Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July 30/12
The bid for Syria’s first safe haven in Aleppo region is thwarted
Israel's Barak sees no threat of chemical attack
India says Iran behind Feb. attack on Israeli diplomat
Iran's power struggle rivalries heat up courts
Report: Iran halts missile work over sanctions
Iran brings forward nuclear timetable
Druze suspected of spying for Syria
Syrian regime claims gains in Aleppo, rebels deny
Palestinian official: Romney comments unacceptable
Romney comments at fundraiser outrage Palestinians
Ongoing efforts might end sheikh's sit-in in south Lebanon: sources
Lebanon’s EDL warns of imminent nationwide blackout
Lebanese Army chief says won't allow establishment of buffer zones
Lebanon's Arabic press digest - July 30, 2012
Syrian diplomat in London quits, no longer willing to represent regime: Britain
Turkish military convoy heads for Syrian border: reports
Aleppo rebels under fire, Syrian fighter jet flies over
Rebels hold off Syrian forces in Aleppo
Muallem: Rebels in Aleppo 'Will Definitely be Defeated'
Classic armed insurgency taking shape in Syria
'Romney would back Israel if it strikes Iran'
Romney: Diplomatic support as important as military
Regional change: Syrian nightmare for Israel
Iran threat: Netanyahu is no Churchill
'IDF didn’t need Hezbollah clip to draw lessons'
Shiite Lebanese Abducted pilgrims not heading home before end of holy month
Ali Abbas Says Abducted Pilgrims Blame Person 'Who Has Refused to Apologize
Lebanese Cabinet set to brave election law minefield
Lebanon economy taxed by Syria turmoil
Sidon businessmen postpone Anti-Assir strike
Lebanese Army hits back at Merhebi for calling Kahwagi a failure
Italian defense minister in Beirut for talks
Gunbattles, tough times make for bleak Ramadan in Tripoli
Lebanese Army arrests two transporting arms, three in weapons cache raid
Iran praises Hezbollah, Lebanese on occasion of 2006 war

 The bid for Syria’s first safe haven in Aleppo region is thwarted
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report July 30, 2012/US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta commented Monday, July 30 on his way to the Middle East that the Syrian army’s shattering assault on Aleppo, Syria’s commercial hub, “will ultimately be another nail in Assad’s coffin.” This was a measure of the frustration generated by the failure for now of the Western-backed Arab bid to establish a safe haven in the Aleppo region. It was thwarted by the ruthless drive of Syria army’s 18th and 11th Divisions and parts of the 14th with massive air and artillery support to destroy rebel forces.
When Panetta declared, “It’s not a question of whether he’s coming to an end, it’s when,” pro-Assad forces were again rooting out and liquidating rebel forces in Aleppo as they did in Damascus ten days earlier.
Western military experts expect Assad’s forces to take longer to subdue Aleppo than Damascus, because his officers are directed to refrain from knocking over the architectural and historic gems of Syria’s most beautiful and affluent city, as they did elsewhere. They were also told to keep civilian casualties down to a minimum.
All the same, at least 200,000 Aleppo citizens (almost one-tenth of its 2.2 million inhabitants) were estimated by the UN to have fled the city by Sunday night as their homes were reduced to rubble by heavy artillery fire. Others were pinned down in the encircled southern and western districts where food and fuel is running low. Monday morning, the Syrian army overran part of rebel-held Salaheddin. But the fighting continues in parts of Aleppo and surrounding villages accompanied by the soldiers' relentless pursuit of fleeing rebels.
The swelling stream of refugees from Syria to neighboring countries - mostly through Turkey - has reached as far as Egypt, which reports the arrival of 50,000 homeless Syrians in the last few days.
Monday morning, Saudi and Qatari intelligence officers, based in Free Syrian Army headquarters at Apaydin in the southwest Turkish Hatay region, were forced to admit that Bashar Assad’s army had smashed their plan for a safe haven in the Aleppo area. Territory was to have been seized by rebels and converted into the base of the forward FSA command and the seat of a transitional government, in the same way as the Benghazi rebel headquarters was established in 2011 six months before Muammar Qaddafi’s overthrow.
The FSA’s Saudi and Qatari backers said they had received from Washington a qualified undertaking to share in the defense of a safe haven if one could be established and to diversify its aid to the rebels.
Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked: “More and more territory is being taken. It will eventually result in a safe haven inside Syria.”
Sources in Washington then reported the Obama administration to be weighing options for more direct involvement in the Syrian civil war if the rebels were able to wrest enough territory for a safe haven.
So certain were the Saudis that their Aleppo scheme would succeed that Saturday, July 28, they convened a meeting of Arab UN delegations in Cairo to formulate the text of a motion for the UN Security Council to recognize the safe havens rising in Syria and calling on UN members to support them.
That step has proved premature in the light of anti-Assad forces inability to hold out against the government’s military onslaught – an inability partly attributed by debkafile’s military sources to chaotic relations within the insurrectionist movement.
The battle for Aleppo is being fought mainly by a splinter rebel group which rejects the authority of the FSA command in Turkey and refuses to obey its orders. It is led by Col. Abdel Jabbar al-Okaidi, who claims to represent the FSA. However, most of his fighters do not belong to the main rebel force but to a radical Islamic militia calling itself “Banner of Islam.” Many of them are al Qaeda jihadis arriving in Syria from Iraq and Libya.

India says Iran behind Feb. attack on Israeli diplomat
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4262033,00.html
Ynet Published: 07.30.12
Official New Delhi Police report names Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guards responsible for attack on Israeli Embassy. The New Delhi Police has officially named Iran's Revolutionary Guards responsible for the February 13 terror attacks against Israeli diplomats in the Indian capital.
The attack saw an explosion tear through a diplomat's car in the vicinity of the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. Tal Yehoshua Koren, the wife of one of the diplomats was injured in the blast. According to the Time of India, the investigation has concluded that the Iranian suspects "discussed the plan to attack the Israeli diplomats in India and other countries with Indian journalist Syed Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi in January." The meeting took place after a hit on an Iranian nuclear scientist. The investigation further found that Kazmi was in touch with the suspects and their Iranian handles for almost 10 years. India has reportedly demanded that Iran share details of the five terror suspects, including Houshang Afshar Irani, Sedaghatzadeh Masoud Syed Ali Mahdiansadr, Mohammad Reza Abolghasemi and Ali Akbar Norouzishayan. According to the report, Masoud is also considered the mastermind behind the attacks on the Israeli missions in Georgia, Bangkok and New Delhi.

Report: Iran halts missile work over sanctions
Yitzhak Benhorin 07.30.12/Ynetnews
London's International Institute for Strategic Studies says financial vise placed on Tehran by West prompted changes in Islamic Republic's pursuit of advances ballistic missiles
WASHINGTON – The financial sanctions and oil embargo imposed on Iran by the West have affected the Islamic Republic's ballistic missile development program, a new report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies said Monday. According to the London-based IISS, the financial sanctions "have stymied efforts to develop and produce the long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking potential targets in western Europe and beyond." The sanctions, and especially trade embargos placed in the exports of information technology components and knowledge, have prevented the Islamic Republic from accessing key propellant ingredients and components needed for the continued development of its missile program.
IISS believes that the problems Iran is facing have stemmed the development of its long-range Ghadr missiles – Ghadr-1 has a maximum range of roughly 1,600km when and carries some 750kg of explosives; as well as its Sajjil missiles – Sajjil-2 has a maximum range of about 2,000km and can carry a 1,300–1,500kg warhead.
According to the IISS, Sajjil-2 offers Iran three significant strategic benefits: It is based in solid fuel, requires smaller logistical infrastructure and because of its relatively compact design it can be easily fitted on road-mobile launchers. Sajjil-2's range is superior to that of the Ghadr-1 and it can reach Israel; and moreover, Sajjil technology could provide the foundation for the development of longer-range missiles.
