LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
ِFebeuary 05/2010

Bible Of The Day
The Good News According to Luke 13/22-30: "He went on his way through cities and villages, teaching, and traveling on to Jerusalem. 13:23 One said to him, “Lord, are they few who are saved?” He said to them, 13:24 “Strive to enter in by the narrow door, for many, I tell you, will seek to enter in, and will not be able. 13:25 When once the master of the house has risen up, and has shut the door, and you begin to stand outside, and to knock at the door, saying, ‘Lord, Lord, open to us!’ then he will answer and tell you, ‘I don’t know you or where you come from.’ 13:26 Then you will begin to say, ‘We ate and drank in your presence, and you taught in our streets.’ 13:27 He will say, ‘I tell you, I don’t know where you come from. Depart from me, all you workers of iniquity.’ 13:28 There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when you see Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and all the prophets, in the Kingdom of God, and yourselves being thrown outside. 13:29 They will come from the east, west, north, and south, and will sit down in the Kingdom of God. 13:30 Behold, there are some who are last who will be first, and there are some who are first who will be last.”

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
Hizballah team breaks 22 members out of Egyptian jail/DEBKAfile/February 04/11
Could Lebanon end up on U.S. terror list?/By Michael B. Kraft, CNN/February 04/11
Buying Syria’s act/By: Tony Badran/February 04/11
Can Lebanon kill its own tribunal?/By: Michael Young/February 04/11
Why Arabs have airbrushed Lebanon out/By Michael Young/February 04/11
Egypt: The American Debate Has Gone Stark, Raving Crazy/By: Barry Rubin/February 04/11
Statement by Minister Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cannon on Egypt to House of Commons/January 04/2011
The chameleon Lebanese opportunist politician, Walid Jumblat & his acrobatic stances/February 04/11
Egypt won't be quick to give Muslim Brotherhood a chance/By Zvi Bar'el /Haaretz/February 04/11

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for February 04/11
Iran Supreme Leader: Egypt unrest inspired by our Islamic Revolution/By Reuters and Haaretz
Could Syria see an uprising like Egypt's? Not likely/Christian Science Monitor
Spirit of Egypt protest spreads to Yemen, Algeria and Syria/The Guardian
Regional upheaval 'could spread to Syria'/AFP
Security up near Syrian parliament ahead of protests/J.Post
How to enact reform in Egypt/Washington Post
Lebanon's Economic Path Likely to Remain Unchanged in New Government/Voice of America
MP Sakr: Mikati should step down, Hariri should be the PM/Ya Libnan
Egypt VP denies pro-govt supporters killed protesters/Now Lebanon
Miqati Sends Sfeir Message, Patriarch Stresses Importance of PM-President Harmony/Naharnet
Lebanese-German Sues Macedonia over Alleged CIA Kidnapping/Naharnet
Gemayel: We are Still in the Stage of Discussing General Principles/Naharnet
Police, Protesters Clash at Egyptian Embassy in Beirut/Naharnet
Cassese Asks Ban to Appoint Substitute to Ailing Trial Chamber Judge/Naharnet
Security Official: Egypt's Hizbullah Cell Escaped in Prison Break/Naharnet
Aoun after Meeting Miqati: We're Still Studying Cabinet Formation to Determine Distribution of Portfolios/Naharnet
Israel Constructs Fence around Ghajar, Talk of its Withdrawal Come to an End/Naharnet
Harb: Miqati Seeks Participation of All Powers in Cabinet, He Will Face Challenges from those Who Nominated him/Naharnet
Franjieh Insists on 2 Portfolios, Says Country Needs Scoundrels not Technocrats/Naharnet
Aoun and Frangieh hinder Mikati's efforts to form a new cabinet of consensus/iloubnan.info

Iran Supreme Leader: Egypt unrest inspired by our Islamic Revolution
Speaking before worshipers during weekly prayers in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says success of Mideast revolutions could signal an ' irreparable defeat' for the U.S.
By Reuters and Haaretz Service
 04.02.11/Uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia will spell an "irreparable defeat" for the United States, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Friday, adding that the recent wave of unrest sweeping through the Mideast was a result of Iran's Islamic Revolution. Throngs of Egyptians took to the streets in recent days in the largest anti-government protest movement to sweep the country in the last quarter-century. Demonstrators are calling for the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, who has served as president of Egypt for over 29 years.
Speaking with worshippers during Friday prayers in Tehran, Khamenei said that "if they [protesters] are able to push this through then what will happen to the U.S. policies in the region will be an irreparable defeat for America." "Today’s events in North of Africa, Egypt, Tunisia and certain other countries have another sense for the Iranian nation. They have special meaning. This is the same as 'Islamic awakening,' which is the result of the victory of the big revolution of the Iranian nation,” the Supreme Leader was quoted by the official IRNA news agency as saying. The comment by Iran's Supreme Leader wasn't the first time Iran had equated the current run of Egypt protests with the battle against U.S. influence in the region, with Tehran's Foreign Ministry saying on Thursday that Egypt protests would lead to the emergence of "a real independent Islamic Middle East."
"Iran supports the rightful demands of the Egyptian people and emphasizes they should be met," the official Irna news agency quoted a statement as saying.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry statement called upon people and governments around the world to strongly condemn what it said were Israeli and American "interferences aimed at diverting Egyptians' justice-seeking movement, by creating counter-revolt and using rioters." "Iran also warns that any opposition to the movement of the Egyptian people ... will bring about the anger and hatred of all Muslims around the world," the statement said. Israel expressed fears earlier this week that protests in Egypt could put a radical Islamist regime like Iran's in power, jeopardizing Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. "Our real fear is of a situation that could develop ... and which has already developed in several countries including Iran itself -- repressive regimes of radical Islam," said Netanyahu. Netanyahu continued, adding that although the protests may not be motivated by religious extremism, "in a situation of chaos, an organized Islamist body can seize control of a country. It happened in Iran. It happened in other instances." Iran is the only country in the region without full diplomatic ties with Egypt and analysts say Tehran hopes the fall of the Egyptian government could boost its influence.

Hizballah team breaks 22 members out of Egyptian jail
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report February 4, 2011, A joint Hizballah-Hamas unit used the havoc in Egypt to storm the Wadi Natrun prison north of Cairo Sunday, Jan. 30, and break out 22 members of the Hizballah's spy-cum-terror network, tried and convicted in Egypt for plotting terrorist attacks in Cairo, the Suez Canal and Suez cities and on Israeli vacationers in Sinai in 2007-2008. This is reported by debkafile's counter-terror sources.
The second object of the break-in was to release Muslim Brotherhood inmates to boost the anti-Mubarak street protests now in their second week across Egypt.
In April 2009, Hizballah's leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted he had sent Sami Shehab to Egypt to establish the network. It soon became one of the most dangerous terrorist cells ever to be exposed in the region in recent years. Among its members were also combatants of the radical Palestinian Hamas.
Thursday, Feb. 3, Mahmoud Qmati, Hizballah member of the Lebanese parliament, was glad to announce that all 22 members of the network, including its leader Sami Shehab, had been freed from jail and returned home safely. He provided no information on how this happened.
The unit assigned by Nasrallah for the jail-break consisted of 25 trained Hizballah and Hamas gunmen. When the riots erupted in Egypt, they started making their way from Gaza to Egypt via smuggling tunnels. On the way, they picked up weapons and explosives in El Arish, northern Sinai, under cover of an onslaught armed Palestinians and Bedouin had launched against Egyptian security forces - partly for this purpose.
The break-out team was met at the Suez Canal by Muslim Brotherhood activists who ferried them across to Ismailia on the western bank by Egyptian smuggling boats. From there, they were driven to the Wadi Natrun prison, one of the largest in Egypt, to be briefed outside by former MB inmates on the guard and security arrangements in the jail and the locations of the cells holding the Hizballah, Hamas and Brotherhood convicts.
After days of surveillance, the team struck.
Explosives and missile-launched grenades flattened the outer gates killing at least 30 Egyptian prison guards who tried to fight them off. Small explosive devices were used to smash internal gates and clear the way to the cells. To expedite the escape of a large number of prisoners, they also blew big holes in the prison's outer walls.
Outside, they were collected by a large convoy of trucks and buses brought in by the Muslim Brotherhood which distributed its freed members around the disturbance hubs in Cairo.
A smaller convoy of minivans carrying the 22 Hizballah and Hamas convicts and their liberators made its way by various routes past Egyptian security forces, who were fully engaged with the protest riots, to Sinai and onto the Gaza Strip. As soon as the escape was discovered, Egyptian forces in Sinai and Israeli forces on the Egyptian border deployed in an effort to stop them entering Gaza, but were too late. This audacious Hizballah-Hamas attack on the Egyptian prison was the first major quasi-military operation they had ever carried out deep inside Egypt.

