Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for December 21/12
Egypt's Christians: Caught in the Middle/By: Raymond Ibrahim/December 21/12
Musawi rejects Mufti Shaar plot allegations
Alleged plot to kill Lebanese mufti sparks controversy
Future MP, Jamal Jarrah told wants Syria’s interior minister tried
Lebanese bourse to swing on events in Syria
Pro Axis Of Evil Energy Minister Gebran Bassil under fire over closing borders suggestion
Bassil, Mansour threaten to seal border
Roumieh guards in Lebanon are helping inmates access drugs
Lebanon: National Labor Confederation quits GLC
Bahrain FM calls for "Friends of the Iranian people Conference"
Putin wavers on Assad support
Syrian minister stable at Beirut hospital
Nephews of Syria vice president arrested: activists
Gulf Union to be announced mid-2013 – Bahraini official
Canada rules on wearing religious veil in court

Egypt's Christians: Caught in the Middle
December 20, 2012 | Raymond Ibrahim
Published by Gatestone Institute
While the conflict in Egypt has largely been portrayed as a conflict between secular Egyptians, or “moderate Muslims,” who oppose full-blown Sharia, and the Islamists, led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, who want Taliban-style Sharia to govern the nation, largely missed have been the Christian Copts in the middle, who find themselves in an especially awkward position.
Moderate Muslims are still capable of offering the requisite lip service to Islam—saying “prayers and peace upon Muhammad” and all the other Muslim mantras—even as they reject the full application of Sharia. This makes it more difficult for their radical brethren to portray them as infidel enemies. Moderate Muslims can resist Sharia, but in subtle ways, arguing over Islamic exegesis, calling for ijtihad[modern interpretations, questioning], and so forth.But when Egypt’s Christian Copts resist Sharia—as religious minorities, or dhimmis, they stand to suffer the most under it—pro-Sharia Muslims retaliate with extreme vengeance, portraying them as infidels who reject the law of Allah.
This has been truer than ever in recent days, as President Morsi and his Islamist and jihadi allies push for a Sharia-based constitution and Egypt’s secularists resist. Trapped in the middle, the Copts’ suffering is only about to begin. A video that recently surfaced in Egypt shows Salafi Muslims holding an Egyptian man whose hands are tied behind his back under arrest in an alley. They grab him by the collar, interrogating and threatening him, humiliating him by poking and slapping him in the face and calling him “boy”—all as they try to determine if he is a Christian and as he insists “No, I’m a Muslim!” One of his captors can be heard saying “Can you imagine if he turns out to be a Christian?” implying that would be the end of him.
The video ends with him sobbing and saying, “Have mercy,” followed by, “There is no god but Allah,” the first half of the Islamic shehada, or profession of faith, which, unlike the second half—”and Muhammad is his prophet”—Christians in Egypt are only too happy to declare.
The poking, throttling and slapping are all reminders of the Islamic textbook way of treating dhimmis. Such degradation appears regularly in the commentaries of Islam’s doctrines, so that in the Medieval Islamic Civilization Encyclopedia one can read that Muslim “jurists came to view certain repressive and humiliating aspects of dhimma as de rigueur. Dhimmis were required to pay the jizya [tribute] publicly, in broad daylight, with hands turned palm upward, and to receive a smart smack on the forehead or the nape of the neck from the collection officer.” Islam’s jurists mandated a number of humiliating rituals at the time of jizya payment, including slapping, choking, and pulling the beard of the paying dhimmi.
Such hostility for Christian minorities is not surprising considering that Safwat Hegazy, a longtime Muslim Brotherhood figure and popular preacher, just went on record formally threatening every Coptic Christian who votes against the Sharia-laden constitution. In a video speaking before a throng of Muslims, he said:
A message to the church of Egypt, from an Egyptian Muslim: I tell the church—by Allah, and again, by Allah—if you conspire and unite with the remnants [opposition] to bring Morsi down,that will be another matter [screams of "Allah Akbar!" followed by chants of "With our soul, with our blood, we give to you, O Islam!"]… We say and I say to the Church: yes, you share this country with us; but there are red lines—and our red line is the legitimacy of Dr. Muhammad Morsi. Whoever splashes water on it, we will splash blood on him” [followed by more wild shouts of "Allah Akbar!"]
Then of course there was the case of Mina Philip, one of the protesters who was stripped of his clothes and beat into a bloody pulp by the Egyptian president’s Islamic supporters. OnTube, the Egyptian Internet channel complementing ONTV, recently showed the gruesome images of Philip’s torture, including, in the host’s words, how “Mina Philip was dragged through the streets by a Muslim Brotherhood mob who took off his clothes and beat him, accusing him of being a thug, while in fact he is an engineer who works for an international telecommunications company.”
In the video, Mina continuously pleads with his tormentors, “please, I didn’t harm anyone.” The mob can be heard cursing and threatening him, and demanding his name—probably to determine whether he is Muslim or Christian—which he insists he “forgot.” (“Mina Philip” is a distinctly Coptic name.)
