LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
ِJuly 09/2010

Bible Of the Day
Psalm 17:15/As for me, I shall behold your face in righteousness; when I awake, I shall be satisfied with your likeness. (ESV)
Today's Inspiring Thought: To See His Face
When we awake from this mortal life on earth into newness of life in heaven, we shall behold his face in righteousness—and our souls will be completely satisfied with what—or who—we see. We can look forward to heaven with excitement because we will finally stand before him fully satisfied as we look into his beautiful face.

Free Opinions, Releases, letters, Interviews & Special Reports
Obama’s new approach/By: Eytan Gilboa/July 07/10
Under pressure/Ana Maria Luca and Mona Alami/July 07/10
Potential Lebanese- Israeli Conflict over Natural Gas Revisited/By Ghassan Karam/yalibnan/July 07/10
Analysis: The IDF intel/By YAAKOV KATZ/July 07/10

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July 08/10
Israeli Commander: We Are Ready for Any Attack as Hizbullah Gathers Intelligence on Israel/Naharnet
Report: Top Revolutionary Guard Corps Officer Overseeing Hizbullah Operations/Naharnet
Israel Releases Photos Showing Hizbullah Weapons inside Villages/Naharnet
Syria Secretly Producing Missiles, Part of which to be Sent to Hizbullah, Report/Naharnet
Ban Urges Israel to Withdraw from Ghajar, End Overflights/Naharnet
Security Council Meets Friday to Discuss UNIFIL-Residents Clashes/Naharnet
Security Council Reportedly To Renew UNIFIL's Mandate, Won't Discuss New Rules of Engagement/Naharnet
UNIFIL Meets Villagers Thursday to Reduce Tension/Naharnet
Ban Urges Israel to Withdraw from Ghajar, End Overflights/Naharnet
Harb: Government to Reinforce Army's Presence in South … No Point in Dialogue/Naharnet
CNN Middle East Senior Editor Fired after Praising Fadlallah/Naharnet
Gunmen Open Fire at Makassed Hospital's Emergency Ward/Naharnet
Alloush: Possibilities of War in the Region almost Inevitable, But Not Near/Naharnet
Maliki in Beirut to Condole Fadlallah's Death, Meet Hariri/Naharnet
US backs Lebanon UN mission after incidents/AFP
Hezbollah readying for urban war in southern Lebanon, IDF warns/Ha'aretz
Lebanon loses after clashes with Unifil/National
At the White House, Netanyahu makes his case/Washington Post (blog
Netanyahu meets with Gates, Ban Ki-moon/JPOST
Israel: Hizbullah storing weapons inside southern villages/Daily Star
Christian MPs drafting law to give Palestinians limited rights/Daily Star
Death sought for three in failed Lebanon assassination/AFP
Analysts: Postwar Afghan Political Landscape Unclear/Voice of America
Obama Wants to Engage Syria and Forget About Lebanon/AOL News
MP: UNIFIL's mission is to support Lebanon army, not the resistance/Ya Libnan
Patriarch Sfeir Boycotts Ayatollah Fadlullah's Funeral, Doesn't Give Condolences/ABNA.ir
 

Israel Releases Photos Showing Hizbullah Weapons inside Villages
/Naharnet/Israel's military released maps and aerial photographs showing what it described as a network of Hizbullah weapons depots and command centers inside villages in south Lebanon, near the Israeli border. The Israeli material included detailed maps and 3-D simulations showing individual buildings that the military identified as rocket storehouses. Some were shown to be located close to schools and hospitals.  The rare publication of what seemed to be detailed intelligence material appeared aimed at demonstrating Israel's reach and preparing public opinion for possible strikes inside villages and the attendant civilian casualties if a future round of fighting erupts. In Beirut, a Hizbullah official said he would not comment before seeing the information. Lt. Col. Avital Leibovich, an Israeli military spokeswoman, said the information showed that Hizbullah was increasingly moving its forces inside populated areas. "We are talking about more than 100 villages that have become military camps for Hizbullah, and we see that civilians in these villages will be Hizbullah's human shields if there is a war in the future," she said. Hizbullah attacked an Israeli border patrol in 2006, sparking a monthlong war in which Israel went after the group in a massive air, sea and ground campaign, while Hizbullah launched around 4,000 rockets into Israel. Nearly 1,200 people died in Lebanon and 159 lost their lives in Israel. Israel said Hizbullah's tactics forced the military to operate in heavily populated areas, but the high civilian death toll nonetheless drew heavy criticism of Israel. The war ended with a U.N. resolution that imposed a blockade on weapons destined for Hizbullah and banned the group from operating near the Israeli border. Israel says the resolution and international peacekeeping forces in Lebanon have been largely ineffective. Israel believes Hizbullah has increased its prewar arms stockpile to more than 40,000 rockets. Israeli defense officials say the range of the group's arsenal now includes Israel's main population center in and around Tel Aviv. The border area has been largely quiet since the fighting ended in 2006.(AP) Beirut, 07 Jul 10,

Report: Top Revolutionary Guard Corps Officer Overseeing Hizbullah Operations
Naharnet/Iran has reportedly deployed a top Revolutionary Guard Corps officer in Lebanon to oversee Hizbullah operations on behalf of the Islamic Republic, a senior Israeli officer has said. The man called Hossein Mahadavi maintains an office in Beirut and is a senior member of the Revolutionary Guards' al-Quds Force, which is responsible for Iran's overseas operations, the officer told The Jerusalem Post. His job includes overseeing Hizbullah daily operations and serving as a liaison between Teheran and Beirut, he said. According to the officer, Tehran has bolstered its control over Hizbullah since the 2006 summer war. "We identify more Iranian involvement in Lebanon today.""It is comprehensive and significant," he said. Mahadavi's presence in Lebanon could be connected to the vacuum left following the assassination of Hizbullah's top military commander Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in February 2008, The Jerusalem Post said. The officer told the newspaper that Hizbullah would likely not be able to launch an attack against Israel without Iranian green light. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 10:11

Israeli Commander: We Are Ready for Any Attack as Hizbullah Gathers Intelligence on Israel
Naharnet/The commander of the western brigade at Israel's northern border said Hizbullah is gathering "significant quantities of intelligence" on Israeli forces but expressed readiness to handle any attack. "Hizbullah is hunkering down in the villages. They're gathering significant quantities of intelligence on our forces," said Col. Ronen Marley of Brigade 300, stationed on the Lebanese border. "Every day it is busy digging tunnels and building up communication infrastructure to prepare itself for war," he said. "An event can take place today, or a year from now; I am ready for it to happen by surprise. We are operating in different ways to thwart any event – if one should take place, we will know how to handle it," Marley added.

Syria Secretly Producing Missiles, Part of which to be Sent to Hizbullah, Report
Naharnet/Syria has surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles that would enable it to react in case of an Israeli attack on its territory, the Paris-based Intelligenceonline said. It said Damascus has secretly established a factory for the production of missiles type M-600, adding that there is talk about a joint Syrian-Iranian plan to sent half of these projectiles to Hizbullah. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 10:05

Security Council Reportedly To Renew UNIFIL's Mandate, Won't Discuss New Rules of Engagement
Naharnet/The U.N. Security Council will renew UNIFIL's mandate in south Lebanon "without hesitation" regardless of a request by France for the UNSC to convene an emergency meeting to discuss the latest clashes between U.N. peacekeepers and locals, An-Nahar newspaper reported Thursday. High-ranking diplomatic sources told An-Nahar that efforts will be exerted to deal with France's "annoyance." They said that despite France's request for the Security Council to convene over UNIFIL-residents skirmishes, the UNSC will renew UNIFIL's mandate "without hesitation" during its July 14 meeting. An-Nahar also quoted another source at the Security Council as saying that the UNSC will not discuss new or modified rules of engagement of UNIFIL. The security source said "there is no doubt that Hizbullah has a hand" in the recent incidents in the South. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 08:02

Security Council Meets Friday to Discuss UNIFIL-Residents Clashes
Naharnet/The U.N. Security Council has approved a French request for the UNSC to convene an emergency meeting to discuss the latest skirmishes between UNIFIL troops and residents in southern Lebanon. French diplomatic sources in Paris told An-Nahar newspaper that Friday's Security Council closed-door meeting will discuss a draft statement prepared by Paris.
The sources said the statement was set to have a "high" political tone." On Wednesday, the French Foreign Ministry announced that "France will call for a U.N. Security Council meeting over the recent attacks on UNIFIL to again voice its support for its troops participating in the international force."Spokesman for the ministry, Bernard Valero, said that French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner had informed Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri during their meeting in Paris on Tuesday of the need to carefully implement UNSCR 1701 and respect UNIFIL's freedom of movement. Valero added at a press conference: "Respect is a main condition for the deployment of the peacekeeping force given the recent attacks against the troops in southern Lebanon, which France strongly condemned." Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 07:34

UNIFIL Meets Villagers Thursday to Reduce Tension
Naharnet/UNIFIL on Thursday will meet with villagers from southern Lebanon in an effort to resolve the row following incidents in which French peacekeepers were attacked by villagers, the Voice of Lebanon radio station said. It said the meeting will take place at 4:00 pm Thursday in Tibnin between UNIFIL officers as well as MPs and political figures from south Lebanon.
VDL said preparations are also underway for a similar in Touline which witnessed confrontations between U.N. peacekeepers and residents. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 09:48

Ban Urges Israel to Withdraw from Ghajar, End Overflights
Naharnet/U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon has urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to withdraw from the northern part of the border village of Ghajar in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701, An Nahar daily reported Thursday. Although both officials did not make statements following their 45-minute meeting in New York on Wednesday, An Nahar said Ban discussed with Netanyahu Israel's pullout from the Lebanese part of Ghajar based on a UNIFIL plan and urged the premier to stop flights in Lebanese airspace. The newspaper said it was not clear if Netanyahu had responded to Ban's demands. However, he said that Israel wanted guarantees to prevent rocket fire.A statement issued by Farhan Haq, Ban's associate spokesperson, said the U.N. secretary general and the Israeli prime minister discussed among other things the peace process, the Gaza blockade, Lebanon and the latest report on the implementation of 1701. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 07:33

Harb: Government to Reinforce Army's Presence in South … No Point in Dialogue
Naharnet/Labor Minister Butros Harb said repeated attacks against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon "is not in the interest of Lebanon."Such incidents also put Lebanon in an "awkward" position internationally, Harb told al-Mustaqbal website. He uncovered that the Lebanese government was considering boosting the presence of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon "in order to play its role in defending Lebanon and maintaining its sovereignty." Asked about outcome of all-party national talks, Harb said: "I don't have high hopes on dialogue in the way in which it is progressing." Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 12:11

Gunmen Open Fire at Makassed Hospital's Emergency Ward
Naharnet/Gunmen opened fire at the emergency ward of Makassed hospital in Beirut on Thursday morning, causing huge material damage, the National News Agency reported.
NNA said the gunmen entered the hospital at 6:00 am and asked staff for a doctor. The staff immediately telephoned a physician. However, the assailants did not wait for the doctor and opened fire at the equipment inside the emergency ward, causing huge material damage, NNA added. Health Minister Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh told Voice of Lebanon radio that the cabinet will discuss repeated attacks on hospitals during its session at Baabda palace on Thursday. However, head of the private hospitals syndicate Suleiman Haroun said the situation has become unacceptable and urged the health ministry and security officials to be responsible. In remarks to Free Lebanon radio, Haroun said doctors and nurses are refusing to work due to repeated attacks. He hinted to shut down emergency wards if the situation remains the same. Beirut, 08 Jul 10,

Alloush: Possibilities of War in the Region almost Inevitable, But Not Near
Naharnet/Former MP Mustafa Alloush said possibilities of war in the region was "almost inevitable, but not in the near future." In an interview published Thursday by the Kuwaiti daily Al-Anbaa, Alloush saw that the incidents in south Lebanon between UNIFIL and villagers began to escalate following renewed sanctions on Iran. Beirut, 08 Jul 10, 10:46

Maliki in Beirut to Condole Fadlallah's Death, Meet Hariri
Naharnet/Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is in Beirut for condolences on the death of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, held talks with his Lebanese counterpart Saad Hariri on Thursday. Maliki arrived at Rafik Hariri International Airport at 10:00 am. He was accompanied by Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani and National Security Minister Marwan al-Wadi. Beirut, 08 Jul 10,

CNN Middle East Senior Editor Fired after Praising Fadlallah
Naharnet/Octavia Nasr, senior editor of Middle East affairs at CNN, is leaving the U.S. television news network after sending a message on Twitter praising the late Shiite cleric Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. Nasr, who joined CNN in 1990, said in a "tweet" over the weekend that she was "Sad to hear of the passing of Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah... One of Hezbollah's giants I respect a lot." She followed that up with a blog post on CNN.com expressing "deep regret" for her "tweet" about the man considered the spiritual guide of Hizbullah and who figured on a U.S. "terrorist" list. "It was an error of judgment for me to write such a simplistic comment and I'm sorry because it conveyed that I supported Fadlallah's life's work," Nasr wrote. "That's not the case at all." She said she was referring to Fadlallah's "contrarian and pioneering stand among Shiite clerics on woman's rights."
"This does not mean I respected him for what else he did or said," she said. "Far from it."
Parisa Khosravi, senior vice president for CNN International Newsgathering, said in an internal memo forwarded to AFP that she had spoken with Nasr and "we have decided that she will be leaving the company. "As you know, her tweet over the weekend created a wide reaction. As she has stated in her blog on CNN.com, she fully accepts that she should not have made such a simplistic comment without any context whatsoever," Khosravi said. "However, at this point, we believe that her credibility in her position as senior editor for Middle Eastern affairs has been compromised going forward," Khosravi said. "We thank Octavia for all of her hard work and we certainly wish her all the best." Nasr has covered virtually every major Middle Eastern story for CNN during the past 20 years and anchored CNN World Report and CNN International's World News from 1993 to 2003.
Before joining CNN, she worked for the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation. Nasr's departure from CNN comes exactly a month after veteran White House correspondent Helen Thomas retired after coming under fire for controversial remarks about Israel.(AFP) Beirut, 08 Jul 10,

