LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
ِNovember
23/2010
Bible Of The
Day
Deuteronomy/You Can Do It/ 30/11-19
"For this commandment which I command you this day, it is not too hard for you,
neither is it far off. 30:12 It is not in heaven, that you should say, “Who
shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us, and make us to hear it, that
we may do it?” 30:13 Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, “Who
shall go over the sea for us, and bring it to us, and make us to hear it, that
we may do it?” 30:14 But the word is very near to you, in your mouth, and in
your heart, that you may do it. 30:15 Behold, I have set before you this day
life and good, and death and evil; 30:16 in that I command you this day to love
Yahweh your God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his
statutes and his ordinances, that you may live and multiply, and that Yahweh
your God may bless you in the land where you go in to possess it. 30:17 But if
your heart turns away, and you will not hear, but shall be drawn away, and
worship other gods, and serve them; 30:18 I denounce to you this day, that you
shall surely perish; you shall not prolong your days in the land, where you pass
over the Jordan to go in to possess it. 30:19 I call heaven and earth to witness
against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, the blessing
and the curse: therefore choose life, that you may live, you and your seed;
30:20 to love Yahweh your God, to obey his voice, and to cling to him; for he is
your life, and the length of your days; that you may dwell in the land which
Yahweh swore to your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them.
Today's Inspiring Thought: You Can Do It
Is there an area of struggle in your Christian walk that seems impossible for
you to conquer? I have one. (Well, at least one.) And, I doubt I'm the only
Christian who has cried, "Lord, I just can't do this! It's too hard for me." I
don't know why certain challenges in our spiritual life are harder than others.
But, this verse gives us some clues to overcoming when we face a giant problem.
The Word! Hopefully, it is "very near you." If not, bring it close, right now!
And, keep it close. Memorize it. Let it be "in your mouth and in your heart." By
the power of the Holy Spirit, speak God's Word to your giant. Meditate in your
heart on God's Word, "so that you can do it!"
Free Opinions,
Releases, letters, Interviews & Special Reports
Who killed Lebanon's Rafik
Hariri, and the failures of a UN commission/CBC/November
22/10
Michel Sleiman's Independence
message/NNA/November
22/10
A work in progress/NOW
Lebanon/November 22/10
The Demand for the Freedom to
Assassinate/By: Tariq Alhomayed/November
22/10
Ban the Burqa? France Votes Yes/by
Benjamin Ismail/November
22/10
Latest News
Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for November
22/10
Suleiman, Berri, Hariri Participate
in Independence Day Parade, Hold Brief Meeting at Baabda Palace/Naharnet
Saudi Envoy in Damascus in Effort
to 'Remove US Landmine/Naharnet
The Forgotten Kurds of
Syria/FrontPage Magazine
UN probe into Lebanon PM's
murder criticized/Globe and Mail
Gemayel: March 14 might
compromise/Daily Star
Gemayel: Lebanon is on the road to
sovereignty/Now Lebanon
Aoun, Jumblatt, and Franjieh miss
Independence Day gathering/Now Lebanon
Hariri in Tehran Nov. 27/Naharnet
New Syrian, Hizballah's guided
missiles defy Israel's aerial supremacy DEBKAfile Special Report
Saudi-Syrian efforts to defuse
tension increase/Daily Star
Aoun insists Karam did not harm
country's security/Daily Star
Suleiman, Berri,
Hariri Participate in Independence Day Parade, Hold Brief Meeting at Baabda
Palace
Naharnet/President Michel Suleiman, Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Saad
Hariri on Monday attended a military parade in downtown Beirut to mark Lebanon's
67th anniversary of independence from France. Suleiman, accompanied by Defense
Minister Elias Murr, inspected the 70-minute parade at Shafiq Wazzan Ave. A
21-gun salute was fired at the start of the parade after which Suleiman palced a
wreath on the Unknown Soldier Monument. Suleiman's motorcade was greeted by a
show of helicopters. Dozens of soldiers and officers from the navy and marines
participated in the parade. At the end of the parade, Suleiman, Berri and Hariri
headed to Baabda Palace to receive well-wishers on the occasion of Independence
Day.
But Lebanon's top three leaders decided to discuss the latest developments in a
brief meeting at the Presidential Palace prior to receiving well-wishers.
Beirut, 22 Nov 10, 11:05
Lebanese Solider Killed on
Independence Day
Naharnet/A Lebanese military intelligence agent on Monday was gunned down at the
Lebanese-Syrian border crossing of Masnaa. Local media identified the soldier as
Corporal Youssef Youssef. State-run National News Agency said Youssef was shot
at by occupants of a Mercedes-Benz that fled the scene. It said the Lebanese
army immediately set up random checkpoints in nearby neighborhoods to arrest the
killers. Beirut, 22 Nov 10, 09:37
Saudi Envoy in Damascus in Effort to 'Remove US Landmine'
Naharnet/Saudi envoy, son and advisor to Saudi King Abdullah Prince Abdul Aziz,
has reportedly arrived in Damascus to follow-up on Syrian-Saudi mediation
efforts to end the crisis over an indictment to be issued by the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. The indictment is reportedly set to accuse Hizbullah
members in the 2005 assassination of former PM Rafik Hariri.
As-Safir newspaper on Monday said the Saudi envoy's visit was aimed at
exchanging ideas with Syrian President Bashar Assad in an effort to finalize a
settlement, which reached a critical stage. The daily said success depends on
whether Damascus and Riyadh are able to remove what it described as "the U.S.
landmine." It quoted well-informed sources as saying that Damascus and Riyadh
were trying to remove the "intensive" US pressure under the slogan "no
discussions before indictment is issued." Beirut, 22 Nov 10, 06:42
Hariri in Tehran Nov. 27
Naharnet/Prime Minister Saad Hariri will head a high-level political and
economic delegation to Tehran November 27, Iran's official news agency IRNA
quoted the Lebanese embassy in Tehran as saying. A Lebanese parliamentary
delegation is also scheduled to visit Tehran on Thursday, according to IRNA.
It said Hariri will hold a series of meetings with senior Iranian officials
including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to discuss bilateral relations between
the two countries and ways to boost cooperation and exchange views on issues of
common concern. Beirut, 22 Nov 10, 07:04
Gemayel:
March 14 might compromise
Phalange Party leader says coalition could accept domestic or foreign-backed
deal, but once justice served
By The Daily Star /Monday, November 22, 2010
BEIRUT: Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel said Sunday March 14 parties might
approve a foreign-backed or domestic compromise to Lebanon’s political deadlock,
but only after justice is served by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
Gemayel was speaking after a Mass held in Jdeideh to mark the fourth anniversary
of his son’s assassination, Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, who was killed in
daylight by masked men who intercepted his car and shot him.
The Mass was attended by a large gathering of March 14 leaders and state
officials. Minister of State Jean Hogassapian, MP Abdelatif al-Zein and former
Prime Minister MP Fouad Siniora represented President Michel Sleiman, Speaker
Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Saad Hariri respectively.
“Today we do not need a new national pact or Taif Accord or a second Doha
agreement but we rather need a verdict against those who killed our martyrs and
afterward we can talk and welcome all local, Arab and international mediations,”
Gemayel said.
While Saudi-Syrian contacts continue in a bid to break the political deadlock
between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s coalition and Hizbullah over the STL, news
reports have emerged recently over the possibility of amending the Taif Accord
as a comprehensive solution to the political crisis.
“This is our choice and we convey it to those close to us as well as those far
away: we want justice to rest with regard to our present and the future of our
sons,” he added.
In the front row sat Pierre’s father, his wife Patricia and her two children
Amin and Alexander, his mother Joyce and his brother Metn MP Sami.
The mood inside was melancholy among attendees with Pierre’s family members
bursting into tears on several occasions, whereas an atmosphere of anger reigned
among the party’s supporters gathered outside the church.
The supporters chanted Pierre’s name and vowed to protect Sami as the Phalange
party leader made his speech.
Addressing concerns over the country’s security situation, Gemayel said March 14
parties would stand their ground in support of the STL regardless of any
difficulties.
“We want justice, it is our right and we will not back down on it regardless of
all difficulties … we will not allow the course of justice to stop and we will
not accept any compromise at the expense of our martyrs, particularly Pierre and
his comrades,” he said.
Pro-Hizbullah media outlets recently leaked scenarios involving a Hizbullah
takeover of a number of state institutions if the STL indictment implicates some
of its members in the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri.
Hizbullah neither denied nor confirmed the reports. “We will not choose between
justice and strife but we rather choose both justice and stability, which are
equally important to build a state,” Gemayel said. – The Daily Star
Gemayel:
Lebanon is on the road to sovereignty
November 22, 2010 /Lebanon is on the road to “complete sovereignty” despite
obstacles along the way, Kataeb Party leader Amin Gemayel said at the
Presidential Palace in Baabda on Monday. Realizing justice is the only way to
guarantee stability for Lebanon, he told LBCI. “It is impermissible to say that
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) will lead to war […] the tribunal is the
first step in reinforcing stability and independence.”Gemayel was speaking from
the celebration of Independence Day at the Baabda Palace.
Tension is high in Lebanon amid unconfirmed reports that the STL will soon issue
its indictment in former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s 2005 assassination. It is
rumored that the indictment will name Hezbollah members. In a speech on November
11, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said that Hezbollah will
"cut off the hand" of anyone who tries to arrest any of its members in the case.
-NOW Lebanon
Michel Sleiman
November 22, 2010
The Lebanese National News Agency (NNA) carried the following report on November
21, 2010 following President Michel Sleiman’s speech on Lebanon’s 67th
Independence Day anniversary:
“Fellow Lebanese, each time our country’s flag is raised on the anniversary of
its independence, whether in Lebanon or around the world, all hearts are with it
and all eyes are turned toward it, recalling the glorious struggles led before
us by national leaders who paved the way before this independence. This
independence opened the doors of progress and advancement in the face of
generations whose ambitions, determination and intelligence allowed them to
occupy forward positions both domestically and abroad. First of all, we must not
forget that despite the setbacks which deeply affected the course of
independence, we were able to maintain our faith in Lebanon, its unity and its
free democratic system, as well as in our coexistence, the level of our
educational curricula and the vitality of our banking system.
