LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
July 29/08

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 13,31-35.  He proposed another parable to them. "The kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed that a person took and sowed in a field. It is the smallest of all the seeds, yet when full-grown it is the largest of plants. It becomes a large bush, and the 'birds of the sky come and dwell in its branches.'"He spoke to them another parable. "The kingdom of heaven is like yeast that a woman took and mixed with three measures of wheat flour until the whole batch was leavened." All these things Jesus spoke to the crowds in parables. He spoke to them only in parables, to fulfill what had been said through the prophet: "I will open my mouth in parables, I will announce what has lain hidden from the foundation (of the world)."

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
The Role of Arms: From Gaza to Lebanon-By: Elias Harfoush 28/07/08
The Deobandi Fatwa Against Terrorism Didn't Treat the Jihadi Root. By Walid Phares 28/07/08
NEW Opinion: Resistance: Do we need it?NowLebanon.com 28/07/08
The Flower of Lebanon Languisheth-By SIMON ROUGHNEEN 28/07/08
Is Assad Bluffing?BY: Olivier Guitta 29/07/08
Releasing terrorists encourages more attacks-By Ron Kehrmann 28/07/08
May an American Comment on Israel?by Daniel Pipes 28/07/08
The syndrome of one-time exceptions and the drive to establish the proposed Hariri court-By Muhamad Mugraby  28/07/08
Fatah and Hamas may be getting ready for another bloodbath- The Daily Star 28/07/08

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July 28/08
Berri Warns: Parliamentary Consultations to Name New PM if No Policy Statement Within Constitutional Period-Naharnet
Jumblat Says No to Isolationism, Stresses Arabism and Palestinian Cause-Naharnet
March 14 Hits Back at Hizbullah Threats … Policy Statement Subject to Ongoing Dispute-Naharnet
Gemayel Meets Kadhafi, Calls for Arab Solidarity against Israel-Naharnet
France Says Its Dialogue with Syria Will Help Solve Issue of Lebanese Detainees-Naharnet
Assad Hosts Lahoud and Family at Aleppo Mansion-Naharnet
Aoun to Paris for Meetings with Lebanese, French Officials-Naharnet
Lebanese Troops Arrest Gunmen on Streets of Tripoli-Naharnet
Report: Hizbullah to Target Israeli Fighter Jets-Naharnet
2 Lebanese Army Soldiers Wounded in Tripoli Clashes-Naharnet
Hundreds Still Homeless after Tripoli Battles-Naharnet
Syrian envoy to US calls for ending 'state of war' with Israel-AFP
Sfeir, Qabalan weigh in on recent fighting in Tripoli-Daily Star
Lebanese army restores calm in Tripoli, arrests wanted gunman-Daily Star
Ministers expected to issue platform 'on Monday or Tuesday'-Daily Star
Sleiman voices optimism on future of Lebanese-Syrian relations-Daily Star
Israel denies reports of impending Ghajar pullout-Daily Star
Lebanese, Syrian officials meet to discuss detainees-Daily Star
Iranian VP's remarks spark angry reactions in Beirut-Daily Star
Masses of Tripoli residents wait to return home after deadly battles-AFP

End 'state of war' with Israel, say Syria's US envoy
JERUSALEM (AFP) — Syria's ambassador to the United States on Monday called for ending the "state of war" with longtime foe Israel, weeks after the two states announced the launch of  indirect peace talks. "We desire to recognise each other and end the state of war," Imad Mustafa told a gathering of activists in Washington allied with Israel's Peace Now movement, in remarks broadcast on Israeli army radio. "Here is then a grand thing on offer. Let us sit together, let us make peace, let us end once and for all the state of war."He added however that any peace agreement would depend on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which the Jewish state occupied in the 1967 war and annexed in 1981. His remarks came just two weeks after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said Damascus would establish "normal" relations with Israel, including the opening of embassies, if the Turkish-mediated talks lead to a peace deal.
The launch of indirect talks between the two longtime enemies, who have technically been at war since 1948, was revealed in May, following an eight-year freeze in May. The talks had previously foundered in 2000 on the question of the strategic Golan plateau which runs down to the shores of the Sea of Galilee, Israel's main source of fresh water, and is currently home to some 20,000 Jewish settlers. Israel has demanded that Syria cut its ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, the Palestinian Hamas movement, and other armed groups pledged to the Jewish state's demise, as well as distance itself from Iran.

Berri Warns: Parliamentary Consultations to Name New PM if No Policy Statement Within Constitutional Period
Naharnet/Speaker Nabih Berri warned he would carry out parliamentary consultations to name a new prime minister if a 30-day constitutional period ends without finalizing the cabinet policy statement. "There is absolutely no reason for this delay" in drafting the ministerial statement, Berri said in remarks published by the daily As Safir on Monday. "Time is passing by at the expense of the country's peace and stability," Berri warned. "The 30-day constitutional period is nearing an end," he cautioned, "and based on our commitment to the constitution, we will ask President Michel Suleiman to call for (parliamentary) consultations if the period expires" without finalizing the policy statement. Berri reiterated a proposal calling for adoption of clauses from the previous cabinet policy statement concerning the "role of the resistance" in addition to Security Council Resolution 1701 to facilitate drafting the new government's ministerial statement. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat, a leading figure of the pro-government March 14 Forces, agreed on the proposal but Premier Fouad Saniora was not informed about it yet. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abu Jamra expected the policy statement to be announced on Monday evening. In an interview with NBN TV late Sunday, Abu Jamra said that economic reforms remained to be discussed. He said Saniora was dynamically working on speeding up the drafting of the ministerial statement. Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 08:13

