LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 11,14-23. He was driving out a demon (that was) mute, and when the demon had gone out, the mute person spoke and the crowds were amazed. Some of them said, "By the power of Beelzebul, the prince of demons, he drives out demons." Others, to test him, asked him for a sign from heaven. But he knew their thoughts and said to them, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be laid waste and house will fall against house. And if Satan is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand? For you say that it is by Beelzebul that I drive out demons. If I, then, drive out demons by Beelzebul, by whom do your own people drive them out? Therefore they will be your judges. But if it is by the finger of God that (I) drive out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you. When a strong man fully armed guards his palace, his possessions are safe. But when one stronger than he attacks and overcomes him, he takes away the armor on which he relied and distributes the spoils. Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters.

Hizbullah-Israel Coming War Would Change South into Parking Lot
Naharnet/Time Magazine reported in its latest edition that war between Israel and Hizbullah is a "matter of time' and it would change south Lebanon into a mere parking lot.
"The inconclusive results for Israel of the month-long war it fought in the summer of 2006 against Lebanon's militant Shiite Hizbullah meant that another confrontation was probably just a matter of time. And with the February 12 assassination in Damascus of a senior Hizbullah commander continuing to roil the waters of the Middle East, that much-anticipated second round could be drawing nearer," the magazine noted.
"Hizbullah has vowed revenge for the car bomb killing of Imad Mughniyeh, and Israel is taking the threat seriously. Israel has placed its army on alert and reinforced its presence along the northern border with Lebanon. Patriot anti-missile batteries have been deployed near Haifa, Israel's second-largest city, 40 kilometers south of the Lebanese border. Even airlines flying into Israel have been instructed to ensure that all passengers are seated half an hour before landing to protect against a 9/11-style hijacking and aerial attack," it added.
It noted that Hizbullah "also is on alert. In south Lebanon, young men normally living and working in Beirut during the weekdays were back in their home villages last week, visible indication that Hizbullah has placed its cadres on standby,"
It quoted a local Hizbullah unit commander who fought in the 2006 war as saying "We are ready for another war and it will come."
He said that the Shiite fighters would be on the offensive in the next war, hinting at taking the battle into Israel itself.
"We weren't expecting the last war and we fought only to defend our land, but next time you will see a very different kind of fighting," he said.
"These guys are very ready for war," says Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a Hizballuh expert with the Carnegie Endowment's Middle East Center in Beirut.
"But not everyone in south Lebanon is ready for another round with Israel. Many residents of the battle-scarred south are still repairing the damage of the 2006 war and the notion of another conflict striking the region is not welcomed, even among some Hizbullah supporters," Time wrote.
"God bless Nasrallah and the resistance. They have fought and sacrificed for Lebanon. But we are tired of wars and just want to raise our children in peace," said Hassan, a shopkeeper in a mainly Shiite border village.
"Indeed, a Western diplomat in Beirut predicted that Israel will turn south Lebanon into a parking lot in the next war, hoping to drive a wedge between Lebanese Shiites and Hizbullah," Time concluded. Beirut, 27 Feb 08, 19:47

Sfeir voices hope that Lebanese will overcome obstacles to 'tranquility'
By Maroun Khoury
Daily Star correspondent
Thursday, February 28, 2008
BKIRKI: Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir voiced hope Wednesday that Lebanon would overcome all the obstacles it is witnessing in order for the country to recover its freedom, prosperity and peace. "All Lebanese should cooperate in favor of their country, which is going through a very tough period," Sfeir said before a delegation of Lebanese Forces students. "We are doing our best to help Lebanon return to normalcy where all of its residents live in tranquility," he added.
Sfeir also met on Wednesday with Culture Minister Tarek Mitri, with whom he discussed the latest developments in Lebanon.
Maronite League chief Joseph Tarabay said after meeting Sfeir that the Lebanese failed to elect a new president despite Arab and international efforts to fill the presidential vacuum. "We believe, along with Bkirki, that the Christians are being excluded from the issue of presidential election," Tarabay said.