Netanyahu meets with Gates, Ban Ki-moon
By JPOST.COM STAFF
07/07/2010 23:19
Netanyahu seeks reassurances from US on security interests and Iran.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Wednesday to discuss the acquisition of advance American weapons systems to deal with the threat from Iran. Netanyahu expressed to Gates at their meeting his fears that an American withdrawal from Iraq and Iran's expansionist designs would lead to a new threat on Israel's eastern front. He said that Israel was concerned about what would be the day after the American withdrawal from Iraq. One of Jerusalem's concerns was that regional alliances that the US was hoping to build with moderate Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon would possibly conflict with the American policy of maintaining Israel's military edge in the region.
Netanyahu also spoke with Gates about the possibility of the US providing Israel with security guarantees in the event of a future peace arrangement in the region. Netanyahu said that peace agreements on paper were not enough alone to provide security. He pointed out that there were agreements meant to prevent the transfer of arms to both Hizbullah in south Lebanon and to Hamas in Gaza, but that these agreements have not kept the Iranians from providing both Hamas and Hizbullah with enormous quantities of missiles and ammunition.
President Obama had earlier assured Netanyahu during their own encounter that the US would not ask Israel to take steps that would endanger it's security.
"There has been no change in the policies of the US in this area, said Obama. "We believe that Israel has special security needs and that it needs to be able to respond to threats towards it. The US will not ask of Israel to undertake steps that will harm it's security interests."  PM meets with UN Secretary General in New York
Netanyahu left Washington after his conversation with Gates to head to a closed-door meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in New York to discuss the easing of the blockade of Gaza, peace talks and the inquiry into the May 31 IDF commando raid on the Mavi Marmara.
The formal launch of Israel's flotilla inquiry was greeted with lukewarm enthusiasm by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who continued to voice his preference for an international, UN-led investigation into the May 31 flotilla incident. The UN chief has also demanded Israel lift its blockade of Hamas-run Gaza.
Israel has already given its approval to international aid organizations to import construction materials into Gaza and Netanyahu said on Wednesday that further steps were under consideration. "There are more things we are prepared to do... There are things like additional easing of movements, some questions of economic projects," Netanyahu told ABC News in an interview cited by AFP. "There are quite a few. The point is we are prepared to do them."
*Herb Keinon and Jordana Horn contributed to this article.

UNIFIL chairs tripartite talks with Lebanese, Israeli army chiefs
Kouchner calls for meeting over peacekeepers’ role in Lebanon
By Patrick Galey and Elias Sakr
Daily Star staff/Thursday, July 08, 2010
BEIRUT: UN peacekeepers met Wednesday with Lebanese and Israeli Army chiefs, as France’s foreign minister called for a special meeting over the force’s role in Lebanon.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bernard Valero said that Bernard Kouchner had asked for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to be allowed to operate freely following a pair of attacks on the force by southern residents.
“Viewing the latest anti-UNIFIL protests, respecting UNIFIL’s role is a key condition for the deployment of peacekeeping forces,” announced Valero. “Kouchner expressed concern over the incidents and said his country will call for a special Security Council session to be held as soon as possible.” Thursday’s tripartite meeting was chaired by Force Commander Alberto Asarta Cuevas and attended by army officials from Lebanon and Israel, according to UNIFIL spokesperson Neeraj Singh.
“During the meeting all the issues relevant to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 were discussed, including the situation along the Line of Withdrawal (Blue Line), the ongoing visible marking of the Blue Line and the issue of the village of Ghajar,” Singh said. “Both parties expressed their full support and commitment to work together with UNIFIL for the implementation of Resolution 1701,” he added. There was no mention of the recent clashes between UNIFIL patrols and southern residents, which saw at least three peacekeepers injured as villagers accosted troops, confiscated weapons and hurled stones.
The protests have sparked a flurry of reactions from international and Lebanese officials, with the conduct of peacekeepers being called into question across the political spectrum.
UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams, following a meeting with Defense Minister Elias Murr, reiterated calls from UN chief Ban Ki-moon that UNIFIL be allowed freedom to roam within its mandated operations area. “A large part of our discussion today focused on the recent events in south Lebanon, particularly the incidents involving residents of some villages, and I emphasize some villages, in the area and UNIFIL patrols,” Williams said after the meeting.
“Minister Murr and I agreed that the excellent cooperation between UNIFIL and the [Lebanese Army] over the past four years has been the backbone of the stability that has prevailed in south Lebanon. This cooperation, we believe, must be maintained and enhanced,” he said.
“UNIFIL’s presence in south Lebanon and its freedom of movement are critical to support the [Lebanese Army] in the area and the implementation of Resolution 1701. This, in turn, serves the interests of Lebanon and the stability of the wider region.”
Murr, for his part, also held meetings with US, French and German ambassadors and denied that UNIFIL and army representatives had met with Hizbullah delegates, as alleged by some.
“It’s very normal during training by any military group within villages that incidents sometimes happen,” Murr said. “As much as we are keen on UNIFIL’s mission on Lebanese territory, we are also keen that the Lebanese Army accompanies that mission to avoid incidents. “I agreed with Mr. Williams that the Lebanese Army will accompany UNIFIL on all its missions. If there is a need for reinforcements, we will send them regardless of numbers,” he added. The defense minister, however, warned against future altercations. “We should not forget that UNIFIL has a new command … the old command was experienced to avoid incidents,” Murr said. “The freedom of movement without the army’s permission is one thing, but freedom of movement accompanied and supported by the army is another,” he added. “I do not believe the Lebanese Army has any interest [in such incidents] because it is Lebanese land which is not a dishonorable land.” The Central News Agency (CNA) reported that Asarta was set to present President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri with a message from peacekeepers in which he will insist his force continues to enjoy Lebanese Army support, as stipulated in Resolution 1701.
Asarta will stress the importance of fulfilling all UNIFIL missions and point out that its primary role in Lebanon is to protect civilians, it added. Berri, following his discussions with Amal Movement lawmakers, ruled out the allegation that anti-UNIFIL protests were political in nature. “The incidents in the south between UNIFIL and residents were not motivated by political background and should not be politically exploited,” the Parliament speaker was quoted as saying by party sources.
“Ninety-five percent of the issue has been resolved and there is not party proposing to amend the rules of engagement which are founded on cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese. “Amal and Hizbullah do not target Resolution 1701 or UNIFIL forces,” Berri said, adding that the issue was no longer suitable for media discussion.
The March 14 General Secretariat, following its weekly meeting, said that the Lebanese state was not a neutral bystander in disputes between peacekeeping forces and civilians.
A parliamentary bloc statement warned against repeat incidents “that could lead to the abolition of Resolution 1701, which in turn would mean that the state dropped its exclusive right to address the international community and decide upon the Lebanese people’s fate.” The Loyalty to the Resistance bloc also met on Wednesday, voicing support for UN presence in Lebanon. “UNIFIL is a supporting force to the Lebanese Army and is bound by certain rules of engagement in line with resolution 1701,” a bloc statement said. “No one should overbid southern residents’ keenness on stability in the region.”

Israel: Hizbullah storing weapons inside southern villages
Thursday, July 08, 2010
OCCUPIED JERUSALEM: Israel’s military released maps and aerial photographs Wednesday showing what it claimed was a network of Hizbullah weapons depots and command centers inside villages in south Lebanon, near the Israeli border. The Israeli material included detailed maps and 3-D simulations showing individual buildings that the military identified as rocket storehouses. Some were shown to be located close to schools and hospitals. The rare publication of what seemed to be detailed intelligence material appeared aimed at demonstrating Israel’s reach and preparing public opinion for possible strikes inside villages and the attendant civilian casualties if a future round of fighting erupts. In Beirut, a Hizbullah official said he would not comment before seeing the information. Lt. Col. Avital Leibovich, an Israeli military spokeswoman, said the information showed that Hizbullah was increasingly moving its forces inside populated areas. “We are talking about more than 100 villages that have become military camps for Hizbullah, and we see that civilians in these villages will be Hizbullah’s human shields if there is a war in the future,” she said. Hizbullah fought a monthlong war in which Israel went after the group in a massive air, sea and ground campaign, while Hizbullah launched around 4,000 rockets into Israel. Nearly 1,200 people, mostly civilians, died in Lebanon and 159, mostly soldiers lost their lives in Israel. Israel said Hizbullah’s tactics forced the military to operate in heavily populated areas, but the high civilian death toll drew heavy criticism of Israel. The war ended with a UN resolution that imposed a blockade on weapons destined for Hizbullah and banned the group from operating near the Israeli border. Israel says the resolution and international peacekeeping forces in Lebanon have been largely ineffective. Israel believes Hizbullah has increased its prewar arms stockpile to more than 40,000 rockets. Israeli military officials say the range of the group’s arsenal now includes Israel’s main population center in and around Tel Aviv.

Family feud leaves woman dead, 10 wounded in Tabaya
By Mohammed Zaatari /Daily Star staff
Thursday, July 08, 2010
SIDON: A family feud erupted late Sunday night in the southern village of Tabaya, killing one woman and wounding 10 other people. The dispute erupted between members of the Hammoud family and machine guns and hand grenades were used. Hasna Obeid, in her 40s, was killed during the clash, as she rushed to the village square to find her son. The victim had heard gunshots and rushed to the streets to find her son, who was outside the house at the time. The child later returned home safely. Locals were in shock and disbelief that such a crime had been committed in their village and many participated in the funeral held for Obeid. Family and friends walked the streets of the village, located only 10 kilometers away from Sidon, and some pointed out the contradiction between Tabaya’s reputation and the unfortunate incident. The village is known for its humanitarian and peace-promoting initiatives. A banner hanging in the square – the scene of the murder – read, “Tabaya is beautiful and clean.” Ibrahim, a Tabaya resident, participated in the funeral and criticized the people involved in the fight. “Tabaya is black now, just as they wanted it to be. Black like their faces and bitter hearts,” he said. Ibrahim Hammoud, the mukhtar of Tabaya, also condemned the crime and said measures would be taken to prevent similar incidents in the future. He asked the Lebanese Army and to security forces to arrest the perpetrators and reestablish calm in the village. Obeid had five daughters and one son, who all marched in her funeral. Warda, one of her daughters, was pregnant with twins but had a miscarriage when she heard about her mother’s murder. Tabaya Mayor Fadi Hammoud described the situation as unacceptable and asked security forces to bring the culprits to justice, noting that the identity of the shooters was known. Another family feud occurred on Tuesday in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh near Sidon, leaving one man dead.

Christian MPs drafting law to give Palestinians limited rights
Maronite bishops insist that weapons come under state control
By Elias Sakr /Daily Star staff
Thursday, July 08, 2010
BEIRUT: Christian parties are drafting a law to grant Palestinian refugees humanitarian and social rights in a bid to counter two earlier drafts that would award them civil rights.
While Phalange party chief Amin Gemayel warned that the integration of Palestinian refugees into the Lebanese community would lead to their naturalization, the Maronite Bishops Council tied the refugees’ rights to responsibilities toward the Lebanese state, starting with the disarmament of Palestinian groups.
“Rights are tied to responsibilities particularly to controling weapons inside and outside refugee camps and placing them under the control of the Lebanese state,” the bishops said in a statement Wednesday.
But the Maronite Bishops Council stressed that the humanitarian rights of Palestinians should be addressed by the Lebanese state to ameliorate the refugees’ living conditions.
Last month, lawmakers of the Democratic Gathering bloc and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party submitted two proposals to grant Palestinian refugees civil and social rights equal to those of Lebanese citizens with the exception of the right to vote and run for municipal and parliamentary elections and to obtain public sector employment.
“Democratic Gathering bloc leader MP Walid Jumblatt’s demand to grant Palestinian refugees privileges will lead directly to their naturalization,” Gemayel said in remarks published by the local news website el-Nashra.
Gemayel added that if Palestinians were granted the rights that Jumblatt proposed, the international community would neglect their right of return.
Similarly, the Maronite Bishops Council also expressed fear that humanitarian demands would turn into a political domestic issue and lead to the settlement of refugees as permanent residents.
“We fear denying [Palestinian refugees] the right of return and forcing their naturalization at times when the Lebanese are emigrating because of the economic and social crisis as well as Lebanon’s small surface,” the statement added.
Gemayel warned against any attempt to pass Jumblatt’s proposed law through an absolute majority vote if consensus over the issue failed.
The Phalange Party leader said such as step would overthrow the national pact and the basis of national coexistence.
“If they want a revolution, let them take such a step [pass the law through an absolute majority vote] and if they are looking for a problem, then this is the perfect way to create one,” Gemayel said. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), some 440,000 Palestinian refugees are living in camps throughout the country, making up an estimated 10 percent of the Lebanese population. Christian parties fear that granting the refugees rights would lead to their naturalization and would thereby alter the country’s confessional power sharing balance. In other developments, the representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon Ambassador Abdullah Abdullah said no accurate statistics on the number of refugees in Lebanon exists, adding that the number provided by UNRWA is exaggerated. “The Palestinian statistics department is in the process of conducting an accurate survey that could be completed in few months to reveal the true numbers,” Abdullah said. The Palestinian ambassador pointed out that many Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA have left the country and moved to Arab states looking for job opportunities but were not crossed off the UNRWA’s register.
Commenting on the Maronite Bishops Council’s stance tying the refugees’ rights to the disarmament of Palestinian factions, Abdullah said “the issue of rights is an essential one that should not be tied to other matters.” Abdullah also expressed the Palestinian Authority’s readiness to discuss any issue with the Lebanese Cabinet.
He also voiced support for the Lebanese National Dialogue committee’s decision to disarm Palestinian groups outside refugee camps.
In other news, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir moved from Bkirki to his summer residence in Diman in Bshari district under a heavy security escort.

