LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March 31/2012

Bible Quotation for today/The True Spirit and the False Spirit
01 John 04/01-06: " My dear friends, do not believe all who claim to have the Spirit, but test them to find out if the spirit they have comes from God. For many false prophets have gone out everywhere. This is how you will be able to know whether it is God's Spirit: anyone who acknowledges that Jesus Christ came as a human being has the Spirit who comes from God. But anyone who denies this about Jesus does not have the Spirit from God. The spirit that he has is from the Enemy of Christ; you heard that it would come, and now it is here in the world already. But you belong to God, my children, and have defeated the false prophets, because the Spirit who is in you is more powerful than the spirit in those who belong to the world. Those false prophets speak about matters of the world, and the world listens to them because they belong to the world. But we belong to God. Whoever knows God listens to us; whoever does not belong to God does not listen to us. This, then, is how we can tell the difference between the Spirit of truth and the spirit of error.

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
Passivity and incoherence on Syria/By: Tony Badran/Now Lebanon/March 30/12
Kofi Annan's Plan Is Destined to Fail/By David Schenker/Washington Institute/March 30/12
The Human Rights Crisis in Syria/By: Andrew J. Tabler/Washington Institute/March 30/12
On Massacres and Motivations/by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi/The American Spectator/March 30/12
Syria: the debate over military intervention/By Amir Taheri/Asharq Alawsat/March 30/12
Al-Assad’s latest scam/By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat/March 30/12
The Portuguese lesson/By Adel Al Toraifi/Asharq Alawsat/March 30/12
A record of political assassinations/By Ghassan Al Imam/Asharq Alawsat/March 30/12

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for March 30/12
Israel braces for Arab protests on Friday (today)
Kuala Lumpur seizes suitcases of counterfeit US dollars traced to Iran
UN says one million Syrians need humanitarian help
Arab leaders tackle Syria at landmark summit
Arab summit falls short of calling on Assad to step down
Sleiman in Iraq says backs efforts to seek political solution in Syria
Crowds expected for Land Day march
Syria: opposition accepts Annan's plan if implemented in two days
Iranians freed in Syria after kidnap ordeal: reports
Turkey voices support for Iran nuclear program
Syrian suspicions swirl over Iranian hand in Assad's repression
Arabs, U.N. push Syria to act on peace plan as 15 more killed
Syria's Assad says will cooperate with UN peace plan if rebels halt violence
UN chief to Syria's Assad: World is waiting for you to implement peace plan
Assad's cousin: West is right to back Syrian opposition, but it is backing the wrong one
Belgium closes embassy in Syria
Khamenei Meets Erdogan: Iran Will Defend Syria
Azerbaijan denies granting Israel access to air bases on Iran border
Insurers Win $9.4 Billion Judgment Against Hizbullah in 9/11 Lawsuit
Maronite Patriarch Beshara Ra renews call for national unity
Al-Rahi in Turkey to Discuss Issue of Maronites in Turkish-Occupied Cyprus
Rai expresses support for non-violent Arab spring
Sami Gemayel: Money should be spent on power plants, not ships
Iranians freed in Syria after kidnap ordeal, reports say
Mikati to seek other power-ship tenders if Turkish, U.S. prices too high
Miqati Says Lebanon Respects Calls for Freedom in Neighboring Countries but ‘Won’t Interfere
Lebanon will not budge from dissociation policy: Mikati
GLC chief condemns hospital workers’ strike
Two more truckloads of weapons seized in Bekaa
21 suspects charged with smuggling arms to Syria
Lebanese Authorities Return Palestinian, who Swam to Lebanon, Back to Israel
Jumblat to Cut Ties with Syrian Regime Completely, Supports Cabinet

Maronite Patriarch Beshara Ra renews call for national unity
March 30, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai renewed his call Thursday for boosting national unity in order to serve the public interest despite political divisions in the country. “Despite everything, we have to work for bolstering internal unity and diversity and respect each other for the sake of the public interest,” Rai told reporters at Beirut airport before leaving for an official pastoral visit to Turkey.He said he was happy to visit Turkey which, he said, is bound with Lebanon by “links of cooperation” and is contributing troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. “There should be a dialogue with the Turkish state. Turkey is a big state that has a big role with regard to dialogue between [various] religions and Islam,” Rai said. Noting that his visit to Turkey was part of a pastoral tour and not for political reasons, Rai said: “There are many matters relating to the Maronites’ affairs and the issue of Maronites in Cyprus in the Turkish and Cypriot sectors that need to be discussed with the Turkish side.”

Israel braces for Arab protests on Friday
Ynetnews/AP Published: 03.30.12/IDF imposes full closure on West Bank, deploys thousands of soldiers, police along borders with Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan ahead of 'Global March to Jerusalem'; protesters in Amman burn Israeli, American flags Israel on Thursday stepped up preparations a day before a series of planned Arab protests, deploying thousands of troops and police across the country and along its borders in anticipation of possible violence.On Friday, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are marking Land Day, an annual protest against what they say are discriminatory Israeli land policies. Supporters in neighboring Arab countries planned marches near the Israeli borders in a solidarity event they call a "Global March to Jerusalem.While organizers said the events would be nonviolent, Israel's army and police were girding for trouble after similar protests last year turned deadly. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has instructed the army to impose a full closure on the West Bank, which will be lifted in 24 hours barring any unforeseen developments. At least 15 people were killed in clashes with Israeli soldiers when they tried to cross the Syrian and Lebanese borders with Israel in a May protest marking Palestinian sorrow over Israel's creation in 1948. A month later, Israeli troops killed 23 demonstrators who crossed into the no-man's land between Israel and Syria in a demonstration against Israeli control of the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in the 1967 Middle East war. Israeli Public Security Minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch, who oversees the national police force, said officers would be spread out in potentially explosive areas Friday but would not enter Arab villages unless needed. The guidelines are to allow everyone to mark Land Day quietly ... We will keep a low profile," he told Israel Radio. Police spokesman Mickey Rosenfeld said thousands of officers were on the move throughout the country Thursday in preparation for Land Day. He said the biggest deployments were near Arab towns in northern Israel and in Jerusalem.
He said police were in touch with leaders of Arab communities in Israel in an attempt to keep protests peaceful.
"We're hoping there won't be any major incidents," he said. "If there are ... obviously the police will respond and deal with them."
In Jerusalem, the entrance to the Temple Mount compound will be limited. Thousands of police officers will be deployed in and around the capital.
Mahmoud Aloul, a Palestinian leader in the West Bank involved in preparations, said demonstrations were to be held in Jerusalem, the Qalandiya checkpoint - a frequent flashpoint of violence on the outskirts of Jerusalem - and in the West Bank town of Bethlehem. Other events were planned in Arab towns in northern Israel.
The Israeli military was also preparing for possible trouble along the borders with Lebanon and Syria in the north, Jordan to the east, and Egypt and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip to the south.
In a statement, the Israeli military said it was "prepared for any eventuality and will do whatever is necessary to protect Israeli borders and residents." It gave no further details.
As part of the preparations in north Israel, roadblocks will be set up at the entrances to major cities. Activists in Gaza planned to hold a demonstration about a kilometer (half a mile) from the Israeli border, but said they did not plan to move closer, minimizing the chance of clashes. The IDF has positioned snipers along the Gaza border fence for fear demonstrators may try to approach it.
