LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 03/09

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint John 1,19-28. And this is the testimony of John. When the Jews from Jerusalem sent priests and Levites (to him) to ask him, "Who are you?"he admitted and did not deny it, but admitted, "I am not the Messiah."So they asked him, "What are you then? Are you Elijah?" And he said, "I am not." "Are you the Prophet?" He answered, "No."So they said to him, "Who are you, so we can give an answer to those who sent us? What do you have to say for yourself?" He said: "I am 'the voice of one crying out in the desert, "Make straight the way of the Lord,"' as Isaiah the prophet said." Some Pharisees were also sent. They asked him, "Why then do you baptize if you are not the Messiah or Elijah or the Prophet?" John answered them, "I baptize with water; but there is one among you whom you do not recognize, the one who is coming after me, whose sandal strap I am not worthy to untie." This happened in Bethany across the Jordan, where John was baptizing.

Saint Augustine (354-430), Bishop of Hippo (North Africa) and Doctor of the Church
Sermon 293, 7th for the Nativity of John the Baptist
"I am the voice of one crying out in the desert"
John was the voice but «in the beginning was the Word» (Jn 1,1). John was a voice for a time; Christ, the Word from the beginning, the eternal Word. Take away the word and what is the voice? Where there is nothing to understand there is only an empty sound. A voice without a word may strike the ear, it does not edify the heart. However, let us examine how things are put together in our hearts when they are to be edified. If I think about what I have to say, the word is already in my heart; but when I want to address you then I consider how to cause what is already in my heart to pass over into yours. So if I am seeking how the word already in my heart can meet up with you and take root in your heart, then I make use of the voice. And it is with this voice that I speak to you: the sound of my voice conveys to you the idea contained in the word. Then, it is true, the sound of it evaporates, but the word that the sound conveyed to you is henceforth in your heart without having left mine.
When the word has reached you doesn't its sound seem to say, like John the Baptist: «He must increase; I must decrease»? (Jn 3,30). The sound of the voice rang out to accomplish its task, then vanished away as if to say: «My joy is complete» (v.29). So let us hold on to the Word; do not let us allow the Word conceived in the depths of our hearts to pass away.

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Has Israel learned its lesson?By: Jeff Jacoby/Boston Globe/ 02/01/09
Defining Victory for Israel-By Michael Gerson/Washington Post/ 02/01/09
The Gaza Conundrum-By LESLIE SUSSER Jerusalem Post 02/01/09
Israel’s Goals and Hezbollah’s Hand-FOXNews. 02/01/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for January 02/09
Analysts: Hezbollah will not fight Israel over Gaza-Middle East Online
Can Sarkozy's Syria Ties Deliver a Mideast Truce?-TIME - USA
Sarkozy meets Lebanon parliament majority leader ahead of Mideast trip-Xinhua
Leftists threw old shoes on Egyptian embassy in Lebanon-Xinhua
Thousands rally in Lebanon to condemn Gaza raids-AFP
Hariri From Paris: Everyone in Lebanon Understands Regional Dangers-Naharnet
Saniora: What Goes On In Gaza Should Help Us Unite-Naharnet
Experts: Israel Aims to Cripple Hamas, Warns Hizbullah and Other Foes-Naharnet
Hayek Predicts Tribunal Would Operate, Identity of Hariri's Killer Would be Known in 2009-Naharnet
Raad: Israel Would Be Surprised by Range of Hamas Rockets-Naharnet
Survey: Lebanon Optimistic About 2009-Naharnet
Experts: Hizbullah-Like Tactic Used by Hamas Against Israel-Naharnet
Arab Parliamentary Union Calls for Unified Stance on Gaza-Naharnet
Nasrallah: What has Been Achieved in Gaza is a Victory to the Resistance and a Failure to Israel-Naharnet
Israel destroys Hamas homes, flattens Gaza mosque-AP
Lebanon public debt at $47 bln end-2008-minister-Reuters
Arabs should be flexible at UN over Gaza - Egypt-Reuters
Rockets are again at the heart of a Mideast war-The Associated Press
Warning for Israel: Avoid the Iranian-Hamas Trap!-World Defense Review
Egypt is losing steam as a go-between-Philadelphia Inquirer
Striking Deep Into Israel, Hamas Employs an Upgraded Rocket Arsenal-New York Times
Observers worry about consequences of escalation-WorldNetDaily
Gaza Offers Israel a Golden Opportunity-Gather.com