Hezbollah readying for urban war in southern Lebanon, IDF warns
Deployment of UN forces has pushed militants into built-up areas where international troops have no authority, army says.
By Anshel Pfeffer /Haaretz/Published 07.07.10
Israel news Second Lebanon War Lebanon Hezbollah Israel's military on Wednesday offered evidence of what it says is a growing threat from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, using aerial images to highlight the militants group's activities in towns and villages close to the Israeli border. In a briefing to journalists, Israel Defense Forces Colonel Ronen Marley revealed previously classified photographs to show what he said was a unit of 90 Hezbollah militants operating in the village of Al-Hiyam, where they were storing weapons close to hospitals and schools.
"Hezbollah is establishing itself with increasing strength in the villages," Marley said. "Every day they are collecting significant intelligence on our forces along the border and every day they are engaged in digging, building and laying communications infrastructure to prepare themselves for war." In the four years since Israel fought a month-long war with Hezbollah, the IDF had collected data on thousand of targets to be bombed by Israel in the event of renewed hostilities, Marley said. In the last war, much of the fighting took place on open scrubland, he said. But the deployment of United Nations forces in southern Lebanon had forced Hezbollah into built up areas where troops from the international UNIFIL force have no authority. The IDF believes Hezbollah has an arsenal of some 40,000 short and medium range rockets stored in towns and villages south of the Litani River, with many of the weapons stored in private houses. Hezbollah also has hundreds of longer range M-600 rockets capable of striking major Israeli cities, Marley said. The weapons are operated by a force of some 20,000 armed Shi'a Muslim militants, around a third of which have undergone combat training in Iran, available for action at short notice. Marley said every Shi'a Muslim village had a detachment of between 30 and 200 fighters, whose task would be to hold of the advance of enemy troops into built-up areas in the event of an Israeli invasion.

Patriarch Sfeir Boycotts Ayatollah Fadlullah’s Funeral, Doesn't Give Condolences
http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=194766/It is hard to understand how politics in Lebanon mingle with religion, personal interests, and in many cases intolerance. Ahlul bayt News Agency (ABNA.ir), It is hard to understand how politics in Lebanon mingle with religion, personal interests, and in many cases intolerance. When Ayatollah Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlullah was pronounced dead, representatives from countries, parties, and associations as well as high level politicians, diplomats, and religious figures gathered at the Hassanein Mosque to offer condolences to the family of a man who became known for his openness, tolerance, knowledge, and dialogue. Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Christian, religious, non-religious figures expressed deep regret at the loss of Ayatollah Fadlullah. “Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir alone boycotted Sayyed Fadlullah’s funeral and did not offer condolences,” said Hasan Olleik in Al-Akhbar newspaper on Wednesday. “He did not dispatch a representative, nor did he issue an obituary statement. Sfeir, among every other religious authority in Lebanon, still ignores the event. Sfeir’s attitude is questioned by many circles as some politicians and monitors have pointed that he Patriarch was still angry at the Sayyed, since August 2009, when Ayatollah Fadlullah retorted at Sfeir’s comments about the rule of the majority and the opposition of the minority in Lebanon. They also put Sfeir’s attitude reflects his personal doubt in the patriotism and the objectives of a part of the Lebanese people who ‘pose a present threat to the Lebanese identity,’ according to the Patriarch. Back then, Sayyed Fadlullah criticized ‘religious groups that say that Lebanon’s glory was granted to it’ and then projected his point of view saying that ‘Lebanon’s glory was only given to the resistant and the struggling people of Lebanon.’ Some circles have found Patriarch Sfeir’s silence during a pure human-centered and national event leading one politician to ask whether Sfeir was seeking to establish a ‘boycott with the Shiite sect’ or he wanted to say that ‘he is not tolerant of those who dare to argue about politics with him,” Olleik said in his article. When Akel Hashem, the number-two in the Antoine Lahed’s South Lebanon Army (SLA), was executed by the Islamic Resistance back in 2000, Patriarch Sfeir dispatched a delegation to the occupied territories in the south to take part in the collaborator’s funeral. Hashem was supposed to take the lead of the SLA after the retirement of chief collaborator Antoine Lahed. His execution was delayed several times because Hashem was often accompanied by civilians, namely his wife and children.

Ayatollah Sayyed Fadlullah's Last Wish: Israel's Vanishing…
http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=194694
Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlullah has passed away but his views, words, values and principles will continue to circulate from one generation to another…
Ahlul Bayt News Agency (ABNA.ir), Sayyed Fadlullah alongside his followers launched a school of beliefs and thoughts, a school that would always be committed to the main causes of Islam, from Jihad to Resistance, and face all foreign threats against the region. Until the last moment, Sayyed Fadlullah remained committed to the central cause, Palestine, calling to fight occupation through all possible means. His eminence issued different "fatwa"s calling to fight Israel and boycott American goods and ban normalizing of relations, and was a "true supporter" of Islamic unity all over his life. In his last moments before his death, Sayyed Fadlullah was still preoccupied with the cause. He was asking about the dawn prayers and telling his nurse that he wouldn't rest before Israel's vanishing. Sayyed Mussa Fadlullah describes the last moments of his uncle's life. "He asked the nurses if the time has come for the dawn prayers. They tell him to rest. He smiles and says that he would sleep. Then, the bleeding occurs, yielding to his death."Sayyed Mussa Fadlullah remembers how his uncle was comfortable on Friday's eve, following up his new book to be published soon. "When one of his sons told him that he would leave the hospital the next day, his eminence said that nothing is certain unless God wants it. The Holy Koran was always present in his conscience and mind."
"Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlullah has the obsession of taking care of orphans not only in Lebanon but in the whole Arab and Islamic nation," Sayyed Mussa Fadlullah says, while emphasizing the human characteristics of the late great man. "Politically, his eminence used to have two concerns. Mainly, he had the concern of the Resistance, the Resistance in Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and everywhere. He was also concerned with safeguarding the Islamic Republic of Iran." Even in his last moments, Sayyed Fadlullah remained committed to the cause. The wish of Israel's vanishing summarizes many of his views, of his solid opposition to the Zionist occupation of the Palestinian territories. Sayyed Fadlullah, who was famous for his call to boycott US and Israeli products because America, that kills scores of Palestinians daily but with Israeli hands, will never think of the interests of the Iraqis, Arabs, or Muslims, died with the wish of Israel's vanishing. Nothing is strange. The strange thing would be only if his lovers don't fulfill his wish and make it true

Under pressure
Ana Maria Luca and Mona Alami,
July 8, 2010
Now Lebanon
Lebanese army troops inspect a damaged UNIFIL armored vehicle in Tulin, South Lebanon (AFP/Mahmoud Zayat)
Some say it was embarrassing. French UN peacekeepers were attacked in South Lebanon last week when a mob of Hezbollah supporters hurtled stones and sticks at them and took their weapons. Others say the French UNIFIL soldiers reacted in the best possible way: keeping their “sangfroid” and putting up with the humiliation without fighting back so that the incident wouldn’t turn into a new war. But what the French people agree on is that if the attacks happen again, it might be the end of their country’s involvement in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
It started 10 days ago, when French soldiers were simultaneously attacked by people in 20 villages in South Lebanon during a routine exercise. The violence was repeated last Saturday in Tulin, where “some residents of the village and of the close-by Kabrikha village attacked a patrol with sticks and threw stones and eggs at them,” according to a French military spokesperson.
According to the French army, what triggered the anger of the villagers was the soldiers’ detention in Kabrikha of a young man who had asked them what they were doing in the village. By the time they reached the neighboring village, people were already on the streets and ready to fight.
“The locals took the [UNIFIL] soldiers’ weapons and briefly took control of their vehicle before the Lebanese army intervened and made the patrol leave. The weapons were given back to UNIFIL, and the incident ended,” the French military spokesperson added.
The skirmishes might have ended quickly, but questions on the efficacy of UNIFIL are just beginning to pop up. The incidents surprised and worried the European countries that send their troops to South Lebanon as Blue Helmets. When the news broke in France, it caused a wave of discontent over the participation of the French troops in UNIFIL, and publications were flooded by reader requests for the withdrawal of the troops from South Lebanon. “FINUL ou Le Fait Nul?”(“UNIFIL or the Null Fact”) the French people joke.
Diplomatic sources inside the French Embassy in Lebanon attributed the tensions between their troops and locals in the South to Hezbollah. "The army has failed to intervene because it fears the Party of God," an embassy source told NOW Lebanon on condition of anonymity.
The Lebanese army, meanwhile, has kept silent. Although UNIFIL is stationed in South Lebanon to ostensibly provide assistance to the LAF and to help it boost its presence, the army’s patrols are still scarce in the area below the Litani. After the recent incidents, rumor in the Lebanese media has it that a new brigade was getting ready to deploy.
Some analysts link the attacks to the French pressing for UN sanctions against Iran last month, after a UN report stated that Tehran is stepping up uranium enrichment in its controversial nuclear program. Hezbollah politicians have denied that their party is behind the attacks, and they warned UNIFIL to “be careful” and indirectly accused the peacekeepers of acting under the influence of their governments, which, they noted, are favorable to Israel.
The French public now largely considers UNIFIL’s mission a failure, as the soldiers are mere observers not allowed to react even when attacked. The French Ministry of Defense said the “Lebanese situation is to be re-evaluated globally,” and the Sarkozy government will ask for a UN Security Council meeting to discuss what happened.
But the incidents will not affect the French engagement with UNIFIL for the moment, according to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Blue Helmets’ freedom of movement in their operational areas is one of the indispensable conditions for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Therefore, we firmly ask for respecting this freedom of movement in South Lebanon,” said Bernard Valero, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, at a press conference in Paris.
But the question of why the French soldiers detained the young man in Kabrikha remains. The French troops are only involved in missions linked to the civilian population in South Lebanon: de-mining, health care and even assisting in local agriculture.
"We understand that the presence of the international forces may present some inconveniences, however UNIFIL has tried making maximum efforts to try minimizing as much as possible any impact on the local population," French Ambassador Denis Pietton told NOW Lebanon. "We are waiting for the UNIFIL report to be published, but we hope that this kind of incident will not occur again in the future. The international forces need to have the ability to fulfill their mandate, which is in the interest of the region and of Lebanon,” he added.

Antoine Zahra
July 7, 2010
On July 6, the Lebanese National News Agency carried the following report:
Member of the Lebanese Forces parliamentary bloc, Deputy Antoine Zahra, believes that “attempts to push international troops out of Lebanon and leave the arena open to all possibilities is the biggest service we can offer to the Israeli enemy.” In an interview with the Future News channel, Zahra said: “The facts on the ground and the multiple stories revolving around them confirmed that the incidents [between the Southerners and UNIFIL] are not innocent, in addition to the political positions which embraced this action and placed conditions on UNIFIL. The reaction of the states that sent their troops to the Lebanese South is one of deep thought, especially in light of the current economic situation and the necessity to cut costs. It is worth mentioning in this context that never in history has the United Nations pulled its troops out of a location without it turning into a war arena.
“Do we want war in the South? I do not think that the Southerners who are carrying out these acts want war. Everyone made sure that the clashes occurred with the population.” Consequently, he called on the Lebanese government to present clarifications in regard to what happened and not to cover it up, so that it does not happen again in a more violent way that would be difficult to contain. He added: “So far, the political sides have said their word and UNIFIL responded by saying that all it was doing was coordinated with the Lebanese army as per Resolution 1701. Moreover, today we heard the army commander saying that the simple disputes will be resolved. The public needs to know the truth before being reassured about the ways [the incidents] will be handled.” He pointed to the fact that “these developments surfaced after the Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Iran and following the increase of the sanctions by the European states and America,” calling on the concerned sides to reassure the people and restore normalcy.
“The Lebanese government, the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry are the ones that have the prerogative to define whether or not UNIFIL violated the rules of engagement,” considering that “Hezbollah is the political power controlling the political situation in South Lebanon and capable of mobilizing the people. The biggest violation of Resolution 1701 was seen in the introduction of elements which tackled the implementation or interpretation of the resolution and the explanation of the tasks of UNIFIL, knowing that they are neither concerned by the resolution nor by its implementation. This is where the responsibility of the Lebanese government and the Defense Ministry resides on the ground, followed by that of the Foreign Ministry through international relations.”
On the other hand, while he assured that Lebanese Forces ministers “will address what happened in the South in the coming governmental sessions because the issue is related to the fate of all of Lebanon,” he rejected [attempts to turn] Lebanon into an arena to respond to any international tensions with the Iranian regime. He indicated: “What happened with UNIFIL falls in the context of a series of responses to the states which issued sanctions resolutions against Iran, saying that Iran cannot be sanctioned without seeing a response in Lebanon…
“Resolution 1701 must be implemented in full and all Lebanese must commit to it because we have started to see that some in Lebanon can exit the will of the Lebanese government and the Lebanese political decision and lead the situation in a direction which they only see fit. This is what we are complaining about and are trying to handle, so that Lebanon remains a country and not an arena. This is also what is making us call for keeping the decision in the hands of the Lebanese government around the dialogue table.
“The Southern people are a key part of the Lebanese people. They are resistance fighters who paid a hefty price. However, Lebanon as a state and the logic of the state exceed these equations. The Lebanese state and all its components approved Resolution 1701 and today, if we are going to undermine this resolution, we would be determined to open the door before all possibilities in the Lebanese South. Is this what we want? For our part, this is not the case. We do not want war and wish to have stability.” In response to the information saying there are 3,500 Lebanese soldiers in the South, Zahra believed that in case the information is true, this shortcoming should be addressed and the necessary number of soldiers should be provided to allow Lebanon to uphold its duties and commitments toward the international community.