Authorities in Lebanon and Jordan also said they would keep demonstrators far from the Israeli border. Several thousand protesters were expected in each place. It was unclear whether protesters would gather in Syria, which is in the midst of a vicious civil war that has left thousands dead over the past year.Palestinian organizer Mustafa Barghouti said activists from 82 countries were expected to participate in Land Day activities. Barghouti said the marches were aimed at "ending the apartheid regime and the ethnic cleansing."
It was reported this week that at least to of the Arab protest organizers were aboard the Mavi Marmara ship when it was raided by IDF commandoes while trying to violate the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. Meanwhile, dozens of Jordanians protested near the Israeli embassy in Amman on Thursday against Israeli presence in the Hashemite Kingdom. During the rally demonstrators burned Israeli and American flags and said they would continue to protest until the Israeli embassy "is removed from Jordanian land and Palestine is liberated. They chanted, "Arab, fight for your rights."
The rally was organized by a Jordanian group that has been protesting against the presence of the Israeli embassy in Jordan for a few months. The group has also been protesting against the Israel-Jordan peace treaty.
**Roi Kais contributed to the report

Kuala Lumpur seizes suitcases of counterfeit US dollars traced to Iran
DEBKAfile Special Report March 28, 2012/Two suitcases crammed with counterfeit $100 bills were seized in Kuala Lumpur this week from two Iranian traders who flew in to the Malaysian capital on direct flights from Tehran. One contained 153,000 forged dollars and the second 203,000. The traders claimed they were issued the bills by tellers at the Iranian central bank CBI to finance their business transactions and had no notion they had not been dealt genuine greenbacks. debkafile’s sources report that alert local businessmen spotted the fake currency despite its quality workmanship when they used it to pay for their purchases. According to a Malaysian source, the bills were finely printed on special paper. The initial investigation identified the paper as made in China especially for use in printing currency and a supply recently reached Iran. Malaysian authorities have not identified the Iranian traders who were taken in custody except by their initials – H.M. and A. G.
Kuala Lumpur finds itself in the middle of an international scandal developing around the affair and involving the US, China and Iran. The Iranian embassy is leaning hard on the government to keep it hushed up, threatening to cut off commercial ties if the story is made public, or if the two traders are forced to stay in the country until the legal proceedings take their course.
Tehran fears the embarrassment attending disclosure of its suspected traffic in counterfeit US currency as the April 13 date approaches for important nuclear negotiations with the six world powers. Iran would find itself badly compromised on world financial markets on top of the difficulties it already faces as a result of the tough international financial sanctions clamped down by America and Europe.
debkafile’s intelligence sources disclose that American undercover agents are in Malaysia trying to get hold of some of the fake bills on order to have them tested in their US laboratories for clues to their provenance. They could then be compared with other forged $100 bills seized last year in several Middle Eastern countries.
Comparison with fake bills impounded recently in Iraq, for example, or in the Persian Gulf countries, might shed light on dark corners of Iran’s industry for the counterfeiting and circulation of American dollars and establish whether it is run by criminal mafias or clandestine elements tied to the Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Chinese secret agents have also arrived to track the paper’s trail to Iran The special paper used for the dollar bills seized in Kuala Lumpur is exported from China only under special license..
Evidence that the Islamic regime of Iran was responsible for the wholesale forgery of the emblematic American dollar would have harsh consequences. Washington would not pull its punches and would convince a widening circle of world governments to step up sanctions against Tehran for the crime of undermining international currency.
Since the international money transfer firm SWIFT severed its ties with most of Iran’s banks, the traders have had to travel abroad in person carrying suitcases full of cash for contracting their business operations. Five months ago, Western intelligence circles issued a warning that Iran would try and overcome the shortage of available foreign currency reserves caused by sanctions by printing counterfeit $100 bills. In 2010, when US forces were still present in Iraq, they captured several million American dollars suspected to have been forged in Iran and smuggled into Iraq.
In 2010, the US Federal Reserve Board had a new $100 bill designed to defeat counterfeiters. Its release was delayed by printing defects.

Passivity and incoherence on Syria
By: Tony Badran/Now Lebanon/March 29, 2012
President Barack Obama meeting with his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev this week. The Obama administration has embraced a plan that endorses the Russian position on Syria. (AFP photo)
Has the Obama administration abandoned its previously stated policy of regime change in Syria? Following the trajectory of Washington’s diplomatic choices, now culminating in the enthusiastic endorsement of Kofi Annan’s six point plan, it certainly seems so.
The fact is that neither the Annan plan nor the supporting UN Security Council statement that followed it make any reference to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stepping down. They also ignore the earlier Arab League call for Assad to hand over power to his vice president. In contrast, the Annan plan backed by President Obama calls for a “Syrian-led” dialogue between Assad and the opposition, thereby legitimizing the dictator as an interlocutor.
Various statements coming from administration officials about the policy objective in Syria have contributed to the speculation about this reversal. Whenever the administration discussed its desired outcome in Syria, it spoke of a “democratic transition.” What, exactly, that implied was not always explained. However, every so often, an official would offer hints as to what the administration meant by that term.
Take for instance the eyebrow-raising definition offered by Ambassador Robert Ford last month. “Transition,” he explained in an interview, “means that gradually – gradually – the political system opens up to respecting basic human rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom to establish political groupings or charitable organizations without objection from the Syrian government, or the freedom of peaceful protest.” When pressed on whether this should happen “with Bashar Assad,” Ford timidly replied that this was a decision for the Syrian people, and that the US position was merely “an opinion, and nothing more.” Ford’s performance was not a passing gaffe. Just last Friday, a State Department spokesperson used even vaguer language, telling the press that what the administration wanted to see “is a process that … proceeds on to a real conversation about a transformation in a democratic direction in Syria.”
To be fair, it’s possible the White House has not abandoned regime change. Pressed earlier this month to explain exactly where Washington stands on Assad’s status, a senior administration official stressed that the “political transition” the United States wants would “of course … include [Assad] stepping down.” Moreover, according to the readout of President Obama’s meeting with his outgoing Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev on Monday, the president “made clear his belief that part of the transition envisioned in Kofi Annan's initiative would have to involve President Assad leaving power.”
However, the problem is that these statements do not register as a publicly and forcefully articulated red line backed up by a credible threat. Rather, they are more like a suggestion, along the lines of Ford’s characterization of the US position as a mere expression of opinion.
Moreover, even these subdued statements are further undermined by the very process that the administration is promoting. Clearly, the Russians couldn’t care less about the administration’s public hedges as long as the US has officially committed itself to a plan that explicitly bows to the Kremlin’s conditions. More than that, what the Obama administration has done effectively is to empower the Russian position over that of its regional allies, making it the only game in town.
Despite its praise for the historical leadership role of the Arab League on Syria, the administration has actually forced its Arab allies to take a step back from their position calling on Assad to hand over power and instead embrace a plan that endorses the Russian position.
The same extends to Turkey, which will be hosting the next Friends of Syria meeting on Sunday. Concerned about a push toward a more aggressive approach, the administration has made it known that it expects the Turks to “deepen and broaden the consensus about the way forward.” In other words, Ankara must line up behind the administration’s preference in supporting the Annan plan.
