LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March 20/2010

Bible Of the Day
Luke12/42-48: " The Lord said, “Who then is the faithful and wise steward, whom his lord will set over his household, to give them their portion of food at the right times? 12:43 Blessed is that servant whom his lord will find doing so when he comes. 12:44 Truly I tell you, that he will set him over all that he has. 12:45 But if that servant says in his heart, ‘My lord delays his coming,’ and begins to beat the menservants and the maidservants, and to eat and drink, and to be drunken, 12:46 then the lord of that servant will come in a day when he isn’t expecting him, and in an hour that he doesn’t know, and will cut him in two, and place his portion with the unfaithful. 12:47 That servant, who knew his lord’s will, and didn’t prepare, nor do what he wanted, will be beaten with many stripes, 12:48 but he who didn’t know, and did things worthy of stripes, will be beaten with few stripes. To whomever much is given, of him will much be required; and to whom much was entrusted, of him more will be asked".

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports 
On forgiving and forgetting/By:Ziad Majed/March 19/10
Big spectacle, little substance/Daily Star/March 19/10

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for March 19/10
Geagea: My Visit to Syria Conditioned by Solving Pending Bilateral Issues/Naharnet
Quarrel at Roumieh Prison as Inmates Demand Longer Visiting Hours/Naharnet
Jordanian PM in Beirut to Sign Several MoUs/Naharnet
Israel attack on Iran could ignite Middle East: Hezbollah/Washington Post
Allawi in Beirut for talks aimed at promoting regional stability/Daily Star
Moussa: Israel has no say in regional security before two-state solution/Daily Star
Over 70 ISF officers graduate from US-sponsored policing academy/Daily Star
Cabinet remains silent on criticism against Sleiman/Daily Star
Baroud, Murr lash out at Wahhab slurs/Daily Star
Subsidized interest loans in Lebanon reach $2.71 billion/Daily Star
French companies upbeat about Lebanese economic future/Daily Star
Phalange, March 14 General Secretariat hold talks/Daily Star
UK doctors discuss family practitioners with Khalifeh/Daily Star
Ethiopian-flight committee meets with Najjar/Daily Star
Palestinian youths get chance to air frustrations/Daily Star
Bahia Hariri launches annual music festival in honor of Arab mothers/Daily Star
Most Sidon drivers still snub fire extinguishers/Daily Star
Don't wait for disaster/Daily Star
Lebanese protest in front of Parliament for civil marriages/Daily Star
Wave of Defense Against Campaign on Suleiman/Naharnet
Sfeir Rejects Campaign against President, Says Doing his Job in Best Manner
/Naharnet
UNIFIL Observes 32nd Anniversary of Presence in South
/Naharnet
Iran Suggests that Lebanon Drafts U.N. Resolution on Israel-Palestinians
/Naharnet
Suleiman Rejects Discussing 'Improper' Libyan Invitation
/Naharnet
Plane Crash Victims' Committee Meets Najjar
/Naharnet
President: Israeli Threats Necessitate Unity
/Naharnet
Report: Hariri in Damascus April 4-5
/Naharnet
Cabinet Ministers Laud Abboud's Tourism Plan
/Naharnet
Wahab Says Keenness of Some on Presidency Position 'Remarkable' Compared to That during Lahoud Term
/Naharnet
Murr Rejects Any Attempt at Separating between President Suleiman, Presidency Position
/Naharnet
Baroud Defending Suleiman: Is It Required That He Stops Being All of Lebanon President
/Naharnet
Truth behind Lebanese Police Training: U.S. Proud of Program, Lebanese Split
/Naharnet
 

Sfeir Rejects Campaign against President, Says Doing his Job in Best Manner
/Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir defended President Michel Suleiman on Friday, saying he backed the head of state and the country's legal institutions. After talks with former MP Ghattas Khoury in Bkirki, Sfeir said that he rejected everything that harmed the seat of the presidency and constitutional authorities. On Thursday, Sfeir said the head of state was "doing his job in the best manner." "Every time they search for someone to attack him and now is the turn of the president," Sfeir said. Suleiman "needs some help and we should stand by him," the patriarch stressed. Earlier in the week, Tawheed Movement leader Wiam Wahab called on the head of state to resign, saying "there is a flaw in the president because after two years into his presidency, it feels as if we have arrived at the end of his term.""If domestic parties care for the interests of their neighbor rather than those of their nation, constructive efforts will always prove in vain," the prelate said. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 08:10

