LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March 30/2012

Bible Quotation for today/Courage before God
01 John 03/19-24: "This, then, is how we will know that we belong to the truth; this is how we will be confident in God's presence. If our conscience condemns us, we know that God is greater than our conscience and that he knows everything. And so, my dear friends, if our conscience does not condemn us, we have courage in God's presence. We receive from him whatever we ask, because we obey his commands and do what pleases him. What he commands is that we believe in his Son Jesus Christ and love one another, just as Christ commanded us. Those who obey God's commands live in union with God and God lives in union with them. And because of the Spirit that God has given us we know that God lives in union with us."

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
The Annan plan will bring more violence March 29, 2012/ By Michael Young/The Daily Star/March 29/12
Syria’s rebels must say ‘yes’ to a managed transition/By David Ignatius/The Daily Star/March 29/12
Syria's Struggling Civil Society, the Syrian Uprising/By Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio/Middle East Quarterly/March 29/12
The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn,The Syrian Uprising/By Yvette Talhamy/Middle East Quarterly/March 29/12
Pseudo- intellectuals/By Emad El Din Adeeb/Asharq Alawsat/March 29/12
Israel is comfortable/By Bilal Hassan/Asharq Alawsat/March 29/12

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for March 29/12
Wikileaks claims Netanyahu was a Stratfor source, disclosed 2 Iranian nukes on missiles in 2009
Israel's plan to attack Iran put on hold until next year at the earliest
Iran could recover from attack on its nuclear sites within six months, says U.S. report
Clandestine war's pressure on Iranian leaders
Erdogan: No force should threaten Iran’s peaceful nuclear program
Iran backs UN-sponsored peace plan for Syria
High-level Israeli-Egyptian talks held in Cairo
A USA federal judge has awarded $44.6 million from Iran to victims of the 1983 suicide truck-bombing attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut.
US senators file resolution to arm Syria opposition
Qatar opposes attack on Iran
Italy seizes $1.5 billion of Qaddafi family assets
Iran and Al-Qaeda exploit Yemen uncertainty, US envoy says
France: Friends of Syria meeting chance to judge Assad on peace plan
Tripartite meeting discusses Resolution 1701, violations
UK envoy condemns Syrian violation of Lebanese sovereignty
Aarsal officials give contradictory statements on Syrian army incursion
Activists in Lebanon gear up for Friday anti-Israel protest march
March 14: Government should deal responsibly with Syrian incursions
Saad slams Bassil, criticizes Hezbollah’s “silence”
Gemayel returns from Belgium
Daoud: Assad reassured concerning situation in Syria
Qabbani: Majority of Lebanese want Bassil out
Syria says will reject any peace initiative proposed by Arab League summit
Arab summit to stop short of call for Assad ouster
Arab summit to seek Syria consensus
Syria’s divided opposition limits West’s options
'If there is civil war in this region, it will start here'/The Irish Times
UNIFIL review calls for stronger Lebanon Army
Lebanese Cabinet agrees to lease electricity-generating ships, build power plants
Sheikh Ahmad Assir tells Aounists to ‘watch out’ for policies
Lebanon will not tolerate incursions: Sleiman
U.K. plans additional training for Lebanese Army
Lebanese Army makes arrests, seizes arms in Joura
Lebanese, Israeli army officials meet with U.N. peacekeepers
Eastern UNIFIL troops to be put to test
Google sees potential in Lebanon

A USA federal judge has awarded $44.6 million from Iran to victims of the 1983 suicide truck-bombing attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut.
March 29, 2012/ By Frederic J. Frommer /WASHINGTON: A federal judge has awarded $44.6 million from Iran to victims of the 1983 suicide truck-bombing attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut. The money will be difficult, if not impossible, to collect. U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth awarded the money Wednesday to two servicemen who were injured, Jeffery Paul O'Brien and Daniel Lane Gaffney, and their family members. The lawsuit claimed that Iran was involved in the attack, which killed 241 servicemen. Lamberth said the court "applauds plaintiffs' persistent efforts to hold Iran accountable for its cowardly support of terrorism."O'Brien and Gaffney were each awarded around $6.7 million.

Arab summit to stop short of call for Assad ouster
March 28, 2012/By Wissam Keyrouz, Ammar Karim?Daily Star
BAGHDAD: The Arab summit in Baghdad will stop short of calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to quit or discuss arming his foes, both sharply divisive issues, Iraq's foreign minister said on Wednesday. Hoshyar Zebari's confirmation that the 22-member Arab League will steer clear of the strong moves advocated by Qatar and Saudi Arabia came on the eve of the landmark summit in the Iraqi capital. The Syria crisis, in which monitors say almost 10,000 people have died in a bloody crackdown on a year-long revolt, has loomed large over the three days of meetings in Iraq, the first such talks hosted by Baghdad in over 20 years. "The Arab League initiative is clear and did not demand that Bashar step down, we (foreign ministers) also did not ask for that and the upcoming decision will not go in this direction," Zebari said after a ministerial meeting.  Asked whether the arming of Syrian rebels was raised, Zebari said: "We did not discuss this subject at all."
The two issues have pitted countries which have called for Assad to leave and advocated sending arms to rebel groups, and those pushing for political reconciliation, such as Iraq.
"The subject of Syria is urgent and it is no longer a regional, local, national, or Arab subject," Zebari said. "It is now an issue discussed on an international level."
"We cannot be neutral about this subject or on the subject of violence and daily killings." After opening remarks, the session, which was held in the Jerusalem Room of the former Republican Palace in Baghdad's heavily-fortified Green Zone, was closed to the media. Syria, which was not invited to the summit and has been suspended from the pan-Arab body, said on Wednesday that it would reject any initiative from the Arab League. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh told journalists that Iraq was proposing the Syrian authorities and opposition choose a consensus figure to whom the power to negotiate internally and externally would be transferred.
The proposal suggests that "powers be transferred to someone the opposition and the authorities in Syria think can negotiate and manage a mature dialogue," Dabbagh said. Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi earlier said he expected the summit to support a six-point plan put forward by UN-Arab League peace envoy Kofi Annan and reportedly accepted by Damascus on Tuesday.
Annan, an ex-UN secretary general, held talks over the past week in Beijing and Moscow. Both powers have been criticised for blocking UN Security Council resolutions condemning Assad's crackdown, but backed Annan's efforts.
In Kuwait on his way to attend the summit, UN chief Ban Ki-moon urged Assad to "immediately" implement Annan's plan. "I urge President al-Assad to put commitments into immediate effect. There is no time to waste," he said. A draft resolution to be debated in Baghdad urges the "Syrian government and all opposition factions to deal positively with the envoy (Annan) by starting serious national dialogue," according to a copy of the text obtained by AFP. It also says "the Syrian government should immediately stop all actions of violence and killing, protect Syrian civilians and guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations for achieving the demands of the Syrian people." The fallout from other Arab uprisings -- which toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and put pressure for reform on other autocratic regimes in the region -- are also on the agenda at the summit. More than 100,000 members of Iraq's forces are providing security in Baghdad, and Iraq has spent upwards of $500 million to refurbish major hotels, summit venues and infrastructure.Despite the dramatically tighter measures, a suicide bomber at a police checkpoint in west Baghdad killed one policeman and wounded two others on Tuesday, officials said. A week ago, Al-Qaeda attacks nationwide killed 50 people, including three in a car bombing opposite the foreign ministry.

Wikileaks claims Netanyahu was a Stratfor source, disclosed 2 Iranian nukes on missiles in 2009
DEBKAfile Special Report March 28, 2012/Continuing the release of the US Stratfor research site’s e-mails, Wikileaks Wednesday, March 28 issued a batch of mails which indicated that Binyamin Netanyahu may have been a source of the site’s Vice President for intelligence Fred Burton (a former Deputy Chief of the Department of State's counterterrorism division for the Diplomatic Security) from at least May 2007 up until 2010 after he became Prime Minister of Israel.The Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem has not commented on the publication.
According to one e-mail from Burton, Netanyahu is said to have revealed in Dec. 2009 that “Iran has two nukes on missiles ready to go.” Burton went on to report that the White House (Barack Obama) was “doing everything possible to block Israel’s next steps. He added the view that “Israel will go it alone. Israeli subs are off Iran's coast.”
In answer to a question, Burton replied: “My source is bb (eyes only).”Another Burton e-mail posted in 2009 revealed the shaky relations between Netanyahu and the US president: He wrote: “I also have it on good word that BB trusts Obama about as much as he trusted Arafat or Waddi Haddad [head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the 70s].”
The emails released by Wikileaks indicate that Netanyahu kept Fred Burton abreast of key security and political developments intending his thoughts and information to reach the US intelligence community. At one point, he is quoted as saying: “Thank you Fred for your support of Israel...."Asked when an Israeli strike would occur, Burton replied "I've never asked him. He thinks I'm CIA, which I may be.”
In another communication, Burton offers the opinion: “When they [lose] their HUMINT [i.e. human intelligence] coverage they [Israel] will move. Thus far, elements of their disruption strategy have been working from what I understand. When the window closes, BB knows what he must do. We won't be given any warning.”“A very good source just informed me,” Burton wrote in Nov. 2009, “that extremely quiet discussions are underway between [the Department of Homeland Security] and the FBI on the blowback to the Jewish community, facilities, synagogues, day-cares, et al in the United States, in the event of an Israeli strike on Iran... “The entire batch released by Wikileaks consists of communications between the Stratfor Vice President and unnamed correspondents, apparently clients he had an interest in impressing about his sources. None were written by Netanyahu. Their “quotes” are therefore based on hearsay and are second hand.

Iran could recover from attack on its nuclear sites within six months, says U.S. report
By Haaretz /U.S. congressional report says Israel and U.S. do not know exact location of Iran nuclear facilities, which may be dispersed in such a way that an Israeli attack would not be successful. Iran could probably rebuild most of its centrifuge workshops within six months after an attack on its nuclear sites, according to a new report by U.S. congressional researchers, Bloomberg reported on Wednesday. The report by analysts at the Congressional Research Service, citing interviews with current and former U.S. officials, said that the Islamic Republic’s centrifuge “workshops” are widely dispersed and hidden, which could complicate a potential Israeli military strike. According to the report, neither Israel nor the U.S. knows for certain where Iran’s nuclear facilities are located and the possibility of dispersed nuclear sites makes any assessment of a military strike’s success more difficult. It is “unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons,” Bloomberg quoted the report as saying. The congressional researchers said that, “An attack that left Iran’s conversion and centrifuge production facilities intact would considerably reduce” the time Iran would need to resume its nuclear activities. Moreover, the researches quoted a former U.S. official as saying that Iran could probably replicate most of its centrifuge workshops within six months.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has recently voiced “serious concerns” about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran denies suspicions that it is covertly seeking nuclear weapons capability, in part by coordinating efforts to process uranium, test high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

Israel's plan to attack Iran put on hold until next year at the earliest
By Amir Oren/Haaretz /Damning U.S. war simulation forces Ehud Barak to reconsider attack plans; Americans pledge more money for Iron Dome antimissile system. At 8:58 P.M. on Tuesday, Israel's 2012 war against Iran came to a quiet end. The capricious plans for a huge aerial attack were returned to the deep recesses of safes and hearts. The war may not have been canceled but it has certainly been postponed. For a while, at least, we can sound the all clear: It won't happen this year. Until further notice, Israel Air Force Flight 007 will not be taking off. According to a war simulation conducted by the U.S. Central Command, the Iranians could kill 200 Americans with a single missile response to an Israeli attack. An investigative committee would not spare any admiral or general, minister or president. The meaning of this U.S. scenario is that the blood of these 200 would be on Israel's head.The moment the public dispute over whether to attack Iran is put in those terms, Israel has no real option to attack in contravention of American declarations and warnings. That's the negative side. The complementary positive side was presented this week, on Tuesday evening. At 8:20, Pentagon spokesman George Little announced that the Defense Department would be seeking more money to help Israel fund the Iron Dome antimissile defense system. Noting that support for Israel's security was a top priority for U.S. President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Little said that, given the Iron Dome system's success in intercepting 80 percent of the rockets fired from Gaza this month, the Defense Department "intends to request an appropriate level of funding to support such acquisitions, based on Israeli requirements and production capacity." Thirty-eight minutes after that, Defense Minister Ehud Barak publicly thanked both Panetta and himself ("The decision was the result of contacts between the Defense Ministry and the Pentagon" ). Israelis may be the world champions of chutzpah, but even biting the hand that feeds you has its limits when the bitten hand is liable to hit back. When Barak thanked the Obama administration "for helping strengthen Israel's security," he was abandoning the pretension to act against Iran without permission before the U.S. presidential elections in November.
For all intents and purposes, it was an announcement that this war was being postponed until at least the spring of 2013.