Lebanon public debt at $47 bln end-2008-minister
Fri Jan 2, 2009
BEIRUT, Jan 2 (Reuters) - Lebanon's 2008 public debt is expected to have reached $47 billion, finance minister Mohammad Chatah was quoted as saying by Al-Hayat newspaper on Friday.Lebanon's gross public debt stood at around $45.65 billion at the end of September 2008. Chatah had said in September that debt would reach $49 billion if privatisation in the telecom sector did not go ahead.

Israel destroys Hamas homes, flattens Gaza mosque
By IBRAHIM BARZAK and MATTI FRIEDMAN, Associated Press Writers Ibrahim Barzak And Matti Friedman, Associated Press Writers –
GAZA CITY, Gaza Strip – Israel bombed a mosque it says was used to store weapons and destroyed the homes of more than a dozen Hamas operatives on Friday, the seventh day of a blistering offensive in Gaza and the day after an airstrike killed a prominent Hamas figure.
In what appeared to be a new Israeli tactic, the military called at least some of the houses ahead of time to warn inhabitants of an impending attack. In some cases, it also fired a sound bomb to warn away civilians before flattening the homes with powerful missiles, Palestinians and Israeli defense officials said.
Israel launched the aerial campaign last Saturday in a bid to halt weeks of intensifying Palestinian rocket fire from Gaza. The offensive has dealt a heavy blow to Hamas, but has failed to halt the rocket fire. New attacks Friday struck apartment buildings in a southern Israeli city. No serious injuries were reported.
After destroying Hamas' security compounds, Israel has turned its attention to the group's leadership.
In airstrike after airstrike early Friday, Israeli warplanes hit some 20 houses believed to belong to Hamas militants and members of other armed groups, Palestinians said. They said the Israelis either warned nearby residents by phone or fired a warning missile to reduce civilian casualties. Israeli planes also dropped leaflets east of Gaza giving a confidential phone number and e-mail address for people to report locations of rocket squads. Residents stepped over the leaflets.
Israel used similar tactics during its 2006 war in Lebanon.
Most of the targeted homes Friday belonged to activist leaders and appeared to be empty at the time, but one man was killed in a strike that flattened a building in the Jebaliya refugee camp in northern Gaza.
More than 400 Gazans have been killed and some 1,700 have been wounded in the Israeli campaign, Gaza health officials said. The number of combatants and civilians killed is unclear, but Hamas has said around half of the dead are members of its security forces and the U.N. has said more than 60 are civilians, 34 of them children.
Three Israeli civilians and one soldier have also died in the rocket attacks, which have reached deeper into Israel than ever before, bringing an eighth of Israel's population of 7 million within rocket range.
The mosque destroyed Friday was known as a Hamas stronghold, and the army said it was used to store weapons. Hamas has boasted that more than 100 of the mosque's worshippers have been killed in the past on missions against Israelis.
It also was identified with Nizar Rayan, the Hamas militant leader killed Thursday when Israel dropped a one-ton bomb on his home. The explosion killed 20 people, including all four of Rayan's wives and 10 of his children.
The strike on Rayan's home obliterated the four-story apartment building and peeled off the walls of others around it, carving out a vast field of rubble.
Rayan, 49, ranked among Hamas' top five decision-makers. A professor of Islamic law, he was known for his close ties to the group's military wing and was respected in Gaza for donning combat fatigues and personally participating in clashes against Israeli forces. He sent one of his sons on an October 2001 suicide mission that killed two Israeli settlers in Gaza. Israel's military said the homes of Hamas leaders are being used to store missiles and other weapons, and the hit on Rayan's house triggered secondary explosions from the stockpile there.
Israeli defense officials said the military had called Rayan's home and fired a warning missile before destroying the building. That was impossible to confirm. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss military tactics.
Israel has targeted Hamas leaders many times in the past, but halted the practice during a six-month truce that expired last month.
Most of Hamas' leaders went into hiding at the start of Israel's offensive. Rayan, however, was known for openly defying Israel and in the past had led crowds to the homes of wanted Hamas figures — as if daring Israel to strike and risk the lives of civilians.
The offensive has not halted rocket fire at Israel, and a barrage landed in the city of Ashkelon early Friday. Two rockets hit apartment buildings, lightly wounding one man, police said. Sirens warning Israelis to take cover when military radar picks up an incoming rocket have helped reduce casualties in recent days.
The military said aircraft destroyed the three rocket launchers used to fire at Ashkelon.
Israel has been building up artillery, armor and infantry on Gaza's border in an indication the punishing air assault could expand with a ground incursion. At the same time, international pressure is building for a cease-fire that would block more fighting.
Israel appears to be offering an opening for the intense diplomatic efforts, saying it would consider a halt to the fighting if international monitors were brought in to track compliance with any truce with Hamas.
Concerned about protests, Israeli police said they would step up security and restrict access to Friday prayers at Jerusalem's al-Aqsa Mosque. Devout Muslims attend large, communal prayers on Fridays. Police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld said thousands of police would be deployed throughout the city, and that only Palestinian men over the age of 50, along with women of all ages, would be permitted to enter. He also said that police were in contact with Muslim leaders to ensure things remain quiet. The army also imposed a closure on the West Bank, barring nearly all of the area's more than 2 million Palestinians from entering Israel.
*Friedman reported from Jerusalem.

