LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March
20/2010
Bible Of the
Day
Luke12/42-48: " The Lord said, “Who then is the faithful and wise steward, whom
his lord will set over his household, to give them their portion of food at the
right times? 12:43 Blessed is that servant whom his lord will find doing so when
he comes. 12:44 Truly I tell you, that he will set him over all that he has.
12:45 But if that servant says in his heart, ‘My lord delays his coming,’ and
begins to beat the menservants and the maidservants, and to eat and drink, and
to be drunken, 12:46 then the lord of that servant will come in a day when he
isn’t expecting him, and in an hour that he doesn’t know, and will cut him in
two, and place his portion with the unfaithful. 12:47 That servant, who knew his
lord’s will, and didn’t prepare, nor do what he wanted, will be beaten with many
stripes, 12:48 but he who didn’t know, and did things worthy of stripes, will be
beaten with few stripes. To whomever much is given, of him will much be
required; and to whom much was entrusted, of him more will be asked".
Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special
Reports
On forgiving and forgetting/By:Ziad
Majed/March
19/10
Big
spectacle, little substance/Daily Star/March
19/10
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for March 19/10
Geagea: My Visit to Syria
Conditioned by Solving Pending Bilateral Issues/Naharnet
Quarrel
at Roumieh Prison as Inmates Demand Longer Visiting Hours/Naharnet
Jordanian PM in Beirut to Sign Several MoUs/Naharnet
Israel attack on Iran could ignite Middle East:
Hezbollah/Washington
Post
Allawi
in Beirut for talks aimed at promoting regional stability/Daily
Star
Moussa:
Israel has no say in regional security before two-state solution/Daily
Star
Over 70
ISF officers graduate from US-sponsored policing academy/Daily
Star
Cabinet
remains silent on criticism against Sleiman/Daily
Star
Baroud,
Murr lash out at Wahhab slurs/Daily
Star
Subsidized interest loans in Lebanon reach $2.71 billion/Daily
Star
French
companies upbeat about Lebanese economic future/Daily
Star
Phalange, March 14 General Secretariat hold talks/Daily
Star
UK
doctors discuss family practitioners with Khalifeh/Daily
Star
Ethiopian-flight committee meets with Najjar/Daily
Star
Palestinian youths get chance to air frustrations/Daily
Star
Bahia
Hariri launches annual music festival in honor of Arab mothers/Daily
Star
Most
Sidon drivers still snub fire extinguishers/Daily
Star
Don't
wait for disaster/Daily
Star
Lebanese
protest in front of Parliament for civil marriages/Daily
Star
Wave of
Defense Against Campaign on Suleiman/Naharnet
Sfeir Rejects Campaign
against President, Says Doing his Job in Best Manner/Naharnet
UNIFIL Observes 32nd
Anniversary of Presence in South/Naharnet
Iran Suggests that Lebanon
Drafts U.N. Resolution on Israel-Palestinians/Naharnet
Suleiman Rejects
Discussing 'Improper' Libyan Invitation/Naharnet
Plane Crash Victims'
Committee Meets Najjar/Naharnet
President: Israeli Threats
Necessitate Unity/Naharnet
Report: Hariri in Damascus
April 4-5/Naharnet
Cabinet Ministers Laud
Abboud's Tourism Plan/Naharnet
Wahab Says Keenness of
Some on Presidency Position 'Remarkable' Compared to That during Lahoud Term/Naharnet
Murr Rejects Any Attempt
at Separating between President Suleiman, Presidency Position/Naharnet
Baroud Defending Suleiman:
Is It Required That He Stops Being All of Lebanon President/Naharnet
Truth behind Lebanese
Police Training: U.S. Proud of Program, Lebanese Split/Naharnet
Sfeir Rejects Campaign
against President, Says Doing his Job in Best Manner
/Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir defended President Michel
Suleiman on Friday, saying he backed the head of state and the country's
legal institutions. After talks with former MP Ghattas Khoury in Bkirki,
Sfeir said that he rejected everything that harmed the seat of the
presidency and constitutional authorities. On Thursday, Sfeir said the
head of state was "doing his job in the best manner." "Every time they
search for someone to attack him and now is the turn of the president,"
Sfeir said. Suleiman "needs some help and we should stand by him," the
patriarch stressed. Earlier in the week, Tawheed Movement leader Wiam
Wahab called on the head of state to resign, saying "there is a flaw in
the president because after two years into his presidency, it feels as
if we have arrived at the end of his term.""If domestic parties care for
the interests of their neighbor rather than those of their nation,
constructive efforts will always prove in vain," the prelate said.
Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 08:10
Cabinet Ministers Laud Abboud's Tourism Plan
Naharnet/The cabinet has welcomed Tourism Minister Fadi Abboud's
2010-2014 plan to activate the tourism sector in Lebanon, ministerial
sources told An Nahar newspaper.