Clandestine war's pressure on Iranian leaders
By Anshel Pfeffer/Haaretz
In his new daily blog, Anshel Pfeffer reflects on news and analysis on Iran and the Middle East. The series of mysterious bombings at key locations throughout Iran and assassinations of nuclear scientists over the last few months have obviously got under the skin of the regime's intelligence services. This morning, the official FARS News Agency tells us of a "terrorist team" that was arrested in an operation by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC); the news was also broadcast last night on Iranian state television. There are very few details in this report that allow us in any way to ascertain its veracity, but a few details are intriguing. In the past, similar reports have usually indicated the source of such groups, (the U.S, Israel, Britain), but today the Iranians are ascribing them to "the arrogant powers."
The location of the operation is also interesting: southeastern Iran, which would mean probably Balochistan, somewhere near Iran's borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been waging a low-key campaign for independence against both the Iranian and Pakistani governments, and Tehran and Islamabad have accused foreign powers for aiding it.
But this is a region of Iran that is far removed from the centers of nuclear research, so it is hard to see how it could be connected to the current crisis, unless someone is simply interested in creating yet another headache for the regime.
Perhaps the most interesting detail in the report is the fact that it names the Iranian Quds Force as the specific agency that carried out the operation against the "terrorist team." The Quds Force is normally Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) special department tasked with furthering the Islamic revolution outside of the country's borders, and is also responsible for arming and training Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad – as well as supporting Iran-backed terror operations around the world.
The appearance of the Quds Force as an anti-terror unit within Iran is new, and indicates a need to burnish its credentials. It will be interesting to see if any new details emerge about this operation, including the identity of those arrested and pictures of the "enormous amount of equipment, flammable material and grenades" which were apparently captured.
The fact that Iran's intelligence services feel the need to defend their record was made clear from another FARS report about a speech made by Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi Tuesday in Medina, in which he claimed that "Iran has the most powerful intelligence service in the region" and that they had "identified and disbanded large U.S. and Israeli spy networks with tens of branches, centers and nodes in different world countries, and has arrested a large number of spies during its operations."
Moslehi's speech came in the wake of a rare public appearance two weeks ago by the mastermind of Iran's intelligence network himself, the commander of the Quds Force, Major General Qasem Suleimani, who said that "the armed forces will show Iranian zeal in the face of any possible aggression against the country." It is unclear to whom and where he said this, though the quotes appeared days after the Lebanese media published that Suleimani had visited Hezbollah in Beirut, a report strenuously denied by the Iranian government.
Whatever the truth regarding his movements, this is the second time in two months that the Iranian media has published quotes from Suleimani which indicate that he is under increasing pressure to show results while the clandestine war against Iran is intensifying.
On the same issue, the Sunday Times reported this week that "Israel is using a permanent base in Iraqi Kurdistan to launch cross-border intelligence missions in an attempt to find 'smoking gun' evidence that Iran is building a nuclear warhead." The report by the paper's Tel Aviv correspondent is based on "western intelligence sources," and was preceded two months ago by a similar story in Le Figaro informed this time by "a security source in Baghdad."
There is no way that an Israeli news organization can independently and professionally verify these reports without breaching the military censorship's guidelines. Whether or not all the details in the Sunday Times report are accurate, the story is not outlandish considering Israel's historic relations with the Kurds in northern Iraq - dating back to the early 1960s - and the basic geography of the region which makes it an ideal base for operations into Iran.
Israel's engagement with the Kurds, which included military training and advisers, ended in 1975 following the signing of agreement resolving Iran-Iraq border disputes with the U.S.'s blessing - but the reports of an Israeli return to the region have been circulating for nearly a decade. The deterioration of Israel's strategic alliance with Turkey - the Kurds' traditional enemy - and the urgency of launching clandestine missions against Iran could only have increased the impetus to rejuvenate the relationship (The connection between Israel and the Iraqi Kurds is not only of a security nature, at least one Israeli NGO is also building other bridges – have a look at the moving stories of Iraqi-Kurdish children treated in Israeli hospitals through Save a Child's Heart).
The fragile internal situation in Iraq - and Jerusalem's desire to salvage relations with Ankara - mean that any Kurdish connection will by necessity remain secret. But Israel is making less of an effort to hide its burgeoning relationships with two other of Iran's neighbors – Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, exploiting both countries' disagreements with Iran over Caspian Sea resources and their fears of Islamic intervention in their secular dictatorships.
The timing of the public announcement last month - of the mammoth sale of Israeli weapon systems to Azerbaijan is just another stage in the alliance which has seen the country become one of Israel's main oil suppliers - was hardly coincidental. The unmanned aerial surveillance drones and radar systems will not only cement the defense ties between the two nations, it will also allow Israel an eye across the border. The security services both countries have cooperated to prevent Iranian-backed terror attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Baku. Last month, an alleged Israeli agent working in Azerbaijan was quoted in a Times report saying that "this is ground zero for intelligence work. Our presence here is quiet, but substantial. We have increased our presence in the past year, and it gets us very close to Iran. This is a wonderfully porous country.” Ties with Turkmenistan have taken longer to get off the ground. The Turkmen government refused two potential Israeli ambassadors due to their former intelligence ties but recently has been warming up. Two months ago, an Israeli Foreign Ministry delegation publicly visited Ashgabat. Tehran cannot have failed to notice.

Israel is comfortable
By Bilal Hassan/Asharq Alawsat
The Arab region is experiencing a state of inertia with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a struggle supposed to exist and continue for as long as Palestine remains occupied, and as long as other Arab territories in the West Bank and the Golan Heights remain occupied. This stalemate has existed for quite a long time in terms of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan - the countries surrounding Israel; however matters used to be heated and highly active in the Palestinian-Israeli sphere until such mobility lost momentum on the Palestinian side, as a result of the "negotiations" endeavor. This is a trend that prominent Palestinian leaders, currently in power, show a strong inclination towards.
Here I do not intend to call for military action against the Israeli occupation – although this is a legitimate right – but rather I mean to point out that Israel will have no cause to negotiate unless real resistance pressure is mounted upon it. Such pressure could either be military or peaceful, but at present we neither have peaceful nor military resistance.
The current Palestinian leadership is not inclined towards armed military resistance, and overtly and officially it prefers popular and nonviolent measures. However, so far, this has only taken the form of expressing political stances, without preparing Palestine or its people for any kind of resistance required, and instead hoping to use negotiations as an alternative.
The Israeli enemy is an occupant force that will not enter negotiations of its own volition. As an occupier, it will consider negotiations only when forced to do so. At present, when Israel is certainly not compelled, it is continuing with its occupation and steering clear of negotiations.
The current Palestinian leadership, with its inclination towards negotiations, is deluded into thinking that Israel will respond to its call spontaneously, and when Israel declines to respond, the Palestinian leadership never considers any counteraction to force its hand.
Historically speaking, a prerequisite for negotiations with an occupying force is to mount intense resistance and force it to renew talks. If resistance is lacking, the occupier will never consider negotiations, for it is already in a comfortable state, and we can say that Israel is now more comfortable than ever.
This means that the current Palestinian leadership cannot fulfill its desired objective of negotiations without first relying on effective resistance against the occupation. This leadership, which has removed the term 'armed resistance' from its vocabulary and failed to organize any popular nonviolent resistance in its place, is promoting its ideas along the lines of a preacher; it only urges people to be peaceful, but fails to exert any tangible effort to make the climate favorable for such popular nonviolent resistance. Hence, the result is that the Israeli enemy lives comfortably; with no resistance or pressure being mounted on it.
Advocating peace and negotiations does not mean that you must relinquish resistance, otherwise the occupant force will continue. In fact, resisting occupation should be part of any nonviolent plan, unless of course the occupant is an angel, which it is not. Rather, Israel is an occupying force that sees no end on the horizon to its occupation, nor will it consider a change in its strategy.
The Palestinian leadership has a great responsibility to abandon the current state of laxity, which has resulted from a reliance on the negotiations theory, and then set a clear objective based on resisting the Israeli occupation with the ultimate goal of reaching negotiations.
Here I do not say this without understanding the consequences and hardships of armed resistance. I am aware that this requires organization, support, and first and foremost a political decision, which are all lacking at present.
The idea of popular nonviolent resistance has emerged recently through senior Palestinian leaders. The idea has its roots in history and was applied successfully in major examples such as in India, when it was occupied by Britain. This type of resistance was practiced until Britain gave up its occupation, and eventually India became independent. Yet throughout that process, it was proven that popular nonviolent resistance is not easy; it requires an active leadership to adopt a slogan, determine an objective and then act to ensure the prerequisites for success. Nonviolent resistance can never be successful if we content ourselves with preaching, addressing the public, or urging them to mount peaceful demonstrations, without engaging with them or backing them to undertake such a struggle.
For example, nonviolent resistance may mean a strike, which could affect whole of Palestine. If so, how would resistance be achieved under such conditions? How would the people live under an open strike? These are simple questions that must be raised in this context, which require practical answers on the ground, all being part of the responsibility shouldered by the leadership adopting such a trend. Yet what we see currently is that the Palestinian leadership – by putting forward the theory of nonviolent resistance - only wants to absolve itself from the responsibility of being engaged in armed confrontations with the Israeli occupation, without considering the consequences of what comes next.
Determining the political and ultimate goal of any form of struggle will act as an incentive for the people to get behind it. Yet, if we only urge the people and preach to them without making the ultimate goals clear, then popular participation will be of no use, nor will it be capable of exercising any kind of struggle. In fact, determining the objectives, outlining the methods and ensuring the requirements of livelihood are all part of the leadership's responsibility, a responsibility even greater than what armed resistance would involve.
Let us return to say that the Palestinian people have lengthy experience in confronting the Zionist occupation. They have carried out armed resistance against the occupation in the same manner that they have also exercised popular nonviolent resistance, but under a unanimously agreed leadership; the revolution's leadership and the 1936 strike, a nationwide strike that shook the then Zionist movement as well as the British Mandate of Palestine. Each form of struggle has its consequences. Popular nonviolent struggle does not mean that the Palestinian leadership is absolved of any responsibility. If this leadership really seeks to mount nonviolent resistance, then it should take the lead and ensure the prerequisites for this, and only then can the people provide their zealous support. For the leadership to urge people from afar, this means only one thing: armed resistance has been abandoned whilst the climate is not appropriate for any other form of struggle, and this can only result in ultimate failure.

