LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 07/10
Bible Of the
Day
Luke 3/15-22: "As the people were in expectation, and all men reasoned in their
hearts concerning John, whether perhaps he was the Christ, 3:16 John answered
them all, “I indeed baptize you with water, but he comes who is mightier than I,
the latchet of whose sandals I am not worthy to loosen. He will baptize you in
the Holy Spirit and fire, 3:17 whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly
cleanse his threshing floor, and will gather the wheat into his barn; but he
will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.” 3:18 Then with many other
exhortations he preached good news to the people, 3:19 but Herod the tetrarch,
being reproved by him for Herodias, his brother’s wife, and for all the evil
things which Herod had done, 3:20 added this also to them all, that he shut up
John in prison. 3:21 Now it happened, when all the people were baptized, Jesus
also had been baptized, and was praying. The sky was opened, 3:22 and the Holy
Spirit descended in a bodily form as a dove on him; and a voice came out of the
sky, saying “You are my beloved Son. In you I am well pleased.”
Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special
Reports
The Terrorists Are In
Charge/By Walid Phares/January
06/09
For Israel, was 2009 just the calm before their
storm?/By: Emile Hokayem/National/January
06/09
US intelligence: Southern Gaza and Lebanon are
the next Yemen/DEBKA file/January
06/09
The
West must cut its terror ties/Daily Star/January
06/09
Iran from the inside/By: Farhad
Bisotooni/Now Lebanon/January
06/09
Worth Reading Study
How Taqiyya Alters
Islam's Rules of War.By: Raymond Ibrahim
06/01/10
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for January 06/09
Hariri Returns to Beirut after
Discussing Middle East Peace Efforts with Jordanian King/Naharnet
Qassem: Memorandum of
Understanding with FPM a Solid Base to Endure for Decades/Naharnet
Murr
Slams March 14 Campaign as Fneish Stresses Dahiyeh Under the Law/Naharnet
Lebanon ranked world's second most improved
democracy/Jerusalem Post
Hariri
in Amman to Discuss Arming Lebanese Army/Naharnet
Haret
Hreik Blast Occurred during Live Ammunition Training, Hizbullah Displeased with
Hamas/Naharnet
Syria will back Hizbullah
against IDF'/Jerusalem Post
Aoun-Jumblat
Meeting Postponed/Naharnet
Murr
Slams March 14 Campaign as Fneish Stresses Dahiyeh Under the Law/Naharnet
Arslan: Choueifat
Reconciliation to Include Speeches by Nasrallah, Berri, Jumblat/Naharnet
McCain in Beirut within
Days for Talks with Top Lebanese Officials/Naharnet
Merkel's Advisor Concludes
Beirut Visit after Talks with Top Lebanese Leaders/Naharnet
Murr, Sison Discuss
Accelerating U.S. Scheduled Aid to Lebanese Army/Naharnet
Lebanon's Berri backs Hezbollah's weapons/UPI.com
Syria deems US screening
rules insufficient/AsiaOne
Lebanese speaker warns against discussion over
Hezbollah disarmament/Xinhua
Lebanese Daily: Lebanese PM Said Syria Will
Execute Citizen Involved In
Al-Hariri Assassination/MEMRI
(blog)
Strike on CIA base tests US assessment of
al Qaeda/Reuters
Osama's son in Syria after release from
Iran jail/GulfNews
Hariri: Key appointments
to be based on meri/Daily Star
Jumblatt, Aoun to ink MOU on Chouf
displaced/Daily Star
US Ambassador Sison meets with key
ministers/Daily Star
Maronite League
facilitates a Geagea-Aoun meeting in Baabda/Now Lebanon
Lebanese
Daily: Lebanese PM Said Syria Will Execute Citizen Involved In Al-Hariri
Assassination
/MEMRI (blog)/In an article in the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to
Syria, editor Ibrahim Al-Amin wrote that Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri
had clarified, during his visit to Syria, that the country had no connection to
the assassination of his father, and that a Syrian citizen whose involvement in
the assassination had been proven had been sentenced in Syria and would be
executed. Nevertheless, the Syrians clarified to Al-Hariri that they would not
permit Lebanese elements to again exploit the assassination or its investigation
in order to extort Syria or to tarnish its image. Source: Al-Akhbar, Syria,
January 5, 2010/Posted at: 2010-01-05
Hariri
Returns to Beirut after Discussing Middle East Peace Efforts with Jordanian King
Naharnet/Prime Minister Saad Hariri arrived in Beirut Wednesday afternoon from
the Jordanian capital Amman after one-day talks with King Abdullah II and his
Jordanian counterpart Samir Rifai. Hariri and the Jordanian king discussed the
ongoing efforts to re-launch the stalled peace negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians, according to a statement issued by the Jordanian Royal Court.
The statement added that King Abdullah and PM Hariri "discussed the current
regional developments, especially the ongoing efforts to achieve a comprehensive
peace that guarantees the establishment of an independent Palestinian State,
ending the Israeli occupation to all Lebanese and Syrian territories, and
reclaiming all Arab rights."
The two leaders stressed upon the importance of the Saudi-inspired Arab peace
initiative -- on the table since Beirut's 2002 Arab League Summit --, according
to the statement.
The Jordanian king stressed his country's "persistent support for the security,
stability, and sovereignty" of Lebanon. At a press conference he held at
Jordan's Queen Aliaa Airport alongside his Jordanian counterpart, Hariri said
that his latest visit to Damascus "benefited Lebanon, Syria, and the region."
Hariri reiterated his longing for "special relations with Syria built upon
honesty and common interests between the two countries."Answering a question on
whether he discussed military cooperation with the Jordanian officials, Hariri
said: "You all know that Jordan has always stood by Lebanon… There is a military
cooperation between the two countries in terms of training and equipment. We
discussed these issues with HH (King Abdullah II), as discussions are expected
to resume with the Jordanian premier in our next meeting in March." Beirut, 06
Jan 10, 19:58
Qassem: Memorandum of Understanding with FPM a Solid Base to Endure for Decades
Naharnet/Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem on Wednesday
hailed "all the efforts seeking to bring the Lebanese together, especially those
exerted by the Free Patriotic Movement." After meeting with a delegation from
the FPM headed by its Media and Public Relations Officer Nassif Qazzi, Qassem
said: "The memorandum of understanding between FPM and Hizbullah is the solid
base that will endure for tens of years." The delegation informed Qassem about
the preparations that followed the Baabda reconciliatory meeting between MPs
Michel Aoun and Walid Jumblat under the auspices of President Michel Suleiman.
It also put Qassem in the image of the work plan that FPM and Progressive
Socialist Party intend to implement in order to conclude the issue of the
displaced people and to facilitate the process of their return to Mount
Lebanon's villages. Beirut, 06 Jan 10, 17:53
Murr Slams March 14 Campaign as Fneish Stresses Dahiyeh Under the Law
Naharnet/Outcome of the investigation into the Haret Hreik explosion inside a
Hamas center was discussed during Cabinet meeting on Tuesday after Prime
Minister Saad Hariri raised the subject, describing the blast as "dangerous."
The explosion which took place last Saturday night "does not only target a
specific group but rather targets all of Lebanon and all Lebanese," Hariri told
Cabinet. Cabinet ministers Boutros Harb, Salim al-Sayegh and Ibrahim Najjar have
criticized both the performance of the security forces and the government for
lack of authority over Beirut's southern suburbs. They demanded explanations as
to the reason for failure of the security and judicial authorities to carry out
their task on the first day of the incident.
Harb believed that the explosion has uncovered the "urgent need" for cooperation
among Cabinet ministers, particularly after "what happened between Information
Minister Tareq Mitri and Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar." Sayegh, for his
turn, asked why criminal investigators were late to arrive at the explosion
site. He stressed the need to implement the clause agreed upon at the dialogue
table regarding resolving the issue of Palestinian weapons outside the camps.
Najjar, however, pointed out that the justice ministry "cannot guarantee that
the scene of the incident had not changed 24 hours after investigators put their
hands on the case."
