LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS
BULLETIN
July 07/08
Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to
Saint Matthew 11,25-30. At that time Jesus said in reply, "I give praise to you,
Father, Lord of heaven and earth, for although you have hidden these things from
the wise and the learned you have revealed them to the childlike. Yes, Father,
such has been your gracious will. All things have been handed over to me
by my Father. No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the
Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son wishes to reveal him. Come to
me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke
upon you and learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart; and you will find
rest for your selves. For my yoke is easy, and my burden light."
Free
Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Syria: Close to Israel, Far from Saudi Arabia. By Tariq
Alhomayed.Asharq Alawsat 07/07/08
Syria, Lebanon, and France: Love and Revenge.Dar Al-Hayat
06/07/08
Waltz with Nasrallah.By Zvi Bar'el. Harretz 06/07/08
Lebanon’s new status quo. By: Paul Salem 06/07/08
Can Nasrallah Unite Lebanon?-By RANNIE AMIRI.CounterPunch
06/07/08
A clear message to Israel.By Duraid Al Baik. Gulf News
06/07/08
Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July
06/08
New Cabinet Tuesday or Wednesday, Pending Agreement on
Distribution of Majority Portfolios-Naharnet
Israel tests 'Iron Dome' anti-rocket system-Telegraph.co.uk
Sfeir From Australia:
Greed Threatens Lebanon from Far and Near-Naharnet
New Cabinet Tuesday or Wednesday, Pending Agreement on
Distribution of Majority Portfolios-Naharnet
Report: Ex-top Israeli diplomat says Syria ready to cut Iran ties-Ha'aretz
Lebanese leaders close to government deal: sources-Reuters
Israeli official: Syria ready to sever ties with Iran-Ynetnews
Zahra Criticizes Christian
Gathering-Naharnet
New Cabinet Tuesday or Wednesday, Pending Agreement on Distribution of Majority
Portfolios
Naharnet/After more than one month of intensive consultations to form a new
government, the national unity cabinet was expected to be announced on Tuesday
or Wednesday. The leading daily An Nahar, which carried the report, said Prime
Minister-designate Fouad Saniora, will on Sunday hold consultations with the
pro-government ruling majority camp after having settled the issue with the
opposition over the distribution of cabinet seats.
Saniora had received a list of candidates for the five ministerial portfolios
allotted to Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun's Change and Reform
parliamentary bloc. They are: Gebran Bassil (telecommunications), Mario Aoun
(social affairs), MP Elias Skaff (agriculture), Alan Tabourian (energy), Issam
Abou Jamra (deputy premier). An Nahar quoted Saniora circles as confirming late
Saturday that there were "No difficult obstacles" facing the cabinet line-up.
It said Saniora was planning to launch his new government under the slogan:
"Living in Harmony" to make up for all the time and attention not spent on the
people during the three-year-old political crisis. The positive atmosphere
emerged following a visit by Saniora to Aoun on Saturday after which the premier
said he was confident that a national unity government would be announced soon.
"The clock has started ticking for the formation of a government," Saniora told
reporters after talks with Aoun that lasted two and a half hours. "It's an
extraordinary step under extraordinary conditions and we will work hard to make
it succeed," he said.
Saniora circles described the meeting as "excellent," adding that the two
leaders discussed issues beyond the cabinet portfolios -- "visions for the
future" of Lebanon.
Saniora also tackled with a Hizbullah delegation on Saturday the party's
portfolios in the new cabinet.
Hizbullah's three seats include the ministries of labor and youth and sports.
The Hizbullah delegation named MP Mohammed Fneish for the labor ministry and
said it would later announce its candidates for the two other cabinet posts.