Pseudo- intellectuals!
By Emad El Din Adeeb/Asharq Alawsat
If you want to know the true value of a so-called “Arab intellectual” you need only look at the state of Arab culture! Arab culture is in the gutter thanks in no small part to our intellectual elite!
Our cultural output in recent years, according to human development reports, confirms that in a single day, American publishing houses produce the same number of books as all publishing houses – both private and public – in the Arab world in one year. Illiteracy in general, Arabic cultural illiteracy in particular, reveals the state of cultural deterioration in the Arab world.
Arabs under 21 years of age receives 68 percent of their information from television, the rest from the internet, and only 3 percent from the press!We are a people who do not read; we watch, listen, and forward rumors, rather than relying on available knowledge and scientific research.In order not to add insult to injury, I will refrain from addressing the issue of the education system in the Arab world, which has no relation whatsoever to the job market or the requirements of the modern state, as this is based on knowledge and scientific research. Anybody who watches these “prankster” television shows on Arab TV will find themselves confronting some frightening facts which cause them to “fear for the future” of the Arab world. In one of these programs, the presenter carried out a cultural trick with people in the street who have gotten used to giving their viewpoint on any issue, despite ignorance on the issue. The presenter asked: in what year did the month of Sha’aban [eight month of the Islamic calendar] come after the month of Ramadan [ninth month of the Islamic calendar]? This question was asked to 20 different people, the majority of whom failed to understand the prank that was being played upon them, not recognizing the relative impossibility of this. One man even postulated that Sha’aban follows Ramadan once every ten years! In answering case, the presenter asked the audience [another impossible question]: when does Hajj take place during Eid al-Fitr rather than Eid al-Adha? I remember that Amr Adeeb once conducted a similar test of intellect and general knowledge to new presenters who were working at the F.M. channel in Cairo. He asked them the following question: in what year was the 1973 October war take place?I ask you to think about this question for a minute, for you will be shocked that more than 85 percent of those who answered this did not know the answer; they had failed to even concentrate on the details of the question being asked to them, which contained the answer!

Lebanese, Israeli army officials meet with U.N. peacekeepers
March 28, 2012/The Daily Star /BEIRUT: Senior Lebanese and Israeli military officials met Wednesday under the supervision of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon to discuss Blue Line violations and Israel's withdrawal from the northern part of Ghajar. The National News Agency said the meeting began at 10 a.m. and took place at the UNIFIL headquarters in the southern coastal city of Naquora.
Lebanon and Israel are technically in a state of war. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 brought a halt to hostilities between Lebanon and Israel in the summer of 2006, following a month-long war between the two sides. However, Israel continues to occupy northern Ghajar.

Lebanon will not tolerate incursions: Sleiman
March 28, 2012/The Daily Star /BEIRUT: Lebanon will not tolerate infringement of its territory, President Michel Sleiman said in remarks published Wednesday, a day after conflicting reports emerged over Syrian incursions into the Bekaa. “I will not tolerate any incursions,” Sleiman told An-Nahar newspaper. Syrian troops fired machine guns into the Bekaa border town of Joura in the Masharih al-Qaa area Tuesday during clashes between the Syrian army and rebel groups, but no direct Lebanese casualties were reported.Sleiman echoed Lebanese officials’ denial that the Syrian army advanced into the area Tuesday.

Lebanese Army makes arrests, seizes arms in Joura
March 28, 2012/By Rakan al-Fakih/The Daily Star /BEKAA, Lebanon: The Lebanese Army arrested 10 Lebanese and Syrians and seized a vanload of weapons and mortar shells during raids Tuesday afternoon in the Bekaa border town of Joura, a security source said Wednesday. The source said Lebanese troops in Joura in the Masharih al-Qaa area intercepted a van loaded with various types of machines guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells. The van driver – a Lebanese identified as Ibrahim Ahmad Rayed – was also arrested, said the source, who spoke to The Daily Star on condition of anonymity.The source identified the other detainees as Lebanese Abdel-Karim Mohammad Rayed as well as Hasan, Mohammad and Ali Mohammad Izzeddine. It was not known whether they were related. The other five suspects were identified as Syrian nationals Hussein Hamid Hammad, Youssef Mohammad Saeed, Bilal Mohammad Dib Masri, Moheddine Mohammad Zuhouri and Mohammad Ahmad Asaad.According to the security source, the suspects are still in military custody at the Army barracks in Ablah, the Bekaa, for further interrogation. Joura and its environs had witnessed clashes between the Syrian army and rebel groups Tuesday. No direct Lebanese casualties were reported, but Zahra Mohammad Hamid, a 50-year-old Lebanese woman, was transported to Chtaura Hospital due to breathing problems she suffered when a mortar round landed next to her house. Tens of Lebanese families that live in the area fled to safer places.Also Tuesday, Lebanese officials denied a news report of a Syrian military incursion into the area.

U.K. plans additional training for Lebanese Army
March 28, 2012/The Daily Star /BEIRUT: U.K. Ambassador to Lebanon Tom Fletcher informed President Michel Sleiman about additional British funding for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and outlined plans by his government to offer the Lebanese Army further training to help maintain the country’s stability. “I updated the president on additional British funding for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and welcomed his clear commitment that Lebanon will continue to fulfill its international obligations,” a U.K. Embassy statement said. U.K. Foreign Secretary Willian Hague announced Monday that his government would finance The Special Tribunal for Lebanon to the tune of £1 million ($1.6 million), bringing the total contribution of the U.K. thus far to £3.3 million ($5.3 million).
Fletcher said that during his meeting with Sleiman the two discussed bilateral ties and the situation in the region. The U.K. envoy also reiterated his government’s concern at “the appalling situation in Syria and outlined the actions we are taking in response.” Fletcher also praised efforts by Lebanese authorities to ensure that unrest in its neighbor did not affect the country’s stability.
“I noted our understanding of Lebanon’s unique situation and commended the efforts of the Lebanese authorities in ensuring that Lebanon’s hard-won stability is not threatened by events across the border,” Fletcher said. “To help maintain that stability, I was pleased to outline plans for further British training to the Lebanese army,” he added. The ambassador said the two discussed the need for Lebanon’s neighbors to fully respect Lebanese sovereignty and “regretted recent violations.”Fletcher also confirmed that the United Kingdom would continue to offer support in dealing with the humanitarian implications of violence in Syria.“I also informed the president that, to mark HM Queen's 60th Jubilee, we will celebrate in June the U.K. and Lebanon's links in business, innovation and technology, showcasing Great Britain in Great Lebanon," he added.

Sheikh Ahmad Assir tells Aounists to ‘watch out’ for policies
March 29, 2012/By Mohammed Zaatari The Daily Star /SIDON, Lebanon: A Sidon-based sheikh Wednesday called upon Christians supportive of Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement to “watch out” for his policies to depict Sunnis “as a scarecrow.”He also assured Sunnis that Aoun’s stances do not reflect those of Christians in Lebanon.“I call on you [FPM supporters] to pay attention to the policy of the Aounist movement which depicts the Sunnis as a scarecrow, and beasts that support of extremism,” controversial Sheikh Ahmad Assir told a news conference at his office in Abra east of Sidon.

Cabinet agrees to lease electricity-generating ships, build power plants
March 29, 2012/ By Hassan Lakkis/ The Daily Star /BEIRUT: The Cabinet agreed Wednesday during a marathon session to lease for a maximum of three years power-generating ships to produce 270 megawatts and to the construction of 1,500-megawatt power plants. The deal spared the Cabinet a confrontation among its members, particularly between ministers loyal to Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and those allied with Prime Minister Najib Mikati. Energy Minister Gibran Bassil, Aoun’s son-in-law, had originally proposed leasing two power-generating ships, which have a capacity of close to 300 MW. However, Mikati had expressed reservations over Bassil’s proposal, arguing that the cost of renting the ships would be too great, a claim denied by Bassil’s camp.
Mikati presented an offer from a foreign company to build a power-generating plant within a year at a cost less than leasing the ships proposed under Bassil’s plan. Bassil struck back Tuesday, saying that Mikati’s proposal lacked “seriousness and professionalism,” and predicting dire consequences should his proposal be rejected in favor of the prime minister’s. In a deal reached by the Cabinet Wednesday evening, it was agreed that a ministerial committee will negotiate prices and conditions for contracts to be offered to the companies renting out the ships, a demand that had been consistently rejected by Bassil. Under the agreement, ships will supply electricity to the country for three years.
The Cabinet also agreed to “accelerate the construction of 1,500-megawatt power plants,” including finalizing studies, preparing specification handbooks and electricity infrastructure, securing needed funds and taking measures to facilitate the participation of the private sector. Lebanon suffers a severe shortage in electricity. Bassil, who had previously warned that the country could suffer severe electricity rationing of almost 12 hours a day if his plan wasn’t approved, said the country’s demand in the summer was expected to rise to 3,000 megawatts per day. Energy production currently stands at below 1,500 MW per day. Speaking during a news conference Tuesday, Bassil said that Aoun’s ministers would resign if the government remained “unproductive.”
“We shouldn’t take it for granted that the government won’t resign. Do you think we’ll remain in an unproductive government?” he asked.
During the Cabinet session, which lasted for around six hours under President Michel Sleiman at Baabda Palace, the president said that a solution is impending on the issue of private hospitals, which began a week-long strike Monday, refusing to treat patients who are covered by the National Social Security Fund. The president highlighted the importance of addressing social demands and following up on the issue of spoiled food, voicing his relief that business in the tourism industry picked up again following the state’s crackdown on spoiled food.
Sleiman said the demands of the Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations to appoint a head for the Higher Judicial Council would be addressed soon, and that Justice Minister Shakib Qortbawi had begun preparations to appoint a head of the body. Sleiman and Aoun are currently at loggerheads over the appointment. The Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations held a strike Monday in protest against the delay in appointing a head for the body whose term expires in June.However, the Cabinet made modest progress in appointments during the meeting, naming Antoine Gibran as the head of Human Resources Unit in the Council of Civil Service, Nathalie Yared as the head of the Research and Guidance Management Unit in the same council and Mona Awwad in the post of the director general of ministerial affairs in the directorate general of the prime minister’s office. Political bickering has prevented major appointments. The Cabinet approved five draft laws to conduct an audit on state spending between the years 2006 and 2010 inclusively. – With additional reporting by Nafez Kawwas