But Iran has only tested the Sajjil-2 about 20 times – not enough to make the missile operational – and IISS said that Tehran would need to conduct "at least another half-dozen flight tests" before the missile could be deployed. "Iran's missile-related activities suggest that the reason for the hiatus is not that it is seeking to avoid provoking international opprobrium for violating UN sanctions," the institute said, adding it is more likely that a major design flaw was discovered. Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is expected to arrive in Israel on Tuesday, as part of a Mideast tour.
Speaking to reporters on his plane, Panetta said that "With regards to where Israel is right now, my view is that they have not made any decisions with regards to Iran and that they continue to support the international effort to bring pressure against Iran" to stop its nuclear program. Panetta will meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Panetta's visit follows that of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney.

Druze suspected of spying for Syria
Yoav Zitun 07.30.12/Ynetnews
Shin Bet, Northern District Police officers arrest Majdal Shams resident for allegedly spying on IDF operations in north on behalf of Syrian intelligence
Cleared for publication: Shin Bet and Northern District Police officers have arrested a Druze resident of Majdal Shams on suspicion of spying for Syria. Iyad Jamil Assad al-Johari, 38, was indicted Monday on charges of contacting a foreign agent and divulging information to an enemy agent.
The indictment, filed with the Nazareth District Court, alleges that al-Johari, a medical student who resided in Syria in 2002-2012, was in regular contact with Syrian intelligence agents and gave them information about IDF deployment across the Golan Heights and the northern border.
According to available details, al-Johari, who was arrested in June, admitted that between 2005 and 2008 he had direct contact with several Syrian intelligence officers.
According to him, his handlers would instruct him as to the kind of information they needed him to gather while he was visiting his family in Israel, during summer vacations.
He also admitted to using his vacation in Israel to buy equipment needed by his handlers.
Shin Bet sources said that al-Johari admitted to giving his handlers information regarding IDF bases in northern Israel, including names, locations and size and information about IDF deployment near the border.
He also shared information about the security protocols in the Quneitra border crossing; the security outfit on the Majdal Shams border fence and the relevant IDF deployment in the area.
The Shin Bet said that al-Johari also transferred equipment to his handlers, including Hebrew books, an Israeli SIM card, an Israeli military radio he said he had found by chance, and a map of the Golan Heights. The investigation also derived that he tried to recruit two of his friends to act as informants, asking them to supply him with information of a military nature, or any other information Syrian intelligence service may find interesting. Authorities said that several other people were detained in relation to the case, but were later released.

Trouble for Nasrallah
By Hussein Shobokshi/Asharq Alawsat
One day, the Arab people will realize the true extent of the damage inflicted upon them by Hezbollah in general, and Hassan Nasrallah specifically; because of his various stances, and particularly his support for the criminal regime in Damascus that commits atrocities against its own people that thugs and assassins would not dream of.
I watched and listened to Hassan Nasrallah’s recent speech, lamenting the deaths of a group of criminals affiliated to the al-Assad regime, and insulting the Syrian people by describing them as “martyrs”, “comrades in arms” and holy warriors, along with other ridiculous rhetoric.
Today, with his stance in support of murder and bloodshed, Hassan Nasrallah has become part of the problem. He is supporting the tyranny that prevails over the Levant, but he is also a wily and calculating politician. He is fully aware (regardless of the fact that he desires otherwise) that the Syrian regime is sinking like the Titanic, after it struck an iceberg mostly obscured underwater. Water then began rushing in to the heart of the ship and it began to descend into the depths, as is the case with the Syrian regime.
It was quite remarkable that Nasrallah’s speech focused heavily on thanking, praising and glorifying the Syrian missile, “produced in Syria and supplied [to Hezbollah] from Syria”. He claimed that Syrian missiles have even been “praised by Israel”; allegedly the most powerful piece of weaponry being used against them. I was truly surprised by such an intense and repeated focus on the identity of these missiles! Then I realized that the purpose of this was to dress up this falling and sinking regime and coat over all its calamities, and in turn remove all accusations about Iran and its involvement. In a few days we may see “witnesses” emerging in Lebanon, as was the case with the assassination of Rafik Hariri, to bear responsibility directly and clearly for what happened to Assef Shawkat, brother in law of Bashar al-Assad, who died recently in the massive Damascus bombing that targeted an important security cell responsible for “managing” the Syrian crisis, according to the Syrian regime. All these moves are intended to remove all strings of accusation about Iran and its primary revolution exporter in the region, Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is well aware that its ruling alliance has now become as frail as a spider’s web. Najib Mikati, Walid Jumblatt and Michel Aoun’s power has been worn out, their arguments have weakened, and the reality has had an impact on each of them personally. Mikati is unable to restore dignity to the state in more than one location, and protests have fatigued and weakened his position, even though he knows that many of them are fabricated by his “allies” just to embarrass him. Walid Jumblatt is now seeking redemption after distancing himself from the “humiliating” power alliance in Lebanon. He is heading to Damascus broken with his head bowed requesting grace and forgiveness from the Syrian people, hoping he will one day be able to call out at the top of his voice to the heavens and claim revenge for the death of his father. He believes al-Assad’s Damascus regime is trembling under the capacity of the popular revolution. Michel Aoun is lamenting in his old age, and he knows for sure that securing the presidency, which he has long dreamed of, has become impossible with the erosion of the al-Assad regime. Instead he will continue his position as a clown in a cheap circus.
But Hassan Nasrallah still stands to suffer most in the event of al-Assad’s imminent fall, for he today is tasked with finding an alternative lifeline, because the coming regime in Damascus will look upon him with doubt, suspicion, anxiety and fear due to his desperate defense of the murderous al-Assad regime. Nasrallah’s reliance upon al-Assad has not only impacted upon Hezbollah internally, but it has also damaged the party’s reputation with the entire Shiite sect ever since the Khomeini revolution came to power, and the emergence of the Wali al-Fiqh. Now a gap has widened between Hezbollah, its neighbors and its opponents, in a manner that cannot be bridged.
The new Syria will be different from the one ruled by a tyrant and bequeathed to his son, which sold the world myths and illusions. The time has come to expose this regime and salvage the country.

Israel, West need Romney in White House
Shaul Rosenfeld 07.29.12/Ynetnews
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4261901,00.html
Op-ed: Obama, who has repeatedly broken promises and sided with Islam, will do even more damage as second-term president . "We must never force Israel to the negotiating table," presidential hopeful Barack Obama told an AIPAC conference in June 2008, and to those who were still not convinced of his commitment to the Jewish state, he added that "Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel and it must remain undivided."
As president, Obama said the "Jerusalem promise" made by Obama the candidate was a mistake, although all signs indicate that it was not a blunder, but a blatant lie. Because a lie is created when there is no correlation between what one believes in and plans to carry out and what he writes, declares or promises. Of course, Obama is not the first to make false promises to Israel or the US Jewish community. In 1957 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said the US would consider the closure of the straits of Tiran by Egypt warranted Israeli military action. In 1975 President Gerald Ford said Washington would support Israel's continued sovereignty over the Golan Heights in the framework of negotiations with Syria. And there was Bill Clinton, who promised to release Jonathan Pollard in exchange for Israel's agreement to sign the Wye Accord. So, a number of American leaders have abided by the rule that promises should only be kept when it is convenient to do so.