There is a clear disconnect in the administration’s posture. When the US declares a policy of regime change in Syria, this cannot be a mere suggestion or nothing more than an “opinion.” Regional allies who have staked out forward leaning positions against Assad expect the US to follow through on its declared policy and ensure it is achieved.
So has the administration abandoned regime change? The signs gleaned from its actions are not encouraging. The statements to the contrary have the feel of a rhetorical deflection of criticism, but when added up they don’t amount to a coherent position.
US allies are looking to it for leadership and clarity but instead find passivity and incoherence when it comes to securing Assad’s ouster. When the administration does exert assertive leadership, it is only to force its allies in line behind the policies of Assad’s backers in Moscow. While this may not save Assad in the end, it is not without long-term implications for US credibility in the region. The message the Obama administration is reinforcing is that when it comes to punishing common enemies, Washington may not always have its allies’ back.
**Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.

On Massacres and Motivations
by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi/The American Spectator
March 28, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/3200/massacres-motivations
Commenting on the recent massacre of 17 Afghan civilians that was allegedly carried out by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, Glenn Greenwald, a leading pundit on the American political left, wrote the following:
There is, quite obviously, a desperate need to believe that when an American engages in acts of violence of this type, there must be some underlying mental or emotional cause that makes it sensible, something other than an act of pure hatred or evil. When a Muslim engages in acts of violence against Americans, there is an equally desperate need to believe the opposite: that this is yet another manifestation of inscrutable hatred and evil, and any discussion of any other causes must be prohibited and ignored.
This is a typical example of how Greenwald engages in overblown rhetoric. To take just a couple of examples that refute his inaccurate generalizations here, no one attempted to rationalize the Mahmudiyah killings in 2006, which involved the massacre of an Iraqi family -- including the gang rape and killing of a 14-year old girl -- by some U.S. soldiers from the 502nd Infantry Regiment.
Indeed, the unequivocal condemnation was entirely justified, and the motivation for the massacre was made clear for all observers: namely, a hatred for Iraqis as a people and a desire to engage in a punitive revenge attack. We know this because that is how one of the perpetrators -- James P. Barker -- explained it. As he said in an interview in 2009, "Because I hated Iraqis. They smile at you, then shoot you in the face."
As for acts of violence perpetrated against Americans by individual Muslims, one need only look at the cases of Nidal Malik Hasan, who was responsible for the spree shooting at Fort Hood, and Faisal Shahzad -- the failed Times Square bomber -- to see how many commentators, officials, and media outlets tried to explain their actions in terms beyond "inscrutable hatred and evil."
For example, on NPR radio in the aftermath of the Fort Hood massacre, Tom Gjelten -- covering the story for the outlet -- referred to "a phenomenon that you could maybe call a pre-traumatic stress disorder" as an underlying cause behind Hasan's rampage.
In a similar vein, Muqtedar Khan, writing in the Washington Post's "On Faith" section, made the following argument: "It is important to understand that Major Hasan is an isolated, alienated and sad individual who was clearly not well adjusted to his life. In a community that values family life, he was single at 39 and still looking desperately for a wife, according to his former Imam.… He was frequently taunted and harassed for being a Muslim by his own colleagues… [H]e did not feel as if he belonged and perhaps that was the key to why he could turn on his own." It is hardly as though Khan was subject to widespread condemnation for what he wrote.
Likewise, many observers were quick to note that Shahzad "had faced the loss of his family home to bank repossession," a supposed stepping-stone on his path to radicalization. Others primarily focused on Shahzad's anger over American drone attacks in Pakistan.
Greenwald's writings on this matter come in the wider context of attempts to equate the Afghan massacre with the recent spree killing in Toulouse, the work of a French Muslim called Mohammed Merah. A case in point is a blog post by Harvey Morris at the New York Times, in which the author rhetorically asks: "Robert Bales? Mohammed Merah? Maybe they were both mad."
The issue of massacres and motivations behind them needs to be clarified on several counts. When it comes to incidents of spree-killings, it is always good to start by asking whether the attack is planned in advance and the targets are intentionally chosen.
In the case of Merah, who killed three Muslim paratroopers and then four Jews at a Sephardic school, it is clear that the perpetrator's attacks were premeditated, and in keeping with al Qaeda's jihadist ideology that not only deems non-Muslims who do not live under Sharia as legitimate targets for jihad -- whether "offensive" or "defensive" -- but also Muslims perceived to be apostates for serving in the armed forces of Western countries, inter alia.
The latter concept is known as takfir, and is well illustrated in statements made by Islamist thinkers in the West aligned with al Qaeda. For example, Abu Izzadeen, a former spokesman for the banned Islamist group al-Ghurabaa, was filmed proclaiming that any Muslim who joins the British Army should be beheaded. Further, Merah proclaimed himself to be a "mujahideen," and Jund al-Khilafah ("Army of the Caliphate"), a group linked to al Qaeda, took responsibility for the attacks. It is therefore evident that Merah's acts were driven by his ideology.
As for Robert Bales, the problem is that many details of the massacre have still been withheld from public disclosure, hence the wide variety of speculation on causes and motives and whether the attacks were premeditated. What might suggest premeditation is that Bales may have carried out the massacre in "two episodes, returning to his base after the first attack and later slipping away to kill again."
If this be the case, then it is plausible to suggest that Bales was driven by a desire to carry out what he saw in his mind as a punitive revenge raid on Afghans, not dissimilar to the perpetrators of the Mahmudiyah massacre. What will be crucial to determining Bales' motivations is his own testimony at his forthcoming trial, where he could be facing the death penalty.
In fact, the Bales affair demonstrates the failure of trying to draw equivalence between his actions and those of Mohammed Merah. The very fact that Bales is being prosecuted shows that the U.S. military does not have a policy of inciting hatred against Afghans, does not encourage soldiers to engage in revenge attacks on civilians, and does not promote any sort of supremacist ideology. On the contrary, the American armed forces pursue a policy of accommodation towards local cultures.
If it turns out that Bales is simply "mad," it does not follow that the same is true of Merah. It is untrue to claim, as Nicolas Sarkozy recently did, that the "Islamic faith has nothing to do with the insane motivations of this man [Merah]," for the concept of takfir has a precedent in earlier Islamic thought, specifically in the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, while jihad against non-Muslims has much broader elements in traditional theology that justify it.
To round off, it is worth coming back to Greenwald, who regards the likes of Faisal Shahzad as driven solely by political grievances (in Shahzad's case, U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan) rather than any Islamist ideology. Where Greenwald errs is to assume that these grievances and ideology are mutually exclusive. Of course Shahzad is angry about American drones, but what he himself said in a video released by al-Arabiya illustrates that his motivations go beyond an aim to end drone strikes.
In particular, Shahzad declared, "You'll see that the Muslim war has just started… until Islam is spread throughout the whole world." This fits in with traditional ideas about jihad as warfare to expand the realm of Dar al-Islam. It is also notable that Shahzad affirmed his desire to avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud, who was the leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban until he was killed by a drone strike in August 2009. Mehsud outlined his goals as follows: Drive out the non-Muslims from Muslim lands, and then attack them in the West until they pay jizya or convert to Islam.