Syria’s rebels must say ‘yes’ to a managed transition
March 29, 2012/By David Ignatius/The Daily Star /Maybe it’s time for Syrian revolutionaries to take “yes” for an answer from Syrian President Bashar Assad and back a U.N.-sponsored “managed transition” of power there, rather than rolling on toward a civil war that will bring more death and destruction for the region. Syria announced Tuesday that it was ready to accept a peace plan proposed by U.N. special envoy Kofi Annan. The Syrian announcement in Beijing followed endorsement of the plan by China and Russia. The proposal has many weaknesses, but it could open the way toward a “soft landing” in Syria that would remove Assad without shattering the stability of the country. Yes, I recognize that moderate diplomatic solutions like these are for wimps. The gung-ho gang has been advocating supplying arms to the Syrian opposition, setting up no-fly zones and other versions of a military solution. Morally, it’s hard to dispute the justice of the opposition’s cause; the problem is that these military solutions will get a lot more innocent civilians killed, and destroy the delicate balance of the Syrian state.
We should learn from recent history in the Middle East and seek a nonmilitary solution in Syria – even with the inevitable fuzziness and need for compromise with unpleasant people. A Syria peace deal will also give a starring role to Russia and China, two countries that don’t deserve the good press. That’s okay with me: Vladimir Putin gets a ticker-tape parade if he can help broker a relatively peaceful departure for Assad. The case for this cautious, managed transition can be summarized with a four-letter word: Iraq.
Looking back at the Iraq war, one of the most damaging mistakes was that after toppling Saddam Hussein, the United States went on to destroy Iraq’s state structure and its army. Without these institutions, the country had no stability and Iraqis retreated for self-protection to the most basic loyalties of sect and tribe. In this sense, the U.S. invasion unintentionally and tragically sent Iraq hurtling backward in time. Iraq gained a measure of “democracy,” but lost social cohesion.
The U.S. shouldn’t make the same mistake in Syria, no matter how appealing the opposition’s pleas for weapons. We’ve seen this movie before. We know that it leads to a kind of lawlessness that’s very hard to reverse. And we know, too, that for all the perversions of Assad and his Baathist goons, the Syrian state and army are national institutions that transcend the ruling family, his Alawite sect or the corrupt Baathists who hijacked the nation in the 1960s. I credit the Obama administration for resisting the growing chorus of calls to arm the Syrian rebels – and for continuing to seek Moscow’s help even after the Russians’ foot-dragging that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (imprudently but accurately) described last month as “despicable.”
It’s a moment for realpolitik: The West needs Russia’s help in removing Assad without a civil war, and Russia needs to broker a transition to bolster its future influence in the Arab world. That’s the pragmatic logic that’s driving Annan’s peace effort.
Political change (even the cautious, managed-transition version I’m urging) won’t come to Syria without some bloodshed. Over the past year, it has been one-sided, with perhaps 10,000 opposition fighters and civilians slaughtered by Assad’s forces, but there’s bound to be some settling of scores.
The Friends of Syria gathering, which will meet this weekend in Istanbul, should start thinking about ways to prevent reprisals against the Alawite and Christian communities that have been loyal to the regime, once Assad is on a plane for Doha or Moscow. I hope Annan will reach out to religious leaders of these minority communities to offer them reassurance they won’t be massacred if Assad goes.
The alternative to a diplomatic soft landing is a war that shatters the ethnic mosaic in Syria. It’s easy to imagine Sunni militias gaining control of central cities such as Homs, Hama and Idlib, while Alawites retreat to parts of Damascus and Latakia province in the north. Assad might still claim to be president in this scenario, but he would be little more than a warlord (albeit one with access to chemical weapons). It’s a grim scenario in which Western air power would have limited effect. Patrick Seale, who probably knows Syria better than any other Western writer, captured in his biography of Assad’s father the brutal, fight-to-the-death code that led to the massacre in Hama 30 years ago: “Fear, loathing and a river of spilt blood ruled out any thought of a truce.” You can only pray that the same no-compromise logic doesn’t prevail today, on either side.
*David Ignatius is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR.

The Annan plan will bring more violence
March 29, 2012/ By Michael Young The Daily Star
There was something nauseating in Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s recent comments that the plan currently being peddled by Kofi Annan, the Arab League-United Nations envoy on Syria, represents the last chance to avert a Syrian civil war. Medvedev knows that Russia has been greatly responsible for escalating the violence in Syria, sending weapons and advisers to help President Bashar Assad repress his own people. Diplomatically, however, the Russians are paying no price. In fact, they’re making headway.
The outgoing Russian president isn’t alone. Annan’s six-point plan has been picked up by the international community as the way to resolve the Syrian crisis. That the plan is awash with ambiguity, so that each government can interpret it advantageously, has been its strongest point. However, imprecise plans are usually easier to market than to execute. Annan’s scheme is no different.
The former United Nations secretary-general has put together a package that includes kick-starting a Syrian-led process of negotiations “to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people”; a commitment by all sides to end the fighting, under U.N. supervision; the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas affected by combat, including implementation of a two-hour humanitarian pause to allow this; intensification of the “pace and scale” of release of “arbitrarily detained persons,” as well as identification of their place of detention and authorization to visit such facilities; agreement to grant freedom of movement throughout Syria to journalists; and respect for “freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.”
The Syrian regime has accepted this proposal, and one can immediately see why. It ensures that Assad will remain in office to bargain with the opposition in the “Syrian-led process.” In that way, Annan has effectively undermined an Arab League plan demanding that the Syrian president step down and surrender power to his first vice president. Annan’s plan also buys the Syrian security services more time to suffocate the uprising, since it will take weeks to bring all the machinery in place, not least a sizable U.N. observer team.
And last but not least, it gives Assad considerable leeway to dance around the wording. Two examples: Who defines what an “arbitrarily detained person” is? The Syrians will argue that those arrested broke Syrian law, and it’s not clear what authority, let alone information, the U.N. will have to disprove this. As when it comes to freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully, what does the caveat “as legally guaranteed” tagged onto the end imply? If the Syrian regime deems a demonstration illegal under its laws, what happens then? Anticipate endless bickering over the details, and don’t expect Russia and China to contradict Assad in these disputes.
The most contentious aspect of the plan is that Assad stays in place. It’s remarkable that some Western observers regard the Annan project as a mechanism for ousting the Syrian president. On this page, for instance, David Ignatius writes that it “could open the way toward a ‘soft landing’ in Syria that would remove Assad without shattering the stability of the country.” And yet Annan’s plan is but a modestly reinforced version of an Arab League plan from last November – one also accepted by Damascus – that hardly weakened Syria’s president.
We should have no illusions. Russia and China consider the Annan plan a formula for saving Bashar Assad, not getting rid of him. The most ridiculous claim in the past two weeks is that Moscow and Beijing have softened on Syria, and proved this by moving closer to the Americans and the Europeans in the Security Council, where they signed on to a presidential statement backing Annan’s mission.
The truth is that it’s the Obama administration and its European partners that have adopted the Russian and Chinese perspective. When President Barack Obama says that Assad will fall, that’s empty oratory destined to keep Syria at arm’s length during an election year, and avoid accusations that the U.S. president is soft on mass murder. But Obama’s focus is elsewhere. He prefers to subcontract Syria to regional states, even to the feckless Russians, so that he can pursue America’s strategic reorientation away from the Middle East.
The Russian calculation is that if Assad can begin negotiations with the opposition, he will prevail. The different opposition groups will be divided, with some endorsing talks and others rejecting them, permitting the Syrian regime to select its interlocutors. Those who say no to Annan’s offer, Moscow believes, will lose international legitimacy. Once the situation is calmer, the Syrian president will reassert his writ, isolate his foes, introduce cosmetic reforms, and perhaps even integrate opposition figures into a government that otherwise has no margin to challenge the Assad-led security order.
The problem is that most Syrians are wise to the dangers of Annan’s plan. Many prefer civil war to more Assad rule, compounded by barbarous retribution if the Syrian president regains his grip. Annan wants Assad’s victims to cede to their president the latitude to subjugate them for years to come. The provisos in his project manufactured in New York won’t change that. Annan’s six points offer only generalities to defend the Syrian people, with no valid implementation mechanism, and no penalties if Assad ignores the conditions.
That is why Annan’s endeavors will likely accelerate a military conflict. The Syrian opposition will refuse to deal with their killer; those who do so will be marginalized. As many Syrians observe the international community endorsing the Russian and Chinese position; as they realize that Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy are patent hypocrites; and as they witness outsiders, including Syrian exiles hostile to the Assad regime, maneuvering without consulting them, they will become more frustrated and angry, and they will purchase weapons. There will be war, all because no one dares show Bashar Assad the exit.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.

UNIFIL review calls for stronger Lebanon Army
March 29, 2012 /By Stephen Dockery /The Daily Star
BEIRUT: A strategic review of the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations in Lebanon called for increased involvement of the government in security operations in the south, a stronger Lebanese Army and possibly a future force reduction. The report from the secretary-general addressed to the U.N. Security Council was released this month and concludes a four-month-long review aimed at determining how the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon can better carry out its mandate as specified in Resolution 1701, which put an end to the 2006 summer war with Israel.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon specifies three areas the strategic review identified as priorities: better communication between U.N. bodies working with UNIFIL, more Lebanon government involvement and increased Lebanese Army military abilities. The report also suggested the force could continue to decrease in size from its current level of around 12,000 peacekeepers to a “leaner but no less capable force.”After a bombing late last year that wounded members of their peacekeeping contingent, French officials recently announced a 400 soldier reduction in their contribution to UNIFIL. Over the past several years a number of other Western contingents have also reduced their contributions. The military review portion of the study suggested UNIFIL increase peacekeeping-related activities and refocus their attention on the Blue Line. To increase Lebanese involvement, Ban asked to bring in external donors and greater U.N. involvement to help equip and train the Lebanese Army.
Israeli and Lebanese officials, as well as the Security Council, have been briefed on the review’s findings. “The review identified a need for a formal assessment of the overall United Nations presence in Lebanon, with a view to optimizing the considerable human and material resources in the country,” the review stated.

'If there is civil war in this region, it will start here'
The Irish Times - Thursday, March 29, 2012/MICHAEL JANSEN in Tripoli, Lebanon
The revolt in Syria has taken a toll on Lebanon. Ill-feeling to Alawites is simmering dangerously
A STIFF western wind blows in from the Mediterranean, white caps roll in, crashing on the shore not far from the port where Jamil Safieh used to work facilitating the transit of goods from Lebanon to the Arab hinterland. As we sit in a simple cafe over small cups of Turkish coffee, he describes the situation here since the troubles began in Syria. “Before the Syrian revolt, things were not bad. The worldwide economic crisis did not affect us. Commerce here is local. But over the past year, the flow of goods through Syria to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf has fallen dramatically due to the lack of security in Syria. Beans, lentils and clothes are no longer coming from Turkey.”Sanctions forced Syrian merchants who had money in banks here to withdraw it in cash and carry it in bags across the border. The collapse of the Syrian pound means Syrians cannot afford to come here.
“Lebanese who used to go to Syria to buy cheap clothing and food cannot go there because of fighting, kidnapping and killing.
“Syria stopped selling us electricity, oil and gas, so the price of electricity has doubled. Power is cut eight hours a day. The cost of cooking gas has doubled. Real estate prices have fallen by 15 per cent.
“Syrians who have money are buying apartments here, like in Beirut. Unemployment has risen. The atmosphere is low, there is less money, less business.”
Relations between the Sunni and heterodox Shia Alawite communities in Tripoli are fine. “We have no problems. We have been living together since the 1930s, when they became citizens. Historically, the Sunnis employed Alawites [who were originally from Syria] as labourers and maids, but they have bettered themselves. We do business together, intermarry.”
However, since former premier Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, militant puritan Salafis inspired by Saudi Arabia appeared on the Tripoli scene.
The Future movement, now led by his son, Saad Hariri, has been encouraging them with the aim of exploiting anti-Syrian feeling. “Many of these people feel Alawites are agents of the Syrian regime,” observes Safieh. “Future buses outsiders in for demonstrations. Poor people from the Akkar come to Tripoli. They have money, drugs and guns.
“The youth who don’t remember the civil war are ready to fight again. If there is to be a civil war in this region, it will start here before Syria, because there are so many people fuelling it. Tripoli is the front line.”Safieh blames former Maronite Christian warlord Samir Geagea, the Salafis, the Saudis and Future.Fortunately, there are key players who are keeping the peace for the time being, including Maronite patriarch Beshara al-Rai. “The army is controlling the factions now and the local Alawites are organised and armed. Hizbullah is trying to maintain the balance.”
The saving grace, he says, is factionalism among radical Salafis.“Before they fight the Alawites they will fight each other.”

