
The state and successive generations of its government have failed to address in a comprehensive and deep fashion the difficult problems created by the existence of a large Arab minority inside the Jewish state. Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory. The establishment did not show sufficient sensitivity to the needs of the Arab sector, and did not do enough to give this sector its equal share of state resources. The state did not do enough or try hard enough to create equality for its Arab citizens or to uproot discriminatory or unjust practices.[3]
Behind this self-incriminatory diagnosis lay the conviction that Arab resentment and distrust of the Jewish state were corollaries of socioeconomic deprivation and that with growing affluence, such feelings would be supplanted by their opposites. The fact that Arab enmity had not given way, but on the contrary had intensified, was thus seen as proof that the 'Arab sector' had been a victim of official discrimination and had yet to receive 'its equal share of state resources'.
Unfortunately, this theory is false in general, and especially false in this particular case. In the modern world, it is not the poor and the oppressed who have led the great revolutions and/or carried out the worst deeds of violence; rather, it is militant vanguards from among the better educated and more moneyed circles of society. So it was with the Palestinian Arabs - in both mandatory Palestine and the state of Israel. The more prosperous, affluent, and better educated they became, the stronger and more vociferous their leaders' incitement against their state of citizenship, to the point of open rejection of the fundamental principles underpinning its very existence. But to understand this requires a look back at the history of Arab-Jewish relations during the past century.
Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land
The inflow of Jewish immigrants and capital after World War I revived Palestine's hitherto moribund condition. If prior to the war, some 2,500-3,000 Arabs, or one out of 200-250 inhabitants, emigrated from the country every year, this rate was slashed to about 800 per annum between 1920 and 1936 while Palestine's Arab population rose from about 600,000 to some 950,000 owing to the substantial improvement in socioeconomic conditions attending the development of the Jewish National Home.[4] The British authorities acknowledged as much in a 1937 report by a commission of enquiry headed by Lord Peel:
The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact that the increase in the Arab population is most marked in urban areas affected by Jewish development. A comparison of the Census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that, six years ago, the increase in Haifa was 86%, in Jaffa 62, in Jerusalem 37, while in purely Arab towns such as Nablus and Hebron it was only 7, and at Gaza there was a decrease of 2 per cent.[5]
Raising the standard of living of the Palestinian Arabs well above that in the neighbouring Arab states, the general fructifying effect of the import of Jewish capital into the country was not limited to the upper classes, or the effendis, who 'sold substantial pieces of land [to the Jews] at a figure far above the price it could have fetched before the War', but extended to the country's predominantly rural population, the fellaheen, who 'are on the whole better off than they were in 1920'. The expansion of Arab industry and agriculture, especially in the field of citrus growing, Palestine's foremost export product, was largely financed by the capital thus obtained, and Jewish know-how did much to improve Arab cultivation. In the two decades between the world wars, Arab-owned citrus plantations grew six-fold, as did vegetable-growing lands, while the number of olive groves quadrupled and that of vineyards increased threefold.[6]
No less remarkable were the advances in Arab social welfare. Perhaps most significantly, mortality rates in the Muslim population dropped sharply and life expectancy rose from 37.5 years in 1926-27 to 50 in 1942-44 (compared with 33 in Egypt). Between 1927-29 and 1942-44, child mortality was reduced by 34% in the first year of age, by 31% in the second, by 57% in the third, by 64% in the fourth, and by 67% in the fifth. The rate of natural increase leapt upward by a third (from 23.3 per 1000 people in 1922-25 to 30.7 in 1941-44) - well ahead of the natural increase (or of the total increase) of other Arab/Muslim populations.[7]
That nothing remotely akin to this was taking place in the neighbouring British-ruled Arab countries, not to mention India, can be explained only by the decisive Jewish contribution to state revenues (in 1944-45, for example, the Jewish community paid 68% of Palestine's income tax compared with 15% by the twice larger Arab community).[8] In addition, the extensive Jewish public health provision greatly benefited the country's Arab population. Jewish reclamation and anti-malaria work slashed the prevalence of this lethal disease (during the latter part of 1918, for example, 68 of 1000 people in the Beit Jibrin region died of malaria; in 1935 the number of malaria-related deaths in the whole of Palestine was 17), while health institutions, founded with Jewish funds primarily to serve the Jewish National Home, also served the Arab population. It is hardly surprising therefore that the greatest reductions in Arab mortality, as well as the rise in the quality and standard of living, occurred in localities in or near those in which Jewish enterprise had been most pronounced.[9]
Had the vast majority of Palestinian Arabs been left to their own devices, they would most probably have been content to get on with their lives and take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the growing Jewish presence in the country. Throughout the British Mandate era (1920-48), periods of peaceful coexistence were far longer than those violent eruptions and the latter were the work of a small fraction of Palestinian Arabs.