Cabinet Ministers Laud Abboud's Tourism Plan
Naharnet/The cabinet has welcomed Tourism Minister Fadi Abboud's 2010-2014 plan to activate the tourism sector in Lebanon, ministerial sources told An Nahar newspaper.
Premier Saad Hariri, who also lauded the plan, told the cabinet on Thursday that similar moves should be made by other ministries for discussion by the council of ministers. Abboud's 15-page plan includes suggestions to activate the sector and ways to contribute to the national economy. The proposal also calls for establishing an authority that would promote Lebanon's image abroad. The cabinet formed a ministerial committee to follow-up on the implementation of the plan. Tourism in Lebanon is expected to grow by 25 percent in 2010 after setting a record-breaking year in 2009 when it contributed a quarter of the country's GDP, Abboud said on Wednesday. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 08:31

Report: Hariri in Damascus April 4-5
Naharnet/Ministerial sources have confirmed to As Safir newspaper that Prime Minister Saad Hariri will travel to Syria on the first week of April. The sources said Hariri will be accompanied by a large ministerial delegation during his visit to Damascus on April 4-5. Syrian President Bashar Assad will welcome Hariri, they said, adding that the Lebanese and Syrian sides would hold the first large scale ministerial work session in 6 years to discuss agreements signed between the two countries. As Safir noticed that a date for Druze leader Walid Jumblat's visit to the Syrian capital hasn't been set yet. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 09:

Geagea: My Visit to Syria Conditioned by Solving Pending Bilateral Issues
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Thursday said that "the calls for the resignation of President Michel Suleiman are beyond those launching them – those who don't possess the needed popular and political weight to launch such stances." In an interview with the al-Arabiya satellite TV network, Geagea added: "The reasonable alternative for the president's resignation -- demanded by some – is the election of a president from the parliamentary majority." "Suleiman and PM Saad Hariri are being targeted by campaigns because they are considered the symbols of stability in this period," he added, wondering "if the other group doesn't want stability in Lebanon anymore." "Lebanese-Syrian relations have not become normal yet, and the president and the premier are exerting major efforts in this direction. Therefore, my visit to Syria is conditioned by solving the pending issues between the two countries and establishing normal and balanced relations," Geagea said in response to a question. He identified the pending issues as "the presence of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons and of (Syrian-backed) Palestinian military bases outside (refugee) camps … that breach the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Lebanese State, in addition to procrastination in (Lebanese-Syrian) border demarcation." Answering a question on his comparison of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu to March 8 Alliance, Geagea said: "This is not a joke, there are two approaches on the Lebanese and regional levels: The approach that believes in political action and March 8's approach that doesn't believe in any solutions outside the frame of war and confrontation."
Beirut, 18 Mar 10, 22:32

Wave of Defense Against Campaign on Suleiman

Naharnet/Although the cabinet abstained from issuing a stance on verbal attacks against President Michel Suleiman, ministers have unleashed a wave of defense against the head of state's critics. Informed sources told An Nahar daily in remarks published Friday that "consensual unity" with Suleiman during the cabinet session the day before was a sign that forces accused of launching the campaign were not behind the criticism. Ministerial sources said that following Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar's statement on attacks on Suleiman and the presidency, the session witnessed a series of reactions in favor of the head of state. Ministers Gebran Bassil, Mohammed Fneish and Youssef Saadeh also reiterated that the campaign against the president should not be exaggerated, An Nahar said. However, when several ministers suggested issuing a cabinet statement on the topic, Suleiman said that he didn't want to get involve in the campaign against him and rejected the release of a communiqué. Officials from across the political spectrum defended Suleiman on Thursday against Tawheed Movement leader Wiam Wahhab's call on the president to resign and other criticism targeting him. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 09:15

Jordanian PM in Beirut to Sign Several MoUs
Naharnet/Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai was in Beirut on Friday at the head of a high-level ministerial delegation to sign memorandums of understanding with Lebanon in several fields. The Jordanian delegation includes the agriculture, education and transport ministers in addition to assistants and advisors. Premier Saad Hariri welcomed al-Rifai at Rafik Hariri International airport. Present were several ministers and Jordan's ambassador Ziad al-Majali. Hariri later met with al-Rifai at the Grand Serail and discussed details of the talks that will be held between the Lebanese and Jordanian sides on Friday afternoon. After holding talks with his Lebanese counterpart, al-Rifai met with President Michel Suleiman at Baabda palace. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 11:24

Quarrel at Roumieh Prison as Inmates Demand Longer Visiting Hours

Naharnet/A verbal brawl erupted Friday at Roumieh jail between guards and prisoners demanding longer visiting hours with their parents/families. State-run National News Agency, which carried the report, did not give further details. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 13:06