Recognizing that the problem of Islamist terrorism is foremost an issue of ideology with roots in traditional theology does not amount to characterizing the actions of Islamist militants as manifestations of "inscrutable hatred and evil" (to use Greenwald's words). Rather, it is simply based on examining what the militants themselves say they want to achieve.
I am no fan of Obama's "surge" in Afghanistan (based on the erroneous assumption that the primary cause of the decline in violence in Iraq from 2007 onwards was the increase of U.S. troop numbers and COIN strategy) or the use of drones, but these policies should not be changed merely because Faisal Shahzad is angered by them. It is difficult to think of a counter-terrorism measure against his fellow Islamist militants that would not similarly anger him.
Instead, a policy of containment is needed, and on the understanding that Islamism is ultimately rooted in questions of identity and the role of Sharia in the modern world, it should be acknowledged that the burden of stopping Islamist terrorism lies in the hands of Muslims.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum.

The Human Rights Crisis in Syria
Featuring Andrew J. Tabler
March 27, 2012 /
The Washington Institute
Testimony prepared for the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Assad regime's brutal year-long crackdown on Syria's pro-democracy protestors. Throughout years as a journalist and analyst based in Damascus, I followed Tom Lantos's often-critical words on the Assad regime's policies with great interest. I'm pleased to see the commission continues his good work at a key time in the Syrian uprising.
My testimony today is based on a recent trip to Antakya, southern Turkey, and northern Lebanon last month, where I met with Syrian refugees and oppositionists based in both countries. With the help of the Turkish authorities, who have done a solid job of taking care of Syrians fleeing to their country, I was able to enter the refugee camp at Yayladagi, one of seven Syrian refugee camps near the Turkish-Syrian frontier in Turkey's Hatay province. The Yayladagi camp, which once was a tobacco factory, hosted around 4,500 residents in makeshift tents, each warmed with an electric heater provided by the Turkish Red Crescent. The residents seemed well taken care of, and Turkish control over entry and exit to the camp was complete.
The residents I interviewed hailed from either communities along the Syrian coast -- the ancestral homeland of the Alawites, the minority that dominates the Syrian regime -- or the conservative Idlib province. Like most if not all Syrian refugees in Turkey, they were Sunni; all those I interviewed were a mix of ethnic Arabs and Turkmens. All shared with me harrowing stories of their plight against regime forces in Syria, including in many cases having to flee in the wake of attacks by shabbiha -- armed gangs primarily of Alawites who terrorize Sunni villagers throughout the Syrian coast. Others from Idlib -- all of whom had already spent up to a decade of their lives imprisoned under the Assad regime -- spoke of the regime's brutal raid into their community of Jisr al-Shughour and their hurried exit across the border to Turkey for safety. None imagined returning to Syria unless the Assad regime collapses. And no one I met believed that would happen -- sooner or later -- without force.
The real story of what is going on with Syrian refugees in Hatay province happens outside the camps. Hatay is officially disputed territory between Turkey and Syria, and people there are a mix of Sunnis, Alawites, and Turkmens. While the area was ceded to Turkey in 1939, large families still straddle the border. Thousands of refugees who have elected to leave the camps did not return to Syria; they stayed in Hatay with family. More fortunate Syrians who fled the fighting simply rent apartments in and around Antakya. To its credit, Turkey has turned a benevolent blind eye to Syrians whose visas probably expired months ago.
Like those refugees in the camps, Syrians in Hatay just try to get through the day as best they can. But there are others who are acting on the notion that Assad will not go without force. Members of the Free Syrian Army -- an organization formed last June by Col. Riad al-Asaad, a military deserter who resides in what is referred to as the "soldiers" camp at Ayadin -- have watched the horror going on across the border in Syria for months. Like civilian refugees residing in Hatay, they are outraged at the Assad regime's brutal suppression of the Syrian uprising. They communicate with fellow deserters via iPhones and similar smart phones using the Turkish cell phone network (Turkish network coverage extends well over the border into Syria) and via voice-over-IP program Skype. For those in Turkey, there is little more that they can do other than monitor movements and activities of regime forces in Syria and give advice on when residents of villages or cities should flee.
Like civilian refugees I met in Hatay, FSA members wondered why the international community had not done more to protect Syrians from a brutal regime with one of the worst human rights records in the world. I tried to respond with what we hear in the news about the strength of Syria's air defenses, or the fear of setting off civil war or aiding al-Qaeda. They scoffed at my answers. "Doesn't the United States have the strongest military in the world?" one asked. "Does it matter if people die in an uprising or a civil war?" asked another. And last but not least: "Just because some of us are pious Muslims and have beards doesn't make us al-Qaeda -- you lived in Syria, you know that."
That doesn't mean there are not some things to worry about, especially in poor and conservative Idlib province. There is some evidence of Islamist groups operating there that share America's short-term interest of bringing down the Assad regime but not our long-term interest in helping to foster a secular post-Assad Syria. But they do not make up anything close to the majority of the opposition. Given the diversity of sects in Syria -- and divisions in the Sunni community as well -- it is far from clear how much traction Islamist extremist groups would have in the country.
The Assad regime is keen to keep Syrians from fleeing the fighting, as refugee flows could trigger an external intervention by Turkey. The day we left Antakya, we began to receive news that the regime was laying mines on the foot trails leading into Hatay -- an admonition that it was preparing to move its onslaught north into Hama and Idlib governorate from the central Syrian city of Homs. To find out what's going on in Homs, one need only visit northern Lebanon, where thousands of Syrian refugees have moved out of the pocket at Wadi Khaled into the Sunni hinterland north and east of the Lebanese coastal town of Tripoli and in the Beqa Valley. In Lebanon there are no formal refugee camps -- those fleeing the fighting have to make it on their own.
As in Hatay, most Syrian refugees in Syria are Sunni. They continue to flee the country due to shabbiha operations aimed at terrorizing Sunni villages around Homs, where the sectarian map is as diverse as that in Lebanon. Over the last year, shabbiha forces have moved into hundreds of Sunni villages, where they threaten, shoot, and kidnap residents who protest against the regime or support the uprising as a whole. Like Syrian refugees in Turkey, many had smart phones and digital cameras with photos or video clips of the destruction of their homes by shabbiha and regime forces.
During my visit to northern Lebanon, the Assad regime was in the midst of trying to clear and hold Bab Amr, a neighborhood of Homs where deserters from the military who had refused orders to shoot protestors had fled. The Syrian military knew better than to send more military units into the city -- soldiers in regular army units, a majority of whom are Sunni like the residents of Bab Amr, often run away when faced with the dilemma of killing a fellow Syrian. And the military only has so many elite units, which are dominated by Alawites and other minorities, and which it needs to put down the uprising elsewhere. Instead, the regime resorted to shelling and rocketing Bab Amr for nearly a month, driving more refugees into Lebanon and driving up death tolls to an all-time high in February of around 1,800 persons. The onslaught also took the life of American journalist Marie Colvin.
Eventually, the regime's forces moved into Bab Amr and Homs to "clear" the area of armed oppositionists, once again driving up death tolls. And as expected in the days following my return to Washington, the regime's "killing machine" marched north into Hama and Idlib, sowing a path of death and destruction. But much to Assad's chagrin, the regime's forces are unable to completely "hold" and secure those areas -- as clearly demonstrated by the videos coming out of Syria on a daily basis.