But then, rather than follow the wishes of its constituents, the corrupt and extremist Palestinian Arab leadership, headed since the early 1920s by the Jerusalem Mufi Hajj Amin Husseini, embarked on a relentless campaign to obliterate the Jewish national revival, which culminated in the violent attempt, supported by the entire Arab world, to destroy the state of Israel at birth. In the mournful words of the Peel commission,
We have found that, though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary… with almost mathematical precision the betterment of the economic situation in Palestine meant the deterioration of the political situation.[10]
The Arab Minority in the Jewish State
The end of the 1948 war found the Palestinian-Arab community profoundly shattered. Of the 750,000 Arab residents of the territory that came to be Israel, only 158,000 had stayed put through the hostilities; at the state's founding, they formed 13.6% of the total population.[11] But these numbers did not stay low for long. Thanks to remarkable fertility rates, and despite successive waves of Jewish immigration into Israel, the proportion of Arabs grew steadily over the decades. By the end of 2009, Israel's Arab minority had leapt eightfold in number to over 1.6 million, or 20.6% of the state's total population.[12]
The mass exodus of 1948-49 took Israel's leadership by surprise, as the Zionist movement had always assumed the existence of a substantial Arab minority in the future Jewish state on an equal footing 'throughout all sectors of the country's public life', to use the words of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founding father of the branch of Zionism that was the forebear of today's Likud party.[13]
As early as 1905 Jabotinsky argued that 'we must treat the Arabs correctly and affably, without any violence or injustice', reiterating this position in his famous 1923 article 'The Iron Wall': 'I am prepared to take an oath binding ourselves and our descendants that we shall never do anything contrary to the principle of equal rights, and that we shall never try to eject anyone. This seems to me a fairly peaceful credo'.[14]
Eleven years later, Jabotinsky presided over the drafting of a constitution for Jewish Palestine. According to its provisions, Arabs and Jews were to share both the prerogatives and the duties of statehood, notably including military and civil service; Hebrew and Arabic were to enjoy the same legal standing; and 'in every cabinet where the prime minister is a Jew, the vice-premiership shall be offered to an Arab and vice versa'.[15] Echoing this vision, David Ben-Gurion told the leadership of his own (Mapai) party in December 1947 that the non-Jews in the Jewish state 'will be equal citizens; equal in everything without any exception; that is, the state will be their state as well'.[16]
Committees laying the groundwork for the nascent state discussed in detail the establishment of an Arabic-language press, the improvement of health, the incorporation of Arab officials into the government, the integration of Arabs within the police and the ministry of education, and Arab-Jewish cultural and intellectual interaction. Even military plans for rebuffing an anticipated pan-Arab invasion in the late 1940s were predicated, in the explicit instructions of the commander-in-chief of the foremost Jewish underground organization, the Hagana, on the 'acknowledgement of the full rights, needs, and freedom of the Arabs in the Hebrew state without any discrimination, and a desire for coexistence on the basis of mutual freedom and dignity'.[17]
The same principle was enshrined in Israel's Declaration of Independence, issued on 14 May 1948. The new state undertook to 'uphold absolute social and political equality of rights for all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex'. In particular, Arab citizens were urged 'to take part in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and on the basis of appropriate representation in all its institutions, provisional and permanent'. While the declaration lacked constitutional status, its principles were taken as guidelines for governmental behaviour; over the years, they would gain legal authority through supreme-court decisions and acts of the Knesset (parliament).
In its first meeting on 16 May 1948, the provisional Israeli government discussed a basic law regulating the nascent state's ruling institutions and practices, which ensured inter alia the right of Arab citizens to be elected to parliament and to serve as cabinet ministers, as well as the continued functioning of the autonomous Muslim (and Christian) religious courts that had existed during the mandate. Four months later, the government decided that Arabic, alongside Hebrew, would serve as the official language in all public documents and certificates.[18]
Israeli Arabs have indeed enjoyed full equality before the law, and are endowed with the full spectrum of democratic rights - including the right to vote for and serve in all state institutions. (From the first, Arabs have been members of the Knesset.) This is in itself a remarkable fact. From the designation of Arabic as an official language, to the recognition of non-Jewish religious holidays as legal resting days for their respective communities, to the granting of educational, cultural, judicial, and religious autonomy, Arabs in Israel may well enjoy more formal prerogatives than ethnic minorities anywhere in the democratic world, not to mention the Middle East and the Muslim world.
This hardly means that the state's treatment of its Arab minority has been spotless. Civic equality, like any other principle, does not exist in a vacuum, or in isolation from other fundamental political values like stability and public security. In every modern nation-state, majority-minority relations have been a problem, and all the more so when an ethnic minority forms part of a larger nation or group that is hostile to the state in which it resides. Early on, the attempt of the Arab states and the Palestinian Arab leadership to destroy Israel at birth, the repeated talk of a 'second round', and the fact that many Israeli Arab enclaves were located in sensitive border areas fuelled fears within the Jewish state of a possible transformation of its Arab communities into hotbeds of subversive activity.
For security reasons, then, the main Arab population centres were placed under military administration, a policy that ended only in December 1966. Similar considerations precluded the conscription of most Arabs into military service. The exemption was also designed to ease the Arabs' 'dual loyalty' dilemma, sparing them the need to confront their cousins on the battlefield; it corresponded, as well, with the wishes of the Arab population itself.
The policy of exempting Israeli Arabs from military service had real-life effects. In the short term, it conferred a certain practical benefit, giving young Arabs a three-year head start over most of their Jewish counterparts in entering the labour force or acquiring a higher education. Over the longer term, however, it worked to constrain Arab economic and social mobility, for the simple reason that, until the 1990s, military service was the main entry point into the corridors of adult Israeli life. But these constraints were not the result of 'insufficient sensitivity', let alone of discrimination on the basis of religion or nationality; the same disadvantages beset and continue to beset Jewish individuals and communities that have likewise been exempted from military service, notably the ultraorthodox Jews.
Deprived and Marginalized?
The issue of discrimination aside, it cannot be sufficiently stressed that, contrary to the dismal pronouncements of the Orr commission, the Arabs living in the Jewish state have made astounding social and economic progress. Far from lagging behind, their rate of development has often surpassed that of the Jewish sector, with the result that the gap between the two communities has steadily narrowed.