Meanwhile, the pan-Arab daily Al Hayat said Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told
Saniora during a meeting between the two men late Saturday that he wants Fawzi
Salloukh for the interior ministry and Mohammed Khalifeh for the health, adding
that he would later announce his candidate for the industry portfolio.Beirut, 06
Jul 08, 08:33
Israel
tests 'Iron Dome' anti-rocket system
By Carolynne Wheeler in Jerusalem
Last Updated: 5:07PM BST 06/07/2008
Israel has carried out a successful test of its "Iron Dome" anti-missile defence
system intended to combat crude rockets of the kind launched from Gaza and south
Lebanon. The test, which Voice of Israel radio reported was carried out secretly
late last week, follows earlier delays and warnings that the $300 million (£150
million) system may not catch all Qassam rockets launched by Palestinian
militants at southern Israeli communities. But Israeli security officials, while
not commenting publicly on specific tests, say the system will be operational by
early 2010. "We are doing our best so that the system will be operational by
2010 and all the checking we are doing now is going very well," said a spokesman
for the Ministry of Defence, Shlomo Dror. Israel's former defence minister, Amir
Peretz, ordered the Iron Dome system, which is manufactured by Israel-based
Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, early in 2007 to intercept both Qassams and
Katyushas, after more than 4,000 of the latter were launched from south Lebanon
into Israel during the 2006 summer war. The system, which uses a small kinetic
interceptor to stop such missiles, is scheduled for deployment along Israel's
northern border as well as around Gaza. Its developers have come under heavy
pressure to finish the system ahead of schedule, even receiving a rare exemption
allowing them to work on the Jewish Sabbath, as the Qassam rockets grow more
powerful. Defence analysts have warned the system may not work quickly enough to
sense all rockets and say the cost of interception will amount to tens of
thousands of dollars per rocket. The news comes as Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza
struggle to maintain a ceasefire declared nearly three weeks ago. Though
Israel's southern towns have remained largely quiet, the truce has been shaken
several times by sporadic rockets and mortars, in turn prompting Israel to
temporarily close its border crossings with the territory.
Syria: Close to Israel, Far from Saudi Arabia
By Tariq Alhomayed
Asharq Al-Awsat,
06/07/2008
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem does not see any problem in achieving
peace with Israel since he announced that Syria is ready when Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert is ready. Muallem repeated Damascus’ request for the
required rapprochement with the United States based on the consideration that
the peace process with Israel requires American sponsorship. Yet at the same
time, the Syrian foreign minister sees that rapprochement between Syria and
Saudi Arabia requires efforts to be exerted by both sides!
Is it conceivable that restoring normal relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia
would be more difficult than achieving peace between Syria and Israel? That is
unbelievable! Saudi Arabia does not occupy any Syrian territory just as it has
never sought to destabilize the Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia does not tamper with
Syria’s security and does not facilitate any security threats to meddle with the
security of that country.
Rather, on the contrary, Riyadh, and specifically King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz,
was the one that defended Syria in some of the most difficult political
situations both before and after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri. In fact it was the Saudis who strove to save face for
Damascus after the International Tribunal to try suspects of the Hariri
assassination began to take form.
Walid al Muallem said “Syria and Saudi Arabia can both play an important role in
serving Arab issues and regional security and stability and in confronting the
dangers that surround the region”; the question is how?
Is it Saudi Arabia that wants dominate and occupy Lebanon? According to reality,
Saudi Arabia seeks to consolidate Lebanese institutions in contrast to what
Syria wants.
It was Saudi Arabia that wanted to unify the Palestinian ranks and it did not
support one party at the expense of another unlike Damascus.
It was Riyadh that wanted good neighborly ties to be established between Iran
and other countries in the region without exploiting sectarianism or intervening
in the affairs of others whilst Damascus went too far in its alliance with
Tehran, to the extent that one would think that Iran borders Syria, or Lebanon,
in spite of everything that the Mullah regime has done in the region.
Damascus, and its allies that are now concerned about Syrian-Israeli
negotiations, had previously criticized Saudi Arabia for its moderation. At that
time, we were told, “Leave us to get on with our adventures and you enjoy your
moderation.” Today, we see that it is Riyadh that has become a resistant state
whilst Syria, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas, is negotiating with Israel, and
Iran has stayed quiet because of the United States.
A few days ago the Syrian Foreign Minister expressed regret that his country
does not own a nuclear weapon like Israel. What the foreign minister actually
wanted to say was that he is regretful because Israel possesses a power that
Syria does not have.
Well, if Syria has not engaged in war in almost thirty years, has not built a
thing and has not been able to surpass Israel economically, militarily or
scientifically, then what has it accomplished for the Syrians and the region?