Conclusion
When folks in Washington ask my overall impression of my visit to southern Turkey and northern Lebanon, I often say it felt like tracking a tornado in the storyline of the 1990s film Twister. The yearlong uprising in Syria is a tempest with two forces swirling around each other -- a tyrannical minority-dominated regime with a forty-two-year history of not being able to reform, and an opposition chiseled out of a country that boasts perhaps the youngest population in the Middle East outside the Palestinian territories. You can feel the tension on Syria's borders as the political tempest continues to churn, killing thousands and displacing many more. I see no sign this will settle down anytime soon.
Where the situation in Syria differs from the Twister story is that it's possible to curtail and eventually stop the crisis if action is taken sooner rather than later. As the last year has shown, that will take much more than sanctions and diplomacy. The Obama administration is currently exploring all its options, including everything from military force to support for the opposition within Syria. I commend this effort. But I think it's completely fair to say this exploration of options has come far too late if the United States wants Bashar al-Assad to step aside anytime soon. Short of more robust action, including support for the opposition within Syria, the crisis will likely last for years to come.
**Andrew J. Tabler is a Next Generation fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.

Kofi Annan's Plan Is Destined to Fail
By David Schenker/Washington Institute
CNN Global Public Square, March 27, 2012
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1846
President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to U.N. envoy and former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's six-point plan to end the bloodshed in Syria. Al-Assad was wise to do so. The U.N. initiative, which endorses al-Assad's oversight of a "political process to address the legitimate aspirations" of the Syrian people, is a boon to the dictator and a setback for the opposition.
Al-Assad had little to lose by signing on to the plan. The concessions he made in the deal -- the ceasefire, the ensuring of humanitarian assistance, a release of political prisoners, allowing entry to journalists, and permitting demonstrations -- can all be reversed relatively quickly.
Meanwhile, the benefits for al-Assad are significant. Notwithstanding the fact that the regime has killed nearly 10,000 Syrian citizens, some U.N. member states will likely view the president's acceptance of the plan as a positive step providing evidence of the regime's new willingness to compromise with the opposition. More importantly, Annan's plan says nothing about al-Assad having to leave, much less face trial for crimes against humanity. To wit, when queried on March 27 about whether al-Assad would step down, Annan said "it's up to the Syrian people."
Putting aside the absurd supposition that the Syrian "people" ever had or ever will be empowered to determine al-Assad's future through peaceful means, the plan not only perpetuates, but legitimates al-Assad's continued rule. For the time being, at least, the debate has changed from how al-Assad can be forced from power to what reforms the Syrian strongman can be convinced to make. At the same time, the plan hurts the opposition. The predictably divergent responses to the news of al-Assad's acceptance from the Syrian National Council, the opposition's government in exile, highlight rifts within the group. Should the negotiations actually occur, questions of who will speak for the opposition will only exacerbate extant divisions. Worse, Annan's plan will slow the momentum building in Washington calling for providing critical funding and lethal assistance to the Free Syrian Army, the military opposition to the regime.
For al-Assad, the Annan plan also provides a useful respite both from international condemnation and for his troops. In particular, a ceasefire would give the regime's 4th Division -- some 12,000 Alawite troops loyal to the minoritarian Alawite regime -- a much-needed break. For the past year, the division has been deployed throughout Syria, tasked with suppressing largely Sunni Muslim rebel forces.
Accepting this U.N. roadmap is vintage al-Assad regime strategy. As usual, he is playing for time. During the Bush Administration, for example, the regime was under a lot of pressure, internationally isolated for its assumed role in the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and for helping to move insurgents into Iraq to kill American soldiers.
At moments of maximum international pressure on the regime, however, al-Assad would float the possibility of negotiations with Israel. The mere prospect of Damascus joining the peace camp alleviated the pressure and ended Syria's pariah status. Al-Assad succeeded in waiting out a hostile Bush Administration, which was replaced by an Obama Administration that campaigned on a pledge to diplomatically engage the regime.
If the Annan plan had even a remote chance of succeeding, it might be worth risking the potential downsides. Alas, there is absolutely no prospect of success. Al-Assad had more than ten years to implement political reforms. Judging from al-Assad's recently intercepted emails where he referred to promised reforms as "rubbish laws of parties, elections, and media," the revolt has not spurred an epiphany.
While al-Assad may indeed engage in dialogue with opposition figures, he will not consent to real democratic elections that will lead to majoritarian (i.e., Sunni Muslim) rule in Syria. He may likewise agree to vest parliament with more authority and provide the historically powerless legislature with the appearance of relevance. But this is al-Assad's vision of reform -- it does not reflect the aspirations of the Syrian people who for the past year have put their lives on the line to end the corrupt, tyrannical, and increasingly brutal regime.
What al-Assad will offer during the "political process" will be acceptable to neither the political nor the military opposition. In fact, it's difficult to see anything short of al-Assad's departure from power being accepted.
So Kofi Annan's initiative to end the crisis in Syria is destined for failure. To be sure, al-Assad will blame the plan's failure on the opposition "terrorists" and continue with the atrocities. Meanwhile, the opposition will regroup, and the Free Syria Army, armed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, will continue the fight to protect demonstrators and end the regime.
At the end of the day, however, the biggest cost of this ill-advised effort may be time. The longer the conflict drags on, the more Islamist the opposition is becoming. Regrettably, counterproductive U.N. efforts like the Annan plan will do little to reverse this trend.
**David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute.

Syria: the debate over military intervention
By Amir Taheri/Asharq Alawsat
What does a US administration do to justify failure to deal with a foreign crisis?
In response to that question, over the years, a system of signaling in three phases has been developed.
In the first phase, the administration uses its media contracts, the think tanks and academia to deny there is a crisis. Erudite papers are published demonstrating that what headline writers present as crisis is nothing but a storm in the tea-cup or a distant thunder storm in no way affecting American interests.
The tactic was used to cover inaction over the genocide organized by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1970s. In 1991 it was used to pooh-pooh ideas of US intervention to stop massacres in former Yugoslavia. “We have no dog in that race,” the then Secretary of State James Baker declared.
The second phase is to narrow down options to just two: doing nothing or full-scale invasion of a distant land that few Americans would be able to locate on the map. “Do we want another Iraq?” pontiffs demand on television when they think they are clinching the argument.
For three decades, the tactic has been used in the case of the Khomeinist imamate in Tehran.
The third phase is triggered when it becomes clear that the crisis in question is unlikely to just blow away and that its continuation could damage the interests of the United States and its allies.
In this phase, un-named sources, “in the Pentagon” or “from the military”, brief friendly reporters about the “difficulties” and “dangers” of military intervention.
As far as the Syrian crisis is concerned we are in the third phase. This is why, these days, American newspapers are full of reports citing “senior military sources” arguing against any form of military intervention to stop massacres by Bashar al-Assad.
The Washington Post quotes “senior sources” asserting that taking on Assad’s forces “could be difficult”. (If a “superpower” cannot deal with a tin-pot despot, who could?)