Health statistics are but one indicator. Perhaps most significantly, mortality rates among Israeli Arabs have fallen by over two-thirds since the establishment of the Jewish state, while life expectancy has increased 30 years, reaching 78.5 (women 80.7, men 76.3) in 2009. At the end of the 1940s, life expectancy of Israeli Arabs was fifteen years lower than that of their Jewish counterparts; by the 1970s, the gap had decreased to 2-3 years and has remained virtually unchanged since then (3.7 years in 2009).[19] Not only does this compare favourably with the Arab and Muslim worlds, but the average Israeli Arab male can expect to live longer than his American (76 years in 2007) and many European counterparts.[20]
Thanks to Israel's medical and health-education programs, infant-mortality rates have similarly been slashed: from 56 per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 6.5 in 2008 - slightly above the US mortality rate and much lower than that of the neighbouring Middle Eastern states (in Algeria, for example, it is 24.9 deaths/1,000 live births, in Egypt 30, in Iraq 40, in Iran 41).[21] Another indication of the improving socioeconomic position of the Israeli Arabs has been the steady decline in fertility rates since the 1970s: from 8.4 children per women in 1965 to 3.6 in 2008.[22]
No less remarkable have been the advances in education. Since Israel's founding, while the Arab population has grown tenfold, the number of Arab schoolchildren has multiplied by a factor of 40.[23] If, in 1961, the average Israeli Arab spent one year in school, today the figure is over eleven years. The rise was particularly dramatic among Arab women who in 1961 received virtually no school education and today are equally, indeed better educated than their male counterparts (in 1970-2000, for example, the proportion of women with more than eight years of schooling rose nearly sevenfold - from 9% to 59%).[24]
In 1961, less than half of Arab children attended school, with only 9% acquiring secondary or higher education. By 1999, 97% of Arab children attended schools, with 46% completing high school studies and 19% obtaining university/college degrees. In 2011, over a half of Arab twelfth-grade students (two thirds of Christian students) won the matriculation certificate, with dropout rates of Arab students similar to those in the Jewish sector: 1.8% and 1.5% respectively. Indeed, the dropout rate in the weaker parts of Jewish society were higher than their Arab equivalent: 3.1% among ultraorthodox Jews and 3.6% among foreign native Jews, compared to 2.6% in the Bedouin sector - the weakest part of Arab society.[25]
Nor do Jewish schools enjoy better individual services than their Arab counterparts. In 2007/08, for example, Arab students were six times more likely to receive didactic assessment, and five times more likely to have a nurse based in their school, than their Jewish counterparts. Arab students had somewhat more frequent access to youth and/or social workers, as well as truancy officers, while Jewish students had somewhat better access to psychological and educational counselling.[26]
More important, during the past twelve years, relative investment in Arab education has far exceeded that in the Jewish sector resulting in a significantly larger expansion across the board: Teaching posts in pre-primary Arab education trebled, compared to a twofold increase in the Jewish sector; Arab primary education posts grew three times faster than their Jewish counterparts while the relative increase in Arab secondary education posts was six times higher than in the Jewish sector.[27]
Still more dramatic has been the story in higher education where the numbers of Arab graduates multiplied fifteen times between 1961 and 2001. Fifty years ago, a mere 4% of Arab teachers held academic degrees; by 1999, the figure had vaulted to 47%. In 1999, the proportion of Arab students studying for advanced degrees was 19%; a decade later 34% of Arab high school graduates passed the university entry exams. And while this figure is still lower than in the Jewish sector (48%), it is compensated by the much larger Arab presence in education colleges where Arab students occupy 33% of all places - way above their relative population share.[28]
Last but not least, during Israel's first fifty years of existence, adult illiteracy rates among Israeli Arabs dropped from 57.2% (79% among women) to 7.7% (11.7% among women).[29] This not only places Israeli Arabs miles ahead of their brothers in the Arab world - in Morocco illiteracy is at 44%, in Egypt at 38%, in Iraq at 22% - but reflects a pace of improvement nearly double that of the Jewish sector.[30]
Standard of living? In the late 1940s, following the flight of its more affluent classes and the breakdown of economic relations with neighbouring Arab states, the Arab minority in Israel was left largely impoverished. As they became increasingly incorporated into local economic life, Arabs experienced a steep rise in earnings and a visible improvement in their material circumstances. More Arabs than Jews have come to own the dwelling they live in - 82.2% vs. 68.8% in 1997, 91.5% vs. 68.6% in 2000, 82.3% vs. 70.4% in 2008.[31] By 2002, 86% of Arab households - more Arab households than Jewish ones - occupied dwellings of three or more rooms; and by 2006, Arab households surpassed their Jewish counterparts in ownership of key durable goods, such as refrigerators (99.8% vs. 99.4%), deep-freezers (23.8 % vs. 18.3%), washing machines (97.7% vs. 94.5%), televisions (97.7% vs. 89.9%), and one cellular phone at least (88.8% vs. 86.7).[32]
Contrary to the standard image of cramped neighbourhoods and acute land shortages, population density in Arab localities is substantially lower on average than in equivalent Jewish locales. While Jewish neighbourhoods in central Israel, where most of the country's population lives, are hopelessly congested - 21,031 persons per square kilometre in Bene Brak, 16,329 in Giv'atayim, 15,913 in Bat Yam, and 9,759 in Holon, 7,947 in Tel Aviv, among other places - the urban Arab population in the same area enjoys a much more spacious existence: 1,958 persons per sq. km. in Taibe, 1,894 in Tire, 1,756 in Umm al-Fahm, and so on and so forth. Even the Galilean city of Nazareth, Israel's largest and most congested Arab locality has a population density of 5,113 - less than a quarter its Jewish equivalent.[33]
As for income statistics, it is undeniable that, on average, Israeli Arabs still earn less than Jews. But to what is this attributable? For one thing, the average Muslim in Israel is ten years younger than his Jewish counterpart; all over the world, younger people earn less. Then, too, far fewer Arab women enter the labour market than do Jewish women: in 2008, for example, only 21% of Arab women, compared to 57% of Jewish women, worked outside their homes.[34]
The salience of these and other factors - family size, level of schooling, cultural tradition, and so forth - may be judged by looking at segments of Israeli Jewish society like the ultraorthodox or residents of development towns (localities established during the 1950s and 1960s to absorb the fresh waves of Jewish immigration, especially from Arab countries), whose income levels more closely resemble those in the Arab sector. Thus, for example, while the 2008 average monthly salary in Arab Nazareth was lower than in the mostly Jewish Upper Nazareth (4,749 vs. 5,437 shekels), the average self employed monthly earning there was higher than in Upper Nazareth: 7,498 vs. 7,351 shekels. No less important, income inequality was lower in Arab Nazareth than in Jewish Upper Nazareth: 0.36 vs. 0.37 on the Income Gini coefficient (a value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 - absolute inequality).[35]