Leftists threw old shoes on Egyptian embassy in Lebanon
www.chinaview.cn 2009-01-02
BEIRUT, Jan. 2 (Xinhua) -- Lebanese and Palestinian leftist youth organizations, who have been staging sit-ins to protest the Israeli attacks on Gaza, threw old shoes at the fences of the Egyptian embassy in Beirut Friday, Elnashra website reported. The demonstrators were protesting against the removal of Palestinian flags by the embassy security, which were planted by protesters earlier this week. The surroundings of the Egyptian embassy in west Beirut witnessed riots and violence Last Sunday, when protesters burned tiers denouncing the closure of Rafah crossing from the Egyptian side, and riot police separated them by force, using tear gas and water pipes. Leaders of the Shiite armed group Hezbollah have been launching fierce verbal attacks against the regime in Egypt.
Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah called the Egyptian people to take the streets "in millions" to pressure their leaders into opening the crossing with the Gaza Strip.
Editor: Chris

Has Israel learned its lesson?
By Jeff Jacoby
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/01/has_israel_learned_its_lesson/
January 1, 2009
ISRAEL'S 2006 war against Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed terrorist army based in Lebanon, was a disaster - an ill-planned operation that did more damage to Israel's military reputation than to Hezbollah's resolve and influence. Now, as it fights Hamas in Gaza, Israel seems determined not to repeat the mistakes of two years ago.
This time, Israeli prewar preparations were much more meticulous. Months were devoted to gathering detailed information on scores of Hamas targets, including training camps and offices, rocket launchers, underground bunkers, weapons-making sites, tunnels from Egypt, and the homes of terrorist commanders. Israel's military and political operations appear better coordinated than in 2006, and Israeli diplomats are making use of online weapons - a dedicated YouTube channel, for example - to get its message out.
But it remains an open question whether Israel's leaders have learned the most critical lesson of all: that genocidal jihadists and other mortal foes cannot be wheedled, negotiated, bribed, or ignored into quietude. In a war with enemies like Hezbollah and Hamas and the PLO - enemies explicitly committed to Israel's destruction - goodwill gestures beget no goodwill, and peace processes do not lead to peace.
The proximate cause of the fighting in Gaza was the sharp increase in rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli civilians after Hamas refused to extend its tenuous cease-fire with Israel past Dec. 19. But the deeper cause was the transformation of Gaza into an Iranian proxy and terrorist hub following Israel's reckless "disengagement" in 2005. Israelis convinced themselves that ethnically cleansing Gaza of its Jews and handing over the territory to the Palestinians would reduce violence and make Israel safer. It did just the opposite.
In 2000, Israelis had similarly believed that a unilateral retreat from southern Lebanon would deprive Hezbollah of any pretext for continuing its war against the Jewish state. But far from extinguishing Hezbollah's jihadist dreams, it inflamed them.
The hard truth is that no matter how much Israelis crave peace, they cannot achieve it through concessions and compromises and "road maps" - not when their enemies view such overtures and agreements as signs of weakness, and as proof that terrorism works. For 60 years, Israel has had to contend with the hostility of its neighbors and the heavy costs of war; its yearning for peace is understandable. But there will be no peace without victory, and no victory without fighting for it.