But more importantly, we were able to liberate most of our occupied territories
in 2000, through solidarity between our army, people and Resistance and our
overall national capabilities. During the last few years, we were able to secure
internal stability and commit to the constitutional requirements through the
staging of free parliamentary and municipal elections. We were also able to form
a national-unity government, launch a national dialogue committee and adopt a
clear mechanism for administrative appointments based on competence. We
succeeded in restoring exceptional Lebanese-Syrian relations, in establishing
diplomatic relations between the two countries, in winning a non-permanent seat
at the Security Council, restoring our position and status on the international
arena and preventing any foreign aggression.
Fellow Lebanese, while we are grateful to our Arab brothers for supporting
Lebanon and its civil peace, the primary responsibility falls on us as Lebanese
to come up with the adequate solutions and adopt them, considering that free
Lebanese will is one of the main conditions of independence. Therefore, it is up
to us to maintain the
previous achievements and use them to draw up the bases of the Third Republic.
We are able to do so if we have a solid political will and if all the energies
and capabilities are mobilized for that purpose. This requires us to work for
the accomplishment of the following goals:
1- Maintaining national unity and civil peace as a priority and relinquishing
tense speeches that instigate hatred. Strife, which was avoided following the
assassination of martyred Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other Lebanese
figures, should not be allowed to resurface via other means and affect Lebanon
with its evils.
2- Working within the context of the regime and the constitution, upholding
dialogue and respecting the legitimate institutions which should be resorted to
at all times to resolve the crises and the conflicts.
3- Upholding the Taif Accord and completing its implementation without
hesitation or fear; Agreeing on clarifying the constitutional problems which
affected the implementation of some of its articles two decades after its
adoption.
4- Sharing responsibility far away from obstruction or monopolization and moving
from the logic of power to the logic of the state.
5- Upholding our civilizational formula and working for the success of the
Lebanese challenge that is based on the participation of all the factions and
sects in the management of public affairs and not just coexistence; This is a
Lebanese and Arab responsibility in the face of Israel’s policy that is based on
the Jewish character of the
state and its attempts to divide the Arab world.
6- Pursuing the efforts aimed at forcing Israel to commit to [UN Security
Council] Resolution 1701 and implement all its articles, while maintaining our
right to liberate or restore the remaining occupied land by all available and
legitimate means.
7- Proceeding with the efforts to reach concord over a national defense strategy
based on the primary role of the army that has proved its efficiency in
defending the country during the July 2006 war and the Aadaiseh incident, by
providing it with the adequate armament and equipment.
8- Continuing to enhance the opportunities for economic, social and cultural
growth and reaching balanced development.
9- Introducing the necessary political, judicial and administrative reforms to
improve the work of the institutions.
10- Proceeding with the efforts to ensure the immigrants’ right to vote and
facilitating the measures allowing them to reinstate their original nationality.
After decades of wars and conflicts, the time has come for us to ensure an
overall state of calm and stability, so that we can proceed with our work and
deal with the concerns of the people. This calm will also allow us to fix the
deviations affecting the moral values and behaviors seen in our community, fight
corruption, cheating, greed and the blunt violations committed against our
beautiful nature, and contain the migration of our children. I therefore call on
you, fellow Lebanese, as I call on the political and spiritual leaders, the
opinion leaders, syndicates, students and civil society associations from my
position as head of the state and a symbol of national unity, not to allow
Lebanon to become an open arena for conflicts and foreign interferences. I call
on you to work with me to avoid the crises, allow the prevalence of the
principles which were recognized by the national concord pact and commit to
dialogue, tolerance and brotherly behavior which the past experiences have
proven unavoidable. This is the only way to become worthy of our proud people’s
trust and the gratitude of the next generations. Long Live the Lebanese, Long
Live Lebanon.”
Aoun, Jumblatt,
and Franjieh miss Independence Day gathering
November 22, 2010 /Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun, Progressive
Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblatt and Marada Movement leader MP Sleiman
Frangieh were absent from Monday’s Independence Day celebrations at the
Presidential Palace in Baabda, LBCI reported. However, the report added that
members from all three leaders’ political blocs attended the festivities. The
report also quoted an anonymous source as saying that there is no political
motivation behind Aoun’s absence and that “he normally does not participate in
such events.’-NOW Lebanon
A work in
progress
November 22, 2010
(NOW Lebanon)
Monday is Independence Day, but the extent to which Lebanon really is
independent, is to many people, a moveable feast. During Syria’s 29-year
‘presence’ in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, and Israel’s 18-year occupation of its
self-declared security zone during the so-called South Lebanon Conflict From
June 1982 to May 2000, November 22 Independence Day celebrations were hollow
affairs.
It was a period during which the Lebanese could not take pride in their tiny
Mediterranean country, a land whose sons and daughters had excelled in all
fields across all continents, but who at home were meek servants to whims of
their more powerful neighbors.
And yet in 2005, in the aftermath of the bloody and brutal assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 other innocent victims, the
country woke up. It said ‘enough was enough’, and, in a spontaneous and hitherto
unseen explosion of public anger, gave expression to the desire to have a say in
their own destiny. It culminated on March 14, 2005, when 1 million people
descended on Martyr’s Square in the biggest demonstration of people power in the
Middle East in recent memory.
The spirit of that day created the embryo of Lebanese freedom, sovereignty and
independence. But they were stillborn and today’s fanfare will sadly once again
paper over the fundamental cracks in the nation’s claim that it is genuinely
independent. Issues remain.
Lebanon’s borders, one of the most telling symbols of sovereignty, are still not
demarcated. Syria, which has not dropped what it sees as a historic right to
control Lebanon (despite recently, and grudgingly, acknowledging Lebanon’s
status by an exchange of embassies) must play its part in ensuring that all
mutual borders are defined and formally recognized by all parties.
Lebanon’s army and security forces are still not in full control of the nation’s
security. This is arguably the ultimate obstacle to genuine independence.
Hezbollah must agree, and it must agree very soon, to either disarm or make its
soldiers and weapons at the disposal of the state. Any other course of action is
unacceptable.
For surely, there has to be a clear understanding on who actually controls the
Resistance. If the Resistance was created to defend the state, then the state
must have its say on the terms and conditions of the ‘contract’. The Resistance
must act in the nation’s best interests, even if this means cancelling the
‘contract’.
And let us not kid ourselves. The Resistance fulfilled its contract in 2000 when
it expelled Israel from Lebanese soil, a feat of arms for which the nation was,
and still is grateful. The outstanding territorial issues – the decade-old
Shebaa Farms dispute and the more recent question of Ghajar – should be handled
by the state through international diplomacy. The status quo has nothing to do
with resistance and all to do with the dynamics of regional politics.
This is also the case for the presence on Lebanese soil of the worrying number
of non-Lebanese militias, which operate in Lebanon and consider themselves above
the law. Their continued presence and the international cover under which they
operate is an insult to the idea Lebanese sovereignty and the Arab League has an
obligation to work toward their eventual disarmament and expulsion. Finally,
Lebanon’s parliamentary majority is still hostage to an armed opposition. The
threat of violence if the March 8 alliance does not get its way is very real and
has kept the nation on its nerves for months. On Monday, we will witness the
many trapping of Lebanese sovereignty but they will all count for naught if the
state is not protected and it cannot act in the best interests of its people.
Question: "Is it wrong to feel disappointment with
God?"
Question.com/Answer: Disappointment with God is not necessarily wrong or sinful;
rather, it is a part of the human condition. The word "disappointment" means "a
feeling of dissatisfaction when one’s hopes, desires, and expectations fail to
come to pass." When God somehow fails to satisfy our hopes or doesn’t live up to
our expectations, disappointment inevitably follows. If God doesn’t perform in
the manner we think He should, we are disillusioned with Him and dissatisfied
with His performance. This can lead to wavering faith in God, especially in His
sovereignty and His goodness.
When God doesn’t act when we think He should act, it isn’t because He is unable
to do so. Rather, He simply chooses not to. While this might seem an arbitrary
or capricious act on His part, the exact opposite is true. God chooses to act or
not to act according to His perfect and holy will in order to bring about His
righteous purposes. Nothing happens that is out of God’s plan. He has control of
every molecule that floats around in the universe, and God’s will encompasses
every act and decision made by every person throughout the world at all times.
He tells us in Isaiah 46:11, “From the east I summon a bird of prey; from a
far-off land, a man to fulfill my purpose. What I have said, that will I bring
about; what I have planned, that will I do.” Even the birds are somehow part of
His foreordained plan. Furthermore, there are times when He chooses to let us
know His plans (Isaiah 46:10) and times when He does not. Sometimes we
understand what He is doing; sometimes we do not (Isaiah 55:9). One thing we do
know for sure: if we belong to Him, whatever He does will be to our benefit,
whether we understand it or not (Romans 8:28).
The key to avoiding disappointment with God is to align our wills with His and
to submit to His will in all things. Doing so will not only keep us from being
disappointed with God, but it will also preclude grumbling and complaining about
the events that occur in our lives. The Israelites in the desert griped and
questioned God on several occasions, despite having seen miraculous displays of
His power in the parting of the Red Sea, the provision of manna and quail in the
wilderness, and the glory of the Lord that followed them in the form of a pillar
of fire (Exodus 15–16; Numbers 14:2-37). Despite God’s continual faithfulness to
His people, they grumbled and were disappointed with God because He did not act
as they thought He should. Rather than submitting to His will and trusting Him,
they were in a constant state of turmoil and confusion.
When we align our wills with God’s will and when we can say, with Jesus, “Not my
will but yours be done” (Luke 22:42), then we find the contentment Paul spoke of
in 1 Timothy 6:6-10 and Philippians 4:11-12. Paul had learned to be content with
whatever God sent his way. He trusted God and submitted to His will, knowing
that a holy, righteous, perfect, loving, and merciful God would work all things
together for his good because that is what He promised. When we see God in that
light, we can’t possibly be disappointed with Him. Rather, we submit willingly
to our heavenly Father, knowing that His will is perfect and that everything He
brings to pass in our lives will be for our good and for His glory.
New Syrian, Hizballah's guided missiles defy Israel's aerial supremacy
DEBKAfile Special Report November 22, 2010,
Israeli Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin took his leave from
the Israel cabinet Sunday, Nov. 21, with a stern warning: "Tel Aviv will be a
front line in the next conflict," he said. debkafile's military sources report:
Syria and Hizballah now possess thousands of surface missiles from Iran with
enhanced ranges of up to 300 kilometers and they are being outfitted by Iranian
engineers with guidance systems. The new guided Fateh-110, M-600 and Scud D
missiles hardware can pinpoint any part of Israel within a 10-meter radius in
defiance of Israel's aerial and anti-missile capabilities, say Israeli and
Western missile experts. Hizballah and Syria have been furnished by Iran with
the means for fighting a new, far more comprehensive war.