Since the late 1990s, the unemployment rate in Israel's Arab sector was consistently lower than in Jewish development towns. In 2009, for instance, the unemployment rate in the Arab sector was 8.5% compared to 10.8% in development towns, with 76.5% of Arab men having a fulltime job compared to 69.7% of their Jewish counterparts. Unemployment rate among Arab women was similarly lower (9.4% vs. 11.2%), though their share in the civilian labour force was only half that of their Jewish counterparts - underscoring the persistent Arab social constraints on women's integration in Israeli society, with the attendant lower family income.[36]
Has the government given short shrift to the economic needs of the Arab sector, as the Orr commission asserts? Quite the reverse. Allocations to Arab municipalities have grown steadily over the past decades and are now on a par with, if not higher than, subsidies to the Jewish sector. By the mid-1990s, Arab municipalities were receiving about a quarter of all such allocations, well above the 'share' of Arabs in Israel's overall population, and their relative growth has continued to date. In numerous cases, contributions to Arab municipal budgets substantially exceed contributions to equivalently situated and sized Jewish locales, let alone the larger and more established Jewish cities where government allocations amount to a fraction of municipal budget. In 2008, for instance, relative disbursements to the Arab town of Kafr Qassem were five times higher than to the Jewish town of Zichron Yaacov; nearly four times higher to (Arab) Tamra and Umm Fahm than to (Jewish) Yahud and Ra'anana respectively; five times higher to (Arab) Abu Snan than to (Jewish) Even Yehuda; six times higher to (Arab) Iksal than to (Jewish) Azur. And so on and so forth.[37]
Chauvinist Radicalization
The preceding analysis proves the attribution of the October 2000 riots to social and economic deprivation to be totally misconceived. If indeed the culprits were poverty and second-class status, why had there never been any disturbances remotely like the October 2000 riots among similarly situated segments of Jewish society in Israel, or, for that matter, among Israeli Arabs in the much worse-off 1950s and 1960s? Why, indeed, did Arab dissidence increase dramatically with improvements in the standard of living, and why did it escalate into an open uprising after a decade that saw government allocations to Arab municipalities grow by 550 per cent, and the number of Arab civil servants nearly treble?
The truth is that the growing defiance of the state, its policies, and its values was not rooted in socioeconomic deprivation but rather in the steady radicalization of the Israeli Arab community by its ever more militant leadership, not unlike their mandatory predecessors.
The process began with the Six-Day war of June 1967. In the relatively relaxed aftermath of that conflict, Israeli Arabs came into renewed direct contact with their cousins in the West Bank and Gaza as well as with the wider Arab world. Family and social contacts broken in 1948 were restored, and a diverse network of social, economic, cultural, and political relations was formed. For the first time since 1948, Israeli Muslims were allowed by Arab states to participate in the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, thus breaking an unofficial ostracism and restoring a sense of self-esteem and pan-Arab belonging - and encouraging a correlative degree of estrangement from Israel.
Six years later came the Yom Kippur war, shattering Israel's image as an invincible military power and tarnishing its international reputation. One result was quickly felt on the local political scene. During the 1950s and 1960s, most Arab voters had given their support to Israel's ruling Labour party and/or a string of associated Arab lists. This had already begun to change by 1969, when Raqah, a predominantly Arab communist party and a champion of radical anti-Israelism, made its successful electoral debut. By 1973, in elections held three months after the Yom Kippur war, Raqah (or Hadash, as it was later renamed) had become the dominant party in the Arab sector, winning 37% of the vote; four years later, it totally eclipsed its rivals with 51% of Arab ballots cast. By the late 1990s, things had moved so far in an anti-Israel direction that many Arabs, apparently finding Raqah/Hadash too tame, were shifting their allegiance to newer and still more militant parties.[38]
Nor did the PLO fail to capitalize on these internal developments. Founded in 1964, it had at first ignored the Israeli Arabs but soon embarked on a sustained effort to incorporate them into its struggle for Israel's destruction and, by the late 1960s, had recruited scores of young Israeli Arabs.[39] In January 1973, the Palestine National Council, the PLO's quasi-parliament, decided 'to strengthen the links of national unity and unity in struggle between the masses of our countrymen in the territory occupied in 1948' - i.e., Israel – 'and those in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and outside the occupied territory'.[40] Things came to a head on 30 March 1976 in the form of mass riots - harbingers of worse to come. The occasion was the government's announced intention to appropriate some 5,000 acres of the Galilee for development. Though most of the land was owned either by the state or by private Jewish individuals, the announcement triggered a wave of violence that ended in the deaths of six Arab rioters and the wounding of dozens more. 'Land Day', as the disturbances came to be known, was thenceforth commemorated annually in renewed and increasingly violent demonstrations, often in collaboration with the PLO and its political affiliates in the West Bank.[41]
Meanwhile the 'Palestinization' of Israeli Arabs continued apace. In February 1978, scores of Palestinian intellectuals signed a public statement urging the establishment of a Palestinian state, and a year later, Israeli Arab students openly endorsed the PLO as 'the sole representative of the Palestinian people, including the Israeli Arabs', voicing support for the organization's pursuit of the 'armed struggle' (the standard euphemism for terror attacks), indeed for its commitment to Israel's destruction.[42] By 1976, less than half of Israeli Arabs defined themselves as Palestinians; by 1985 more than two thirds did.[43]
By then, too, extremist politics and violence had become institutionalized, with the PLO funnelling funds to Arab bodies and institutions in Israel, and Israeli Arabs increasingly implicated in the sale of weapons and explosives to terrorist organizations in the territories.[44] December 1987 saw the outbreak of the first widespread Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the West Bank and Gaza. Showing their support for their brethren in the territories, Israeli Arabs committed acts of vandalism (burning forests, stoning private cars, destroying agricultural crops and equipment) and launched armed attacks on Jews within Israel proper. In the course of two years, the number of such individual attacks rose sharply from 69 (in 1987) to 187 (in 1989), and acts of sedition from 101 to 353.