Plane Crash Victims' Committee Meets Najjar

Naharnet/Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar has met with the follow-up committee of families of the victims of the Ethiopian plane crash to set in motion recommendations that were approved in meetings held by Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Saad Hariri with plane crash victims' families. The meeting was attended by Committee members, lawyers Waddah al-Shaer, Shaker Raad, Ali Issawi, and Haitham Arnaout.  The attendees were briefed on all the procedures that have been agreed upon by the health and interior ministries with regards to issuing individual death certificates for each crash victim. Committee members were handed over documents that had been prepared in collaboration with judicial authorities in a bid to set up a Social Association of Ethiopian Plane Crash Victim Families to facilitate judicial follow-up consultations. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 10:21

President: Israeli Threats Necessitate Unity

Naharnet/President Michel Suleiman has said that Israel's intransigence in building settlements in East Jerusalem clearly indicates that threats by the Jewish state against Lebanon "necessitate unity" to confront aggression. Suleiman pointed to the importance of National Dialogue meetings, expressing hope that constitutional institutions, mainly Parliament and Cabinet, will continue to be able to carry out their roles. He called for "greater unity and solidarity" in Lebanon and urged Lebanese to commit to the national fundamental principles in order to face up to of any external threat. Suleiman reiterated that internal stability at all levels and in various fields is a "key incentive" for attracting investment as well as tourists and expatriates to promote social and economic development. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 11:03

Samir Geagea

March 19, 2010
On March 18, the Lebanese National News Agency carried the following report:
The head of the Lebanese Forces Executive Committee, Samir Geagea, considered in an interview on Al-Arabiya channel on the show Studio Beirut hosted by journalist Gisele Khoury, that the calls “demanding the resignation of President of the Republic Michel Suleiman extend beyond those issuing these calls.
“With all due respect to them as people, they do not enjoy the necessary popular and political weight to launch such positions. What is more dangerous than their calls are the reasons on which they based them, saying for example that President Suleiman was a consensual president at a time when the country mostly needs a consensus president. It is based on that that he was elected in 2008 since the consensual character of President Suleiman is seeking to bring the different viewpoints closer together. For our part, we had certain reservations over some of the positions of President Suleiman but were logical in the way we approached the situation and moved forward to serve higher national interests. The logical alternative to the calls issued by some to see the consensual president resigning is the arrival of a president from the majority. For their part, President Suleiman and Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri have been subjected to these campaigns because they are the headlines of stability at this stage, i.e. since 2008 and until this day. This is why, along with other legitimate institutions, they have been subjected to a fierce attack for around two weeks. Therefore, we cannot help but wonder whether or not the other team wanted stability in Lebanon.
“Stability is the most important achievement which we the Lebanese accomplished during the last couple of years, thus preventing our political disputes from being reflected on the ground and considering that all the problems could be resolved around the dialogue table and via the constitutional institutions. The calls for the resignation of the president of the republic are undoubtedly finding a fertile ground within the March 8 forces, since had this not been the case, the people issuing these calls would not have been able to do so seeing as how they are unprepared or unqualified to adopt such positions. We hope in this context that the major parties in March 8, especially Hezbollah and Amal, are not somewhere behind these calls and I have my doubts in this regard..."
Asked about the circumstances which could make him visit Damascus following the visit of Prime Minister Al-Hariri who said it took place for Lebanon’s interest, and the expected visit of Deputy Walid Jumblatt who said it will be in the best interest of his sect, he stated: “The interest of the Christians in Lebanon is that of the Lebanese state and I do not believe that any sect in Lebanon can enjoy an interest by itself. Either it is the interest of all the Lebanese, both the Muslims and Christians, or there is no interest for one team.
“The relations between Lebanon and Syria are not yet normal and the president of the republic and the prime minister are deploying massive efforts in this regard. Therefore, my visit to Syria is linked to the resolution of the pending dossiers between the two countries and the establishment of normal and balanced relations between them. Syria is the closest country to us but the Syrian brothers must realize that their interests cannot be secured at the expense of the Lebanese interests...What is obstructing the establishment of such relations until now is the presence of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons, the presence of Palestinian military posts outside the camps constituting security pits undermining the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the slacking [off of work] affecting the demarcation of the border. This in our opinion undermines national sovereignty while there is a committee ready to demarcate the border whether from the North or the Bekaa, although we would rather see it beginning its work from the Shebaa Farms if Syria has the good intention of liberating it from Israel.” Regarding the March 14 forces meeting at the Bristol Hotel and what was said about Geagea’s monopolization of these forces, he stated: “I completely reject that talk. [Former] Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora was present and he is among the prominent figures in the country, which is why he is subjected to campaigns and slander...”
Asked whether or not his statement during the Bristol meeting which was considered by some as being issued by an Arab nationalist, marked the repositioning for the Lebanese Forces on the Arab arena and the weaving of certain Arab alliances, he said: “What I said was not necessarily linked to our friendship and our good Arab relations. Our cause is not an isolated one. It is connected to the Middle East region. Therefore, we should closely monitor what is happening in the region...” He then believed that the Lebanese and Palestinian people were the ones suffering the most in the region, stressing the necessity for these people who do not have a state to start enjoying a strong and independent state, and adding: “The resolution of the Middle East issue has become urgent.” Asked whether he placed himself within the axis of the states wishing to negotiate to reach peace or in the axis of the states wishing to resist, Geagea said: “I do not want to talk about the resistance in general. It is a fascinating and enticing concept and I have personally lived it. I will rather talk about the resistance axis extending from Iran to Hamas and Hezbollah and which I believe is incapable of regaining one inch of the Palestinian soil. Quite the contrary, the entire world is against this resistance and it is impossible for an axis showing hostility to the entire world to achieve palpable progress. In my opinion however, President Mahmoud Abbas and what he represents, has more chance of reaching a solution and establishing a Palestinian state than this resistance axis...”
Asked about the ways to resist Israel if Hezbollah is disarmed, Geagea assured: “We desperately need a clear and blunt announcement by all the Lebanese parties and especially Hezbollah, placing the peace and war decision in Lebanon in the hands of the Lebanese government solely. The threat lurking around Lebanon has nothing to do with Lebanese causes. Israel has no detainees in Lebanon and is involved in a confrontation with Iran which is organically linked with Hezbollah. I am afraid that Iran will activate Hezbollah in Lebanon to respond to any Israeli attacks on Iranian interests, since this will lead Lebanon toward the unknown... The defense strategy is necessary to avoid seeing our people led into conflicts that do not serve their interests. The war which the Israelis are seeking to launch is related to their own interests and enjoys regional dimensions that do not particularly concern Lebanon unless it is dragged into it. Therefore, it is necessary to divest the Israelis of any pretext that would allow them to drag Lebanon into a war it does not want.
“If the destruction which some might bring upon Lebanon can lead to the liberation of one Palestinian village, we would not mind. However, for the country to be destroyed without any results, this is completely unacceptable. What I am proposing is a simple step placing the peace and war decision in the hands of the government to render our position stronger than it is right now.” Geagea then concluded saying that he had security information pointing to the fact that he was personally pursued, adding that he had no fears over the Lebanese Forces Party.”