Premier Saad Hariri, who also lauded the plan, told the cabinet on
Thursday that similar moves should be made by other ministries for
discussion by the council of ministers. Abboud's 15-page plan includes
suggestions to activate the sector and ways to contribute to the
national economy. The proposal also calls for establishing an authority
that would promote Lebanon's image abroad. The cabinet formed a
ministerial committee to follow-up on the implementation of the plan.
Tourism in Lebanon is expected to grow by 25 percent in 2010 after
setting a record-breaking year in 2009 when it contributed a quarter of
the country's GDP, Abboud said on Wednesday. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 08:31
Report: Hariri in Damascus April 4-5
Naharnet/Ministerial sources have confirmed to As Safir newspaper that
Prime Minister Saad Hariri will travel to Syria on the first week of
April. The sources said Hariri will be accompanied by a large
ministerial delegation during his visit to Damascus on April 4-5. Syrian
President Bashar Assad will welcome Hariri, they said, adding that the
Lebanese and Syrian sides would hold the first large scale ministerial
work session in 6 years to discuss agreements signed between the two
countries. As Safir noticed that a date for Druze leader Walid Jumblat's
visit to the Syrian capital hasn't been set yet. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 09:
Geagea: My Visit to Syria Conditioned by Solving
Pending Bilateral Issues
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Thursday said that "the
calls for the resignation of President Michel Suleiman are beyond those
launching them – those who don't possess the needed popular and
political weight to launch such stances." In an interview with the al-Arabiya
satellite TV network, Geagea added: "The reasonable alternative for the
president's resignation -- demanded by some – is the election of a
president from the parliamentary majority." "Suleiman and PM Saad Hariri
are being targeted by campaigns because they are considered the symbols
of stability in this period," he added, wondering "if the other group
doesn't want stability in Lebanon anymore." "Lebanese-Syrian relations
have not become normal yet, and the president and the premier are
exerting major efforts in this direction. Therefore, my visit to Syria
is conditioned by solving the pending issues between the two countries
and establishing normal and balanced relations," Geagea said in response
to a question. He identified the pending issues as "the presence of
Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons and of (Syrian-backed) Palestinian
military bases outside (refugee) camps … that breach the legitimacy and
sovereignty of the Lebanese State, in addition to procrastination in
(Lebanese-Syrian) border demarcation." Answering a question on his
comparison of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu to March 8 Alliance, Geagea
said: "This is not a joke, there are two approaches on the Lebanese and
regional levels: The approach that believes in political action and
March 8's approach that doesn't believe in any solutions outside the
frame of war and confrontation."
Beirut, 18 Mar 10, 22:32
Wave of Defense Against Campaign on Suleiman
Naharnet/Although the cabinet abstained from issuing a stance on verbal
attacks against President Michel Suleiman, ministers have unleashed a
wave of defense against the head of state's critics. Informed sources
told An Nahar daily in remarks published Friday that "consensual unity"
with Suleiman during the cabinet session the day before was a sign that
forces accused of launching the campaign were not behind the criticism.
Ministerial sources said that following Justice Minister Ibrahim
Najjar's statement on attacks on Suleiman and the presidency, the
session witnessed a series of reactions in favor of the head of state.
Ministers Gebran Bassil, Mohammed Fneish and Youssef Saadeh also
reiterated that the campaign against the president should not be
exaggerated, An Nahar said. However, when several ministers suggested
issuing a cabinet statement on the topic, Suleiman said that he didn't
want to get involve in the campaign against him and rejected the release
of a communiqué. Officials from across the political spectrum defended
Suleiman on Thursday against Tawheed Movement leader Wiam Wahhab's call
on the president to resign and other criticism targeting him. Beirut, 19
Mar 10, 09:15
Jordanian PM in Beirut to Sign Several MoUs
Naharnet/Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai was in Beirut on Friday
at the head of a high-level ministerial delegation to sign memorandums
of understanding with Lebanon in several fields. The Jordanian
delegation includes the agriculture, education and transport ministers
in addition to assistants and advisors. Premier Saad Hariri welcomed al-Rifai
at Rafik Hariri International airport. Present were several ministers
and Jordan's ambassador Ziad al-Majali. Hariri later met with al-Rifai
at the Grand Serail and discussed details of the talks that will be held
between the Lebanese and Jordanian sides on Friday afternoon. After
holding talks with his Lebanese counterpart, al-Rifai met with President
Michel Suleiman at Baabda palace. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 11:24
Quarrel at Roumieh Prison as Inmates Demand Longer Visiting Hours
Naharnet/A verbal brawl erupted Friday at Roumieh jail between guards
and prisoners demanding longer visiting hours with their
parents/families. State-run National News Agency, which carried the
report, did not give further details. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 13:06
Plane Crash Victims' Committee Meets Najjar
Naharnet/Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar has met with the follow-up
committee of families of the victims of the Ethiopian plane crash to set
in motion recommendations that were approved in meetings held by Speaker
Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Saad Hariri with plane crash victims'
families. The meeting was attended by Committee members, lawyers Waddah
al-Shaer, Shaker Raad, Ali Issawi, and Haitham Arnaout. The
attendees were briefed on all the procedures that have been agreed upon
by the health and interior ministries with regards to issuing individual
death certificates for each crash victim. Committee members were handed
over documents that had been prepared in collaboration with judicial
authorities in a bid to set up a Social Association of Ethiopian Plane
Crash Victim Families to facilitate judicial follow-up consultations.
Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 10:21
President: Israeli Threats Necessitate Unity
Naharnet/President Michel Suleiman has said that Israel's intransigence
in building settlements in East Jerusalem clearly indicates that threats
by the Jewish state against Lebanon "necessitate unity" to confront
aggression. Suleiman pointed to the importance of National Dialogue
meetings, expressing hope that constitutional institutions, mainly
Parliament and Cabinet, will continue to be able to carry out their
roles. He called for "greater unity and solidarity" in Lebanon and urged
Lebanese to commit to the national fundamental principles in order to
face up to of any external threat. Suleiman reiterated that internal
stability at all levels and in various fields is a "key incentive" for
attracting investment as well as tourists and expatriates to promote
social and economic development. Beirut, 19 Mar 10, 11:03
Samir Geagea
March 19, 2010
On March 18, the Lebanese National News Agency carried the following
report:
The head of the Lebanese Forces Executive Committee, Samir Geagea,
considered in an interview on Al-Arabiya channel on the show Studio
Beirut hosted by journalist Gisele Khoury, that the calls “demanding the
resignation of President of the Republic Michel Suleiman extend beyond
those issuing these calls.
“With all due respect to them as people, they do not enjoy the necessary
popular and political weight to launch such positions. What is more
dangerous than their calls are the reasons on which they based them,
saying for example that President Suleiman was a consensual president at
a time when the country mostly needs a consensus president. It is based
on that that he was elected in 2008 since the consensual character of
President Suleiman is seeking to bring the different viewpoints closer
together. For our part, we had certain reservations over some of the
positions of President Suleiman but were logical in the way we
approached the situation and moved forward to serve higher national
interests. The logical alternative to the calls issued by some to see
the consensual president resigning is the arrival of a president from
the majority. For their part, President Suleiman and Prime Minister Saad
al-Hariri have been subjected to these campaigns because they are the
headlines of stability at this stage, i.e. since 2008 and until this
day. This is why, along with other legitimate institutions, they have
been subjected to a fierce attack for around two weeks. Therefore, we
cannot help but wonder whether or not the other team wanted stability in
Lebanon.
“Stability is the most important achievement which we the Lebanese
accomplished during the last couple of years, thus preventing our
political disputes from being reflected on the ground and considering
that all the problems could be resolved around the dialogue table and
via the constitutional institutions. The calls for the resignation of
the president of the republic are undoubtedly finding a fertile ground
within the March 8 forces, since had this not been the case, the people
issuing these calls would not have been able to do so seeing as how they
are unprepared or unqualified to adopt such positions. We hope in this
context that the major parties in March 8, especially Hezbollah and Amal,
are not somewhere behind these calls and I have my doubts in this
regard..."
Asked about the circumstances which could make him visit Damascus
following the visit of Prime Minister Al-Hariri who said it took place
for Lebanon’s interest, and the expected visit of Deputy Walid Jumblatt
who said it will be in the best interest of his sect, he stated: “The
interest of the Christians in Lebanon is that of the Lebanese state and
I do not believe that any sect in Lebanon can enjoy an interest by
itself. Either it is the interest of all the Lebanese, both the Muslims
and Christians, or there is no interest for one team.
“The relations between Lebanon and Syria are not yet normal and the
president of the republic and the prime minister are deploying massive
efforts in this regard. Therefore, my visit to Syria is linked to the
resolution of the pending dossiers between the two countries and the
establishment of normal and balanced relations between them. Syria is
the closest country to us but the Syrian brothers must realize that
their interests cannot be secured at the expense of the Lebanese
interests...What is obstructing the establishment of such relations
until now is the presence of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons, the
presence of Palestinian military posts outside the camps constituting
security pits undermining the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Lebanese
state and the slacking [off of work] affecting the demarcation of the
border. This in our opinion undermines national sovereignty while there
is a committee ready to demarcate the border whether from the North or
the Bekaa, although we would rather see it beginning its work from the
Shebaa Farms if Syria has the good intention of liberating it from
Israel.” Regarding the March 14 forces meeting at the Bristol Hotel and
what was said about Geagea’s monopolization of these forces, he stated:
“I completely reject that talk. [Former] Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora
was present and he is among the prominent figures in the country, which
is why he is subjected to campaigns and slander...”