Philip provided more information in another interview. He was coming back from work when he stopped to see what was going on with the protests:
As I watched, a group of Muslim Brotherhood men dragged me with others… they surrounded me and started beating me while others took my clothes off so I was topless; they took my wallet and keys and dragged me. They beat me with rocks and rods; I kept on saying that I didn’t touch anyone and they would reply with curses, calling me a “secular dog.”
He then told the same story recorded by many others—including Muslims who were also attacked by the Muslim Brotherhood: “They later questioned me, asking who was paying me and threatened to leave me for the rest of the Brotherhood’s men to kill me if I didn’t confess that I received money from Hamdin and Baradei [opposition candidates].”
So it is, Egyptian’s moderates and radicals battle it out, while Christian minorities are trapped.

Alleged plot to kill Lebanese mufti sparks controversy
December 20, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Hezbollah MP Nawwaf Musawi denied Thursday allegations that Syrians used his office to plot to kill North Lebanon’s Mufti, Sheikh Malek al-Shaar. “The accusations made by someone via a media outlet are fabrications, lies and false accusations that have nothing to do with the truth,” Musawi said, according to a statement. The statement, issued from Musawi’s office, said it was in response to “an accusation by a Syrian person with plotting to assassinate a personality.” Musawi, according to the statement, said he felt compelled to respond to the allegations, which he described as “too absurd to worry about.” In an interview to Al-Mustaqbal Television Wednesday, Sheikh Abdel-Jaleel al-Saeed, the former head of Public Relations and Communications in Syria’s Dar al-Fatwa, accused Capt. Mohrez Ibrahim Hamad, the head of the Security Department of Dar al-Fatwa in Syria, of plotting with others to assassinate Shaar. Saeed said Hamad frequently visited Beirut to coordinate with the others at Musawi’s office. He also alleged that the case was related to that of former Lebanese Minister Michel Samaha. Saeed added that he would give his testimony to Lebanon’s general prosecutor once he received sensitive documents he is trying to acquire from Syria. Shaar said earlier this month that he received death threats, prompting him to extend a visit to Europe. Shaar said he would remain abroad for a period of time. The Muslim preacher said members of the Internal Security Forces appealed to him on the eve of his daughter’s wedding to leave the country because his life was at risk.

Future MP, Jamal Jarrah told wants Syria’s interior minister tried
December 20, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Syria’s interior minister, who was recently admitted to a Beirut hospital, should be tried for war crimes, a lawmaker in Lebanon’s Future Movement said in remarks published Thursday. “After treatment, [Syria’s Interior Minister Mohammad Shaar] must be handed over to international justice for trial because he is a war criminal and has killed thousands of Syrians," MP Jamal Jarrah told Al-Joumhouria newspaper. He said Lebanon has signed international treaties that require it to hand over war criminals for trial “and the Lebanese judiciary is committed to doing so.” Jarrah also insisted that Shaar get the proper medical care first. “March 14 deals with this issue from both a humanitarian and judicial point of view,” he said. “This is the first issue of this kind.”Security and medical sources told The Daily Star Wednesday that Shaar is being treated at the American University of Beirut’s Medical Center.Shaar was lightly wounded last week in a deadly attack on the Interior Ministry in Damascus that was claimed by the jihadist Nusra Front, a security source told Agence France Presse. The state-run National News Agency said Wednesday Shaar was put under medical observation and that he was in stable condition. The NNA quoted a doctor at AUBMC as saying that Shaar did not require surgery. The unidentified doctor said the Syrian government official suffered burns and shrapnel wounds. The Future Movement, a major component of the opposition March 14 alliance, has voiced support to Syrians seeking an end to the rule of President Bashar Assad.

Pro Axis Of Evil Energy Minister Gebran Bassil under fire over closing borders suggestion
December 20, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Energy Minister Gebran Bassil was criticized Thursday over his suggestion that Lebanon seal its borders as the government struggles to deal with the growing influx of refugees from war-torn Syria.
Youth and Sports Minister Faisal Karami said closing the border in the face of refugees was “unacceptable,” stressing that the issue was a humanitarian one.
“The issue, however, of closing the border or removing or returning refugees under these circumstances is totally unacceptable because this is a humanitarian situation and we must address the core of the problem and find solutions,” Karami told reporters. Karami made his comments after meeting with the newly elected Greek Orthodox patriarch John X Yazigi at the former’s hometown of Tripoli, where divisions over the Syrian crisis have led to clashes between supporters and opponents of President Bashar Assad. The minister admitted, however, that Lebanon could not accommodate all the refugees fleeing violence in their home country.
During a Cabinet session Wednesday, Bassil suggested that the 550-kilometer-long border with Syria be closed as Prime Minister Najib Mikati appealed to the international community to quickly come up with promised financial assistance. U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly said Thursday the U.N. would allocate $267 million out of the $1.5 billion it is seeking in humanitarian aid to cope with the crisis in Syria. Meanwhile, National Struggle Front member and former Minister of the Displaced Akram Shehayeb warned of a “wave of racism” from some members of the March 8 coalition concerning the refugees entering Lebanon.“Yesterday, a minister who believes in Greater Syria and the ‘enlightened’ energy minister called for the closing of the border to the Syrian and Palestinian refugees,” Shehayeb said, referring to Bassil, a member of the Free Patriotic Movement. “This stance comes amid a wave of racism against the people who need to be provided relief and embraced after they fled from the crimes of the Assad regime,” he added.