Analysis: The IDF intel
By YAAKOV KATZ
07/08/2010 05:56
Deterring Hizbullah, preparing world for next war.
The IDF’s decision to declassify maps, videos and photos of Hizbullah positions in southern Lebanon carries an element of risk. Hizbullah will see that the IDF knows where its positions are in the village of el-Khiam, and will likely make a similar assumption regarding its positions in other villages. It could then move its assets and try hiding them again in different buildings.
The IDF weighed the risks, but decided on Wednesday that it had more to gain than to lose in releasing the information.
There are several reasons for the move. First and foremost is the continued Israeli effort to bolster its deterrence in face of Hizbullah and its continued military buildup in Lebanon. The deterrence, created by the Second Lebanon War in 2006 as well as by the assassination in 2008 of Hizbullah military commander Imad Mughniyeh, is something that needs to be maintained on a regular basis.
The declassification of the highly sensitive intelligence sends a strong and clear message to Hizbullah that the IDF knows what it is doing in southern Lebanon and where its military installations are located. Also, the chances that Hizbullah will move its assets are deemed slim.
“There is too much to move,” one senior officer explained.
The second effect the IDF is hoping to achieve is diplomatic. In recent weeks, leading up to the war’s fourth anniversary, the IDF launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at educating the international community about Hizbullah’s military buildup ahead of the next war and the consequences that strategy entails.
In June, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Heiman, head of the IDF’s Strategic Planning Department, flew to UN headquarters and presented the evidence to UN officials. A few weeks later, the Northern Command’s chief intelligence officer, Col. Ram, presented the evidence to UNIFIL commander Maj.-Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas.
“The world needs to understand that Hizbullah is deliberately positioning its military positions inside civilian centers, and that this strategy has consequences,” a top IDF officer said.
The IDF has said in the past that it will respond disproportionately to a new Hizbullah attack, and that each of the 160 villages in southern Lebanon where the guerrilla group has established its positions will be targeted. The release of the information on Wednesday also reflects an IDF understanding that the Goldstone Report, which came out following Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip last year, was partially a result of Israel’s failure to properly prepare the world for what would happen in the event of an Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip.
This happened again with the flotilla to the Gaza Strip on May 31 and the navy’s boarding of the Mavi Marmara Turkish passenger ship, which ended with nine Turkish men dead after they attacked the IDF commandos. Then, too, the IDF admitted that it should have, in advance of the operation, invested resources in preparing the public for the possibility that people would be killed. This does not mean that a war with Hizbullah is around the corner – just that the IDF is preparing for one. The chance of a war with Hizbullah this summer is low, according to the IDF’s assessment. Hizbullah is scared of what Israel’s response would be, and concerned about the effect a new war would have on its standing within Lebanon.

Obama’s new approach
By: Eytan Gilboa
US president realizes his tough approach to Israel was counterproductive
07.07.10, / Israel Opinion
Even if the Obama and Netanyahu photos and statements following their meeting do not fully reflect what was said in the Oval Office, they convey important messages for our region and for US citizens, who in four months will cast their ballots in the Congress elections.
Obama and Netanyahu had to walk a very fine line. Both of them are pressed between foreign affairs and defense strategies on the one hand, and domestic political elements on the other. Obama is pressed between his approach to Israel and resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and his deteriorating status among voters in general, and among Israel’s friends in particular. Netanyahu is pressed between Obama’s demands and the more rightist components of his coalition.
Unbreakable Bond
Obama: Israel serious about peace / Yitzhak Benhorin and AP
Following meeting with Netanyahu, president says he believes Israel serious about desire for direct talks with Palestinians; Bond with Jewish State unbreakable, Obama says, vows to keep up pressure on Iran. Bibi calls for tougher sanctions
The meeting was meant to hold off the pressure and improve both Obama’s and Netanyahu’s status at home and abroad; it appears these objectives were met.
In all the previous meetings between the two, the US president criticized the prime minister, reprimanded him, pressed him, and in some cases even humiliated him. The US Administration also made an effort to highlight the disagreements between the sides and the president’s dissatisfaction with the prime minister and his policy.
Yet in the latest meeting, the tables were turned. Obama lauded Netanyahu and his policy, treated him with respect, and stressed the areas of agreement with him. Both leaders characterized their meeting as excellent and lavished gratitude and praise at each other.
The change in Obama’s attitude stems from a combination of diplomatic and political elements. The strategy of exerting brutal pressure on the prime minister and creating a crisis in US-Israel relations did not produce the hoped-for results, did not improve America’s status in the Arab and Muslim world, did not promote talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and did not prompt strategic shifts in Netanyahu’s policy.
The opposite was true: America’s status deteriorated, among other things because its Arab allies wondered whether this is the kind of attitude accorded to (as Obama himself characterized it) America’s most important Mideastern ally. Meanwhile, the Palestinians reached the conclusion that they need not do a thing – the US will do the job for them and elicit all the concessions they demanded from Israel.
On the unilateral front, Obama reached the conclusion that it’s better to influence Netanyahu via embraces and encouragement rather than through slaps to the face and pressure. On the regional front, the message that emerged from the meeting is meant to change the interpretation given to the tensions in US-Israel relations, which undermined important regional and global US interests.
The message stopped the deterioration in US-Israeli ties and stressed the close military and diplomatic ties between the sides. Obama is attempting to restore the special relationship between the two states and even gave expression to this by referring to Israel’s nuclear program. He said that because of Israel’s size, past, and the existential threats it faces, the Jewish State is a unique case.
Message to Palestinians, Americans
The message to the Palestinians is that they must stop looking for excuses and enter direct negotiations with Israel. Obama hinted that they should not count on an American peace plan that will be forced upon Israel in case the two sides to the conflict fail to secure an agreement themselves. The message to the region is that the US supports Israel, and anyone who thought he can provoke and harm Israel without paying any price or facing any response better think again.
In four months, elections will be held for all Congress seats and one third of Senate seats. Obama’s status among voters has deteriorated and he needs every vote. His attitude to the prime minister and to Israel provoked criticism among Israel’s friend in the US, including Democratic Party members.
An immense majority of Senators and Congress members of both parties sent the president critical letters on several occasions and demand that he change his attitude to Israel. The frequency of these inquiries was unprecedented. Hence, the meeting with Netanyahu was also meant to reassure Israel’s friends among the voters and stress the change in the Administration’s attitude to Israel.
The dispute with the US also undermined Netanyahu’s status. The strategic ties with the Americans are vital to Israel, and a prime minister who fails to safeguard them appears to undermine our national security, especially at a time when Israel’s global status deteriorates and it faces grave threats on the part of states like Iran and its allies.
The outcome of the meeting with Obama enables Netanyahu to claim that he is restoring the ties with the US without paying a high price. By doing so he boosts his status within the public and among his coalition partners.
The summit meeting did not eliminate the deep gaps that still exist between Obama and Netanyahu in respect to their worldview, ideology, and policy. The manner in which the summit was presented serves first and foremost their shared short-term interests.
Obama wishes to avert a collapse of talks between Israel and the Palestinians and even to advance them to a direct negotiations format. He wishes to boost his status ahead of the November elections among Israel supporters, and hopes and that direct talks will prompt the continuation, in practice, of the construction freeze in the territories.
Netanyahu is interested in direct talks, in restoring the ties with America, and in boosting his coalition. Only towards the end of the year we’ll be able to determine whether the meeting indeed reflected a new chapter of cooperation in US-Israel relations, or merely a lull between periods of disagreement, tensions, and crises.
**Professor Eytan Gilboa is an expert on US affairs and a Political Science and Communication lecturer at Bar-Ilan University

Potential Lebanese- Israeli Conflict over Natural Gas Revisited
July 7, 2010
By Ghassan Karam/yalibnan
http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/07/07/potential-lebanese-israeli-conflict-over-natural-gas-revisited/
The USGS has declared the large potential of the Levant field in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea but the Lebanese authorities have failed so far to either demarcate officially the Lebanese exclusive economic zone, or initiate a process of attracting bids for exploration rights from credible exploration companies. The Lebanese authorities have even failed so far to pass a law to govern the exploration of such resources inspite of the fact that te process of adopting an institutional structure similar to that of Norway was started by the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.
Israel on the other hand had auctioned some blocs, natural gas has been found and its commercial production is expected to start by 2012. The find at Tamar1 and the potential of the other fields could make Israel a major exporter of natural gas to Europe in a matter of years. The great potential of this find is not purely economic but carries with it huge political implications. Israeli exports of natural gas to Europe ,if they materialize could affect significantly the power that Russia hold over Europe by being the only major supplier of natural gas to Europe.
As the above map shows, the Tamar1 find is within Israel’s territorial exclusive economic zone. That is not an issue. The real problem arises if the Lebanese can show that a natural gas/oil field spans the territorial boundaries of the two state. In that case what is the accepted international procedure for determining who gets what?
Interestingly enough and maybe even surprising to some, there is no single standard principle. There are two principles:
(1) The Right Of Capture principle says that each side is permitted to lift as much as it can on its side of the border. This principle is in effect all throughout the state of Texas but more importantly it is what governs the relationship between the US and Mexico in the Gulf of Mexico.
(2) Both sides of the dispute would resort to international arbitration.
Keeping in mind that Lebanon and Israel are in a state of war and given that the Israeli side has already started the exploration and the construction of the required infrastructure which of the above two principles is going to apply if Lebanon can demonstrate that there are natural resources that span the internationally recognized boundary? You have guessed it, The Right of Capture is most likely to be applied.
Based on the above what is the rationale of taking the Natural Resources discussion to the Hiwar/Dialogue table the place where nothing ever gets done?
This is a link to a map of the natural gas finds in the North Sea. Note that although some of the fields lie exactly at the border of the territorial waters separating the UK from Norway no armed conflict resulted:-)
http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/energymap/ (North sea )