Gemayel Meets Kadhafi, Calls for Arab Solidarity against Israel
Naharnet/Former President Amin Gemayel has discussed the Lebanese situation with Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi, the state-run National News Agency said Monday. "We are in dire need for unity to confront major challenges … to confront Israel," Gemayel said after the meeting which took place in Tripoli, Libya on Saturday. He said that solidarity will facilitate a solution to several issues in Lebanon, among them Israeli-occupied territory. Describing Libya as "dear" to Lebanon, Gemayel said that "consultations and solidarity are needed in order to create a solid Arab stance regarding the Palestinian problem and relations with the West."
Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 12:55

France Says Its Dialogue with Syria Will Help Solve Issue of Lebanese Detainees
Naharnet/The French minister of state, Jean-Marie Bockel, during a visit to Lebanon said that his government's new dialogue with Damascus would make it possible to resolve the issue of Lebanese detainees in Syrian jails. This issue "is on the mind of all those who are endeavoring to support the dialogue between Lebanon and Syria, and above all French President Nicolas Sarkozy," Bockel told An Nahar in remarks that were published on Monday.
The minister pointed out that Sarkozy had emphasized that the exchange of embassies must not be "an empty symbol" of relations between Beirut and Damascus, but rather the outstanding issues must be resolved simultaneously with the establishment of diplomatic ties. Bockel said that the exchange of embassies would give additional impetus to Sarkozy's anticipated visit to Damascus, although he did not specify whether the establishment of diplomatic relations was a condition of the French president's trip to the Syrian capital. He said that the exchange of embassies might take place before Sarkozy's visit to Damascus and the region.
Bockel said that his visit to Beirut "comes in the context of a follow-up to French President Nicolas Sarkozy's visit, in order to support the progress of national reconciliation in Lebanon and to rebuild permanent peace in the region." Bockel noted that French Prime Minister François Fillon was expected to visit Lebanon in mid-October at the head of a political and economic delegation in order to study ways of consolidating economic relations between the two countries. He added that he expected Premier Fouad Saniora to visit France. Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 13:52

Aoun to Paris for Meetings with Lebanese, French Officials
Naharnet/Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun is likely to leave for Paris later Monday for a series of meetings with Lebanese and French officials.
Among the leaders he is planning to visit was former Deputy Premier Issam Fares, who last week received ex-cabinet minister Suleiman Franjieh.
Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 10:39

Jumblat Says No to Isolationism, Stresses Arabism and Palestinian Cause
Naharnet/In a far-ranging interview with New TV on Sunday, the head of the Democratic Gathering, MP Walid Jumblat, asked the leader of Hizbullah to salute Beirut, not to apologize to it. He called upon Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah "to salute Beirut, which is neither for March 8 nor for March 14, but is rather Beirut of the siege," which expelled Israel, "Beirut of the Palestinian resistance, and Beirut of the joint Lebanese-Palestinian struggle, the Beirut of diversity."
"I do not ask him to apologize, but rather to salute Beirut," the Druze leader said. He said that divorce with Hizbullah is impossible and the March 14 alliance and the Shiite group must meet after formulating a clear relationship between the state and Hizbullah.
While Jumblat denied that his reception of released Lebanese prisoner Samir Qantar in Abey indicated that he had entered into an alliance with Hizbullah, he said one cannot be Lebanese "without Arabism and without Palestine." The Druze leader also stressed that he is remaining in alliance with the March 14 movement.
The leader of the Progressive Socialist Party criticized Nasrallah's allegiance to Iran and the concept of the "Faqih rule," asking: "When will we and Hizbullah be able to build a state outside of the framework of foreign interests and connections?" He spoke of the need for all parties in Lebanon to remain committed to Arabism and to the Palestinian cause, noting that "the pressures of the past phase…made us depart from the concepts (to which we are committed) and forget Palestine and Arabism." He emphasized the need to return to these principles "so that we do not become isolationists, which is what the Zionists, who are striving to fragment the region, want." "If the Sunnis, or the Druze, or the Shiites, and all of the sects, abandon the cause of Palestine, then nothing remains," Jumblat said. He also emphasized the importance of the Taif Agreement. "Any change in the system or in the Taif Accord will lead to disputes and perhaps to civil war," he said.
Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 10:56

Assad Hosts Lahoud and Family at Aleppo Mansion
Naharnet/Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, in compliance with an invitation from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, headed for Aleppo on Saturday with his wife, and children – former MP Emile Lahoud and Ralf Lahoud accompanied by his wife, Carine. News reports said Lahoud, who is expected to return to Lebanon on Monday, spent the weekend with his family at Assad's summer residence in Aleppo. Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 11:31

March 14 Hits Back at Hizbullah Threats … Policy Statement Subject to Ongoing Dispute
Naharnet/A fiery statement by Hizbullah MP Mohammed Raad has caused uproar among the ruling March 14 coalition.
Raad on Sunday warned March 14 against attempting to "abolish the resistance's right to exit" in the forthcoming policy statement, saying "this is tantamount to declaring war."