Can Lebanon kill its own tribunal?
By: Michael Young, February 4, 2011
Reading between the lines of NOW Lebanon’s interview week with François Roux, the head of the defense office at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, one immediately senses a tension that has yet to be resolved between the legal and political dimensions of the upcoming trial of those suspected of involvement in the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri.
This has been both the strength and the Achilles Heel of the tribunal process. On the one side you have the judges and lawyers in Leidschendam, for whom the assassinations in Lebanon in 2005 provide grist for a stimulating judicial case, away from political intrigue; on the other you have a majority of Lebanese, who have focused on the political repercussions of the Special Tribunal. Until now the conventional wisdom is that politics will not impact on the pursuit of justice and that the tribunal “cannot be stopped.”
But how true is that? Yes, the tribunal probably cannot be stopped, but it can be shot through with enough arrows so that its foundations and credibility may be damaged, and its activities slowed down.
It’s not clear what the prime minister-elect, Najib Mikati, will do about the tribunal once he forms a government. Many insist that he was appointed on condition that he revoke the agreement with the tribunal, cease funding for the institution, and recall the Lebanese judges. However, Mikati has implicitly denied this, telling the French-daily Le Figaro this week, “My position is clear, unless the Lebanese decide to reconsider [relations with the tribunal], unanimously and with Arab support, the government remains committed to respecting the protocol with the United Nations on the tribunal.”
Until we can determine whether that’s true, we must give Mikati the benefit of the doubt. But for the sake of argument, what would happen if a new cabinet did break with the tribunal? This was a question posed to Roux, and he was understandably evasive. “A new government is bound by agreements that were signed by a previous government,” he answered, adding: “The tribunal will continue to do its work. It does not change anything. A government might fall, but the state continues.”
The consensus view is that even if Lebanon fails to pay its 49 percent share of the institution’s budget, alternative sources of funding will be found. Several states have already offered to cover the shortfall. As for Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal, the tribunal’s official position is that this is mandatory because the agreement Lebanon signed with the body came under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Article 15 of the agreement itself also makes cooperation compulsory.
There is less sanguineness, however, when it comes to the judges, who were named not by Beirut but by the Security Council. An effort by a new cabinet to remove the judges is bound to agitate at least some of the Lebanese named to the tribunal’s offices. If they succumb to the pressures from home, it may not be easy for the tribunal to find replacements. Perhaps some judges may be sought out in the diaspora, in itself hardly ideal; or some effort would have to be made to find judges in Lebanon willing to replace their shaken peers. However, such an endeavor could delay proceedings. And if this leads nowhere, according to some observers more radical measures might have to be considered, such as placing the tribunal under full UN authority.
A Lebanese divorce from the Special Tribunal would play against the initial intent underlying the tribunal’s establishment: to bolster the rule of law in Lebanon, and more specifically to ensure that there would no longer be impunity for political assassination in the country. That was why the tribunal was conceived as a mixed body, and it is why the prosecutor and UN investigators in Beirut until today are dependent on the Lebanese judiciary and security services to implement their requests. If the tribunal were to lose its Lebanese identity, this could seriously undermine the rationale of the enterprise as a whole.
This disconnect between Lebanon and the tribunal would be taken to its extreme if none of the individuals indicted is in the dock, so that the trial is conducted mostly or entirely in absentia. Asked about his effectiveness in such a trial, Roux responded: “Our role in the case of absentia trials is all the more important. Because this is a novelty in international law. This is the first time that we can have such a trial. Our role would be to support defense teams in that scenario by putting all our skills at their disposal, so that a trial like that can be a success.”
But what would constitute “success” if no one is in court, if Lebanon proclaims that it will have nothing to do with the tribunal, and if the idealistic ambitions that accompanied the setting up of the institution have all evaporated? If success means the process moves forward to some intellectually stimulating climax, because the case embodies legal novelties, but with none of the guilty ever punished, then this seems a fairly low standard. The Lebanese surely deserve better.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut and author of the recent The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle (Simon & Schuster).