How to Support the Struggle for Iran's Soul
Iranian Reform and Stagnation
by Ilan Berman
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2010, pp. 53-61
http://www.meforum.org/2685/struggle-for-iran-soul
Does Washington care about freedom in Iran? On the surface, it seems like a silly question. Ever since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini swept to power in 1979, Washington policymakers of all political stripes have been holding out hope that a kinder, gentler regime would emerge in Tehran. Republican and Democratic administrations alike have expressed their support for freedom within the Islamic Republic, and both sides of the political aisle have condemned the regime's repressive domestic practices. Yet, concrete proof of the U.S. commitment to pluralism in Iran is hard to come by. The strategies by which the United States can assist Iran's opposition remain poorly understood and even less effectively implemented. This is unfortunate, since with the proper vision and political will, the United States can harness economic, diplomatic, and informational strategies to significantly affect the unfolding struggle for Iran's soul.
A Timeline of Dithering
The Carter administration, on whose watch the Islamic Republic took root, vacillated between appeasement of the new Iranian regime and complete political disengagement from it. Jimmy Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, made isolation of Iran the official U.S. policy but did not seek to promote change there as he did within the Soviet Union's "evil empire." To the contrary, efforts to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon even led Washington to embark upon an ill-fated plan to sell arms secretly to Iran's ayatollahs.
The collapse of the Soviet Union had the effect of sidelining Iran as a foreign policy priority during the tenure of President George H. W. Bush. The Clinton administration took up the issue but quickly became paralyzed by internal divisions: Should it try to foster behavioral change within the ruling class or seek a more fundamental transformation of the regime itself? The George W. Bush administration seemed to bring a breath of fresh air. Its post-September 11 advocacy of a "forward strategy that favors freedom"[1] fanned hopes among many that—in contrast to its predecessors—it would truly engage with pro-democracy forces within Iran. President Bush's calls for the Iranian leadership "to respect the will of its people and be accountable to them"[2] also raised hopes.
In practice, however, the principles of the Bush doctrine did not extend as far as the Islamic Republic. For all its talk about Iranian democracy, the Bush White House offered only nominal aid to those seeking freedom and pluralism within the country. Between 2004 and 2008, it authorized a total of $215 million in funding for all diplomatic programs dealing with Iran.[3] But only a small fraction of that sum—some $38.6 million—was dedicated specifically to democracy promotion.[4] And even those paltry funds were, in the end, diluted by bureaucratic infighting that served to undermine their effectiveness.[5]
Since taking office, the Obama administration has done even less. Eager to break with the policy of its predecessors and to engage with Iran's leaders, the new White House systematically downgraded the idea of promoting pluralism within the Islamic Republic. It eliminated the State Department's Iran Democracy Fund, the central node for pro-democracy funding during the Bush years, folding it into a generic Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) Fund that lacks a clear direction or mandate.[6] It cut off funding for the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, a nongovernmental organization committed to chronicling the regime's human rights abuses.[7] It likewise rolled back funding for a raft of other groups from nongovernmental organizations such as Freedom House to the U.S.-funded International Republican Institute, putting their Iran-related activities at risk.[8] In the process, it has sent the unmistakable signal that the United States is no longer interested in seeking substantive change in the nature of the Iranian regime or its domestic behavior.
Electoral Earthquake
The focus on this state of affairs has sharpened since the summer of 2009. The results of Iran's June 12 presidential election—in which incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated all challengers in a contest blatantly punctuated by fraud and manipulation[9]—generated widespread outrage in Iran, resulting in the most sustained outpouring of opposition since the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself.
However, while Ahmadinejad's reelection may have catalyzed the current protests, it was not the reason for them. The underlying causes for Iran's turmoil run much deeper and can be traced back to the socioeconomic failures endemic to the current regime. These range from runaway inflation—officially cited at 13.6 percent but estimated to be at least twice that figure[10]—to widespread poverty (with nearly a quarter of the Iranian population now estimated to live below the poverty line)[11] to what is perhaps the highest rate of drug addiction in the world.[12] Together, these factors have conspired to create widespread disaffection with the current regime—disaffection given voice by the "Green Movement" that coalesced in the weeks and months following the June 12 vote.
The Islamic Republic has responded harshly. It has tightened its already strict control of the Internet, passing draconian new legislation to regulate assorted "illegal" activities on the web and turning social networking tools employed by protesters against their users.[13] It has targeted opposition leaders, both secular and religious, seeking to discredit and silence them.[14] It has sought to intimidate Iranian opposition activists living abroad.[15] Additionally, it has attempted to shore up the legitimacy of Iranian supreme leader 'Ali Khamenei through a variety of measures, from a bid to alter the country's constitution to the elimination of potential clerical competitors.[16]
This response is understandable. Iran, after all, is a country in the throes of monumental internal transformation. Its population of 70 million is overwhelmingly young; nearly half (48.8 percent) is aged twenty-four or younger, according to official regime statistics.[17] Iran's ruling elite, by contrast, is aging and infirm with the majority of the Islamic Republic's original revolutionaries in their late sixties and early seventies. This generational divide is deeply significant. It suggests that more than half of all Iranians have little or no memory of the Islamic Revolution itself and, as the events of the past half year make clear, are alienated from the Islamic Republic—and may now be looking for some sort of fundamental break with it.
Leveraging International Trade
As the post-electoral crisis unfolded, the conventional wisdom in the Obama administration was that the United States could do little to assist Iran's opposition and that U.S. involvement would do more harm than good. In keeping with this belief, the president took pains to insist that the United States would not interfere in Iran's internal affairs, and his administration systematically muted its criticism of the Iranian regime's repressive domestic conduct.[18] Over time, however, Washington has progressively reevaluated the viability of Iran's Green Movement and its chances for success.[19] The State Department's point man on Iran, John Limbert, has gone so far as to draw comparisons between the current situation and the turmoil that preceded the 1979 Islamic Revolution.[20]
The Obama administration's lackluster response to Iran's internal ferment has thus far been predicated in part on the belief that engagement with the Iranian regime requires the United States to refrain from expressing support for regime opponents. Such a stance has served to buttress the Iranian regime, indicating to officials in Tehran that the international community will not weigh in decisively to prevent repression or to aid its opponents. This stance has opened up the administration to criticism that it has abandoned American values.[21]
A middle way exists, however. It lies in a model of "conditional recognition," under which the United States makes clear to the Iranian government that how it treats its internal opposition will directly influence how it is treated by other nations in a variety of spheres, including but not limited to commercial ties and diplomatic recognition. Such an approach is certainly not new. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. government applied a similar strategy toward the Soviet Union in an attempt to influence the Kremlin's internal conduct. That initiative—named "Jackson-Vanik" after its two main cosponsors, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Democrat of Washington) and Rep. Charles Vanik (Democrat of Ohio)—linked most-favored-nation trading status for the Soviet Union to a liberalization of the USSR's draconian emigration policies. The approach worked: Eager to engage in commerce with the West, Moscow loosened restrictions on travel, granting freedom to a generation of Soviet dissidents and laying the groundwork for glasnost, perestroika, and the fall of the Soviet Union.
The lesson remains valid today. For too long, legitimate concerns over the Iranian regime's atomic efforts have overshadowed serious discussions about human rights conditions within Iran. But Iran is a country deeply interested in international recognition and desperate for regional prestige and, therefore, vulnerable to pressure that questions its status on these two counts. Washington can exploit this opening in two ways.
The first has to do with engagement. Outreach to Iran has been the centerpiece of the Obama administration's Middle East strategy, but as administration officials are quick to explain, it is not intended to be open-ended or to shield Tehran from the consequences of its actions on the nuclear front. The same should hold true with the regime's behavior at home. U.S. policy on Iran cannot become a foil that facilitates ever greater repression by the Iranian government. To make sure it does not, Washington will need to put Tehran on notice that the prospects for real, long-term dialogue—should the regime truly desire it—are as much a function of Iran's domestic practices as of its nuclear ambitions.
The second focuses on trade. The United States today has little direct economic leverage over Iran, but here Europe can help. Collectively, the countries of the European Union serve as Iran's largest trading partner with an annual total trade of more than €25 billion ($34.25 billion).[22] While European capitals have proved resistant to using this economic clout to pressure Tehran over its nuclear ambitions, there is reason to believe that the question of human rights might find a more receptive ear on the continent. That is because the countries of Europe, almost without exception, are signatories to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which obliges them to encourage "the effective exercise of civil, political, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms" abroad.[23] Over the years, those standards have never been applied in any significant fashion to Iran as a result of human rights concerns. Washington, however, has the ability to make that laissez-faire attitude an issue and to nudge Europe toward taking a more active stance on altering Tehran's domestic behavior by highlighting the regime's widespread domestic abuses, and the moral imperative of disengagement as a result.
Upgrading Official U.S. Communications
By objective measure, official U.S. broadcasting toward Iran enjoys widespread popularity within the Islamic Republic. The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors estimates that the U.S. government's outreach to Iranians—encompassing the Voice of America's Persian News Network television channel, its radio counterpart Radio Farda,[24] and associated websites—"has a combined weekly radio, television, and Internet audience of 29.4 percent of the adults in Iran."[25] Audience, however, does not equal influence. Riddled with mismanagement, a lack of accountability, and a chronic absence of strategic vision, official U.S. broadcast outlets remain a marginal voice in Iranian politics.
Four years ago, a study commissioned by the Iran Steering Group, jointly chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council, exposed these deficiencies. That report found that the main instruments of official U.S. broadcasting into Iran "fall short of realizing their stated mission and mandate" on a number of levels from self-censorship in the selection of content, to inadequate analysis and interpretation of important events, to a failure to properly frame sensitive political issues.[26]
Those conclusions still stand, despite the fact that in the years since that study was written, U.S. broadcasting into Iran has received major infusions of economic capital and political attention. However, structural reforms—such as greater linguistic proficiency among senior managers and more stringent oversight over programming—have lagged far behind, as highlighted in a scathing report issued by the State Department's inspector general in April 2009.[27]
Reversing course requires the United States to make major investments in a number of areas. Chief among them is clarity of purpose. The current disarray in official U.S. broadcasting is attributable at least partly to a lack of unambiguous direction from the country's political leadership. In its day, the Bush administration—for all of its lofty rhetoric to the contrary—sent mixed signals about its commitment to a fundamental, political transformation in Tehran. The Obama administration, preoccupied with engagement of the current Iranian regime, has so far refrained from articulating in an unmistakable and sustained fashion a commitment to political trends that might jeopardize this policy. If, however, the administration hopes to be able to influence Iranian politics over the long term, it will need to articulate much clearer support for political pluralism in the Islamic Republic. And once it does, it will need to enforce that policy throughout the bureaucracy that manages U.S. public diplomacy.
This change, moreover, must be reflected in the quality of the actual content that is generated by U.S. broadcasting. Today, with some notable exceptions, U.S. outreach to Iran has degenerated into prolonged sessions of entertainment, often carried out at the expense of proven approaches to shaping the strategic landscape through cultural, intellectual, and historical programs. And the audience appears to have taken notice: Anecdotal evidence suggests that although U.S. broadcasts are ubiquitous throughout the Islamic Republic, they desperately need a reconfiguration that provides for greater discourse about liberal Western democracy, human rights, personal freedoms, and political independence.[28] Key themes that require amplification include: U.S. support for opposition forces within Iran; the extent of regime brutality against its own people; the corruption endemic to the country's ruling clerical class; and the dangers that the Iranian regime's persistent quest for nuclear weapons poses to its own population.
Harnessing Iran's Blogosphere
With Internet penetration estimated at over 25 percent of Iran's population of seventy million, the Islamic Republic already ranks among the most "wired" nations in the Middle East.[29] This online community is both dynamic and vibrant; Iran is estimated to have some 60,000 or more active weblogs, making it the third largest blogosphere in the world (after the United States and China).[30] It is not by accident that telecommunications capabilities and the Internet have been routinely interrupted since the June 12 election. Simply put, Iran's leaders are deeply and justifiably afraid of the transformative power of the Internet. If harnessed effectively, Iran's blogosphere can serve as a potent tool to highlight the shortcomings of the Islamic Republic. It can also provide Western policymakers with far greater understanding of the internal dynamics at play within the Iranian political system.
An important first step in this regard is to facilitate the interaction between Iranian bloggers and Western media. Over the past year, a number of Western newspapers have provided forums for Iranian activists and dissidents to report and provide context on the events taking place within Iran.[31] Such contributions, however, have been sporadic and ad hoc, even after the outbreak of unrest in June. Nor have news blogs such as Tehran Bureau, which was influential in reporting the early stages of post-election protests, managed to sustain the West's attention over time.
Consistent input from these blogosphere sources is essential to informed policymaking. Simply put, without a good understanding of the evolving human terrain within Iran, Western capitals will find it impossible to formulate an accurate picture of the Iranian political scene and determine the most effective avenues to influence events there. To this end, Western media outlets should be encouraged to create a consortium of trusted Iranian bloggers to report regularly on events within Iran and to analyze their long-term implications. Such bloggers would not only serve to enrich Western reporting on events in Iran, they would provide policymakers and the general public alike much needed nuance and context as they attempt to navigate the rapidly changing Iranian political scene.
Helping the Opposition to Coordinate
During the summer of 2003, a resurgence of anti-regime protests rocked the Islamic Republic. Over the course of several weeks, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities in a sustained series of demonstrations—the largest since the student uprising of 1999, which was bloodily suppressed by the regime. Foreign broadcasting outlets such as the Los Angeles-based National Iranian Television aided Iranian opposition leaders by allowing them to use their airwaves to coordinate activities and seek support from Iranians inside and outside the country.
Unable to put an end to such foreign broadcasting itself, Iran turned to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Within days, Havana began using a Russian-built electronic warfare facility to jam both U.S. government and private broadcasts into the Islamic Republic.[32] The interference eliminated a crucial outlet for political information and organization for Iranian protesters, effectively neutralizing the nascent democratic protests at a critical time as they had begun to spread across the country.
Little has changed since. Although some in Congress have attempted to deter Iran's suppression of foreign broadcasts, these steps remain ineffective. A notable effort was the Iran Human Rights Act introduced by Sen. Sam Brownback (Republican of Kansas) in 2006. This piece of legislation outlined that the president "may impose diplomatic and, if necessary, economic sanctions on foreign governments or entities that assist the government of Iran in jamming, blocking, or otherwise preventing the free transmission of United States Government radio and television broadcasts into Iran." The Iran Human Rights Act, however, did not pass review by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was ultimately shelved by its sponsors. Iran's opposition, meanwhile, still lacks reliable, independent means for communicating and coordinating. But the West can help on this score. During the Cold War, the United States actively provided Soviet dissidents and opposition movements in the Soviet bloc with the technological tools to organize more efficiently.[33] The United States has the power to do much the same today. By discreetly supplying Iran's opposition with communications equipment such as satellite phones, Washington could provide them with a low-cost, resilient way to coordinate with each other and with supporters outside the country.
International Focus on Iranian Dissidents
Who are Iran's future leaders? Today, the Green Movement remains chaotic and unfocused. Its most recognizable figures—failed presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi—are hardly authentic champions of the opposition. On the contrary, both are establishment politicians: Mousavi served as prime minister from 1981 to 1989, the period during which the Islamic Republic established the Lebanese terrorist powerhouse Hezbollah and restarted the shah's nuclear program, this time with a military bent. Karroubi, for his part, served as speaker of Iran's parliament, the majles, from 1989 to 1992, and again from 2000 to 2004. Despite some reformist views, neither seeks to dismantle the Islamic Republic. Rather, both appear to be trying to preserve it, albeit in a form more palatable to the West.
Failed presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, here pictured on his Facebook page, is hardly an authentic champion of the opposition. On the contrary, he is an establishment politician. He served as prime minister from 1981 to 1989, the period during which the Islamic Republic established the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and restarted the shah's nuclear program.
Skeptics have highlighted the resulting leadership vacuum in arguing against the Iranian opposition's chances of success.[34] These arguments, however, are ahistoric. It is useful to recall that, at its start, Poland's powerful Solidarity movement lacked clear and cohesive leadership. Figures such as Lech Walesa emerged over time, bringing with them the ideological cohesion and political power that helped Poland ultimately shrug off the communist yoke. At least some recent instances of grassroots revolution, such as the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Cedar Uprising in Lebanon the same year, have followed similar evolutionary paths (albeit with very different results).
Moreover, a cadre of activists capable of such leadership already exists within Iran. These nascent leaders come from all walks of life. They include union organizers such as Mansour Ossanlou,[35] now incarcerated in Tehran's Evin Prison for agitating on behalf of greater rights for Iran's bus drivers, and clerics such as Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei,[36] widely tipped to be the spiritual successor to recently deceased dissident Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri. These individuals may vary in their world-views and political agendas, but they share a common bond as enemies of the clerical state.
Currently, the international community has little familiarity with these voices, but it would be better if it did. During the Cold War, Western politicians were intimately familiar with the identities of political prisoners, dissident activists, and others persecuted for opposing Soviet rule and agitated regularly on their behalf during diplomatic parlays with their Soviet counterparts. A similar focus today could provide much needed international attention to Tehran's most potent adversaries, restraining the regime from dealing with them quite as ruthlessly and infusing regime opponents with a renewed sense of political direction.
The Future in the Balance
Today, Iranian politics are dominated by a deep divide. On one side is Iran's repressive theocratic regime—a clerical junta that ranks as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism and which is hell-bent on acquiring a nuclear capability. On the other are the people of Iran—a vibrant constituency that holds the future of the country in its hands. The course of their confrontation will determine the nature of the Iranian state and its place in the world for years to come.
For the United States and its allies, this struggle carries enormous consequences. The emergence of a more accountable, pluralistic regime in Tehran would allay—if not eliminate—mounting concerns over Iran's emerging nuclear capability and regional adventurism. Such a regime could create the conditions necessary for the historic rapprochement between Washington and Tehran so sought after by the Obama administration. As it adapts its Iran policy, the White House should make every effort to support the forces of pluralism there in order to make such an outcome more likely.
**Ilan Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. He is the author, most recently, of Winning the Long War: Retaking the Offensive against Radical Islam (Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Sept. 2002).
[2] The New York Times, Dec. 21, 2002; CNN News, Dec. 21, 2002.
[3] "Iran All-Spigot Funding Chart," White House, Office of Management and Budget, July 18, 2008.
[4] Ibid.
[5] The New York Sun, Nov. 8, 2007.
[6] Bari Weiss and David Feith, "Denying the Green Revolution," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 2009.
[7] The Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 2009.
[8] Weiss and Feith, "Denying the Green Revolution."
[9] Mehdi Khalaji, Patrick Clawson, Michael Singh, and Mohsen Sazegara, "Iran's 'Election': What Happened? What Does It Mean?" Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Policy Watch, no. 1537, June 18, 2009.
[10] Associated Press, Jan. 21, 2010.
[11] "Iran, Islamic Republic of: Background" United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), accessed Feb. 10, 2010.
[12] The Washington Post, Sept. 23, 2005.
[13] Press TV (Tehran), July 20, 2009; Evgeny Morozov, "Are Iranian Authorities More Sophisticated than We Think?" Foreign Policy, July 10, 2009.
[14] See, for example, "Iran: Stop 'Framing' Government Critics," Human Rights Watch, New York, July 21, 2009.
[15] The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2009.
[16] Reuters, Nov. 14, 2009; Associated Press, Nov. 26, 2009; The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 2010.
[17] "A Glance at Iran: Population," Statistical Centre of Iran, Vice-Presidency for Strategic Planning and Supervision, Islamic Republic of Iran, accessed Feb. 10, 2010.
[18] The Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 2009.
[19] The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 2010.
[20] "Interview, Embassy-Hostage-Turned-U.S. Envoy Compares '79 to Iran Today," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Jan. 6, 2010.
[21] See, for example, Rep. Mark Kirk, remarks before the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Nov. 4, 2009.
[22] "Trade, Countries, Iran," European Commission, Brussels, June 1, 2009.
[23] Final Act, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975.
[24] Jeffrey Gedmin, "Our Iranian Colleagues Believe in Radio Farda's Mission," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008, pp. 53-6.
[25] "Broadcasting Board of Governors Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request," Washington D.C., p. 25, accessed Feb. 12, 2010.
[26] "Draft: A Study of USG Broadcasting into Iran Prepared for the Iran Steering Committee," U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sept. 14, 2006, p. 1.
[27] The Washington Times, Apr. 14, 2009.
[28] "Draft: A Study of USG Broadcasting into Iran," p. 1; J. Scott Carpenter, "Challenging Iran on Human Rights," The Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2010.
[29] Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media (Richmond, Va.: Freedom House, Apr. 1, 2009), p. 70.
[30] See, for example, Shawn Woodley, "Iran: On Blogs and Ballots," Diplomatic Courier, June 14, 2009.
[31] See, for example, Heshmat Tabarzadi, "What I See on the Frontline in Iran," The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 2009.
[32] The Washington Times, July 16, 2003.
[33] "Memorandum for the 303 Committee," Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret. Eyes Only, National Security Council, Washington, D.C., Dec. 9, 1969.
[34] See, for example, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, "Another Iranian Revolution? Not Likely," The New York Times, Jan. 6, 2010.
[35] "Rights Crisis Escalates: Faces and Cases from Ahmadinejad's Crackdown," International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, New York, Sept. 20, 2008.
[36] The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Jan. 6, 2010.
Related Topics: Iran | Ilan Berman | Spring 2010 MEQ
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The Middle East Forum