Allaeddine Terro, who took over Shehayeb’s ministry portfolio, said Lebanon could not absorb the number of refugees entering the country without Arab and international assistance.
“The repercussions of the Syrian crisis have begun to cast their shadow on the Lebanese scene, particularly regarding the waves of refugees, the last of which included thousands of our Palestinian brothers who entered Lebanon,” he said in a statement. “It also forebodes of a dangerous humanitarian and social situation which Lebanon may not be able to handle without foreign assistance, particularly international and Arab [support],” he added.
“The worsening problem has become a burden on the Lebanese state and there needs to be an emergency humanitarian plan and the international community and international humanitarian organizations should be urged to shoulder their responsibilities,” he said.

Syria's Instability Reaches Lebanon
David Schenker/Washigton Institute
December 20, 2012
The war in Syria is raising the risk of all-out confrontation between Sunni and Shiite extremists in Lebanon, though the violence might be worse if not for the U.S.-supported Lebanese Armed Forces.
Recent fighting in Lebanon between pro- and anti-Assad forces raises the specter that spillover from Syria will engulf its neighbor. With Washington focused on the crises in Syria and Egypt, perennially-on-the-brink Lebanon is a second-tier concern for now, but it will not remain so if Islamist militants gain the upper hand politically or, worse, acquire Syrian chemical weapons.
BAABDA PRINCIPLES NOT HOLDING UP WELL
In June, Lebanese president Michel Suleiman convened a meeting of the country's diverse sectarian and political leadership. During this so-called National Dialogue, the first such gathering in nearly two years, he forged a consensus between the pro-Western "March 14" opposition bloc and the Shiite militia Hizballah's "March 8" bloc, which controls the current government. The agreement, known as the Baabda Declaration, affirmed the need for calm. It also called for enhanced support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and -- most important given the divisive nature of Syria's war -- a commitment to disassociate "from the regional axes and international conflicts, as well as abiding tensions and regional crises." Notwithstanding the war next door -- in which Hizballah backs the Assad regime and the March 14 "Future Movement" supports the rebels -- the agreement underpinned a tense quiet until October, when a car bombing in Beirut took the life of Internal Security Forces investigations chief Wissam al-Hassan.
The death of the March 14-aligned Hassan, along with two failed attacks on the bloc's prominent Christian leaders, evoked a return to 2004-2007, when nearly a dozen senior opposition members were killed, likely by Syria and/or Hizballah. Concerned about the deteriorating security situation, March 14 announced that it would boycott the March 8 government and the National Dialogue until Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned. It also accused Hizballah of violating the Baabda Declaration by deploying troops to Syria to defend the nominally Shiite Alawite Assad regime, and by dispatching an Iranian aerial drone over Israel -- two steps that the militia's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed credit for in an October 11 speech.
Meanwhile, Hizballah has been criticizing March 14 for breaching the Baabda principles by providing Syrian rebels with arms. In late November, the pro-Hizballah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar published wiretap transcripts of March 14 parliamentarian Okab Sakr talking to Free Syrian Army (FSA) leaders in Turkey about transferring weapons and ammunition. Sakr has admitted such activity; his role as a conduit for Saudi weapons was first reported by Time magazine in September. Although opposition officials claim he was acting on his own, the al-Akhbar transcripts -- in which Sakr invokes March 14 leader Saad Hariri -- suggest otherwise. Hizballah and its Christian coalition partner, Michel Aoun of the Free Patriotic Movement, are demanding that Sakr's parliamentary immunity be stripped, and Lebanese courts have initiated an investigation.
HIZBALLAH IN SYRIA
Although Sakr's legal fate is uncertain, Hizballah will almost certainly face zero consequences for its activities in Syria. Nasrallah first acknowledged the militia's deployment in October, suggesting that its operations were merely intended to protect Lebanese Shiites across the border. Yet increasing Hizballah casualties -- including the loss of top military commander Ali Hussein Nassif and the kidnapping of intelligence official (and Nasrallah nephew) Ali Safa -- tell a different story, as do reports from FSA sources and former Assad regime officials.
To be sure, information from such sources must be taken with a grain of salt. Yet defectors from Assad's Air Force Intelligence Directorate have reported 1,500 Hizballah troops stationed in Syria, and the FSA claims the militia has participated in battles around Homs, Hama, and Damascus. Anecdotally, Lebanese Shiites report that quiet burials of Hizballah members have been ongoing in southern Lebanon for nearly a year. More troubling, several sources -- including the New York Times, citing a "senior American official" -- indicate that Hizballah units are guarding or stationed adjacent to Syrian chemical weapons depots.