The first reason cited for “the difficulty” is that Assad is supposed to have “a powerful air force”. Sure, thanks to Hafez al-Assad, since 1970, Syria has devoted the lion’s share in its military budget to the air force. Nevertheless, experience shows that the massive investment may not have produced the desired results.
Between 1973 and 2006, the Israeli air force penetrated Syrian defense forces in a big way on at least three occasions but met little resistance. In 2007, Israeli planes attacked and destroyed Syria’s nuclear program at al-Kibar without being challenged by Assad’s air force.
In Iraq in the 1990s, the US imposed a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s murderous raids. Although better equipped, partly thanks to advanced French-made warplanes, Saddam’s air force was in no position to fight back. Mostly equipped by Russia and North Korea, Syria’s air force is even less able to stop US intervention.
Another “difficulty” cited by “sources” is that Assad is supposed have a 350,000-strong army. Again, Iraq’s experience may be relevant. Remember how US media claimed that Saddam commanded “the fourth largest army in the world”?
However, in 2003, the 500,000-man Iraqi army decided not to fight for Saddam.
Today, the same is true of Syrian Army. A force of conscripts, like that of Iraq at the time of Saddam, the Syrian army is not keen on killing its people on behalf of a despot from a minority community. Assad relies on Special Forces, possibly no more than 40,000 men, to continue the massacre.
The last argument cited against military intervention may be the most comical.
The “sources” claim that military intervention in Syria could involve “other powers” in and lead to war with Russia and Iran. To start with, other powers are already involved in Syria. Russia and Iran are shipping arms to Assad while Iran may have deployed some of its Lebanese Hezbollah units in support of the despot. For its part, Turkey is involved on the side of the opposition.
Does anyone in the Pentagon seriously believe that Russia and Iran would declare war against the US and European allies to save Assad?
The truth is that Moscow and Tehran would not go beyond certain limits to maintain their Syrian client in power. Once it becomes clear that Assad is doomed, Moscow and Tehran would jettison him as fast as possible.
This analysis, however, should not be read as a call for military invasion of Syria by the United States or anybody else for that matter. Syria today is not what Iraq was in 2003. At that time, under Saddam Hussein, there was no internal mechanism for change in Iraq. Outside intervention in Iraq was necessary not to impose democracy by force, as some jibed, but to remove the impediment to democracy that was Saddam’s regime.
In Syria, on the other hand, the internal mechanism for change exists in the form of a popular uprising of remarkable resilience that backed by almost every ethnic and religious community.
Any foreign intervention that might be needed would be for the protection of safe havens beyond the reach of Assad’s killing machine. Assad should be persuaded that he cannot win by massacring Syrians. To that end, the US and European and Arab allies must make it clear that they would not shirk from using military means to protect Syrians.
Paradoxically, the prospect of foreign military intervention may be the surest means of avoiding that eventuality. Like all cowards in history, Assad would stop killing only when persuaded that there is a force out there, beyond the actual conflict that is willing and able to stop him.

Al-Assad’s latest scam
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
Russia wasted no time congratulating the al-Assad regime’s acceptance of Kofi Annan’s 6-point proposal, while the Arab ministers taking part in the summit in Baghdad also seized the opportunity to welcome this step, while also rejecting foreign intervention [in Syria], and the man responsible for cooking up this dish – or plan – Mr. Kofi Annan began shouting that “implementation will be the key!”
Of course, al-Assad will not implement this plan, and – as I said two days ago – it will be precisely the same whether regime responds positively or negatively. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult for al-Assad to execute this plan because it would result in his ouster...that’s correct, al-Assad’s ouster. This is because suppressive regimes cannot carry out any “adjustments”, and they do not know the meaning of the word “pragmatism”. The legitimacy of dictatorial regimes are based on force and intimidation, they govern on the basis of divide and rule, not convergence or bringing people together around them. Therefore, the reasons that the al-Assad regime has agreed to Annan’s 6-points are clear to see; or rather they have become even clearer today. Al-Assad accepted this plan for a number of reasons, including because he understood the message that Moscow was sending him when it stated that Annan’s mission was his last chance, therefore the drowning al-Assad has grabbed the Russian life preserver. As for evidence that he is drowning and weak, this can be seen in his visit to Baba Amr on the day that his regime announced its acceptance of Annan’s plan, for he wants to tell his followers that he is present and strong, and he was therefore attempting to raise the morale of those around him. The other reason that al-Assad has accepted Annan’s plan is to confound any consensus at the Arab summit in Baghdad, and hinder the Friends of Syria summit in Turkey.
Do we expect the al-Assad regime to implement this [plan]? Of course not, Annan’s points are clear, and implementing them would mean that al-Assad was on the way out, for he will only negotiate with the opposition if he is leaving; we cannot imagine this occurring under any other circumstances. As for withdrawing the regime’s forces, and allowing demonstrations to take place, this would mean demonstrations breaking out across the whole of Syria; at this point we will see a repeat of the Tahrir Square scene in Egypt, resulting in the beginning of the countdown to the end of al-Assad’s rule. In the event that the al-Assad regime returned to the use of force, as it is doing today, this means that there would be no other option than international intervention on the basis that Annan’s plan provides for the necessity of international observers, and not along the lines of the al-Dabi delegation. From here it is clear that the only reason that al-Assad has accepted Annan’s plan is to – once more – buy time, this is the game that he has excelled at since he first came to power in Syria. This is in order to shuffle the cards and strengthen the position of his supporters, whether in Iran or Syria, as well as to confuse Turkey before the Friends of Syria meeting, in the hope that this will enable him to finish off the revolution militarily.
This is how the al-Assad regime thinks, and this is certainly what it is doing today. The evidence of this can be seen in the fact that more than 80 Syrians were killed on the same day that al-Assad announced his acceptance of Annan’s plan. Therefore we must not be fooled again and again by the games being played by the al-Assad regime. We must instead start arming the revolutionaries, via the correct channels who know the situation on the ground and the [opposition] leadership. We must not wait any longer, for every day that passes means the killing of more Syrian innocents at the hands of al-Assad’s forces.

A record of political assassinations
By Ghassan Al Imam/Asharq Alawsat
The Syrian sectarian and family-run regime does not like intellectuals. The Alawite sect's military apparatus removed the Baath party's historical intellectuals so they could seize power with the least possible clamor. The sectarian regime threw Syria's accomplished poet "Badawi al-Jabal" into the mud of a dried-up segment of the River Barada, regardless of his stature or his Alawi orientation. Nationalist intellectual Zaki al-Arsouzi died in poverty after he retired from teaching, without tasting any of the spoils that his ruling sect enjoyed.
Following the public assassination of Colonel Adnan al-Malki - an influential figure both within the Baath party and the army - at the hands of a sergeant belonging to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party inside a football stadium in 1955, Syrian intellectual Ali Ahmed Sa'id fled to Lebanon. He was reincarnated as Adonis, the last of the ancient Syrian gods of the pre-Arab and Islamic era, and subsequently installed himself as the prince of Arab poetry. However, Adonis would not enter history from the gate of poetry. Rather he would enter as an intellectual, a scholar, and a critic of the Sunni doctrine, history and culture. Indeed, the Sunnis and their culture are unfortunate that Adonis wrote in truly wonderful and highly elegant prose, rather than out of mere criticism and persuasion.