Asked whether or not his statement during the Bristol meeting which was
considered by some as being issued by an Arab nationalist, marked the
repositioning for the Lebanese Forces on the Arab arena and the weaving
of certain Arab alliances, he said: “What I said was not necessarily
linked to our friendship and our good Arab relations. Our cause is not
an isolated one. It is connected to the Middle East region. Therefore,
we should closely monitor what is happening in the region...” He then
believed that the Lebanese and Palestinian people were the ones
suffering the most in the region, stressing the necessity for these
people who do not have a state to start enjoying a strong and
independent state, and adding: “The resolution of the Middle East issue
has become urgent.” Asked whether he placed himself within the axis of
the states wishing to negotiate to reach peace or in the axis of the
states wishing to resist, Geagea said: “I do not want to talk about the
resistance in general. It is a fascinating and enticing concept and I
have personally lived it. I will rather talk about the resistance axis
extending from Iran to Hamas and Hezbollah and which I believe is
incapable of regaining one inch of the Palestinian soil. Quite the
contrary, the entire world is against this resistance and it is
impossible for an axis showing hostility to the entire world to achieve
palpable progress. In my opinion however, President Mahmoud Abbas and
what he represents, has more chance of reaching a solution and
establishing a Palestinian state than this resistance axis...”
Asked about the ways to resist Israel if Hezbollah is disarmed, Geagea
assured: “We desperately need a clear and blunt announcement by all the
Lebanese parties and especially Hezbollah, placing the peace and war
decision in Lebanon in the hands of the Lebanese government solely. The
threat lurking around Lebanon has nothing to do with Lebanese causes.
Israel has no detainees in Lebanon and is involved in a confrontation
with Iran which is organically linked with Hezbollah. I am afraid that
Iran will activate Hezbollah in Lebanon to respond to any Israeli
attacks on Iranian interests, since this will lead Lebanon toward the
unknown... The defense strategy is necessary to avoid seeing our people
led into conflicts that do not serve their interests. The war which the
Israelis are seeking to launch is related to their own interests and
enjoys regional dimensions that do not particularly concern Lebanon
unless it is dragged into it. Therefore, it is necessary to divest the
Israelis of any pretext that would allow them to drag Lebanon into a war
it does not want.
“If the destruction which some might bring upon Lebanon can lead to the
liberation of one Palestinian village, we would not mind. However, for
the country to be destroyed without any results, this is completely
unacceptable. What I am proposing is a simple step placing the peace and
war decision in the hands of the government to render our position
stronger than it is right now.” Geagea then concluded saying that he had
security information pointing to the fact that he was personally
pursued, adding that he had no fears over the Lebanese Forces Party.”
On forgiving and forgetting
Ziad Majed, March 19, 2010
March 16, 1977 was not only the date of the assassination of Kamal
Jumblatt, it also opened a new page in the Lebanese civil war and paved
the way for a regional force to have a direct hand in the management of
the war. This hand first carried out a political assassination, then
acted as if the assassination was a deterrent against the victim, or a
way to avoid the damage that could be caused had he been allowed to keep
living!
It was then up to his kin to accept that and get over it, if they wanted
to preserve their own souls and prevent matters from getting even worse,
in their own “homes”. More than that, it was up to them to apologize for
the actions of the victim and for his own blood spilled, and to stop
summoning his memory in order not to harm the “reputation” of his
killer.
It is in this sense that one can interpret what Syrian officials told
Walid Jumblatt after the ceremony marking forty days since his father’s
assassination: that Kamal wanted a military resolution in Lebanon and
would not accept Syrian intervention (and mediation), having described
Syria as a “great prison”… In this sense as well, one can interpret the
leaks provided by various sources close to the Syrian regime that
claimed that Rafik Hariri was conspiring with Marwan Hamadeh and others
to issue UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and dispel the Syrian army
from Lebanon. Similarly in this sense it has been said that Samir Kassir
crossed the line when he wrote about Syrian internal affairs and linked
independence in Lebanon to democracy in Syria… All of these are examples
of what supposedly necessitated, time and again, “punishments” or
“measures” to be taken in order to prevent things from going too far…
On this basis of either “preventative or retaliatory violence”, the
choice of “blood or surrender” was given to Lebanon for three full
decades. And if March 14, 2005 achieved something (apart from any
discussion over its political or sectarian characteristics), it was that
it dispelled with that choice, overcame the fear mongering and refused
to acquiesce to the notion that the deceased, not the killer, was the
guilty one, and that shutting up and surrendering were the best ways to
avoid further killings and tumult.
… Today, on March 16, 2010, 33 years since the foundational crime (of
Kamal Jumblatt), and five years since the choice, built on that
foundation, was defeated, it is perhaps worth emphasizing one single
thing regardless of all of the back and forth bickering, excuses, satire
and innuendo: forgiving and forgetting does not solve the problem, nor
does it offer any new choices.
Forgiveness could only be possible after the trial or after the killer
admits his crimes and apologizes for them.