He accused March 14 cabinet ministers of "obstructing the decision-making by trying to strip the resistance of its weapons."
Naharnet/Raad also accused the alliance of succumbing to foreign powers. Addressing the ruling majority team, Raad said: "You are singing out of the tune of the President's stances and out of the tune of the majority of the Lebanese people's stand." Minister of State Nassib Lahoud, member of the ministerial committee tasked with drafting the new cabinet policy statement, hit back at Raad, saying his remarks are "totally unacceptable." "No way could I work in a committee that is subject to this kind of speeches that could be interpreted by many as threats against the committee," Lahoud said. Lahoud, speaking to reporters during a break in the committee's ninth meeting on Sunday, said he hoped Raad would issue a statement clarifying his declaration. Information Minister Tareq Mitri also struck back at Raad, saying his statement was "way beyond reality.""The best way to facilitate agreement (on the policy statement) is to refrain from the use of threatening and thorny language," Mitri said. Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 09:23

Lebanese Troops Arrest Gunmen on Streets of Tripoli
Naharnet/Calm returned to Tripoli after Lebanese army troops arrested a number of gunmen on the streets of the northern port city. News reports on Monday said that among the detainees was Mohammed Ahmad Arour, a supporter of pro-opposition former Premier Omar Karami. The arrests were made following a half-hour clash on Sunday between Lebanese troops and armed Arour followers at Bab al-Tabbaneh.Two Lebanese army soldiers were wounded in the fight which broke out shortly before 6 pm. The clash erupted when Arour refused to stop at a Lebanese army checkpoint in Bab al-Tabbaneh, the state-run National News Agency reported. It said troops pursued Arour and arrested him after a thirty-minute clash that left two army troops wounded, one of them seriously.
Beirut, 28 Jul 08, 10:23

Releasing terrorists encourages more attacks
By Ron Kehrmann
Haifa (JTA) — I am writing from Israel as my government releases terrorists back to Lebanon in exchange for the return of two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah and for information on the fate of missing Israeli airman Ron Arad.
My government made this decision without knowing all the details and the exact price Israel will have to pay, without knowing if the captive soldiers are alive, without knowing if the report on Arad is reliable.
The negotiations over the prisoner swap deal and the families’ torment have been in the headlines here for more than 700 days, since Gilad Shalit was kidnapped by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser were taken captive by Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The constant concern in Israel for our captive soldiers has increased the price of their release.
As a father who lost his daughter in a terrorist attack, this fateful trade -- one that is backed by public opinion and fueled by the media -- forces me to raise some questions.
How many terrorists will Israel ultimately have to release from prison to bring home its captured soldiers? How much will this decision increase the price of releasing Shalit, the solider we know is alive? Would the price of a swap have been this high if media outlets had not injected themselves into these deliberations?
How many more Israelis will die or be taken captive as a result of this swap?
My daughter Tal was 17 years old when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives belt on March 5, 2003, killing 17 Israelis -- Jews, Christians, Muslims and Druse. Did I fail as a father to protect my daughter's life when I did not try to change my government's decision to release convicted terrorists years before the attack? Would my government have listened to me?
During the past months and especially in the past few weeks, we have seen the families of the abducted soldiers criticizing and banging on the doors of Israeli government ministers, Knesset members and other public figures urging them to release terrorists and get back their sons.
As a parent, I understand their efforts and agree that a parent must always do everything for his child’s well-being. The parents of an abducted child have the full right and obligation to act in any way possible to bring back their child, irrespective of the price the public must pay.
But the involvement of the media and public opinion in their efforts raises serious moral questions.
Should governments take such considerations into account? What about the other Israelis who now are at greater risk of attack?
Poor decisions by politicians led to the murder of my daughter and 16 others on Bus 37 in Haifa. Now that I have joined the ranks of the bereaved, what should I do in order to protect Tal's brothers, Dror and Mika? Who will safeguard their lives after the mass release of terrorists with or without blood on their hands?
The past has taught us that some convicted terrorists who are released from jail kill again. These attacks are a matter of when, not if.
These terrorists were found guilty by the Israeli legal system in fair trials. But they remain heroes -- and inspirations -- to their people. Releasing them further jeopardizes the Israeli people and is a breach of the government’s responsibility to its citizens.
As a parent who must protect the lives of his children, I wish that I would be welcomed in the halls of the Knesset with the same attentiveness, understanding and empathy as the parents of the captive soldiers. I wish I could add my input and experience to influence a decision with such a strategic and long-term impact.
In any case, deliberation of such crucial issues must take place far from the public eye, free from the influence of stricken families or the media. Their intervention increases the price of a swap and prolongs the process of bringing home captive soldiers.
Israel has to set a firm policy for dealing with the release of kidnapped soldiers and citizens -- a policy that will make clear that kidnapping Israelis does not bring rewards. The mass release of murderous terrorists teaches that terror is the way to victory. But we need to show that only honest negotiations will bring peace. Then Israeli and Arab children will have a better future, and not lose their lives as a result of senseless, hate-driven acts of violence.