While Interior Minister Ziad Baroud believed the explosion case was in Lebanese
army hands, Defense Minister Elias Murr responded to criticism by reviewing the
work of the military authorities first. He snapped back at the March 14 alliance
which launched a criticism campaign against Hizbullah following the explosion.
"Delay in arrival (of security forces) was purely due to technical reasons," Al-Liwaa
newspaper on Wednesday quoted Murr as snapping back at March 14 Cabinet
ministers who launched a criticism campaign against Hizbullah. "Delay was not
for any other reason, particularly since most of the peopel were not aware of
the explosion," Murr has reportedly added.
As-Safir, for its part, quoted Murr as saying that the forces involved in the
investigation carried out their duties "without any restrictions by any party."
These forces, Murr went on to say, took charge of the investigation into the
Haret Hreik explosion "right after the incident took place."
Murr, however, told An-Nahar daily in remarks published Wednesday that the "rule
of coordination" between Hizbullah and the Lebanese army calls not to move
"swiftly" to the incident scene. He pointed to the method adopted in the
shooting incident at a Syrian passenger bus in the north, which led to the
arrest of the perpetrator.
An-Nahar inferred that information Murr has obtained about the explosion
indicate the blast was caused by an explosive device targeting Hamas official in
Lebanon Ossama Hamdan, but instead, exploded at the entrance of the building
occupied by Hamas in the southern suburbs. Fneish, meanwhile, defended Hizbullah,
saying there is no link between what he called "resistance security forces" and
delay in the arrival of state security services, pointing to the traffic jams on
the day of the explosion triggered by preparations for the Ashoura ceremony.
He stressed that Dahiyeh is "just like any other area in Lebanon … It is under
the law. The labor ministry is located in that area and so is Minister Boutros
Harb." Beirut, 06 Jan 10, 09:31
US intelligence: Southern Gaza is the next Yemen
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report/January 5, 2010,
Scene in Yemen already replicated in Gaza
The year 2010 will see a new Israeli military operation in Gaza - not against
the Palestinian Hamas, which is not eager for more punishment, but the al Qaeda
bastions spreading across the southern Gaza Strip. This prognosis is shared by
intelligence circles close to the Obama administration and the CIA, DEBKAfile's
intelligence and counter-terror sources report.
A senior White House terror expert warned recently that strengthened al Qaeda
networks in the Gaza Strip would be as dangerous and menacing as the jihadists'
strongholds in Yemen. This threat prompted Egypt to build its iron wall along
the Gaza-Egyptian border. Their access to Sinai would not only directly imperil
the peninsula, but might well spill over into Egypt proper, first terrorizing
the cities along the Suez Canal and the vital waterway itself. US intelligence
watchers have picked up a working link between the Gaza-based networks and
Pakistan accompanied by a swelling influx of Pakistani fighters into the
Hamas-ruled Palestinian territory at a rate estimated at dozens a month. They
include some Saudi jihadists.
According to current US evaluations, while al Qaeda's new headquarters in
Pakistani Baluchistan is working hard to push reinforcements into Yemen, its
operational planners are not neglecting the Gaza Strip, assuming that this
Palestinian enclave will be the next Western-jihadist warfront after Yemen.
Bruce Riedel, who produces the latest evaluations on the Afghanistan and
Pakistan conflicts for president Barack Obama, predicts another Gaza war may be
triggered by a jihadist cell ambushing another military patrol on the border of
Gaza, killing several and capturing one or two. Israel will not be able to
endure another Shalit ordeal for the return of its captive soldiers and will
therefore go into the Gaza Strip with maximum force. "Another Gaza war would be
another gift to al Qaeda," says Riedel, especially if the ambush is timed to
take place on the anniversary of 9/11 in September 2010. Worries about al
Qaeda's spreading tentacles were also voiced in Lebanon by Fatah commander
Brigadier Sultan Abu al-Aynayn. Sunday, Jan. 3, he accused external parties of
seeking to “export” fundamentalists to refugee camps across Lebanon. “We have
taken measures to prevent Al-Qaeda from infiltrating Palestinian refugee camps
after we received information that external parties were seeking to export
extremists, particularly from Iraq, and stir up tension inside the camps,” Abu
al-Aynayn said in an interview.
For
Israel, was 2009 just the calm before their storm?
Emile Hokayem/National
Last Updated: January 05. 2010
It was a good year for Israel. Beyond the paralysis on the peace-process front
in 2009, for which the hardline Israeli prime minister can claim credit, Israel
has had the quietest year since the beginning of the second intifada. Its
territory was kept secure and fewer Israelis were killed and injured (although
more than 1,500 Palestinians lost their lives at Israeli hands in the meantime)
On the three war fronts that remain open, Israel has managed to establish
deterrence by steeply and decisively raising the cost of war. Rejecting the
notion of targeted, proportional and graduated responses, it has sought to
retaliate so overwhelmingly that its enemy would simply prefer to stop the
fight.
In 2006, the Israeli army conducted a destructive attack against Hizbollah in
Lebanon. Though its operation will go down in military history as a classic case
of how not to conduct a war, and ended with the perception of an Israeli defeat
and a Hizbollah victory, the Lebanese-Israeli border has since been quiet. The
devastation wrought on southern Lebanon and the Shia suburbs of Beirut, and the
human, psychological and economic cost incurred almost solely by the Shia
community, have been powerful restraints on Hizbollah.
In 2007, the Israeli air force conducted a daring raid against a suspected
nuclear reactor in northern Syria. All the Syrians could do was protest mildly
and move on, even calling for a resumption of peace talks. Syria was forced to
recognise that its military was no match for Israel’s. But its conflict with
Israel will still be fought through proxies and political manoeuvring: the 1974
disengagement agreement remains the oldest ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the occupied Golan Heights its quietest front.
Then, in early 2009, the Israeli military devastated the already besieged Gaza
strip. Hamas boasted that its rockets could shake Israel, but ultimately the
suffering of the Gazan population decisively outweighed whatever claim of
victory it could make. Gaza continues to suffer immensely but has become a
security afterthought for the Israeli public. And paradoxically, Hamas itself
enforces this truce.
So it is not wholly unjustified for the Israeli population and parts of its
security establishment to feel at ease. Its military has shown competence and
ruthlessness, which have delivered this respite. Israeli society takes comfort
in military dominance, which alleviates its existential fears. But for realists,
cynics and security analysts alike, the real question is how stable that unfair
and forced equilibrium really is.
Judging from the Lebanese case, not very. An ominous reason for the apparent
calm is simple: Hizbollah, like the Israeli army, needs time and quiet to learn
and apply the lessons of the previous conflict, to rearm and to retrain.
In 2006, the conflict ended with the establishment of a UN-controlled zone in
southern Lebanon where Hizbollah activities are nominally forbidden, but recent
massive explosions in Hizbollah arms caches are evidence to the contrary. Israel
too routinely violates this security buffer with observation flights over
Lebanon and extensive spy networks, many of which were uncovered in recent
months. Sadly, the presence of the UN force may complicate – but will not
prevent – the next round of war. UN troops in southern Lebanon could do nothing
when Israel invaded in 1982.
A lesson learnt by the Israeli army is that reliance on air power alone is not
enough and that a ground offensive up the Bekaa Valley is essential to defeat
Hizbollah by cutting its access to its Syrian suppliers and putting Damascus on
notice to remain on the sidelines. This will put Syria in a difficult spot, torn
between its alliance with Hizbollah and Iran – and the very survival of the
regime – should Israel take the fight to Damascus.
Another Israeli lesson is that restraint does not work. In 2006, at the urging
of the Bush administration, which sought to differentiate between Lebanon’s
pro-US government and Hizbollah, Israel limited its targeting of the country’s
main infrastructure, military and key government buildings. It is difficult to
imagine Mr Netanyahu doing the same this time, especially now that Lebanon is
more than ever under Hizbollah control. Israeli officials already state in
not-so-subtle terms that Lebanon would incur the full wrath of the Israeli war
machine.