Meanwhile, the vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan, expressed his support for the Arab initiative on Wednesday, calling on Lebanese politicians to boost discussions. "The Arab initiative still exists and we do not have another one," Qabalan said. "We are against international initiatives and if we reach a Lebanese initiative we will support it and get rid of the Arab one."According to Qabalan, the problem in Lebanon resides in the Lebanese politicians and not in "the outside.""The Lebanese ought to rescue their country from the dangers threatening it through the election of a new president, the formation of a national unity government and the establishment of a modern and just electoral law," he said. Qabalan said a new Israeli offensive against Lebanon "is expected any time.""If Israel attacks Lebanon again it will cost it its life," he said. "We are with Hizbullah in its war against Israel."

Missing the point in Lebanon's stalemate
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Rarely a day goes by without someone writing an article protesting against the incapacity of Lebanese politicians to come to an agreement on the future of their country. Why can't they just all get along? That's the lament running through these principled and naive pleas. But the continued failure of the Arab League plan suggests there is more to the deadlock than leaders perpetuating a status quo for self-seeking reasons.
There is still great incomprehension about what is sinking Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's apparently impossible mission. There is incomprehension, too, about what Syria's true intentions in Lebanon are. One line of argument is that the Assad regime accepted the end of its Lebanese presence in 2005 and today seeks only to "influence" affairs in Beirut, to "protect its interests." Syria has no intention of driving its tanks back into Lebanese territory, controlling all aspects of the state, placing senior Syrian officials in lucrative business and smuggling networks, crushing all latent challenges to its domination, and so forth.
But reading that list, you can only conclude that that is precisely what the Syrians want, because Lebanon is of no value to them unless those aims are satisfied, unless the Assad regime has a tight grip over the country's political power centers, has its army and security forces in place to back this up, can distribute patronage to Syrian officers to ensure their long-term loyalty, and can extract billions of dollars from the Lebanese economy to cushion trying times ahead for a Syrian economy that will soon have to dispense with oil revenues and lift vital subsidies.
That's not to mention that for Syria to be regarded as relevant by Israel and the United States, its soldiers need to be present inside Lebanon. Why? To protect Hizbullah's military autonomy against an international community that backs Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701 and a Lebanese public increasingly critical of the party's unwillingness to disarm; and to leverage the promise of managing or liquidating Hizbullah in any forthcoming negotiations with the Israelis and Americans.
That's the real backdrop to negotiations over the Arab League plan. The breakdown is occurring because the opposition is relaying the Syrian position on the distribution of Cabinet portfolios, therefore on the political balance of power in Lebanon. The focal point of disputation is the so-called "sovereign" ministries: defense, interior, justice, finance and foreign affairs. The opposition's "softest" proposal, a three-way division of portfolios in a 10-10-10 ratio, would effectively hand the parliamentary majority at most two of those key ministries; and, even then, the opposition has prepared a list of conditions to deny the March 14 coalition the means to control them. The Syrians are especially seeking to block the majority's sway over the defense and interior ministries, because these can provide it with security instruments; and it wants someone friendly at the Justice Ministry to impede progress in the Hariri tribunal. The Assad regime is organizing a creeping coup in Lebanon, and will hinder all progress until March 14 and the Arab states raise their hands in surrender.
But it's not as if Damascus were hiding its game. Syria's allies in Lebanon will readily acknowledge its ambitions, both in public and in private. Former parliamentarian Nasser Qandil, a habitual Syrian megaphone, has twice declared that the Syrian Army will return to Lebanon. In his meetings with Arab and European officials, Syrian President Bashar Assad regularly brings up the Hariri tribunal and indicates how central it is to Syria's playing a more helpful role in Lebanon. Assad meant what he said in March 2005, when he told his Parliament: "A Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon will not mean a disappearance of Syria's role in Lebanon."
In the coming month, Assad will have to address growing Arab resentment of his regime in order to salvage the Arab League summit scheduled for the end of March in Damascus. It would be a mistake to assume the Syrians will languidly accept the humiliation of a failed conference, and much of their intimidation directed against the Gulf states in Lebanon is an effort to coerce them into attending. But that tactic won't succeed, which is why March 14 is worried about a possible Plan B: Syria facilitates the election of Michel Suleiman as president, but then subsequently blocks the formation of a new government.