In a sign of his embarrassed repentance for affiliating to a fascist party, Adonis fled to France following the eruption of the Lebanese war, where he settled there among a group of Alawite intellectuals, a group of real "human beings" unpolluted by the massacres committed by their sect. Adonis and his entourage then prepared themselves to receive the Nobel Literature Prize, but now the poet seems to have lost hope of winning as a result of his hesitant attitude towards the actions of his sect. The ruling Alawites in Syria have distorted his image regionally and internationally by persisting in committing massacres against their own people. Among the "exploits" of Adonis and his group was the act of convincing Algerian Amazigh intellectual Mohamed Arkoun of the "progressive nature" of the Shiite Fiqh, in comparison with the Sunni Fiqh. Believing in Adonis' "theory", Arkoun wrote in French about this alleged Shia precedence without supporting his views with any research on Shiite Fiqh. The Sunnis here were fortunate that Arkoun applied Orientalist critical theories to Islam; hence his argument became outdated and ineligible, as reflected in his translation into Arabic.
Adonis is an extremely sensitive critic and intellectual, and indeed it seems that tears are always ready to flow in abundance down his cheeks. And yet, his humanity has never been provoked by the Syrian regime's massacres. In his most recent television appearance, Adonis explicitly said "I'm not against the regime", and he sounded as if he was apologizing for his previous minor criticisms of Bashar al-Assad. Adonis’ entourage only humor him, and in their hesitation to condemn the regime's sectarian crimes, the group seems to be implicitly condemning the "sectarian" nature of the Syrians as a whole, whether Sunnis or Alawis!
In my column today, it is not my duty to engage in intellectual sectarian point scoring, as the fundamentals of the Sunni Fiqh are well known. It has its schools of thought and institutions to defend and protect it. Here I intend to challenge Adonis’ hesitation in condemning the al-Assad regime, by presenting an account of the regime's record that is rife, not only with political maneuvers, but also with massacres and assassinations of its own people, the majority of which are Arab Sunnis. In this first episode, I will detail what this regime has done in Syria, and in next week’s article, I will highlight what it did in Lebanon.
The Alawite sect began its moves to seize power on the same date that the secret "Military Committee" was formed during the time of Syrian unity with Egypt, during the reign of [late Egyptian President] Jamal Abdul Nasser in 1959. The Alawite Baath party officers (Mohamed Omran, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad) all played a major role in this. Within a few years, they were successful in neutralizing the Baath party’s historical leaders (Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Akram El-Hourani), then dislodging them from political activity by staging a military coup. This happened despite the fact that (Sunni) El-Hourani had paved the way for them to enroll in the army.
Salah Jadid's role emerged first, for he was able to neutralize the independent and Nasserite officers who took part in the 1963 coup. Salah Jadid used two senior officers (Major General Ziyad al-Hariri and Lieutenant General Amin al-Hafiz) to strike the Nasserite trend, before he later on got rid of them by deporting the former and staging a coup against the latter.
The Military Committee's movements remained secret, and the Syrians knew nothing about it, even after it was dissolved as a result of disagreements between its Alawite leaders. Major General Mohamed Omran was murdered in his house in Tripoli, Lebanon, following accusations of being a liberalist and "conspiring" with Salah al-Din al-Bitar, who himself had left the Baath party following a disagreement with Aflaq. Then came the role of Hafez al-Assad, who objected to Salah Jadid's attempt to apply Marxism to the Baath party. As a result of al-Assad's military coup, the “Ismaili" Chief of the Intelligence Apparatus Abdel Karim al-Jundi was either murdered or committed suicide, and Salah Jadid was imprisoned, together with the president and prime minister. In 1993, Salah Jadid died in jail, whereas Yusuf Zuaiyin, the prime minister, was released. As for "President" Nureddin al-Atassi, he was released in the same year, and a few weeks later died of cancer in a hospital in Paris.
Under Hafez al-Assad, the Alawite sect completed the process of securing absolute control of power. The Syrian people remained detached from politics and freedom, and they carried Hafez al-Assad on their shoulders after he was appointed as president. The Sunni majority rejected the Muslim Brotherhood's call to stage civil disobedience to cripple the sectarian regime, and al-Assad returned the Sunnis' favor by destroying their liberalist powers when independent unions (lawyers, doctors, engineers and pharmacists) demanded true democracy in 1980.
Nevertheless, al-Assad continued to promise to meet the Sunnis’ demands, and so the unions ended their sit-ins and strikes, and again he returned the favor by imprisoning those who participated in the strike for several years and by nationalizing all unions. Since then and until now, the Syrian security apparatuses has appointed the heads and members of unions.
Yet the tension in Lebanon seemed to exhaust Hafez al-Assad, who suffered life-threatening ills at a young age. Having regained consciousness following a long coma as a result of a heart attack, he found himself and his regime on the verge of collapse. His brother Rifaat, along with officers from the Alawite sect, who once were his opponents, quelled the Muslim Brotherhood's protests in Hama by destroying the city with heavy bombardments in 1982. Subsequently, the victors disagreed with one another over al-Assad’s power legacy, believing that the president would not regain consciousness.
However, Hafez al-Assad, having recovered, sometimes resorted to maneuvers, sometimes to settlements, and sometimes to tricks and threats, until he eventually ended up successfully neutralizing his younger brother Rifaat by expelling him from Syria (in 1998) and discharging his opponents. The remaining Muslim Brotherhood members were pursued mercilessly, reminiscent of the 1,000 Brotherhood detainees who were killed in the Tadmor Prison massacre.
Al-Assad’s revenge extended even to previous, peaceful Brotherhood leaders; and the wife of former Brotherhood leader Isam al-Attar was assassinated in her house in Germany when the death squad failed to find her husband.Hafez al-Assad's patience was limitless; he gained control over Lebanon, struck the Maronites and the Sunnis there, relied upon the Shiites, contained the Druze, and maneuvered and declined to enforce the Taif Agreement. Having grown tired of the Syrian President, the US appointed Hafez al-Assad as its “policeman” in the region, and simultaneously, two Lebanese presidents were assassinated. Rewarding him for his participation in the Second Gulf War (expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait), the US and Europe allowed al-Assad to besiege Michel Aoun, hence undermining his "state" and forcing him to flee to France. However, 15 years later, Bashar al-Assad allowed him to return home, but this time as an obedient allay.
The al-Assad regime, during the reign of both the father and the son, has a story worthy of narration, not only in terms of its well-known political aspect, but also in terms of its dark side; its intelligence guise.
Next week I will write again hoping that Adonis and his associates have reconsidered their support for the Syrian regime, regardless of their sectarian affiliation which I do not hold them accountable for. However, I do blame them for dedicating this sectarian orientation entirely to leveling accusations at the Syrian Sunni majority. Over 50 years, the sectarian regime has brainwashed the Syrian people to only think in terms of sect, rather than as Arabs. Here the regime today is repeating the same old tragedy by slaughtering the uprising and giving it a "sectarian orientation".