Buying Syria’s act
Tony Badran, February 3, 2011
A conventional wisdom has been taking shape over the designation of Najib Mikati as Lebanon’s prime minister. In that reading, Mikati’s ascent is viewed as a result of a Syrian maneuver aimed at reestablishing Damascus as the primary arbiter in Lebanon. However, despite the obvious Syrian interest in marketing such a narrative, a more persuasive case could be made that Mikati’s designation not only showcases the limits of Syrian influence, but also suggests that the putsch by Hezbollah and its patrons may have fallen short of its original, farther-reaching objectives.
The analysis of how the choice settled on Mikati revolves around two variant, if somewhat conflicting, readings. The first holds that the Syrians, realizing that Hezbollah’s push to back Omar Karami for the post was far too controversial, intervened with their allies at the last minute and suggested the more palatable figure of Mikati instead. As such, whereas Karami was Hezbollah’s more radical option, Mikati represented Syrian pragmatism, if not moderation.
The second reading painted Syria in a much more deliberate light, cunningly pulling the strings of a more complex scheme. Here Karami’s candidacy was merely part of a classic Syrian bait-and-switch tactic: floating a distasteful decoy only to turn around and offer what would appear as an acceptable compromise, which in reality was the primary choice all along.
It was expected to see the Syrians making claims about the future Mikati government that presented them not just as a moderating influence, but also as the principal architects of all political designs in Beirut. However, while it's certain that Damascus is going to try and market such conceits ad nauseam, its story is rather unconvincing.
In reality, there is every reason to believe that Karami was indeed the primary choice. The objective behind his nomination was a full-blown overhaul of the Lebanese political scene, including cutting Lebanon’s ties with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the targeting of key security and judicial figures associated with it. As consultations proceeded, however, it became apparent that Karami would not have enough votes in parliament to clinch the nomination, and Saad Hariri would have likely maintained the majority.
Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt offered hints that support this reading. In an interview with the Qatari Al-Watan on Monday, Jumblatt made clear that when he declared he would vote for the choice of “Syria and the Resistance,” the only name under consideration was Karami’s. Mikati’s name was not in play.
Moreover, Syria was apparently not able to garner regional and international support for the Karami bid, even among its friends in Qatar, Turkey and France. While the pro-Syrian As-Safir daily spun Mikati’s nomination as being the result of a joint Syrian-Qatari-French deal, other media leaks from Lebanese and French sources suggested otherwise.
For instance, the Central News Agency reported that Mikati's candidacy came as a result of Qatari and French pressure on Syria, as they feared Karami's appointment would lead to serious problems on the ground.
Similarly, a French diplomatic source expressed to Akhbar Al-Yawm his conviction that there was a divergence in the Qatari and Syrian positions over Lebanon – probably a reference to the disagreement over Karami and the way the Hariri government was toppled. To be sure, Syria went along with Mikati’s candidacy. However, it is increasingly clear that this was a fallback position, with really no other credible options.
This is where the emerging conventional wisdom that Mikati was the Syrians’ original choice is at its weakest. The Syrian intention was to get Hariri to acquiesce to their demands and preside over the rejection of the STL, as only he could, being the leader of the Sunni community and Rafik Hariri’s son. Once that failed, the only way to terminate Lebanon’s relations with the STL was to go with someone like Karami, who had no regional or international connections beyond Syria, was in the twilight of his career, and had nothing to lose. Mikati, on the other hand, has plenty to lose. An ambitious politician and a wealthy businessman, he is extremely vulnerable politically and financially.
In addition, the Sunni community is now highly mobilized against any move to trash the STL, making Mikati’s position that much more tenuous, especially when Saudi Arabia has refrained from extending him explicit official support.
This in part explains Mikati’s very careful public positions on the key issue of the STL, for instance. However, there could be more at play. Mikati may very well sense that with the failure of the Karami option, he has some sort of leverage: If pushed too far by Hezbollah and Syria (not to mention if threatened financially by the US), he could always resign, adding yet another layer of complexity to an already very thorny situation. In fact, one report suggested that Mikati’s brother told the French that this was a possible option, depending on how things go.
Mikati’s intentions will become clear soon enough, as Hezbollah and Syria will doubtless press him to toe the line and force his hand. Nevertheless, one must ask: Was this very uncertain situation Syria’s original plan? Did the Assad regime and Hezbollah go ahead with the politically costly decision of toppling the Hariri government all for such an ambiguous return? Or does the Mikati episode provide an example of the limits of Syria’s – as well as Hezbollah’s – political influence?
Syria can try all it wants to sell that it is the primary, if not exclusive arbiter of Lebanese affairs. That’s Syria’s stock in trade. But leaving aside the fact that it has had to contend with an increasing array of players like the French, Qataris and Turks (not to mention the Iranians), judging from the reactions of Saudi publicists, not even the Saudis seem interested in buying Syria’s act anymore.
**Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Could Lebanon end up on U.S. terror list?
By Michael B. Kraft, Special to CNN
February 3, 2011
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
(CNN) -- Although overshadowed by the demonstrations in Egypt, a problem continues to simmer for U.S. policymakers in Lebanon.
A 32-year-old law enacted in reaction to threats against Egypt and Lebanon by their Arab neighbors could result in the State Department's designation of Lebanon and perhaps an independent Palestine as state sponsors of terrorism. Such a designation could cut off U.S. foreign assistance and impose other sanctions.
The issue with Lebanon is that its president has appointed Najib Mikati as the new prime minister, and Mikati is backed by Hezbollah, which the U.S. regards as a terrorist group. Hezbollah's future actions could determine whether Lebanon faces those sanctions.
The long history of strife in the Middle East still reverberates in U.S. counterterrorism legislation, which dates to a time when rogue states were the main actors in international terrorism, long before the emergence of al Qaeda and related Islamic militant fundamentalist groups. The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 established the so-called terrorism list of state sponsors of terrorism.
The 1979 congressional initiative was intended to force the administration to scrutinize more closely export licenses for equipment or services that might enhance the military capabilities of those nations designated as supporters of international terrorism.
Over the years, Congress enacted "piggy back" amendments that required the cutoff of military and economic assistance to the designated countries and imposed other sanctions, such as prohibiting financial transactions and denying U.S. tax credits for income that U.S. individuals and companies earned in terrorism list countries.
Two events in the late 1970s triggered the EAA counterterrorism provision, and both involved threats to Arab states.
The Commerce Department had approved export licenses for a U.S. company to sell 400 heavy duty trucks to Libya, ostensibly for carrying oil rigs. But these were the same kind of trucks the U.S. and Canadian armies used to transport tanks, and Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi was threatening border incursions against Egypt.
I was a young foreign policy staffer then to the late Rep. Millicent Fenwick, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee. A State Department official unofficially approached me to discuss ways to block the sale.
At the same time, the Syrians were shelling the Christian suburbs of Beirut in their intervention in the Lebanese civil war. Despite that, the Commerce Department and a midlevel State Department Near East Bureau official had approved the export of six "civilian versions" of the C-130 military cargo plane for Syria.
Rep. Edward Derwinski, who had American-Lebanese constituents, was upset with the proposed sale. Both Derwinski and Fenwick thought the two sales -- trucks to Libya and cargo planes to Syria -- had major foreign policy implications and Congress should have been informed in advance.
The end result was the Fenwick amendment, which required the executive branch to notify Congress 30 days before such licenses were issued. The law required such licenses to be approved at the highest levels of the State Department, and perhaps the White House, instead of midlevel officials or licensing clerks making the decision. Syria and Libya were original members of the terrorism list.
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 included language that the State Department worked out with Congress.
The Senate and House report language laid out virtually identical illustrative criteria for designations, saying it "...should include, but not be limited to, whether the country provides to terrorists: sanctuary from extradition or prosecution; arms, explosives and other lethal substances; logistical support; safe houses or headquarters; planning, training or other assistance for terrorist activities; direct or indirect financial backing; and diplomatic facilities such as support or documentation intended to aid or abet terrorist activities."
Until now, Lebanon has received a pass from Republican and Democratic administrations, partly based on the view that the weak Lebanese government did not really control its territory, especially the Bakaa Valley, where many secular terrorist groups had bases, and the southern regions dominated by Hezbollah.
But Najib Mikati's appointment could change that, especially if Hezbollah continues building up its huge stock of advanced missiles and again launches large numbers at Israeli civilians or conducts other forms of terrorism. Hamas, which controls Gaza, and Hezbollah are on the U.S. government's list of foreign terrorist organizations. They and dozens of other groups are designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996.
The Palestinian Authority is making a big effort to get other nations to recognize a Palestinian state. The campaign is even getting support in Latin America.
But, if a Palestinian state is officially established and Hamas becomes part of the government, or even if the Palestinian Authority allows terrorists to enjoy sanctuary, the Republican-controlled House Foreign Affairs Committee is likely to be watching very carefully and perhaps press for designation.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Michael Kraft.

Egypt VP denies pro-govt supporters killed protesters
February 4, 2011 /Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman denied Thursday that pro-government elements killed protesters in violent unrest in Cairo, insisting to ABC News that "they behaved very well."When asked about shooting into the crowds of protesters that have gathered at Cairo's Tahrir Square, Suleiman replied, in English, "No. Nobody being killed by rifles or by snipers. No way."In the interview by ABC's Christiane Amanpour, Suleiman said that Egyptian forces would "not use any violence against" the protesters.
"But we will ask them to go home. And we will ask their parents to ask them to come home."Amanpour also spoke with embattled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, but did not record their talks. She said he told her that he wants to leave office, but fears there will be chaos if he resigns now.-AFP/NOW Lebanon

Sleiman addresses developments with Gemayel
February 4, 2011 /President Michel Sleiman met with Kataeb Party leader Amin Gemayel in Baabda on Friday to address the latest domestic developments, according to a statement issued by Sleiman’s office.The statement did not elaborate further.-NOW Lebanon

Cabinet 'Identity' to be Unveiled as Soon as March 14 Announces its Decision to Miqati
Naharnet/Prime Minister-designate Najib Miqati is expected to hold a "very important meeting" with a high-ranking March 14 official on Friday, An Nahar newspaper reported.
The cabinet's structure and "identity" would be decided after Friday's meeting in the aftermath of days of consultations with several March 14 members, the daily said.
Miqati's circles told An Nahar that the premier-designate will continue his consultations with March 8 and March 14 officials to discuss all available options to form the government.
The circles also told As Safir daily that the premier-designate is seeking to form a "cabinet that satisfies all sides," a stance similar to that of President Michel Suleiman who "does not favor the formation of a government" whose members are from a single camp. An Nahar said the next two days would be decisive on the decision of the March 14 forces to participate in the cabinet and whether the government would involve only the March 8 coalition or independent politicians or technocrats. Despite reports that the weekend is decisive, Miqati rejects to abide by dates. "When the line-up is ready we will announce it as soon as possible without delay," his circles told As Safir. March 8 sources also told An Nahar that he would announce the line-up "either on February 14 or 15 or 29," a hint that Miqati is not abiding by any specific date. The sources reiterated that the March 8 alliance rejects conditions set by March 14 prior to the formation of the government. Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 08:24

Franjieh Insists on 2 Portfolios, Says Country Needs Scoundrels not Technocrats
Naharnet/Marada movement leader Suleiman Franjieh has stressed he would participate in the cabinet only if he gets two portfolios and said the country needs "tough men" and not technocrats. "If they don't give me (2 portfolios) I will say thank you and won't participate," in the government, Franjieh told Marcel Ghanem's Kalam al-Nass talk show on LBC TV network. Prime Minister-designate Najib Miqati is likely to form a technocrat-politicians mixed cabinet "but in this country there are no technocrats. It needs strong men and scoundrels," the MP said. "Who should we put (as interior minister to confront) Wissam al-Hassan and Ashraf Rifi?" Franjieh asked. "I like Ziad Baroud a lot but he can't confront Rifi and al-Hassan."
Turning to the possible participation of the March 14 forces, the Marada leader said: "If the other team participates we want to get the two-third" of ministers.Franjieh also unveiled that Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Suleiman informed him through Caretaker Energy Minister Jebran Bassil that if got the interior portfolio he would not have another candidate in the ministry.  Aoun also told him that if Franjieh rejects the interior ministry, he would ask for the portfolio for one of his bloc's members. Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 09:06