Nobody wants to make an enemy out of Syria and it would not be wise to do so;
that is my belief. However what is baffling is how Syria can leave a vast
playing field, where it can do a lot, and squeeze itself into a tight corner.
Imagine a moderate Syria that calls for regional stability; we would be on the
threshold of a new history in the region. This is where the danger and
importance of Syria lies
Syria, Lebanon, and France: Love and Revenge
Abdullah Iskandar
Al Hayat - 06/07/08//
Bilateral or tripartite relations between France, Syria, and Lebanon have been
moving back and forth between two extremes ever since the two Arab countries
gained their independence. They are relations that are good, even exceptional,
at times, and tense at others. They fluctuate unjustifiably between extreme love
and extreme revenge, given the relations that are supposed to exist between
countries with a common history and common interests. Such relations are
supposed to be cumulative in terms of cooperation and exchange of interests,
instead of regressing to zero. On the other hand, these relations witness an
excess of enthusiasm that does not seem to have benefited from this regression.
These relations are also characterized by the fact that the Lebanese issue
always remains in the background, even when it is about French-Syrian matters,
such as cooperation in administrative reform or cultural cooperation. This means
that bilateral relations in this triangle still involve a whirlwind of emotions
and irrationality linked to the establishment of the Syrian and Lebanese States,
under French sponsorship, a little less than a century ago. These relations have
not yet been able to overcome the impact of such establishment and turn into
normal relations among independent countries which history is supposed to be an
incentive for widening the scope of cooperation and reconciliation.
Nowadays, a new phase is on its way, for as Syrian foreign minister Walid
Moallem put it, he is in Paris in order to prepare for president Assad's
"historic visit" and meeting with his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy in
margin of the Mediterranean Summit after a week. This phase moves the
Syrian-French relation from contention to understanding, and restores
cooperation. Nowadays, we also witness the formation of the first government
during Lebanese president Michel Sleiman's mandate, which eases French openness
to Syria and puts an end to Syrian reservations regarding authority in Lebanon.
In other words, circumstances are propitious for the Syrian-Lebanese relation to
move from the phase of disputes and accusations to the phase of normalization.
It is obvious that a prerequisite for this would be to overcome the impact of
the establishment of the Syrian and Lebanese States, i.e. to establish
diplomatic relations based on the full independence of both. It is also obvious
that Damascus is ready to bring about such a relation, according to many Syrian
declarations - the last of which was that this will take place after the
formation of the Lebanese government.
In parallel, it appears from Syrian diplomacy that there is an adjustment of
Syrian objectives. Regardless of the motives behind it and the extent which such
a step may reach, Damascus has taken unexpected measures in the last months,
from attending the Annapolis Conference to facilitating a solution in Lebanon to
indirect negotiations with Israel.
It is thus that in a short period of time, all the essential constituents are
present for applying what should have been done more than half a century ago,
i.e. diplomatic exchanges between Beirut and Damascus, with normalized relations
between two neighboring independent countries linked by givens and interests
that exceed mere borders. With this step, Syrian-French relations are
normalized, with a solid foundation - getting rid of the Lebanese obsession and
recognizing the independence of Lebanon. Assad and Sarkozy's agenda will surely
include many important items, including Lebanon, and it is probable that Paris
will witness the first Lebanese-Syrian summit during Sleiman's mandate. What
better time than these meetings to announce the agreement on starting the
practical measures for diplomatic representation between Beirut and Damascus and
on introducing the troubled relations among the countries of this triangle to
the context of normalization
Lebanon’s new status quo
Paul Salem
Daily Times
Until the Lebanese state is able to integrate or dominate non-state militias,
and until some of the raging confrontations in Lebanon’s immediate environment
are calmed, Lebanon is not likely to know real stability
Hezbollah’s armed insurrection in May, which overran Beirut and other parts of
Lebanon, has dealt a further blow to hopes of true state sovereignty in the
country, strengthening Hezbollah and weakening the Western-backed government.
But it also brought about a new political accord, negotiated in Doha, Qatar,
providing for election of a president after a long stalemate, formation of a
national unity government, a new election law, and a return to a national
dialogue over relations between the state and non-state actors, particularly
Hezbollah.