On forgiving and forgetting

Ziad Majed, March 19, 2010
March 16, 1977 was not only the date of the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, it also opened a new page in the Lebanese civil war and paved the way for a regional force to have a direct hand in the management of the war. This hand first carried out a political assassination, then acted as if the assassination was a deterrent against the victim, or a way to avoid the damage that could be caused had he been allowed to keep living!
It was then up to his kin to accept that and get over it, if they wanted to preserve their own souls and prevent matters from getting even worse, in their own “homes”. More than that, it was up to them to apologize for the actions of the victim and for his own blood spilled, and to stop summoning his memory in order not to harm the “reputation” of his killer.
It is in this sense that one can interpret what Syrian officials told Walid Jumblatt after the ceremony marking forty days since his father’s assassination: that Kamal wanted a military resolution in Lebanon and would not accept Syrian intervention (and mediation), having described Syria as a “great prison”… In this sense as well, one can interpret the leaks provided by various sources close to the Syrian regime that claimed that Rafik Hariri was conspiring with Marwan Hamadeh and others to issue UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and dispel the Syrian army from Lebanon. Similarly in this sense it has been said that Samir Kassir crossed the line when he wrote about Syrian internal affairs and linked independence in Lebanon to democracy in Syria… All of these are examples of what supposedly necessitated, time and again, “punishments” or “measures” to be taken in order to prevent things from going too far…
On this basis of either “preventative or retaliatory violence”, the choice of “blood or surrender” was given to Lebanon for three full decades. And if March 14, 2005 achieved something (apart from any discussion over its political or sectarian characteristics), it was that it dispelled with that choice, overcame the fear mongering and refused to acquiesce to the notion that the deceased, not the killer, was the guilty one, and that shutting up and surrendering were the best ways to avoid further killings and tumult.
… Today, on March 16, 2010, 33 years since the foundational crime (of Kamal Jumblatt), and five years since the choice, built on that foundation, was defeated, it is perhaps worth emphasizing one single thing regardless of all of the back and forth bickering, excuses, satire and innuendo: forgiving and forgetting does not solve the problem, nor does it offer any new choices.
Forgiveness could only be possible after the trial or after the killer admits his crimes and apologizes for them.
As for forgetting, it does not change what has happened. It would, in the best of circumstances, allow anyone to conveniently forgo his/her memory of an event without negating the event itself or its effects and circumstances. More important, it does not negate the fact that there are those who will not forget and will always prefer justice to forgiveness, even if it takes some time…This article is a translation of the original, which was published on the NOW Arabic site on Tuesday, March 16