The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn,The Syrian Uprising
by Yvette Talhamy/Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2012, pp. 33-40 (view PDF)
http://www.meforum.org/3198/syria-muslim-brotherhood
As Syrian president Bashar al-Assad struggles to contend with a massive popular uprising, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) is poised to dominate whatever coalition of forces manages to unseat the Baathist regime. Though in many ways the Brotherhood's official political platform is a model of Islamist moderation and tolerance, it is less a window into the group's thinking than a reflection of its political tactics. Unlike its parent organization, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which often kept its ideological opponents at arm's length, the SMB has repeatedly forged alliances with secular dissident groups even as it secretly tried to negotiate a deal with the Assad regime to allow its return from exile. Since the moderation of its political platform over the past two decades has clearly been intended to facilitate this triangulation, it does not tell us much about the ultimate intentions of the Syrian Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood's Background
After the secular, nationalist Baath party took power in 1963, tensions between it and the Muslim Brotherhood ratcheted up, culminating in the February 1982 bombardment and massacre by the regime at Hama, a Brotherhood stronghold. Here, Baath soldiers stand over a body in Hama.
The SMB was established in 1945-46 by Mustafa as-Sibai as a branch of Hassan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Though favoring the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria,[1] it participated in parliamentary elections after the country gained independence in 1946 (winning 4 seats in 1947, 3 seats in 1949, 5 seats in 1954, and 10 seats in 1961) and even had ministers in two governments.[2]
When the secular, nationalist Baath party took power in 1963, it quickly moved to weaken the SMB and the urban, Sunni merchant class that supported the movement. The group was outlawed in 1964, and its leader Isam al-Attar was exiled. That same year, a revolt led by the SMB erupted in the city of Hama and was quelled by force.[3] During the 1970s, relations between the SMB and President Hafez Assad (r. 1970-2000) deteriorated into large-scale violence.
Although the Brotherhood's opposition to Baathist rule was expressed ideologically in polite company, there was a deep sectarian undercurrent, as the Assad regime was dominated by Alawites, a schismatic Islamic sect viewed as heretical by religious Sunnis. Armed elements of the SMB assassinated government officials and carried out bombings of government buildings, Baath party offices, and other targets associated with the regime.[4] In 1979, the SMB carried out a massacre of eighty-three unarmed Alawite cadets at an artillery school in Aleppo. In June 1980, it is said to have made an assassination attempt against the president, who allegedly retaliated by ordering hundreds of captured SMB prisoners gunned down in their cells. Although the SMB has always maintained that it had no connection to underground, armed factions responsible for violence,[5] few take the claim seriously.
In 1980, the Assad regime issued Law No. 49, making membership in or association with the SMB a crime punishable by death.[6] In December 1980, the SMB issued a manifesto that included a detailed program for the future Islamic state in Syria.[7] It continued to work clandestinely in predominantly Sunni, urban centers outside of Damascus, particularly in the city of Hama, and it was there that the Assad regime is reported to have notoriously massacred tens of thousands of people in February 1982, effectively bringing armed resistance to a halt.[8]
The SMB was no longer able to work openly inside Syria, and its leadership was dispersed in exile. As its influence in the country diminished, SMB leaders increasingly sought alliances with secular opponents of the Assad regime.
Alliances and Triangulation
Shortly after the Hama massacre, the SMB began working to forge a united opposition front with secular dissidents. In March 1982, it joined with the pro-Iraqi wing of the Baath party and other militant, secular opposition groups to form the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria.[9] This alliance called for a constitutional, multiparty democracy with Shari'a (Islamic law) as the basis of legislation.[10] In 1990, the SMB and a broader array of opposition groups met in Paris and formed the National Front for the Salvation of Syria with similar declared objectives.
With the election of Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni as general supervisor in 1996, the Brotherhood began secret negotiations with the government, which for its part felt more secure in offering greater accommodation of religious groups after its suppression of the Islamist uprising of the early 1980s.[11] After the ascension of Bashar al-Assad, the regime released several hundred Brotherhood members from prison.[12] Some SMB figures were allowed to return to Syria (most notably Bayanouni's brother, Abu al-Fatih), and the regime also allowed the publication and sale of some previously blacklisted books by SMB founder and ideologue Mustafa as-Sibai.
After these gestures, the SMB began to rapidly shift its political platform. It firmly renounced violence, implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of Assad's rule.[13] However, Assad refused to grant Bayanouni's three core demands: the release of all SMB members from prison, permission for all exiles to return home, and a lifting of the government's ban on the Brotherhood.
Meanwhile, the SMB continued its outreach to other opposition groups. In August 2002, it met with several opposition factions in London and issued what was known as the National Pact in Syria. This pact further refined the SMB's new vision of citizenship, rule of law, democracy, pluralism, equality, and nonviolence.[14]
In December 2004, the SMB published a program for the creation of a modern civil state under the title, "The Political Project for the Future Syria."[15] It is characterized by the rule of law, pluralism, civil society, and the peaceful alternation of political power. The SMB emphasized that it was undergoing a process of self-revitalization through reconsidering the past, the present, and the future.[16]
Islam is enshrined as "a code of conduct for the devout Muslim," a "civilizational identity" for all Syrians, the official religion of the country, and the highest source of legal authority, yet such liberal principles as democracy, pluralism, and tolerance were also affirmed.[17] The SMB also called for the acknowledgment of other principles such as coexistence, human rights, and nonviolence.
Ironically, as Syrian society was growing more deeply religious (as seen in the far greater prevalence of veiling today compared to twenty years ago), the Brotherhood was growing more outwardly secular. Some staunch secularists saw this transformation as a ruse. Wafa Sultan, a psychiatrist and Syrian expatriate residing in the United States, published a June 2005 article on the reformist Annaqed website cautioning liberal opponents of the Syrian regime about the SMB's ostensible embrace of pluralism and democracy:
Do they have the courage to openly declare their new beliefs and apologize for their past so that we won't need to dig up their past? They are calling [now] for a pluralistic, democratic society ruled by the principles of justice and equality. On what basis are they going to build this society?... Have they changed their fundamental beliefs? Why don't they give an answer to this question?... They used to commit crimes [and then] escape to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Jordan [in order to find] a safe haven, and now they are planning to return from these safe havens to the scene of their crimes to participate in building a democratic, pluralistic society based on justice and equality?![18]
Although Sultan is no friend of the Assad regime, her views on the SMB correspond with those held by many in the Syrian government.
In October 2005, the SMB joined five secular opposition parties and independent political figures in signing the Damascus declaration.[19] While emphasizing the role of Islam as the "ideology of the majority" and "prominent cultural component in the life of the nation and the people," the declaration called for the "establishment of a democratic national regime." Moreover, reflecting the sensibilities of dissidents inside Syria who fear being arrested, the declaration pointedly called for a reform process that was "peaceful, gradual, founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other"[20]—that is to say, led by the regime.
The National Salvation Front
A few months later in March 2006, the SMB aligned itself with former vice president Abd al-Halim Khaddam, one of the most powerful figures in the Assad regime until his defection in late 2005. In Brussels, Khaddam and Bayanouni joined a host of less illustrious Syrian exiles in establishing the National Salvation Front (NSF). Unlike the signers of the Damascus declaration, NSF members explicitly called for regime change, albeit through peaceful means.[21]
The SMB alliance with Khaddam was deeply unpopular among the movement's rank and file and was roundly criticized by prominent Damascus declaration signatories. Riyad at-Turk lambasted Khaddam for his involvement in crimes committed by the Assad regime and warned that this alliance would cause internal disputes within the opposition. Some exiled opposition figures, such as Farid al-Ghadri, also objected.[22]
Bayanouni brushed aside the complaints in a June 2006 interview:
We are members of the [Damascus] declaration and members of the NSF, and we asserted that membership in the NSF does not conflict with membership in other alliances or fronts… We are now in the midst of a peaceful opposition to bring about democratic change in the country, and we are willing to partner with all the national groups.[23]
But Bayanouni's commitment to the NSF was uneven. As the front was called into being, the SMB issued "an appeal to the free of the world to abolish Law No. 49,"[24] the implication being that it was still willing to return amicably to Syria in exchange for a full amnesty and legalization of its activities. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, when Syria and Hezbollah were winning plaudits in the Arab world, Bayanouni announced that the SMB had decided to freeze its activities against the regime temporarily.[25] A year later, however, he was back to calling on Assad to step down and threatening to launch a campaign of demonstrations and civil disobedience.[26]
Bayanouni seems to have believed that the SMB's alliance with Khaddam, who has long-standing ties to the Saudis and the family of the late Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, would open up channels with Washington and facilitate defections from the Syrian regime. He claimed that there was pervasive dissatisfaction among the military and intelligence forces and that these forces would move against the regime if they had international support. "When there is a favorable international position sympathetic to the Syrian people, they will arise and move," he said.[27]
In his efforts to appeal for Western sympathy, Bayanouni went so far as to say that Islamist movements in the Arab world should be willing to accept the election of a woman or a Christian as president.[28]
However, the NSF failed to deliver. The alliance with Khaddam damaged the SMB's credibility in the eyes of many Syrians, and for very little return. By the fall of 2008, it was clear that Western and Arab governments were committed to reengaging the Assad regime.