Preparations north and east of the Litani river are ongoing to block an Israeli
ground advance. Hizbollah admits that it has more than replenished its stock of
missiles and rockets – a powerful deterrent that numbers around 40,000 and could
bring the war into the northern part of Israel and even Tel Aviv, now within the
range of its most advanced missiles. And Hizbollah may have more surprises in
store. A few months ago the Israeli navy seized a massive shipment of light
weaponry, claiming it originated from Iran. Such an arsenal can be used for
conventional fighting within Lebanon, but it is possible that Hizbollah will
seek to bring the fight to Israel, thus fundamentally shaking the Israeli
psyche, while relying on newly acquired air-defence systems to deny Israel its
key strategic advantage.
And an eruption in Lebanon could precipitate another in Gaza this time. A Hamas
official recently vowed: “If Israel launched a new attack against Lebanon ... we
will face the aggression side by side with our brethren in Lebanon.”
Will such a worst-case scenario really unfold? Sadly, the two sides, though not
itching for a fight, are actively preparing for one, which increases its
prospects. An accidental war remains a possibility. After all, Hizbollah by its
own admission did not expect such massive retaliation to the kidnapping that
started the 2006 war. It is also possible that Israel will obtain (or
manufacture) intelligence pointing to the transfer of a specific kind of
weaponry that can be a game-changer in the strategic balance. A Hizbollah
operation to avenge the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, its security chief,
could also trigger such an escalation. The drums of war are not yet deafening,
but complacency and denial will not silence them.
ehokayem@thenational.ae
The
Terrorists Are In Charge
By Walid Phares
FOXNews.com
January 05, 2010
Even President Obama has admitted that we're falling down on the job when it
comes to fighting the war on terror.
In 2002, one would-be shoe bomber forced millions of travelers to take off their
shoes. In 1996, terrorists planned to bring down aircraft on transatlantic
flights by smuggling liquid explosives onto plane. They were thwarted but they
succeeded in preventing passengers from bringing liquids into airline terminals.
Lesson number one: In this terror war, the jihadists have the upper hand. THEY
are in charge. THEY are the ones who choose to use a new weapon and they are
also the ones who – by using simple logic -- have refrained from using the same
terror weapons more than once. In fact, since September 2001, Al Qaeda’s
henchmen have avoided rushing into the cockpit of an airliner with box cutters.
Does this mean we were successful in deterring the terrorists? Of course: as
long as we can prevent them from using the 9/11 methods, they won't be naïve
enough or foolish enough to repeat the same strategy. So are we winning the
fight with Al Qaeda by using these measures? No, we are simply protecting our
population until we win the war. But winning is not measured by surviving
potential copycat attacks.
Instead, this war will be won by striking at the mechanism that produces the
jihadists. And on that level, we haven’t won this war either under the previous
administration nor under the incumbent one. For, as President Obama admitted
late last month after a near-terror attack on Northwest Flight 253, there is a
"systemic failure" in our defense against the jihadi terrorists.
In my analysis, it has to do with the refusal by our leaders -- based on the
opinion of their own experts -- to attack the factory that produces terrorists
and instead to wait passively until the jihadists show up at our country's ports
of entries.
We have been fighting this war inside our own trenches and often behind our own
lines of defense. Preventing Al Qaeda’s zombies from killing our airline pilots
and flight attendants by securing cabin doors with steel and installing machines
to detect liquid, creams and potential explosives is like fighhting an invading
army inside our own trenches and neighborhoods with bayonets. If anything, it
means that our strategists have no way to remotely detect this threat and they
can't even decide what is and isn't a threat until it actually strikes us or is
a few inches from us. It is a pretty ironic situation when the grand narrative
of our government is that we are fighting terrorists or extremists (pick your
word, it has the same conclusion) in Waziristan, Afghanistan, and beyond, so
that our defense perimeters are thousands of miles away.
So are we wrong to institute any of the security measures? No, we need to take
all possible measures to secure the population, but we also need to take them in
the framework of a grand strategy to defeat the threat. And in this regard we do
not have one. The jihadists are monitoring our actions, our measures and I do
assume also are comfortably spying on us and looking into the deepest of our
security mechanisms. After the Nada Prouty and Nidal Hasan penetration cases no
one can convince me that neither Hezbollah nor Al Qaeda haven’t deployed more
agents throughout our national security apparatus. The enemy knows our defense
strategy, and some would argue that they are already inside our walls. As we’re
learning -- constantly and dramatically -- the so-called “isolated extremists”
are not that isolated and those believed to be "lone wolves" are in fact part of
a much greater, well-camouflaged packs. The jihadists are way ahead of our
security measures -- even though we need to apply them nevertheless.
In the wake of the Abdulmutalib terror act the Obama administration announced
that any travellers flying into the United States from foreign countries will
receive tightened random screening, and all passengers from "terrorism-prone
countries" will be patted down and have their carry-on baggage searched before
boarding U.S.-bound flights. The list includes Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as
well as those travelling from Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen. But here is the
problem: In the jihadi war room, this was duly noted. Thus, the next human
missiles will be selected from the “other” countries, and there are many
countries where combat Salafis are indoctrinated and readied: Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Indonesia to name a few, by the way all
U.S. allies. Even better, the jihadi strategists could task recruits with
German, British, French as well as Australian and Canadian passports to wreck
havoc in our cities. The past year has shown us that the jihadis can also emerge
from North Carolina, Illinois, New York and other states all across the land.
Most likely the “emirs” of Al Qaeda will recommend dumping the use of powder to
blow up planes, and soon another Zawahiri tape will rail at us for spending
millions on a path they won’t use for a while.
As we move to implement our mammoth security measures, the swift men of jihadism
are already mapping out the endlessly open areas of our underbellies. In
strategic terms we’re not going even going anywhere near that direction, it is a
dead end. The Al Qaeda jihadists will keep coming, each time from a different
direction, background, with a new tactic. And they will surprise us.
Unfortunately, that is the price of a national security policy that identifies
terrorism as a “manmade disaster” and jihadism as form of yoga.
**Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The Confrontation:
Winning the War against Future Jihad
'Syria will
back Hizbullah against IDF'
By JPOST.COM STAFF
If Israel were to attack Hizbullah in Lebanon, Syria would respond and not sit
idly by, the Katari Al Watan newspaper quoted Syrian sources as saying in a
report published Wednesday.
The sources reportedly added that Damascus considered any threat to Lebanon's
security and stability as a threat to Syria's security. The paper reported that
Damascus was worriedly taking notice of "Israeli deployment and maneuvers along
the northern border," and that Syrian leadership assessed Israel was planning a
military operation in Lebanon in May. US officials have notified the Lebanese
government that if it does not manage to unarm Hizbullah, "Israel plans to
invade the country all the way to Beirut," the Syrian sources told the
newspaper. According to Al Watan, the sources said that "this is a message to
both Syria and Lebanon." On Sunday, a senior Beirut-based Hamas official that
his group would work side-by-side with Hizbullah in the next war against Israel,
Army Radio reported. "Israel should know that if it decides to attack, we won't
be able to sit on our hands, and we will assist our brothers against Israeli
brutality," the official said. He was speaking at a memorial ceremony for two
Hamas operatives who were killed in a Beirut explosion some two weeks ago.
Hariri Tribunal VP hands in retirement notice
Daily Star staff/Wednesday, January 06, 2010
BEIRUT: Vice President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Judge Ralph
Riachi submitted Tuesday to Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar an early retirement
memo demanding to put an end to his services in the Lebanese judiciary after six
months of occupying his position in the STL. Riachi said his request aimed to
allow him to dedicate himself to his position at the STL as he hoped he
accomplished to the fullest extent his mission during years of service in the
Lebanese judiciary. The STL is in charge of investigating former Premier Rafik
Hariri’s assassination in 2005. The memo is to be transferred by Najjar to the
Higher Judiciary Council in order to be approved since Riachi requested to
retire seven years prior to reaching the legal age.
However, in the absence of a response by the higher council two months after the
request is received, Riachi would be considered retired regardless of the
council’s decision.