As for forgetting, it does not change what has happened. It would, in
the best of circumstances, allow anyone to conveniently forgo his/her
memory of an event without negating the event itself or its effects and
circumstances. More important, it does not negate the fact that there
are those who will not forget and will always prefer justice to
forgiveness, even if it takes some time…This article is a translation of
the original, which was published on the NOW Arabic site on Tuesday,
March 16
Big spectacle, little substance
Friday, March 19, 2010
Editorial/Daily Star
The last week or so of Lebanese politics, if we can call it that, has
had several moments of political fireworks, while seeing a few meaty
issues arise.
Last weekend, of course, saw a three-way drama: Walid Jumblatt gave his
“long-awaited” interview and offered a mea culpa, of sorts, to his
official Syrian audience. Naturally, the focus was on how Jumblatt
explained his earlier polemics, but the side items were notable.
Incorporate the resistance into the Lebanese Army? Yes, but at some
point down the road. How to get there? No idea, we’re just beginning the
process.
It was the kind of interview in which Jumblatt had no problem talking up
his core beliefs, namely forward-minded secularism, and his core
principles, namely backward-looking sectarianism, as he went on and on
about the Druze of Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
And then there was Michel Aoun, holding forth on Saturday night at a
banquet, also broadcast live on television. Aoun offered some
interesting rhetoric, about how his Free Patriotic Movement does its
business and holds its own accountable. But he managed to get into
trouble yet again with the judiciary, for commenting on an ongoing court
case while claiming he wouldn’t comment on it. Aoun also sniped about
the country’s defense strategy, and the state’s inability to agree on
anything yet. Aoun gave us the usual dose of rhetoric, instead of facts
and figures about the Army’s performance and capabilities, and how much
it might cost to upgrade them to truly defend Lebanon. Aoun and many
other figures have, unfortunately, a tendency to sound like opposition
politicians, despite their presence in the Cabinet.
Finally, the March 14 coalition assembled to tell us about its plan:
defend Lebanon. Just like countless other times, they offered bullet
points, with no details, along with a plea to the Arab League – the Arab
League – to guarantee Lebanon’s defense.
There were other fireworks, such as the campaigns against President
Michel Sleiman, and the Internal Security Forces training program with
the US.
Some domestic issues have been in play, such as an effort to craft a
tourism-sector strategy, and consultations on using merit to make
appointments to the state bureaucracy. However, while these policies
have yet to be fully elaborated, we’re left with spectacle, and no
substance.
Citizens listen to the polemic, which is rarely backed up by useful
debate on how things really work, and how they can be changed. Are they
supposed to be energized by such ultimately meaningless drivel? Some
might yawn, and others might, with considerable despair, agree with
Jumblatt, and realize that we’re just at the beginning of a long
process. Even more depressingly, no one seems to have a workable road
map for how we’re supposed to make the journey.
Hamas: Learning from mistakes
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Anyone who has watched the performance of Hamas or followed its
rhetoric since its founding in Palestine in the late 1980s realizes that the
Islamic group has greatly matured over the past 20 years.
Originally, Hamas shunned everything related to the Oslo Peace Agreement signed
by Palestinian president Yasser Arafat, claiming that by accepting United
Nations resolutions Arafat was offering de facto recognition of Israel. The
founding charter of Hamas refused to recognize the Jewish state and promised to
eradicate it completely, thereby restoring all of Palestine of 1948.
It refused to hold government or parliamentary office in the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) that was born out of the Oslo Agreement and waged a
bloody war against Israel during the
second intifada that broke out 10 years ago, in September 2000. It also refused
to recognize any US role in the Middle East. Today, 22 years after its founding,
Hamas is taking a long hard look at its history, learning from both its
successes and mistakes to chart a new course for the party and its top
leadership.
Things began to change in 2006, when Hamas decided to run for the first
post-Arafat parliament in the Palestinian territories - a product of the Oslo
Agreement. By agreeing to hold office in an institution created by the peace
process, Hamas was actually recognizing the Oslo Accords. In its campaign,
although Hamas called for maintaining the armed struggle against Israel, it did
not call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, as stated in
its 1988 charter, "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will
obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it."
Hamas foreign minister Mahmud al-Zahhar made it clear, "There is no place for
the state of Israel on this land," but meanwhile, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad
Yassin had accepted a long-term truce, or hudna, with Israel, if the latter
agreed to return to the 1967 border and grant the "right of return" to
Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. In January 2004, that offer was reinstated
by Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, a senior commander of Hamas, who called for "phased
liberation of land" before being assassinated by Israel three months later, in
April.
Let us take a closer look at the details. Hamas boycotted the January 2005
election of President Mahmud Abbas, but did participate in the municipal
elections of May 2005, taking strongholds like Rafah in the Gaza Strip and
Qaliqiyah in the West Bank, with a sweeping majority. In the parliamentary
elections of 2006, it took 42.9% of the votes and 74 of the 132 seats after
presenting the electorate with a "List of Change and Reform".
Hamas hoped to be given a chance to prove its merit and rule the Palestinian
territories, offering a 10-year truce to Israel in return for complete
withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. It did not call
for liberation of all of Palestine - realizing that politics is the art of the
possible and that such a demand would fall on deaf ears in the international
community.