Now, with the 2012 elections looming, when the Jewish vote and Jewish funding are as crucial as ever and Republican hopeful Mitt Romney is visiting Israel, Obama is once again stressing his "unshakeable commitment" to Israel. Earlier this week the president signed a bill calling for enhanced cooperation with Israel and announced the release of $70 million in approved funding for Israel's short-range rocket shield known as "Iron Dome."But we mustn't forget that at the beginning of his term Obama declared that in terms of numbers the US was "one of the largest Muslim countries in the world," and, speaking to the Turkish parliament, Obama conveyed his "deep appreciation for the Islamic faith, which has done so much over the centuries to shape the world - including in my own country." The American president bowed before Saudi King Abdullah and spoke of the monarch's wisdom and generosity. He also visited Egypt, where he praised the "holy Koran," which "tells us, 'Be conscious of God and speak always the truth.'"
In light of these statements, it is easy to understand why Obama chose to condemn the "disaster" of expanding a balcony in Gilo and the authorization of additional construction in Ramat Shlomo, just as it easy to explain his considerable efforts to force Israel to cede all its territorial assets – including those in the heart of its capital. These declarations can also explain his decision to "shred" George W. Bush's promise to Ariel Sharon regarding the settlement blocs.
In general, Obama is becoming more Palestinian than the Palestinians by demanding that Israel halt all construction beyond the Green Line as a precondition for renewing peace talks.
Obama has also refused to fulfill the US' obligations as a superpower, such as not permitting insane thugs like Ahmadinejad to do whatever they please in the nuclear and any other field. The American leader also abandoned important allies such as Mubarak.
But as someone whose character was molded in radical liberal hotbeds such as Columbia University and Harvard, and whose political doctrine was shaped at the left wing of the Democratic Party, Obama - who also learned of the "false assumptions" underlying Western attitudes toward the Middle East from Edward Said - is merely realizing his destiny.
More than Israel, the US and the West need Romney in the White House, they need Obama out. Because as a second-term president, he may become an immortal hero of the Chinese, Russians, Islamists and the rest of those who "support" Israel and the West.

Iran brings forward nuclear timetable
Published: 07.30.12Ynetnews
Analysis: If Islamic Republic maintains current pace of uranium enrichment at Natanz, Fordo facilities, it can become nuclear power in two years unless stopped. Iran does not have a nuclear bomb, but if it continues to enrich uranium pace at the current pace, it will become a "nuclear threshold" country within a year. According to intelligence officials, there is a possibility that between mid-2014 and the end of that year the Islamic Republic will become a nuclear power with more than one bomb in its arsenal. To understand how Iran is advancing its nuclear program one must first understand how a nuclear warhead is produced. The production of a nuclear warhead similar to bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima requires some 25 kilos (55 pounds) of highly-enriched natural uranium containing +90% U-235, the fissile isotope of uranium. The most difficult stage in this process is enriching uranium to a low concentration level (LEU). One nuclear bomb requires 1,600 kilos (3,530 pounds) of low-enriched uranium that has a 3.5-5% concentration of U-235. The next stage is enriching the uranium to a 20% concentration level. Between 220 and 260 kilos (485-573 pounds) of 20% enriched uranium are required to produce weapons grade uranium, which must contain highly enriched uranium (HEU) with an isotopic concentration greater than 90% U-235. Upon reaching this stage, it takes only a few months to produce enough HEU for a number of nuclear bombs.
To date, Iran has produced some 6,600 kg (14,550 pounds) of LEU. If the enrichment process continues, it will have enough HEU to build four or five nuclear warheads.
Iran has already advanced to the next stage and has enriched 1,000 kg (2,200 pounds) of LEU to a fissile concentration of 20%. Currently the Islamic Republic possesses some 160 kg (352 pounds) of 20% enriched uranium (about 100 kg, or 220 pounds less than the amount needed for a nuclear bomb).
The Iranians have some 10,600 centrifuges in two nuclear plants in Natanz and Fordo. Between 328 and 348 of these centrifuges are already active. The Pakistani-made centrifuges in Natanz, which are less advanced, are mostly used to produce LEU. The centrifuges are concentrated in underground halls that are vulnerable to bombs both Israel and the US possess. But the Natanz plant also contains 164-174 advanced IR-1 Iranian –made centrifuges capable of producing 20% enriched uranium. The centrifuges in Natanz produce four kilos (nine pounds) of uranium enriched to 20% each month. The Fordo centrifuges produce about eight kilos (about 18 pounds) of uranium enriched to 20% every month.
The data indicate that Iran has significantly increased the pace of its uranium enrichment over the past four months. Currently the Islamic Republic produces 230 kg (507 pounds) of LEU each month and 12 kg (about 26 pounds) of uranium enriched to a fissile concentration of 20%.
Most of the efforts to speed up the enrichment process are concentrated in Fordo, where Iran will eventually produce weapons grade uranium if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gives the order to do so. In order to shorten the uranium enrichment process, Iran is developing two types of centrifuges, IR-2 and IR-4. Fortunately, Iranian engineers have run into some technical difficulties, and have yet to be able to activate the centrifuges.
The facility in Fordo is situated inside a mountain and is protected by layers of rock. The US Air Force has yet to develop a bomb capable of penetrating the plant. It appears that the Iranians are willing to "sacrifice" the facility in Natanz in the event of an American or Israeli strike.
Should the Iranians continue to enrich uranium at the current pace, they will have some 260 kg (about 570 pounds) of uranium refined to a fissile concentration of 20% in January or February of 2013. With this amount, it would take Iran only about two months to produce weapons grade uranium for a nuclear warhead or bomb – a "nuclear threshold" situation. Western intelligence officials have not identified any "technological bottleneck" that can prevent Iran from enriching uranium to a fissile concentration of +90%, meaning that it could theoretically become a nuclear power by mid-2014 or a few months later.
Such a nuclear "breakthrough" may result in a military confrontation with the US or other countries and put the regime in Tehran at risk. Iran believes that a reliable nuclear arsenal containing a number of nuclear warheads would prevent a military strike and even serve as a bargaining chip to lift the harsh economic sanctions imposed by the West. This is why Khamenei - before deciding on a nuclear "breakthrough" - will likely demand that Iran produce enough 20% enriched uranium for four nuclear warheads.
It is also very reasonable to assume that Tehran is secretly developing nuclear warheads which can be mounted on ballistic missiles already in its possession and on more accurate long-range missiles that are most likely being developed. Iran already possesses missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) that are capable of reaching Eastern Europe. According to the Pentagon, in 2015 Iran will have missiles that can also pose a direct threat to the US.

Wahhab: Jumblatt siding with attempted assassins
July 30, 2012/ The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Arab Tawhid Party leader Wi’am Wahhab accused Sunday his rival Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt of standing behind PSP officials who planned to assassinate him. “I am interested in clarifying a number of issues, the first of which is that I have not so far accused him [Jumblatt] of being behind the attempt on my life,” said Wahhab in a statement. “But his behavior indicates that he stands behind the party [PSP] officials who tried to recruit Raghed Eid, who confessed [in a videotape].” The former minister said last week that Eid had confessed to having been recruited to assassinate him while in Syria. The confessions of Eid, who refused to be recruited, were aired in a videotape. Wahhab said last week that Eid had ties with a PSP official, but denied that Jumblatt had been aware of the attempt.

Ali Abbas Says Abducted Pilgrims Blame Person 'Who Has Refused to Apologize'
Naharnet/29 July 2012/One of the abducted Lebanese Shiite pilgrims in Syria on Sunday confirmed that the 11 kidnapped men are in the remote Aleppo area of Aazaz, blaming Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, without naming him, for their protracted captivity.
“We are in good health and we are in the remote Aazaz area which is liberated and not witnessing any bombardment,” abductee Ali Abbas said in a phone interview with LBCI.
Addressing the Lebanese officials, Abbas added: “We have been outside Lebanon for three months now and we don't know what you are waiting for. You are liars and we don't know why you have abandoned us.”