“After my years of service as a Lebanese judge surpassed the period allowing me
to request my retirement before reaching the legal age and since my appointment
in the Special Tribunal does not conflict with the continuation of my active
service in the Lebanese Judiciary, I ask to take the necessary procedures to
issue a retirement decree based on my demand,” Riachi’s statement said. – The
Daily Star
Hariri: Key appointments to be based on merit
Cabinet to discuss issue after parties agree on process
By Elias Sakr and Nafez Qawas /Daily Star staff
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
BEIRUT: Both the issue of the spring municipal elections and the administrative
appointments topped the Cabinet’s discussions on Tuesday. Prime Minister Saad
Harri stressed the need to prepare a draft law to be studied concerning norms to
be adopted when it comes to administrative appointments. “We will give
qualifications and honesty top priority when it comes to the issue of
administrative appointments,” he said. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud
said he would discuss with Cabinet members during upcoming sessions the
possibility of holding municipal elections on time or a potential postponement
of the polls in the event that any reforms are to be implemented.
“The Council of Ministers united is to issue a decision in that regard and refer
it to Parliament,” Baroud said, while stressing that his ministry was ready to
hold the process on time if the Cabinet decides to do so. Well-informed sources
told The Daily Star that Free Patriotic Movement ministers raised the issue of
the municipal elections during the session, demanding a clear response with
regard to whether they would be held on time.
The interior minister has reiterated on several earlier occasions that four
essential amendments to the municipal electoral law needed to be passed,
including the election of the municipalities’ heads through direct vote, the
approval of proportional representation in major municipalities, the
establishment of a female quota and the adoption of pre-printed ballot papers.
Also, lowering the voting age to 18 would necessitate the addition around
300,000 new voters to the electoral list which requires time that is not allowed
for given the current deadline.
The Dabinet also tackled the issue of the Lebanese-Syrian border demarcation and
last month’s explosion in the Beirut sothern suburb of Haret Hreik that killed
two Hamas members.
Separately, President Michel Sleiman stressed Tuesday that political and
security stability pave the way for administrative reforms, thus promoting
social stability for the Lebanese people, particularly its working class.
“I call on all parties [to engage in] further cooperation and unity since the
real threat to the country comes from Israel, which is harmed by a united and
secure Lebanon,” Sleiman added.
The Cabinet as expected avoided during its meeting Tuesday tackling the
administrative appointments before a political agreement over the issue was
reached and a clear procedure was set.
The issue is expected to lead to a heated debate between political leaders given
the lack of a clear process to choose candidates, along with the need to comply
with parity between Muslims and Christians as well as the allocation of shares
between political parties.
Berri’s press office denied Tuesday media reports regarding a dispute between
Sleiman, Berri and Hariri over the issue of administrative appointments.
In other news, Hariri is scheduled to visit Jordan Wednesday to discuss
bilateral ties and regional developments with King Abdullah II, who met with
Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz during a brief trip to Saudi Arabia aimed at
breaking the deadlock surrounding the Middle East peace process.
Meanwhile, the Central News Agency reported Tuesday that US Senator John McCain
would arrive in Lebanon over the weekend to meet top Lebanese officials as part
of a regional tour to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict. McCain’s visit to
Beirut comes before the arrival of US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George
Mitchell to the region, the CNA added.
“McCain would also discuss with Lebanese officials ways to reach a comprehensive
peace solution in light of the resistance weapons against Israel along with
Lebanon’s call to the international community to pressure Israel into
implementing international resolutions,” the CNA reported.
The issue of Hizbullah’s weapons has been the subject of debate lately between
the party’s officials and March 14 Christians figures, who accuse Hizbullah of
serving Iranian interests and undermining the state’s authority. The CNA quoted
diplomatic sources as saying that the Lebanese officials would reiterate
Sleiman’s stances during his last visit to Washington, adding that Berri would
inform McCain of his position on the resistance, UNSCR 1559, and the daily
Israeli violations against Security Council Resolution 1701.
Haret Hreik Blast Occurred during Live Ammunition Training, Hizbullah Displeased
with Hamas
The explosion that rocked Beirut's southern suburbs over the weekend has
reportedly took place during live ammunition training of Hamas members.
Pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, citing Lebanese sources, said Wednesday the
blast occurred as Hamas members exercised with live ammunition in the basement
of Hamas headquarters in Haret Hreik neighborhood in Dahiyeh. The sources said
the Hamas basement office has been temporarily shut pending a settlement of the
situation in light of March 14 coalition's stance which described as "dangerous"
the presence of armed Palestinian centers outside refugee camps. Judicial
sources, meanwhile, told al-Hayat newspaper that investigation into the
explosion has been completed after the suspicious circumstances have been
uncovered. They said the probe became clear after military judge Rahif Hamdan
heard the testimony of Hamas representative in Lebanon Ossama Hamdan on Monday.
Hamdan told the daily al-Liwaa in remarks published Wednesday that one of the
two Hamas members killed in last Saturday night's explosion was head of his
personal bodyguards. Hamdan, who identified the victim as Basel Ahmed Jumaa,
accused Israel of being behind the explosion.
He stressed that the bomb was placed in a box that looked like a donation
package. Beirut media agreed that the explosion took place inside a room used by
Hamas members in the basement of a building that houses Bank of Kuwait and the
Arab World on the main road between Haret Hreik and Bir Abed.
Asharq al-Awsat said Hizbullah was displeased with Hamas. It said Hizbullah has
informed Hamas leadership that the Shiite group was "deeply dismayed at what had
happened, particularly that training took place without the knowledge of the
party and inside a residential building." Beirut, 06 Jan 10, 08:11
Aoun-Jumblat Meeting Postponed
Naharnet/he long-awaited meeting scheduled for Thursday between Druze leader
Walid Jumblat and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun has been postponed.
Progressive Socialist Party spokesman Rami Rayess told Naharnet that the meeting
has been postponed till next Monday due to the death of Judge Nuhad Hariss, head
of the Druze Appeals Court. Beirut, 06 Jan 10, 12:11
Iran from the inside
Farhad Bisotooni, /Now Lebanon
January 6, 2010
Modern Iran is a lot like the classic story “The Emperor’s new clothes.” In the
story, the ruler of a country is fooled into thinking he is wearing a fancy new
suit though he is in fact wearing nothing at all. Even though the emperor is
parading around naked, all of his subjects pretend to admire the suit for fear
of being persecuted. Finally, a brave little child screams, “The emperor is
naked!” The Green Movement in Iran is that child.
For me, it began one day after I had just finished my class at university and I
was driving home. My new shoes were pinching, so, as it wasn’t a crowded street,
I stopped to put on a pair of slippers I had in my car. It was a decision that
could have cost me my life. A few seconds after I opened the trunk to get my
slippers, five armed men had me surrounded and were pointing their rifles at me.
I didn’t know whether to feel embarrassed or scared. I slowly changed my shoes
and drove away. As it was, I had stopped too close to the Revolutionary Guards
Intelligence office, a building I had no idea was there.
It didn’t stop there. Last week, I was driving at night on a street in North
Tehran when I was blocked by the Basij, the paramilitary volunteer militia
founded in 1979 and commanded by the Revolutionary Guards. Most were nothing
more than aggressive teenagers, but I was scared. There was no reason for them
to stop me; they just wanted to flex their muscles by harassing passersby.
It occurred to me right at that moment that back in 1979, the Revolutionary
Guards were supposed to be, as the name would suggest, the guardians of the
Revolution. Of course, the Revolution was also supposed to be the revolution of
the people. But now they have become the enemy of the ordinary citizen.
Like me, the people of Iran are unhappy. They are struggling in their everyday
lives, in their poverty; they are threatened with execution if they speak up,
all while their government is spending billions of dollars to finance
organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The riots began in universities around Iran because many students and teachers
are dissatisfied with the situation in the country. When you take a look at the
high-ranking universities in Iran you can see what I call “displacement”; people
who are not in the positions they deserve. Some of the professors cannot pass
their own exams, but as long as they can pass the “commitment to the values of
the government test”, they are secure.
The threat of execution is always there. We must hold our tongue. If we dare to
criticize the government, we are deemed to be against Islam, Allah, the Prophet
and the Supreme Leader. The demonstrators arrested in the last two weeks all
face execution.