LEBANESE FOMENT AND THE LAF
Spillover from Syria is having a political, economic, and social impact on Lebanon. More than 130,000 Syrians have already registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Lebanon. No formal camps have yet been established to accommodate them, even though many are destitute and facing increasingly desperate conditions with the onset of winter. Prime Minister Mikati has requested $180 million in international assistance to cover the anticipated expenses of caring for these refugees through next year. (For more on the economic and political situation in Lebanon, see PolicyWatch 2007.)
Meanwhile, political fault lines on Syria have erupted in violence in several Lebanese flash zones where rival constituencies reside in close proximity. For months, the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli has seen sporadic fighting between Alawites and Sunnis. After seventeen Lebanese Sunni fighters were killed in Syria earlier this month, however, hostilities spiked, with skirmishes involving machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars killing more than a dozen before the LAF intervened.
The southern city of Sidon -- Hariri's hometown -- has also witnessed clashes in recent weeks, including an incident last month in which Hizballah members shot two bodyguards working for Ahmed Assir, a rival Sunni Salafi cleric. Assir has since presided over a series of large anti-Assad, anti-Hizballah demonstrations in the largely Sunni city. The violence in Lebanon's second- and third-largest cities has not yet spread to Beirut, but political tensions in the capital could degenerate into fighting as the country prepares for parliamentary elections in 2013.
The situation might have been worse if not for the LAF, which has been deploying continuously to sectarian flashpoints over the past two years. The mission has proved difficult, and several missteps have led to local criticism that the LAF is biased in favor of Hizballah and the Assad regime. Early on, for example, LAF personnel detained Syrian refugees fleeing the carnage and did not take even symbolic measures to protect them from the regime's cross-border attacks. Then, in May 2011, an anti-Assad Sunni cleric and his colleague were killed at an LAF checkpoint in Akkar. More recently, several Hizballah militiamen were detained while on a scouting mission in the Shouf; they were rumored to have been carrying identification cards issued by military intelligence.
Despite the LAF's shortcomings, however, Washington has continued to provide it with $75 million per year in Foreign Military Financing, which accounts for the lion's share of Lebanon's military procurement allocation. Although it has not always been effective, the LAF is perhaps the country's sole reliable military institution -- the Internal Security Forces are widely seen as Sunni, and the General Security Directorate as Shiite.
U.S. PRIORITIES IN LEBANON
If current trends continue, Lebanese Islamists seem better positioned than Washington's moderate friends to capitalize on Assad's ouster and the emergence of a Sunni-led government in Syria. To forestall such Salafist/Islamist gains, the Obama administration should cajole the March 14 coalition to get its house in order now so that it is better able to compete for Sunni hearts and minds as Syria unravels and Lebanon's elections approach. Saad Hariri has been outside Lebanon for nearly eighteen months, and his absence has led to a Sunni vacuum within the coalition.
Washington must also back up its strong statements about the security of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles. Among other things, this issue is important for Lebanon's security, since such weapons could be leaked to Hizballah; while perhaps unlikely, they could also fall into the hands of Sunni militants in Syria, who might then transfer them to ideological fellow travelers in Lebanon. Either scenario would heighten the risk of chaos in Lebanon and another conflagration with Israel.
**David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute.

Bahrain FM calls for "Friends of the Iranian people Conference"
By Abeed al Suhaimy
Dammam, Asharq Al-Awsat – Statements issued by an Iranian official have stoked the ire of Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry, resulting in Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa hitting back. The Bahraini Foreign Minister, communicating via Twitter, commented that “it’s about time we see a ‘Friends of the Iranian people Conference’”. This statement, which was tweeted in both Arabic and English on Tuesday, was re-tweeted a total of 800 times as of Thursday morning. Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa’s twitter account lists him as “Diplomat, Ambassador, Foreign Minister of Bahrain, Reader, World Traveller [and] Bon Vivant” and has 121,254 followers. The Bahraini Foreign Minister’s remarks come after Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, accused Bahraini security forces of utilizing “toxic gases” to disperse protesters.
The Bahraini Foreign Ministry responded by issuing an official statement asserting that “we are deeply astonished at these false allegations that aim to cover up the catastrophic situation in Iran and the disastrous and tragic economic conditions suffering by the brotherly people of Iran. We stress that the globally recognized reforms launched by King Hamad in 2001 will continue for the sake of a Bahraini society that enjoys freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.” The statement confirmed Bahrain’s “steady and firm” rejection of any interference in its domestic affairs, adding that it regards this as “an encroachment on its sovereignty.”
The Bahraini Foreign Ministry added “we call on the Iranian government and its officials to immediately stop making allegations and statements regarding Bahrain’s domestic affairs and to abide by diplomatic norms and the principles of good neighbourliness.” For his part, a senior Bahraini Foreign Ministry source, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity, stressed that Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa’s remarks came in response to “provocative and on-going Iranian interference in Bahraini affairs” adding that Tehran is seeking to “besmirch” Bahrain’s good name at every opportunity.