Miqati Sends Sfeir Message, Patriarch Stresses Importance of PM-President Harmony
Naharnet/Prime Minister-designate Najib Miqati sent a message to Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Miqati's advisor Joe Issa al-Khoury told reporters in Bkirki on Friday.
Following talks with Sfeir, al-Khoury refused to unveil details of the message that he delivered to the patriarch. Among Sfeir's visitors was former Minister Wadih al-Khazen who said that the patriarch stressed the importance of harmony between Miqati and President Michel Suleiman to preserve the constitutionality of the cabinet formation process. Al-Khazen said he agreed with Sfeir on the need to form a balanced government that does not provoke any side. Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 12:09

Gemayel: We are Still in the Stage of Discussing General Principles
Naharnet/Phalange party leader Amin Gemayel threw the ball of the cabinet formation process in the March 8 court saying the alliance should facilitate the mission of Premier-designate Najib Miqati.In his turn, Miqati should make proposals that lead to partnership and consensus on how to deal with controversial issues, Gemayel told As Safir daily in remarks published Friday. He refused to say whether the Phalange would participate in the cabinet even if the rest of the March 14 forces rejected to take part. He only said that consultations among members of March 14 are ongoing. Gemayel denied that the Phalange had discussed with Miqati on the size of the party's representation or portfolios. "We are still in (the stage of discussing) general principles. The Phalange party supports "true partnership," the former president said but stressed that it was also keen on keeping the international tribunal functioning.
"We have two martyrs -- Pierre Gemayel and Antoine Ghanem – and we are interested in knowing the truth and achieving justice," Gemayel stressed. Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 10:39

Police, Protesters Clash at Egyptian Embassy in Beirut
Naharnet/More than 100 demonstrators briefly clashed with police outside the Egyptian embassy in Beirut on Thursday after they tried to break through the security cordon around the diplomatic mission, a security official said. "Police intervened to push back the demonstrators after they tried to break through the barbed wire in order to enter the embassy," the official told Agence France Presse, speaking on condition of anonymity. He added that no one was arrested or injured during the clashes that lasted about 20 minutes. The demonstration outside the embassy was organized by leftist activists, many of whom carried portraits of the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian flags or Lebanese Communist Party flags.
Anti-riot police were seen using batons and rifle butts to disperse the protesters after they managed to remove the barbed wire around the embassy or jump over it late afternoon. Army reinforcements were brought in and the barbed wire was put back in place after the clashes. Similar demonstrations against the regime of embattled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak have taken place in Beirut in recent days.(AFP) Beirut, 03 Feb 11, 18:29

Harb: Miqati Seeks Participation of All Powers in Cabinet, He Will Face Challenges from those Who Nominated him
Naharnet/Caretaker Labor Minister Butros Harb stated on Thursday that Prime Minister-designate Najib Miqati is attempting to allow the participation of all political powers in the new government, including the March 14 forces. He told the Central News Agency that the March 14 camp may take part in Cabinet if Miqati respects the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Hizbullah's arms possession, and if he ensures that the March 14 forces would be able to play an effective role in preventing decisions that would harm Lebanon.
"If these two factors are provided, then they won't refuse to cooperate with Miqati," he added. Harb noted that the premier-designate will face major obstacles from those who nominated him. Some of these hardships include the content of the ministerial statement and the March 8 camp's position towards the STL, as well as the number of portfolios it wants to acquire, he said. "The formation of the government will be complicated, especially if Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun maintains his position and demands," the minister pointed out. Beirut, 03 Feb 11, 17:59

Jumblat for Balanced Cabinet, Says March 14 Lost Major Ally in Egypt
Naharnet/Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat said Premier-designate Najib Miqati was seeking to form a centrist and balanced cabinet without falling in the "illusion" that the March 14 forces would participate in the cabinet. "The best way to deal (with the cabinet formation process) is to come up with a centrist and balanced government," Jumblat told Marcel Ghanem's Kalam al-Nass talk show on LBC TV network on Thursday night. Miqati is seeking to have an acceptable cabinet structure "without falling in the illusion that March 14 would participate," he said. Jumblat advised former Premier Saad Hariri not to listen to the advices of the U.S. and France "because geopolitics is more important." The Druze leader said last week that geopolitics means having good ties with Syria. "Unfortunately we weren't able to unify and the sectarian system is dividing the (Lebanese) society," the MP said when asked if he believed Lebanon would witness anti-regime demonstrations similar to Egypt. "March 14 lost a major ally," he said about Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's regime.
"The alliance wasn't able to move the street," Jumblat told LBC about the March 14 forces. "We are heading towards a new, free and democratic Middle East," he said.
Jumblat held talks with Miqati in Verdun on Thursday. He declined to make a statement after the meeting. However, MTV reported that talks between the two men did not tackle the distribution of portfolios in the new cabinet. Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 09:43

Walid Jumblatt
February 4, 2011
On February 3, the website of the Progressive Socialist Party, Psp.org, carried the following report:
President Walid Jumblatt believed that “March 14 has lost a major ally, which is why it appears in their media outlets as though the bird is over their heads [Arabic saying, meaning totally silent as though they were hunters afraid of making any noise that would frighten the birds in the trees above them]. We also saw they were unable to mobilize the street of which they were historically so proud.” In a special interview on Kalam al-Nass show, Jumblatt hoped that Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri would not listen to the advice of the Parisian and American circles, because geopolitics were more important, assuring that the best way to deal with the Lebanese file would be through the formation of a moderate and balanced government by Prime Minister Najib Mikati.
He considered that the putting in place of an acceptable governmental formula constituted a challenge, indicating that this was in fact what the prime minister was trying to do without believing the illusion that the so-called March 14 will participate. Jumblatt then announced that the Egyptian people had risen to demand freedom in a spontaneous way, as the uprising was neither led by the intellectuals nor the parties which later turned out to be backward. He assured that it was led by the Egyptian youth thanks to the spread of communication technology. He indicated that in a country where democracy and freedom are absent, there is oppression “and this is what happened in Tunisia throughout 25 or 28 years of false slogans saying that the country is prosperous and stable. The situation is even worse in Egypt where the political class is corrupt and whether the authority and the money are monopolized at the expense of eighty million poor citizens.”
Jumblatt then believed it was unfortunate that “we in Lebanon could not unite, because the sectarian system divides society and makes each component resort to sectarian and denominational leaders instead of social and economic dimensions… Consequently, Christian unity no longer exists. In Tunisia, the reason behind the uprising was the oppressive regime which collapsed. The Western disregarding of this situation aimed at making us accept this oppressive regime because it contained the Islamic movements. But this is a major lie because the Islamic movement is part of the Arab and Islamic world. In Egypt, also under the headline of fighting Islamic extremism, Mubarak oppressed and impoverished the Egyptian people for 30 years. This reality is different from the one prevailing in Tunisia. As for the West, it is now afraid of seeing the new leader or the new regime annulling the Camp David Accord, i.e. discontinuing the protection of Israel. The West only cares about Israel’s interests and this is where the difference between Egypt and Tunisia lies.
“We are heading toward a new Middle East featuring freedom and democracy. In reality, the Middle East is mostly Islamic, and we saw yesterday the embraces between the Copts and the Muslims. The Copts live in Arab and Muslim communities and there was never a sectarian problem except under this regime.” He thus believed that Mubarak was late in understanding the signs on the street, assuring: “The Egyptian people no longer want President Mubarak, even if he has promised not to run again in the elections which will be held in six or seven months. The Egyptian people have tolerated him for thirty years and they no longer want him...
“America and the West will try hard to regain Egypt or the Camp David Accord. This is the main American concern and we must wait to see the identity of the new Egyptian command because today, the parties are no longer present. There may be a role played by the Muslim Brotherhood, but eventually, the revolution was staged by the people.” He added that the Western concern was the protection of Israel, “which means there will be an attempt to lure in someone from the so-called Egyptian opposition or the Egyptian army to maintain the Camp David Accord…” He continued that the American loss in Tunisia and Egypt was massive, and that consequently, “it was losing a key base similar to the one it lost in Iran with the fall of the Shah. But the Arabs of the Gulf must offer financial aid to Egypt, so that America does not resume its interference or hijack Egypt under the headline of the aid…”