All of Syria's chemical Scud C and D warheads have been converted into guided
missiles, and so have the 1,000 Scud Ds kept in Syrian bases near the Lebanese
border ready to push across to Hizballah in a military confrontation with
Israel, which Hassan Nasrallah said ten days ago he would welcome.
During the three-week war of 2006, Hizballah launched 500 rockets a day -
relying on sheer, terrifying numbers against populated areas, mostly in the
North - to bring Israeli armed forces low. A dozen a day of the guided,
long-range weapons would do far more damage, say our military sources. Iran's
allies would likely go for Greater Tel Aviv in order to sow demoralization in
the most densely populated part of Israel and devastate its industrial and
financial centers.
Earlier this month, Israel's Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gaby Ashkenazi, said it was
possible that in the next war, large segments of the population would have to be
evacuated from their homes.
Former head of the Israel Mission Defense Organization Uzi Rubin said recently:
"The enemy has achieved aerial supremacy without even having aircraft." Iran's
fully-guided Fateh-110 rocket would enable Hizballah and Syria to strike
critical Israeli facilities with dozens rather than hundreds of rockets, he
said.
Hizballah and Syria have 1,500 warheads that could strike the Tel Aviv area.
"This is a revolution," said the missile expert.
debkafile's military sources note that Rubin did not mention Israel's missile
and rocket defense systems, the Arrow, Iron Dome and David's Sling, as able to
thwart the new Syrian and Hizballah guided weapons – for good reason. Those
systems are not up to intercepting heavy hails of thousands of incoming
missiles. Even if only scores reached their targets, the damage would be
tremendous. As for aerial strikes against launching sites, Hizballah has
dismantled its missile bases and scattered the warheads widely apart in
underground bunkers and natural caverns, from which they can be launched.
The Demand for the Freedom to Assassinate!
21/11/2010
By Tariq Alhomayed/Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat,
Much has been said about the ongoing ‘special’ negotiations on Lebanon, in
anticipation of the potential reaction to the indictment rulings, in the event
that elements of Hezbollah, or otherwise, are accused. The indictments of the
International Tribunal, performing an inquest into the death of the late Rafik
Hariri, are expected to be issued at any time, although no specific date has
been set.
The bulk of what we hear and read, stemming from leaked information, is that the
objective of these negotiations is to strengthen stability in Lebanon, and
preserve civil peace. Essentially, this means that there is a group in Lebanon,
with external support, that wants the blessing of Arabs, and others, to have the
‘freedom to assassinate’ in Lebanon. Thus, [according to this principle], anyone
who assassinates a Prime Minister, a politician of any rank, or a media
personality, should not be harmed; otherwise civil peace in Lebanon will be
severely jeopardized. This means that the Arabs are following a
‘mafia-mentality’ in their management of the Lebanese crisis, instead of
established laws.
This is the crisis that exists in Lebanon today, and it is the crux of the
current negotiations, regarding the future of Lebanon, as well as the future of
the International Tribunal of Rafik Hariri, and other Lebanese victims.
Subsequently, we hear phrases such as “avenger of blood”, or “choose between
justice and stability”, or that the International Tribunal “has become
politicized”. In reality, almost all parties concerned are not looking to put a
stop to assassinations, and to support Lebanon’s stability both now and in the
future. The simplest example of what we are saying here came from Michel Aoun,
who was not alone in this regard, when he warned that issuing indictments before
clarifying the issue of false witnesses, “will lead to the outbreak of
hostilities”. Aoun believes that Hezbollah’s response will be stronger, because
it considers itself to be innocent. Yet it is well-known that those who are
innocent seek to prove their innocence, instead of destroying everything and
everybody around them, and bringing down the house from the inside!
Here we are not accusing Hezbollah, or anyone else, but we demand that the
innocent seek to show their innocence, without threat or menace. We also demand
an end to solutions along the lines of “the Lebanese must choose between justice
and stability”, as these only entrench the idea that assassination is an act of
politics, an act which unfortunately has been happening in Lebanon for decades.
The unfortunate reality in Lebanon is that whenever the relevant parties,
whether in Lebanon or the surrounding area, reach an ‘acceptable’ solution, this
simply means that they have lowered their demand from the ‘freedom to
assassinate’, to simply arguing that the punishment for the offence is too
severe. Yet there does not seem to be a consensus that because assassination is
a crime, the offender must pay a price to ensure it does not reoccur.
For the benefit of our region, one hopes that the United Nations will have a
hand in the investigation of assassinations, or disappearances, in our region.
This includes Lebanon, Iraq, or Somalia, or any region where there is no respect
for human life. Otherwise, we will continue in our approach of “let bygones be
bygones”, and we will accept assassinations as part of the political process in
our region. Who can guarantee that an assassination will not occur tomorrow in
Lebanon, or that a national political figure in Iraq will not be targeted, for
example, if there is no one to pay the price?
Saudi-Syrian efforts to defuse tension increase
Two countries aim to coordinate efforts to appease rival Lebanese camps over
Tribunal indictment
By Hussein Dakroub
Daily Star staff
Monday, November 22, 2010
BEIRUT: Saudi-Syrian attempts to break the Lebanese political deadlock over the
UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) appeared over the weekend to be in
a race against time over the STL’s impending indictment into the 2005
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Hizbullah, which is widely expected to be implicated in the killing, has made
clear warnings that Lebanon faces the threat of instability if the Saudi-Syrian
mediation efforts fail to find a solution – acceptable to rival Lebanese
factions – for the crisis over the STL’s indictment.
Hizbullah’s warning came amid reports that Prince Abdel-Aziz bin Abdullah, son
of Saudi King Abdullah, arrived in Damascus Sunday as part of the ongoing
Saudi-Syrian bid aimed at maintaining stability in Lebanon.
Syria and Saudi Arabia, which wield considerable influence on rival Lebanese
factions, are coordinating their efforts in a bid to find a solution to the
crisis over the indictment acceptable to both the March 8 and 14 camps.
Media reports quoted an unnamed official in Damascus as saying that Saudi Arabia
and Syria are convinced of the necessity to prevent an explosion in Lebanon over
the indictment. The two countries are discussing a host of proposals in a bid to
reach a joint agreement aimed at protecting Lebanon from the repercussions of
the indictment, the reports said.
A key political adviser to Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said that
his party was counting on Saudi-Syrian attempts to defuse political tension over
the indictment, and he warned that the failure of these attempts could
destabilize Lebanon.
“The Saudi-Syrian effort to save Lebanon from the crisis is in a feverish race
with American pressure exerted on the international tribunal in order to hasten
[release of] the so-called indictment,” Hussein Khalil told reporters Saturday
after meeting with MP Michel Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to
thank him for his positions in support of Hizbullah during his visit to France
last week.
“We hope that the Arab effort will beat all the other hostile attempts because
[failure of Arab effort] could push Lebanon into the unknown, which we do not
want,” Khalil said. The word “unknown” is Lebanese jargon that could mean
anything from chaos and instability to strife.
Arab and foreign leaders have voiced concern over stability in Lebanon due to
the indictment, which is threatening to plunge the country into renewed
sectarian strife. Nasrallah, and Arab and foreign media reports, said that the
indictment is expected to accuse some Hizbullah members of involvement in the
massive suicide truck bombing that killed Hariri and 22 others on February 14,
2005.
In a dramatic development signaling that the STL is setting the stage for an
indictment implicating Hizbullah, the tribunal’s judges have changed the court’s
rules to clarify when a trial in absentia can be staged if suspects refuse to
surrender.
The changes appear to reflect concerns that once prosecutors name suspects they
may not be able to arrest them. Under changes to the STL’s rules announced
Friday, a trial in absentia could be ordered around 60 days after an indictment
is issued. The tribunal already had provisions for trying suspects in their
absence, but had not set time limits for when it could happen.
The court’s amendments apparently came in response to Nasrallah’s recent
declaration that Hizbullah will not allow the arrest of any of its fighters
charged in Hariri’s assassination.
In a televised speech on November 11, Nasrallah, who has denied that his group
was involved in Hariri’s killing, vowed to “cut off the hand” that tries to
arrest any Hizbullah fighter named in the indictment.
Tensions have been simmering for months between the March 8 and 14 camps over
the STL. The STL is expected to hand down its indictment before the end of the
year.
The tension heightened fears of sectarian strife in Lebanon, especially if the
STL’s indictment implicates Hizbullah. Hizbullah and its allies in the March 8
camp refuse to recognize the STL, dismissing it as an “Israeli-American tool”
designed to incite strife.
Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain leader, and his allies in the rival
March 14 coalition have upheld support for the STL as the best means to reveal
the truth behind his father’s assassination. He has also reassured worried
Lebanese that there will be no sectarian strife.
MP Okab Saqr, a member of Hariri’s Parliamentary Future bloc, said that he
expected a Saudi-Syrian solution to the Lebanese crisis over the indictment to
be ready within two weeks. “The Syrian-Saudi solution is the only available
solution. I don’t think anyone will reject it because this amounts to a
rejection of Lebanon’s protection,” Saqr said in an interview with Al- Jadeed TV
Saturday.
MP Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the
Marada Movement, said that Saudi-Syrian good offices were in race with American
attempts seeking to destabilize Lebanon.
“There is a race between the Syrian-Saudi efforts and the US policy. We hope
that the Syrian-Saudi good offices will beat all other attempts,” Franjieh told
reporters in the northern village of Bna’shi after meeting with Aoun. He said
that Lebanese factions that support the US attempts did not want to serve
Lebanon’s interest. “The West, particularly America, does not want good for this
country. They want a Shiite-Sunni rift so that Israel can be relieved,” Franjieh
said. He added that he was worried about the situation, saying he feared that
Israel might intervene to destabilize Lebanon. Phalange Party leader Amin
Gemayel said March 14 parties might approve a foreign or domestic backed
compromise to Lebanon’s political deadlock, but only after justice is served by
the STL. “Today we do not need a new national pact or Taif Accord or a second
Doha agreement but we rather need a verdict against those who killed our martyrs
and afterwards we can talk and welcome all local, Arab and international
mediations,” Gemayel said. He was speaking after a mass held in Jdeideh Sunday
to mark the fourth anniversary of his son, former Metn MP, Pierre who was
assassinated in a nearby region in daylight by masked men who intercepted his
car and shot him. MP Mohammed Raad, head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, said
that the STL’s indictment is seeking to target the Resistance’s head. He said
that after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and internal clashes between pro- and
anti-government groups in 2008 have failed to destroy Hizbullah, “the
Resistance’s head is now being targeted through a fabrication of an indictment
that harms the resistance’s role, Mujahedeen and leaders.”