There is much speculation about the reasoning behind the government’s decisions
in May to dismiss the pro-Hezbollah chief of airport security and investigate
Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network, which sparked the
confrontations. The government had been under longstanding international
pressure to honour at least some of its international commitments to contain
Hezbollah, and it wrongly calculated that the group would only respond in a
limited way. Most importantly, the government mistakenly reckoned that Hezbollah
would not risk Shia-Sunni clashes in Beirut.
Similar questions surround Hezbollah’s reasoning in unleashing large-scale
action that risked sectarian warfare and jeopardised its moral high ground. But
it has largely achieved its aims. Militarily, it has nipped in the bud any
potential armed militia in West Beirut that could hinder its movement beyond the
southern suburbs. It also secured key highways south and east of Beirut that
Druze leader Walid Junblatt previously dominated and reasserted its access to
the capital’s airport and seaports.
Politically, Hezbollah abandoned its policy of waiting out the government, in
favour of pushing it to the breaking point and quickly fashioning a new status
quo. Now it has strong influence with the new president whom it helped bring to
power, a blocking veto in the next government, and it has drawn a clear line in
the sand regarding the untouchability of its arms and its communication and
operational infrastructure.
Hezbollah and its main backer, Iran, were motivated by two concerns: fear of the
next Israeli attack, which Hezbollah believes is inevitable, and concern over
Syrian-Israeli peace talks that, if successful, could leave Hezbollah without
its main bridge to Iran. Hezbollah has been rearming and redeploying since the
2006 war; the actions of May further consolidate its position in and around
Beirut. By reasserting its access to the airport and seaports, and by
consolidating the political situation in the country, Hezbollah can better
survive a shift in Syrian policy: the United States and Israel can no longer ask
Syria to “deliver” Hezbollah as part of any peace deal over the Golan.
Moreover, by resuscitating the weak institutions of the Lebanese state,
Hezbollah gains important political protection from external attack. It will be
hard for Israel to launch a large-scale attack on Hezbollah if it is
participating in a semi-stable Lebanese state headed by an internationally
recognised president, with a pro-Western prime minister and a democratically
elected parliament, teeming with tourists, and buffered by 10,000 UNIFIL troops
in the south. In other words, Hezbollah’s survival strategy partly depends on
the protective shell of a rickety Lebanese state.
Hezbollah’s moves were clearly a defeat for the US and Saudi Arabia. However,
when they saw that Hezbollah had limited demands and wanted Lebanon’s
Western-backed coalition to continue to lead the government, they chose to make
advantage out of adversity. The US and Saudi Arabia welcomed the Doha Agreement
and the election of the new president, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
flew to Beirut to express US support for the president and the Lebanese state.
Qatar’s role in bringing about a resolution, alongside that of Turkey in
mediating Syrian-Israeli talks, signals a return to pragmatism in Middle East
relations. It also indicates the dead-end to which the ideological politics of
the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia has led. Although the Doha agreement papers over
serious political and institutional contradictions, it reinforces the emergence
of a pragmatic approach toward managing the region’s crises. Lebanon now limps
forward carrying the contradictions of internal and regional politics with it.
The Doha agreement might allow a number of months, or years, of relative calm.
But until the Lebanese state is able to integrate or dominate non-state
militias, and until some of the raging confrontations in Lebanon’s immediate
environment are calmed, Lebanon is not likely to know real stability. —DT-PS
Paul Salem is the Director of the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, Lebanon
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C06%5Cstory_6-7-2008_pg3_6
Can Nasrallah Unite Lebanon?
By RANNIE AMIRI - CounterPunch
"Differences among the Lebanese have reached the edge of suicide."
- Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, in a meeting of the country’s Christian
and Muslim religious leaders after renewed violence in the city of Tripoli.
The foreboding statement by Lebanon’s newly-elected president at first seemed
out of place. It came on the heels of clashes between Sunnis loyal to the
government in the Bab al-Tebbaneh quarter of Tripoli and Alawite supporters of
the opposition in the neighboring Jabal Mohsen quarter. The June 22nd-23rd
clashes ultimately left nine dead and 45 wounded before the Lebanese Army
stepped in to end the fighting.