Extended Bosnia Mission Endangers U.S. Troops
Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
http://www.senate.gov/%7erpc/releases/1997/iran.htm#top
January 16, 1997
"'There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition. 'And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this . . . thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to have the time and contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia.'" ["Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges: Classified Report Says Izetbegovic Has Been 'Co-Opted,' Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," Los Angeles Times, 12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of Bosnia.]

"'If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a senior Western diplomat with long experience in the region. 'He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us.'" ["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies," New York Times, 9/2/96]

Introduction and Summary
In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force" (IFOR) to ensure that the warring Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian factions complied with provisions of the Dayton peace plan. [NOTE: This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. For background, see RPC's "Clinton Administration Ready to Send U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95," and Legislative Notice No. 60, "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through statements by Administration spokesmen, notably Defense Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili, the president firmly assured Congress and the American people that U.S. personnel would be out of Bosnia at the end of one year. Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 election was safely behind him, President Clinton announced that approximately 8,500 U.S. troops would be remaining for another 18 months as part of a restructured and scaled down contingent, the "stabilization force" (SFOR), officially established on December 20, 1996.
SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the nature of its mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had successfully accomplished its basic military task -- separating the factions' armed forces -- there has been very little progress toward other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that has held through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the Serbs) and Mostar (divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies, both of which are currently being armed by the Clinton Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third that of its predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks by one or another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it in renewed fighting: "IFOR forces, despite having suffered few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks from all of the contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. As a second mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves, presumably maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the deterrent effect which has existed may well become less compelling and vulnerabilities of the troops will increase." ["Military Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and Future," Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States, 12/18/96]
The Iranian Connection
Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission -- and more importantly, to the safety of the American personnel serving in Bosnia -- is the unwillingness of the Clinton Administration to come clean with the Congress and with the American people about its complicity in the delivery of weapons from Iran to the Muslim government in Sarajevo. That policy, personally approved by Bill Clinton in April 1994 at the urging of CIA Director-designate (and then-NSC chief) Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, has, according to the Los Angeles Times (citing classified intelligence community sources), "played a central role in the dramatic increase in Iranian influence in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in September 1996 National Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton Administration claims of declining Iranian influence, insisting instead that "Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active throughout Bosnia." Likewise, "CIA analysts noted that the Iranian presence was expanding last fall," with some ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities "known to be fronts" for the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's intelligence service, known as VEVAK, the Islamic revolutionary successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [LAT, 12/31/96] At a time when there is evidence of increased willingness by pro-Iranian Islamic militants to target American assets abroad -- as illustrated by the June 1996 car-bombing at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 American airmen, in which the Iranian government or pro-Iranian terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb Probe on Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] -- it is irresponsible in the extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to which its policies have put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable position while performing an increasingly questionable mission.
Three Key Issues for Examination
This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green light to Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious implications for the safety of U.S. troops deployed there. (In addition, RPC will release a general analysis of the SFOR mission and the Clinton Administration's request for supplemental appropriations to fund it in the near future.) Specifically, the balance of this paper will examine in detail the three issues summarized below:
1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was made.
2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization," called the Third World Relief Agency, has been well-documented. The Clinton Administration's "hands-on" involvement with the Islamic network's arms pipeline included inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government officials.
3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8): Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being the tolerant, multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself; the progressive Islamization of the Bosnian army, including creation of native Bosnian mujahedin units; credible claims that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo were staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim.
The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments
Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia issued reports late last year. (The Senate report, dated November 1996, is unclassified. The House report is classified, with the exception of the final section of conclusions, which was released on October 8, 1996; a declassified version of the full report is expected to be released soon.) The reports, consistent with numerous press accounts, confirm that on April 27, 1994, President Clinton directed Ambassador Galbraith to inform the government of Croatia that he had "no instructions" regarding Croatia's decision whether or not to permit weapons, primarily from Iran, to be transshipped to Bosnia through Croatia. (The purpose was to facilitate the acquisition of arms by the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo despite the arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security Council.) Clinton Administration officials took that course despite their awareness of the source of the weapons and despite the fact that the Croats (who were themselves divided on whether to permit arms deliveries to the Muslims) would take anything short of a U.S. statement that they should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to Bosnia as a "green light."
The green light policy was decided upon and implemented with unusual secrecy, with the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense only informed after the fact. ["U.S. Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran," Los Angeles Times, 7/14/96] Among the key conclusions of the House Subcommittee were the following (taken from the unclassified section released on October 8):
"The President and the American people were poorly served by the Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without due deliberation, full information and an adequate consideration of the consequences." (page 202)
"The Administration's efforts to keep even senior US officials from seeing its 'fingerprints' on the green light policy led to confusion and disarray within the government." (page 203)
"The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about its Iranian green light policy." (page 204)
Clinton, Lake, and Galbraith Responsible
While the final go-ahead for the green light was given by President Clinton -- who is ultimately accountable for the results of his decision -- two Clinton Administration officials bear particular responsibility: Ambassador Galbraith and then-NSC Director Anthony Lake, against both of whom the House of Representatives has referred criminal charges to the Justice Department. Mr. Lake, who personally presented the proposal to Bill Clinton for approval, "played a central role in preventing the responsible congressional committees from knowing about the Administration's fateful decision to acquiesce in radical Islamic Iran's effort to penetrate the European continent through arms shipments and military cooperation with the Bosnian government." ["'In Lake We Trust'? Confirmation Make-Over Exacerbates Senate Concerns About D.C.I.-Designate's Candor, Reliability," Center for Security Policy, Washington, D.C., 1/8/97] His responsibility for the operation is certain to be a major hurdle in his effort to be confirmed as CIA Director: "The fact that Lake was one of the authors of the duplicitous policy in Bosnia, which is very controversial and which has probably helped strengthen the hand of the Iranians, doesn't play well," stated Senate Intelligence Chairman Richard Shelby. ["Lake to be asked about donation," Washington Times, 1/2/97]
For his part, Ambassador Galbraith was the key person both in conceiving the policy and in serving as the link between the Clinton Administration and the Croatian government; he also met with Imam Sevko Omerbasic, the top Muslim cleric in Croatia, "who the CIA says was an intermediary for Iran." ["Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the real story," The New Republic, 10/28/96; see also LAT 12/23/96] As the House Subcommittee concluded (page 206): "There is evidence that Ambassador Galbraith may have engaged in activities that could be characterized as unauthorized covert action." The Senate Committee (pages 19 and 20 of the report) was unable to agree on the specific legal issue of whether Galbraith's actions constituted a "covert action" within the definition of section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 413(e)), as amended, defined as "an activity or activities . . . to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."
The Militant Islamic Network
The House Subcommittee report also concluded (page 2): "The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US strategic interests." Further --
" . . . The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist support systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus [known as the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID)] to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. The Iranian embassy became the largest in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled privileges and access at every level of the Bosnian government." (page 201)
Not Just the Iranians
To understand how the Clinton green light would lead to this degree of Iranian influence, it is necessary to remember that the policy was adopted in the context of extensive and growing radical Islamic activity in Bosnia. That is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants had long been active in Bosnia; the American green light was an important political signal to both Sarajevo and the militants that the United States was unable or unwilling to present an obstacle to those activities -- and, to a certain extent, was willing to cooperate with them. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of facilitating the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the de facto partner of an ongoing international network of governments and organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of Islamic revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran), and Turkey, together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian and cultural activities.
For example, one such group about which details have come to light is the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney humanitarian organization which has been a major link in the arms pipeline to Bosnia. ["How Bosnia's Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo: Relief Agency Brokered Aid From Nations, Radical Groups," Washington Post, 9/22/96; see also "Saudis Funded Weapons For Bosnia, Official Says: $300 Million Program Had U.S. 'Stealth Cooperation'," Washington Post, 2/2/96] TWRA is believed to be connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (the convicted mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Osama Binladen, a wealthy Saudi emigre believed to bankroll numerous militant groups. [WP, 9/22/96] (Sheik Rahman, a native of Egypt, is currently in prison in the United States; letter bombs addressed to targets in Washington and London, apparently from Alexandria, Egypt, are believed connected with his case. Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan, until last year; he is now believed to be in Afghanistan, "where he has issued statements calling for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf." [WP, 9/22/96])
The Clinton Administration's "Hands-On" Help
The extent to which Clinton Administration officials, notably Ambassador Galbraith, knowingly or negligently, cooperated with the efforts of such front organizations is unclear. For example, according to one intelligence account seen by an unnamed U.S. official in the Balkans, "Galbraith 'talked with representatives of Muslim countries on payment for arms that would be sent to Bosnia,' . . . [T]he dollar amount mentioned in the report was $500 million-$800 million. The U.S. official said he also saw subsequent 'operational reports' in 1995 on almost weekly arms shipments of automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-armor rockets and TOW missiles." [TNR, 10/28/96] The United States played a disturbingly "hands-on" role, with, according to the Senate report (page 19), U.S. government personnel twice conducting inspections in Croatia of missiles en route to Bosnia. Further --
"The U.S. decision to send personnel to Croatia to inspect rockets bound for Bosnia is . . . subject to varying interpretations. It may have been simply a straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons were being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an opportunity to examine a rocket in which the United States had some interest. But it may also have been designed to ensure that Croatia would not shut down the pipeline." (page 21)
The account in The New Republic points sharply to the latter explanation: "Enraged at Iran's apparent attempt to slip super weapons past Croat monitors, the Croatian defense minister nonetheless sent the missiles on to Bosnia 'just as Peter [i.e., Ambassador Galbraith] told us to do,' sources familiar with the episode said." [TNR, 10/28/96] In short, the Clinton Administration's connection with the various players that made up the arms network seems to have been direct and intimate.
The Mujahedin Threat
In addition to (and working closely with) the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence are members of numerous radical groups known for their anti-Western orientation, along with thousands of volunteer mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Islamic world. From the beginning of the NATO-led deployment, the Clinton Administration has given insufficient weight to military concerns regarding the mujahedin presence in Bosnia as well as the danger they pose to American personnel. Many of the fighters are concentrated in the so-called "green triangle" (the color green symbolizes Islam) centered on the town of Zenica in the American IFOR/SFOR zone but are also found throughout the country.
The Clinton Administration has been willing to accept Sarajevo's transparently false assurances of the departure of the foreign fighters based on the contention that they have married Bosnian women and have acquired Bosnian citizenship -- and thus are no longer "foreign"! -- or, having left overt military units to join "humanitarian," "cultural," or "charitable" organizations, are no longer "fighters." [See "Foreign Muslims Fighting in Bosnia Considered 'Threat' to U.S. Troops," Washington Post, 11/30/95; "Outsiders Bring Islamic Fervor To the Balkans," New York Times, 9/23/96; "Islamic Alien Fighters Settle in Bosnia," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/23/96; "Mujahideen rule Bosnian villages: Threaten NATO forces, non-Muslims," Washington Times, 9/23/96; and Yossef Bodansky, Offensive in the Balkans (November 1995) and Some Call It Peace (August 1996), International Media Corporation, Ltd., London. Bodansky, an analyst with the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, is an internationally recognized authority on Islamic terrorism.] The methods employed to qualify for Bosnian citizenship are themselves problematic: "Islamic militants from Iran and other foreign countries are employing techniques such as forced marriages, kidnappings and the occupation of apartments and houses to remain in Bosnia in violation of the Dayton peace accord and may be a threat to U.S. forces." ["Mujaheddin Remaining in Bosnia: Islamic Militants Strongarm Civilians, Defy Dayton Plan," Washington Post, 7/8/96]
The threat presented by the mujahedin to IFOR (and now, to SFOR) -- contingent only upon the precise time their commanders in Tehran or Sarajevo should choose to activate them -- has been evident from the beginning of the NATO-led deployment. For example, in February 1996 NATO forces raided a terrorist training camp near the town of Fojnica, taking into custody 11 men (8 Bosnian citizens -- two of whom may have been naturalized foreign mujahedin -- and three Iranian instructors); also seized were explosives "built into small children's plastic toys, including a car, a helicopter and an ice cream cone," plus other weapons such as handguns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The Sarajevo government denounced the raid, claiming the facility was an "intelligence service school"; the detainees were released promptly after NATO turned them over to local authorities. ["NATO Captures Terrorist Training Camp, Claims Iranian Involvement," Associated Press, 2/16/96; "Bosnian government denies camp was for terrorists," Reuters, 2/16/96; Bodansky Some Call It Peace, page 56] In May 1996, a previously unknown group called "Bosnian Islamic Jihad" (jihad means "holy war") threatened attacks on NATO troops by suicide bombers, similar to those that had recently been launched in Israel. ["Jihad Threat in Bosnia Alarms NATO," The European, 5/9/96]