“We are the victims of a futile state and useless officials,” Abbas went on to say.
Asked whom he was referring to, the abductee answered: “I'm referring to the person who has refused to apologize and I'm speaking in the name of everyone here.”
A previously unknown armed group calling itself "Syrian Revolutionaries - Aleppo Countryside" on May 31 claimed the 11 Lebanese pilgrims were in its custody.
A statement carrying the group’s signature and sent to Qatar-based satellite news channel Al-Jazeera said negotiations to release the abductees “would only be possible after (Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan) Nasrallah apologizes for his latest speech.”
“We have decided to keep the Lebanese abductees after we learned that some of them are involved in the crimes and massacres committed by the regime and they are currently under interrogation,” a man who identified himself as Abu Abdullah al-Halabi, the group’s spokesman, told Al-Jazeera back then.
“Our message to Nasrallah is that it is prohibited to enter Syria and shed the blood of Syrians,” al-Halabi added.
Addressing the abductors in a speech on May 25, Nasrallah said: "If this abduction was aimed at putting pressure on our position (of support for Syria)," it failed.
“We condemn your act and the kidnapping of the innocent harms your cause,” he added.
Syrian state media has said the kidnapping took place near the Aleppo town of Aazaz, which sits along the border with Turkey. It said the 11 men were part of a group of 53 pilgrims on board two buses.
The women were allowed to go free and returned to Beirut by plane on May 23. In his speech, Nasrallah thanked Syrian authorities and President Bashar Assad for providing the plane that transported the women to Beirut hours after the abduction of the men.
Speaking to LBCI on Sunday, Ali Hussein Zgheib, another abductee, said: “It seems that we are only numbers and I would have liked to see more attention from the president and all the MPs.”
“There are reluctant and meaningless initiatives and they should have talked to our hosts,” Zgheib said, adding that “had there been successful negotiations, we would have been freed.”
One of the abductors, who identified himself as Abu Ibrahim, told LBCI: “There is no problem in releasing the hostages but they are happy here and God willing they will return soon to their families.”
“We have fears concerning the checkpoints they will have to cross and concerning Assad’s gangs,” Abu Ibrahim added.
In another interview with the Beirut-based, pan-Arab television al-Mayadeen, Abu Ibrahim said: “Remarks that the abductees would be released in the month of Ramadan are baseless and they have not been released for security reasons.”
Abu Ibrahim added that he has not negotiated with anyone over the release of the abductees.
“I have not negotiated with anyone and I don’t anything about all the remarks broadcast on television. There are brokers who are only after money and we have not demanded any sum of money at all,” the presumed kidnapper added.
He stressed that the hostages “are on Syrian territory and Turkey has nothing to do with them.”
Abu Ibrahim said Ankara had tried to negotiate with his group several times, but added that he asked the Turkish officials to stop trying because “this is a domestic Syrian issue.”
He noted that he is a civilian who joined the armed rebellion and not a “defected officer.”

Abducted pilgrims not heading home before end of holy month
July 30, 2012/BEIRUT: One of the kidnappers holding 11 Lebanese pilgrims in Syria denied Sunday reports that the men would be released before the end of the holy month of Ramadan. Several of the kidnapped blamed Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah and the Lebanese government for delaying their release.
Abu Ibrahim, an opposition leader in the Syrian province of Aleppo holding the men, said, “it is possible that they will be released,” but added that reports on the imminent release of two Lebanese were incorrect.
Speaking to Al-Mayadeen television channel by telephone, Abu Ibrahim reiterated that all the kidnapped pilgrims were in good health, describing them as guests in Syria.
In a statement carried by Al-Jazeera TV on July 18, the kidnappers said they had decided to release two hostages in response to calls by a committee of Muslim scholars in Lebanon.
Two hostages told LBCI television channel by telephone Sunday that the men’s release was delayed as a result of Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah’s refusal to apologize to the Syrian people. Ali Abbas, one of the pilgrims, added that the Lebanese government is responsible for the delay in their release because it does not know how to negotiate. The comments of Abbas, speaking on the telephone about his treatment, were also played on Al-Mayadeen TV.
“We haven’t been subjected to any torture,” Abbas said. “Two others and I were sick and the kidnappers brought a doctor to examine us, and they have since provided us with medicine,” he added. Ali Tormos, Abbas Hammoud, Hasan Hammoud, Hussein Omar, Jamil Saleh and Hasan Arzouni – all members of the group kidnapped on May 22 while returning from a pilgrimage in Iran – also spoke of their experiences in brief audio clips.
Al-Mayadeen broadcast the footage two days after the New Yorker magazine published an account of one of its reporters’ visit to the kidnapped.
Abu Ibrahim, who was a fruit merchant prior to the Syrian uprising, told The New Yorker journalist that the kidnapping of the Lebanese pilgrims was a way to send a message to the Shiite community to seek their support for the Syrian uprising.
“Through the people we are holding we are sending a message to the Shiite people to support the Syrian people, not the regime,” Abu Ibrahim told The New Yorker.
When asked by Al-Mayadeen about his motivation, Abu Ibrahim said, “We are just sending a message to [the] Lebanese about Hezbollah’s position toward the Syrian revolution and the statements by Hezbollah secretary-general Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah supporting the Syrian regime.”
The New Yorker article revealed the location of the pilgrims for the first time since their kidnapping two months ago. According to The New Yorker, the kidnapped were likely staying in the town of Azaz, located only three kilometers from the Turkish border with Syria.
“We and the [pilgrims] are in an area fully liberated from Syrian regime control,” he said.
The New Yorker reporter, who met three of the hostages – Ali Zagheeb, 44, from the Bekaa, Awad Ibrahim, 46, from Baalbek and Abbas, 29, from south Lebanon – said the encounter took place in the Baath Party headquarters in Azaz. According to The New Yorker, Awad Ibrahim said that he would support the Syrian revolution upon his return to Lebanon.
“As God as my witness and I repeat it three times, I have never seen such a man as this, and this experience has opened my eyes about the revolution in Syria. When I go home I want to help support its revolution,” The New Yorker quoted Awad Ibrahim as saying.
Abu Ibrahim described himself as a civilian and part of the revolution but denied being a member of the Free Syrian Army.
When asked how he was able to support the 11 men in his custody, Abu Ibrahim said he received large financial support from Syrian businessmen abroad.
“Thank God, we are a big group. My group has large financial funding ... Our work in the revolution isn’t just to resist the Syrian regime, but we act as police and work at the civilian, economic and health levels. Syrian businessmen outside and Europe ... have put large quantities of money at their disposal,” he said.
Abu Ibrahim said he had received some 1.3 million euros ($1.6 million) in financial assistance from Qatar, used mostly for food and medicine.

Competition heading towards Damascus
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Alawsat
The race to inherit power after the fall of the al-Assad regime has accelerated after signs of its fall became clear to everyone, even its allies: The Doha meeting, the statements from Riyadh, the call from Rome, the clashes on the border with Jordan, Turkey’s threat that it would intervene to confront the separatist PKK on its border with Syria, in addition to the political and military revolutionary blocs both inside and outside Syria. The fall of the Syrian regime in its final days will not be easy, as some had imagined, and the inheritance of power will be even more difficult than the scene we are currently facing. Everyone is possessed by a desire to move Syria onwards to a different future, and bid farewell to four decades of iron-fisted rule, with the exception perhaps of the “Syrian dissidents” who met in Rome [to call for a political solution to the crisis], the affiliates of the regime and some of its symbols that have allied with Tehran and Moscow since last year.