The dissident Grand Ayatollah Hussein Montazeri declared that we want freedom
for the people, not for the government. The people are not free. A year before
the elections I witnessed how people in a little city in Western Iran rose
against a new policy of fuel distribution. Around ten of them immediately
disappeared. They were said to have been taken to the Mehran area, next to the
border with Iraq, held in a container without food or water, and locked for two
months there, in the desert. The Revolutionary Guards spread rumors about the
punishments to set an example for any uprising or resistance. The families were
told to keep their mouths shut.
But when I look at myself and my friends who graduated from the best
universities in Iran I just see disappointment. We don’t even have the right to
access the free world, via internet or satellite or any other media. The
government is using technology bought mainly from China to control anything we
communicate with: mobiles, SMSs, e-mails and even blogs. After the recent Green
Movement protests, the filters have become even tougher; you have to use a proxy
to reach foreign websites. Checking your emails now takes two hours.
The Green Movement has brought hope to Iran. The “children” who scream “The
Emperor is naked” are growing in number. I’ve seen people looking at each other
and asking “Is this possible?” The answer seems to be a more determined “yes” by
the day. Even an illiterate person living in a small town, like my father, who
could not even imagine that he could criticize Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is now a
critic. “He is not doing well, doing what he is doing. He must respect the
people,” he told me the other day. His words mean more to me than any article
criticizing the government in Tehran.
How Taqiyya Alters Islam's Rules of War
Written by Raymond Ibrahim
Tuesday, 05 January 2010 18:30
http://www.rightsidenews.com/201001058051/global-terrorism/how-taqiyya-alters-islams-rules-of-war.html
Defeating Jihadist Terrorism
Middle East Forum
Islam must seem a paradoxical religion to non-Muslims. On the one hand, it is
constantly being portrayed as the religion of peace; on the other, its adherents
are responsible for the majority of terror attacks around the world. Apologists
for Islam emphasize that it is a faith built upon high ethical standards; others
stress that it is a religion of the law. Islam's dual notions of truth and
falsehood further reveal its paradoxical nature: While the Qur'an is against
believers deceiving other believers-for "surely God guides not him who is
prodigal and a liar"[1]-deception directed at non-Muslims, generally known in
Arabic as taqiyya, also has Qur'anic support and falls within the legal category
of things that are permissible for Muslims.
Taqiyya offers two basic uses. The better known revolves around dissembling over
one's religious identity when in fear of persecution. Such has been the
historical usage of taqiyya among Shi'i communities whenever and wherever their
Sunni rivals have outnumbered and thus threatened them. Conversely, Sunni
Muslims, far from suffering persecution have, whenever capability allowed, waged
jihad against the realm of unbelief; and it is here that they have deployed
taqiyya—not as dissimulation but as active deceit. In fact, deceit, which is
doctrinally grounded in Islam, is often depicted as being equal—sometimes
superior—to other universal military virtues, such as courage, fortitude, or
self-sacrifice.
Yet if Muslims are exhorted to be truthful, how can deceit not only be prevalent
but have divine sanction? What exactly is taqiyya? How is it justified by
scholars and those who make use of it? How does it fit into a broader conception
of Islam's code of ethics, especially in relation to the non-Muslim? More to the
point, what ramifications does the doctrine of taqiyya have for all interaction
between Muslims and non-Muslims?
The Doctrine of Taqiyya
According to Shari'a—the body of legal rulings that defines how a Muslim should
behave in all circumstances—deception is not only permitted in certain
situations but may be deemed obligatory in others. Contrary to early Christian
tradition, for instance, Muslims who were forced to choose between recanting
Islam or suffering persecution were permitted to lie and feign apostasy. Other
jurists have decreed that Muslims are obligated to lie in order to preserve
themselves,[2] based on Qur'anic verses forbidding Muslims from being
instrumental in their own deaths.[3]
This is the classic definition of the doctrine of taqiyya. Based on an Arabic
word denoting fear, taqiyya has long been understood, especially by Western
academics, as something to resort to in times of religious persecution and, for
the most part, used in this sense by minority Shi'i groups living among hostile
Sunni majorities.[4] Taqiyya allowed the Shi'a to dissemble their religious
affiliation in front of the Sunnis on a regular basis, not merely by keeping
clandestine about their own beliefs but by actively praying and behaving as if
they were Sunnis.
However, one of the few books devoted to the subject, At-Taqiyya fi'l-Islam
(Dissimulation in Islam) makes it clear that taqiyya is not limited to Shi'a
dissimulating in fear of persecution. Written by Sami Mukaram, a former Islamic
studies professor at the American University of Beirut and author of some
twenty-five books on Islam, the book clearly demonstrates the ubiquity and broad
applicability of taqiyya:
Taqiyya is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect
agrees to it and practices it … We can go so far as to say that the practice of
taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it
diverge from the mainstream … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics,
especially in the modern era.[5]
Taqiyya is, therefore, not, as is often supposed, an exclusively Shi'i
phenomenon. Of course, as a minority group interspersed among their Sunni
enemies, the Shi'a have historically had more reason to dissemble. Conversely,
Sunni Islam rapidly dominated vast empires from Spain to China. As a result, its
followers were beholden to no one, had nothing to apologize for, and had no need
to hide from the infidel nonbeliever (rare exceptions include Spain and Portugal
during the Reconquista when Sunnis did dissimulate over their religious
identity[6]). Ironically, however, Sunnis living in the West today find
themselves in the place of the Shi'a: Now they are the minority surrounded by
their traditional enemies—Christian infidels—even if the latter, as opposed to
their Reconquista predecessors, rarely act on, let alone acknowledge, this
historic enmity. In short, Sunnis are currently experiencing the general
circumstances that made taqiyya integral to Shi'ism although without the
physical threat that had so necessitated it.
The Articulation of Taqiyya
Qur'anic verse 3:28 is often seen as the primary verse that sanctions deception
towards non-Muslims: "Let believers [Muslims] not take infidels [non-Muslims]
for friends and allies instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no
relationship left with God—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking
precautions."[7]
Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (d. 923), author of a standard and authoritative
Qur'an commentary, explains verse 3:28 as follows:
If you [Muslims] are under their [non-Muslims'] authority, fearing for
yourselves, behave loyally to them with your tongue while harboring inner
animosity for them … [know that] God has forbidden believers from being friendly
or on intimate terms with the infidels rather than other believers—except when
infidels are above them [in authority]. Should that be the case, let them act
friendly towards them while preserving their religion.[8]
Regarding Qur'an 3:28, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), another prime authority on the
Qur'an, writes, "Whoever at any time or place fears … evil [from non-Muslims]
may protect himself through outward show." As proof of this, he quotes
Muhammad's close companion Abu Darda, who said, "Let us grin in the face of some
people while our hearts curse them." Another companion, simply known as Al-Hasan,
said, "Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the Day of Judgment [i.e., in
perpetuity]."[9]
Other prominent scholars, such as Abu 'Abdullah al-Qurtubi (1214-73) and Muhyi
'd-Din ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. In other
words, Muslims can behave like infidels and worse—for example, by bowing down
and worshiping idols and crosses, offering false testimony, and even exposing
the weaknesses of their fellow Muslims to the infidel enemy—anything short of
actually killing a Muslim: "Taqiyya, even if committed without duress, does not
lead to a state of infidelity—even if it leads to sin deserving of
hellfire."[10]
Deceit in Muhammad's Military Exploits
Muhammad—whose example as the "most perfect human" is to be followed in every
detail—took an expedient view on lying. It is well known, for instance, that he
permitted lying in three situations: to reconcile two or more quarreling
parties, to placate one's wife, and in war.[11] According to one Arabic legal
manual devoted to jihad as defined by the four schools of law, "The ulema agree
that deception during warfare is legitimate … deception is a form of art in
war."[12] Moreover, according to Mukaram, this deception is classified as
taqiyya: "Taqiyya in order to dupe the enemy is permissible."[13]
Several ulema believe deceit is integral to the waging of war: Ibn al-'Arabi
declares that "in the Hadith [sayings and actions of Muhammad], practicing
deceit in war is well demonstrated. Indeed, its need is more stressed than the
need for courage." Ibn al-Munir (d. 1333) writes, "War is deceit, i.e., the most
complete and perfect war waged by a holy warrior is a war of deception, not
confrontation, due to the latter's inherent danger, and the fact that one can
attain victory through treachery without harm [to oneself]." And Ibn Hajar (d.