Whilst Bahraini Foreign Ministry Undersecretary, Hamad Al Amer, stressed that Iranian interference in Bahraini domestic affairs is nothing new, adding that Tehran officials had been making similar statements over the past two years. He added that the Iranian regime has sought to issue provocative statements interfering in Bahraini affairs at all levels, from the Supreme Guide to the President to the Foreign Minister and his aides. Amer expressed his sorrow regarding Tehran’s actions in this regard, stressing that Bahrain wants to have good relations and cooperation with all neighbouring states, including Iran.
Earlier this month, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], issued a statement denouncing Iran’s “flagrant infringement against the sovereignty and independence of GCC states” adding “this is in disharmony with the principles of good neighbourliness, as well as international and Islamic norms and laws.”

Gulf Union to be announced mid-2013 – Bahraini official
By Abeed al Suhaimy
Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat – A Bahraini official informed Asharq Al-Awsat that the Gulf Union is expected to be announced in mid-2013, although he refused to divulge the precise number of states that will initially comprise this international organization. He revealed that the Gulf Union would be announced at a consultative summit scheduled to be held in Saudi capital Riyadh next year.
Whilst Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa confirmed that Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] moving from a stage of “cooperation” to one of “union” will not be announced at the forthcoming GCC summit scheduled to take place on 24 and 24 December in Manama. He added that this will take place at a special summit held in Riyadh, according to the decision of the GCC Supreme Council at its most recent consultative summit. For his part, Deputy Bahraini Parliamentary Speaker, MP Adel al-Mouwda, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Bahraini Foreign Minister had informed Bahrain’s parliament that the Manama summit would not see any announcement regarding the Gulf Union. However he revealed that this may be announced at the consultative summit to be hosted by Riyadh in mid-2013, although the Bahraini Foreign Minister did not give any additional details regarding the timing or content of this announcement  Al-Mouwda revealed that he had previously asked the Bahraini Foreign Minister, during a parliamentary session, what diplomatic achievements have been made towards responding to the call issued by Saudi Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, for a Gulf Union.  As for the Bahraini Foreign Minister’s response, al-Mouwda said this was issued in writing according to the traditions of the Bahraini parliament, whilst a parliamentary session was then held to discuss this. The Deputy Parliamentary Speaker stressed that the Bahraini parliament is seeking to express the pulse of the Bahraini street, sending a message to the GCC leadership to speed up the proposed union, albeit in a step-by-step manner during the first stage. As for the features of this first stage towards a Gulf Union, al-Mouwda described this as being akin to a “confederation”, with each state retaining its national sovereignty. During a Bahraini parliamentary session, Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa confirmed that the GCC states moving from a state of “cooperation” to one of “union” is an important strategic step, adding that Bahrain and its ruler, King Hamad Bin Isa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, had welcomed this as soon as it was proposed by Saudi monarch King Abdullah. He stressed that Bahrain will implement everything that has been agreed upon in this respect, regarding it as a popular demand of the Bahraini people. He added “the Kingdom of Bahrain has already appointed its representative to the body of the Union which has been created in order to put the Saudi overture in place.”

The departure of the non-revolutionary intellectual
By Adel Al Toraifi/Asharq Al-Awsat
During the Pahlavi era when the streets of Tehran were punctuated by daily demonstrations and shops closed down due to strikes, the Shah became increasingly confused about what was happening. None of his advisors could alleviate his anxiety and bewilderment, and the reports of his security services failed to reduce the confusion he was being plagued by. Then the Shahbanu (emperor), Farah Pahlavi, suggested that her husband consult a professor in social sciences whom she had known for some time; a man named Ehsan Naraghi. The Shah asked his personal secretary to provide him with a report about this university professor, and after studying the SAVAK intelligence report he found that Naraghi had been arrested several times for criticizing the regime. In fact he had long launched accusations against it, once as a communist and another time as a sympathizer with the Islamists, and even though Naraghi was a prestigious professor of sociology who worked in academic and international organizations such as UNESCO, the Shah was not reassured. Despite all this, the confused Shah, perhaps out of frustration, eventually met with this academic who had been critical of but necessarily opposed his policies, in order to listen to his advice. They met a total of eight times and many years later, out of respect for his relationship with the Shahbanu, Naraghi published the details under the title: From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution (1994).
Two weeks ago, Professor Ehsan Naraghi passed away in Tehran amidst a government and cultural silence. A request to bury him in the section of Behesht-e Zahra cemetery devoted to senior figures was rejected, after the chairman of Tehran city council refused to issue a permit. It is true that Naraghi withdrew from the cultural scene over the past two decades, but his presence can still be felt not only through his significant works but also as an example intellectual integrity.