In the wake of Israel's military campaign in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip during the winter of 2008-09, Bayanouni began to triangulate yet again. As in 2006, the SMB announced that it would suspend its opposition activities against the Syrian regime, which sponsored Hamas—the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. In April, the SMB formally withdrew from the NSF, and Khaddam accused the group of seeking a rapprochement with Damascus and meeting with agents of the regime.[29] A statement on the withdrawal of the Brotherhood by the remaining members of the NSF general secretariat was thick with suspicion:
The MB suspension of their opposition activities against the regime has nothing to do with the Palestinian cause… why, after long years of conflict, has the MB elected to stand by the Palestinian people today? And has the Syrian regime already liberated the Golan and are its armies about to finish the job of the liberation of Palestine?!... The NSF believes that the worst form of weakness and inability is ceasing opposition activities and aligning one's position with the regime, the same regime that murdered and killed scores of MB members and thousands of other Syrian citizens.[30]
For his part, Bayanouni accused Khaddam of adopting an opinion similar to that of Israel regarding the war in Gaza and cited this as the reason for the SMB's withdrawal from the NSF.[31]
The SMB waited for the regime to reward its about-face. In a November 2009 interview, Bayanouni stressed that the group's suspension of opposition activity was conditional upon a positive response from the regime. "There were several general positive promises made by the regime to some mediators, which we welcome, but we still wait for actions. Until now, nothing has changed, and this shows that the problem is with the regime, not us," he said.[32]
In July 2010, the General Council of the SMB gathered in Istanbul and elected Muhammad Riad al-Shaqfa to succeed Bayanouni as supervisor general.[33] Many expected Shaqfa to take a less compromising position toward Assad as he was from Hama and had played an active role in the SMB insurrection before leaving Syria in the late 1970s.[34] His deputy, Muhammad Farouq Tayfor, is also from Hama and also took part in armed struggle during the 1970s.[35] A month after being elected, however, the new general supervisor affirmed that the SMB would continue to suspend opposition activities against the Syrian regime.[36]
After Shaqfa's election, Muhammad Said Hawwa, son of the former SMB leader Said Hawwa (d. 1989), wrote a letter to the Brotherhood outlining a "road map" to rebuild its relations with the regime. He argued that in order to end this historical crisis, the SMB must "handle the consequences of its historical, political, philosophical, and military mistakes" and "the leaders who were involved in the past historical mistakes should give up all their posts since they led the SMB into the dark tunnel." He stressed that the SMB should accept the regime's offer to allow the return of some individuals without blood on their hands. Given the present political situation and the declining influence of the SMB, it should not expect more. Hawwa also noted that certain Muslim Brotherhood leaders demanded the impossible and attempted to impose their own conditions as if they were the victors. Instead, they should accept the regime's offers as a starting point for negotiations between the two and later on expand them to include more SMB demands.[37]
This view was endorsed by Kamal al-Halbawi, a London-based Muslim scholar and former SMB spokesman, who wrote an article in al-Quds al-Arabi calling on the new SMB leadership to work toward ending its historic dispute with the Assad regime. He urged the SMB to go back to working within Syrian social institutions, rather than letting new generations bear the brunt of a feud in which they had no part.[38]
A more significant influence on Shaqfa's thinking was the SMB's increasingly close relations with Turkey's Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), which also enjoyed warm ties with Assad. According to Shaqfa, there were several mediation attempts between them and the Syrian regime, but they all failed due to the regime's refusal to fully lift restrictions on the SMB. "Bashar is softer than his father, and he talks to mediators... but he always says 'now we are busy,'" remarked Shaqfa. "We would like the Turkish government to intervene to solve the problems," he said in October 2010.[39] In a November 2010 interview, Shaqfa said that the SMB was even willing to stop calling itself the Muslim Brotherhood if allowed to go back "home" and if the regime met its long-standing conditions.[40]
A Game Changer
The proliferation of popular protests across the Arab world during 2011 changed much. When initial calls for demonstrations in Syria in February fell flat, the SMB remained cautious in its statements about the regime. By March, however, the contagion had hit Syria with a vengeance, and its streets swelled with citizens calling for freedom and democracy. The regime accused the SMB of collaboration with Western countries in steering these demonstrations and fomenting armed attacks against the security forces.[41]
Though the SMB openly declared its support for the protests, it denied responsibility for organizing them. The demonstrations "are not led by the SMB or any other party or group," said Shaqfa.[42] "We are supporters, not creators. The voice of the street is a spokesperson for itself," explained SMB spokesman Zuhair Salim.[43] The SMB might have been willing to reconcile with Assad had the Syrian president been willing to abolish Law No. 49 and lift other restrictions on the movement's activities, but no such concessions were forthcoming. "If I go back to Syria, I could be arrested," Shaqfa complained in June.[44] Worldwide support for the uprisings and Assad's recalcitrance led the SMB to fall back on its old demand for the toppling of the regime. Although Salim said that the Brotherhood "would consider dialogue with the Assad government, under certain conditions, if the violence against protesters were to stop,"[45] he was surely aware that the Syrian president could not end the repression without inviting a tsunami of mass mobilization against the regime.
Shaqfa has been far more concerned with shoring up the SMB's primacy over other opposition factions. When the Syrian opposition held a four-day conference in Turkey at the end of May, SMB delegates "made sure their presence was noted by arriving late for the opening ceremony, noisily chanting 'God is great,'" noted The Washington Post.[46] However, it is not such displays of religiosity that lead many secular opposition leaders to distrust the Brotherhood but its long history of mercurial political shifts over the past three decades. "Those thirty years destroyed their organization, and they lost their legitimacy because they changed positions so much without explanation over the past five years," said Burhan Ghalioun, a prominent dissident and scholar at the Sorbonne in Paris.[47]
In October 2011, a Syrian National Council, comprising seven opposition factions including the SMB, was formed in Istanbul. Elected as council leader, Ghalioun reassured The Wall Street Journal that there was no real chance of an Islamist takeover since the SMB's thirty-year-long exile had deprived it of a solid domestic base.[48] The SMB, however, was more upbeat. "I believe that the Assad regime will collapse within the next few months... the regime's days are over," Shaqfa prophesied, stressing that the SMB was sufficiently rooted in Syria as to make this long-cherished dream a reality.[49] Whether this prediction will come to pass remains to be seen.
Yvette Talhamy served for three years as a teaching fellow at the University of Haifa's department of Middle Eastern studies. She is the author of articles published in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, and Chronos History Journal.
[1] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime," in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 151.
[2] Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," MERIP Reports, Nov.-Dec. 1982, p. 17.
[3] Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria," p. 157.
[4] Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," p. 20.
[5] "Al-Mashru as-Siyasi li-Suriya al-Mustaqbal," The Arab Orient Center for Strategic and Civilization Studies (London), Dec. 19, 2004.
[6] R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 109.
[7] Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), pp. 201-67.
[8] Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Assad Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 17-21.
[9] Thomas Collelo, ed., Syria: A Country Study (Washington: Library of Congress, 1987).
[10] "Syria: National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria (1980-1990)," Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, SYR32163.E, June 1, 1999.
[11] Eyal Zisser, "Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam," Middle East Quarterly, Mar. 1999, pp. 49-56.
[12] "Syria Profile," BBC News, accessed Dec. 21, 2011.
[13] Sami Moubayed, "No Room for Political Islam in Syria," Asia Times (Hong Kong), May 10, 2010.
[14] "Al-Mithaq al-Watani fi Suriya," Syrian Human Rights Committee, London, Feb. 11, 2004.
[15] "Al-Mashru as-Siyasi li-Suriya al-Mustaqbal," Dec. 19, 2004.
[16] Najib Ghadbian, "Syria's Muslim Brothers: Where to Next?" The Daily Star (Beirut), Sept. 17, 2010.
[17] "Al-Mashru as-Siyasi li-Suriya al-Mustaqbal," Dec. 19, 2004.
[18] "Syrian Expatriate Asks: Who Are the Muslim Brotherhood Trying to Fool?" The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington, D.C., Aug. 3, 2005.
[19] Middle East Transparent, Oct. 16, 2005; Damascus declaration, Oct. 16, 2005.
[20] Damascus declaration, Oct. 16, 2005.
[21] "Conference Final Statement: Founding Conference for the National Salvation Front for Syria," Free Syria (London), June 5, 2006.
[22] Elaph (London), Mar. 19, 2006.
[23] "Bayanouni interview (6/7)," The Syria Monitor, Center for Liberty in the Middle East, Washington, D.C., June 8, 2006.
[24] "An Appeal to the free of the world to abolish rule 49\1980 that legalizes crime," Free Syria, Apr. 22, 2006.
[25] "News Round-Up (8\29-9\1)," The Syria Monitor, Sept. 28, 2006.
[26] Reuters, Mar. 16, 2007.
[27] Ibid.
[28] "Al-Bayanouni lays the foundations of the modern concept of citizenship among the Muslim Brotherhood," Free Syria, Nov. 1, 2007.
[29] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Apr. 5, 2009.
[30] "Statement by the General Secretariat of the National Salvation Front in Syria: On the Withdrawal of the Muslim Brotherhood from the National Salvation Front!" Free Syria, Apr. 11, 2009.
[31] Al-Intiqad (Beirut), June 6, 2008.
[32] "Bi-Wduh," al-Hiwar TV (London), Nov. 15, 2009.
[33] "Muhammad Riyad ash-Shaqfa," www.IkhwanWiki.com, Feb. 20, 2011.
[34] Al-Arabiya News Channel (Dubai), Sept. 8, 2010.
[35] "Ikhwan Suriya… Shaqfah Muraqiban Aman Khalafan li-l-Bayanouni," Islam on-Line, Aug. 2, 2010.
[36] "Muhammad Riyad lil-Sharq al-Awsat: 'Mawjudun fi Aghlab al-Duwal al-Arabiya wa-l-Natadakhal fi-l-sha'n al-Dakhili wa-Natawasal abr al-Internet,'" Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Syria, Aug. 8, 2010.
[37] "Najl al-Rahil Sa'id Hawa Yaqtarih Kharitat Tariq baynaha Hal al-Jama'a wa-l-Awda ila al-Bidaya," Syrian Observatory Human Rights (London), Aug. 10, 2010.
[38] "Al-Hilbawi yadu ila Fak al-Ishtibak bayn jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin wa-l-Nizam fi Suriya," Syrian Observatory Human Rights, Aug. 15, 2010.
[39] BBC Arabic, Oct. 27, 2010.
[40] Ash-Sharq (Doha), Nov. 16, 2010.
[41] The Wall Street Journal (New York), May 17, 2011; FrontLine (Chennai, India), Dec. 17-30, 2011.
[42] Al-Rai (Kuwait City), May 29, 2011.
[43] The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011.
[44] France 24 TV (Paris), June 11, 2011.
[45] The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011.
[46] The Washington Post, June 2, 2011.
[47] The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011.
[48] Ibid., Dec. 2, 2011.
[49] Asharq al-Awsat, Dec. 5, 2011.