What would the advantages be? By authorizing Suleiman's election, the Syrians would oblige Arab leaders to go to Damascus, saving their summit. Once a president is chosen, however, the Siniora government would automatically become a caretaker body, with limited constitutional prerogatives. As for the army, it would no longer have a commander. This would leave Lebanon without an effective executive authority, with its armed forces leaderless, and in a dangerous state of limbo.
The beauty of the scheme is that it might trap the parliamentary majority in its own exigencies. The Syrians and the opposition have for months demanded a package deal that includes agreement on the presidency and Cabinet. March 14 has rejected this. The opposition could turn around and accept the conditions of March 14, thereby electing Suleiman without an accord over a new ministry. The practical result might be a situation far worse than what we have today. Suleiman would be in, the government would be out, Syria would have partly broken out of its isolation, and the opposition would have won more pull to impose a favorable government, since any rejection of its demands could only prolong a debilitating vacuum.
Fortunately, there are ways around this plan. Arab states must set as a prerequisite for their participation in the Damascus summit prior agreement in Lebanon on Suleiman's election and the formation of a new government. Yes, this would confirm Syria's and the opposition's package deal requirement imposed on Moussa, but that debate is now largely irrelevant: Negotiations over the Arab League plan are at a deadlock. The point of the Arab move would be not to push for a breakthrough in Lebanon, since that is presently impossible; but to block a Syrian plan to leave Lebanon without any effective leadership.
That is where the parliamentary majority has to be careful. In insisting so loudly that Suleiman must be elected now, it is ignoring the fact that the election could be disastrous if handled improperly. But then why didn't the Syrians support the army commander's election sooner, and block the formation of a new government? On the one hand they fear that constitutional procedures would be implemented, so that the president and majority, following consultations, might agree on a prime minister Syria disapproves of. Damascus also realizes that, even in a caretaker role, the Siniora government would still hold all the key ministries. A prolonged stalemate would still leave Suleiman working with a Cabinet dominated by March 14, something the Assad regime cannot stomach.
That only shows Syria's rationale in Lebanon. But it doesn't alter the fact that there are dangerous unknowns in allowing Suleiman to be elected minus a government. As the situation stands today, it is the opposition that is, plainly, blocking everything. Better for things to stay that way and for the Siniora government to remain in place. Political maneuvering may create instability that only plays to Syria's advantage.
***Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.

Syria standing alone in region
By Francis Matthew, Editor-at-Large
February 28, 2008, 00:40
The developing split in the Arab world between Syria and Saudi Arabia is getting more serious as Saudi Arabia maintains its position as the pragmatic leader of the Arab states, and Syria continues its position of pro-Iranian solitude. Three issues are fuelling the flames of this dispute: the two countries' backing of different sides in Lebanon, their contrasting attitudes to handling Iran's regional ambitions, and their differences over what to do about the continuing American-led disaster in Iraq.
The Arab summit due to be held in Damascus at the end of March provides a useful deadline to bring minds together on how to sort out some of the answers to the immediate points surrounding these issues. Saudi Arabia's threat to boycott the summit, and the continued failure of Damascus and Riyadh to find any common ground, has led to a rush of diplomacy as other Arab states try to help. His Highness Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, visited both Iran and Syria two weeks ago, seeking a way forward.
This week King Abdullah of Jordan visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the run up to the Arab summit as well as the Palestinian peace process, before moving on to see President George W. Bush in the United States.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has just completed a round of visits to several Gulf states, including the UAE, during which he was making clear Egypt's view that Syria is the problem in Lebanon. The political crisis in Lebanon is the most obvious point of dispute between Syria and Saudi Arabia. Syria has played a dominant or influential role in Lebanon for years, and, after the withdrawal of its troops, does not want to see its influence reduced even further.
It supports the Shiite group Hezbollah against the governing coalition led by Sa'ad Hariri, which is backed by Saudi Arabia and several other Arab states.
Unfortunately for Lebanon, neither side is weak enough that it has to back down, and neither side is strong enough to force its way through disregarding the other.
The result has been political stalemate in Lebanon, allowing a continued drift into chaos and failure which the country cannot afford. But all the various attempts to mediate, from within Lebanon, by the French foreign minister, and most recently by the Arab League, have failed.