Rather than invest in the newfound policy of Hamas, the international community
boycotted the Palestinian territories to punish the Palestinians for voting for
Hamas, imposing sanctions at the urging of the George W Bush White House, in May
2006. This led hardliners within Hamas to call off any moderation, claiming that
Israel only understands the language of force, and advocate a return to what
Hamas knew best: leading an armed uprising against Israel.
The mainstream leaders of Hamas, however, clearly wanted to be recognized as
statesmen, rather than simply guerilla warriors. The scenario they had in mind
was that of Arafat himself, who after years of work in the Palestinian
underground, rose to become an elected president in the 1990s, bent on providing
jobs, paying salaries, attracting investment and bringing both security and
normalcy to the Palestinian territories.
What really mattered, the leaders of Hamas soon realized, were better schools
for the Palestinians, finer and cheaper hospitals and higher living standards
for the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza. Rooting out corruption and cranking
out more PhD students at Palestinian universities became more pressing to them
than waging an underground battle against Israel.
A few months back, Ismail Haniyya, the prime minister of the Hamas-led
government in Gaza, announced that he welcomed the positive momentum brought to
the region by US President Barack Obama. He was willing to give Obama the
benefit of the doubt should the latter apply needed pressure on Israel to end
the siege of Gaza. Gone were the days of Hamas refusing to accept any US role in
the Middle East.
Last week, Hamas released detained British journalist Paul Martin, much to the
relief of the British government, from jail in Gaza. This showed that Hamas
could solve problems in the Middle East, reminding of how a few years back it
had helped release BBC anchor Alan Johnston from captivity in Gaza. Hamas also
recently announced that it was willing to accept the Arab Peace Initiative,
proposed at the Beirut summit of 2002, which recognized Israel by the 1967
borders. Also seemingly gone were the days of Hamas refusing any peace deal not
based on the liberation of all of Palestine.
There are a multitude of reasons why Hamas has changed attitude, while
maintaining nevertheless, its original dream of liberating Palestine. One is a
desire to come to power in the Palestinian territories - an ambition shared by
political parties throughout history.
It happened to Fatah in 1993, when Arafat realized that armed combat alone would
never succeed in liberating Palestine or bringing him to power in the
Palestinian territories. Another reason why Hamas has softened its policy is the
amount of destruction and bloodshed imposed on Gaza since the war of 2008-2009.
Although it outlived the Gaza war, Hamas realized that people under its
jurisdiction were suffering unbearable conditions and that it had to elevate
their living standards - fast. If softening its policies was the price for
easing suffering in Gaza, then this was a price Hamas was willing to pay.
A third reason why Hamas is changing fast is yet another realization, being how
different its natural surrounding is to that of Hezbollah, which has the luxury
of maintaining a hard line policy, and yet, co-sharing power with pro-Western
elements in Lebanese politics.
First, co-sharing power with Fatah is clearly not possible in the Palestinian
territories, despite all attempts at doing just that since 2006. Second, while
Hezbollah is sheltered by the geographic proximity of Syria, Hamas is neighbored
by a very hostile Egyptian government, which far from offering support, makes
life all the more difficult for the Gazans.
While Hezbollah also makes use of the rugged terrain of south Lebanon, fighting
from the caves and mountains, Hamas cannot do that in flat Gaza, being an easy
target for Israeli warplanes. Additionally, Hezbollah takes its security very
seriously and has made sure that under no circumstances do the Israelis get the
chance to infiltrate the Hezbollah community.
Clearly from the results of 2006, Israel has no information on the whereabouts
of heavyweight Hezbollah commanders. Otherwise it would have gunned them down,
as it has been doing with Hamas leaders since the 1990s.
Within the Palestinian territories, hunger has people by the throat, making it
very easy for Israel to send out an army of spies and informers to buy off those
in dire need for money. Because of this, Israel has managed to strike down
scores of Hamas officials like its founder Ahmad Yassin, Rantisi, and was
suspected of playing a part in the death of Arafat himself in 2004.
In January it managed to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, another Hamas
heavyweight, in Dubai, and last weekend arrested the founder of Hamas in
Ramallah, Maher Udda. A few weeks ago, the son of Sheikh Hasan Youssef, a top
Hamas founder, came out to announce that he had been working with Israeli
intelligence Mossad since the 1990s, and had since moved to the US and converted
to Christianity.
The information he provided apparently saved the life of Israeli President
Shimon Peres and led to the arrest of influential Palestinians like Marwan
Barghouti. Such a case is unheard of in Hezbollah circles, showing just how
difficult it is for Hamas to digest a reality: because of poverty, Israel has
infiltrated Palestinian society in dramatically sophisticated ways. Poverty on
the streets, an indifferent international community, all topped with a desire to
rule, explain why Hamas is wiser in 2010 than ever before.
**Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward magazine.
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Hezbollah: Craving war, not wanting it
By Nicholas Noe
BEIRUT - Almost five years after the George W Bush administration was handed a
potentially game-changing opportunity to peacefully declaw the militant Shi'ite
movement Hezbollah, Washington is finally waking up to the grim reality of its
ill-conceived "Cedar Revolution" policy in Lebanon: the prospect of a renewed
war involving a sophisticated actor whose hybrid military power has only grown
exponentially.
Setting aside, for the moment, the contentious argument over who is indeed
responsible for these developments - which, it should be noted, quickly followed
the forced exit of Syrian troops in April 2005 - the truly pressing issue for
concerned policymakers and citizens alike is that both opposing axes, but
especially the "resistance axis" of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas, now seem to
believe that the next war can and should be the last one between Israel and its
enemies.
Unfortunately, this ideological certainty only helps to further grease the
wheels of conflict - since the perception is that there will (finally) be no
more "winning by not losing" or "winning, but the loser as "we know him'
remains" - while virtually guaranteeing that, should war come to pass, the costs
will be truly awful for all those touched by it.
Interestingly, from Hezbollah's perspective, which has been increasingly uniform
across private discussions and public rhetoric, there is relatively little
concern or extended analysis about exactly when, or even whether, war will
happen.
The central reason for this seems to be that with either a war or a
confrontational ceasefire with Israel, it perceives victory.
The real questions being asked, then, concern the mechanics of how this victory
will come about, and, more remotely, whether the "hardware" and "software" of
the US-Israeli negotiating position(s) will change just enough to avoid the end
of Zionism.
For the party, which now publicly appears to be the least doubtful actor among
its allies, this represents a dramatic shift in strategic thinking - a shift
that needs to be fully appreciated by those who believe further violence is
either wrong and/or will ultimately serve no one's interests.
The transformation in Hezbollah's outlook was evident as early as September
2006, in the wake of what the Lebanese call "the July War". For much of the
Western media the change only came into focus in the past month - that is,
following the recent "resistance axis summit" in Damascus and Hezbollah
secretary general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's mid-February speech threatening the
wide devastation of Israel should it pre-emptively attack.
Aspects of this movement had been apparent before, most notably following the
collapse of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria and the unilateral
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in early 2000, after which point Nasrallah
famously declared Israel was "weaker than a spider's web".
But it was the July War (vigorously encouraged by the Bush administration), the
February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeah and then the
May 2008 street violence between the opposition and the majority "March 14"
forces that really crystallized what Nasrallah now publicly views as the
impending, "divine" telos of history.
"Arab armies and peoples," Nasrallah told the war-weary crowd of over a million
one month after the August 14, 2006 ceasefire, are "not only able to liberate
Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they are simply capable of regaining
Palestine from sea to river by one small decision and with some determination".
"This is the equation," Nasrallah declared. "Today, your resistance broke the
image of Israel. We have done away with the invincible army. We have also done
away with the invincible state. Indeed, we have done away with it. I am not
exaggerating or voicing slogans."
With this, Nasrallah had decisively broken through the greatest barrier in his
own thinking, in that of the leadership and, crucially, in the hearts of his
supporters: Israel could be defeated, once and for all, and, more to the point,
it could be done with relative ease.
By the time Mughniyeah was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008, Nasrallah
felt certain enough to declare that Israel would collapse, not in 10 or 20
years, but in the "coming few years".
"In the aftermath of the 2000 withdrawal," Nasrallah explained, "The only
remaining question [is]: Can this entity [Israel] cease to exist? Well, before
the year 2000 this was impossible. Before the Lebanese resistance and the first
and second Palestinian Intifada, this talk was merely a legend and madness ... I
can say that after 2006 this question was undoubtedly answered ... there was a
new answer ... Could Israel be wiped out of existence? Yes, and a thousand times
yes, Israel can be wiped out of existence."
Soon after his declaration of impending victory, Nasrallah laid out eight,
detailed points as to why he believed the Jewish state of Israel was finished.
Not surprisingly, as is Hezbollah's custom, the points borrowed heavily from
analyses laid out by leading Israelis themselves concerning the inner, long-term
dangers facing their state - including demography, emigration amid fear,
corruption and mounting miscalculations in conducting international relations
and international conflict.
Nasrallah did not, however, address exactly how the Israelis would react in the
event of an impending collapse, whether such a reaction might entail mutual
destruction or whether most Lebanese thought such a process worth it in the
first place.
Always the careful purveyor of cost-benefit calculations, the secretary general
had unbound his normal economy of rhetoric and cast aside exactly the question
he had long said should be paramount for any resistance movement: will
self-sacrifice lead to a reasonable outcome?
No matter. Avenging Mughniyeah's death had become a critical lever in
accelerating the effective end of such questions: for it had become permanent.