“This accusation is fabricated by big powers which have appointed themselves as
protectors of Israel’s security,” Raad told a rally in south Lebanon Sunday.
However, he added, that the indictment will not succeed in vilifying “the
resistance which is so deep-rooted among our people that it will not be harmed
by a rumor, a fake accusation or a fabricated indictment.”
Meanwhile, Aoun said that his five ministers in Hariri’s 30-member national
unity Cabinet will not attend any Cabinet session before the issue of “false
witnesses” linked to the UN probe in Hariri’s killing is settled. He spoke to
reporters after meeting with Franjieh in the northern village of Bna’ shi.
President Michel Sleiman has repeatedly deferred a Cabinet discussion of the
issue of “false witnesses” to avoid a further split among the ministers.
Hizbullah and its allies have insisted that the key to reducing political
tensions and reaching the truth behind Hariri’s murder lies in prosecuting
witnesses who allegedly misled the UN probe with their false testimonies.
Aoun insists Karam 'did not harm country's security'
By The Daily Star /Monday, November 22, 2010
BEIRUT: Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader MP Michel Aoun defended Sunday
former General Fayez Karam, a senior FPM official, who has been detained on
suspicion of spying for Israel, saying that Karam is not guilty of collaboration
with the enemy. Karam, 62, a retired Lebanese Army general, was arrested by the
Internal Security Forces’ Information Branch in August on suspicion of spying
for Israel. Addressing FPM members in the northern city of Zghorta Sunday, Aoun
reiterated that Karam’s arrest was politically motivated and was part of the
authorities’ campaign against the FPM. “General Karam did not sell information
[to Israel], nor did he harm the country’s security. He is not guilty,” Aoun
said. He added that Karam did not steal state funds or treasury bonds, nor did
he serve as “a false witness” in connection with the UN probe into the 2005
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Aoun said that he was waiting for the judiciary to issue its verdict in Karam’s
case, promising to reveal details of the investigation with Karam. “If he [Karam]
is found to be guilty, we will accept the verdict. If he is not found to be
guilty, we will not accept this [Karam’s detention] because he is not guilty,”
Aoun said. – The Daily Star
CBC Investigation: Who killed Lebanon's Rafik Hariri?
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/11/19/f-rfa-macdonald-lebanon-hariri.html
SPECIAL REPORT
Neil Macdonald/ CBC News
Sunday, November 21, 2010
It wasn't until late 2007 that the awkwardly titled UN International Independent
Investigation Commission actually got around to some serious investigating.
By then, nearly three years had passed since the spectacular public murder of
Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri.
Hariri, the builder. The billionaire tycoon who'd reclaimed Beirut's
architectural heritage from the shattered cityscape of a civil war and made it
his mission to restore Lebanon's mercantile leadership. Hariri, the nationalist
who'd had the courage to stand against Syria, Lebanon's long-time occupier; and
in his day was the most important reformer in the Middle East.
The massive detonation that killed him on Feb. 14, 2005 unleashed forces no one
knew were there. All of Lebanon seemed to rise up in the murder's aftermath,
furiously pointing at the country's Syrian overlords. The not unreasonable
assumption was that Hariri had died for opposing Damascus. Lebanon's fury
quickly accomplished what the assassinated leader had failed to achieve in his
lifetime. The murder gave rise to the so-called Cedar Revolution, a rare
Lebanese political consensus. Syria, cowed by the collective anger, withdrew its
troops. At the UN, France and the U.S. pushed the Security Council into
dispatching a special investigative commission. For a time, it actually seemed
that Lebanon was moving toward the rule of law and true democracy.
.But, by the end of 2007, all that had ebbed. The killers remained uncaught.
Syria was gradually reasserting its influence. And assassinations of other
prominent Lebanese continued.
In the White House, senior administration officials began to conclude that the
UN's famous clay feet were plodding toward nothing.
It turned out they were right.
A months-long CBC investigation, relying on interviews with multiple sources
from inside the UN inquiry and some of the commission's own records, found
examples of timidity, bureaucratic inertia and incompetence bordering on gross
negligence.
Among other things, CBC News has learned that:
Evidence gathered by Lebanese police and, much later, the UN, points
overwhelmingly to the fact that the assassins were from Hezbollah, the militant
Party of God that is largely sponsored by Syria and Iran. CBC News has obtained
cellphone and other telecommunications evidence that is at the core of the case.
UN investigators came to believe their inquiry was penetrated early by Hezbollah
and that that the commission's lax security likely led to the murder of a young,
dedicated Lebanese policeman who had largely cracked the case on his own and was
co-operating with the international inquiry.
UN commission insiders also suspected Hariri's own chief of protocol at the
time, a man who now heads Lebanon's intelligence service, of colluding with
Hezbollah. But those suspicions, laid out in an extensive internal memo, were
not pursued, basically for diplomatic reasons.
In its first months, the UN inquiry had actually appeared promising. The first
commissioner, a German judge named Detlev Mehlis, quickly delivered a blistering
report suggesting Syria had ordered, if not actually carried out, the hit.
Unspecified agents, Mehlis contended, had done the deed. But Mehlis's successor,
a Belgian prosecutor named Serge Brammertz, seemed to be more interested in
avoiding controversy than in pursuing any sort of serious investigation, at
least according to people who worked for him. Under his leadership, the
commission spent most of its time chasing what turned out to be false leads and
disproving wild conspiracy theories. That isn't to say the commission didn't
have some good investigators. It did. In fact, it had a handful of the best that
Western police agencies had to offer. But Brammertz could not be persuaded to
authorize the one technique that those investigators wanted above all to deploy:
telecommunications analysis, probably the single most important
intelligence-gathering tool in modern times. Telecommunications analysts use
powerful computers and highly sophisticated software to sift through millions of
phone calls, seeking patterns, referencing and cross-referencing, identifying
networks and associations.
Police forces call it "telecomms." Spy agencies call it "sigint." It leads to
convictions in courts and missile strikes in places like Afghanistan and Yemen.
Unbelievably, though, the UN commission in Lebanon did no telecom analysis at
all for most of its first three years of existence. It wasn't until Brammertz
was nearing the end of his term that one particularly dogged detective prodded
him into letting the inquiry start examining phone records.
The breakthrough
At that point, in October of 2007, things began moving fast. Commission staff
actually managed to obtain the records of every single phone call made in
Lebanon the year of Hariri's murder — a stunning amount of data — and brought in
a British firm called FTS to carry out the specialized analysis. Follow the
networks. Investigators created a chart that showed the ever expanding
connections between the suspected hit team and other cellphone carriers. UN
clerks worked day and night inputting data into a program called IBase. Then, in
December, a specialist from FTS began examining what the computer was spitting
out. Within two days, he called the UN investigators together. He had identified
a small network of mobile phones, eight in all, that had been shadowing Hariri
in the weeks prior to his death. It was the single biggest breakthrough the
commission had accomplished since its formation — "earth-shattering," in the
words of one of the people in the room the day the network was identified. What
the British analyst showed them was nothing less than the hit squad that had
carried out the murder, or at least the phones they'd been carrying at the time.
For the first time, commission investigators were staring at their quarry. The
trouble was, the traces were now nearly three years old, long past the "golden
hour" for harvesting the best clues. Still, it was something. And when the
investigators began their due diligence, double-checking their work, there was
another revelation, this one even more earth-shattering.
Someone digging though the commission's records turned up a report from a
mid-ranking Lebanese policeman that had been sent over to the UN offices nearly
a year and a half earlier, in the first months of 2006. Not only had the
policeman identified what the UN would eventually dub the "red network" — the
hit team — he had discovered much more. He had found the networks behind the
networks. In fact, he'd uncovered a complex, disciplined plot that had been at
least a year in the planning, and he had already questioned suspects. What's
more, everything he'd discovered pointed to one culprit: Hezbollah, the Party of
God. All of this was in the policeman's report, which he had dutifully sent to
the UN officials with whom he was supposed to be partnering. And the UN
commission had promptly lost it.
Before his violent death in 2008, Wissam Eid was an unusual figure in the murky,
often corrupt world of Arab policing. He had never actually wanted to be a
policeman, or an intelligence officer. In authoritarian Arab society, he had no
interest in becoming an authority figure. And yet, he'd had no choice. Eid was
killed by a car bomb on Jan. 25, 2008, along with his bodyguard and three
others, shortly after agreeing to help UN investigators. When he was doing his
military service in the 1990s, the ISF, Lebanon's all-encompassing security
force, noticed Eid's degree in computer engineering. The security service was
then trying to build an information technology department. And that was that.
"He was a patriot," says his father Mahmoud, sitting in the living room of the
family home in Deir Ammar, on the outskirts of Tripoli. The centerpiece of the
room is, in the Arab way, a shrine to their son. The young man's intense,
chiselled countenance stares back at visitors over commendations and
testimonials.
His mother Samira, a picture of Islamic dignity, is a religious person. It helps
with the grief. The rest of her family is not particularly observant. But they
all understand the savage realities of their country and how those realities
clashed with Eid's unyielding pursuit of some of the most dangerous people in
the world. By the time Hariri was killed in 2005, Eid was a captain in the ISF.
His boss, Lt.-Col. Samer Shehadeh, brought him into the investigation. It was a
Lebanese investigation, Eid was told, but it was also a UN one. Eid was to
co-operate with the foreigners working out of the old abandoned hotel in the
hills above Beirut.