The Arab world has lived with a failing Lebanon before, but one reason for the determination on both sides this time is that the clash in Lebanon is seen as part of Iran's efforts to spread its influence in the Middle East, in this case through its close relationship with Hezbollah, backed by its alliance with Syria.
Those opposed to Iran's greater influence on the ground in Arab states (which is the vast majority of Arab states) think that in Lebanon they cannot afford to give way. If they and their ally Hariri agreed to a larger role for Hezbollah in the new governing structure, they see Iran's influence becoming too great to tolerate.
Syria cherishes its role as Iran's only close ally in the Arab world, and has used this position to its benefit for some years. But now it is getting itself into a dead end with its pro-Iranian policy. More and more Arab states are having to distance themselves from Syria over this issue, and this will have a major impact on Syria's other aspirations as it seeks to liberalise its economy and get investments from Arab and other states.
Active engagement
Saudi Arabia leads the GCC states in following a policy of active engagement with Iran while resisting its efforts to mobilise any forces friendly to its aims. The Saudis see grave dangers in Syria's support of Iranian aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and various Shiite groups in Iraq.
In the wider Middle East, the Saudi position and that of any Arab state supporting active engagement with Iran, is in opposition to the United States, which is seeking to isolate Iran and force its leadership into some sort of accommodation, in both regional terms and over Iran's nuclear ambitions.
By seeking to be neither allies nor enemies of Iran, Arab states are trying to find a peaceful way forward.
But such calm is not helped by the continuing violence in Iraq. The persistent failure of the US-led forces to achieve genuine security in Iraq, and the failure to agree on a consensus between the political groups and parties in Iraq, are major causes for serious political unrest across the whole region.
Too many different regional states see their vital interests being challenged in the continued confusion in Iraq.
Both Saudi Arabia and Syria opposed the invasion, but afterwards the Saudis along with most Arab states accepted the American-imposed reality and tried to work with the US to move on, although King Abdullah did describe the American presence as an illegal occupation.
In contract, Syria sought to actively oppose the continued American presence, and as a result has become the focus of considerable US attention.
The Damascus summit is important since the Arab states need to coordinate their various positions on Iran and Iraq, as well as prepare a response to the eventual failure of Bush's ill-fated Annapolis peace initiative in Palestine. If the direct clash between Saudi Arabia and Syria over their allies in Lebanon derails the whole summit, it is not only Lebanon which will suffer, but also the Arabs' ability to build a formal consensus on the big regional problems. It looks as though the Lebanon stalemate will affect the whole region.

Ahmadinejad gives Iran's enemies all the tools they need
By The Daily Star
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Editorial
The diplomatic battle that has been raging for the last few years over Iran's nuclear program can best be characterized as a contest of influence. The details surrounding the Islamic Republic's nuclear program have long been murky - largely as a result of Iranian reluctance to be more forthcoming with the International Atomic Energy Agency - and the few facts that are available are less important than the ability to sway key decision-makers. The scarcity of accurate information in the diplomatic tug-of-war can be used to either side's advantage to bolster contradictory conclusions about Tehran's true intentions. What matters most is which side proves to be more effective in convincing the fence-sitters of a given point of view.
As a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran entered this diplomatic struggle with a slight but distinct advantage over its opponents, since the agreement guarantees the Islamic Republic's right to a peaceful nuclear energy program. But developments over the last few years suggest that even with this legal advantage, Iran has been outmaneuvered by its adversaries in the contest of influence. The most recent indication of this came on Wednesday, when Russia's envoy to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, delivered Iran an ultimatum, warning that if it does not change course on the nuclear file within the "next few days," Moscow will support the imposition of a new round of Security Council sanctions. More importantly, Churkin made clear that new sanctions would not stem from fresh evidence or facts about Iran's nuclear activities, but would come as a result of "a strategy to express the displeasure of the international community at the lack of a political reaction from Iran." This suggests that the next round of punitive measures - if imposed - will be the direct result of Iran's political posturing.