The Flower of Lebanon Languisheth
By SIMON ROUGHNEEN
Published: July 28, 2008T
BEIRUT -- With its sun-kissed Mediterranean coast, and cedar-laden snow-bound mountains, Lebanon, like California, is one of the few places where you can top up your tan in the morning, and ski in the afternoon.
Add that to Beirut's seen-to-be-seen party-hard attitude, great cuisine and plush shopping malls, it is easy to see why this tiny country was a Middle East culture-hub during the 20th century.
But, as Scripture puts it, "the flower of Lebanon languisheth."
A recent power sharing deal cut in Doha, between the pro-West March 14 coalition and the Iran-backed Hezbollah-led opposition, might seem like progress for the politically-polarized nation, but in reality, Lebanon remains unstable.
There is good and bad. Mona Yacoubian, a Lebanon specialist at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C. told me that "The Doha Agreement is a positive development, launching a badly needed reconciliation process among Lebanon's competing factions. Prior to the accord, Lebanon stood at the brink of another civil war."
The deal came only after Hezbollah overran west Beirut, with the U.S.-backed Lebanese Army either unwilling or unable to confront the Shiite militia, which calls for Israel's destruction.
Hezbollah now has a cabinet veto, stifling discussion of the groups potent arsenal – including missiles able to reach Tel Aviv – and the U.N. tribunal set up to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on March 14, 2005, which sparked the pro-democracy Cedar Revolution, and saw occupying Syrian troops leave Lebanon.
I drove around Hezbollah's southern Beirut stronghold last week, and saw dozens of large-scale building projects, funded by an Iran flush with high oil prices, replacing the craters left by Israel's 2006 aerial bombardment, which left 1,200 Lebanese dead.
With elections set for next spring, the question remains, can the Shiite militia achieve a predominant status in Lebanon's poly-confessional tapestry?
Hezbollah, though Shia, has seen its star rise across the Arab world, with reclusive leader Hassan Nasrallah far more popular than Sunni politicians in the Middle East. After all, Israel's 2006 counter-attack, after Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in an incursion into Israel's north, did not break what six countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Australia designate as a terrorist group, and ultimately, Hezbollah got what it wanted last week: the return of prisoners held in Israel's jails.
But Lebanon's Westernized urbanites – be they Muslim, Christian or Druze – turn cold at the prospect of a Tehran-style theocracy in their Levantine riviera. Even in southern Beirut, women dressed in jeans and T-shirts outnumbered those in Islamic dress.
I spoke with a group of students at the American University of Beirut. Half were brought up overseas, a legacy of Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war. Hana, a 21-year-old business major, said "we will never accept the lifestyle here you see in Saudi Arabia or Iran," while her friend, Arwa, from Jordan, said, "Jordan is relatively free, but people still come here to do things they cannot do at home: drink, party, have a normal life. Rich men from the Gulf don't want to lose their casinos and discos in Beirut! Where would they go?"
Back to politics: by breaching a long-standing pledge never to turn its guns on fellow Lebanese, by overrunning west Beirut in May, Hezbollah may have compromised itself.
So has the March 14 coalition, by what one human rights NGO leader in Beirut – a March 14 supporter requesting anonymity – told me was its "fawning over a child killer," a reference to Samir Quntar, one of the prisoners released last week by Israel in exchange for two soldiers abducted and killed by Hezbollah in 2006. Quntar was jailed in 1978 after an attack in northern Israel that culminated in him crushing a toddler's head with his rifle butt.
But March 14 playing political tag-along is another sign that Hezbollah is ascendant.
As is Syria's coming in from the cold, with Israel engaging in Turkish-mediated dialogue and Sarkozy rolling out the red carpet for Syrian President Bashar Assad during the recent Euro-Med summit in Paris.
This all despite Syria's abysmal human rights record and sponsorship of Hamas, Hezbollah, and more recently, Sunni jihadists in northern Lebanon, aiming to split the pro-Western, but anti-Israeli Sunnis in the March 14 coalition.
Beirut's ice-cream parlors are selling "reconciliation," a multi-flavored composition of all the colors in Lebanon's national unity government. I gave it a shot. But in the 90 percent humidity 30 degree city heat, the cone soon melted.
That does not augur well, perhaps, for Lebanon's latest political settlement.