The situation in Tripoli though pales in comparison to the events that unfolded
in Beirut more than a month prior. At that time, Hezbollah’s men swept across
and extended control over nearly all of West Beirut after Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora’s cabinet ordered the group’s private telecommunications network
dismantled. Beirut appeared to be poised for all-out civil war. After
intervention by Qatar’s prime minister, representatives of the opposition and
the ruling March 14 Coalition agreed to convene in Doha. The result was the Doha
Accord, reached on May 21st, which allotted the opposition enough ministerial
posts to wield veto power over cabinet decisions and led to the election of
General Michel Suleiman as president four days later.
After Siniora was nominated by March 14 to continue on as prime minister, hopes
ran high that a cabinet would soon be formed and the 18-month political crisis
that had paralyzed the country would finally be over. Continued wrangling over
key portfolios between the opposition-allied Change and Reform Bloc of Michel
Aoun and Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, the leading party in the majority
coalition, has prevented one from materializing.
The resumption of fighting on sectarian grounds (albeit in Tripoli and not
Beirut) after Doha, coupled with the failure to form a national unity cabinet is
likely what led Suleiman to issue his fatalistic pronouncement.
Lebanon however, is a nation where hope and despair often co-exist.
As the two-year anniversary of the July 2006 War nears, Hezbollah and the
Israeli government have reached an agreement on the exchange of prisoners. In a
July 2nd press conference, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah
confirmed that the two Israeli soldiers captured after found trespassing in the
summer of 2006 (providing the needed pretext for the subsequent Israeli
invasion) would be handed over to Israel in exchange for five Lebanese prisoners
held there.
The most famous of them (or infamous, depending on which side of the
Lebanese-Israeli border the narration is told) is Samir Kantar, a Lebanese
Druze. Acting as a member of the Palestine Liberation Front, he was sentenced to
four life terms for a 1979 raid that killed three Israelis, including a young
girl (Kantar asserts she died in the firefight with Israeli soldiers).
Israel will also hand over the remains of other Lebanese and Hezbollah fighters
killed in the July War and release an undisclosed number of Palestinian
prisoners at a later date. Israel will likewise receive the remains of its
soldiers and be given definitive information on the fate of the long missing
airman, Ron Arad.
In his press conference confirming the deal reached with Israel, Nasrallah
concluded by saying:
"First, I congratulate all Lebanese on this achievement and I hope that all the
Lebanese consider it their achievement. We will deal with it just as we dealt
with the 2000 victory and we will not use this new achievement for internal
ends.”
“The second point is the bodies that will return to Lebanon…their funerals
should be a national, unified event, a chance for the Lebanese to meet again… I
personally announce Hezbollah’s absolute openness to any political meeting under
any title and in any context if it helps in uniting Lebanon, preserving civil
peace and overcoming the previous phase in Lebanon.”
“The final point is that I urge all popular powers to distance themselves from
any provocation so that we can make good and civilized use of the sacred blood
in bridging the gaps between the Lebanese.”
The reaction to Nasrallah’s speech from among those who have opposed him most,
including Siniora and Walid Jumblatt, was refreshingly positive.
Siniora hailed the imminent return of the Lebanese detainees, declaring it a
“national success.” He vowed to attend the ceremony marking their return and
make it a national holiday. Jumblatt described Nasrallah’s statements as
“encouraging” and also planned on greeting Kantar and the others remarking,
“This issue goes beyond any security or political considerations."
Unfortunately, but quite predictably, Future Movement head Saad Hariri failed to
comment but indicated his party would participate in the welcoming ceremonies as
well.
Whether the outreach found in Nasrallah’s words or the upcoming return of
Lebanon’s captured and fallen will be enough to unite this fractured country
remains to be seen. The initials signs are hopeful. But as Lebanon’s political
future has always been a risky one to predict, it is probably best to say this
is a chapter yet to be written.
**Rannie Amiri is an independent commentator on the Arab and Islamic worlds. He
may be reached at: rbamiri (at) yahoo.com.