The fear is that this competitive and hasty race towards Damascus may beget more chaos, and open the door wide for forces who want to sabotage Syria. Here I am talking specifically about Iran and its affiliates. The Syrian groups competing are, in the most part, nationalistic, and represent different trends of various internal categories. However, unless they expand their circles of participation, fall under one umbrella, accept pluralism and leave it up to the Syrian citizen to choose between them at a later stage, they will find themselves bottlenecked at the regime’s hour of exit. Even though the past years of Syrian rule did not allow us to identify all forces, this does not mean they were not present. Pluralism within the Syrian social fabric is an old-established fact, whether in terms of ideas, politics or movements.
The Syrian arena is now at the height of its mobility: there is the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, the Democratic Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Kurdish National Council, the powerful Arab tribes, the Turkmen movements, the Association of Syrian Ulama, the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians, the historical families such as al-Shishakli and al-Atassi, and of course the coordinators and the various revolutionary forces on the ground.
It is too early, of course, to draw a Syrian political map, but it is not too early for the Syrians to think about gathering together collectively under a new flag. From there they can think about mechanisms of political representation and action, and later the formation of a government. No one wants the al-Assad regime to fall only for its formula to remain in place, i.e. a totalitarian, security-based regime that abused the Syrians ever since it seized power in the Baathist coup of 1963. The only safe choice to avoid the risk of a vacuum in the post-Assad phase is a broad umbrella that accommodates everyone, leaving the majority of the Syrian people with the option to choose later on. It is not a question of settling scores, but it is about a shared future.

Marriage and democracy
By Emad El Din Adeeb/Asharq Alawsat
What links the experience of marriage and the experience of democracy in the Arab world? This is not a trick question, like the riddles aired during the “fawazir Ramadan” television shows.
The short answer is that both are painful and tiring experiences riddled with problems in the first hundred years, after which everything becomes easier!
Of course the meaning of my answer is that Arab marriage and Arab democracy are not stable at all! Perhaps one of the reasons for a failed marriage is “personal stubbornness”, whereby each side is keen to uphold their own ego, and thus the partnership of marriage transforms into a game of personal animosity with each side trying to impose their style and manner and defend their interests alone, without taking the other side into account. “Personal stubbornness” and an inflated sense of self-importance are also causes that have led to the failure of governance experiences in the Arab world.
Rarely have we found in the Arab world a ruler engaged in a state of objective disagreement with his opponents, and most disputes that reach the stage of arrests, clashes and assassinations can be traced back to personal reasons.  Because of this we see disputes laden with tribal, family, regional, sectarian or historical origins. We find forces in the Arab world in a permanent state of disagreement primarily because there is a traditional “historical culture” of dispute between the people of one region and another, or the members of this tribe with that one, or the followers of this doctrine and that one, all carried out without strong reasons or motives in the first place. When you ask someone for the reasons behind their current conflict, they will simply reply: “We have been brought up since we were children to believe that the followers of this sect are infidels, or that this tribe is treacherous, or that this regime is corrupt!” Then you return and ask what they consider to be the most appropriate solution to the matter? They will respond, with utter calmness: “We must overthrow and destroy them down to the last man and woman”!
We talk about democracy but we practice exclusion, we call for the transfer of power but we also try to rule forever, we promote the slogans of justice, equality and civil liberties, but in reality we consecrate injustice, discrimination and repression!Did I not tell you: democracy in our countries is like marriage; very painful for the first hundred years!

Are Iraq and Turkey Models for Democratization?
by Ofra Bengio/Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2012, pp. 53-62
http://www.meforum.org/3293/iraq-turkey-democratization
In the wake of the upheavals that have shaken the Arab world since December 2010, activists, politicians, and analysts have all been searching for new, democratic models of governance that could come into force in these lands. The cases of Iraq and Turkey are perhaps the most obvious choices to examine based on the notion that these are the only examples of functioning democracies within Muslim-majority nations of the Middle East.
Iraq's current experiment in constitutional government is off to a shaky and uncertain start. Despite Iyad Allawi (left) scoring the highest number of votes in the March 2010 elections, the candidate was compelled to hand the prime minister's post to his chief rival, Nouri al-Maliki (right).
Hoping to turn post-Saddam Iraq into a model to be emulated by the Arab states, the Bush administration set out to create an Athens-on-the-Tigris complete with free elections and a constitution with separation of powers provisions. Although the Turkish model had a completely different genesis and evolution, it is worth exploring as Ankara has proclaimed itself a model for the post-revolutionary regimes. What lessons can be drawn from the Iraqi and Turkish experiences, and to what extent do they fit other Middle Eastern states?
The Iraqi Model
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Western powers sought to graft onto the political systems of the newly-born Arab states the values of democracy, constitutionalism, and pluralism. As soon as Britain obtained the mandate for Iraq in 1920, it set out to build a democratic system very much resembling the British model itself. This included the establishment of a constitutional monarchy subordinate to a progressive constitution, the establishment of a parliament with upper and lower houses, and the launching of a nationwide system of elections. However, this edifice crumbled on the first day of Abd al-Karim Qassem's July 1958 putsch, and it would take nearly fifty years, and a large scale foreign invasion of Iraq, before an attempt at its reconstitution would be made. What went so horribly wrong? And are the new circumstances more conducive to the success of the nascent Iraqi democracy?
The evident answer to the first question is that this construction was imposed artificially on a society that had different cultural, political, and social values and did not evolve from within the society itself. Even if Iraqis wished to have a Western-type constitution, they had no say in its promulgation. In the words of the British president of the Iraqi Court of First Instance, the constitution was a "gift from the West."[1] Similarly, although there was a parliament in place, it did not function in a healthy or normal fashion: During its entire existence, the legislature never cast a single no-confidence vote against the cabinet, rubber-stamping its decisions while simultaneously suffering sporadic dissolutions.[2] While elections were held, they were rigged time and time again. In short there was a façade of democratic institutions but the ideas and practices never set down roots in society. With Qassem's takeover and the murder of the entire royal family, the democratic project expired.
The idea of reviving the democratic project in Iraq began to gather momentum in 1998, once again spurred not by Iraqis themselves but by an outside superpower, the United States. Thus, according to the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, "it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government in place of that regime."[3]
In time, the moving spirit behind the project of Iraqi democratization came to be President George W. Bush who was, in a fashion, walking in the footsteps of his British predecessors. His declared goal was to help the downtrodden people of Iraq get rid of their oppressor and bring progress and democracy to the state. But in Bush's case another more ambitious target was stated as well, namely turning the post-Saddam Iraqi democracy into a model for other Arab countries to follow. Thus, on the eve of the invasion he declared: "A free Iraq can be a source of hope for all the Middle East … instead of threatening its neighbors and harboring terrorists, Iraq can be an example of progress and prosperity in a region that needs both."[4] On another occasion, he stated: "The nation of Iraq, with its proud heritage, abundant resources, and skilled and educated people, is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom."[5]
But how has this democracy fared in Iraq itself? Can it serve as a model or "a source of hope" to other Arab countries?