Big spectacle, little substance

Friday, March 19, 2010
Editorial/Daily Star
The last week or so of Lebanese politics, if we can call it that, has had several moments of political fireworks, while seeing a few meaty issues arise.
Last weekend, of course, saw a three-way drama: Walid Jumblatt gave his “long-awaited” interview and offered a mea culpa, of sorts, to his official Syrian audience. Naturally, the focus was on how Jumblatt explained his earlier polemics, but the side items were notable. Incorporate the resistance into the Lebanese Army? Yes, but at some point down the road. How to get there? No idea, we’re just beginning the process.
It was the kind of interview in which Jumblatt had no problem talking up his core beliefs, namely forward-minded secularism, and his core principles, namely backward-looking sectarianism, as he went on and on about the Druze of Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
And then there was Michel Aoun, holding forth on Saturday night at a banquet, also broadcast live on television. Aoun offered some interesting rhetoric, about how his Free Patriotic Movement does its business and holds its own accountable. But he managed to get into trouble yet again with the judiciary, for commenting on an ongoing court case while claiming he wouldn’t comment on it. Aoun also sniped about the country’s defense strategy, and the state’s inability to agree on anything yet. Aoun gave us the usual dose of rhetoric, instead of facts and figures about the Army’s performance and capabilities, and how much it might cost to upgrade them to truly defend Lebanon. Aoun and many other figures have, unfortunately, a tendency to sound like opposition politicians, despite their presence in the Cabinet.
Finally, the March 14 coalition assembled to tell us about its plan: defend Lebanon. Just like countless other times, they offered bullet points, with no details, along with a plea to the Arab League – the Arab League – to guarantee Lebanon’s defense.
There were other fireworks, such as the campaigns against President Michel Sleiman, and the Internal Security Forces training program with the US.
Some domestic issues have been in play, such as an effort to craft a tourism-sector strategy, and consultations on using merit to make appointments to the state bureaucracy. However, while these policies have yet to be fully elaborated, we’re left with spectacle, and no substance.
Citizens listen to the polemic, which is rarely backed up by useful debate on how things really work, and how they can be changed. Are they supposed to be energized by such ultimately meaningless drivel? Some might yawn, and others might, with considerable despair, agree with Jumblatt, and realize that we’re just at the beginning of a long process. Even more depressingly, no one seems to have a workable road map for how we’re supposed to make the journey.