Syria's Struggling Civil Society, the Syrian Uprising
by Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio
Middle East Quarterly/Spring 2012,
http://www.meforum.org/3194/syria-civil-society
For a brief moment in 2000 and 2001, it looked as if there might be a "Damascus Spring" with the investiture of Bashar al-Assad and his British-born first lady. But all signs of openness were soon quashed by the repressive measures first perfected by Bashar's father and Syria's long-time ruler, Hafez.
Article 8 of the Syrian constitution established the Baath party, which has prevented any independent parties from emerging since the 1963 military coup that brought it to power as "the leading party in the state and society."[1] Yet despite this systematic repression, there has been a sustained effort by a small group of intellectuals and critics over the past decade to transform the country's political system and make it more open and accountable.
While these activists did not ignite the uprising that has shaken Syria since March 2011, their courageous defiance of Bashar al-Assad's regime has given them high standing among many Syrians. They may yet play a significant role in shaping Syria's future.
Commitment to Freedom
Bashar al-Assad's assumption of the presidency in July 2000 gave rise to a brief period of unprecedented easing of state repression known as the "Damascus Spring" whereby dozens of discussion forums and associations were created, all calling for political liberalization and democratic openness.
This sector of Syrian civil society came to light with the "Declaration of the 99," signed by numerous intellectuals including Burhan Ghalyoun, Sadeq al-Azm, Michel Kilo, Abdul Rahman Munif, Adonis and Haidar Haidar, who demanded: 1) an end to the state of emergency and martial law applied in Syria since 1963; 2) a public pardon to all political detainees and those who are pursued for their political ideas and permission for all deportees and exiled citizens to return; 3) a rule of law that will recognize freedom of assembly, of the press, and of expression; 4) freedom in public life from the laws, constraints, and various forms of surveillance, allowing citizens to express their various interests within a framework of social harmony and peaceful [economic] competition and enable all to participate in the development and prosperity of the country.[2]
On January 1, 2001, a group of Syrian lawyers demanded a complete reform of the constitution, the lifting of emergency laws, and the concession of full civil liberties. Shortly thereafter, a group of activists published the founding charter of their civil society committee—better known as the "Declaration of the 1,000."[3] The following day, the Jamal Atassi Forum for Democratic Dialogue was established with the participation of communists, Nasserites, socialists and Baathist critics of the regime, and on March 7, authorization was given to create independent organizations for the defense of human rights as well as cultural and social associations made up of moderate Muslims. This group included the Islamic Studies Center, headed by Muhammad Habash, a progressive scholar opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, who served as a parliament member. By July 3, 2001, the Human Rights Association of Syria had been established with lawyer Haitham al-Malih as president.
In just a few months, two hundred discussion clubs and forums were created. Reacting to the proliferation of spaces where the future of Syria was being freely debated, the regime pushed back, fearful it might lose its monopoly on power. Invoking a need to maintain national unity in the face of external threats, beginning in September 2001, the regime arrested deputies Riad Saif and Mamoun al-Homsi, economist Arif Dalila, lawyer Anwar al-Bunni, and Atassi Forum spokesman Habib Issa, followed in short order by Kamal al-Labwani and Haitham al-Malih.[4] All were sentenced to between three and twelve years in jail on charges of "weakening national sentiment" and "inciting sectarian strife." Other important figures were forbidden to leave the country including Radwan Ziyyade, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, and Suhair Atassi, director of the Jamal Atassi Forum.
In an open challenge to the regime, prominent figures persisted in the demand for reform. The Damascus declaration stated that the "establishment of a democratic national regime is the basic approach to the plan for change and political reform. It must be peaceful, gradual, founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other." This declaration also called on the government to "abolish all forms of exclusion in public life by suspending the emergency law; and abolish martial law and extraordinary courts, and all relevant laws, including Law 49 for the year 1980 [which made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense]; release all political prisoners; [allow] the safe and honorable return of all those wanted and those who have been voluntarily or involuntarily exiled with legal guarantees; and end all forms of political persecution by settling grievances and turning a new leaf in the history of the country."[5]
declaration was the result of efforts made by journalist Michel Kilo to unify the main political forces, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood. Kilo had met with the group's leader, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, in Morocco where they agreed on a program based on nonviolence, democracy, opposition unity, and political change. A further public attack on the regime, the Beirut-Damascus declaration, which called on the Syrian regime to recognize Lebanon's independence, establish full diplomatic relations and demarcate the joint border, led to a second wave of arrests during which Kilo and Bunni were imprisoned.[6] With this example, the regime tried to put a stop to its opponents' efforts and to ensure that their demands did not awaken Syrian society from its political lethargy.
The People's Revolt
One of the dissidents' foremost weaknesses was their inability to get their message out due to draconian restrictions on the freedom of gathering and expression. In a 2005 interview, noted activist Kamal al-Labwani provided an accurate, indeed prophetic, prognosis of the current situation when he cautioned that
there is no politically mobilized street. When that happens, everything will change. Today, the opposition is purely symbolic, and this sort of opposition is incapable of uniting because it is based on personalities, on the capability of single individuals to confront the authorities… Society is watching, and when the masses begin to move, they will move behind those who represent them… So right now, we are reserving space in that arena so that when the day comes that people move to the street—either because of foreign or their internal pressures—we will be ready.[7]
The fall of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Husni Mubarak in Egypt, along with the upheavals in Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain, had a contagious effect across the Arab world. Most Syrian dissidents saw the uprisings as the long-awaited opportunity to introduce major changes inside the country. In an article in the Lebanese newspaper as-Safir, the prominent Syrian dissident Michel Kilo argued, "We are entering a new historical stage based on the primacy of citizenship, freedom, justice, equality, secularism, and the rights of men and citizens."[8] After spending five years in prison, Anwar al-Bunni stated that "an event like this only happens once every 200 years, and it is clearly going to bring about a radical change."[9]
On March 10, former parliamentarian Mamoun al-Homsi appealed to the Syrian people: "After fifty years of tyranny and oppression, we are beginning to see the sunlight of freedom approach."[10] He openly accused the regime of resorting to repression, corruption, and sectarian division to remain in power. On March 15, after a first unsuccessful attempt, an anonymous Facebook group, The Syrian Revolution 2011, called for a second day of rage, which led to a mass demonstration against the regime to demand democratic openness.[11]
Despite these appeals, few in Syria expected Assad to follow the path taken by Ben Ali and Mubarak and abdicate power. Rather, it was hoped that the new regional developments would force the regime to abandon its stubborn resistance to change and, in the face of pressure from the street, introduce reforms. As the more politicized elements in Syrian society had been decimated by successive waves of repression, there was little attempt at the outset to mobilize the masses, reasoning that they had little power to affect such change. Thus, the outbreak of popular rage surprised everyone. Suhair al-Atassi, who was in hiding at the time, recently said,
We have been subjected to suppression and murder for merely calling for freedom, democracy, general freedoms, the release of all prisoners of conscience, an end to the state of emergency, and the return of all political exiles. At the time, we said that any suppression would cause the volcano to erupt… we knew that we were working slowly but surely toward freedom, but we didn't dream of a revolution like this breaking out. It was the Syrian youth who made this dream a reality.[12]
The revolt began in the southern city of Dar'a and then gradually and progressively spread across almost the entire country. The demonstrations, which at first mobilized a few thousand people at best, began to enjoy great prestige. In Bunni's words:
In the past, only a few of us dared to call for freedom and human rights. We used to feel isolated, as the majority of people avoided us for fear of retribution from the authorities. After my release, I have realized that my demands became the demands of the entire Syrian people.[13]
Initially, important sectors of the population demanded limited reforms, but Assad's brutal repression raised the bar. Appearing before parliament on March 30, 2011, the president made it clear that any reforms would not come about as a result of popular pressure and that the process of political liberalization would not be hurried. Some members of the intelligentsia believed that the regime would not be able to introduce reforms without collapsing:
We all know that the authorities lie and they won't permit anyone to speak out because the regime is corrupt and dictatorial, and corruption and dictatorship fundamentally contradict transparency and freedom of opinion because the first opinion that anyone would express would be opposition to the regime's corruption and tyranny and the crimes it has committed. And then they'll face arrest, interrogation, and a trial. They say, we'll enact a party law; we'll implement reform, but these are all lies because these authorities are incapable of it.[14]
Michel Kilo added,
Syria today is experiencing an existential crisis related to the distribution of wealth, social justice, freedom, and political participation, and this is not going to be resolved with repression. The police should be arresting killers, thieves, and smugglers, but not hungry people with nothing to put in their mouths.[15]
As the uprising spread, the Syrian regime blamed the violence on armed radical elements seeking to destabilize the country. Assad told parliament that Syria was facing a conspiracy intended to provoke a sectarian war between Sunnis and Alawites.[16] The regime tried to use this tactic to play for time in the midst of a rebellion that had taken it by surprise as well as to justify the high number of civilians killed by the security services and pro-government armed groups. Repression has intensified in the ensuing months and spread to most of the cities, but the security forces have failed to suppress the popular uprising. Faced with the success of the demonstrations, the Syrian regime was forced to back down in July and adopt a series of cosmetic reforms to try to quell the unrest, including the initiation of a national dialogue.[17] The rebels roundly declared these measures insufficient and designed merely to buy the Assad regime more time.
As the unrest has continued, most activists have come to believe that the protest wave has transformed into a revolution that will bring about the fall of the regime. From her hiding place in July 2011, Suhair al-Atassi gave an apt description of the spirit of the demonstrations:
It's a revolution… triggered by the Syrian people seeking to stand up and say that they are citizens and not subjects, and that Syria belongs to all its citizens and not just the Assad family. This is a revolution of the youth who are demanding freedom and are being confronted with violence and murder… Today Syria is witnessing a battle for freedom by unarmed civilians urging the ouster of a regime that has utilized methods of brutal and inhumane suppression. They have brutally attacked and killed the protesters whilst the demonstrators have nothing but their words to defend them.[18]
An Opposition Divided
As a result of fifty years of repressive measures, it is not surprising that the recent uprising has been an ensemble movement with contributions from different players. The economist and commentator Omar Dahi has identified five clearly differentiated groups taking part in the unrest: traditional opposition parties (socialists, Nasserites, and communists); dissident intellectuals; the youth movement, including the leaders of the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), which has driven the revolution and was joined by other sectors of society; a disorganized cohort of conservative Muslims; and armed Salafist groups who represent a minority.[19]
Most of these groups (with the exception of the Salafi elements) agreed about the need to avoid violence, reject sectarianism, and prevent foreign intervention. On August 29, 2011, the LCC stated,
While we understand the motivation to take up arms or call for military intervention, we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically. Militarizing the revolution would minimize popular support and participation in the revolution. Moreover, militarization would undermine the gravity of the humanitarian catastrophe involved in a confrontation with the regime. Militarization would put the revolution in an arena where the regime has a distinct advantage and would erode the moral superiority that has characterized the revolution since its beginning.[20]
Initially, opposition figures urged the creation of a new social pact between the rulers and the ruled, rejecting the use of violence to force Assad from power. Bunni, for example, advocated "a peaceful solution to all the problems" while Kilo urged "a new national contract for a peaceful and negotiated end to the crisis" arguing that "a bloody conflict must be prevented given that exacerbating the sectarian tensions could lead to chaos."[21] At the beginning of August, Kilo warned, "There are some who have chosen to take up arms against the regime, but they only represent a minority of the demonstrators. But if the authorities persist in using violence, then they will become a majority."[22]
At first, national dialogue was also defended, but as the uprising has advanced and the repression intensified, most of the intelligentsia has come to reject this option. In March, the intellectual Burhan Ghalyoun, later named president of the National Transition Council, warned that
to get out of the crisis, the whole crisis, the use of weapons must be rejected and political logic must be accepted… The logic of negotiation and political dialogue requires credibility and the recognition of the other.[23]
He cautioned, however, that such an attitude seemed lacking in Assad, who continued "to dream about formal reforms within the existing regime, a regime with only one ruler, one party, and one authority."[24]
Confronted with external and internal pressure, the regime indicated its readiness for a national dialogue, authorizing a historic meeting with opposition members in Damascus on June 27. Some members of the protest movement, notably Kilo, Louai Hussein, and Hassan Abbas, chose to participate, yet most signatories to the 2005 Damascus declaration boycotted the meeting and contested the participants' right to speak on behalf of the demonstrators. While Hussein contended that the main goal of the meeting was "to organize a safe, peaceful transition from tyranny to freedom,"[25] Bunni argued that it would be exploited by the regime and used "to cover up the arrests, murders, and tortures that continue to take place on a daily basis."[26]