Is Assad Bluffing?
By OLIVIER GUITTA  (Middle East Times)
Published: July 28, 2008
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The real star at the French Bastille Day parade earlier this month in Paris was Syrian President Bashar Assad. It marked his return into the international community. In fact, the French Nicolas Sarkozy administration believes, along with to a lesser degree the Ehud Olmert government in Israel, that Assad can be a part of the solution rather than a part of the problem. But what are Assad's real intentions?
In light of what occurred over the past few months, a case can be made that Assad is really having a change of heart. Since actions speak louder than words, let's look at the facts.
First, in February, Hezbollah terror master Imad Mugnieh was assassinated in Damascus in what is likely a Syrian-made operation. The investigation over Mugnieh's death was quickly terminated and Iran and Hezbollah did not get the answers they were waiting for.
Second, Assef Shawkat, the powerful head of Syrian security and Assad's brother-in-law was suddenly pushed aside. Shawkat is close to Tehran and has allegedly a hand in former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's murder in Beirut in 2005.
Third, Assad acknowledged publicly peace negotiations with Israel.
Fourth, Assad agreed on opening a Syrian embassy in Beirut, something his country has always refused since it considered that Lebanon is just a Syrian province. This was a huge condition for the French who see it a pledge given by Damascus to Lebanese sovereignty.
Fifth, Syria has, according to Arab sources, made a big "summer housecleaning" by eliminating dozens of prisoners at the Sidnaya prison. Among them, two leaders of Jund al-Sham, the Islamist organization linked to Syrian services. They are A. Zacaria and K. Omar. The first one was close to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and was recruiting combatants for Iraq. The second one was close to Abu Qaaqaa, the Syrian preacher killed last fall by the regime to erase the traces of official Syrian involvement in terrorism in Iraq. Less than a week after these "accidental" deaths, two leaders of "Jund al-Sham" in the Palestinian camp of Ain el-Helweh in south Lebanon, Chehadé Jaohar and Abu Ramez al-Sahmarani, were killed with one of their lieutenants. In a way, Syria is sacrificing its agents to be rehabilitated.
Sixth, according to the Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyassah, Syria also asked Hamas leaders based in Damascus to leave the Syrian territory. The latter could move into the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Hezbollah stronghold.
Seventh, Syria is allegedly trying to break up Hezbollah. Al-Seyassah believes that Syria has resumed its contacts with the former secretary general of Hezbollah and one of its co-founders, Sobhi Toufaili. Syria wants to strengthen Toufaili's faction to weaken Hassan Nasrallah and divide the party. To do so, the Syrians have promised Toufaili military aid and funding to break up Hezbollah.
In light of Syria's history and mastery of deception, this could just all be an Assad ploy. For instance the likely opening of a Syrian embassy in Lebanon could be seen as just a tiny concession rather than a big sign of things changing in Syrian-Lebanese relations. The March 14 Movement, the anti-Syrian Lebanese majority, are very dubious. An analyst close to that camp said: "What will it serve? There was an Iraqi embassy in Kuwait, this did not prevent Saddam Hussein from invading the emirate."
The $64,000 question remains: will Syria break off ties with Tehran? This is what it is all really about.
While it looks that Syria's relations with Hezbollah have deteriorated since Mugnieh's death, signs of a real drift between Damascus and Tehran have not emerged. The reason why is that Iran is bankrolling Syria's economy and Assad will have to find a way to replace Tehran's funding at some point. His overture to France is really to grab Washington's attention. Assad thinks he can use Sarkozy to get to the George W. Bush administration and ink a deal that would assure him international respectability and a large financial package (similar to what Egypt receives from the United States).
Like all authoritarian regimes, Assad worries about two things: staying in power and money. There is only one country other than Iran that can assure him of this, and it is the United States. The question for Washington is to assess if it is worth breaking Syria's alliance with Iran in the current overly tensed situation with the mullahs' regime.--
Olivier Guitta, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a foreign affairs and counterterrorism consultant, is the founder of the newsletter The Croissant (www.thecroissant.com).
The building is in a state of severe disrepair, the grounds overgrown and the gate shackled with lock and chain.
"Everything was looted during the (civil) war, marble benches and even windows," bemoaned Samuel, a member of the Jewish Community Council in Lebanon, who preferred to use a pseudonym. Without a synagogue, or even a rabbi, the handful of Jews left here -- about 300 according to official estimates -- are forced to pray at home. "What we (also) lack is a place to buy locally produced kosher. We have no Jewish schools to teach our children prayer and Hebrew," said the 60-year-old Samuel, sitting in his shop near the seafront. The seminary near the Beirut synagogue was destroyed during the war and the community has had no rabbi for years. "We only speak Arabic. We just use Hebrew for prayer," Samuel said. In the capital, along the former demarcation line between the Muslim and Christian areas, another vestige survives in the form of the Jewish cemetery. The inscriptions in Hebrew and the stars of David on the entrance are covered with dust. "Very few people come," said Samuel. Efforts are now being made, however, to revive the community with plans under way to renovate the synagogue and the establishment of an online blog called "Jews of Lebanon" (thejewsoflebanon.org).
"We hope that this synagogue, one of the largest in the Arab world, will be renovated later this year or in 2009," said Samuel, adding that the renovations would be funded mainly by expatriate Lebanese Jews.
The blog seeks to raise awareness of the Jewish community and to make it an active participant in public life.
-- 'They don't understand Israel means nothing to us' --Judaism is recognized as one of the 18 religious confessions in Lebanon, although the Jewish community has dwindled over the years, in the face of violence and prejudice. "Before the (1975-1990) civil war, there were about 22,000 of us. It was after the 1982 (Israeli) invasion of Lebanon that our presence became considerably diminished," said Samuel. For Efraim, also a merchant and a member of the Jewish Council, the community's official authority, one of the annoyances of life in Lebanon is the way in which other Lebanese mix the terms "Jewish" and "Israeli". Lebanon is technically in a state of war with Israel, which is commonly dubbed "the Zionist enemy".
"People still occasionally ask me if I am Israeli," said Efraim, also speaking under a pseudonym.
To him, "that's exactly as if we used the term Iranians to describe Lebanese Shiites.
"They do not understand that Israel means nothing to us. We consider it an enemy country as do all the Lebanese," he said.
"After 1982, very few Jews went to Israel, and those who did go didn't stay long. They felt deeply Lebanese," said Efraim.
Having been in Lebanon for more than 2,000 years, Jews began to leave the country during the turmoil.
"There has not been a wave of persecutions, despite some incidents. Those (Jews who left) are like thousands of other Lebanese who fled the country in search of a better future," said Samuel. "The Jews mostly lived in major cities like Beirut, Baalbek, Tripoli and Sidon, in perfect coexistence with other communities," he said, adding that synagogues in these cities too had fallen into ruin.
"Many (Jewish expatriates) still have land and do not want to sell, because it would be like selling a part of themselves," Samuel said.
The expatriates remain committed to their heritage and some even come back every year for vacation, but not to settle.
"Is it possible (to settle) with the current tensions in Lebanon?" asked Efraim, who travels frequently.
"We have always been neutral in politics and we remain so," he said. "Today, we live peacefully and we want to continue to live like that, in our country."
© 2008 Agence France-Presse