The Road to October 2000
If the intifada strained Arab-Jewish relations within Israel to their limits (till then), other factors contributed to the worsening of the situation as well. One was the rising power and influence of the Islamist movement in Israel and the disputed territories, which injected into the conflict a religious element that had largely lain dormant ever since 1948. Another was the growing 'post-Zionist' trend among educated Israelis, which, by creating the impression of a fatigued society ready to pay any price for respite, emboldened the most radical elements on the Arab side to dream of delivering a final blow.
Yet it was the delusional the embrace of the Oslo accords, signed in 1993 between Israel and the PLO, despite the latter's brazen and continual flouting of its contractual obligations, that did the greatest damage. In recognizing the PLO as 'the representative of the Palestinian people', the Rabin government effectively endorsed that organization's claim of authority over a substantial number of Israeli citizens and gave it carte blanche to interfere in Israel's domestic affairs. Such a concession would be a sure recipe for trouble even under the most amicable of arrangements; made to an irredentist party still officially committed to the destruction of its 'peace partner', it proved nothing short of catastrophic.
From the moment of his arrival in Gaza in July 1994, Arafat set out to make the most of what Israel had handed him, indoctrinating not only the residents of the territories but also Israeli Arabs with an ineradicable hatred of Israel, of Jews, and of Judaism. His intention was made clear as early as his welcoming speech, which smeared his new peace partner with extensive references to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and ended with a pledge to 'liberate' Israel's Arab citizens from their alleged subjugation. 'I am saying it clearly and loudly to all our brothers, from the Negev to the Galilee', Arafat proclaimed, 'and let me quote Allah's words: "We desired to be gracious to those that were abased in the land, and to make them leaders, and to make them the inheritors, and to establish them in the land."'[45]
Within a month of his arrival in Gaza, Arafat had secretly ordered the extension of Palestinian Authority's activities to Israeli Arabs, allocating $10 million in initial funding and appointing Ahmad Tibi, his political adviser and an Israeli citizen, to head the subversive operation. In subsequent years, PLO and PA interference in Israel's domestic affairs would range from mediation of internal Arab disputes, to outright attempts to influence the outcome of Israeli elections, to the spread of vile propaganda calling for Israel's destruction.[46] 'Zionist - your death is in my hands', proclaimed a videocassette produced by Force 17, Arafat's praetorian guard, and distributed in Nazareth in the mid-1990s. 'The one who has forcefully robbed my land will only give it back by force. [Force] 17 in Gaza and Jaffa, 17 in Jerusalem and Haifa, 17 in Jenin and Ramleh, 17 in Lod and Acre'. And the PA's daily, al-Hayat al-Jadida put it in similarly blunt terms: 'Our people have hope for the future, that the occupation state [Israel] will cease to exist'.[47]
The incitement struck an eager chord. As the 1990s wore on, open identification with Israel's sworn enemies and even euphemistic calls for its destruction became regular themes of Israeli Arab leaders. If in the mid-1970s, one in two Israeli Arabs repudiated Israel's right to exist, by 1999, four out of five were doing so.[48] When, in February 1994, a Jewish fanatic murdered 29 Muslims at prayer in Hebron, large-scale riots erupted in numerous Arab localities throughout Israel with mobs battling police for four full days. The scenario repeated itself in April 1996 when dozens of Palestinians were mistakenly killed in an Israeli bombing of terrorist targets in south Lebanon, and yet again in September 1996 when Arafat, capitalizing on the opening of a new exit to an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem, stirred a fresh wave of mass violence in which fifteen Israelis and fifty-eight Palestinians died. In this respect, at least, the riots of October 2000 were an event foretold although one could not have predicted their scope and duration.
The first signs occurred as early as July. As the Camp David summit was about to convene amid widespread talk of a breakthrough for peace, Abdel Malik Dahamshe, the Islamist movement's most senior Knesset representative, threatened that any Arab concessions over Jerusalem would trigger a violent eruption of cosmic proportions. 'Our souls yearn for martyrs' death for the defence of al-Aqsa and blessed Jerusalem, and millions of Muslims and Arabs will respond to the call to martyr themselves', he declared. 'I am willing and praying to be the first shahid [martyr] to sacrifice his body in defence of Islam's holiest sites in Jerusalem'. Not to be outdone was his Islamist colleague, Sheikh Raid Salah. In public appearances, newspaper articles, and poems, he urged his followers to make the ultimate sacrifice for the liberation of the 'stolen homeland'. Azmi Bishara, a member of the Knesset and founding head of the Arab nationalist Balad party, applauded Hezbollah's armed struggle, which in May 2000 culminated in Israel's swift unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon.[49]
The Camp David talks ended on 25 July with Arafat's blanket repudiation of Barak's proposal for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in virtually the entire territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital. In the following months, the PA made comprehensive preparations for a full-fledged confrontation with Israel, and on 29 September, the day after a mutually agreed visit by Ariel Sharon to the Muslim-administered areas of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, launched the 'al-Aqsa intifada' with open clashes between Palestinian rioters and the security forces throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
The next day, as low scale violence spilled over from the territories to Israel itself, the 'follow-up committee' - the effective leadership of the Israeli Arabs - issued an official statement deriding the deaths of seven Palestinian rioters as a 'premeditated, horrendous massacre' by the Barak government and proclaiming 1 October a day of national mourning, strikes, and demonstrations. 'The blood of our wounded has mixed with the blood of our people in defending the blessed al-Aqsa and crossed the green line [i.e., the pre-1967 line]', ran the statement. 'It does not stand to reason that we will remain aloof in the face of the... barbaric actions in Jerusalem and the attempt to desecrate al-Haram al-Sharif and to subject it to Israeli sovereignty'.[50]
The following day the Israeli Arab sector exploded.