Then on July 9 and 10, the regime sponsored yet another national dialogue meeting, which was boycotted by almost all opposition leaders. "While the regime is meeting—and that is what today was—there are funerals in other cities, and people continue to be killed and arrested," commented Razan Zeitouneh, a lawyer and prominent LCC member.[27] Syrian Human Rights Association president Malih, likewise, declined the invitation, saying
Whoever attends such a dialogue with a regime that commits these crimes is a traitor to the people. After 200 martyrs, 1,500 missing persons, and 15,000 refugees, what is there to talk about? How can you have a dialogue with a person who is holding you at gunpoint?[28]
The meeting was attended by two hundred delegates, most of them intellectuals and politicians with close ties to the regime, and was presented as a steppingstone to a transition to democracy. Vice President Farouk al-Shara opened the meeting with the expressed hope that "it will lead to... the transformation of Syria into a pluralistic, democratic state where its citizens are equal."[29] In a surprising development, the final statement exceeded expectations by raising the issue of releasing all political prisoners, including those arrested since the uprising began (with the exception of those involved in crimes). It also argued that "dialogue is the only way to end the crisis in Syria" and strongly rejected any foreign interference under the pretext of defending human rights.[30] Furthermore, it called for deeper reforms and stronger efforts to combat corruption and requested the amendment of the constitution to make it commensurate with the rule of law, a multiparty system, and democracy.
Most Syrian activists agreed that the offer to engage in dialogue came too late and that the regime had lost all credibility. In the words of Suhair Atassi,
It has been contaminated by the blood of our people! How could we accept this [national dialogue]? It came too late! This is not to mention the lack of trust between the people and the regime. The best example of this was the arrests of the artists and intellectuals who decided to take to the streets in solidarity with the legitimate demands for greater freedoms in Syria. The Syrian regime was merely trying to buy time with this national dialogue… The Syrian opposition is united, which can be seen in its joint decision to boycott the so-called dialogue with the authorities that have been killing and suppressing the people.[31]
In their statement, the LCC dismissed the meeting's results on the grounds that
Syrians who have already been killed and tortured by the thousands will not accept any proposals or arrangements that leave Bashar Assad, the intelligence service, and the death squads in control of their lives.[32]
As the uprising intensified and the dissidents' demands grew, the need to form a transition government, given the possible collapse of the regime, was considered. As early as April 2011, Kilo had requested the formation of "a government of national unity," and by mid-July, Malih had gone still further, calling for a shadow government made up of "independent experts" that would unify the opposition movements and prepare for the post-Assad era.[33]
Foreign Intervention?
The Turkish government has followed the unfolding Syrian crisis with deep concern. In the earliest phases of the uprising, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu advised the regime to end the repression and democratize the country. Assad ignored this "friendly advice," generating a profound unease in Ankara, which was heightened by the arrival of thousands of refugees fleeing the besieged Syrian town of Jisr Shughour.[34]
The possibility of a full-fledged civil war troubles Ankara, which believes that the intensification of violence would significantly increase the influx of refugees into its territory. In an interview with the Qatar newspaper ash-Sharq, Erdoğan stressed the importance of the ties between the two countries:
For Turkey, Syria is not just another country, it's a neighbor with which we share a 910-kilometer-long border… and with which we have shared interests that cannot be ignored… We know very well that stability there is part of our national security, and we are afraid that the situation will lead to the outbreak of a civil war between Alawites and Sunnis.[35]
The widening gap between Ankara and Damascus also means the end of Davutoğlu's "zero problems with neighbors" policy.[36] The premise of this policy was that by way of increasing its international clout, Turkey had to maintain the best possible relationships with neighboring countries and diversify its alliances. This required that Ankara turn its attention back to the Middle East, a region that had formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, thus filling a long-standing vacuum that no Arab regime had been able to fill.
The Turkish government thus warned Damascus that trade relations between the two countries, which amount to around $2.5 billion annually, could be endangered.[37] It also hosted various opposition group meetings inside Turkey with the goal of creating a road map for a post-Assad era. In mid-July, Istanbul hosted the National Salvation Conference, which elected Malih as its president. During the meeting, Malih rejected any dialogue with the regime: "The Syrian regime has declared war on its people, who will not go back home until the regime has fallen."[38] The final statement from the meeting called for the formation of a shadow government, but not before the fall of the regime, and expressed its will to reach "a unified approach" between the opposition and the young demonstrators.
In a subsequent meeting, held in Istanbul on August 23, 2011, the Syrian opposition agreed to create a National Transition Council (NTC) comprised of opposition members both inside and outside the country and presided over by Burhan Ghalyoun, a Syrian academic residing in France.[39] Despite their differences, the intensity of the repression had brought opposition members together. Basma Qadmani, their spokesperson, told the media that "the NTC represents the major forces: political parties and independent figures who symbolize the Syrian opposition." The names of Syria-based NTC members were kept secret to prevent reprisals.
In September, this group was renamed the Syrian National Council (SNC). It included members of the Damascus declaration, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Local Coordination Committees, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, Kurdish factions, tribal leaders, and independent figures. One of the first decisions of SNC was to approve a national consensus charter that defined the principles of the Syrian revolution:
1) Affirming that the Syrian revolution is a revolution for freedom and dignity;
2) Maintaining the peaceful nature of the revolution;
3) Affirming national unity and rejecting any call for sectarianism or monopolizing of the revolution;
4) Recognizing Syria is for all Syrians on an equal footing;
5) Rejecting foreign military intervention.[40]
While the opposition members initially rejected any foreign intervention, voices favoring this eventuality began to emerge, albeit still in the minority. During the Istanbul conference, Malih urged the U.N. to put an end to the bloodshed through political and diplomatic pressure but soundly rejected any military intervention.[41] Earlier, Kilo had also declared his desire "to see an exclusively Syrian solution... reached based on a broad, complete national understanding."[42]
Yet given the worsening situation, the opposition has begun to consider different scenarios to bring the dictatorship to an end. Some favor following the Libyan example where the uprising combined with foreign military intervention to bring about the collapse of the regime: Ashraf al-Miqdad, signer to the Damascus declaration living in Australia, told Asharq al-Awsat that
the Syrian regime will never stop the repression and murders, meaning that there are only two options: foreign intervention or arming the revolutionaries… International military intervention has become the only possible solution. The other alternative would be to divide the army, which would avoid having to arm the people.[43]
Although these voices still represent a minority, they reflect the growing desperation of the Syrian opposition, which believes that the uprising may lose its muscle if none of the objectives are reached soon. On July 29, 2011, a group of defectors formed the Syrian Free Army (SFA).[44] By mid October, there were an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 defectors especially active in the north and central regions. In the last months of the year, SFA began launching some operations against the Syrian army.[45]
The LCC has tried to nip this debate in the bud, stating in a communiqué, "While we understand the motivation to take up arms or call for military intervention, we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically."[46] At least for now, then, it seems that a Libya-style intervention is being rejected. The communiqué stressed
The method by which the regime is overthrown is an indication of what Syria will be like in the post-regime era. If we maintain our peaceful demonstrations, which include our cities, towns, and villages, and our men, women, and children, the possibility of democracy in our country is much greater. If an armed confrontation or international military intervention becomes a reality, it will be virtually impossible to establish a legitimate foundation for a proud future Syria.[47]
Malih concurred, "Any foreign intervention would destroy Syria, just like what has happened in Libya… the revolution in Syria will prevail, and the regime will be brought down by peaceful means." He added that "the revolutionaries will not fall into the trap" of militarizing the uprising.[48]
An eventual militarization could have devastating effects and would likely be exploited by the regime to present itself as the guarantor of internal stability and to regain some of the territory lost to the rebels. The possibility of an outbreak of civil war could have unforeseeable effects on Syria's neighbors since it shares borders with Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. As Arab League secretary general Nabil al-Arabi recently said, "Syria is not Libya… Syria plays a central role in the region, and what happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq."[49]
Conclusion
Although the influence of opposition intellectuals in Syria remains limited, there is little doubt that the Assad regime considers their demands for the release of political prisoners, suspension of the state of emergency, and an end to the single-party system a declaration of war. This further underscores the regime's tenuous grip on power as none of the members of this small opposition group can count on a broad social base or hail from Syrian families boasting great wealth or long lines of politicians with the notable exception of Suhair Atassi, scion to a prominent political family that has produced three heads of state.
Given the absence of freedom of expression and the regime's absolute control of the media, the intelligentsia has not been able to inculcate its message to the Syrian "street" or to mobilize it, a task that now falls entirely to the Local Coordination Committees. Some are further hampered by their past: A good portion of their members are Nasserites, communists, or socialists, affiliations that are in decline and lack any significant popular backing. Support for secularism also weakens their influence among the more traditional or devout segments of Syrian society.
Internal divisions and lack of coordination have also taken their toll. Some of the leading figures differ over core issues such as whether it is possible to have a dialogue with the regime; what the proper relationship with foreign powers should be; what form a transitional government should take, and how it should rule. These differences have been apparent over the last few months.
These structural deficiencies notwithstanding, the opinions of these intellectuals are followed by an important segment of the demonstrators, who hold the struggle by these thinkers against the regime in great esteem. Indeed, this group of intellectuals and critics is solidly represented in both the Committee for National Salvation and the Syrian National Council spearheading the uprising. Perhaps this uncertain situation is best summed up in Malih's words:
The opposition and the Syrian intellectuals did not create the revolution. The revolution is the work of the youth. Now they need political support, and we want to be by their sides in this revolution.[50]
Ignacio Alvarez Ossorio is a lecturer of Arabic and Islamic studies in the University of Alicante, Spain. His recent books include Report on Arabs Revolts (Ediciones del Oriente y el Mediterráneo, 2011) and Contemporary Syria (Sintesis, 2009).
[1] Syrian constitution, Mar. 13, 1973; al-Jazeera TV (Doha), July 25, 2011.
[2] "Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals," al-Hayat, Sept. 27, 2000.
[3] Gary C. Gambill, "Dark Days Ahead for Syria's Liberal Reformers," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 2001.
[4] Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 - Syria, Human Rights Watch, New York, Jan. 17, 2002.
[5] Damascus declaration, Oct. 16, 2005.
[6] The Syria Monitor (Center for Liberty in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.), May 13, 2007.
[7] Joe Pace, interview with Kamal al-Labwani, posted on Syria Comment blog by Joshua Landis, Sept. 2, 2005.
[8] As-Safir (Beirut), Apr. 16, 2011.
[9] "Veteran Activist's Demands Reflect New Syria," Amnesty International, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011.
[10] YouTube, Mar. 10, 2011.
[11] "The Syrian Revolution 2011," Facebook, accessed Dec. 27, 2011.
[12] Asharq al-Awsat (London), July 16, 2011.
[13] "Veteran Activist's Demands Reflect New Syria," July 26, 2011.
[14] Pace, interview with Labwani, Sept. 2, 2005.
[15] Al-Akhbar (Cairo), Aug. 9, 2011.
[16] Voice of America, Mar. 30, 2011.
[17] The Guardian (London), June 27, 2011.
[18] Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.
[19] Omar Dahi, "A Syrian Drama: A Taxonomy of a Revolution," posted on Syria Comment blog by Joshua Landis, Aug. 13, 2011.
[20] "Statement to the Syrian People," Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LLC), Aug. 29, 2011.
[21] As-Safir, Apr. 16, 2011.
[22] Al-Akhbar, Aug. 9, 2011.
[23] Al-Jazeera TV, Mar. 28, 2011.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., June 27, 2011.
[26] Ibid.
[27] The Guardian, July 10, 2011.
[28] Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.
[29] Al-Watan (Kuwait), July 8, 2011.
[30] Syrian Arab News Agency (Damascus), July 12, 2011.
[31] Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.
[32] Declaration, Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LCC), Sept. 7, 2011.
[33] As-Safir, Apr. 26, 2011; al-Bayan (Dubai), July 11, 2011.
[34] BBC News, June 8, 2011.
[35] Ash-Sharq (Doha), Sept. 13, 2011.
[36] See Svante E. Cornell, "What Drives Turkish-Foreign-Policy?" Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2012, pp. 13-24.
[37] The National (Abu Dhabi), Aug. 11, 2011.
[38] France 24 TV (Paris), July 19, 2011.
[39] Associated Press, Oct. 3, 2011.
[40] National Consensus Charter, Syrian National Council, Sept. 15, 2011; Steven Heydemann, "Syria's Opposition," United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2011.
[41] France 24 TV, July 19, 2011.
[42] Al-Arab al-Yawm (Amman), June 18, 2011.
[43] Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 6, 2011.
[44] YouTube, July 29, 2011.
[45] The New York Times, Nov. 17, 2011.
[46] "Statement to the Syrian People," Local Coordination Committees in Syria, Aug. 29, 2011.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 11, 2011.
[49] Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Sept. 7, 2011.
[50] Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.