Waltz with Nasrallah
By Zvi Bar'el
Haaretz 6/7/08
Last Wednesday negotiations that went on for almost two years reached a highly
successful conclusion, from the viewpoint of Hassan Nasrallah. "No Arab country
has been able to close its file of prisoners and MIAs," the secretary general of
Hezbollah said, as though he himself were a head of state. Still, even now he
stuck to custom and offered not a scrap of information about the condition of
the Israeli abductees.
On the other hand, he effused generosity toward his political rivals. "This is a
victory for all of us," he declared. "We should all celebrate." It is not only a
Lebanese victory, he said, but one of all Arabs and Muslims.
Gloating and smiling, Nasrallah took the unusual step of describing in detail
the negotiations with Israel, emphasizing in particular his guiding principles:
total secrecy; release of all the Lebanese prisoners, headed by Samir Kuntar;
obtaining all the bodies of fighters who came out of Lebanon, "whether they are
Lebanese, Palestinian or Arab," including those killed before the Lebanon War;
release of Palestinian and Arab prisoners; and receipt of information about the
fate of four Iranian diplomats. Nasrallah did not omit saying that Israel at
first did not even ask for the body parts of its fallen soldiers that remained
in Lebanon. As he put it, "It seemed as though Israel forgot we had body parts
in our possession."
His rivals were fiercely critical of the prisoner exchange deal - not because of
the return of the Lebanese prisoners but because of the prestige it accords
Nasrallah. Amin Gemayel, the former Lebanese president and a minister-designate
in the new cabinet, complained that "the state of Lebanon was absent from the
negotiations" and that "the signing of an agreement between a state and a
Lebanese organization is a new model of indirect diplomatic activity with
Israel. What is there to prevent a non-Lebanese mediator, such as the president
of France or the king of Jordan, from conducting negotiations between Lebanon
and Israel on liberating the remaining occupied lands in Lebanon and on blocking
the Israeli violations?"
Gemayel's sarcasm was aimed both at Nasrallah and at Syria, which intends to
hold direct talks with Israel. Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, also spoke his
mind: "How does it happen that some of us have the right to conduct negotiations
for the return of prisoners, to conduct negotiations with Israel on the table
and under the table, whereas Lebanon is not allowed to demand international
protection for the Shaba Farms and, when that idea is raised, its government is
accused of collaborating with the enemy?"
What these trenchant critics forget to mention is that the abductees are not in
their hands to be negotiated for; that the Israeli government did not insist
that the contacts be held exclusively with the government of Lebanon or with
mediators of its choice; and that Hezbollah proposed that the Lebanese
government mediate, on condition that the abductees remain in the organization's
hands. Now, when the time has come to reap the rewards, the critics can only
whine over their weak stance.
'Positive atmosphere'
These events are strung like beads on the slight string that Syrian President
Bashar Assad last week termed a "positive atmosphere in the Middle East."
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was scheduled to meet with Assad in Damascus
last weekend. This week a new government is supposed to be installed in Beirut,
and at the end of this week Assad will visit France to take part in the summit
meeting of the Mediterranean Union, the big project of French President Nicolas
Sarkozy. The dialogue with Israel is progressing; another "Turkish round" took
place last week, and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem no longer had a
problem stating that the discussions held last week in Turkey were intended to
lead to direct negotiations. He even abstained from reiterating his statement of
last week, according to which Prime Minister Olmert will not meet with Assad at
the Mediterranean Union event. Indeed, people who sit at the same table will
probably not be able to evade a handshake.
Assad also has a few other arrangements to make. For example, he has to decide
whether to accede to the request of Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store,
who visited Damascus last week, and organize a meeting between Abbas and Hamas
chief Khaled Meshal. Moallem explained that the invitation to Abbas is part of
the Syrian effort to bring about Palestinian reconciliation. How can
reconciliation be brought about without the sides meeting, and where can the
sides both meet and reposition Assad on the region's diplomatic map if not in
Damascus?
True, Hamas and Fatah spokespersons have made it clear that no meeting is
planned between the two and that no arrangements have been made for such an
encounter. But with Egypt dallying and still not inviting the leaders of the two
camps to meet in Cairo, why should Assad not snatch an important political
victory? After all, Hamas is angry at Egypt, and there are some in the
organization who are calling for Egypt's replacement as a mediator with Israel.