Epilogue
The October 2000 riots were not an act of social protest, and they did not mark a stage in 'a legitimate struggle for civil rights'. They were a violent internal uprising in support of an external attack. It was as if tens of thousands of Japanese Americans had responded to Pearl Harbour by engaging in wholesale violence against their fellow Americans. Of course, that particular uprising never happened - which did not prevent the American government from interning thousands of American citizens of Japanese origin for much of the war as suspected members of a 'fifth column'.
In Israel, the violence did happen - on a massive scale. But the Barak government, declining to acknowledge it for what it was and what it portended, sought to appease the aggressors by announcing increased economic support for the Arab sector to the tune of four billion shekels and appointing the Orr commission to investigate not the rioters but the state's response to them. Small wonder, then, that this commission ended up lifting the lion's share of the blame from the shoulders of the aggressors, or satisfied itself with uttering the naive wish that its own demonstration of good faith would 'contribute, in the final analysis, to a meeting of hearts among Arabs and Jews in Israel'.[51]
No such meeting of hearts has remotely occurred. On the contrary, just as Hajj Amin Husseini dragged his reluctant constituents into a disastrous conflict that culminated in their collective undoing, and Arafat used the Oslo accords to implicate his equally grudging subjects in the worst military confrontation with Israel since the 1948 war, rather than create the independent Palestinian envisaged by these accords, so Israel's Arab leaders have shown no remorse over the dire consequences of their reckless behaviour, instead intensifying their efforts to widen the breach with the country's Jewish majority.
Thus we have Bishara asking the Knesset (in May 2001) to explore the 'dispensation of poisoned candies from IDF aircraft overflying the Gaza Strip'[52] before departing for Syria to commemorate the first anniversary of the death of Hafez Assad, one of Israel's most implacable enemies. Flanked by other avowed enemies of the Jewish state, he then implored the Arab states to enable anti-Israel resistance activities, reiterated his admiration for Hezbollah, and urged the Israeli Arabs to celebrate the terrorist organization's achievements and internalize its operational lessons.[53] His subsequent prosecution for visiting an enemy state and supporting a terrorist organization only served to boost his international profile and intensify his recklessness. So much so that in 2006 he fled Israel to avoid arrest and prosecution for treason, having allegedly assisted Hezbollah during its war with Israel in the summer of that year.[54]
Bishara's Arab peers remained unimpressed. Ignoring 2002 legislation forbidding unauthorized visits by Israelis to enemy countries, they embarked on a string of trips to the neighbouring Arab states where they conferred with various heads of the anti-Israel 'resistance'.[55] Ahmad Tibi, whose years in Arafat's service would have made him a persona non grata in Hafez Assad's Syria given the latter's loathing of the Palestinian leader, was beside himself with joy on meeting the deceased tyrant's son. 'Heads of state are begging to shake [Bashar] Assad's hand, crawling to shake his hand', he gloated at an Israeli Arab election gathering (in January 2009). 'Yet what they fail to obtain despite their crawling, others get'.[56]
The following year Tibi travelled to Libya with a delegation of Israeli Arab parliamentarians to meet Muammar Qaddafi, whom he lauded as 'king of the Arabs' and his peer praised as 'a man of peace who treats his people in the best possible way'.[57] Confronted with scathing Knesset criticism upon their return, Knesset member Taleb Sana was unrepentant. 'Israel's enemy is Israel itself', he said. 'As Qaddafi said during the visit, they have no problem with Jews but only with Zionism. Perhaps you'll learn and understand some time - that is: Abolish the Jewish state of Israel'.[58]
By this time, open calls for Israel's destruction had substituted for the 1990s' euphemistic advocacy of this goal. Bishara, whose Balad party was predicated on making Israel 'a state of all its citizens' - the standard euphemism for its transformation into an Arab state in which Jews would be reduced to a permanent minority - became increasingly outspoken after his flight from the country, predicting the Jewish state's fate to be identical to that of the crusading states.[59] His successor as Balad leader, Jamal Zahalka, preferred a more contemporary metaphor claiming that just as South Africa's apartheid had been emasculated, so its Zionist counterpart had to be destroyed.[60] And Sheikh Ra'id Salah, who never tired of crying wolf over Israel's supposed designs on al-Aqsa, 'while our blood is on their clothes, on their doorsteps, in their food and water', prophesied the Jewish state's demise within two decades should it not change its attitude to the Arab minority.[61]
Meanwhile the 'follow up committee' escalated the 'Nakba Day' events - observed alongside Israel's Independence Day to bemoan the 'catastrophe' wrought on the Palestinians by the establishment of the Jewish state - by instituting (in May 2001) a national minute of silence. Seven years later, as Israel celebrated its sixtieth year of existence, the committee dedicated these events to the 'right of return' - the standard Arab euphemism for Israel's destruction through demographic subversion.[62] Even in Haifa, the epitome of Arab-Jewish coexistence since the early 1920s, local politicians attempted to replace the name of The Zionism Avenue with its pre-Israel precursor.[63]
This incitement had its predictable effect. Commemoration of the October 2000 events was often accompanied by violence, at times coordinated with the PA, as have Israel's defensive measures against Palestinian terrorism. When on 29 March 2002, two days after the murder of 29 Israelis as they celebrated the Passover meal in a Netanya hotel, the IDF launched a large scale offensive against the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, violent demonstrations broke out in Arab localities throughout Israel, and the Islamist movement initiated widespread activities in support of the Palestinians in the disputed territories; similar outbursts of violence occurred in December 2008-January 2009 when Israel moved to end years of rocket and missile attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza on its towns and villages.[64] No less alarming was the steady increase in Israeli Arabs involved in terrorist activities. In 2001, for example, the number of arrested suspected terrorists increased tenfold compared to 1999: from 2 to 25, with 19 further terror suspects arrested in 2002's first five months.[65]
And so it goes. With Israeli Arab leaders bent on blaming the Jewish state for every conceivable ill, including most recently the September 2012 anti-Islamic video that allegedly sparked the deadly riots across the Muslim world;[66] with 40 per cent of Israeli Arabs denying the existence of the Holocaust, and one in two refusing to send their children to Jewish schools or have Jewish neighbours,[67] is there any way to encourage them to normalize their minority status within the Jewish state, intensify their identification with its destiny, and thereby help convince their Palestinian cousins to reconcile themselves as well to its permanent existence?