The Portuguese lesson
By Adel Al Toraifi/Asharq Alawsat
At 12.25 AM [1974], a Lisbon radio station aired the song “Grândola, Vila Morena”, which was banned during the rule of dictator Antonio Salazar (1932-1974) as it was a favorite of the communists. This was the signal for some army elements to stage a coup against the regime, and within the space of one day – April 25th 1974 – Marcelo Caetano’s government surrendered. The people were joyous and took to the streets to celebrate the fall of a dictatorial regime that had lasted over five decades, but the perpetrators of the coup never imagined that their movement would lead to what some political historians term the “third wave” of democracy, which would continue for years, incorporating Spain, Brazil, and around 30 other countries in Europe and Latin America.
However, the peaceful transfer of power was not guaranteed, as the fall of the regime could have divided the units of the Portuguese army in accordance with their ideological orientations, from right to left, not to mention the remnants of the former regime.
Portugal continued to simmer for more than 18 months, during which six successive transitional governments held power. Farmers, laborers and the military held consecutive strikes as a result of worsening economic conditions, and at the time it seemed that a civil war between the conservative north and the left-wing, socialist-influenced south could erupt at any moment. During this difficult stage the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with his Portuguese counterpart Mário Soares in Washington, warning him that Portugal could experience conditions similar to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, and a state of decline in its confrontation with the communists. He said: “You are a Kerensky [Chairman of the Russian transitional government after the 1917 revolution]. I believe in your sincerity but you are naïve”. Soares replied angrily: “I don’t want to be a Kerenksy”, to which Kissinger responded: “Neither did Kerensky”. Contrary to all expectations prevailing in America and Europe, the Russian revolution scenario was not repeated; Portugal transformed into a democratic state, in large part thanks to General António Eanes, who led a military campaign to confront the communist officers, thus ending any threat to the fledgling democracy, and was duly elected Portugal’s new head of state [in 1976].
There is no doubt that those observing the popular uprisings that have swept the Arab world since January 2011 could find sizable similarities between what happened in Portugal and other countries of similar language and culture, and what happened in the countries of the “Arab Spring”. It is true that each experience has its own characteristics, but there are many similarities. Tunisia is very similar to Portugal in 1974, Egypt resembles the case of Brazil in 1985, whilst it can be argued that Yemen is like Colombia at the end of the 1990s, and Libya is a combination of [Hugo] Chavez’s Venezuela and Uganda under Idi Amin. As for Syria, it is very similar to Croatia after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The purpose here is not to apply these cases to specific Arab countries, but it is useful to consider the examples of other counties that went through similar experiences. Today, there is a heated debate going on in every “Arab Spring” country between those who support a peaceful, civil transition of power based on the principle of “social absolution” for the past era, and between those who call for the completion of a revolutionary model based on revenge, which would lead to the destruction of the existing regime and the emergence of a new revolutionary regime based on populist tyranny.
This debate is nothing new; many countries that have undergone revolutionary political transformations have experimented with different scenarios, sometimes ending in democratic models, other times ending in oppressive totalitarian regimes that were worse than their predecessors. There is no doubt that the region is still going through a transitional phase that may last for years; there are countries that are well on their way towards peaceful transitions, such as Tunisia, and there are others that are progressing slowly but are engrossed in concerns and clashes between political forces and the army, such as Egypt. Other countries have not made progress, such as Libya and Yemen, but at the same time they have not transformed into civil warring states. As for Syria, it seems like its long crisis is destined for civil war unless there are domestic and international guarantees to preserve the sectarian and ethnic balance in the event of the al-Assad regime falling. Every day that this bloodthirsty regime continues, it works to widen social gaps and burn the social fabric among the components of the Syrian homeland.
In his book “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”, Samuel Huntington indicates that many parts of the world have experienced three waves of democracy, each of them followed by a return to totalitarian rule. During the first wave (1828-1926), wars and revolutions were undertaken to overthrow significant empires such as the Ottoman Empire, which was followed – between the years 1922 and 1942 – by a state of regression embodied in the rise of fascism and Nazism.
The second wave (1942-1962) was characterized by the liberation of Western Europe and the establishment of democratic systems, and the emergence of nationalist, independence movements in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. However, between the years 1958 and 1975, these countries witnessed a series of coups that destroyed democratic institutions such as parliamentary elections.
The third wave (1974-1991) incorporated more than thirty countries that transformed into democracies or at least moved towards liberal reform projects.
This historical division is undoubtedly disputed, because each state has experienced different conditions. For example, at a time when Kuwait was going through a democratic transformation in the 1960s, a country such as Libya was witnessing a revolutionary military coup led by Muammar Gaddafi and his associates, i.e. Libya was experiencing a state of regression. However, Huntington’s thesis was not only concerned with historical divisions, but also with studying the conditions and circumstances of the transition process in countries that witnessed a historic change in the structure of their ruling regime, and the administration of the state. Perhaps the highlight of Huntington’s thesis is the distinction between three obstacles to democratic transformation, and their role in instigating a regression away from democracy, as can be seen in the Iranian revolutionary model for example. Huntington says: “In China, the obstacles to democratization in 1990 were political, economic and cultural; in Africa, they were overwhelmingly economic; in the rapidly developing countries of East Asia and in many Islamic countries, they were primarily cultural”.
The problem for the advocates of the “Arab Spring” in our region is that they want to ride the wave of popular protests and go through the motions without taking into account the political, economic and cultural obstacles to democratic change. They argue that gradual reform will not succeed in achieving anything, and that regimes use this as a slogan to cover up their lack of legitimacy.
The advocates of the “Arab Spring” can be divided into two groups: the first are the Islamists of various affiliations; from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Salafis, or the independents who are seeking to fulfill a personal project. As for the second group, the majority of them are from the liberal left who raise the slogan of being rights or reform “activists”, yet they are closer to the “anti-establishment” current than social reformers. The difference between the two parties is that the Islamists enjoy popularity based on the religious undertones inherent in their conservative communities, and likewise they are closer to the street and act on the ground to provide voluntary services to the public.
As for the liberal left – in more than one Arab country – they are engrossed in a utopian perception of change, and today they are temporarily allied with Islamic parties and personalities under the pretext of this “change”. They are unaware of the conditions required for a gradual, civil, peaceful transition of their regimes, and for this reason some of them are nothing more than 21st century “Kerenksys”.
Some have dismissed fears about the state of chaos that followed the “Arab Spring” as nothing more than history repeating itself, justifying this by saying that every revolution must go through a state of turmoil and chaos. However, for those who say that peaceful, civil change must be achieved through a revolution, it is important to note that the state of chaos in the Portuguese example that we considered earlier did not last long, rather the key figures at the time sought to spare their country from a state of regression by confronting the revolutionary forces, prioritizing the interests of the state over the fantasies and dreams of the revolutionaries.
Any political or human rights activist protesting in demonstrations or on social networking sites should ask themselves: Is it necessary for the country to go through a state of chaos in order to achieve a democratic model? Of course, there are violent, dictatorial regimes, and it is natural that people will stand up in the face of injustice and violence, but in countries with economic and political stability, advocates of reform must work to develop their regimes and reform their culture, and not intentionally take a leap into the unknown. Behind every wave, as Huntington pointed out, there is a state of regression away from the values of democracy, and the “Arab Spring” is no exception.
The Roman historian Tacitus once said: “The first day after the downfall of a wicked Emperor is the best of opportunities”.