These people say it is untenable for Egypt to mediate in a deal involving the
release of prisoners from Israel when Cairo itself is holding three commanders
of Hamas' military wing, Iz al-Din al-Qassam, in detention. (By the way, one of
the three is Iman Nufal, who was a key organizer of the breaching of the border
fence between Gaza and Egypt half a year ago.)
Still, despite the anger, Hamas knows it cannot forgo the services of Egypt, as
only Cairo can conduct negotiations with Israel, both in any deal for the
release of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit and for the continued implementation of
the terms of the Israel-Hamas tahadiyeh (truce). That this need not detract from
Syria's ability to play a useful role was demonstrated when Damascus pressed
Hamas to accept the tahadiyeh. This fact is not lost on Abbas, who will meet in
Damascus with representatives of all the Palestinian groups affiliated with the
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) that continue to coordinate their
positions with Hamas.
Syria will also have an important part to play in the reconciliation talks
between Fatah and Hamas and the other groups. Those talks were supposed to begin
two weeks ago, and there were reports that Abbas was to visit Gaza for the first
time since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip a year ago. But Abbas decided to
switch tactics and first muster the support of the moderate Arab states, and now
also Syria, in order to ensure that his conciliation initiative will have Arab
backing.
Nasrallah has started to wonder about Syria, which is returning step by step to
the Arab "mainstream." Assad told the Norwegian foreign minister last week that
as far as he is concerned, there is nothing to prevent the Shaba Farms from
being placed under United Nations protection, though the demarcation of the
border between Lebanon and Syria, which will determine the final status of the
Shaba Farms, will have to wait until the IDF withdraws. The very fact that the
farms will be placed in UN custody will raise anew the question of Hezbollah's
military role. After the release of the Lebanese prisoners, and if Israel leaves
the Shaba Farms, and in the wake of the understanding that the Lebanese army is
the only force that should protect the country, the dispute over disarming
Hezbollah will break out again in Lebanon. Hezbollah, of course, will have
enough excuses to hang on to its weapons. It is also hard to see any force in
Lebanon that can disarm Hezbollah, but from a public point of view, Nasrallah
will face unnecessary pressure from his perspective. Nor has Nasrallah made
public his position on the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. If the indirect talks
morph into direct negotiations, and if the United States joins the discussions
after the presidential elections, Syria and Hezbollah will have to reexamine
their mutual relations. It will be a delicate examination, because Hezbollah
continues to act as a key anchor for Syria's political control in Lebanon, but
the more important this becomes, the greater becomes Syria's dependence on the
organization's political behavior.
The Doha Agreement, which generated the breakthrough for the election of the
president and the establishment of a unity government in Beirut, provided both
Hezbollah and Syria with an important achievement. However, a government has
still not been formed, and this is becoming an urgent priority for Syria. Assad
would like to arrive in Paris with the affair of the government behind him and
after a state visit to Beirut, where he is scheduled to announce for the first
time the opening of a Syrian embassy in the Lebanese capital. As part of the new
deal, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora will visit Damascus.
This will mark the final acceptance of Syria by the government of Lebanon, and
Assad's most important diplomatic victory. The days ahead will show whether
Hezbollah and its partners have the ability to stretch the web of Syrian
interests in Lebanon and how far Assad's timetable matches that of Nasrallah.
A clear message to Israel
By Duraid Al Baik, Associate Editor
Published: July 05, 2008, 23:24
Last week, Israel agreed to hand over five Lebanese prisoners, including Sameer
Al Kantar who was convicted to serve 542 years in prison of which he has served
only 30 years! This is great news for many Lebanese and Arabs. It is a great
victory for Hezbollah, but what is the price that Hassan Nasrallah, the
Secretary General of Hezbollah, is ready to pay for the long awaited deal that
he has been promising his Lebanese citizens and Arab supporters? What Israel has
asked is the bodies of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev who were captured by
Hezbollah in July 2006. This event sparked the 33-day war on Lebanon.