One good place to start would be with conscription of Israeli Arabs into military service, or equivalent national duties. This would not require any special legislation; the 1986 Defence Service law obligates all Israeli citizens to serve in the army upon reaching the age of eighteen. But it would certainly be a revolutionary move, one that would force Muslim and Christian Arabs to decide where their deepest loyalties lie and act accordingly. (The Druze community, whose sons already serve in the armed forces, made its choice as early as 1948.)
Defending one's state against external aggression is indeed the ultimate test of citizenship. Just as French Jews fought German Jews during World War I, Italian Americans and German Americans fought Italians and Germans during World War II, and Arabs have incessantly fought other Arabs, why should Israel's Arab citizens not undertake to defend their country against external enemies? Failure to share the burden, the anxieties, and the suffering of their Jewish compatriots runs counter to the very principle of equality that Israeli Arabs have been trumpeting for so long as their watchword. Why not test it?
Of course, to raise this possibility may seem utopian in the extreme. Or is it? A 2007 survey, for example, revealed a surprisingly high level of support for the idea of voluntary civil service among Israeli Arabs: 75% among young Arabs (aged 16-22), 71.9% among Arab men, and 89% among Arab women.[68] Another silver lining may be found in the fact that whenever an Israeli politician proposes the inclusion of some frontier Israeli-Arab settlements in the future Palestinian state, as part of a land exchange within the framework of a peace agreement, the residents of these localities immediately voice their indignation. Indeed, even most East Jerusalem Palestinians, who are entitled to Israeli social benefits and are free to travel across Israel's pre-1967 borders, would rather become citizens of the Jewish state than citizens of a new Palestinian one.[69] They all seem to be keenly aware that life in a civil, democratic, and pluralistic society, albeit a Jewish one, is preferable to what is on offer in the Palestinian Authority and the neighbouring Arab states.
One can only hope that, unlike their destructive predecessors, Israel's Arab leaders would pay greater heed to the wishes of their constituents and halt their steady drive towards an all out collision. Given their conduct over the past decades, this may prove one hope too many.
****Efraim Karsh is Professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College, Principal Research Fellow at the Middle East Forum (Philadelphia), and author most recently of Palestine Betrayed (Yale University Press, 2010).
Notes
[1] Efraim Karsh, Arafat's War (New York: Grove, 2003): 186.
[2] 'Vaadat Orr. Vaadat Hakira Mamlachtit Leberur Hitnagshuyot ben Kohot Habitahon leven Ezrahim Israelim Behodesh October 2000. Din Vehshbon: Nosah Ma'le' (Jerusalem: August 2000), Shaar Shishi: Sikum Umaskanot: 20 (http://uri.mitkadem.co.il/vaadat-or/vaadat-or-part6.html). For English summary of the conclusions see 'The Official Summation of the Or Commission Report', Jewish Virtual Library, Sept. 2, 2003.
[3] 'Vaadat Orr, Shaar Shishi': 5.
[4] See, for example, David Ben-Gurion's Diary (Sde Boker), 24 Nov. 1929; Z. Abramowitz and Y. Guelfat, Hameshek Haarvi Beeretz Israel Uveartzot Hamizrah Hatichon (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1944): 5-7.
The decline in Arab emigration from Palestine was particularly marked in comparison with the neighbouring Arab states. While over 103,000 people left Syria and Lebanon from 1920 to 1931, only 9,272 non-Jews left Palestine during the same period: less than half the Syrian/Lebanese rate given that their population was five times as large. Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (London: W. H. Allen, 1970): 225.
[5] Palestine Royal Commission, Report. Presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Parliament by Command of his Majesty, July 1937 (London: HMSO; rep. 1946): 93 (vii).
[6] Ibid.: 94, 157-58; Abramowitz and Guelfat, Hameshek Haarvi, 48-50.
[7] A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry (reprinted 1991 in full with permission from Her Majesty's Stationary Office by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C.), Vol. 2, 708-15.
[8] Ibid: 570-80; Cohen, Israel, 228.
[9] Ibid.: 699-700, 710-14, 719-20; Peel Commission Report, 93 (vi), 231.
[10] Ibid.: 63, 271.
[11] Efraim Karsh, 'How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?' Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011: 224-46.
[12] Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 'Press Release', 25 Apr. 2012.
[13] Vladimir Jabotinsky, The Jewish War Front (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940): 216.
[14] Ze'ev Jabotinsky, 'What is to be Done?' (1905), in his Ktavim Zioniim Rishonim (Jerusalem: Eri Jabotinsky, 1949): 209-10; originally published in Russian in Rassvyet (4 Nov. 1923), the 'Iron Wall' was reprinted several times, including Jewish Herald (South Africa), 26 Nov. 1937 (http://www.mideastweb.org/ironwall.htm).
[15] Jabotinsky, The Jewish War Front: 216-20.
[16] David Ben-Gurion, Bamaaraha (Tel-Aviv: Mapai Publishing House, 1949), Vol. 4, Part 2: 260.
[17] Hagana Archives (Tel Aviv), Hagana Commander-in-Chief to Brigade Commanders, 'The Arabs Residing in the Enclaves', 24 Mar. 1948, HA/46/199z.