Process of elimination
Capt. Eid, though, wasn't interested in delving into some of the wilder theories
making the rounds in Lebanon. He reasoned that finding the first traces of the
killers was a process of elimination. From Lebanon's phone companies, he
obtained the call records of all the cellphones that had registered with the
cell towers in the immediate vicinity of the Hotel St. George, where the massive
blast had torn a deep crater. Once Eid had those records, he began thinning out
the hundreds of phones in the area that morning, subtracting those held by each
of the 22 dead, then those in Hariri's entourage, then those of people nearby
who had been interviewed and had alibis. Soon enough, he had found the "red"
phones the hit team had used. But he didn't stop there. Exhaustively tracking
which towers the red phones had "shaken hands with" in the days before the
assassination, and comparing those records to Hariri's schedule, he discovered
that this network had been shadowing the former PM. The red-phone carriers were
clearly a disciplined group. They communicated with one another and almost never
with an outside phone. And directly after the assassination, the red network
went dead forever.
Capt. Eid, at work at his ISF office, from a videotape his brother made. A
computer specialist, he had the kind of mind that could see intricate patterns.
(Courtesy Eid family/CBC) But Eid had found another connection. He eventually
identified eight other phones that had for months simultaneously used the same
cell towers as the red phones.
Signals intelligence professionals call these "co-location" phones.
What Capt. Eid had discovered was that everyone on the hit team had carried a
second phone, and that the team members had used their second phones to
communicate with a much larger support network that had been in existence for at
least a year.
Eventually, the UN would label that group the "blue" network.
More networks
The blue network also exercised considerable discipline. It, too, remained a
"closed" network. Not once did any blue-network member make the sort of slip
that telecom sleuths look for.
But these people also carried co-location phones and Eid kept following the
ever-widening trail of crumbs.
The big break came when the blue network was closed down and the phones were
collected by a minor electronics specialist who worked for Hezbollah, Abd al
Majid al Ghamloush.
Ghamloush was, in the words of one former UN investigator, "an idiot."
Given the job of collecting and disposing of the blue phones, he noticed some
still had time remaining on them and used one to call his girlfriend, Sawan, in
the process basically identifying himself to Capt. Eid. He might as well have
written his name on a whiteboard and held it up outside ISF headquarters.
Ghamloush's stupidity eventually led Eid to a pair of brothers named Hussein and
Mouin Khreis, both Hezbollah operatives. One of them had actually been at the
site of the blast.
Capt. Eid kept going, identifying more and more phones directly or indirectly
associated with the hit team. He found the core of a third network, a
longer-term surveillance team that would eventually be dubbed the "yellows."
Eid's work would also lead to another discovery: Everything connected, however
elliptically, to land lines inside Hezbollah's Great Prophet Hospital in South
Beirut, a sector of the city entirely controlled by the Party of God.
Lebanese officials inspect the aftermath of an attempt on the life of Lt.-Col.
Samer Shedaheh, Eid's boss at the ISF. Shedaheh survived the car bomb attack,
near Sidon, in September 2006 and was sent to Canada for treatment and
resettlement. (Kamel Jabe/Reuters) It has long been said that the fundamentalist
fighters operate a command centre in the hospital.
Eventually, telecom sleuths would identify another network of four so-called
"pink phones" that had been communicating both with the hospital and,
indirectly, with the other networks.
These phones turned out to be tremendously important. It turned out they had
been issued by the Lebanese government itself and when the ministry of
communications was queried about who they had been issued to, the answer came
back in the form of a bland government record.
CBC has obtained a copy of this record provided to the commission. On it,
someone has highlighted four entries in a long column of six-digit numbers.
Beside the highlighted numbers, in Arabic, was the word "Hezbollah."
Hezbollah has several seats in the Lebanese legislature and at the time had been
part of a governing coalition, hence the government-issued phones.
Finally, Eid was handed a clue from the best source possible: He was contacted
by Hezbollah itself and told that some of the phones he was chasing were being
used by Hezbollah agents conducting a counter-espionage operation against
Israel's Mossad spy agency and that he needed to back off.
The warning could not have been more clear.
As though to underscore it, Eid's boss, Lt.-Col. Shehadeh, was targeted by
bombers in September 2006. The blast killed four of his bodyguards and nearly
killed Shehadeh, who was sent to Quebec for medical treatment and resettlement.
By that time, Capt. Eid had sent his report to the UN inquiry and moved on to
another operation.
The Eid report was entered into the UN's database by someone who either didn't
understand it or didn't care enough to bring it forward. It disappeared.
Mixed with shame
A year and a half later, in December 2007, when the Eid report finally
resurfaced, the immediate reaction of the UN telecom team was embarrassment. And
then suspicion.
Eid claimed to have performed his analysis using nothing but Excel spreadsheets
and that, said the British specialist, was impossible.
No one, he declared, could accomplish such a thing without powerful computer
assistance and the requisite training. No amateur, which is how the specialists
regarded Eid, could possibly have waded through the millions of possible
permutations posed by the phone records and extracted individual networks.
Assassination central
The car-bombing of Rafik Hariri in 2005 was by no means an isolated incident in
Lebanon's troubled history. Since 1977, at least a dozen prominent political
leaders have been assassinated, including president Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and
prime minister Rashid Karami in 1987.
Gemayel's nephew, Pierre Gemayel, a leader in the Christian Phalangist party and
the minister of industry at the time, was killed by a car bomb in November 2006,
a year and half after Hariri and when Hezbollah was in the midst of quitting the
pro-unity government in a protest against the UN special tribunal.
The most recent outbreak of large-scale sectarian violence was in January and
February 2008 when armed militias, made up of those like the pro-government
Sunni gunman pictured above, fought in the streets of Tripoli and other large
centres.
This Capt. Eid must have had help, thought the telecom experts. Someone must
have given him this information. Perhaps he was involved somehow?
By now it was January 2008. A new UN commissioner was in charge, a Canadian
justice official named Daniel Bellemare. Investigators were finally beginning to
believe they were getting somewhere.
A deputation of telecom experts was dispatched to meet Eid. They questioned him
and returned convinced that, somehow, he had indeed identified the networks
himself.
Eid appeared to be one of those people who could intuit mathematical patterns,
the sort who thinks several moves ahead in chess. Even better, he was willing to
help directly. He wanted Hariri's killers to face justice, Hezbollah's warning
be damned.
It was an exciting prospect for the UN team. Here was an actual Lebanese
investigator, with insights and contacts the UN foreigners could never match.
A week later, a larger UN team met with Capt. Eid and, again, all went well.
Then, the next day, Jan. 25, 2008, eight days after his first meeting with the
UN investigators, Capt. Wissam Eid met precisely the same fate as Hariri. The
bomb that ripped apart his four-wheel-drive vehicle also killed his bodyguard
and three innocent bystanders.
Lebanon gave Eid a televised funeral and, at the UN inquiry, there was outrage
as well. But mixed with shame.
Because there was no doubt in the mind of any member of the telecom team why Eid
had died: Hezbollah, they deduced, had found out that Capt. Eid's report had
been discovered, that he'd met with the UN investigators and that he had agreed
to work with them.
Immediately, the telecom team had the records of the cell towers near the Eid
blast site collected, reasoning the killers might once again have left digital
footprints they could follow.
Not this time, though. There was nothing. This time the killers did what they
should have been doing all along: They'd used radios, not cellphones. Radios
don't leave a trace.
That left the UN team with the obvious problem. Their adversary obviously knew
not only what the UN investigators were doing, but knew in considerable detail.
And the more the UN investigators thought about it, the more they focused on one
man: Col. Wissam al Hassan, the new head of Lebanese intelligence.
In the tradition of Middle Eastern intelligence chiefs, Col. Hassan is a
puzzling, even feared figure in his own country.
He was on the UN radar from the beginning, for two reasons: He quickly became
one of the inquiry's main liaisons with the ISF; plus he was in charge of
Hariri's security at the time of the assassination.
Except he hadn't been in the convoy the day of the blast. And his alibi was
flimsy, to put it mildly.
Col. Wissam Hassan, the ISF intelligence chief who was Hariri's chief of
protocol at the time of the bombing. (CBC) On July 9, 2005, Col. Hassan told UN
investigators that he was enrolled in a computer course, Management Social et
Humaine, at Lebanese University.
He said that on the day before the assassination, Feb. 13, he had received a
call from his professor, Yahya Rabih, informing him he was required to sit for
an exam the next day.
Twenty minutes later, he told investigators, Hariri had phoned, summoning him.
Col. Hassan said he arrived at Hariri's residence at 9:30 that evening and
obtained his boss's permission to attend the exam the next day.
He spent the entire next morning studying for the exam, he told the UN, and
turned off his phone when he entered the university, which was at just about the
time Hariri died.
"If I wasn't sitting for that exam," Hassan told investigators, "I would have
been with Mr. Hariri" when he died.
A different story
But Hassan's phone records told another story entirely.
In fact, it was Col. Hassan who called the professor, not the other way around.
And Hassan placed the call half an hour after he had met Hariri earlier in the
evening.
UN investigators prepared a report on Col. Hassan in late 2008 that challenged
his alibi and recommended that he be brought in for detailed questioning.
(Report opens in a separate window.)
The cell towers around Hassan's home also showed that the next day Col. Hassan
spent the hours before Hariri's assassination, the time he was supposedly
studying, on the phone.
He made 24 calls, an average of one every nine minutes.
What was also disturbing the UN investigators was that high security officials
in Lebanon don't normally sit for exams.
"His alibi is weak and inconsistent," says a confidential UN report that labels
Hassan a "possible suspect in the Hariri murder."
That report, obtained by CBC News, was prepared in late 2008 for Garry Loeppky,
a former senior RCMP official who had taken over as the UN's chief investigator
that summer.
Hassan's alibi, said the document, "does not appear to have been independently
verified."
That hadn't been for lack of desire on the part of UN investigators. They'd
wanted to check out Hassan's alibi, to "get in his face," in the words of one
former detective, and pick apart his story.
Exile without end
Lebanon's vicious sectarian strife since the end of the Second World War cannot
be fully understood without reference to the influx of Palestinian refugees who
flooded into the country following the creation of Israel in 1948 and the
Arab-Israeli War in 1967.
Recently, the CBC's Nahlah Ayed and colleagues from Radio-Canada spent some
considerable time in Lebanon documenting the history and plight of these
refugees and what they represent for the future of the region.
Their stories can be read and viewed in our special report: Exile without end:
Palestinians in Lebanon.
At the very least, they wanted to contact Rabih, the professor.
But Brammertz, the second UN commissioner, flatly ruled that out. He considered
Hassan too valuable a contact and any such investigation as too disruptive.