The Deobandi Fatwa Against Terrorism Didn't Treat the Jihadi Root
By Walid Phares
July 28, 2008
Many in the West and in other regions of the world were impressed by the issuing of a fatwa (Islamic theological edict) condemning Terrorism by one of the leading religious centers in the Muslim world, the Darool-Uloom Deoband in India. An Islamic seminary said to have 'inspired' the Taliban has, according to the said document denounced "terrorism" as against Islam, calling it an "unpardonable sin."
Hoping for a major change in ideology, international counter terrorism authorities and policy makers have been asking experts to determine if the Deobandi declaration will help counter the calls for violent Jihad by al Qaeda and its ilk around the world. In the war of ideas with the Jihadists, many Western architects of strategic communications look for any sign that hearts and minds may be changing course and sympathies. From Washington DC to Brussels and beyond, bureaucrats tasked with exploring the Muslim world for new trends, shop around for what they call "counter-narrative against extremism."
The Deobandi School, a classical third branch for Salafi Islamism (along with Wahabism and Muslim Brotherhood), has significant weight in the South Asia Theater. Its teachings based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law have reached many countries, including Afghanistan and Britain, where they are said to have indoctrinated the Taliban.
"If they change course, al Qaeda and the Taliban are finished," I heard in Europe and the United States. So the question now is have they changed doctrinal direction and is this fatwa the evidence?
I regretfully conclude that it is not the case yet.It looked good at first Tens of thousands of clerics and students from around India attended a meeting at the 150-year-old Deoband, north of New Delhi, and declared that they stand "against acts of terrorism."
"There is no place for terrorism in Islam," Maulana Marghoobur Rahman, the older rector of Deoband, told Reuters. "Terrorism, killing of the innocent is against Islam. It is a faith of love and peace, not violence." Rahman said it was unjust to equate Islam with terrorism, to see every Muslim as a suspect or for governments to use this to harass innocent Muslims.
"There are so many examples of people from other communities being caught with bombs and weapons, why are they never convicted?" said Qazi Mohammed Usman, deputy head of Deoband. The meeting defined terrorism as any action targeting innocent people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, whether committed by an individual, an institution or a government.
These statements could be seen as impressive when quoted by news agencies rushing to break the good news, but to the seasoned analysts of Salafism, the solid doctrinal roots of Jihadism were kept untouched. Here is why.
Goals of the fatwa
From the fatwa itself and the statements made as it was issued, the following political goals likely motivated the gathering and the fatwa.
Create a separation in the eyes of the public discourse between Islam (as a religion) and terrorism as an illegal violent activity.
Such a move is legitimate and to be encouraged as it diminishes the tensions towards Muslims in non-Muslim countries, particularly in the West, as some are claiming that the Islamic religion is theologically linked to the acts and statements of the Jihadists. The logic of "we are Muslims and we are against Terrorism," helps significantly the disassociation between the community and the acts of violence. However, without criticizing the ideological roots of this violence, the fatwa seem to state a wishful thinking, not an injunction. A more powerful fatwa should have openly and expressly said: "we reject the calls for violent Jihad regardless of the motives." For the followers of Jihadism do not consider their Jihad as "terrorism." Their answer has always been -to these types of fatwas- "but we aren't performing terrorism, we are conducting Jihad." Thus, at this crucial level, the Deobandi fatwa missed the crux of the problem.
Deny governments the ability to use the accusation that Islam condones Terrorism to oppress Muslims.
The fatwa is concerned with geopolitics more than theological reform. Concern for the safety of one's co-religfionists is of course legitimate and should be addressed. But Jihadism, the legitimizing root of political violence, cannot be ignored in any effort to protect the lives of Muslims.
There is no evidence that modern day governments have expressly linked religion to terrorism; quite the opposite. Almost all national leaders involved in the confrontation with Jihadi forces since 9/11 have clearly made a clear distinction between religion and terrorism.
Some even went further by negating any link whatsoever between theological texts and Jihadism, which of course is not accurate. For in the texts, there are passages used by the Terrorists in their indoctrination. Hence, the Deobandi fatwa should have instead asked clearly the Jihadists not to use these citations or else they would be considered as sinners themselves. But instead of using their religious prominence to remove the theological weapon from the hands of the Jihadists, the Deobandi clerics are attempting to shield the Jihadists from the actions of Governments by denying that these extremists are indeed using -- and abusing -- religion.
Some may argue that the fatwa's open goal is to defend Muslims from being unjustly targeted by non-Muslim governments (a positive move) but a thorough analysis of the text used shows that the main intention of that declaration is to defend the Islamists from being contained by both Muslim and non-Muslim Governments around the world. In other words by denying that Jihadism is the root cause of many acts of Terror in Europe, the US, Africa, the Greater Middle East and Asia, the Deobandi fatwa in fact is shielding the Jihadists from the accusation of Terrorism, thus protecting them.
Who is "innocent"?
The fatwa defined terrorism as violence "targeting innocent people." Such a definition is not new and doesn't set clear boundaries. For the question at hand is what does "innocent" mean? On several web sites and on many shows on al Jazeera television, Jihadi apologists often use the Arabic term"bare'e" for "innocent" and assure the audience that Jihad cannot target the latter.
But Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, and to some extent Hassan Nasrallah, all claim that innocence is relative. Al Qaeda explicitly targets innocent civilians and has authorized the massacre of 4 million US citizens as of 2001. Bin laden explains that civilians who vote for and pay taxes to the infidel enemy are not "innocent."
Hezbollah targets innocent civilians as well, not only in Israel but also in Lebanon and overseas (as in Argentina). The concept of "innocent" isn't that innocent in Jihadism. For the militant ideologues can render individuals and groups "bare'e' or not "bare'e" at their discretion.
Leading Islamist scholar Sheikh Yusuf al Qardawi expounds at will on the innocence of civilians, detailing how civilian populations have been considered as part of the war efforts of the enemies of the Caliphate. In short, the status of "innocence" doesn't overlap fully with the status of "civilians." It is a matter of discretion in Jihadi warfare. Hence, to claim that Terrorism is defined as targeting innocent people is to claim that not all civilians are innocent, and that not only breaches international law, but gives credence to Jihadi violence.
Who is a "terrorist"?
Moreover, still the fatwa doesn't identify al Qaeda, or any other similar group, including the Taliban, as Terrorist organizations. And as of now, no subsequent fatwas based on this Deobandi fatwa have done so yet. Therefore, in terms of identification of terror entities, the edict has failed to show its followers who is the terror perpetrator.
This text simply doesn't bring novelty to the debate about Jihadi-rooted Terrorism. For years, particularly since 2001, Islamist ideologues and militant groups have refrained from simply naming those terror groups as such. Spokespersons have constantly repeated that condemning terrorism in general is enough.
If the Muslim scholars followed this logic on the question of occupations, then neither Iraq nor Palestine should be specifically mention. But that is not the case.
Legal basis
The Deobandi fatwa didn't explain what where the legal basis for the edict. Was there any new ground broken? Which were the previous rules that have changed regarding terrorism? Is the fatwa a reminder of a principle or a new principle to be adopted? Is the rejection of terrorism a duty (wajib) and what kind of obligation?
All these questions are warranted so that a fair assessment of the statement can be issued. Unfortunately, the legal grounds are not specific enough to enable readers -- and eventually followers -- to understand the absolute injunction of rejection of Terrorism.
The body of fatwas
Historically, there have been similar statements and fatwas issued in other quarters of the Middle East, yet they haven't had a definitive impact on reality. And by exploring the reason behind the inefficiency of these declarations, one finds that the body of fatwas remains below the level of a reform, of a doctrinal radical rejection of Jihadism as a aqidah (doctrine).
The Deobandi fatwa -- like its predecessors -- tells followers that the principle of Jihadi wars (efforts) is sound and that the level of innocence of the target is discretionary but that engagement in violence has to be disciplined and not chaotic. In short, don't give the infidels an alibi to compromise the ultimate goals by waging irresponsible acts of violence. Simply put: we don't need Jihadism to be labeled as Terrorism.
Because of its unclear stipulations, there is room for more precise fatwas calling for violence against one or another targets, and receiving support from indoctrinated segments of society. These future fatwas could undo this Deobandi fatwa.
So in the end, how to deal with this and with similar edicts? At first one should welcome any statement that delegitimizes al Qaeda's hot-headed Jihadism, even if the fatwa doesn't cross the doctrinal line. Any call to stop terrorism is positive and should be built upon.
In principle the Deobandi fatwa should be considered as a step that needs more steps in the direction of a doctrinal reform. Minimally, these fatwas should name al Qaeda and similar groups as Terrorists. But to be considered as breaking a new ground, they must render Jihadi violence illegitimate and terrorism against non combatants illegal, regardless of any theological, ideological or political goals.
*Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War Against Future Jihad.