The main element of the deal will be known in maybe a week's time, as per the
announcement made by both Israel and Hezbollah. It is definitely not the
swapping of bodies of Israeli soldiers with the release of five Hezbollah
prisoners. The Israelis have described Al Kantar as the most notorious criminal
who have worked against the state of Israel. The bizarre indication about the
whole deal is the recklessness with which Israeli leaders have handled the
issues that are facing their state in the past three years. Added to this is
their carelessness in protecting the interests of their nation.
Following the Israeli Cabinet's approval for the deal last week, Israeli leaders
proved once again that they lack any level of strategic thinking. They also
proved to the Arabs and to the rest of the world that force is the only language
they understand and abide by.
Why we must come to this conclusion? Let me explain.
First of all, let us remind ourselves with the fact that the current deal,
although it is a big victory for Lebanon and Hezbollah, is not happening for the
first time. It has been done twice in the past few years with the very same
party which Israel tags as a terrorist organisation. But, why should it have
taken the Israeli leaders a full scale war, in which thousands of rockets were
launched on Lebanese cities and scores of soldiers and civilians were killed, in
order to come up with a similar deal that had been done in the past?
Let us refresh our memories to the events before the 2006 war. On the eve of the
2004 prisoner exchange, Hezbollah announced that it has agreed with Israel -
through German mediators - to continue the exchange of remaining Lebanese and
Arab prisoners in return for Hezbollah conducting a comprehensive investigation
into the fate of the Israeli pilot, Ron Arad. At the time of the announcement,
Hezbollah had no chip to bargain with, except its commitment to conduct an
inquiry on Arad. In principle, Israel deem not fit this gesture from Hezbollah
to require it to release Al Kantar and hand over the bodies of prisoners who had
died in their custody. This is what the Hezbollah were demanding at that time
too.
On the other hand, Nasrallah, who promised the Lebanese that he would do all he
could to free Al Kantar could not keep his promise because Israel showed no
interest in the price that he was willing to pay. The result, Nasrallah decided
to collect more chips to bargain with Israel. They were Goldwasser and Regev.
The rest of the story is known. Over 1,300 Lebanese, in addition to more than
100 Israelis were killed, in a war that tilted the balance of power in the
region and gave Hezbollah a place on the negotiation table to discuss a deal!
Today, the Israelis have every right to ask their leaders the reason for Israel
to strike a deal with Hezbollah when it had refused to so three years ago and
the reason for launching a war against Lebanon which gave Hezbollah the upper
hand in dictating its terms to the Jewish state? These questions are quite
reasonable, but the Israeli leaders have no logical answers for them. Their
answers border on arrogance, stupidity and lack of strategic thinking.
Cannot rely on firepower
The exchange of Lebanese prisoners next week should offer Israelis a lesson that
they cannot hold the region and the rights of the Arabs as ransom to their
arrogance. They cannot rely any more on their firepower to ignite fires in the
region. If today, Israel accepted to return Al Kantar after a war, how many wars
will it take it to return the Sheba'a Farms? For that matter, how many kidnapped
soldiers will it accept to return the other seven Lebanese villages in Kfar
Shuba? This are questions that many Arabs and Israelis ask at this stage,
including the leaders of Hezbollah. And finally, how many people will have to
die from both sides before Israel stop violating Lebanese airspace?
Israel, which has celebrated its 60th anniversary two months ago, is passing
through a critical moment of its history - a moment that will decide the future
of Israel and the whole region. The Jewish state which is busy in digging up the
graves of the Lebanese martyrs in order to hand over their remains to Hezbollah
before the deadline, has to apply the same yardstick to its conflict with Hamas
in Gaza and in the West Bank and elsewhere.
The lesson of the current Hezbollah-Israel agreement is that the Jewish state
cannot survive without peace with its neighbours and cannot categorise any Arabs
as terrorists before it first stop terrorising its neighbours.
If the exchange of prisoners, which will coincide with the second anniversary of
the meaningless July 2006 war against Lebanon, failed to offer Israelis with a
useful lesson; I and many people in the world, would have a big doubt about the
future on Israel.
Charles Darwin once said: "It is not the strongest of the species that survives,
nor the intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to
change." This is exactly what Israel needs to understand. I hope it will do.