Lebanese-German Sues Macedonia over Alleged CIA Kidnapping
Naharnet/A Lebanese-German man who says he was snatched by the CIA in Macedonia and tortured at a secret prison after being mistaken for a terrorism suspect, will begin a legal battle against Macedonia Friday to demand official recognition of his ordeal. Khaled el-Masri is seeking €50,000 ($69,000) in compensation — and an apology — from the government in Macedonia, where he says he was abducted while on a trip in 2003. His action follows failed attempts to have his case heard in court in the United States and Germany. El-Masri, who is of Lebanese descent, says he was brutally interrogated at a secret CIA-run prison in Afghanistan for more than four months. He said he went on hunger strike for 27 days and was eventually flown back to Europe and abandoned in a mountainous area in Albania. His lawyers in Macedonia, Darian Pavli and Filip Medarski, said they are seeking compensation on the grounds that Macedonia sanctioned his alleged abduction and subsequently blocked any investigation into the incident. Authorities in Macedonia deny any involvement in his alleged kidnapping. "To start with, it would be good if Macedonia at least apologizes to el-Masri," Pavli said Thursday, adding that his client would not be present for the start of the trial at a court in Macedonia's capital Skopje. U.S. officials have refused to comment publicly on the case, but diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks website show that diplomats in Germany and Macedonia were at pains to keep the case out of the news and the court. In a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, dated Feb. 6, 2006, then-Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski is cited as promising the U.S. ambassador he would continue to refuse local press requests to discuss the el-Masri case. On Friday, an international campaigner against the United States' so-called extraordinary rendition program — to snatch and interrogate terror suspects without court sanction — is due to testify at the Skopje court. Clara Gutteridge, of the London-based rights group Reprieve, will present the findings of the group's investigation into the el-Masri case, the organization said in a statement Thursday. In the United States, El-Masri had filed a lawsuit against former CIA director George Tenet in a case assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union. But the complaint was never heard in court on the grounds that it would reveal U.S. government secrets. That rejection was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2007. In December, a German court rejected a lawsuit filed by el-Masri seeking to force Berlin into prosecuting suspected CIA agents who allegedly illegally detained him. The court case in Macedonia was likely to last at least two years, El-Masri's lawyers said.(AP) Beirut, 04 Feb 11, 10:51

Statement by Minister Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cannon on Egypt to House of Commons
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2011/050.aspx
February 3, 2011 - 4:25 p.m. ET) The following is an edited transcript of a statement made in the House of Commons by the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the situation in Egypt. The statement was made in the House at 6:50 p.m. on Wednesday, February 2, 2011:
“Madam Speaker, over the past few days, the eyes of the world have focused on Liberation Square in the capital of Egypt. Events unfolding in Cairo could have a profound effect on the Middle East and the entire world.
“Our government’s priority is, of course, the safety of Canadians who are in Egypt. That is why we took swift action to organize an air evacuation of those who wanted to leave the region. These measures will be deployed as long as they are required. My colleague the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas and Consular Affairs) will describe in more detail the measures we have made available to Canadians.
“This evening we are particularly disappointed and concerned that the protests that began with hope, order and enthusiasm are now fraught with violence, havoc and fear.
“A few hours ago, live ammunition was used against Egyptian citizens. At least one person has been killed and many hundreds more have been wounded, some seriously.
“Egypt, a nation of 80 million people with an ancient civilization, has long been a moderate leader of the Arab, African and Muslim worlds, and an important partner in the Middle East peace process, based on its long-standing peace treaty and cooperation on security matters with Israel. It is also home to the Suez Canal, a vital shipping route. What happens in Egypt therefore has major implications for other countries of the region, most especially Israel, for the world economy and for international security, including the security of Canadians.
“This morning I spoke to my Egyptian counterpart, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Canada’s deep and strong relationship with Egypt allows us to be frank with each other, as friends should be. In our conversation this morning, I expressed Canada’s concern about the situation in Egypt and our desire to see a peaceful and meaningful transition to democracy. I also reiterated the importance that Canada and the world place on the stability of Egypt and its region.
“In discussions with my colleague, now and in the past, I have not hesitated to raise Canada’s ongoing concerns about the situation of human rights in Egypt. We have urged Egypt to improve respect for human rights, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of association. We have raised concerns about the continuing application of Egypt’s state of emergency, which is still in force after 30 years, and the use of torture and arbitrary detention by Egyptian security forces. We have also encouraged political reforms in order to promote democratic development and respect for the rule of law in Egypt, including the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections with international observers.
“After the political opening of 2005, which saw the introduction of multi-candidate presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt, the following years saw a marked setback on human rights and democratic development. Canada has expressed concern on several occasions in that regard. In particular, we conveyed our disappointment at the parliamentary elections in November and December 2010, which saw the ruling national democratic party win over 80 percent of the available seats and a loss of most of the opposition seats amidst allegations of massive vote fraud and low voter turnout. A lack of international observers surely contributed to the lack of credibility of the outcome.
“These elections represented a setback for democratic reform and modernization in Egypt and a failure by its government to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people for a greater voice in the running of their government. There is no doubt that these decisions by the Egyptian government fed the frustration of the Egyptian people.
“The results of the latest parliamentary elections, the absence of political reform, the slow pace of economic progress, the increase in the price of food and the bleak future for youth led to the protests that began on January 25. There is no doubt that the example of Tunisia, where the people are experiencing the same frustrations, also inspired the Egyptian protests. However, the priority must now be to put an end to the violence, and I urge the Egyptian authorities to respond with restraint during these tense times.
“We urge Egypt to respect freedom of association and freedom of movement for all political actors. However, there have been disturbing reports of looting, as well as prison breakouts, and we urge the Egyptian authorities to respond to these incidents and to safeguard the security and the property of all of the people in Egypt.
“The large-scale protests in many parts of Egypt have demonstrated the desire of the Egyptian people for greater political freedom and economic reform. The people of Egypt are claiming what people all around the world want and what we as Canadians take for granted: freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and the chance at a better life.
“The demonstrators have also shown their commitment to bringing about political and economic reform through peaceful protest, not by taking up arms or through terrorism. They should be commended for peacefully expressing their views and making their voices heard.
“Other darker forces, however, are at work on Liberation Square, and that is why calm and order must be restored as quickly as possible. We all know that the new social networking media, at the heart of popular movements around the world, is transforming the way societies everywhere communicate and share information.
“It is increasingly important for people everywhere to be connected to the Internet, for governments to permit access. We are, therefore, disturbed by interruptions to Internet services in Egypt and the blocking of social networking websites. This not only restricts access to information and communication by the people of Egypt, but also it hampers emergency efforts to provide consular services to foreign nationals in Egypt.
“We are also troubled by the forced closing of some news media. We call on the Egyptian government to ensure freedom of expression by unblocking websites and not interfering in the free dissemination of information.
“We have noted President [Hosni] Mubarak’s promise to leave office next September and the appointment of a vice-president, a new prime minister and a new council of ministers, who have been asked to undertake economic reforms. This new political team will be judged on its response to the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people.
“However, more clearly needs to be done in order to address the long-outstanding need of Egypt for real and meaningful political and economic reform. Putting on a coat of paint to cover the cracks in the wall will not satisfy the Egyptian people’s demand for change.
“The Government of Canada has long engaged Egypt and other governments in the region on the need to bring about reform. Democratic development is a priority of Canada’s foreign policy. Democratic development advances Canada’s interests because it offers the best chance for long-term stability, prosperity and the protection of human rights.
“Canada is committed to strengthening civil society and democratic institutions and processes, including political parties and independent media, throughout the world so that people can have control over the decisions that affect their daily lives. With this same determination and hope today, we are asking President Mubarak and the new Egyptian government to strengthen the foundations of democracy, dialogue and cooperation.
“It is not up to Canada to decide who should govern tomorrow’s Egypt. Today, the people of Egypt are telling us, in the most active and courageous way possible, that they finally want to choose leaders who will bring them prosperity, justice and safety. We do not hesitate to raise our voices, loudly and clearly, in this chamber to say that we hope that Egypt’s future leaders will actively devote themselves to implementing reforms that will meet the needs and aspirations of the Egyptian people.
“Canada wants to see a transition toward greater democracy and freedom in Egypt, with respect for human rights and the rule of law. There needs to be a clear timetable for a new parliamentary election with international observers.
“The 2010 parliamentary election lacked credibility and deprived the people of Egypt of an elected and democratic opposition as a means of peaceful political expression and participation in the governing of their country. The current situation is, at least in part, a direct result of this failure to respect the democratic process.
“A true democratic transition in Egypt will require institutional reforms. For example, it will require the establishment of a credible and non-partisan elections commission to run the elections, as we have here in Canada. Such an elections commission would oversee the preparations for an election, which should reflect international standards for transparency and integrity.
“The international community will no doubt be willing to assist by providing election observers and technical assistance.
“Egypt also needs to make constitutional reforms. These could include stronger guarantees for human rights, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of association, coupled with the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary.
“The state of emergency that Egypt has been living in for 30 years now, which has resulted in much injustice and inequality, must soon be lifted. As I was assured by the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs this morning, the rules governing the registration of presidential candidates are to be revised so that as many people as possible can run in the September election.
“It would also be beneficial to set fixed terms for the president and vice-president.
“However, an election must not be confused with democracy. Although a fair and equitable election process is certainly essential to building a democracy, only a stable and honest government can ensure the sustainability of democratic principles.
“In order for us, here in Canada, to recognize and support the future Egyptian government, it must meet four basic conditions: first, it must respect freedom, democracy and human rights, particularly the rights of women; second, it must recognize the State of Israel; third, it must adhere to existing peace treaties; and fourth, it must respect international law.
“Canada urges Egypt’s government to heed the courageous voice of the Egyptian people, seize the moment and turn it into an opportunity for long-overdue democratic and economic reform that will allow Egypt to maintain its place as a leader among Arab, African and Muslim states.”