Hamas: Learning from mistakes
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Anyone who has watched the performance of Hamas or followed its rhetoric since its founding in Palestine in the late 1980s realizes that the Islamic group has greatly matured over the past 20 years.
Originally, Hamas shunned everything related to the Oslo Peace Agreement signed by Palestinian president Yasser Arafat, claiming that by accepting United Nations resolutions Arafat was offering de facto recognition of Israel. The founding charter of Hamas refused to recognize the Jewish state and promised to eradicate it completely, thereby restoring all of Palestine of 1948.
It refused to hold government or parliamentary office in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) that was born out of the Oslo Agreement and waged a bloody war against Israel during the
second intifada that broke out 10 years ago, in September 2000. It also refused to recognize any US role in the Middle East. Today, 22 years after its founding, Hamas is taking a long hard look at its history, learning from both its successes and mistakes to chart a new course for the party and its top leadership.
Things began to change in 2006, when Hamas decided to run for the first post-Arafat parliament in the Palestinian territories - a product of the Oslo Agreement. By agreeing to hold office in an institution created by the peace process, Hamas was actually recognizing the Oslo Accords. In its campaign, although Hamas called for maintaining the armed struggle against Israel, it did not call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, as stated in its 1988 charter, "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it."
Hamas foreign minister Mahmud al-Zahhar made it clear, "There is no place for the state of Israel on this land," but meanwhile, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin had accepted a long-term truce, or hudna, with Israel, if the latter agreed to return to the 1967 border and grant the "right of return" to Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. In January 2004, that offer was reinstated by Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, a senior commander of Hamas, who called for "phased liberation of land" before being assassinated by Israel three months later, in April.
Let us take a closer look at the details. Hamas boycotted the January 2005 election of President Mahmud Abbas, but did participate in the municipal elections of May 2005, taking strongholds like Rafah in the Gaza Strip and Qaliqiyah in the West Bank, with a sweeping majority. In the parliamentary elections of 2006, it took 42.9% of the votes and 74 of the 132 seats after presenting the electorate with a "List of Change and Reform".
Hamas hoped to be given a chance to prove its merit and rule the Palestinian territories, offering a 10-year truce to Israel in return for complete withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. It did not call for liberation of all of Palestine - realizing that politics is the art of the possible and that such a demand would fall on deaf ears in the international community.
Rather than invest in the newfound policy of Hamas, the international community boycotted the Palestinian territories to punish the Palestinians for voting for Hamas, imposing sanctions at the urging of the George W Bush White House, in May 2006. This led hardliners within Hamas to call off any moderation, claiming that Israel only understands the language of force, and advocate a return to what Hamas knew best: leading an armed uprising against Israel.
The mainstream leaders of Hamas, however, clearly wanted to be recognized as statesmen, rather than simply guerilla warriors. The scenario they had in mind was that of Arafat himself, who after years of work in the Palestinian underground, rose to become an elected president in the 1990s, bent on providing jobs, paying salaries, attracting investment and bringing both security and normalcy to the Palestinian territories.
What really mattered, the leaders of Hamas soon realized, were better schools for the Palestinians, finer and cheaper hospitals and higher living standards for the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza. Rooting out corruption and cranking out more PhD students at Palestinian universities became more pressing to them than waging an underground battle against Israel.
A few months back, Ismail Haniyya, the prime minister of the Hamas-led government in Gaza, announced that he welcomed the positive momentum brought to the region by US President Barack Obama. He was willing to give Obama the benefit of the doubt should the latter apply needed pressure on Israel to end the siege of Gaza. Gone were the days of Hamas refusing to accept any US role in the Middle East.
Last week, Hamas released detained British journalist Paul Martin, much to the relief of the British government, from jail in Gaza. This showed that Hamas could solve problems in the Middle East, reminding of how a few years back it had helped release BBC anchor Alan Johnston from captivity in Gaza. Hamas also recently announced that it was willing to accept the Arab Peace Initiative, proposed at the Beirut summit of 2002, which recognized Israel by the 1967 borders. Also seemingly gone were the days of Hamas refusing any peace deal not based on the liberation of all of Palestine.
There are a multitude of reasons why Hamas has changed attitude, while maintaining nevertheless, its original dream of liberating Palestine. One is a desire to come to power in the Palestinian territories - an ambition shared by political parties throughout history.
It happened to Fatah in 1993, when Arafat realized that armed combat alone would never succeed in liberating Palestine or bringing him to power in the Palestinian territories. Another reason why Hamas has softened its policy is the amount of destruction and bloodshed imposed on Gaza since the war of 2008-2009. Although it outlived the Gaza war, Hamas realized that people under its jurisdiction were suffering unbearable conditions and that it had to elevate their living standards - fast. If softening its policies was the price for easing suffering in Gaza, then this was a price Hamas was willing to pay.
A third reason why Hamas is changing fast is yet another realization, being how different its natural surrounding is to that of Hezbollah, which has the luxury of maintaining a hard line policy, and yet, co-sharing power with pro-Western elements in Lebanese politics.
First, co-sharing power with Fatah is clearly not possible in the Palestinian territories, despite all attempts at doing just that since 2006. Second, while Hezbollah is sheltered by the geographic proximity of Syria, Hamas is neighbored by a very hostile Egyptian government, which far from offering support, makes life all the more difficult for the Gazans.
While Hezbollah also makes use of the rugged terrain of south Lebanon, fighting from the caves and mountains, Hamas cannot do that in flat Gaza, being an easy target for Israeli warplanes. Additionally, Hezbollah takes its security very seriously and has made sure that under no circumstances do the Israelis get the chance to infiltrate the Hezbollah community.
Clearly from the results of 2006, Israel has no information on the whereabouts of heavyweight Hezbollah commanders. Otherwise it would have gunned them down, as it has been doing with Hamas leaders since the 1990s.
Within the Palestinian territories, hunger has people by the throat, making it very easy for Israel to send out an army of spies and informers to buy off those in dire need for money. Because of this, Israel has managed to strike down scores of Hamas officials like its founder Ahmad Yassin, Rantisi, and was suspected of playing a part in the death of Arafat himself in 2004.
In January it managed to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, another Hamas heavyweight, in Dubai, and last weekend arrested the founder of Hamas in Ramallah, Maher Udda. A few weeks ago, the son of Sheikh Hasan Youssef, a top Hamas founder, came out to announce that he had been working with Israeli intelligence Mossad since the 1990s, and had since moved to the US and converted to Christianity.
The information he provided apparently saved the life of Israeli President Shimon Peres and led to the arrest of influential Palestinians like Marwan Barghouti. Such a case is unheard of in Hezbollah circles, showing just how difficult it is for Hamas to digest a reality: because of poverty, Israel has infiltrated Palestinian society in dramatically sophisticated ways. Poverty on the streets, an indifferent international community, all topped with a desire to rule, explain why Hamas is wiser in 2010 than ever before.
**Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward magazine.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Hezbollah: Craving war, not wanting it