May an American Comment on Israel?
by Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post-July 28, 2008
http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/5801
May I, an American citizen living in the United States, comment publicly on Israeli decision making?
Yoram Schweitzer wants me not to judge decisions made by the Israeli government.
I recently criticized the Israeli government for its exchange with Hizbullah in "Samir Kuntar and the Last Laugh" (The Jerusalem Post, July 21); to this, the eminent counterterrorism expert at Tel Aviv University, Yoram Schweitzer challenged the appropriateness of my offering views on this subject. In "Not That Bad a Deal" (July 24) he explained to Jerusalem Post readers how the "contents and tone" of my analysis "patronizing and insulting, overlooking as they do the fact that the government and public have the right to decide for themselves …, and to shoulder the resulting price." He also criticizes me for offering an opinion on Israeli issues from my "secure haven thousands of miles away."
Schweitzer does not spell out the logic behind his resentment, but it rings familiar: Unless a person lives in Israel, the argument goes, pays its taxes, puts himself at risk in its streets, and has children in its armed forces, he should not second-guess Israeli decisionmaking. This approach, broadly speaking, stands behind the positions taken by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and other prominent Jewish institutions.
I respect that position without accepting its discipline. Responding to what foreign governments do is my meat and potatoes as a U.S. foreign policy analyst who spent time in the State and Defense departments and as a board member of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and who as a columnist has for nearly a decade unburdened himself of opinions. A quick bibliographic review finds me judging many governments, including the British, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Iranian, Nepalese, Saudi, South Korean, Syrian, and Turkish.
Obviously, I do not have children serving in the armed forces of all these countries, but I assess their developments to help guide my readers' thinking. No one from these others countries, it bears noting, ever asked me to withhold comment on their internal affairs. And Schweitzer himself proffers advice to others; in July 2005, for example, he instructed Muslim leaders in Europe to be "more forceful in their rejection of the radical Islamic element." Independent analysts all do this.
So, Schweitzer and I may comment on developments around the world, but, when it comes to Israel, my mind should empty of thoughts, my tongue fall silent, and my keyboard go still? Hardly.
On a more profound level, I protest the whole concept of privileged information – that one's location, age, ethnicity, academic degrees, experience, or some other quality validates one's views. The recent book by Christopher Cerf and Victor S. Navasky titled I Wish I Hadn't Said that: The Experts Speak - and Get it Wrong! humorously memorializes and exposes this conceit. Living in a country does not necessarily make one wiser about it.
Ehud Barak, the most highly decorated soldier in Israeli history, made mistakes.
During the Camp David II summit meeting of 2000, when Ehud Barak headed the government of Israel and I disagreed with his policies, more than once, my critique was answered with a how-dare-you indignation: "Barak is the most decorated soldier in Israeli history – and who are you?" Yet, analysts now generally agree that Camp David II had disastrous results for Israel, precipitating the Palestinian violence that began two months later.
It is a mistake to reject information, ideas, or analysis on the basis of credentials. Correct and important thoughts can come from any provenance – even from thousands of miles away.
In that spirit, here are two responses concerning Schweitzer's take on the Samir al-Kuntar incident. Schweitzer argues that "to fail to do the utmost to rescue any citizen or soldier who falls into enemy hands would shatter one of the basic precepts of Israeli society." I agree that rescuing soldiers or their remains is an operationally useful and morally noble priority, but "utmost" has it has limits. For example, a government should not hand live citizens to terrorists in return for soldiers' corpses. In like manner, the Olmert government's actions last week went much too far.
Another specific: Schweitzer claims that, "relatively speaking, the recent exchange with Hizbullah came at a cheap price. It is debatable whether Kuntar's release granted any kind of moral victory to Hizbullah." If that deal was cheap, I dread to imagine how an expensive one would look. And with Kuntar's arrival in Lebanon shutting down the government in giddy national celebration, denying Hizbullah a victory amounts to willful blindness.