1448) counsels Muslims "to take great caution in war, while [publicly] lamenting
and mourning in order to dupe the infidels."[14]
This Muslim notion that war is deceit goes back to the Battle of the Trench
(627), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes
known as Al-Ahzab. One of the Ahzab, Na'im ibn Mas'ud, went to the Muslim camp
and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered that the Ahzab were unaware of
their co-tribalist's conversion, he counseled Mas'ud to return and try to get
the pagan forces to abandon the siege. It was then that Muhammad memorably
declared, "For war is deceit." Mas'ud returned to the Ahzab without their
knowing that he had switched sides and intentionally began to give his former
kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels
between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other, they
disbanded, lifted the siege from the Muslims, and saved Islam from destruction
in an embryonic period.[15] Most recently, 9/11 accomplices, such as Khalid
Sheikh Muhammad, rationalized their conspiratorial role in their defendant
response by evoking their prophet's assertion that "war is deceit."
A more compelling expression of the legitimacy of deceiving infidels is the
following anecdote. A poet, Ka'b ibn Ashraf, offended Muhammad, prompting the
latter to exclaim, "Who will kill this man who has hurt God and his prophet?" A
young Muslim named Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered on condition that in order
to get close enough to Ka'b to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the
poet. Muhammad agreed. Ibn Maslama traveled to Ka'b and began to denigrate Islam
and Muhammad. He carried on in this way till his disaffection became so
convincing that Ka'b took
Muhammad said other things that cast deception in a positive light, such as "God
has commanded me to equivocate among the people just as he has commanded me to
establish [religious] obligations"; and "I have been sent with obfuscation"; and
"whoever lives his life in dissimulation dies a martyr."[17]
In short, the earliest historical records of Islam clearly attest to the
prevalence of taqiyya as a form of Islamic warfare. Furthermore, early Muslims
are often depicted as lying their way out of binds—usually by denying or
insulting Islam or Muhammad—often to the approval of the latter, his only
criterion being that their intentions (niya) be pure.[18] During wars with
Christians, whenever the latter were in authority, the practice of taqiyya
became even more integral. Mukaram states, "Taqiyya was used as a way to fend
off danger from the Muslims, especially in critical times and when their borders
were exposed to wars with the Byzantines and, afterwards, to the raids
[crusades] of the Franks and others."[19]
Taqiyya in Qur'anic Revelation
The Qur'an itself is further testimony to taqiyya. Since God is believed to be
the revealer of these verses, he is by default seen as the ultimate perpetrator
of deceit—which is not surprising since he is described in the Qur'an as the
best makar, that is, the best deceiver or schemer (e.g., 3:54, 8:30, 10:21).
While other scriptures contain contradictions, the Qur'an is the only holy book
whose commentators have evolved a doctrine to account for the very visible
shifts which occur from one injunction to another. No careful reader will remain
unaware of the many contradictory verses in the Qur'an, most specifically the
way in which peaceful and tolerant verses lie almost side by side with violent
and intolerant ones. The ulema were initially baffled as to which verses to
codify into the Shari'a worldview—the one that states there is no coercion in
religion (2:256), or the ones that command believers to fight all non-Muslims
till they either convert, or at least submit, to Islam (8:39, 9:5, 9:29). To get
out of this quandary, the commentators developed the doctrine of abrogation,
which essentially maintains that verses revealed later in Muhammad's career take
precedence over earlier ones whenever there is a discrepancy. In order to
document which verses abrogated which, a religious science devoted to the
chronology of the Qur'an's verses evolved (known as an-Nasikh wa'l Mansukh, the
abrogater and the abrogated).
But why the contradiction in the first place? The standard view is that in the
early years of Islam, since Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by
their infidel competitors while living next to them in Mecca, a message of peace
and coexistence was in order. However, after the Muslims migrated to Medina in
622 and grew in military strength, verses inciting them to go on the offensive
were slowly "revealed"—in principle, sent down from God—always commensurate with
Islam's growing capabilities. In juridical texts, these are categorized in
stages: passivity vis-á-vis aggression; permission to fight back against
aggressors; commands to fight aggressors; commands to fight all non-Muslims,
whether the latter begin aggressions or not.[20] Growing Muslim might is the
only variable that explains this progressive change in policy.
Other scholars put a gloss on this by arguing that over a twenty-two year
period, the Qur'an was revealed piecemeal, from passive and spiritual verses to
legal prescriptions and injunctions to spread the faith through jihad and
conquest, simply to acclimate early Muslim converts to the duties of Islam, lest
they be discouraged at the outset by the dramatic obligations that would appear
in later verses.[21] Verses revealed towards the end of Muhammad's career—such
as, "Warfare is prescribed for you though you hate it"[22]—would have been out
of place when warfare was actually out of the question.
However interpreted, the standard view on Qur'anic abrogation concerning war and
peace verses is that when Muslims are weak and in a minority position, they
should preach and behave according to the ethos of the Meccan verses (peace and
tolerance); when strong, however, they should go on the offensive on the basis
of what is commanded in the Medinan verses (war and conquest). The vicissitudes
of Islamic history are a testimony to this dichotomy, best captured by the
popular Muslim notion, based on a hadith, that, if possible, jihad should be
performed by the hand (force), if not, then by the tongue (through preaching);
and, if that is not possible, then with the heart or one's intentions.[23]
War Is Eternal
That Islam legitimizes deceit during war is, of course, not all that
astonishing; after all, as the Elizabethan writer John Lyly put it, "All's fair
in love and war."[24] Other non-Muslim philosophers and strategists—such as Sun
Tzu, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes—justified deceit in warfare. Deception of
the enemy during war is only common sense. The crucial difference in Islam,
however, is that war against the infidel is a perpetual affair—until, in the
words of the Qur'an, "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to God."[25] In
his entry on jihad from the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Emile Tyan states: "The duty
of the jihad exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been
attained. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of
affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily."[26]
Moreover, going back to the doctrine of abrogation, Muslim scholars such as Ibn
Salama (d. 1020) agree that Qur'an 9:5, known as ayat as-sayf or the sword
verse, has abrogated some 124 of the more peaceful Meccan verses, including
"every other verse in the Qur'an, which commands or implies anything less than a
total offensive against the nonbelievers."[27] In fact, all four schools of
Sunni jurisprudence agree that "jihad is when Muslims wage war on infidels,
after having called on them to embrace Islam or at least pay tribute [jizya] and
live in submission, and the infidels refuse."[28]
Obligatory jihad is best expressed by Islam's dichotomized worldview that pits
the realm of Islam against the realm of war. The first, dar al-Islam, is the
"realm of submission," the world where Shari'a governs; the second, dar al-Harb
(the realm of war), is the non-Islamic world. A struggle continues until the
realm of Islam subsumes the non-Islamic world—a perpetual affair that continues
to the present day. The renowned Muslim historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun
(d. 1406) clearly articulates this division:
In the Muslim community, jihad is a religious duty because of the universalism
of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by
persuasion or by force. The other religious groups did not have a universal
mission, and the jihad was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes
of defense. But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.[29]
Finally and all evidence aside, lest it still appear unreasonable for a faith
with over one billion adherents to obligate unprovoked warfare in its name, it
is worth noting that the expansionist jihad is seen as an altruistic endeavor,
not unlike the nineteenth century ideology of "the white man's burden." The
logic is that the world, whether under democracy, socialism, communism, or any
other system of governance, is inevitably living in bondage—a great sin, since
the good of all humanity is found in living in accordance to God's law. In this
context, Muslim deception can be viewed as a slightly less than noble means to a
glorious end—Islamic hegemony under Shari'a rule, which is seen as good for both
Muslims and non-Muslims.