Egypt: The American Debate Has Gone Stark, Raving Crazy
By Barry Rubin
February 3, 2011
http://www.gloria-center.org/gloria/2011/02/egypt-the-american-debate-has-gone-stark-raving-crazy
As I pointed out recently the mass media in America generally presents only one side of the debate nowadays. Then, it publishes nonsense which survives because it is protected from the withering critique it deserves. And even people who should know better are just losing it.
Consider one example (Roger Cohen has gone beyond ridicule so let's focus on someone who should know better). I regret criticizing Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution as he is one of the smarter, saner people.
Yet the kinds of things he is quoted as saying in the New York Times remind me of why the "neo-conservatives" have been so dangerous because of their naivete about the Middle East. They are fitting counterparts of the apologists for radicals who have demonized them. Both groups are trying to impose their fantasy model on the real Middle East. Of course, if Kagan didn't say things like this he wouldn't be quoted at all in the New York Times.
Kagan explains to us:
"We were overly spooked by the victory of Hamas....The great fear that people have with Islamist parties is that, if they take part in an election, that will be the last election. But we overlearned that lesson and we need to get beyond that panicky response. There's no way for us to go through the long evolution of history without allowing Islamists to participate in democratic society.
"What are we going to do- support dictators for the rest of eternity because we don't want Islamists taking their share of some political system in the Middle East?
"Obviously, Islam needs to make its peace with modernity and democracy. But the only way this is going to happen is when people speaking for Islam take part in the system. It's incumbent on Islamists who are elected democratically to behave democratically."
Presumably, you will never read how absurd this statement is anywhere in the mass media so thanks for dropping by and here's my analysis:
First, what is an Islamist? Someone who wants to seize state power and impose an Islamist state, transforming the society in the process. You cannot have pluralism because all of those who oppose you are evil.
An Islamist party is not necessarily a Muslim party. There can be Muslim parties that are not Islamist, though it is hard right now to find these. That's why, however, the elections they win tend to be the last ones or, at least, they do everything possible to stay in power. Think Communism; think fascism; heck, this is the Middle East so think Arab nationalism!
Do you know what Shakyh Qaradawi, the most prestigious cleric in the Muslim Brotherhood universe, said (he was critiquing Usama bin Ladin)? Of course, Islamists should participate in elections because they would always win them. How many votes can secular-style liberal reformers muster compared to those who say "Islam is the solution"? And Qaradawi is not intending to use those election victories to "behave democratically."
Well, actually, maybe he is. After all, if the majority of people want Sharia law, a dictatorship by the rightly-guided, hostility to the West, and Israel's destruction, I guess a revolutionary Islamist government is fulfilling the will of the people and thus is behaving democratically.
Do you know what the United States did after World War Two? President Obama hasn't apologized for this one yet. It did everything possible behind the scenes to ensure that Communist parties--which were certainly not ready in the 1940s to be moderate--lost the elections in France and Italy. According to this new principle should it have let them win so that they would have become moderate?
Second, "overly spooked!" Is this some kind of paranoid reaction? There was not only Hamas but Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan and now Hizballah. And we have seen what has happened in Turkey with an Islamist regime, though it might accept the loss of power in the election later this year. But that's Turkey which plays by a different set of rules.
Responding to an accurate view of reality and a set of experiences is not being "spooked" it is being rational. All of the experience lines up consistently.
Hizballah has just taken power in Lebanon through elections. Any sign Hizballah has moderated?
And how about Yasir Arafat, not an Islamist though he tried to play that game a bit to maintain popular support. Remember back in 1993 when we were told that if he were allowed to take power he would inevitably become moderate because he would have to deal with road repair and garbage collection? That didn't work out too well either.
Remember when it was said that Ayatollah Khomeini would become more pragmatic once in power? I do.
But why should we deal with real experience when we can engage in wishful thinking?
Consider the following chart:
Who in the Middle East could the United States depend on five years ago to support its basic policy goals?
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
Who in the Middle East can the United States basically depend on today?
Israel, Iraq (?), Jordan (until next week?), Saudi Arabia
Who in the Middle East is likely to oppose basic U.S. policy goals today?
Egypt (soon), Gaza Strip (Hamas), Iran, Lebanon (Hizballah), Libya, Sudan, Syria. Turkey
Might there be a trend here?
The United States is running out of friends in the Middle East who it can overthrow. I'd love to use the 1930s Germany analogy but it is so excessively cited as to have lost effectiveness. So let's go to the Soviet analogy. "We were overly spooked by the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania...." Well, you get the idea.
But wait! The United States is not refusing to allow "Islamists to participate in democratic society," the local regimes are doing so. Perhaps they know something about their own societies.
But wait again! Islamists do participate in elections in Jordan. Of course, the regime there makes sure they lose. So perhaps the United States should step in anhelp the Islamic Action Front wins the next election, all the better to moderate them! I'm sure (sarcasm) that it will keep the peace treaty with Israel. Then we can keep experimenting until there are no more victims left.
"Obviously, Islam needs to make its peace with modernity and democracy. But the only way this is going to happen is when people speaking for Islam take part in the system."
Oh, obviously. Except that it is not necessarily obvious to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, and the Iraqi insurgents, nor to non-Islamist-member-of-the- pack Syria. Why should one believe that taking part in the system will make them moderate. Is there any evidence for this? Any at all? And, no, Turkey doesn't prove that. Quite the contrary.
But what really riles me is when Westerners write a sentence like this one:
"It's incumbent on Islamists who are elected democratically to behave democratically."
Please contemplate those dozen words. What if they don't? What are you going to do about it after they are in power? What if they take your concessions but not your advice? The United States conditioned the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in Egypt's next government on that group's abandoning violence and supporting "democratic goals." There is no chance that it will meet those conditions and also no chance that the United States would try to enforce them.
I have an idea: why don't we wait until we have some reason to believe they will behave democratically before you put them into power?
Let's remember a little detail here: You are all willing to ignore everything the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has said or done for decades. You have no idea of their proposals in parliament, do you? You have no idea of their recent platform, do you? You have no idea what the Brotherhood's leader is saying in his speeches, do you? Nor do you take these things into account.
So how dare you tell me that the Brotherhood is or is about to become moderate when you cannot cite a single piece of evidence--well, ElBaradei's word when he lies to you about these things--to prove your thesis. Not one. Don't you realize that victory has made the Islamists arrogant. They are becoming more radical, not less so. And mainstream clerics in Egypt, for example, have also become increasingly more extremist, well before the latest crisis.
Frankly, the more these people talk like this about Islamists, the more I don't believe them. If they had any real proof they would offer it. And their ignorance makes me suspect their conclusions. In fact, what they have done is to give the Islamists a free pass: they don't have to change their policies or behavior at all because they can depend on Western "useful infidels" to claim they are moderate even when they are not.
Naivete has reached epidemic proportions. The Washington Post, which should also know better, under the headline, "Muslim Brotherhood says it is only a minor player in Egyptian protests," tells us about this group. Of course, it says it is not important. Just as the Big Bad Wolf wore granny's clothes, "All the better to eat you." Why should the Western media pick up the revolutionary Islamists' disinformation themes?
In fact, and I'm not exaggerating, the article tells us both that the Brotherhood is no threat and accuses it of wimping out:
"It is not the organization of radical jihadists that it is sometimes made out to be. But its caution in dealing with Mubarak has made it appear recently that it is more concerned with protecting itself than with improving the nation."
The article tells us two historical facts about the Brotherhood: It was inspired by the YMCA and was brutally repressed by the Egyptian government in the 1950s.
Sigh. And what does it leave out? That it seeks to transform Egypt into an Islamist state, reduce the Christians to third-class citizens (they are already second-class citizens), do away with rights for women, impose Sharia law, drive America out of the Middle East, and wage a war of genocide against Israel.
Oh, and then there's the history of the Brotherhood: it was financed by the Nazis from the 1930s on and tried to deliver Egypt to them in World War Two, used the Nazi weapons it had been given in 1942 to try to destroy Israel in the 1948 war, had a terrorist wing and assassinated a number of officials including an Egyptian prime minister, was repressed because it tried to kill President Gamal Abdel Nasser, supports terrorism not only against Israel but also U.S. forces in Iraq, and its leader now calls for a Jihad against the United States.
Has anyone in the Western media or governments ever read anything from Brotherhood leaders' speeches or publications? Apparently not. In fact, regarding the media I have seen zero evidence that it has any idea what these people say every day.
I am writing this about 50 miles from Egyptian territory. Two next-door countries--Lebanon and for all practical purposes the Gaza Strip--already have Islamist-run regimes. Some would count Saudi Arabia as a third, though I wouldn't necessarily do so. A fourth, Syria, is in the Islamist alliance. Now a fifth, Egypt, might be headed that way. All that's left is Jordan. This week, at least.
So, is the United States going to, "Support dictators for the rest of eternity because we don't want Islamists taking their share of some political system in the Middle East?" Well, you are running out of dictators, though I suppose you could back the overthrow of the king of Morocco and back the Islamic Salvation Front into power in Algeria.
But on the positive side, there are more and more dictators who the United States doesn't support! Good news. They are anti-American dictators who sponsor terrorism and subvert their neighbors. The United States doesn't support these dictators, it merely engages them. We can look forward to a bright future in which the United States doesn't support any dictators in the Middle East at all, because Iran and the Islamists will fill that role. Indeed, President Bashar al-Assad, dictator of Syria, gives the "What? Me Worry" grin.
"Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence...you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances."What does this mean? That if you line up with Iran, support revolutionary Islamism, and oppose the United States you are going to be popular and strong since that demagoguery appeals to the masses. Do you think any future leaders in Egypt are aware of that fact? Oh, and if you shoot or imprison demonstrators at the first sign of trouble and your patron doesn't care about your brutality, nobody will overthrow you. I have an idea for the prophets of Muslim Brotherhood moderation: Please experiment with the lives of people closer to your own homes.