'Might damage relations'
The confidential report concedes that investigating Hassan could have its
drawbacks: "It may damage the commission's relations with the ISF, and if he was
somehow involved in the Hariri murder, the network might resolve to eliminate
him."
Nonetheless, the report states that Col. Hassan "is a key interlocutor for the
commission. He is in a unique position to influence our investigation. As such,
questions regarding his loyalty and intentions should be resolved.
"Therefore, it is recommended that WAH be investigated quietly."
But even that wasn't done. The UN commission's management ignored the
recommendation.
Former UN investigators remain suspicious to this day of Hassan, who, they note,
was eventually cut out of the inquiry's loop.
But Hassan did become Capt. Eid's boss after the Hariri assassination. He
certainly would have known about the sudden interest in the Eid report, and the
meetings.
"He was an unsavory character," a former senior UN official said. "I don't think
he participated in the murder, but there's no way of telling what he knew."
"He rose, at the very least, to the level of a person of interest," said
another.
Reached in Lebanon today, al Hassan repeatedly declined comment.
More calls
Though told to back off, UN investigators nevertheless had managed to collect
Hassan's phone records for late 2004 and all of 2005.
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Nasrallah (left) and his top aide, Hussein Khalil
(second from left), present a gift rifle to the head of the Syrian intelligence
service to Lebanon, Rustom Ghazali (far right) in April 2005, two months after
the Hariri murder and only days before Syria would pull the last of its troops
from Lebanon. Looking on is Lebanese Gen. Fayed al-Haffar. According to UN
investigators, Khalil and Col. Hassan exchanged numerous phone calls in 2004 and
2005. (Reuters photo) In that time, he had 279 discussions with Hussein Khalil,
the principal deputy of Hezbollah chieftain Hassan Nasrallah. Khalil in turn
spoke 602 times to Wafik Safa, who is known in intelligence circles as the hard
man who runs Hezbollah's internal security department.
No one asked Hassan about those calls, either.
Hassan, though, also has his defenders. He remains a close ally of Hariri's son
Saad, the current Lebanese prime minister.
Also, former U.S. officials, some of whom were in the Oval Office when then
president George W. Bush vented his frustration with the commission's apparent
incompetence, maintain that Hassan is in fact a bitter enemy of Hezbollah, and
casting suspicion on him merely plays into the group's hands.
That this particular UN memo about Hassan was ever written, says one former
American security official, is evidence that the commission hadn't the slightest
idea what it was doing.
Several former UN investigators, though, are unanimous. They believe Hezbollah
infiltrated the commission and used Hassan in the process.
"He lied to us on the alibi," says one. "He should have died in the convoy.
That's the question mark."
Nearly six years have now passed since Hariri's assassination. The UN mandate
was eventually expanded to include nine untargeted public bombings and 11
targeted attacks and assassinations, including that of Capt. Eid.
Daniel Bellemare oversaw the commission's transformation into the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, residing in The Hague, and is now its chief prosecutor.
To date, the UN inquiry has reportedly spent in the range of $200 million and
there has been talk for some time now that it is preparing to bring down
indictments, possibly late this year or in early 2011.
Daniel Bellemare, the Canadian prosecutor who heads the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, attends its opening ceremony in The Hague in March 2009. (Michael
Kooren/Reuters) The tribunal currently has an annual budget in excess of $40
million and more than 300 employees from 61 countries. It has a headquarters, a
team of prosecutors, a defence office, judges, clerks, investigators and
research staff, even access to detention facilities, but not a single accused.
Bellemare is singularly uncommunicative about whatever progress has been made,
as was Brammertz. From time to time, Bellemare has assured the Lebanese media
that justice is proceeding, must remain confidential and shouldn't be rushed.
Bellemare refused repeated requests to speak to CBC News about this report.
The commission's telecom team eventually produced a succession of sophisticated
charts depicting the phone networks behind the Hariri killing. CBC News has
obtained a fairly recent iteration.
In recent months, investigators even attached names to some of the red phones
carried by the Hariri hit squad.
But the biggest problem, according to several sources, has been converting the
telecommunications analysis into evidence that will stand up in a court of law.
Will the Canadian get his man? The CBC's Nahlah Ayed interviewed Daniel
Bellemare in March 2009. Her report can be read and viewed here.
That means someone has to find financial records, or witnesses or other
evidence, to actually place the phones in the hands of the alleged perpetrators.
As of mid-2009, sources say, the commission had not done so.
"There was no [corroborating] evidence whatsoever," says one former insider.
"And there was no hope of getting any evidence. Because who are you going to put
on the ground in southern Beirut to go digging around? You can't put anyone on
the ground. It's not possible."
What's more, the commission never used wiretaps, even after it identified
certain phones in networks that hadn't gone dead.
In all likelihood, any formal request to the Lebanese authorities for a phone
tap would have become known in short order to Hezbollah, given its connections.
And Bellemare wouldn't allow his investigators to buy and use eavesdropping
technology on their own.
He had, though, gone cap-in-hand to Washington, looking for help from its
intelligence agencies. There, he met with Bush's national security adviser,
Stephen Hadley, and with then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.
But he was rebuffed. Bellemare had not been Washington's choice for the job and
U.S. officials did not hold him in terribly high regard. They were aware he had
been spending much of his time obsessing over the trappings of his UN offices,
ordering in tailored clothes, boasting about his prosecutorial prowess and
designing a personal coat of arms.
His underlings had watched, bemused, as he dispatched security staff to Beirut's
more fashionable shopping districts to inquire about having the family crest
embossed on pieces of jewelry.
"If I was given to conspiracy theories," said one of Bellemare's former
officials, "I'd think he was deliberately put in there so as not to achieve
anything."
Secret intercepts from intelligence agencies like the CIA or National Security
Agency are not useable in a court such as the UN Special Tribunal. And, knowing
of the leaks and other problems at the UN commission, no intelligence agency in
the West was prepared to hand over such sensitive material.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
Hariri (the son of Rafik) in April 2009, in advance of a critical election. Saad
Hariri has retracted some of his earlier comments about Syrian involvement in
his father's death but the West is still applying pressure. (Bilal
Hussein/Associated Press) When Hadley politely inquired as to what Bellemare
would consider a success — indictments, actual arrests, declarations of official
suspicions? — the Canadian waffled, unable or unwilling to provide a precise
answer.
Meanwhile, back in Lebanon, Hezbollah had begun mounting a campaign to ensure
that gathering supporting evidence would remain next to impossible.
As rumours began surfacing in the Lebanese press that the UN tribunal was
getting close to issuing indictments, Nasrallah, the Hezbollah chief, began
warning that he will simply not tolerate arrests of any of his people.
That's no idle threat. Nasrallah operates a private militia considerably more
powerful than the Lebanese army. And he also demanded that the UN tribunal,
which is partially funded by Lebanon, be dissolved.
In recent months, Nasrallah has taken to claiming that it was actually Israel
that killed Hariri.
More than one former UN investigator believes that should the telecommunications
evidence ever be put before the Lebanese public, Nasrallah will acknowledge that
his operatives were on the street when Hariri died, but claim that they were
there chasing Israeli assassins.
Nothing the UN has uncovered points remotely at Israel. Everything points at
Hezbollah. But invoking Israel always gains traction in the Arab world.
Backing off
One formerly senior official with the commission says "considerable progress"
was made during the most recent months of Bellemare's term in gathering evidence
to support the telecommunications work. But, he concedes, the evidence is still
largely circumstantial.
That may be all the excuse that Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his political
allies need to let this commission die.
Saad Hariri and his supporters originally blamed Syria for the assassination.
But they've been backpedaling in recent months. Hariri recently exonerated
Syria, repudiating his own sworn statement to UN investigators in 2005.
He has also called for an investigation of Nasrallah's claims that Israel killed
his father.
Detlev Mehlis, the first UN commissioner, told CBC News recently that it has
always been obvious Syria ordered the Hariri hit. That it would use Hezbollah,
its long-time proxy, he says, is only logical.
The elder Hariri, Mehlis noted, had pushed not just for a Syrian withdrawal but
also for the disarming of Hezbollah's feared militia.
Scott Carpenter, a former Bush administration official dispatched by the White
House to Lebanon in the wake of Hariri's death, also says the reality is
obvious.
But, he adds: "Is Hezbollah going to get away with it? Yes. Fewer travesties
will be greater, but I don't see where the international will is to take this
on, and I certainly don't see, absent that international will, how the Lebanese
people can take it on."
A martyr remembered
Capt. Eid, who was posthumously promoted to the rank of major, lies in a grave
not far from the family home in Deir Ammar.
His picture is everywhere in the city, looking down upon streets, cafes and
restaurants. He is uniformly described as a martyr to his country.
His family has precious little by which to remember him. A few photos, a
scrapbook of news stories about his death, and a few minutes of amateur video.
Capt. Wissam Eid with his mother, Samira, from a video his brother made when the
two brothers sensed his days might be numbered. (CBC) Mohammed Eid says that by
late 2007, his older brother had begun living in his office, convinced he
probably didn't have much longer to live.
He asked Mohammed to make the video, which depicts him working at his desk in
the ISF's Beirut headquarters. In it, he banters with people off-screen; it is
unremarkable footage, but haunting to anyone who knows his story.
Eid's mother, Samira, says her son was a gift to their country and believes
that, as a martyr, he remains with her eternally.
"If we have a few other Wissams in Lebanon, the country will be just fine," she
says. Her husband just stares sadly into space.
She and her husband and their three surviving sons know almost certainly who
killed Wissam.
But this is Lebanon, and they understand the consequences of talking about that.
"I cannot open my mouth," she says, "because we have other young men to
protect."
Mohammed Eid says the family has even come to realize that Lebanon could pay a
bloody price if his brother's murderers are ever charged. "C'est pas le moment,"
he says, in the family's second language.
But of his brother's investigative skill, the family has no doubt.
In 2009, before the UN inquiry packed up and left for The Hague, an Australian
prosecutor named Raelene Sharp, who'd been working for the commission, paid the
Eid family a surprise visit.
She wept, as she told them that without their son, the commission would be
nowhere.
An increase in the number of immigrants and converts to Islam in France wearing the full-face cover had set off alarm bells about indigenous culture and traditions,[4] and the prolonged parliamentary debates preceding the vote had centered on fears for the future of French values and the republic. How well founded were these fears? And why did the government decide to predicate the ban on a religiously and ethnically-neutral rationale rather than on the actual considerations underlying it?