This view has an ancient pedigree: Soon after the death of Muhammad (634), as
the jihad fighters burst out of the Arabian peninsula, a soon-to-be conquered
Persian commander asked the invading Muslims what they wanted. They memorably
replied as follows:
God has sent us and brought us here so that we may free those who desire from
servitude to earthly rulers and make them servants of God, that we may change
their poverty into wealth and free them from the tyranny and chaos of [false]
religions and bring them to the justice of Islam. He has sent us to bring his
religion to all his creatures and call them to Islam. Whoever accepts it from us
will be safe, and we shall leave him alone; but whoever refuses, we shall fight
until we fulfill the promise of God.[30]
Fourteen hundred years later— in March 2009—Saudi legal expert Basem Alem
publicly echoed this view:
As a member of the true religion, I have a greater right to invade [others] in
order to impose a certain way of life [according to Shari'a], which history has
proven to be the best and most just of all civilizations. This is the true
meaning of offensive jihad. When we wage jihad, it is not in order to convert
people to Islam, but in order to liberate them from the dark slavery in which
they live.[31]
And it should go without saying that taqiyya in the service of altruism is
permissible. For example, only recently, after publicly recounting a story where
a Muslim tricked a Jew into converting to Islam—warning him that if he tried to
abandon Islam, Muslims would kill him as an apostate—Muslim cleric Mahmoud al-Masri
called it a "beautiful trick."[32] After all, from an Islamic point of view, it
was the Jew who, in the end, benefitted from the deception, which brought him to
Islam.
Treaties and Truces
The perpetual nature of jihad is highlighted by the fact that, based on the
10-year treaty of Hudaybiya (628), ratified between Muhammad and his Quraysh
opponents in Mecca, most jurists are agreed that ten years is the maximum amount
of time Muslims can be at peace with infidels; once the treaty has expired, the
situation needs to be reappraised. Based on Muhammad's example of breaking the
treaty after two years (by claiming a Quraysh infraction), the sole function of
the truce is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup before renewing the
offensive:[33] "By their very nature, treaties must be of temporary duration,
for in Muslim legal theory, the normal relations between Muslim and non-Muslim
territories are not peaceful, but warlike."[34] Hence "the fuqaha [jurists] are
agreed that open-ended truces are illegitimate if Muslims have the strength to
renew the war against them [non-Muslims]."[35]
Even though Shari'a mandates Muslims to abide by treaties, they have a way out,
one open to abuse: If Muslims believe—even without solid evidence—that their
opponents are about to break the treaty, they can preempt by breaking it first.
Moreover, some Islamic schools of law, such as the Hanafi, assert that Muslim
leaders may abrogate treaties merely if it seems advantageous for Islam.[36]
This is reminiscent of the following canonical hadith: "If you ever take an oath
to do something and later on you find that something else is better, then you
should expiate your oath and do what is better."[37] And what is better, what is
more altruistic, than to make God's word supreme by launching the jihad anew
whenever possible? Traditionally, Muslim rulers held to a commitment to launch a
jihad at least once every year. This ritual is most noted with the Ottoman
sultans, who spent half their lives in the field.[38] So important was the duty
of jihad that the sultans were not permitted to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca,
an individual duty for each Muslim. Their leadership of the jihad allowed this
communal duty to continue; without them, it would have fallen into
desuetude.[39]
In short, the prerequisite for peace or reconciliation is Muslim advantage. This
is made clear in an authoritative Sunni legal text, Umdat as-Salik, written by a
fourteenth-century Egyptian scholar, Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri: "There must be
some benefit [maslaha] served in making a truce other than the status quo: 'So
do not be fainthearted and call for peace when it is you who are uppermost
[Qur'an 47:35].'"[40]
More recently, and of great significance for Western leaders advocating
cooperation with Islamists, Yasser Arafat, soon after negotiating a peace treaty
criticized as conceding too much to Israel, addressed an assembly of Muslims in
a mosque in Johannesburg where he justified his actions: "I see this agreement
as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the
Quraysh in Mecca."[41] In other words, like Muhammad, Arafat gave his word only
to annul it once "something better" came along—that is, once the Palestinians
became strong enough to renew the offensive and continue on the road to
Jerusalem. Elsewhere, Hudaybiya has appeared as a keyword for radical Islamists.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front had three training camps within the Camp Abu
Bakar complex in the Philippines, one of which was named Camp Hudaybiya.[42]
Hostility Disguised As Grievance
In their statements directed at European or American audiences, Islamists
maintain that the terrorism they direct against the West is merely reciprocal
treatment for decades of Western and Israeli oppression. Yet in writings
directed to their fellow Muslims, this animus is presented, not as a reaction to
military or political provocation but as a product of religious obligation.
For instance, when addressing Western audiences, Osama bin Laden lists any
number of grievances as motivating his war on the West—from the oppression of
the Palestinians to the Western exploitation of women, and even U.S. failure to
sign the environmental Kyoto protocol—all things intelligible from a Western
perspective. Never once, however, does he justify Al-Qaeda's attacks on Western
targets simply because non-Muslim countries are infidel entities that must be
subjugated. Indeed, he often initiates his messages to the West by saying,
"Reciprocal treatment is part of justice" or "Peace to whoever follows
guidance"[43]—though he means something entirely different than what his Western
listeners understand by words such as "peace," "justice," or "guidance."
It is when bin Laden speaks to fellow Muslims that the truth comes out. When a
group of prominent Muslims wrote an open letter to the American people soon
after the strikes of 9/11, saying that Islam seeks to peacefully coexist,[44]
bin Laden wrote to castigate them:
As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarized by the
Most High's Word: "We [Muslims] renounce you [non-Muslims]. Enmity and hate
shall forever reign between us—till you believe in God alone" [Qur'an 60:4]. So
there is an enmity, evidenced by fierce hostility from the heart. And this
fierce hostility—that is, battle—ceases only if the infidel submits to the
authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [i.e., a dhimmi,
or protected minority], or if Muslims are at that point in time weak and
incapable. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the heart, this is
great apostasy! ... Such then is the basis and foundation of the relationship
between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity, and hatred—directed from
the Muslim to the infidel—is the foundation of our religion. And we consider
this a justice and kindness to them.[45]
Mainstream Islam's four schools of jurisprudence lend their support to this
hostile Weltanschauung by speaking of the infidel in similar terms. Bin Laden's
addresses to the West with his talk of justice and peace are clear instances of
taqiyya. He is not only waging a physical jihad but a propaganda war, that is, a
war of deceit. If he can convince the West that the current conflict is entirely
its fault, he garners greater sympathy for his cause. At the same time, he knows
that if Americans were to realize that nothing short of their submission can
ever bring peace, his propaganda campaign would be quickly compromised. Hence
the constant need to dissemble and to cite grievances, for, as bin Laden's
prophet asserted, "War is deceit."
Implications
Taqiyya presents a range of ethical dilemmas. Anyone who truly believes that God
justifies and, through his prophet's example, even encourages deception will not
experience any ethical qualms over lying. Consider the case of 'Ali Mohammad,
bin Laden's first "trainer" and long-time Al-Qaeda operative. An Egyptian, he
was initially a member of Islamic Jihad and had served in the Egyptian army's
military intelligence unit. After 1984, he worked for a time with the CIA in
Germany. Though considered untrustworthy, he managed to get to California where
he enlisted in the U.S. Army. It seems likely that he continued to work in some
capacity for the CIA. He later trained jihadists in the United States and
Afghanistan and was behind several terror attacks in Africa. People who knew him
regarded him with "fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his
inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the
enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic
fundamentalism."[46] Indeed, this sentence sums it all up: For a zealous belief
in Islam's tenets, which legitimize deception in order to make God's word
supreme, will certainly go a long way in creating "incredible self-confidence"
when lying.[47]
Yet most Westerners continue to think that Muslim mores, laws, and ethical
constraints are near identical to those of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Naively or arrogantly, today's multiculturalist leaders project their own
worldview onto Islamists, thinking a handshake and smiles across a cup of
coffee, as well as numerous concessions, are enough to dismantle the power of
God's word and centuries of unchanging tradition. The fact remains: Right and
wrong in Islam have little to do with universal standards but only with what
Islam itself teaches—much of which is antithetical to Western norms.