This statement from Russia, a key strategic ally of Iran and a country that has long shown reluctance to go along with the American agenda at the Security Council, ought to send the strongest message yet to the Iranian people that their president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is alienating their country from the international community. Ahmadinejad's abrasive approach to foreign policy has stirred the suspicions of even those who would count the Islamic Republic among their friends.
Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Tuesday praised the Iranian president for his "personal role" and "resistance in the nuclear case." It is true that Ahmadinejad has been unwavering in his defense of Iran's right to maintain a peaceful nuclear energy program, as guaranteed by the NPT. But his confrontational method of defending that right has caused more problems than it has resolved by providing ammunition to Iran's enemies in their bid to portray the country as a threat to the region and the world.
Modern scientific studies in the fields of psychology, sociology and political science have yielded countless theories on the best strategies to employ when trying to win influence. None of these suggests adopting an aggressive posture. Perhaps Ahmadinejad would serve his country best by taking a crash course in the art of persuasion.

William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
National Security & Foreign Policy Advisers '08
Analysis of the List | Why Advisers Advise | The Generals and the Candidates
Fighting Terrorism Ultimately Means Getting Bin Laden
I've argued that a counter-terrorism campaign focused on "head hunting" high-value targets may be too narrow in its objectives, and that we need to turn into reality our rhetoric that fighting terrorism is as much a non-military as military effort. We need everything from economic aid and development of civil society to a competent and sustained effort to win hearts and minds. I would now like to make an exception to my argument: We should go after Osama Bin Laden.
An interesting op-ed in the Washington Times today makes that case of why "We Need to Nail Osama," saying that the argument that Bin Laden should not be our focus is wrong. I agree: Whether it is for credibility's sake, deterrence or "justice" for the 3,000 deaths on 9/11, America and the world need to end the rule of Bin Laden. That goal should be an absolute priority. On the surface, my argument may seem academic given the recent killing of Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyah and al Qaeda's Abu Laith al-Libi, achievements that undoubtedly set back both organizations. Readers and sources have peppered me with e-mails questioning my conclusions -- "What do you suggest: that we not go after the top terrorists?" -- while many contrarians and sympathizers have asked me to expand my thoughts on what a successful counter-terrorism campaign would look like.
First, the death of Mughniyah: I understand why Israel wanted the Hezbollah leader killed, but does anyone really think that the organization is going to be set back in any significant way? The answer is a resounding no.
Hezbollah is too organized and too embedded within Lebanese society. It is not al Qaeda or some limited clandestine cell for the Mossad to sever and unravel, Hollywood-style. In fact, because Hezbollah has developed into an authentic political and social organization, how to destroy it, if that should even be the objective any longer, is a different question than what to do about al Qaeda. In other words, "terrorism" is not just one thing, and that's why focusing so much hope and resources on head-hunting sometimes isn't the answer.
The killing of Mughniyah is also not an act of "war." It is frontier "justice" -- assassination, covert action, call it what you will -- served up without the aid of courts or the legitimacy of law. It is a version of the pre-9/11 "law enforcement" focus, one that the Bush administration has worked so hard to erase: a relentless promise to go after terrorists wherever they are to make them pay for their acts.
Which brings us to Bin Laden. Al Qaeda is not Hezbollah, and Osama bin Laden is not some obscure second-tier lieutenant to be pursued in the intelligence community's cat-and-mouse game. For more than five years now, Bush and Co. have been pooh-poohing the importance of killing the al Qaeda leader and perpetrator of 9/11.
No one doubts that there is a bit of post-justification based upon frustration and the need to dampen public expectations, but as Elbridge Colby observes in the Washington Times today, the sense that getting Bin Laden is unimportant is also taking hold among influential experts in the counter-terrorism world.
Colby argues, and I agree, "that killing or capturing bin Laden remains a vital national and, indeed, international priority." Al Qaeda isn't Hezbollah or Hamas: it is a purely terrorist organization that has no prospects of transforming into an accepted governing body or element of civil society. Bin Laden not only is titular head of that organization, but he is also inspiration for hundreds if not thousands of terrorists. His survival in the face of the "war" against terrorism -- regardless of the deft Washington utterances that we're not really trying to get him -- symbolizes a hope on the part of many terrorists that they could succeed in taking down America and the West, just as they "defeated" the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
Bin Laden's survival also feeds into the conspiracy in the Arab and Islamic world that he is being kept alive to justify a war against Islam. The irony here though is that the renewed U.S. government focus on Pakistan, after years of coddling and deferring to President Pervez Musharraf, isn't necessarily for the purpose of putting the final nail in the coffin of al Qaeda or Bin Laden. It is an effort far more focused on tactical support of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, which are increasingly challenged by the Pakistani sanctuary.