The 577-seat National Assembly approved the law with 335 votes to one out of a total of 339 votes. After having been amended, the bill set a maximum of a €150 fine per breach and penalties of up to €30,000 and a year in jail (doubled if the victim is a minor) for anyone forcing a person to cover his or her face in public.[5] "Democracy thrives when it is open-faced," enthused Alliot-Marie.[6]
Opponents of the bill quickly pointed to the small number of women wearing the burqa and the niqab; and indeed, a 2009 Ministry of the Interior study estimated the number of women wearing the burqa and the niqab at 1,900, including 270 living in French territories overseas.[7] Yet it was not the scope of the phenomenon that alarmed both parliamentarians and the public at large—a Pew Research Center poll done in April and May 2010 found that 82 percent of French voters favored the ban[8]—but rather its underlying trends, notably that two-thirds of niqab and burqa wearing women were of French nationality, including many second and third generation immigrants.
The bill put France at the forefront of proactive states within the European Union, alongside Belgium, which had passed a similar law on April 29, 2010.[9] The Spanish government, after some local initiatives to ban full-face covers in public buildings, intends to present a law on the freedom of religion that will restrict their use in public places.[10] In Germany, there is no general prohibition on concealing the face though the issue has been hotly debated for quite some time, and a few local bans, especially in schools, have taken place. In Denmark, wearing the burqa and the niqab in public places has been restricted since January 2010 while in the Netherlands, several bills prohibiting the burqa and the niqab, notably in the education and public sectors, are under preparation. In Britain, by contrast, the newly-formed Conservative-Liberal-Democrat coalition seems to have taken a rather contrarian approach; Immigration Minister Damian Green precluded such a move as "rather un-British" while Environment Secretary Caroline Spelman suggested that wearing the burqa could be seen as an "empowering" feminist statement.[11]
This diversity of official attitudes and legislative approaches underlines the relative absence of an official EU position as Brussels prefers to leave its member states the wiggle room to legislate on the matter so long as they respect the European Convention on Human Rights. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights had its say in 2005 in response to a writ by a Turkish student who objected to the burqa ban at the University of Istanbul. The court stipulated that freedom of conscience, protected by article 9 of the convention, "does not always guarantee the right to behave in a manner governed by a religious belief and does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified."[12] A later attempt by Turkey's Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to pass a regulation allowing the headscarf in universities was struck down by the Turkish Constitutional Court.[13]
In France, a similar "law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools" was passed on March 15, 2004, banning the wearing of the hijab (traditional Muslim headscarf) in public primary and secondary schools, alongside other symbols including crosses and the Star of David, and other clothing denoting religious affiliation. But, since the wearing of the full-face cover was almost nonexistent in the early 2000s, no additional law on the matter was passed until July 2010.
To be sure, in June 2009, following violent protests at NATO's sixtieth anniversary summit in Strasbourg, a decree relating to illicit concealment of the face during public demonstrations was passed but was, at the time, aimed primarily at masked delinquents.[14] It was only after a string of recent incidents involving women with full-face coverings—refusal of a wedding by a mayor,[15] denial of French citizenship for wearing the burqa,[16] the booking of the first woman driver for wearing the niqab—that the wearing of these attires became a hot public issue.
Appearances, however, are often deceiving. Rather than the hasty outcome of vigorous public debate, the government's bill was the result of much longer and more deliberative discussions on the legal, cultural, religious, political, and social aspects of legislating a ban, discussions which had begun in the French National Assembly two years earlier. These deliberations convinced the government to change the legal basis used to ban the niqab and burqa from the principles of secularism, gender equality, and other principles of a liberal democracy to the more politically correct and less contentious justification of maintaining public order.
The first bill dealing with niqab banning was the so-called proposal No. 1121 "to fight against attacks on women's dignity from certain religious practices," presented by Member of Parliament (MP) Jacques Myard on September 23, 2008.[17] In the explanatory memorandum introducing the bill, Myard pointed to the March 2004 school ban, noting that its application had not created any "major incident." If the hijab was considered "a distinctive and proselytizing" sign, he reasoned, surely the niqab could not but be viewed in the same vein. While carefully refraining from targeting the full-body cover directly, he recalled the June 27, 2008 decision of the State Council validating a decree that had refused French citizenship to a Moroccan Muslim on the grounds that she was wearing the burqa. The decree had defined such dress as incompatible with the basic values of the French community, notably the principle of gender equality.
The proposed bill suggested a €15,000 fine and two months' imprisonment for anyone on French territory concealing his or her face or encouraging others to do so, thus legislating two offenses punishable by the law. The bill stipulated the doubling of sentences for repeat offenders and allowed authorities to deport foreign offenders. It also noted that the prohibition referred to the "concealment of the face" and not to the wearing of any special garment. Though specifically referenced in the explanatory memorandum introducing the bill, neither the burqa nor the niqab, nor for that matter Islam, were mentioned in the bill itself.
Myard's bill raised the question of restricting certain religious practices protected by French laws and the French constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet it provoked little public reaction,[18] probably because of the global financial crisis, which consumed the public's attention at the time. Not having been vetted previously by the Commission of Constitutional Laws, Legislation, Universal Suffrage, the Rules and General Administration (commonly called the Law Commission), the proposal was not reviewed by the National Assembly, which would eventually discuss only the government bill.[19] Yet it outlined the general gist of the debate in clear and unequivocal terms: The burqa and the niqab were clothes flaunting religious extremism that threatened the principle of laicism.
Almost a year later, on June 9, 2009, MP André Gerin and eighty members of all political persuasions (including Myard) proposed a resolution to the National Assembly "for the establishment of a commission of inquiry on the practice of wearing the burqa or the niqab on the national territory."[20] The memorandum included the content of the September 2008 proposal but went a step further by explaining the present state of laicism in France and by commenting on current Islamic dress habits. The text spoke of "threatened … laicism" and evidenced the statements of a French imam in 2004 "in favor of corporal punishment for adulterous wives" as an example of where French Muslims could be heading. Regarding the niqab and the burqa, it said that they were "virtual, itinerant prisons" putting women who wore them "in a situation of imprisonment, and unbearable exclusion and humiliation." The MPs further stressed: "We also know that to this dress is added a degrading submission to their husbands, the men of their family, and a denial of their own citizenship." Finally, the proposed resolution recalled the September 15, 2008 decision of the High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality. This decision confirmed the requirement to remove the burqa during a language course given by the National Agency for Welcoming Foreigners and Migrations as part of a welcome and integration contract—an optional contract mainly consisting of a day's civic training presentation and an individual meeting with a social assessor, which foreigners admitted to reside on French territory and wishing to settle permanently can sign to show their willingness to integrate.
On June 23, 2009, the requested commission of inquiry comprising thirty members was created to study the practice of wearing the "full veil." Neither the burqa nor the niqab were mentioned in its mandate, as the expression "full veil" was considered more neutral and general.
On January 26, 2010, after six months of investigation, including the testimony of more than two hundred people in France's major cities—of which about 10 percent were key figures of the Muslim community such as Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, or international public figures such as Tariq Ramadan—the committee published its conclusions in the form of a 650-page report.[21] After a lengthy exposition on the historical and cultural aspects of the dress code in Middle Eastern societies, as well as a psycho-sociological examination of these practices, and a comparative legal study of twelve countries—ten European countries plus the United States and Canada—the report concluded that wearing the full-face cover affected "basic [French] values as expressed in the motto—freedom, equality, fraternity—and poses a challenge to [the] republic." Although the commission admitted internal divergences over details, the final conclusion underscored multiparty consensus among its members regarding the need for legislation.[22]
Meanwhile, on July 27, 2009, fifty-four senators presented a proposal "to allow [for] the recognition and identification of persons."[23] The proposed law prohibited an "item of clothing of someone in the public space that prevents their recognition and identification" and punished violations by one month's imprisonment. Terms like the niqab or the burqa, and even "full veil," were visibly absent from the explanatory memorandum, yet upon closer examination, it was evident that these clothes had been taken into account in drafting the bill. Indeed, the preamble invoked article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which allows the restriction of religious freedoms to ensure public safety, indicating that the senators braced themselves for any religious opposition that could arise from this legislation. Basing itself on the legal concept of respect for public order, this bill clearly stood out from Myard's September 2008 proposal, which had referenced religious and ethical rationales.
On February 5, 2010, MPs of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement proposed a bill "to prohibit the wearing of uniforms or accessories that have the effect of concealing the face in public places and on public roads."[24] In its preamble, the bill referred to acts of masked delinquency and to the practice of wearing the niqab. The proposal's main significance lay in its second article, which specified penalties on law violations. Unlike the two previously suggested bills, the latest proposal treated violations as misdemeanors, whose specific details were to be decided later by decree. This created a glaring contradiction between, on the one hand, the explanatory memorandum emphasizing the dangers posed by fully-covered persons, such as the growing threat of terrorism, threats to public order, and sexual discrimination, and, on the other, the lightness of the proposed sentence, making wearing the full-face veil the least serious possible type of infraction in France.
Four days later, Senator Jean-Louis Masson underscored the evolution of the "law and order" basis for proposed legislation on the full-face cover by presenting his bill "to prohibit the wearing of uniforms hiding the face of persons in public places."[25] In Masson's opinion, it was impossible to legislate a ban on religious dress because of the principle of laicism which prohibited state interference in individual religious choices. However, public order could be invoked without "specifically targeting the full veil worn by Muslim women." While using the justification of public order as its underlying rationale, this proposal differed from the February 5 version by imposing one fine on women wearing the full-face cover for religious reasons and another for lawbreakers hiding their faces while perpetrating a crime. This differentiated penalty system stipulated a single €5,000 fine for the simple concealment of the face (an offence that clearly applied to those wearing the niqab or the burqa), as opposed to a three-month imprisonment for masked criminals.