Flaws in the Iraqi Model
Regrettably, the haste with which the framework of democracy was put together in post-Saddam Iraq is reminiscent of the earlier British experiment in the same country. This time, however, the constitution generated debates and disputes between different partners regarding such issues as the place of religion in the state or the role of women.[6] Overall, these controversies centered on what The Wall Street Journal described as "two very different visions of what the new Iraq should be: a nation that gives little political significance to ethnic and religious divisions, or one that weaves those divisions into the political fabric."[7] And although Iraqis did have an important say in composing it, for many of them, the constitution and, for that matter, the democratic experiment as a whole looked like a U.S. diktat.[8]
Unlike in the monarchical and Baathist eras, the Iraqi people did participate in three more or less free and democratic elections. However, while the framework of democratic institutions does exist, the spirit and contents are lacking. More often than not the parliament is paralyzed. It took an entire year to form a cabinet after the March 2010 elections because of incumbent Nouri al-Maliki's reluctance to give up his post. Although the list headed by Iyad Allawi scored the highest number of votes in that election, Maliki's maneuvering and shrewdness won him the prime ministry in the end.[9]
Civilian strife that flared up immediately after the U.S.-led invasion also threatened the entire Iraqi democratization project. The underlying cause for this conflict was that the minority Sunni community that had ruled Iraq since its creation was unwilling to accept the democratic norms that granted power to the erstwhile marginalized Shiite majority and the Kurds. In addition, the sudden change from an extremely totalitarian political system to an avowedly democratic one left the majority of Iraqis completely unprepared for such a transformation. Further, the freedom of expression and organization incorporated in the post-Saddam Iraq constitution gave rise to new Islamist forces, which believed more in God's rule than in the rule of man. In the debates that anticipated the drafting of the constitution, these groups, headed by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, demanded that Shari'a (Islamic law) be the source of legislation. It was not to be, however, because both Washington and the Kurds were against it.
Two sectors in particular fell victim to the expanding power of political Islam and the illiberal society developing in Iraq: women and minorities. As part of their efforts to construct a new Iraqi society, Washington and its allies placed special emphasis on the status of women, believing it would be impossible to establish democracy in a country that lacked equitable representation for women. Initially women did seem to be well represented in the echelons of power. However, as time went by, the increasing influence of Islamic groups further restricted their participation in the government. For example, by May 2006, only four out of thirty-nine cabinet ministers were women, none in important portfolios. In daily life, many women are harassed for not adhering to what is considered a proper Islamic dress code. Acts of violence, including killing, kidnapping, rape, and other forms of sexual harassment increased significantly in post-Saddam Iraq, so much so that some contend that women were better off under Saddam.[10] Iraqi women's rights activists are, in turn, accused of trying to impose secularism and foreign values. Thus, women were once again "left outside state supervision, vulnerable to unfavorable interpretations of Islamic and customary laws."[11]
The fate of minorities has fared no better. A 2007 field study reached the conclusion that Iraq's Christian, Yezidi, and Mandean communities was under threat and that the majority of Christians had fled their homes with nearly half living abroad as refugees. The report emphasized that Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities were targeted for acts of violence and discrimination precisely because they were non-Muslim or Kurdish.[12] It is indeed ironic that under the watchful eyes of the U.S. military, the harassment of indigenous Christians and other religious minorities has reached its peak.[13]
For their part, the Kurds, since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992, sought to portray themselves as a model of democracy for Iraq and other countries in the region. They based their claim on the fact that there was no fratricidal infighting among them since the late 1990s; that elections in the region and the transformation of power from one government to another went smoothly; and that there was freedom of expression and organization. Indeed, though this democracy left much to be desired, it was still stronger than in the rest of Iraq. This was due to both the slower pace of developments in the region and the fact that the framework of democratic institutions was not imposed from the outside (though nongovernmental organizations played an important role in promoting the process). Islamist parties were also much weaker in Kurdistan than in the center of the country.
The eruption of the Arab upheavals at the end of 2010 rekindled the debate over the Iraqi democratization model both in the United States and the Arab world. There were those who considered these events as having been inspired by the Iraqi model and the promotion of democracy there. For instance, Condoleezza Rice, secretary of state under Bush, credited the administration for the Arab uprisings: "The demise of repressive governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere … stemmed in part from Bush's 'freedom agenda,'" which "promoted democracy in the Middle East."[14] Former vice president Dick Cheney stressed that "the fact that we brought democracy … and freedom to Iraq, has had a ripple effect on some of those other countries."[15]
Others were more skeptical. Middle East specialist Fouad Ajami debunked what he termed the "myth" that the Arab upheavals were inspired by developments in Iraq, noting that when the protests began in late 2010, "there was bloodshed in Iraq's streets; there was sectarianism, and few Arabs could consider Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki a standard-bearer of a new political culture." In his view, Saddam's "despotism had been decapitated by American power, so it was not a homegrown liberation. And the new Iraqi order had empowered the Shiite majority." In addition, the Sunni "Arab street was not enamored of the political change in Iraq; it had passionately opposed the American war and had no use for Baghdad's new Shiite leaders."[16]
The late Anthony Shadid of The New York Times was even more negative: "My own sense … is that the Iraq war—the invasion of 2003 and the aftermath—delayed the Arab Spring. I think you can make the argument that these revolts and uprisings that have swept the region may have even happened earlier had not this scar of that occupation not been left on the region."[17]
The Iraqi model of democracy is a poor example to be emulated by other Arab states due to the civil strife that accompanied its birth, because it was viewed as an artificial Western diktat, and because it seemed to be lacking authenticity and staying power. There was, however, something to be learned from the Iraqi experience, namely that the ruler was not invincible and that the worst of dictatorships can be destroyed once the barrier of fear was overcome. In this sense, developments in post-Saddam Iraq did serve as a catalyst for the revolutions in the Arab countries even though they took some eight years to mature.
If Iraq has failed to serve as a democratic model, does Turkey offer a better example?
The Turkish Model
For many years, Turkey was considered an island of democracy in an otherwise autocratic Muslim world. Writing in 1994, Bernard Lewis attributed Turkey's position as "the only Muslim democracy" to various historical, political, and socioeconomic factors: Turkey had never been occupied by a foreign power that attempted to impose Western democratic values upon it. Rather, democracy was nourished slowly and gradually within Turkish society itself. From the start, Ankara was Western-oriented, hence more adaptive to the democratic norms developed there. Though lacking oil, Turkey was able to develop a strong economy, which in turn enabled it to cultivate a civil society, an important pillar of democracy. Last, but certainly not least, in Turkey there was a separation between religion and state. Despite three interventions by the Turkish military between the 1960s and early 1990s, the generals handed power back to civilians after a brief period, indicating a commitment to democratic norms.[18]
Almost two decades later, the picture in Turkey has changed dramatically. Since 2002, the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has managed to marginalize the military in politics, and Ankara is no longer chiefly Western-oriented, having developed strong ties with the Muslim Arab Middle East as well. These transformations also meant that Ankara sought to serve as a model for the democratization of post-revolutionary Arab regimes, a role that held no attraction for it before a decade ago.