Briefly, What Could the U.S. Government Have Done in Egypt?
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2011/02/briefly-what-could-us-government-have.html
By Barry Rubin
I'm not judging right now between these alternatives but want to make clear that many alternatives did exist.
1. The U.S. government could have waited to assess the situation rather than leap in immediately. Avoiding involvement altogether was a serious option, retaining the option to act if the conflict went on a long time or seemed to spiral toward civil war. During many previous cases of internal unrest in allied Arab states--though, of course, this was larger--the United States has not previously intervened without being asked to do so. And in cases where hostile states used massive repression, it remained passive.
2. It could have expressed support for the Mubarak government while urging it to ease conditions. Private pressure in the context of support would have been more effective. The easing of repression, economic benefits, and other steps to ensure fair elections might have been taken with U.S. encouragement. Working with members of the leadership to ensure the retirement of an 82-year-old president is more likely to succeed than threatening the position of all regime officials causing them to circle the wagons and hang tough.
3. By staying "neutral" the U.S. government could have given the Mubarak government an incentive to be flexible since it would hope to retain, perhaps even increase, U.S. support. This approach could also have made the opposition more cautious since it wanted to gain U.S. support and felt that it had less leverage.
4. But by choosing the side of the opposition publicly, it threw away its leverage. Why should the Egyptian government listen to it and why should the opposition stop short of total victory? When Mubarak said that Obama does not understand Egyptian culture, in part he meant that by taking sides the U.S. government further enflamed the crisis. One could argue that the revolt would have inevitably triumphed (though the word "inevitably" is usually a mistake in such circumstances) but as long as Mubarak has support of the army there is no way the opposition could win.
5. By publicly treating the Egyptian government in an insulting way, the U.S. government sent bad signals to every ally. They could only conclude that not only might Washington treat them the same way but that it was not a reliable protector against enemies foreign and domestic.
6. By unilaterally saying it would accept the Muslim Brotherhood in government--on the basis of very flimsy and unenforcable conditions--the U.S. government raised the status of the Brotherhood and, again, threw away leverage. It could have simply remained silent.
7. By expressing excessive optimism that everything would be all right, that threats were low or nonexistent, that the Brotherhood was not dangerous, and so on, the government misled public opinion and lulled itself into a false sense of security. It was then caught by surprise as Mubarak rejected Obama's "orders."
I'd be happy to add more or refine these points based on readers' suggestions. I have also prepared a longer, more detailed article on this subject to publish soon.

Why Arabs have airbrushed Lebanon out
By Michael Young /Daily Star
Thursday, February 03, 2011
One thing has been intriguing me since the beginning of the popular revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. Why is it that virtually everyone, in describing the novelty of the moment, invariably fails to mention Lebanon’s Independence Intifada of 2005?
A passage from an article by my colleague Rami Khouri provides a useful summary of the prevailing view of recent developments in the Arab world: “Never before have we had entire Arab populations stand up and insist on naming their rulers, shaping their governance system, and defining the values that drive their domestic and foreign policies,” he writes. “Never before have we had free Arab citizenries in pursuit of self-determination. Never before have we seen grassroots political, social and religious movements compel leaders to change their cabinets and re-order the role of the armed forces and police.”
What is taking place invites such lyricism. But isn’t Khouri forgetting Lebanon just six years ago, in the dark hours after Rafik Hariri’s assassination? Then, too, a majority of Lebanese stood up and insisted on naming their rulers, shaping their governance system, and defining their foreign policy – until then veneers for Syrian dictates. A cabinet was brought down under popular pressure, and soon thereafter four security chiefs were made to resign. The Lebanese held a parliamentary election that was surprisingly democratic, and the breakdown of seats, on all sides, reflected accurately the alignment of forces existing during the days of the Independence Intifada.
Much has also been made of the fact that Tunisia’s upsurge against Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was led by an educated middle class. But so too were the Lebanese rallies against Syria, even if at the time this provoked more disdain than approval, as those in search of Oriental authenticity mocked what they called a “Gucci revolution.”
Why is it that no one in the Arab world, or for that matter in the West, has been inclined to bring up that electric Lebanese episode as they watch events unfolding in the streets of Tunis and Cairo? It’s not sufficient to point to the checkered aftermath of the Independence Intifada to justify that omission. For one thing, the intifada was a striking success, as liberal indignation with the killing of a former prime minister ultimately obliged Syria to withdraw its army from Lebanon. Such occasions of high emotion come to define themselves, with participants and observers rarely judging their consequences until it’s too late. Protesters want immediate gratification: the overthrow of a hated order. That is their benchmark of achievement.
The Independence Intifada did not excite the Arabs for three reasons. The first is that many did not view the Lebanese system as overly oppressive, so that the plotline of an underdog fighting against great odds was never taken very seriously, though it was surely applicable in 2004-05. After all, to triumph the protesters had to overcome those who had killed Hariri or who had facilitated his elimination; they also had to prevail over the Lebanese Army and security services, who were taking orders from ministers hostile to the protesters; and they had to face down Hezbollah, which sought to intimidate opposition demonstrators on March 8, 2005, with a mass gathering of its own.
A second reason is that the Lebanese uprising was largely non-violent. This was principally because the army and security forces, while they tried repeatedly to frustrate protesters and deny them access to Martyrs Square, never fired on the crowds. Such common sense lessened the drama of the confrontation, unlike the repressive measures of the Tunisian and Egyptian security services that lead to the death of hundreds of civilians, and injury to countless more.
But perhaps the most significant reason why Lebanon 2005 left many Arabs cold, and still does, was that it didn’t quite sit well with their deeper political predispositions. Where developments in Tunisia and Egypt are welcomed as blows against the United States, therefore satisfying regional hostility to the American order in the Middle East, the Lebanese embraced American and international assistance after the Hariri killing. Their intifada took place in the shadow of a United Nations resolution that called on Syria to leave Lebanon, and that implicitly demanded the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Far from perceiving developments in Lebanon as a bracing example of emancipation, many in the Arab world saw it as a victory of the United States and France over Syria and Hezbollah. Therefore, in the bizarre logic prevailing then (and now), it was interpreted as a setback for emancipation – defined as anything that might strengthen Western power in the Middle East. That is why there was none of Al-Jazeera’s selective outrage on hand to warm Arab spirits to the Independence Intifada. The station had always approved of Syria’s and Hezbollah’s agendas in Lebanon, and it still does. The behavior of the Al-Jazeera bureau chief in Beirut has amply demonstrated this fact.
That said, to lament public marginalization of the Independence Intifada is meaningless on its own. That a majority of Arabs will reject any narrative that places the United States in a good light tells us much about Washington’s errors in the region. When was it not obvious, particularly during the post-Cold War period, that America would one day have to choose between its image as global defender of democracy and its sustained support for the most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East? Washington sees risks in allowing Arab states to go their own way, but these are hardly more threatening than propping up its regional alliance system with reviled despotisms.
The Lebanese may complain that American approval brought them little after 2005. Syria and Hezbollah are back in the driver’s seat in the country. But nothing worries Damascus, Hezbollah, or Iran more than genuine political pluralism, alternations in leadership, and democratic self-determination. That’s where America’s cards are strongest, not its support for soulless, corroded republican monarchies that have humiliated and beaten their societies into submission, whose demise no one can possibly regret.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR and author of “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle” (Simon & Schuster).