Anyone watching the Arab uprisings that have swept the region since 2011 would realize that the events caught the political regimes off guard, and shook a number of politically stable countries to varying degrees. There is no doubt that some have realized too late that the frenzy on the street in more than one Arab country has begun to recede slightly, and the hasty hopes that took off on what has been called the “Arab Spring” have faded quickly under the light of reality, after the dust settled. In Tunisia stones have been thrown at the elected president in memory of Mohammed Bouazizi, whose death triggered—as we are meant to believe—a series of popular uprisings. Tunisia is suffering economically in light of weak governance and the escalation of political differences between the opponents of yesterday. As for Egypt there is a case of sharp political division and violent clashes in the streets. Some estimates suggest that the amount of those wounded during the first six months of the first ever elected president exceed those who fell during the weeks leading up to the departure of the Mubarak regime.
I am not writing here to criticize the “revolutions”, this is another matter. However, it is unfortunate that with regards to these events mentioned here and others, a number of intellectuals in the Arab world and the West bear responsibility whether directly or indirectly. There are the intellectuals who blessed and enthused what had happened, and then returned to criticize it later without acknowledging the initial mistake in their interpretation. Perhaps this is something natural in the human psyche, but there are also intellectuals who sought—and even contributed practically—to nourish the revolutionary climate. They volunteered their support for the leaders and parties who today they claim are working against the constitution and national unity. Those who later discovered the gravity of what they did are excused, but the intellectuals who are still betting on the political conflict being resolved through the force of the street are still participating in the incitement of violence and chaos.
Returning to Naraghi, intellectuals in the Middle East desperately need to become acquainted with the idea of an intellectual who is not a revolutionary but at the same time does not lose hope of reform even as he sees the regime falling apart. Unfortunately, some Arab intellectuals before the uprisings were looking to enact reform and commercial openness, and stressed the need to work from the inside to correct the imbalance in religious, social and political infrastructure, but after the “Arab Spring” they simply transformed into preachers of the revolution. Naraghi believed that the concept of cultural compliance that had infiltrated the region was highly damaging because it was the foundation of political and ideological partisanship, at the expense of the scientific method based on neutrality and complete independence from the influence of power and authority, whatever the source. Thus he directed significant criticisms towards revolutionary intellectual personalities such as Ali Shariati. Naraghi revealed that the burning thirst of this revolutionary, ideological generation of personalities such as Shariati had led to the magnification and fabrication of ridiculous tales. For example, Shariati did not meet with Jean-Paul Sartre or Louis Massignon, and he did not teach some of the sociologists he claimed to have.
Naraghi was a realist intellectual; he believed in the objective requirements for change, the nature of the relationship that governs political forces and the partisan trends that drive them. He was clever to differentiate between slogans intended to mislead—or exploit—in a political manner and those that actually expressed the genuine demands of a group of people. In his books and few speeches Naraghi criticized ideological intolerance. He believed that revolutions eliminated the possibility of dialogue between social components, and he advocated the need to connect with the ruling authority in order to achieve reform and bridge the gap between popular demands and governance. Naraghi embodied this approach in the days when he would provide advice to the Shah in the darkest of circumstances, and then after the 1979 revolution when he refused to insult the Shah or spread rumors about him despite pressure from the revolutionaries. For that he was jailed for three years before being released, with unfair rulings issued against him to punish him as a “remnant” of the former regime. Despite this, Naraghi did not transform into an enemy of the ruling regime in the new Islamic Republic, instead he continued to offer criticism and encouragement to reform, pointing out that the solution lied in convincing the mullahs that their model of governance was not valid, and that they ought to accept gradual reforms until Iran emerged from its revolutionary crisis.
Unfortunately, in the Arab region the word “reform” has become somewhat suspicious after being tarnished by regimes such as Gaddafi’s in Libya, or al-Assad’s in Syria. Who says that corruption and exploitation to address “reform” justifies the revolutionary model of governance in Egypt or Tunisia, and who says that an intellectual must abandon the scientific method to become a revolutionary?
In his book Naraghi recounts what the Shah told him during one of their conversations: “So people think that if Khomeini comes to power, they will be any better off? What economic program is Khomeini going to carry out to improve their lives? I’m certain they will lose even what little they have…I really fail to understand these people. It is as if they have completely taken leave of their senses”.
In truth, it is possible for the enraged street to lose its mind for some time, and it may be a while before the peaceful citizen returns to a minimum degree of logical thought. Yet it is regrettable that some intellectuals lose their minds under the spell of the revolution without even realizing it.

Egypt: Purification and circumcision!
By Hussein Shabokshi/Asharq Alawsat
I am filled with great wonder and amazement, as well as sadness and irony, just like many others, when I observe the violent demonstrations, protests and threats launched by Hazem Abu Ismail and his supporters in various parts of Egypt. They have carried out assaults and threatened media representatives, slandering and defaming them, labelling them as infidels and besieging their premises. They have also acted likewise against several political parties, setting fire to their headquarters. We have seen the emergence of wondrous slogans such as “purify the media” and “purify the judiciary”, chanted repeatedly by Abu Ismail and his adherents. Yet Hazem himself had to withdraw from the Egyptian presidential race because his mother’s US citizenship violated the conditions of his nomination (an issue Abu Ismail continues to deny, despite all the evidence and official documents provided).