It must, therefore, be accepted that, contrary to long-held academic
assumptions, the doctrine of taqiyya goes far beyond Muslims engaging in
religious dissimulation in the interest of self-preservation and encompasses
deception of the infidel enemy in general. This phenomenon should provide a
context for Shi'i Iran's zeal—taqiyya being especially second nature to Shi'ism—to
acquire nuclear power while insisting that its motives are entirely peaceful.
Nor is taqiyya confined to overseas affairs. Walid Phares of the National
Defense University has lamented that homegrown Islamists are operating
unfettered on American soil due to their use of taqiyya: "Does our government
know what this doctrine is all about and, more importantly, are authorities
educating the body of our defense apparatus regarding this stealthy threat
dormant among us?"[48] After the Fort Hood massacre, when Nidal Malik Hasan, an
American-Muslim who exhibited numerous Islamist signs which were ignored, killed
thirteen fellow servicemen and women, one is compelled to respond in the
negative.
This, then, is the dilemma: Islamic law unambiguously splits the world into two
perpetually warring halves—the Islamic world versus the non-Islamic—and holds it
to be God's will for the former to subsume the latter. Yet if war with the
infidel is a perpetual affair, if war is deceit, and if deeds are justified by
intentions—any number of Muslims will naturally conclude that they have a
divinely sanctioned right to deceive, so long as they believe their deception
serves to aid Islam "until all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to
God."[49] Such deception will further be seen as a means to an altruistic end.
Muslim overtures for peace, dialogue, or even temporary truces must be seen in
this light, evoking the practical observations of philosopher James Lorimer,
uttered over a century ago: "So long as Islam endures, the reconciliation of its
adherents, even with Jews and Christians, and still more with the rest of
mankind, must continue to be an insoluble problem."[50]
In closing, whereas it may be more appropriate to talk of "war and peace" as
natural corollaries in a Western context, when discussing Islam, it is more
accurate to talk of "war and deceit." For, from an Islamic point of view, times
of peace—that is, whenever Islam is significantly weaker than its infidel
rivals—are times of feigned peace and pretense, in a word, taqiyya.
Raymond Ibrahim is associate director of the Middle East Forum
[1] Qur'an 40:28.
[2] Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, At-Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya,
2000), vol. 10, p. 98.
[3] Qur'an 2:195, 4:29.
[4] Paul E. Walker, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam in the Modern World, John
Esposito, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 4, s.v. "Taqiyah,"
pp. 186-7; Ibn Babuyah, A Shi'ite Creed, A. A. A. Fyzee, trans. (London: n.p.,
1942), pp. 110-2; Etan Kohlberg, "Some Imami-Shi'i Views on Taqiyya," Journal of
the American Oriental Society, 95 (1975): 395-402.
[5] Sami Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam (London: Mu'assisat at-Turath ad-Druzi,
2004), p. 7, author's translation.
[6] Devin Stewart, "Islam in Spain after the Reconquista," Emory University, p.
2, accessed Nov. 27, 2009.
[7] See also Quran 2:173, 2:185, 4:29, 16:106, 22:78, 40:28, verses cited by
Muslim jurisprudents as legitimating taqiyya.
[8] Abu Ja'far Muhammad at-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan 'an ta'wil ayi'l-Qur'an al-Ma'ruf:
Tafsir at-Tabari (Beirut: Dar Ihya' at-Turath al-'Arabi, 2001), vol. 3, p. 267,
author's translation.
[9] 'Imad ad-Din Isma'il Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Karim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-'Ilmiya, 2001), vol. 1, p. 350, author's translation.
[10] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 30-7.
[11] Imam Muslim, "Kitab al-Birr wa's-Salat, Bab Tahrim al-Kidhb wa Bayan al-Mubih
Minhu," Sahih Muslim, rev. ed., Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans. (New Delhi: Kitab
Bhavan, 2000).
[12] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi'l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina (Cairo:
Al-Azhar, 2003), p. 304, author's translation.
[13] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, p. 32.
[14] Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp.
142-3.
[15] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 32-3.
[16] Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997),
pp. 367-8.
[17] Shihab ad-Din Muhammad al-Alusi al-Baghdadi, Ruh al-Ma'ani fi Tafsir
al-Qur'an al-'Azim wa' l-Saba' al-Mithani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya,
2001), vol. 2, p. 118, author's translation.
[18] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, pp. 11-2.
[19] Ibid., pp. 41-2.
[20] Ibn Qayyim, Tafsir, in Abd al-'Aziz bin Nasir al-Jalil, At-Tarbiya al-Jihadiya
fi Daw' al-Kitab wa 's-Sunna (Riyahd: n.p., 2003), pp. 36-43.
[21] Mukaram, At-Taqiyya fi 'l-Islam, p. 20.
[22] Qur'an 2: 216.
[23] Yahya bin Sharaf ad-Din an-Nawawi, An-Nawawi's Forty Hadiths, p. 16,
accessed Aug. 1, 2009.
[24] John Lyly, Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (London, 1578), p. 236.
[25] Qur'an 8:39.
[26] Emile Tyan, The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1960), vol. 2, s.v. "Djihad,"
pp. 538-40.
[27] David Bukay, "Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam," Middle East Quarterly,
Fall 2007, pp. 3-11, f.n. 58; David S. Powers, "The Exegetical Genre nasikh
al-Qur'an wa-mansukhuhu," in Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of
the Qur'an, Andrew Rippin, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 130-1.
[28] Jalil, At-Tarbiya al-Jihadiya fi Daw' al-Kitab wa ' s-Sunna, p. 7.
[29] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah. An Introduction to History, Franz Rosenthal,
trans. (New York: Pantheon, 1958), vol. 1, p. 473.
[30] Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), p.
112.
[31] "Saudi Legal Expert Basem Alem: We Have the Right to Wage Offensive Jihad
to Impose Our Way of Life," TV Monitor, clip 2108, Middle East Media Research
Institute, trans., Mar. 26, 2009.
[32] "Egyptian Cleric Mahmoud Al-Masri Recommends Tricking Jews into Becoming
Muslims," TV Monitor, clip 2268, Middle East Media Research Institute, trans.,
Aug. 10, 2009.
[33] Denis MacEoin, "Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance," Middle East
Quarterly, Summer 2008, pp. 39-48.
[34] Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 220.
[35] Ahmad Mahmud Karima, Al-Jihad fi'l Islam: Dirasa Fiqhiya Muqarina, p. 461,
author's translation.
[36] Ibid., p. 469.
[37] Muhammad al-Bukhari, "Judgements (Ahkaam)," Sahih al-Bukhari, book 89, M.
Muhsin Khan, trans., accessed July 22, 2009.
[38] Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice
(Princeton: Woodstock Publishers, 2006), p. 148.
[39] Ahmed Akgündüz, "Why Did the Ottoman Sultans Not Make Hajj (Pilgrimage)?"
accessed Nov. 9, 2009.
[40] Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of
Islamic Sacred Law (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994), p. 605.
[41] Daniel Pipes, "Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad's Diplomacy," Middle East
Quarterly, Sept. 1999, pp. 65-72.
[42] Arabinda Acharya, "Training in Terror," IDSS Commentaries, Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, May
2, 2003.
[43] "Does hypocrite have a past tense?" for clip of Osama bin Laden, accessed
Aug. 1, 2009.
[44] Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Shahwan, et al, "Correspondence with Saudis: How We
Can Coexist," AmericanValues.org, accessed July 28, 2009.
[45] Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, p. 43.
[46] Steven Emerson, "Osama bin Laden's Special Operations Man," Journal of
Counterterrorism and Security International, Sept. 1, 1998.
[47] For lists of other infiltrators of U. S. organizations, see Daniel Pipes,
"Islamists Penetrate Western Security," Mar. 9, 2008.
[48] Walid Phares, "North Carolina: Meet Taqiyya Jihad," International Analyst
Network, July 30, 2009.
[49] Qur'an 8:39.
[50] James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the
Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd., 2005), p. 124.