On April 27, 2010, the Union for a Popular Movement came up with a new proposal, this time for a resolution on "the commitment to respect republican values against growing radical practices that could undermine them." By way of strengthening its case, the proposal relied on six pieces of landmark legislation: the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the preamble to the French 1946 constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 1950, the 1979 U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of December 2000, as entered into force on December 1, 2009, and in particular article 20. Having concluded that the full-face cover was a radical and discriminatory practice against women and that the principle of freedom of religion did not justify it, the French National Assembly reaffirmed its intention to implement all appropriate means "to ensure the effective protection of women who suffer violence or pressure, in particular women being forced to wear a full veil."[26]
Although the resolution's single article was not legally binding, it underscored the clear discrepancy between the principles it reasserted and the rationale used in the previous bills. Indeed, in a report that had been ordered by the prime minister and handed to him on March 30, 2010, the Council of State, advising the government on legal affairs, including the preparation of bills, ordinances, and certain decrees, argued that a total ban of the full-face cover on French territory "could find no unassailable legal basis."[27]
This was not what most MPs thought. A study published in May by the National Assembly described the wearing of the full-face veil as "self-denial and a denial of others [that] forbids the establishment of a relationship between people. This practice carries in itself a symbolic violence which destabilizes the social pact." Concealment of the face was not only an attack on the dignity of the human person that "attests to a fundamentally inequitable vision of relations between men and women," the study added, but was also "a source of threats to public order."[28]
This parliamentary discussion was eventually followed by the submission of the government's bill on May 19, 2010, for a total ban on the niqab in all public spaces and not just in places where public services were offered. The bill described the wearing of the niqab as "symbolic violence" that ran counter to the "republican social contract" thus causing a disturbance to "the public order."[29] Based on the jurisprudence of the Council of State, the bill stressed that "certain practices, even [if] lawful" might be "contrary to human dignity" and could therefore be prohibited.[30] As such, it provided for a total ban on wearing any clothing hiding the face.
The bill added the possibility of requiring offenders to serve a probationary period of citizenship. However, its uniqueness lay in its far stricter penalization of persons forcing women to cover their face than the female violators themselves, imposing a €15,000 fine and one year imprisonment on perpetrators. Previously, only the 2008 Myard proposal had targeted people other than those actually hiding their faces.
Socialist opposition parties responded by submitting their own bill[31] the next day—the last proposed bill in the run-up to the July 2010 resolution. The opposition MPs argued against a "burqa ban" in all public spaces, citing the March 30, 2010 opinion of the Council of State which expressed doubts about the "possibilities of [a] legal ban on wearing the full veil." They also referred to a February 2010 assertion by the European Court of Human Rights whereby "to condemn [people] for wearing these clothes falls under the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention, which protects, inter alia, freedom to manifest religious beliefs."[32] In the opposition's proposal, only places of public service would be affected by the ban and only if the identification of the person in those places was deemed necessary. The difference was significant because public places (parks, shops, streets) were to be excluded except in cases where chiefs of police invoked public safety concerns as a justification for prohibiting face concealment.
Despite the sweeping support for the ban in parliament where the burqa and the niqab were seen as contravening the principle of "vivre ensemble" (living together), some segments of the media, together with politicians from the opposition, sought to promote their own beliefs by deriding the ban as a political ploy aimed at creating a diversion.[33] After accusations by Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux that the husband of a woman driver booked for wearing the niqab was also guilty of polygamy and cheating on welfare, the case turned into a political squabble that exacerbated the already polemical "grand debate on national identity"[34] launched by the government in November 2009. Conducted on a national scale until January 2010, the debate generated considerable controversy and drifted into other spheres not directly relevant to the issue such as "national identity" and "immigration."[35]
Indeed, the debate initially meant "to address the concerns raised by the resurgence of certain communitarianisms," of which the case of the burqa was one example, and aimed at making all French citizens think carefully about what it means in the early twenty-first century to be French. [36]
An Internet website allowed anyone to contribute to the debate by consulting a textual database and glancing at the positions taken by leading figures as well as to respond to a questionnaire or to provide reflections. The debate was also conducted locally through meetings in each of the 96 departments and 342 districts in mainland France and in the departments and territories overseas. These meetings were chaired by local civil servants or by one or more national parliamentarians, MPs, or senators.[37]
However, the debate on national identity was strongly denounced by various parties from the opposition. Even though "the government said that more than 58,000 people [had] participated in the debate on an Internet site,"[38] a poll conducted in January 2010 showed that only 22.2 percent of the French found the debate "constructive" while 53.4 percent thought it was an "electioneering move."[39]
Does the vehemence of some media criticism imply that the banning of the niqab and the burqa is too sensitive and too complex an issue to be determined by law? Quite the reverse in fact. The question of whether France should legally ban the wearing of the full-face cover on its territory was answered in the affirmative, resoundingly and unequivocally, during parliamentary debates held over the past two years. The only remaining problems for its enactment are more a matter of form over substance, namely, what will be the best rationale for this legislation?
Nor should lingering doubts about the bill's constitutionality be overstated. While the media rarely tires of reiterating the possibility of the French Constitutional Council or the European Court of Human Rights ruling against a ban—a ruling presented by opponents as a possible propaganda coup for religious extremists[40]—this eventuality is highly unlikely. An EU decision to invalidate the French ban would have to be based on the unlawfulness of the government's bill or some of its provisions. Yet this possibility has been fully anticipated by the government which, by changing the bill's rationale from the principles of secularism or the dignity of women to public order, has greatly reduced the likelihood of invalidation. Moreover, and contrary to the received wisdom in the media and press,[41] the extent of the prohibition specified in article 2 of the government's bill is not fully challenged by the Council of State's ruling. Although the council found no "unassailable legal basis" for a total ban, it does not automatically follow that such a ban would be unconstitutional. Furthermore, Belgium's April 2010 ban on face-concealing attire in public spaces created a powerful precedent and made it easier for other EU states to follow suit.[42]
Thus far the French bill has triggered no reaction from the European Court of Human Rights or the European Commission, which is loathe to legislate on the subject.[43] Years of parliamentary debates preceding the ban may not have provided a definitive answer regarding the validity of a total ban. Nonetheless, they helped delineate the substantial contradictions between the republican principles of secularism, human, and female dignity and those of Islam and its radical drifts. Additionally, the discussions have helped sharpen the legal options available to implement the values that various parliamentarians have sought to affirm so forcefully.
It is precisely these tensions between long-held French notions of religious freedom and governmental disinclination to interfere in the religious sphere that explain why one of the most avowedly secular Western societies has found it so problematic to legislate against dress codes that contradict its ideological ethos, despite overwhelming public support for such measures. Meanwhile, countries where Islam is the state religion, such as Tunisia or Syria, have had few qualms about banning the public donning of the niqab, basing their decisions on a desire to combat what Damascus termed an "ideological invasion"[44] and what Tunis called a "sectarian form of dress which had come into Tunisia uninvited."[45]
Benjamin Ismail holds a degree in Chinese language and civilization and a master of arts in advanced international studies from Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, Paris. He specializes in Sino-Central Asian relations, studying the role that Islam plays.
[1]
No. 675, Sénat, July 13, 2010.
[2] Associated Press,
Sept. 14, 2010.
[3] The New York Times, July 14, 2010.
[4] "Étude
d'impact: interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public,"
Assemblée Nationale, Paris, May 2010.
[5]
No. 675, Sénat, July 13, 2010.
[6] BBC News, July 13, 2010.
[7] "Étude
d'impact," May 2010.
[8] "Widespread
Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe," Pew Global
Attitudes Projects, Washington, D.C., July 8, 2010.
[9] Fox News,
Apr. 29, 2010.
[10] La Croix (Paris),
July 4, 2010.
[11] The Daily Telegraph (London), July
17, 19, 2010.
[12]
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Nov.
10, 2005.
[13] The New York Times, Feb. 10, 2008;
Pierre Tristam, "Turkey
at Loggerheads with Itself over Veil Ban," About.com, June 9, 2008.
[14] Le Monde (Paris),
June 20, 2009.
[15] Le Figaro (Paris),
Oct. 15, 2007.
[16] L'Express (Paris),
July 11, 2008.
[17]
No. 1121, Assemblée Nationale, Sept. 23, 2008.
[18] Centpapiers.com,
Oct. 9, 2008.
[19] This, however, is not an uncommon practice as a mere 10 percent of
proposed bills become laws. They are important, however, in that they alert the
government to the desires and concerns of the MPs, and in this respect Myard's
bill achieved its main objective.
[20]
No. 1725, Assemblée Nationale, June 9, 2009.
[21]
No. 2262, Assemblée Nationale, Jan. 26, 2010.
[22] "Mission
d'information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire
national," Assemblée Nationale, Jan. 26, 2010.
[23]
No. 593, Sénat, July 27, 2009.
[24]
No. 2283, Assemblée Nationale, Feb. 5, 2010.
[25] No. 275, Sénat, Feb. 9, 2010.
[26]
No. 2455, proposition, Assemblée Nationale, Apr. 27, 2010;
No. 459, resolution adopted, Assemblée Nationale, May 11, 2010.
[27] "Étude
relative aux possibilités juridiques d'interdiction du port du voile intégral,"
Conseil d'État, Mar. 30, 2010.
[28] "Étude
d'impact," May 2010.
[29]
No. 2520, Assemblée Nationale, May 19, 2010.
[30]
No. 136727, Conseil d'État, Oct. 27, 1995.
[31]
No. 2544, Assemblée Nationale, May, 20, 2010.
[32] Affaire Ahmet Arslan et autres c.,
Turquie, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Feb. 23, 2010, sect. 2.
[33] Libération (Paris),
Jan. 21, 2010.
[34] "Grand
débat sur l'identité nationale," French Ministry of Immigration,
Integration, National Identity, and United Development, Paris, accessed Aug. 26,
2010.
[35] L'Union (Reims),
Feb. 4, 2010.
[36] "Organisation
du débat," French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity,
and United Development, Paris, accessed Aug. 26, 2010.
[37]
Ibid.
[38] The New York Times,
Feb. 8, 2010.
[39] Le Point (Paris),
Feb. 1, 2010.
[40] No. 2544, Assemblée Nationale, May 20, 2010;
Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris), Mar. 30, 2010;
Reuters,
Jan. 15, 2010.
[41] L'Télégramme (Paris),
May 21, 2010.
[42] Le Monde,
Apr. 29, 2010.
[43] Le Figaro,
June 28, 2010.
[44] ABC News,
July 20, 2010.
[45] Noha Mohammed, "A
Triple Whammy," Egypt Today, Jan. 2007.
Related Topics: Muslims in Europe, Muslims in the West, Sex and gender relations | Fall 2010 MEQ To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East Quarterly, please see details about an affordable subscription. This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.