The Pakistani surge should move forward, and we desperately need to put some meat on the bones of our "non-military" counter-terrorism campaign, worldwide as well as in our current theaters of war. But we also vitally need a return to fundamentals, which means "justice" for Bin Laden and a narrow concluding chapter for the 9/11 attacks.
The Bush administration has wanted us to believe that "war" is the proper course to counter terrorism and deliver that justice. Not only is it wrong in its formulation of war -- we need some kind of hybrid of law enforcement, covert action, and special operations of the military that doesn't currently exist -- but it hasfailed in delivering on its very pledge.
The most important issue for the next president is how to fight terrorism. Bin Laden is its leader, and every day he survives, false hope and grand delusions fuel our enemies.

The Failure in the War on Terror
February 25, 2008 10:44 PM
By SAMAD KHURRAM
The former head of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence's (ISI) political cell recently confessed that he was responsible for political manipulation in Pakistan's 2002 elections that led to Islamists coming to power in two provinces and gaining 59 seats in the National Assembly. This fraud was the work of the America's supposedly unfaltering ally in the War on Terror, General (ret.) Pervez Musharraf and his desire to paint an image of Pakistan as an extremely dangerous, unstable country ready to fall into the hands of extremists the moment he leaves.
Musharraf pretends that he is the only hope for the US in Pakistan. Closer analysis, however, suggests that his claims are far from true. In the 2008 elections--which were much freer and fairer than those of 2002--only 6 seats went to the Islamists. In addition, a secular party won the majority of seats from the North-West Frontier Province where the War on Terror is actually taking place. These results prove that the people of Pakistan are against religious fundamentalism, something the US has largely ignored. In 1999, Pakistan was a stable country with a moderate political party in power. There were no suicide bombings, no abductions by extremists, and people were free to move about without security personnel. By 2007, Pakistan was among the world's most dangerous places. This transformation is the result of Musharraf's long, incompetent rule.
There are many other pieces of evidence to support that Musharraf is not committed to fighting terrorism now, or if he ever was. Musharraf's own speeches and words, such as, "[I am] not going around trying to locate Osama bin Laden and Zawahri, frankly" are the biggest confirmation of his indifference. In addition, Washington has been shocked by news reports that the majority of the funds given to Pakistan are not used for the War on Terror. This news is corroborated by widely available pictures of troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas moving around in traditional 'chappals' (open foot shoes) and poor equipment. If even a small portion of the U.S. aid were spent on weapons upgrades, bullet proof jackets, reconnaissance devices and training, the results would have been much better. The Pakistan Army would have performed better: more terrorists caught, fewer casualties and more leads to Osama bin Laden.
Over the past eight years, Pakistan has received $11 billion from the U.S. in direct aid for fighting terrorism, billions from other countries for curbing extremism and development projects, and access to secret intelligence. In response to this, Musharraf has been repeatedly diverting funds in efforts to retain his support within the army, upgrade weapons to be used against India, or pay his supporters and crackdown on political opponents. His long, highly extravagant foreign tours to publicize his book or beg for more aid are hardly helpful in fighting terrorism.
Musharraf's political ambitions have led to many serious lapses and failures in the War on Terror: Rashid Rauf, a high profile terrorist involved in a failed attempt to blow up transatlantic planes, escaped from Pakistani police custody. Militants have been capturing forts and have intercepted NATO's supplies. A radical mosque built up a brigade of terrorists adjacent to the Pakistan Intelligence's building in Islamabad, the capital. The intelligence agencies are not to be blamed; they have more important tasks to do--update files on and blackmail political opponents of Musharraf.