[18] Zionist Archive (Jerusalem), Protocol of Israel's Provisional Government Meeting, 16 May 1948, 11-18, 20; Protocol of the Provisional Government Meeting, 5 Sept. 1948: 5.
[19] CBS, 'Society in Israel', Report No. 4, October 2011: 198; CBS, 'The Arab Population in Israel' (Jerusalem, Nov. 2002): 6.
[20] World Health Organization (WHO), 'World Health Statistics 2009: Mortality and Burden of Disease': 42
[21] Central Intelligence Agency, 'The World Factbook: Infant Mortality Rate (Death/1,000 Live Births)'.
[22] CBS, 'The Arab Population in Israel 2008', Statisti-Lite 102.
[23] CBS, 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Tables 8.7/8.17: Schools, Classes and Students in Primary/Secondary Education'.
[24] CBS, 'Jubilee Publications: Education' (Jerusalem, May 1999): 12, 15; 'The Arab Population in Israel': 8.
[25] Ibid.: 16; 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2012. Table 8.25: Matriculations Examinees, by Entitlement to a Certificate and Selected Characteristics; 'Society in Israel': 145, 167-68.
[26] 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Table 1: Individual Services in All Schools in Hebrew and Arab education, by Supervision'.
[27] 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2012: Table 8.3 & Table 8.6: Teaching Jobs, Full time Equivalent Jobs (F.T.E.) and Teaching Staff in Pre-Primary/Primary Education, by supervision, District, and Selected Characteristics'; 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Table 8.16: Teaching Jobs, Full time Equivalent Jobs (F.T.E.) and Teaching Staff in Secondary Education, by supervision, District, and Selected Characteristics'.
[28] 'The Arab Population in Israel': 9; 'Society in Israel': 149.
[29] 'Jubilee Publications: Education': 12.
[30] Human Development Reports, accessed 11 Oct. 2012.
[31] 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010: Tables 9.1 & 9.2: Selected Data on Housing in Arab/Jewish Households'; CBS, 'Society in Israel', Report No. 3, October 2010: 47.
[32] 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Tables 14.1 & 14.2 - Ownership of Durable Goods, Arab in Arab/Jewish Households'.
[33] Ibid., Table 2.15: Population and Density per Sq. Km. in Localities Numbering 5,000 Residents and More on 31 XII 2009': 130-32.
[34] 'The Arab Population in Israel 2008'.
[35] CBS, 'Local Authorities in Israel 2009', Publication 1451, 22 June 2011.
[36] 'Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010. Table 1.27: Population Aged 15 and Over, By Civilian Labour Force Characteristics, Type of Locality of Residence, Population group and Sex – 2009'.
[37] Ibid.: 'Local Authorities in Israel, 2009'.
[38] Sabri Jiryis, 'The Aras in israel, 1973-79', Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1979: 31-33, 35-40.
[39] Maariv, 27 Nov. 1969.
[40] 'Aims of the Political Programme of the Palestinian Revolution Adopted by the 11th Palestine National Congress, Cairo, 11 Jan. 1973', Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1973: 170.
[41] Maariv, 22 Jan. 1979.
[42] Ibid., 22 Feb. 1979; Jiryis, 'The Arabs in Israel'.
[43] 'Vaadat Orr: Shaar Rishon': 81.
[44] Maariv, 2 Feb., 26 May 1986.
[45] Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, 1 Jul. 1994; al-Nahar, 3 Jul. 1994. The Koranic quote is from the 28th Sura - 'The Story', verse 4. See, The Koran, translated with an Introduction by Arthur J. Abberry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982): 392.
[46] On PA interference in the Israeli elections of 1996 and 1999 see, for example, Haaretz, 14 June 2001.
[47] Quoted in PMW, 'PA depicts a world without Israel.'
[48] 'Vaadat Orr. Shaar Rishon', 77.
[49] Haaretz, 26, 27 Feb. 2002.
[50] 'Vaadat Orr: Shaar Sheni: 7, 45.
[51] Ibid.: Shaar Shishi: 43.
[52] Alexander Bligh, 'Israeli Arab Members of the 15th Knesset: Between Israeli Citizenship and their Palestinian National Identity', Israel Affairs, Dec. 2002: 10.
[53] Haaretz, 13-17 June, 11 July, 4 Nov. 2001, 26 Feb. 2002.
[54] See, for example, Haaretz, 2 May 2007.
[55] Thus, for example, Ahmad Tibi visited Lebanon in 2005, Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha visited Lebanon and Syria in 2006, and Said Nafa visited Syria in 2007. Haaretz, 14 Dec. 2008.
[56] Haaretz, 12 Jan. 2009.
[57] Ynetnews.com, 25 April 2010, 25 Feb. 2011; YouTube video of the visit.
[58] Ynetnews.com, 27 Apr. 2010.
[59] Haaretz, 5 June 2008.
[60] Ibid.: 22 Jan. 2009.
[61]The Marker, 16 Feb. 2007; Haaretz, 1 Apr. 2007.
[62] Haaretz, 24 Apr. 11 May 2001, 6 Mar., 15 May 2008.
[63] Ibid.: 20 Apr. 2001.
[64] Ibid.: 30 Jul., 1 Oct. 2001; 3, 14, 15 Apr. 2002; 29 Sept. 2002; 2 Mar., 9 Oct., 28 Dec. 2008; 12 Jan. 2009; 1 Oct. 2012.
[65] Ibid.: 5 Sept., 7 Oct. 2001; 7 June 2002; 30 Apr. 2009.
[66] Ynetnews.com, 9 Sept. 2012.
[67] Ibid. 17 May 2009.
[68] Haaretz, 27 Oct. 2007, 18 Dec. 2007; 20 Feb. 2008.
[69] David Pollock, 'What Do the Arabs of East Jerusalem Really Want?' Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 7 Sept. 2011; Khaled Abu Toameh, 'Why Palestinians Want Israeli Citizenship', 23 Oct. 2012.