The Role of Arms: From Gaza to Lebanon
Elias Harfoush
Al-Hayat - 28/07/08//
Whether in Palestinian Gaza, Lebanese Tripoli or in other spots that witness from time to time futile domestic clashes, there is now an urgent need to debate the role of the weapons in the hands of the young men of the neighborhoods and streets, weapons that were at first took up under the attractive slogans of liberation before they ended up used in internal strife as the case is today.
Since arms resemble dormant volcanoes, the explosion had to be somewhere. The calm on the frontlines with Israel - in the name of the cease fire in Gaza or as a natural consequence of the July 2006 war in Lebanon inevitably - had to force the arms out of their peace on the borders to another front at the expense of civilians and civilian lives and security, the very things that arms were meant to protect. Hence the arms of liberation became arms exploited in internal strife and possible civil wars. To ordinary citizens at the mercy of these arms, it no longer matters whether they are killed and displaced at the hands of the enemy or at the hands of neighbors and brothers coming for aid and protection. The struggle between Hamas and the conflicting factions in Gaza - like the wars of Bab el-Tebbeneh, Baal Muhsin, and before that the wars of Saadnayel and Taalbaya, or those of Tariq al-Jdeedeh in Beirut - becomes part of a panoramic futile scene where arms vent their anger on their own people as it becomes too difficult to do so in the natural outlets against the enemy.
Following the example of Arab regimes where military establishments evolved into security apparatuses with an eye on citizens rather than on the borders as a result of the prevailing truce there, this contagious effect is now feared to hit the resistance which is being forced by the high political, economic and military costs of the confrontation with Israel to direct its weapons to the interior, always in the name of its right to liberation.
Since this right is "sacred" as the slogan goes, any debate over the use of the resistance arms to claim political power at home becomes prohibited, especially with the freezing of the natural role of arms at the borders. For example, it is a taboo to discuss the factors leading to the calm reached by Hamas with Israel through Egyptian mediation despite the anger this calm instigated among organizations that consider themselves more radical than the Islamic movement such as Jaysh al-Islam. The same applies to the search for a role for the resistance arms in Lebanon in the context of the so-called "defensive strategy" under the new circumstances that emerged in the past two years.
There was no problem with the arming of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza. There was no distinction between the attacks launched by Al-Qassam Brigades or Al-Aqsa Brigades when the Palestinian guns were pointed at the same targets. Martyrs fell for both sides in the face of the same enemy. They were not murdered by "anonymous" hands at the Gaza shores in a way that demands an investigation to identify the culprits. So was the case in Lebanon when the function of the resistance in Lebanon was clear during the struggle for liberation, when no one demanded the definition of the role and functionality of the resistance's arms. The most serious outcome of the recent developments was the fear that the arms of the resistance would become that of a distinct community with a distinct sectarian identity in Lebanon and a distinct political flavor in Gaza.
Accusing the other of treachery is not an appropriate answer to the questions surrounding the function of the resistance's arms. The resistance does not enjoy this luxury which by the way is the shortest path to civil war. This function must be reconsidered within a unified national framework, on the basis of national unity whose goals and costs all agree to in Lebanon, and on the basis of a radical review of the cost of continuous division over the resistance in Palestine. In the least, successful truces and negotiations with the enemy, even if mediated by foreign parties, should be accompanied by negotiations of the same weight and significance with partners at home.