What is happening in Egypt at the hands of Hazem Abu Ismail's supporters, under their different guises, has nothing to do with the concept of peaceful demonstration as recognized by civilized countries. This is because their acts involve threats, slander and impede the work of a large number of people. This all is happening amidst the astonishment of the public and the dubious silence of the state, which considers this man and his group as "allies".
Purification is an admirable concept with which people can perform good deeds. It stems from the word ‘pure”; a state desired by all religions and customs. Yet this noble "slogan" is currently being applied by force in Egypt, and by people who lack any official capacity. The current call for "purification" in Egypt has an aggressive and violent undertone and is completely distant from the climate of dialogue, consensus and moderation. It does not promote the common ground on which the post-revolution state can be built, with modern institutions to stabilize the country.
Such behaviour, with all its recklessness, violence and authoritarian tendencies, is a practical translation of a certain trend that interprets the Islamic religion in a strange way, detached from the consensus of the majority of Muslims. This trend even casts doubts over the legitimacy of al-Azhar, the most prominent Islamic frame of reference in the modern world. It relies on the opinions of certain characters who adopt controversial views and yet are considered virtuous amongst themselves. This kind of radicalism ultimately gives birth to abhorrent extremism and a climate of mistrust.
Egypt is a large and complex country. Its people will continue to listen to Abdul Basit Abdul Samad reciting the Holy Koran and at other times listen to the songs of Umm Kulthum. They will continue to attend Al Ahly and Zamalek football matches. They will watch Adel Imam's latest movie, crack jokes and laugh at it. They will receive visitors without a sense of suspicion or worry.
Therefore, it is only natural that Abu Ismail’s calls for “purification” to be met by a state of growing counter-mobility within Egyptian society. Hence we have seen demands for the purification of mosques, to eradicate the preachers and sheikhs who adopt strange discourse that serves to divide the people rather than unify them.
Radicalism, extremism and intolerance have all invaded Egyptian society, even in the political domain. After the revolution erupted, several radical forces decided to jump on the bandwagon and participate in overthrowing the regime, even though their doctrines once rejected such political involvement. Now these hard-line trends can be seen defending the current president, criminalizing and thwarting any moves against him. Egypt is now at a contradictory impasse, and no leader has yet to provided a convincing answer.
Purification is a misleading slogan. Some people exploit it to falsely convey their righteousness. Here it is sufficient to quote what I heard from an Egyptian taxi driver whilst watching Abu Ismail’s demonstrators demanding the purification of the media. The driver said: "What a shame, purification [synonymous in this instance with circumcision] is something that babies undergo as soon as they are born. So what is the point of all of these protests?"

Syria: Al-Shara's or the "last chance" initiative?
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al- Awsat
Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Shara has only appeared in public once since August, and that was under mysterious circumstances, whereas nobody has seen him since. Following his suspicious disappearance, a “concessionary” initiative has been attributed to him that reflects the regime’s acknowledgement that its collapse is imminent. Al-Shara is calling upon the Syrian opposition to participate in a broad-powered government; this initiative hints that Bashar al-Assad would remain in his palace as a president without any powers.
At the same time as this, another initiative is being cooked up somewhere else, namely the so-called “last chance” initiative. It is likely that UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi intends to share this initiative with al-Assad and his allies sometime over the next few days. This initiative suggests that al-Assad step down and leave Syrian with his family for one of the Latin American countries, conceding his powers to the opposition, in a scenario similar to that proposed by British Prime Minister David Cameron last week. Cameron proposed “safe passage” for al-Assad in return for an end to the bloodshed. Those responsible for this “last chance” initiative are warning that al-Assad rejecting this will only result in an escalation in attacks on his regime. This is something that will ultimately lead to a quick and total collapse of the al-Assad regime, whilst at this point he will not find anybody willing to grant him immunity from prosecution.
However why are those responsible for this “last chance” initiative granting al-Assad, one of the world’s greatest and most blood-thirsty criminals, a chance of escape? The reason for this is that they believe that a negotiated departure, endorsed by different regional and international powers, will lead to a smooth transition of power to the opposition and will spare Syria from a devastating civil war.
However there are huge differences between these two initiatives. One keeps al-Assad in the presidential palace, albeit without powers, whilst another exiles him from the country. It is most likely that the Syrian people – who have lived through a real tragedy – will completely reject both. Indeed they would reject al-Assad’s “safe” departure in this manner even if it means more bloodshed. Therefore, we are witnessing what might be described as the last miles of the race. If he wanted to flee the country al-Assad doesn't need any initiatives, he could flee by night via Syria’s western coast. At this point, the war would continue and he would find himself internationally pursued. Alternatively, he could flee to Russia or Venezuela, hoping that his Russian hosts would not be prepared to assassinate him just to rid themselves of him.
The next few weeks will be very complicated for al-Assad, and the fate of the Syrian leader is the easiest part of this puzzle: he is finished, and will be nothing more than a bloody chapter in Syria’s history. What is more important is the preservation of Syrian unity, not to mention control of Syria’s cities and state institutes. In other words abandoning the al-Assad regime and replacing it with the recently formed entities and institutions within the framework of a new Syria.