Stepping-Stone to Europe
The intended targets of the mujahedin network in Bosnia are not limited to that country but extend to Western Europe. For example, in August 1995, the conservative Paris daily Le Figaro reported that French security services believe that "Islamic fundamentalists from Algeria have set up a security network across Europe with fighters trained in Afghan guerrilla camps and [in] southern France while some have been tested in Bosnia." [(London) Daily Telegraph, 8/17/95] Also, in April 1996, Belgian security arrested a number of Islamic militants, including two native Bosnians, smuggling weapons to Algerian guerrillas active in France. [Intelligence Newsletter, Paris, 5/9/96 (No. 287)] Finally, also in April 1996, a meeting of radicals aligned with HizbAllah ("Party of God"), a pro-Iran group based in Lebanon, set plans for stepping up attacks on U.S. assets on all continents; among those participating was an Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who "runs the Islamist terrorist operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from a special headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria. His forces are already deployed throughout Bosnia, ready to attack US and other I-FOR (NATO Implementation Force) targets." ["State-Sponsored Terrorism and The Rise of the HizbAllah International," Defense and Foreign Affairs and Strategic Policy, London, 8/31/96] Finally, in December 1996, French and Belgian security arrested several would-be terrorists trained at Iranian-run camps in Bosnia. ["Terrorism: The Bosnian Connection," (Paris) L'Express, 12/26/96]
The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime
Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided policy toward Iranian influence in Bosnia is a fundamental misreading of the true nature of the Muslim regime that benefitted from the Iran/Bosnia arms policy: "The most dubious of all Bosniac [i.e., Bosnian Muslim] claims pertains to the self-serving commercial that the government hopes to eventually establish a multiethnic liberal democratic society. Such ideals may appeal to a few members of Bosnia's ruling circle as well as to a generally secular populace, but President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much different private intentions and goals." ["Selling the Bosnia Myth to America: Buyer Beware," Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray, USA, U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1995]
The evidence that the leadership of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and consequently, the Sarajevo-based government, has long been motivated by the principles of radical Islam is inescapable. The following three profiles are instructive:
Alija Izetbegovic: Alija Izetbegovic, current Bosnian president and head of the SDA, in 1970 authored the radical "Islamic Declaration," which calls for "the Islamic movement" to start to take power as soon as it can overturn "the existing non-Muslim government . . . [and] build up a new Islamic one," to destroy non-Islamic institutions ("There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social institutions"), and to create an international federation of Islamic states. [The Islamic Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, Sarajevo, in English, 1990] Izetbegovic's radical pro-Iran associations go back decades: "At the center of the Iranian system in Europe is Bosnia-Hercegovina's President, Alija Izetbegovic, . . . who is committed to the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina." ["Iran's European Springboard?", House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 9/1/92] The Task Force report further describes Izetbegovic's contacts with Iran and Libya in 1991, before the Bosnian war began; he is also noted as a "fundamentalist Muslim" and a member of the "Fedayeen of Islam" organization, an Iran-based radical group dating to the 1930s and which by the late 1960s had recognized the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini (then in exile from the Shah). Following Khomeini's accession to power in 1979, Izetbegovic stepped-up his efforts to establish Islamic power in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983. Today, he is open and unapologetic about his links to Iran: "Perhaps the most telling detail of the [SDA's September 1, 1996] campaign rally . . . was the presence of the Iranian Ambassador and his Bosnian and Iranian bodyguards, who sat in the shadow of the huge birchwood platform. . . . As the only foreign diplomat [present], indeed the only foreigner traveling in the President's [i.e., Izetbegovic's] heavily guarded motorcade of bulky four-wheel drive jeeps, he lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the event, one that many American and European supporters of the Bosnian Government are trying hard to ignore or dismiss." [NYT, 9/2/96] During the summer 1996 election campaign, the Iranians delivered to him, in two suitcases, $500,000 in cash; Izetbegovic "is now 'literally on their [i.e., the Iranians'] payroll,' according to a classified report based on the CIA's analysis of the issue." [LAT, 12/31/96. See also "Iran Contributed $500,000 to Bosnian President's Election Effort, U.S. Says," New York Times, 1/1/97, and Washington Times, 1/2/97] Adil Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim co-founder of the SDA, broke with Izetbegovic in late 1990 due to the increasingly overt fundamentalist and pro-Iranian direction of the party. [See Milovan Djilas, Bosnjak: Adil Zulfikarpasic, Zurich, 1994]
Hassan (or Hasan) Cengic: Until recently, deputy defense minister (and now cosmetically reassigned to a potentially even more dangerous job in refugee resettlement at the behest of the Clinton Administration), Cengic, a member of a powerful clan headed by his father, Halid Cengic, is an Islamic cleric who has traveled frequently to Tehran and is deeply involved in the arms pipeline. ["Bosnian Officials Involved in Arms Trade Tied to Radical States," Washington Post, 9/22/96] Cengic was identified by Austrian police as a member of TWRA's supervisory board, "a fact confirmed by its Sudanese director, Elfatih Hassanein, in a 1994 interview with Gazi Husrev Beg, an Islamic affairs magazine. Cengic later became the key Bosnian official involved in setting up a weapons pipeline from Iran. . . . Cengic . . . is a longtime associate of Izetbegovic's. He was one of the co-defendants in Izetbegovic's 1983 trial for fomenting Muslim nationalism in what was then Yugoslavia. Cengic was given a 10-year prison term, most of which he did not serve. In trial testimony Cengic was said to have been traveling to Iran since 1983. Cengic lived in Tehran and Istanbul during much of the war, arranging for weapons to be smuggled into Bosnia." [WP, 9/22/96] According to a Bosnian Croat radio profile: "Hasan's father, Halid Cengic . . . is the main logistic expert in the Muslim army. All petrodollar donations from the Islamic world and the procurement of arms and military technology for Muslim units went through him. He made so much money out of this business that he is one of the richest Muslims today. Halid Cengic and his two sons, of whom Hasan has been more in the public spotlight, also control the Islamic wing of the intelligence agency AID [Agency for Information and Documentation]. Well informed sources in Sarajevo claim that only Hasan addresses Izetbegovic with 'ti' [second person singular, used as an informal form of address] while all the others address him as 'Mr. President,'" a sign of his extraordinary degree of intimacy with the president. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10/28/96, "Radio elaborates on Iranian connection of Bosnian deputy defense minister," from Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna, Mostar, in Serbo-Croatian, 10/25/96, bracketed text in original] In late 1996, at the insistence of the Clinton Administration, Hassan Cengic was reassigned to refugee affairs. However, in his new capacity he may present an even greater hazard to NATO forces in Bosnia, in light of past incidents such as the one that took place near the village of Celic in November 1996. At that time, in what NATO officers called part of a pattern of "military operations in disguise," American and Russian IFOR troops were caught between Muslims and Serbs as the Muslims, some of them armed, attempted to encroach on the cease-fire line established by Dayton; commented a NATO spokesman: "We believe this to be a deliberate, orchestrated and provocative move to circumvent established procedures for the return of refugees." ["Gunfire Erupts as Muslims Return Home," Washington Post, 11/13/96]
Dzemal Merdan: "The office of Brig. Gen. Dzemal Merdan is an ornate affair, equipped with an elaborately carved wooden gazebo ringed with red velvet couches and slippers for his guests. A sheepskin prayer mat lies in the corner, pointing toward Mecca. The most striking thing in the chamber is a large flag. It is not the flag of Bosnia, but of Iran. Pinned with a button of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's late Islamic leader, the flag occupies pride of place in Merdan's digs -- displayed in the middle of the gazebo for every visitor to see. Next to it hangs another pennant, that of the Democratic Action Party, the increasingly nationalist Islamic organization of President Alija Izetbegovic that dominates Bosnia's Muslim region. . . . Merdan's position highlights the American dilemma. As head of the office of training and development of the Bosnian army, he is a key liaison figure in the U.S. [arm and train] program. . . . But Merdan, Western sources say, also has another job -- as liaison with foreign Islamic fighters here since 1992 and promoter of the Islamic faith among Bosnia's recruits. Sources identified Merdan as being instrumental in the creation of a brigade of Bosnian soldiers, called the 7th Muslim Brigade, that is heavily influenced by Islam and trained by fighters from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. He has also launched a program, these sources say, to build mosques on military training grounds to teach Islam to Bosnian recruits. In addition, he helped establish training camps in Bosnia where Revolutionary Guards carried out their work." ["Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program Would Aid Force Increasingly Linked to Iran," Washington Post, 1/26/96, emphasis added] General Merdan is a close associate of both Izetbegovic and Cengic; the central region around Zenica, which was "completely militarized in the first two years of the war" under the control of Merdan's mujahedin, is "under total control of the Cengic family." ["Who Rules Bosnia and Which Way," (Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 11/17/96, FBIS translation; Slobodna Bosna is one of the few publications in Muslim-held areas that dares to criticize the policies and personal corruption of the ruling SDA clique.] Merdan's mujahedin were accused by their erstwhile Croat allies of massacring more than 100 Croats near Zenica in late 1993. ["Bosnian Croats vow to probe war crimes by Moslems," Agence France Presse, 5/12/95]
The Islamization of the Bosnian Army
In cooperation with the foreign Islamic presence, the Izetbegovic regime has revamped its security and military apparatus to reflect its Islamic revolutionary outlook, including the creation of mujahedin units throughout the army; some members of these units have assumed the guise of a shaheed (a "martyr," the Arabic term commonly used to describe suicide bombers), marked by their white garb, representing a shroud. While these units include foreign fighters naturalized in Bosnia, most of the personnel are now Bosnian Muslims trained and indoctrinated by Iranian and other foreign militants -- which also makes it easier for the Clinton Administration to minimize the mujahedin threat, because few of them are "foreigners."
Prior to 1996, there were three principal mujahedin units in the Bosnian army, the first two of which are headquartered in the American IFOR/SFOR zone: (1) the 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd Corps, headquartered in Zenica; (2) the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 2nd Corps, headquartered in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is based in Tuzla); and (3) the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps, headquartered in Konjic (in the French zone). [Bodansky, Some Call It Peace, page 40] Particularly ominous, many members of these units have donned the guise of martyrs, indicating their willingness to sacrifice themselves in the cause of Islam. Commenting on an appearance of soldiers from the 7th Liberation Brigade, in Zenica in December 1995, Bodansky writes: "Many of the fighters . . . were dressed in white coveralls over their uniforms. Officially, these were 'white winter camouflage,' but the green headbands [bearing Koranic verses] these warriors were wearing left no doubt that these were actually Shaheeds' shrouds." [Some Call It Peace, page 12] The same demonstration was staged before the admiring Iranian ambassador and President Izetbegovic in September 1996, when white winter garb could only be symbolic, not functional. [NYT, 9/2/96] By June 1996, ten more mujahedin brigades had been established, along with numerous smaller "special units" dedicated to covert and terrorist operations; while foreigners are present in all of these units, most of the soldiers are now native Bosnian Muslims. [Some Call It Peace, pages 42-46]
In addition to these units, there exists another group known as the Handzar ("dagger" or "scimitar") Division, described by Bodansky as a "praetorian guard" for President Izetbegovic. "Up to 6000-strong, the Handzar division glories in a fascist culture. They see themselves as the heirs of the SS Handzar division, formed by Bosnian Muslims in 1943 to fight for the Nazis. Their spiritual model was Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who sided with Hitler. According to UN officers, surprisingly few of those in charge of the Handzars . . . seem to speak good Serbo-Croatian. 'Many of them are Albanian, whether from Kosovo [the Serb province where Albanians are the majority] or from Albania itself.' They are trained and led by veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, say UN sources." ["Albanians and Afghans fight for the heirs to Bosnia's SS past," (London) Daily Telegraph, 12/29/93, bracketed text in original]
Self-Inflicted Atrocities
Almost since the beginning of the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992, there have been persistent reports -- readily found in the European media but little reported in the United States -- that civilian deaths in Muslim-held Sarajevo attributed to the Bosnian Serb Army were in some cases actually inflicted by operatives of the Izetbegovic regime in an (ultimately successful) effort to secure American intervention on Sarajevo's behalf. These allegations include instances of sniping at civilians as well as three major explosions, attributed to Serbian mortar fire, that claimed the lives of dozens of people and, in each case, resulted in the international community's taking measures against the Muslims' Serb enemies. (The three explosions were: (1) the May 27, 1992, "breadline massacre," which was reported to have killed 16 people and which resulted in economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and rump Yugoslavia; (2) the February 5, 1994, Markale "market massacre," killing 68 and resulting in selective NATO air strikes and an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from the area near Sarajevo; and (3) the August 28, 1995 "second market massacre," killing 37 and resulting in large-scale NATO air strikes, eventually leading to the Dayton agreement and the deployment of IFOR.) When she was asked about such allegations (with respect to the February 1994 explosion) then-U.N. Ambassador and current Secretary of State-designate Madeleine Albright, in a stunning non sequitur, said: "It's very hard to believe any country would do this to their own people, and therefore, although we do not exactly know what the facts are, it would seem to us that the Serbs are the ones that probably have a great deal of responsibility." ["Senior official admits to secret U.N. report on Sarajevo massacre," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 6/6/96, emphasis added]
The fact that such a contention is difficult to believe does not mean it is not true. Not only did the incidents lead to the result desired by Sarajevo (Western action against the Bosnian Serbs), their staging by the Muslims would be entirely in keeping with the moral outlook of Islamic radicalism, which has long accepted the deaths of innocent (including Muslim) bystanders killed in terrorist actions. According to a noted analyst: "The dictum that the end justifies the means is adopted by all fundamentalist organizations in their strategies for achieving political power and imposing on society their own view of Islam. What is important in every action is its niy'yah, its motive. No means need be spared in the service of Islam as long as one takes action with a pure niy'yah." [Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, Bethesda, MD, 1987] With the evidence that the Sarajevo leadership does in fact have a fundamentalist outlook, it is unwarranted to dismiss cavalierly the possibility of Muslim responsibility. Among some of the reports:
Sniping: "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have concluded that until mid-June some gunfire also came from Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by Bosnian [i.e., Muslim] soldiers and other security forces. A senior French officer said, 'We find it almost impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is true.'" ["Investigation Concludes Bosnian Government Snipers Shot at Civilians," New York Times, 8/1/95]
The 1992 "Breadline Massacre": "United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders -- not Serb besiegers -- as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention. . . . Classified reports to the UN force commander, General Satish Nambiar, concluded . . . that Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb. 'We believe it was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can,' a UN official said then. 'The large impact which is there now is not necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round landing on a paved surface." ["Muslims 'slaughter their own people'," (London) The Independent, 8/22/92] "Our people tell us there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the media were immediately on the scene." [Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver, BC, 1993, pages 193-4; Gen. MacKenzie, a Canadian, had been commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Sarajevo.]