The Turkish leaders' claims to such a role are based on the fact that Turkey is a Muslim-majority state; hence, they argue, Ankara is the best proof that Islam and democracy are compatible. Turkish economist Sinan Ülgen has suggested that the Turkish model is more appropriate for the Arab world "not so much because of what Turkey does but because of what it is." He points to the cultural affinity between Ankara and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which "find Turkey's own experience more meaningful and see it as more relevant and transposable than the similar experiences of non-Muslim nations." He maintains that Turkey's domestic transformation, brought about by the ruling AKP party with roots in political Islam, can only enhance the effectiveness of such cultural affinity.[19]
Ankara, furthermore, asserts that after detaching the military from the domestic political game in a peaceful manner, Turkey is an even stronger candidate for emulation by emerging Arab governments who are struggling with decades-long intervention by military-led regimes.[20] Similarly, the AKP contends that Turkey's long experience with homegrown democracy can assist Arab societies in establishing their own democratic institutions in this period of transition.[21] It also has claimed that it has stood by the Arab revolutionaries in their difficult times, a further incentive for Arab states to follow in its footsteps.[22] Taha Özhan of the Washington-based Turkish think-tank SETA went so far as to suggest that Turkey's policies and stance on various regional issues had an impact on the eruption of the Arab revolutions. He suggested that to "understand the impact of Turkey in the making of the Arab spring" one should consider that "Turkey … has been a success story for those countries suffering from a lack of democratization, economic development, and distribution of income, and despised and oppressed by Israel."[23]
Two Turkish scholars, Nuh Yılmaz and Kadir Üstün have summed up Turkey's vision thus: While "Turkey's transformation from a staunchly secularist NATO ally under military tutelage to a democratic model did not occur overnight … Turkish democracy has matured, and Ankara feels confident enough to present itself as an inspiration to the Middle East."[24] Ersat Hurmuzlu, an advisor to Turkish president Abdullah Gül, insists that "Turkey is not looking for a role but the role is looking for it."[25]
The Turkish government took some practical and energetic moves to promote itself as a role model, inviting members of the opposition and new would-be political leaders to Istanbul to participate in conferences and seminars on the democratization project. For example, the Syrian opposition movement (including members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood) has held meetings in Turkey to prepare for a post-Assad regime in Syria. At the same time, Turkish universities, nongovernmental organizations, and research institutions have upgraded their relations with Arab countries while academic gatherings, common broadcasts, and forums have reached an unprecedented level.[26]
Seeking to derive the most from the current revolutionary momentum, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan set out in September 2011 on an "Arab Spring tour," visiting the post-upheaval states of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. According to the Christian Science Monitor, the tour "has been a hit" as Erdoğan made his way across North Africa, "extolling Turkey as a democratic model for fellow Muslims who have cast off their dictators."[27] In Libya, for example, prayer leader Salim al-Shaykhi told the crowd of several thousand in Tripoli's Martyrs' Square: "After we thank God, we thank our friend Mr. Erdoğan, and after him all the Turkish people."[28] Özhan has written that "people who want to change towards a model based on Turkey enthusiastically welcomed Prime Minister Erdoğan, openly asking him to fill the political vacuum after the Arab revolutions."[29]
Arab commentators have followed suit. Abd al-Bari Atwan stated that "the AKP has become a sort of guide for Islamist parties" which sought to imitate its economic achievements.[30] Others spoke about the admiration that these parties had for the Turkish model.[31] Syrian scholar Sadik al-Azm argued that by the time of the Arab upheavals, all the factions in those countries—leftists, nationalists, and Islamists, who for their own reasons had had a negative view of Turkey—came to regard "the Turkish model" as the best paradigm to be followed.[32]
Erdoğan was welcomed as a hero by crowds in these countries. But this enthusiastic welcome should not be interpreted as wholehearted support for the democratic model. For all the assertions—from Turkish and non-Turkish sources—there is clear evidence that Erdoğan's popularity had to do with other causes, including his government's Islamist tendencies, his confrontational stance on Israel, and Turkey's economic achievements under the AKP.
The election of the Islamist AKP in 2002 was a watershed in the Arab world's interest in Ankara and in its new, positive attitude toward Turkey. There seems to be a clear correlation between a more positive view about Turkey and changes in Turkish foreign policy, particularly with respect to the bilateral relationship with Israel and the Palestinian issue.[33] The most dramatic example came in the aftermath of the 2008-09 Israel-Hamas-Gaza confrontation. As Palestinian journalist Sameh Habeeb stated:
Turkish prime minister Erdoğan criticizing Israel and then leaving the meeting with Israeli president Shimon Peres was the turning point for Turkey in the Arab street ... In a short span of time and in the hearts and minds of those within the Arab street and the global activist community, Erdoğan became a key player in the Middle East, especially in the absence of any real Arab leadership.[34]
Turkey's vibrant economy may have also made it particularly attractive for reformers.[35] As one Turkish analyst suggested, "In sum, the AKP's bottom-up connection with Islam, the economic dynamics that compelled Turkey to seek an active political and economic role in the region, and Turkey's gradual transformation into a soft power have constituted the main pillars of the Turkish model."[36]
Distrust of the Turkish Model
At the same time, skepticism about the Turkish model began to surface little by little. Sami Zubaida of the University of London took issue with Turkish democracy as a model for post-revolutionary Arab regimes and raised concerns regarding the fortune of Turkish democracy under the AKP, stating that "pluralism is now threatened by the repeated electoral successes of the AKP, establishing, in effect, the bases for a majoritarian authoritarianism, at both the institutional and the communal levels."[37] Abdel Moneim Said, chairman of the board of al-Ahram Weekly, a government mouthpiece, admitted to admiring Erdoğan and his achievements but declared that Egypt had
no need for the caliphate. … Historically, Egypt had always offered a model of its own, to which testifies the birth of the modern Egyptian state in 1922 … maybe we will summon the courage to return to our own indigenous principles of civil government as laid down by the fathers of the Egyptian state.[38]
Said's critique was echoed by Hassan Abou Taleb of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies who asked rhetorically, "Following the Turkish model or forging our own?" Taleb insisted that there was no resemblance whatsoever between the experience of Turkey and Egypt as the former had a long, if imperfect, tradition of democracy and maintained that unlike Egypt's Salafis, the AKP "has never cast itself as a religious party that has sought to transform the state into a form of theocracy." He added,
Egypt has its own long heritage of a liberal secularism that is at peace with religion. This legacy should enable Egypt to develop a unique, homegrown model for the application of democracy and the rule of law, even if the Muslim Brotherhood comes to share in power via the ballot box.[39]
Nor was the Turkish model more acceptable to the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest party in Egypt. The initial enthusiastic welcome for Erdoğan in Cairo was muted by his statement that the establishment of a secular state was the best option for Egypt. Mahmud Ghuzlan, spokesman for Egypt's Brotherhood, characterized these comments as interference in Egypt's domestic affairs, noting that the experiments of other countries should not be cloned while disparaging Turkey's Kemalist history as "conditions imposed on it to deal with the secular concept."[40] Turkish analyst Shebnem Gumuscu came to the same conclusion, albeit from a different perspective, asserting there is no "Turkish model for Egypt." She explained:
The coexistence between Islam and democracy has come to pass in Turkey not from the AKP's development of institutional and political structures that accommodated both Islamic and democratic principles, but rather because Islamists themselves came to accept the secular-democratic framework of the Turkish state.[41]
Even more compelling criticism of the Turkish model has arisen as analysts within and outside the Arab world have looked closely at the facts on the ground. At the Doha debates held in mid-January 2012 at Boğaziçi University, some warned the emerging Arab democracies against emulating Turkey, which was described as "a bad model" because of Ankara's record on human rights and media freedom. German Marshall Fund fellow Hassan Mneimneh cautioned that the Turkish model could become "a cover for the insertion of Islamism into positions of power where the Islamists would be really entrenched in the Arab world."[42] Egyptian academic Ibrahim Ghanem maintained that many Arabs were now taking a closer, more skeptical look at the Turkish model: "What is the meaning of 'Turkish model'? Do you mean in dealing with minorities like Alevis and Kurds? Do you mean the Turkish model in terms of the vital role of the army in the political life?"[43]
The Turkish model has now begun to look less attractive to potential audiences with the harshest criticism coming from Turkish journalists on Ankara's abuse of freedoms and drift away from democracy. The latest wave of arrests of Turkish journalists at the end of 2011 moved Milliyet columnist Mehmet Tezkan to write: "In a political structure where the head of internal security forces … perceives writers as 'pens for sale,' not even a halfway democracy, let alone an advanced democracy, is possible."[44] Aslı Aydıntaşbaş commented that the political dynamic was developing in a direction that was totally opposite to what the AKP had promised "with the object of subduing the 50 percent of the population who did not vote for the AKP, instead of satisfying the other 50 percent's demand for democratic change."[45] Mehmet Ali Birand cautioned that arresting journalists, thinkers, and political staff because they were sympathizers of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was "nothing more than forcefully silencing millions of people"[46] while Semih Idiz complained that the arrests were legal "witch hunts" against anyone considered disagreeable from an AKP perspective.[47] Taha Akyol warned against damaging the credibility of the judicial process in Turkey, maintaining that there have been "excessive arrests" which cast a shadow over the rightful nature of the court cases and undermined their credibility.[48]
It is indeed ironic that at the very time that Turkey sought to cast itself as a model of democratization, its own democracy was tottering with ninety journalists[49] and thousands of Kurdish activists or supporters under arrest or in prison.[50] Writing in the Milliyet, journalist Sami Kohen accused the West of indifference toward the negative developments in Turkey, maintaining that what was taking place was "casting a shadow over the 'Turkish model' for the Middle East."[51] For her part, blogger Yesim Erez maintained that
during the last year, Western governments and mass media have urged new, post-revolutionary Arab governments to follow the "Turkish model" as a way of achieving a moderate democracy. The problem with this approach is that the Turkish model is not so moderate, democratic, or admirable.[52]
For all of Ankara's efforts to extol the virtues of and to export its brand of democracy, the Turkish model does not seem to have made much headway in the Middle East. Arab elites remain reserved and suspicious because they fear Turkish ambitions in the region; emerging Islamist parties are wary because Turkey is too secular and too Western despite its AKP government; liberals are skeptical about Turkish democracy, and Arab states are searching for their own authentic, homegrown models to take into account the specific characteristics of each country.