It is wrong to keep on trying to negotiate with al-Assad over his personal safety in exchange for him stepping down from power, particularly as this would be too little too late. There will be no peace for the Syrian people, following all the crimes that were committed under his direct command, if al-Assad is free; he must stand trial. Al-Assad standing trial for his crimes may bring peace to the country. Whilst in the absence of this, it will be others who will pay the price for what he did, perhaps including innocents.

What ignoring Jalal Talabani implies
December 20, 2012/By Michael Young/The Daily Star
In the past two days, it has been strange, though not unexpected, to see the Obama administration reacting with little public interest toward the hospitalization of Jalal Talabani. On Tuesday, the Iraqi president reportedly died in a Baghdad hospital, although his heart started beating again, leaving him in a state of clinical death.
Talabani’s rise to the presidency of Iraq was a foundational moment in the post-2003 period in Iraq, and a triumph for the United States. But it’s a success that President Barack Obama is not particularly eager to highlight, he who built his election victory in 2008 on disillusionment with President George W. Bush’s Iraq war. Recall how Obama admitted in his much-admired Cairo speech in 2009 that Iraqis were “ultimately better off without the tyranny of Saddam Hussein,” before qualifying this by saying the war had also shown why diplomacy and international consensus were preferable.
Talabani, along with Massoud Barzani, the other principal Kurdish leader, knew this was nonsense. Had the United States awaited an international consensus over Iraq, Saddam Hussein would still be in power and Talabani still maneuvering to stay alive. Nor would he have been elevated to the presidency, an act affirming the transcendent irony of history. No one could fail to remark, when Talabani took that office, that if one thing was good about the Iraq war, it was that the victims were now in charge.
However, this seems lost on Obama, who views Iraq as an issue best walked away from. For a president engaged in a regional struggle for influence with Iran, or compelled to engage in that struggle, indifference to Iraq is incomprehensible. Iraq is the main battleground, a truism grasped far better by the Gulf states than by the country that removed Saddam Hussein in the first place. Rather, Obama’s primary war is with Bush’s legacy, and it is a rare contest to which this most standoffish of leaders seems deeply committed.
But it doesn’t stop at Bush. Today, the Iraqi armed forces and Kurdish Peshmerga face off against one another, principally because of their disagreement over disputed territories south of the autonomous Kurdish region, in areas around Kirkuk and Mosul. Among the reasons for this tension is oil, and the fact that the American multinational ExxonMobil is preparing to drill in the territory starting next summer, after reaching agreement with the Kurds.
The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opposes this, and has indicated that it would go to war to prevent it. Barzani, in turn, had underlined that, if attacked, the Kurds will defend themselves. Talabani mediated in the dispute. However, he is out of the game now, and only Washington (or perhaps Iran) has the means to negotiate a durable solution. But Obama is not keen to immerse himself in Iraqi affairs, even though ExxonMobil is an American company which would doubtless listen to the White House.
Obama may yet immerse himself in this knotty situation, if only to make up for having done so little initially to prevent ExxonMobil from coming to an understanding with the Kurdish authorities. American officials have also told the New York Times that the administration had not discouraged the company from drilling in 2013, even though U.S. diplomats have tried to reconcile the rival parties, proposing an arrangement that was turned down by Maliki and Barzani.
Talabani did gain American support for a deal whereby Maliki and Barzani would soften their rhetoric and agree to form a committee to propose security solutions for the disputed areas. However, this is at best a stopgap measure, one that leaves the hostility between Kurds and Arabs in northern Iraq largely untreated. For a more lasting settlement, Obama would have to get his hands dirty and put his personal prestige on the line. This the president has done only domestically, and even then with extraordinary caution.
That Obama’s minimalism over Iraq has brought on a succession of lost opportunities is well known. But is the president really prepared to let the situation fester in the country so that he may soon have to defuse an armed conflict between allies, albeit one far more ambiguous about America than the other? Perhaps the trashing of Bush’s Iraq policy is, deep down, what Obama desires. What better way to prove that the former president was utterly misguided?
For Talabani, these concerns may already be a thing of the past. It’s not likely that the 79-year-old president will make it back from the stroke he suffered, at least without dire ramifications if he does survive. For a Kurd who for a long time managed without the assistance of outsiders, indeed usually suffered from their unwanted interference, American aloofness is par for the course.
Yet Obama is missing an important message. Talabani’s rise to the Iraqi presidency was one of those things, everyone can agree, admirable about the American campaign in Iraq. It was a reversal of fortune of the kind we seem to be routinely praising today, with Arab despots being replaced by those whom they had persecuted.
The late Christopher Hitchens was thinking, among others, of Talabani when he made a presentation in February 2009 at the American University of Beirut, asking “Who are the real revolutionaries in the Middle East?” At this stage in his life, maybe the last stage, Talabani deserves better from Barack Obama. The U.S. president should praise the avatars of revolution in a region from which he has largely kept his distance.
*Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.