Egypt won't be quick to give Muslim Brotherhood a chance
Major opposition group has been largely absent from the uprising in Egypt, and it's unlikely to be leading the country anytime soon.
By Zvi Bar'el /Haaretz
 04.02.11
Among the wealth of improvised placards and graffiti scrawled on Egyptian tanks this week, one slogan is missing: "Islam is the solution." This is the Muslim Brotherhood's slogan from 2005, when the movement won a tremendous victory in the parliamentary elections: 88 seats out of 454.
The group's members also used the slogan in the November 2010 elections, where they suffered a resounding defeat when not a single representative of theirs was elected. The movement has also been largely absent from the current uprising. Even President Hosni Mubarak's dramatic announcement that he intends to retire at the end of his current term in September has not brought the Brotherhood out into the limelight.
"We support continuing this intifada until the people's justified demands are met," wrote the movement's chairman, Mohammed Badie, on the Muslim Brotherhood's website. Their demands are the same as those of the other opposition movements: canceling the emergency regime imposed in 1981; dispersing the parliament and its Shura Council, which was elected fraudulently; holding new elections; releasing all political prisoners; establishing a transitional government without the ruling National Democratic Party; and establishing a commission to investigate the use of violence against the demonstrators. Not the establishment of a state based on Islamic law, and not far-reaching religious legislation. There aren't even any verses from the Koran in Badie's statement.
Before the recent demonstrations erupted, organizers from movements including the April 6 group, the Egyptian Movement for Change and the Students' Movement for Change sent out instructions to their activists. They asked them to avoid party slogans and not to wave party banners. The intent was to depict these demonstrations as nonpolitical and spontaneous, with the sole aim of deposing the regime, and not proposing political alternatives in the meantime - only demanding elections. Movement leaders were asked not to appear on the front lines.
The Muslim Brotherhood understood and abided by the request. However, the dilemma concerning the group's involvement in politics began even before the most recent parliamentary elections. A major dispute erupted within the movement's ranks last year, prior to the election of the head (the so-called Supreme Guide ) and the 16 members of the Guidance Office, the movement's leadership body.
The arguments boiled over into the media, a suit was filed against the election outcome, and Dr. Muhammad Habib, the first deputy of retired Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef, resigned from the organization's leadership.
The struggle was not only personal. The movement's reformist stream wants to take part in the government alongside members of the regime, hopes to promote the status of women, has no problem with female cabinet ministers, and is even prepared to negotiate with the American administration and to be more flexible regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. Now it has found itself outside the ranks. There has already been talk of establishing a religious movement in Egypt to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Badie, 67, is a veterinarian by profession. He is in the Brotherhood's conservative stream, opposes dialogue with the West, and indeed has stated that "while the movement has no problem with the West, it does have a problem with the countries that planted the Zionist entity in the heart of the Muslim world" - meaning, the United States.
In his inaugural speech as leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, he declared: "The Brotherhood has never been the enemies of regimes, but it has never been deterred from exposing corruption or giving advice to regimes as to how they should behave."
In contrast to his predecessor Akef, and like his admired teacher Sayyid Qutb who was executed in 1966, Badie believes there is no point in political activity within the current political system, where the state controls everything. Nevertheless, at the last minute, Badie backed the candidates' participation in the most recent parliamentary elections - apparently so that the rift would not get worse.
Signs of crisis
The signs of crisis in the movement became apparent amid the huge political success in 2005. The movement is banned, yet 88 members managed to get into the Egyptian parliament, nearly five times the number in previous elections. They ran as independent candidates and only after their election did they form a faction.
Mubarak made it his aim to fight this movement, damaged its financial backing by arresting important businessmen who had contributed to it, jailed a string of activists who were convicted of incitement and damaging the foundations of the state, and waged a campaign in the state-owned media that attacked the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood's name was always accompanied in those newspapers with the adjective "forbidden," which has in itself become the movement's nickname in Arabic.
One thing that shook up the movement was the arrest of Khairat al-Shater, now the leader's second deputy and the business partner of Hassan Malek, another member. Shater, who was considered to be the group's chief financial officer, is thought to have a personal worth of about 240 million Egyptian pounds (about $44 million ), but his main contribution is the deals he makes for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf and in foreign stock markets.
Shater, a software engineer who studied in England, also obtained a lot of money for the movement from building material fairs in partnership with an engineers and doctors union, which has more than a million members. These fairs offered building materials at reduced prices and in installments, and enabled credit for hundreds of thousands of young people who were unable to obtain it from banks.
In the 1990s Shater founded a computer company called Salsabeel, offering purchasing, sales and service systems. At that time the Egyptian authorities confiscated scores of discs and documents that they claimed contained a great deal of information about the Brotherhood's activities. Shater was tried and sentenced to five years in prison. Upon his release he was appointed second deputy to the leader of the organization.
After 2005 Egypt's parliament became the most active sparring arena thanks to the movement's representatives, who bombarded government ministers with hundreds of parliamentary questions concerning corruption, education and help for the needy. Their opponents and the other opposition parties had to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood in criticizing the regime. However, it seems this sparring with the regime posed a new ideological challenge to the Brotherhood.
In a website established by secessionists from the movement, Muhammad Habib published an article a year ago explaining why the group should not aspire to establish a party: "In the current political environment, creating a new party will neither help nor hinder. The day the situation changes there will be nothing to prevent us from establishing a party." However, this day has not yet come - even though the streets are tumultuous and people are calling for Mubarak to be brought down.
About a year ago Mohamed ElBaradei appeared on Egypt's political stage and distributed a document with his demands, which are very similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders. However, the group has refused to give ElBaradei their backing.
"We have not given ElBaradei our power of attorney to represent the opposition," it said this week. "Why is there this perplexing position with respect to support for ElBaradei?" asked Habib.
Could the Muslim Brotherhood take control of the regime? Not given Egypt's current political structure, or given the fact that the movement has yet to formulate its principles for participation. Judging by the results of the most recent parliamentary elections, the public is not prepared to give it too much credit either. In order to prevent even one candidate from getting into the legislature, apparently, you need a lot more than an effective campaign of threats and fraudulent activities on the part of the regime.