Last November, on the pretext of fighting terrorism a "state of emergency" was declared in Pakistan, and resulted in a country-wide crackdown on the judiciary, media, human rights activists, and anyone who could possibly oppose Musharraf. This was followed by the release of 25 high profile terrorists including former Taliban Defence Minister Mullah Obaidullah, who has close ties to Osama bin Laden and is the highest-ranking Taliban official ever captured. With Musharraf releasing arrested Taliban figures, U.S. taxpayers can be assured the $11 billion pumped into Musharraf's regime has gone to waste.
Musharraf is a major liability in the War on Terror, yet the Bush Administration fails to see this and continues to provide him unfaltering support. However, Musharraf does not have any support in Pakistan, as evidenced by the strong anti-Musharraf vote in the Feb. 18 elections. If the U.S. continues to support Musharraf it will further alienate the people of Pakistan from the War on Terror and augment anti-U.S. sentiments. When the U.S, backed a highly unpopular dictator in Iran, it back-fired resulting in an extremist Islamic revolution. The world cannot afford a nuclear power like Pakistan to turn into another Iran. The U.S. must use all its capabilities to return Pakistan to the rule of law and to have the Supreme Court judges deposed by Musharraf restored. Musharraf must be tried for his crimes in the War on Terror as well as his crimes against the people of Pakistan by the real Supreme Court of Pakistan. This will send a clear message to the next government that it cannot take the war on terror lightly and that the U.S. will not allow itself to be manipulated by Pakistani leaders.
***Samad Khurram '09-'10, a government concentrator in Winthrop House, is an active member of the resistance movement against Musharraf. His column runs on alternate Tuesdays. Posted by: Mike | February 27, 2008 11:46 AM

Trouble in Assad's Paradise
Agoravox
http://www.agoravox.com/article.php3?id_article=7784
Aging Lebanese singer Wadih al-Safi’s announcement that he will release two songs dedicated to Syria could not restore color to Bashar’s face. Regime stooge Nasser Qandil has also been trying to cheer up his master by spreading a theory that Saudi Arabia, the US, Jumblatt and the Zionists are after him. Mind you Qandil knows that his life is not valued by anyone, not even his pals. But the Assad regime’s pamphleteer is, as instructed, attempting to cover up the humiliation caused by the Mughnieh assassination. Nasrallah’s open war call had failed to remove the question lingering in people hearts and minds. How could the Hizbullah superhero perish in Damascus of all places, under the watch of its intelligence agencies? Was the killing really facilitated by someone from the inside? Trouble in paradise? Has the brother-in-law done it again?
Regardless of whether Hizbullah’s master planner was co-assassinated by the killers of Rafik Hariri, it looks like the Assad game in Lebanon has not brought them relief. A Saudi fleeing Lebanon is not a Saudi going to Damascus, it is a Saudi funding a tribunal. And a summit without a Lebanese president is not a summit worth attending.This much was made clear by the Saudis and Egyptians, who, after the EU, have learned (the hard way), that the Assad regime deserves what it brings to itself.
It continues to kill Bashar how much importance the world gives to a country such as Lebanon. If you think Beirut is troubled, you haven’t seen Damascus. The regime is so frightened, it has jailed everyone in sight-from political dissidents to bloggers writing about motorcycles. The level of distrust and paranoia is reaching new levels. Isolation is not what the doctor ordered for this regime.
Like you, I follow with utmost disgust Aoun’s adventures as a “negotiator”. It is easy to forget, given the preposterous arguments he advances, that the former general is nothing but an empowered village idiot, who was promised a hut if he moved his act to the town hall. In other words, Aoun is there to buy time, as was Berri before him, before the latter ran out of ideas.
The challenge is to not let ourselves see this as a purely Lebanese matter. Lebanon has a lot at stake, and the opposing side is at fault for lacking imagination, but this is also a battle of wills against the Assad regime. One hopes that the time will come when their house of cards falls apart, hopefully with more of that inside help that brought them isolation. As for Hizbullah, forget Nasrallah’s size challenge (the man’s shortcomings are exposed with every weapon he hands to a child). Hizbullah is only half of what it used to be, despite the flaunting of rockets, and the occasional remembrance of Moussa As-Sadr. The soil under them is starting to rot. No missile will bring them back what they lost, and what they will lose if the Assad regime continues to devour its own.