By Nicholas Noe
BEIRUT - Almost five years after the George W Bush administration was handed a potentially game-changing opportunity to peacefully declaw the militant Shi'ite movement Hezbollah, Washington is finally waking up to the grim reality of its ill-conceived "Cedar Revolution" policy in Lebanon: the prospect of a renewed war involving a sophisticated actor whose hybrid military power has only grown exponentially.
Setting aside, for the moment, the contentious argument over who is indeed responsible for these developments - which, it should be noted, quickly followed the forced exit of Syrian troops in April 2005 - the truly pressing issue for concerned policymakers and citizens alike is that both opposing axes, but especially the "resistance axis" of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas, now seem to
believe that the next war can and should be the last one between Israel and its enemies.
Unfortunately, this ideological certainty only helps to further grease the wheels of conflict - since the perception is that there will (finally) be no more "winning by not losing" or "winning, but the loser as "we know him' remains" - while virtually guaranteeing that, should war come to pass, the costs will be truly awful for all those touched by it.
Interestingly, from Hezbollah's perspective, which has been increasingly uniform across private discussions and public rhetoric, there is relatively little concern or extended analysis about exactly when, or even whether, war will happen.
The central reason for this seems to be that with either a war or a confrontational ceasefire with Israel, it perceives victory.
The real questions being asked, then, concern the mechanics of how this victory will come about, and, more remotely, whether the "hardware" and "software" of the US-Israeli negotiating position(s) will change just enough to avoid the end of Zionism.
For the party, which now publicly appears to be the least doubtful actor among its allies, this represents a dramatic shift in strategic thinking - a shift that needs to be fully appreciated by those who believe further violence is either wrong and/or will ultimately serve no one's interests.
The transformation in Hezbollah's outlook was evident as early as September 2006, in the wake of what the Lebanese call "the July War". For much of the Western media the change only came into focus in the past month - that is, following the recent "resistance axis summit" in Damascus and Hezbollah secretary general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's mid-February speech threatening the wide devastation of Israel should it pre-emptively attack.
Aspects of this movement had been apparent before, most notably following the collapse of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria and the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in early 2000, after which point Nasrallah famously declared Israel was "weaker than a spider's web".
But it was the July War (vigorously encouraged by the Bush administration), the February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeah and then the May 2008 street violence between the opposition and the majority "March 14" forces that really crystallized what Nasrallah now publicly views as the impending, "divine" telos of history.
"Arab armies and peoples," Nasrallah told the war-weary crowd of over a million one month after the August 14, 2006 ceasefire, are "not only able to liberate Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they are simply capable of regaining Palestine from sea to river by one small decision and with some determination".
"This is the equation," Nasrallah declared. "Today, your resistance broke the image of Israel. We have done away with the invincible army. We have also done away with the invincible state. Indeed, we have done away with it. I am not exaggerating or voicing slogans."
With this, Nasrallah had decisively broken through the greatest barrier in his own thinking, in that of the leadership and, crucially, in the hearts of his supporters: Israel could be defeated, once and for all, and, more to the point, it could be done with relative ease.
By the time Mughniyeah was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008, Nasrallah felt certain enough to declare that Israel would collapse, not in 10 or 20 years, but in the "coming few years".
"In the aftermath of the 2000 withdrawal," Nasrallah explained, "The only remaining question [is]: Can this entity [Israel] cease to exist? Well, before the year 2000 this was impossible. Before the Lebanese resistance and the first and second Palestinian Intifada, this talk was merely a legend and madness ... I can say that after 2006 this question was undoubtedly answered ... there was a new answer ... Could Israel be wiped out of existence? Yes, and a thousand times yes, Israel can be wiped out of existence."
Soon after his declaration of impending victory, Nasrallah laid out eight, detailed points as to why he believed the Jewish state of Israel was finished.
Not surprisingly, as is Hezbollah's custom, the points borrowed heavily from analyses laid out by leading Israelis themselves concerning the inner, long-term dangers facing their state - including demography, emigration amid fear, corruption and mounting miscalculations in conducting international relations and international conflict.
Nasrallah did not, however, address exactly how the Israelis would react in the event of an impending collapse, whether such a reaction might entail mutual destruction or whether most Lebanese thought such a process worth it in the first place.
Always the careful purveyor of cost-benefit calculations, the secretary general had unbound his normal economy of rhetoric and cast aside exactly the question he had long said should be paramount for any resistance movement: will self-sacrifice lead to a reasonable outcome?
No matter. Avenging Mughniyeah's death had become a critical lever in accelerating the effective end of such questions: for it had become permanent.