"As for retaliation," Nasrallah explained, "It will always be in front of us" -
a statement suggesting that rather than one spectacular operation, payback for
the assassination is to come in war or peace as the total collapse of Israel
Mughniyeah's revenge is therefore to be delivered in war or peace as the
collapse of Israel, not merely via one spectacular operation.
And what of the likely destruction in Lebanon and perhaps beyond, given Israel's
capabilities?
"Our adversaries," Nasrallah assured, "cannot comprehend that this battle has
entered a totally different stage. This new stage's motive, title, and incentive
are the belief in God, trust in God, content in God, dependence on God, and hope
to win God's reward whatever the worldly results were.
"In such cases," he added, in an uncanny parallel to the threat that lies at the
heart of Israel's nuclear program (codename: Samson), "the ability to bear
calamities and to stand the loss of the beloved, the dear, the children, money
and wealth becomes something else."
More than one-and-a-half years on from these statements, Hezbollah's strategic
thinking on the conflict with Israel has only expanded further along the
mutually reinforcing tracks of analytical certainty and war and has gone beyond
mere public posturing to deter an Israeli attack.
As Nasrallah recently explained, Hezbollah "craves war but we do not want it. We
do not want it but we crave it."
The statement, evidently a contradiction, captures the essence of Hezbollah's
primary conviction that Israel cannot tolerate the repeated crossing of
successive military "red lines" - something the Israelis and Washington are now
stating often and openly. As the party crosses these lines (with air defense
weapons but one example), fear increases and military preemption by Israel
becomes ever more impossible.
If, therefore, Israel fails to reprise its spectacular 1982 air assault in the
Bekaa that knocked out Syria's air defense capability (or for that matter, fails
to hit the Iranian nuclear program a la Osirak in 1981), then the fate of
Zionism is sealed, Hezbollah seems to believe.
In this "rosy" scenario, war is avoided, but the crescent of resistance now
partially surrounding Israel steadily locks its inhabitants into either a
negotiated settlement with the kind of far reaching Israeli concessions that
talks have so far failed to produce, or, as the Hezbollah prefers, an outright
one-state solution.
The real scenario, though, that Nasrallah and party leaders appear to be
gambling on - or "craving" - is an outright Israeli "miscalculation"; a rush to
a war that the Israeli Defense Forces and the political echelon do not fully
understand and for which it's army and home front are not really prepared (the
Iron Dome anti-missile system, gas masks, perpetual American assistance - these
things, Nasrallah said recently, only offer illusory protection in the near to
medium term).
"Syria is getting stronger with time," Nasrallah claims. "Iran is getting
stronger with time, Hezbollah is getting stronger with time. The Palestinian
resistance factions are getting stronger with time:" The arc of history is on
the side of the resistance axis.
An Israeli miscalculation, the party believes, will realize Nasrallah's promise
of a Zionist collapse in the next "few years" - rather than the somewhat longer
and perhaps less certain timetable of a relatively peaceful implosion.
What options remain, then, to disrupt these scenarios and calculations?
If one accepts that the war option - or the "war unbound" option as some in
Israel and among ex-Bush administration adherents favor - is a bad option,
playing into the hands of the resistance axis, then what is left are familiar
avenues that have hitherto produced little substantive movement:
1. Bolstering the settlement option, a course that has been blocked even in the
best of times.
2. Containment of the growing military (and possibly nuclear) power of the
resistance axis, which will be difficult given Israeli and some Arab regime
concerns that the prevention of a steady strangulation by the resistance axis's
power through technology, sanctions and targeted assassinations is neither
guaranteed nor an adequate response in the near to medium term.
3. A renewed, Machiavellian effort to stoke domestic and sectarian discord in
the region, something that has proven difficult to manage and exacerbate.
4. A more radical strategy that would obliquely undermine critical points of
grievance among resistance axis members and their constituents - essentially a
policy of "pre-emptive concessions" by an alliance of hegemonic powers that aims
at dramatically undercutting (or wedging) their desire and ability to exercise
violence.
Unfortunately, the reality seems to be that this last approach, like the
settlement option, is also blocked since it is most likely too radical to
sustain politically in either the US, Israel or among Sunni Arab states where
the default setting remains, for the most part, the archaic, racist notion that
Middle Easterners only understand force (or, somewhat differently, only favor
"strong horses").
What is left, then, is a policy of staving off conflict for as long as possible
in the hope that the balance of power will change in an as yet unknown way to
finally unlock old options and present completely new ones.
In the absence of concrete investment in specific remedies for at least some of
what deeply ails the Middle East, such a strategy appears dangerously like a
credit card debtor who, instead of paying off his mounting balance, opens
another line of funds so he and his friends can remain, just a bit longer, the
masters of a situation they know is deadly, but which they just can't bring
themselves to end.
**Nicholas Noe is author of the 2008 Century Foundation White Paper entitled
"Re-Imagining the Lebanon Track: Towards a New US policy" and is the editor of
Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (Verso, 2007). He
is also a co-founder of the Beirut-based media monitoring service
Mideastwire.com.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)