The 1994 Markale "Market Massacre": "French television reported last night that the United Nations investigation into the market-place bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had established beyond doubt that the mortar shell that killed 68 people was fired from inside Bosnian [Muslim] lines." ["UN tracks source of fatal shell," (London) The Times, 2/19/94] "For the first time, a senior U.N. official has admitted the existence of a secret U.N. report that blames the Bosnian Moslems for the February 1994 massacre of Moslems at a Sarajevo market. . . . After studying the crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, the report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Moslem lines." The report, however, was kept secret; the context of the wire story implies that U.S. Ambasador Albright may have been involved in its suppression. [DPA, 6/6/96] For a fuller discussion of the conflicting claims, see "Anatomy of a massacre," Foreign Policy, 12/22/94, by David Binder; Binder, a veteran New York Times reporter in Yugoslavia, had access to the suppressed report. Bodansky categorically states that the bomb "was actually a special charge designed and built with help from HizbAllah ["Party of God," a Beirut-based pro-Iranian terror group] experts and then most likely dropped from a nearby rooftop onto the crowd of shoppers. Video cameras at the ready recorded this expertly-staged spectacle of gore, while dozens of corpses of Bosnian Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged the day before in a 'body swap' with the Serbs) were paraded in front of cameras to raise the casualty counts." [Offensive in the Balkans, page 62]
The 1995 "Second Market Massacre": "British ammunition experts serving with the United Nations in Sarajevo have challenged key 'evidence' of the Serbian atrocity that triggered the devastating Nato bombing campaign which turned the tide of the Bosnian war." The Britons' analysis was confirmed by French analysts but their findings were "dismissed" by "a senior American officer" at U.N. headquarters in Sarajevo. ["Serbs 'not guilty' of massacre: Experts warned US that mortar was Bosnian," (London) The Times, 10/1/95] A "crucial U.N. report [stating Serb responsibility for] the market massacre is a classified secret, but four specialists -- a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans -- have raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs but by Bosnian government forces." A Canadian officer "added that he and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia were 'convinced that the Muslim government dropped both the February 5, 1994, and the August 28, 1995, mortar shells on the Sarajevo markets.'" An unidentified U.S. official "contends that the available evidence suggests either 'the shell was fired at a very low trajectory, which means a range of a few hundred yards -- therefore under [Sarajevo] government control,' or 'a mortar shell converted into a bomb was dropped from a nearby roof into the crowd.'" ["Bosnia's bombers," The Nation, 10/2/95]. At least some high-ranking French and perhaps other Western officials believed the Muslims responsible; after having received that account from government ministers and two generals, French magazine editor Jean Daniel put the question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur: "'They [i.e., the Muslims] have committed this carnage on their own people?' I exclaimed in consternation. 'Yes,' confirmed the Prime Minister without hesitation, 'but at least they have forced NATO to intervene.'" ["No more lies about Bosnia," Le Nouvel Observateur, 8/31/95, translated in Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture, January 1997]
Suppression of Enemies
As might be expected, one manifestation of the radical Islamic orientation of the Izetbegovic government is increasing curtailment of the freedoms of the remaining non-Muslims (Croats and Serbs) in the Muslim-held zone. While there are similar pressures on minorities in the Serb- and Croat-held parts of Bosnia, in the Muslim zone they have a distinct Islamic flavor. For example, during the 1996-1997 Christmas and New Year holiday season, Muslim militants attempted to intimidate not only Muslims but Christians from engaging in what had become common holiday practices, such as gift-giving, putting up Christmas or New Year's trees, and playing the local Santa Claus figure, Grandfather Frost (Deda Mraz). ["The Holiday, All Wrapped Up; Bosnian Muslims Take Sides Over Santa," Washington Post, 12/26/96] In general:
"Even in Sarajevo itself, always portrayed as the most prominent multi-national community in Bosnia, pressure, both psychological and real, is impelling non-Bosniaks [i.e., non-Muslims] to leave. Some measures are indirect, such as attempts to ban the sale of pork and the growing predominance of [Bosniak] street names. Other measures are deliberate efforts to apply pressure. Examples include various means to make non-Bosniaks leave the city. Similar pressures, often with more violent expression and occasionally with overt official participation, are being used throughout Bosnia." ["Bosnia's Security and U.S. Policy in the Next Phase: A Policy Paper, International Research and Exchanges Board, November 1996]
In addition, President Izetbegovic's party, the SDA, has launched politically-motivated attacks on moderate Muslims both within the SDA and in rival parties. For example, in the summer of 1996 former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, (a Muslim, and son of the former imam at the main Sarajevo mosque) was set upon and beaten by SDA militants. Silajdzic claimed Izetbegovic himself was behind the attacks. [NYT, 9/2/96] Irfan Mustafic, a Muslim who co-founded the SDA, is a member of the Bosnian parliament and was president of the SDA's executive council in Srebrenica when it fell to Bosnian Serb forces; he was taken prisoner but later released. Because of several policy disagreements with Izetbegovic and his close associates, Mustafic was shot and seriously wounded in Srebrenica by Izetbegovic loyalists. [(Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 7/14/96] Finally, one incident sums up both the ruthlessness of the Sarajevo establishment in dealing with their enemies as well as their international radical links:
"A special Bosnian army unit headed by Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president's son, murdered a Bosnian general found shot to death in Belgium last week, a Croatian newspaper reported . . . citing well-informed sources. The Vjesnik newspaper, controlled by the government, said the assassination of Yusuf Prazina was carried out by five members of a commando unit called 'Delta' and headed by Ismet Bajramovic also known as Celo. The paper said that three members of the Syrian-backed Palestinian movement Saika had Prazina under surveillance for three weeks before one of them, acting as an arms dealer, lured him into a trap in a car park along the main highway between Liege in eastern Belgium and the German border town of Aachen. Prazina, 30, nicknamed Yuka, went missing early last month. He was found Saturday with two bullet holes to the head. 'The necessary logistical means to carry out the operation were provided by Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija Izetbegovic, who left Sarajevo more than six months ago,' Vjesnik said. It added that Bakir Izetbegovic 'often travels between Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, by using Iraqi and Pakistani passports,' and was in Belgium at the time of the assassination. Hasan Cengic, head of logistics for the army in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was 'personally involved in the assassination of Yuka Prazina,' the paper said." [Agence France Presse, 1/5/94]
Conclusion
The Clinton Administration's blunder in giving the green light to the Iranian arms pipeline was based, among other errors, on a gross misreading of the true nature and goals of the Izetbegovic regime in Sarajevo. It calls to mind the similar mistake of the Carter Administration, which in 1979 began lavish aid to the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the hopes that (if the United States were friendly enough) the nine comandantes would turn out to be democrats, not communists, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. By the time the Reagan Administration finally cut off the dollar spigot in 1981, the comandantes -- or the "nine little Castros," as they were known locally -- had fully entrenched themselves in power.
To state that the Clinton Administration erred in facilitating the penetration of the Iranians and other radical elements into Europe would be a breathtaking understatement. A thorough reexamination of U.S. policy and goals in the region is essential. In particular, addressing the immediate threat to U.S. troops in Bosnia, exacerbated by the extention of the IFOR/SFOR mission, should be a major priority of the 105th Congress.
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