"As for retaliation," Nasrallah explained, "It will always be in front of us" - a statement suggesting that rather than one spectacular operation, payback for the assassination is to come in war or peace as the total collapse of Israel
Mughniyeah's revenge is therefore to be delivered in war or peace as the collapse of Israel, not merely via one spectacular operation.
And what of the likely destruction in Lebanon and perhaps beyond, given Israel's capabilities?
"Our adversaries," Nasrallah assured, "cannot comprehend that this battle has entered a totally different stage. This new stage's motive, title, and incentive are the belief in God, trust in God, content in God, dependence on God, and hope to win God's reward whatever the worldly results were.
"In such cases," he added, in an uncanny parallel to the threat that lies at the heart of Israel's nuclear program (codename: Samson), "the ability to bear calamities and to stand the loss of the beloved, the dear, the children, money and wealth becomes something else."
More than one-and-a-half years on from these statements, Hezbollah's strategic thinking on the conflict with Israel has only expanded further along the mutually reinforcing tracks of analytical certainty and war and has gone beyond mere public posturing to deter an Israeli attack.
As Nasrallah recently explained, Hezbollah "craves war but we do not want it. We do not want it but we crave it."
The statement, evidently a contradiction, captures the essence of Hezbollah's primary conviction that Israel cannot tolerate the repeated crossing of successive military "red lines" - something the Israelis and Washington are now stating often and openly. As the party crosses these lines (with air defense weapons but one example), fear increases and military preemption by Israel becomes ever more impossible.
If, therefore, Israel fails to reprise its spectacular 1982 air assault in the Bekaa that knocked out Syria's air defense capability (or for that matter, fails to hit the Iranian nuclear program a la Osirak in 1981), then the fate of Zionism is sealed, Hezbollah seems to believe.
In this "rosy" scenario, war is avoided, but the crescent of resistance now partially surrounding Israel steadily locks its inhabitants into either a negotiated settlement with the kind of far reaching Israeli concessions that talks have so far failed to produce, or, as the Hezbollah prefers, an outright one-state solution.
The real scenario, though, that Nasrallah and party leaders appear to be gambling on - or "craving" - is an outright Israeli "miscalculation"; a rush to a war that the Israeli Defense Forces and the political echelon do not fully understand and for which it's army and home front are not really prepared (the Iron Dome anti-missile system, gas masks, perpetual American assistance - these things, Nasrallah said recently, only offer illusory protection in the near to medium term).
"Syria is getting stronger with time," Nasrallah claims. "Iran is getting stronger with time, Hezbollah is getting stronger with time. The Palestinian resistance factions are getting stronger with time:" The arc of history is on the side of the resistance axis.
An Israeli miscalculation, the party believes, will realize Nasrallah's promise of a Zionist collapse in the next "few years" - rather than the somewhat longer and perhaps less certain timetable of a relatively peaceful implosion.
What options remain, then, to disrupt these scenarios and calculations?
If one accepts that the war option - or the "war unbound" option as some in Israel and among ex-Bush administration adherents favor - is a bad option, playing into the hands of the resistance axis, then what is left are familiar avenues that have hitherto produced little substantive movement:
1. Bolstering the settlement option, a course that has been blocked even in the best of times.
2. Containment of the growing military (and possibly nuclear) power of the resistance axis, which will be difficult given Israeli and some Arab regime concerns that the prevention of a steady strangulation by the resistance axis's power through technology, sanctions and targeted assassinations is neither guaranteed nor an adequate response in the near to medium term.
3. A renewed, Machiavellian effort to stoke domestic and sectarian discord in the region, something that has proven difficult to manage and exacerbate.
4. A more radical strategy that would obliquely undermine critical points of grievance among resistance axis members and their constituents - essentially a policy of "pre-emptive concessions" by an alliance of hegemonic powers that aims at dramatically undercutting (or wedging) their desire and ability to exercise violence.
Unfortunately, the reality seems to be that this last approach, like the settlement option, is also blocked since it is most likely too radical to sustain politically in either the US, Israel or among Sunni Arab states where the default setting remains, for the most part, the archaic, racist notion that Middle Easterners only understand force (or, somewhat differently, only favor "strong horses").
What is left, then, is a policy of staving off conflict for as long as possible in the hope that the balance of power will change in an as yet unknown way to finally unlock old options and present completely new ones.
In the absence of concrete investment in specific remedies for at least some of what deeply ails the Middle East, such a strategy appears dangerously like a credit card debtor who, instead of paying off his mounting balance, opens another line of funds so he and his friends can remain, just a bit longer, the masters of a situation they know is deadly, but which they just can't bring themselves to end.
**Nicholas Noe is author of the 2008 Century Foundation White Paper entitled "Re-Imagining the Lebanon Track: Towards a New US policy" and is the editor of Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (Verso, 2007). He is also a co-founder of the Beirut-based media monitoring service Mideastwire.com.
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