Conclusions
Neither the Iraqi nor Turkish models have proven attractive to the Arab regimes emerging from the most recent unrest. The Iraqi model seems more frightening than encouraging, in part because it is perceived as a foreign imposition and in part because of the civil strife that was unleashed on its heels. Sunni-majority Arab states seem disinclined to embrace a model that empowers new forces such as Shiites or Kurds, especially when they have their own minorities—Copts, Berbers, or Shiites, among others—with which to contend.
For all the admiration that it had initially aroused, the Turkish model appears as unappealing as the Iraqi but for different reasons. Despite the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country, there are lingering fears and suspicions among the new regimes regarding Ankara's real motives. The export of the Turkish model has been perceived as another vehicle for expanding Ankara's neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region. To some, Ankara's behavior seems arrogant as if it were lecturing the uncultured Arabs who need to be schooled by the "superior" Turks. From this perspective, there is little difference between a Christian or Muslim outsider.
The overwhelming sense is that each country affected by the unrest is searching for its own model and is unwilling to emulate another even when it has proved successful. A democratic system cannot be instantly copied and installed in another place. It needs time, a strong economic basis, stability, and most importantly, the willingness of a large segment of the society to embrace democratic norms. As Daniel Pipes has written: "Democracy is a learned habit, not instinct. The infrastructure of a civil society—such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, minority rights, and an independent judiciary—needs to be established before holding elections. Deep attitudinal changes must take place as well: a culture of restraint, a commonality of values, a respect for differences of view and a sense of civic responsibility."[53]
As of now, it seems highly doubtful that either Iraq or Turkey can help the post-revolutionary Arab regimes implement these conditions.
Ofra Bengio is a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. She is author of The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders (Palgrave, 2004) and The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012).
[1] C. A. Hooper, The Constitutional Law of Iraq (Baghdad: Mackenzie and Mackenzie, 1928), p. 15.
[2] Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Ta'rikh al-'Iraq as–Siyasi al-Hadith, vol. 3 (Sidon: Matba'at al-'Urfan, 1957), p. 235.
[3] "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998," 105th U.S. Congress (1997-98), H.R.4655.ENR, Jan. 27, 1998.
[4] The Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2003.
[5] George Bush, speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., in The Guardian (London), Feb. 27, 2003.
[6] "Iraq Overview: Governance," World Directory of Minority and Indigenous Rights, Minority Rights Group International, London, accessed Mar. 7, 2012.
[7] The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 2004.
[8] For voices critical of this constitution, see Andrew Arato, Constitution Making under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 205-49.
[9] "Nuri Kamal al-Maliki," The New York Times, Dec. 29, 2011.
[10] See, for example, Judith Colp, "Women in the New Iraq," MERIA Journal, Sept. 3, 2008.
[11] Noga Efrat, "Women under the monarchy: A backdrop for post-Saddam events," in Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, eds., Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 121-3.
[12] John Eibner, "The Plight of Christians in Iraq," field trip report, Christian Solidarity International, Westlake Village, Calif., Nov. 3-11, 2007.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011); USA Today, Oct. 31, 2011.
[15] The Washington Post, Aug. 31, 2011.
[16] Fouad Ajami, "Perspective: Five Myths about the Arab Spring," St. Augustine (Fla.) Record, Jan. 15, 2012.
[17] National Public Radio, Dec. 21, 2011.
[18] Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quarterly, Mar. 1994, pp. 41-9.
[19] Sinan Ülgen, "From Aspiration to Inspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East," Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2011, p. 1.
[20] Taha Özhan, "The Arab Spring and Turkey: The Camp David Order vs. the New Middle East," Insight Turkey, no. 4, 2011, p. 55.
[21] Ülgen, "Turkey in the New Middle East," p. 1.
[22] Özhan, "The Arab Spring and Turkey," p. 63; The Asia Times (Hong Kong), Sept. 11, 2011.
[23] Özhan, "The Arab Spring and Turkey," p. 59.
[24] Nuh Yilmaz and Kadir Üstün, "The Erdoğan Effect: Turkey, Egypt and the Future of the Middle East," The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Fall 2011.
[25] Al-Ahram (Cairo), Sept. 14, 2011.
[26] Özhan, "The Arab Spring and Turkey," p. 61.
[27] The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 16, 2011.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Özhan, "The Arab Spring and Turkey," p. 59.
[30] Agence France-Presse, Dec. 2, 2011.
[31] See, for example, Ibrahim al-Amin, "Islamists in North Africa and the Turkish Model," Alakhbar (Cairo), Oct. 24, 2011.
[32] Sadik J. al-Azm, "The 'Turkish Model': A View from Damascus," Turkish Studies, Dec. 2011, pp. 638-40.
[33] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey: Arab Perspectives," Foreign Policy Analysis Series, no. 11, p. 12.
[34] The Palestine Telegraph (Gaza), Sept. 20, 2011.
[35] Altunışık, "Turkey: Arab Perspectives," p. 10.
[36] Alper Y. Dede, "The Arab Uprisings: Debating 'The Turkish Model,'" Insight Turkey, Apr.-June 2011, p. 28.
[37] The Samosa (U.K.), June 6, 2011.
[38] Al-Ahram (Cairo), Sept. 22-28, 2011.
[39] Hassan Abou Taleb, "Following the Turkish Model or Forging Our Own?" al-Ahram, Sept. 19, 2011.
[40] Al-Arabiya News Channel (Dubai), Sept. 14, 2011.
[41] The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 17, 2012.
[42] Gulf Times (Doha), Jan. 17, 2012; The Doha Debates, at Bogazici University, Istanbul, Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development, Jan. 12, 2012.
[43] National Public Radio, Jan. 6, 2012.
[44] Milliyet (Istanbul), Jan. 12, 2011, in Mideast Mirror, Jan. 12, 2012.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Hürriyet (Istanbul), Jan. 24, 2012.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., Jan. 12, 2011, in Mideast Mirror, Jan. 12, 2012.
[49] Mehmet Ali Birand, Posta (Istanbul), Jan. 11, 2012, in Mideast Mirror, Jan. 11, 2012.
[50] Yeni Özgür Politika (Frankfurt), Jan. 8, 2012.
[51] Milliyet, Jan. 10, 2012, in Mideast Mirror, Jan. 13, 2012.
[52] Yesim Erez, "The 'Turkish Model' of Democracy: Neither Moderate nor Democratic," PJ Media, Feb. 1, 2012.
[53] Daniel Pipes, "A Strongman for Iraq?" The New York Post, Apr. 28, 2003.