For a long time now, Israel's leaders have resisted this fact - "We are tired of fighting," Ehud Olmert infamously declared in 2005. For 15 years, beginning with the sham of the Oslo peace process in 1993, Jerusalem has tried to appease its way to tranquility. It allowed Yasser Arafat and his PLO killers to take control of the West Bank and Gaza. It embraced the goal of Palestinian statehood. It responded to terrorism with ever-deeper concessions. It abandoned Lebanon and Gaza. It reiterated, over and over, the false mantra that "you make peace with your enemies." And from the ongoing captivity of Gilad Shalit to the rockets slamming into Israeli cities to the dysfunction and radicalization of Palestinian society, the results have been disastrous.
There are heartening indications this week of a more realistic and unsentimental approach. Defense Minister Ehud Barak described the offensive against Hamas as a "war to the bitter end" and told an American interviewer, "For us to be asked to have a cease-fire with Hamas is like asking you to have a cease-fire with Al-Qaeda." Both leading contenders in the upcoming Israeli election, Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu and Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister and head of Kadima, promise to make it a priority "to topple the Hamas regime" if elected prime minister. Israel's UN ambassador, Gabriela Shalev, has said that the operation in Gaza will last "as long as it takes to dismantle Hamas completely."
Whether this strong rhetoric will be backed up by strong action in the long run remains to be seen. Yesterday, the Israeli cabinet rejected a French proposal for a 48-hour truce. Perhaps, at long last, the lesson has been learned: With an enemy like Hamas, which boasts that it "loves death" and "drinks blood," truces and deals are illusory. If Israel seeks lasting peace, it must first win a lasting victory.
Jeff Jacoby can be reached at jacoby@globe.com.

Israel’s Goals and Hezbollah’s Hand
By Judith Miller
Writer/FOX News Contributor
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/01/AR2009010101782.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
December 31st, 2008
What is the goal of Israel’s “all-out war” against Hamas, as Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak called his country’s air assault against the Islamic militant stronghold of Gaza?
It depends on whom you ask. Most of Israel’s leadership has left the goal somewhat vague. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told FOX News that the raids were meant to stop an “intolerable” situation — Hamas’ rocket attacks on southern Israel, which have put over half a million Israelis at risk.
But other Israeli politicians have gone further. Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations says the mission’s goal is to “destroy completely” the “terrorist gang” that runs this narrow strip by the sea that is home to some 1.5 million Palestinians. Striking an equally bellicose tone, Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, says the attacks are aimed at, first of all, “stopping the attacks on our cities” and then, “eliminating the threat of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.” The latter goal, he says, means “toppling the Hamas rule.”
That is a far more ambitious goal and may prove beyond Israel’s reach. Many analysts warn that Israel should avoid repeating its experience in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 when it invaded its northern neighbor to destroy Iranian-allied Hezbollah’s infrastructure, but failed to do so and wound up being widely blamed for unnecessary death and suffering.
There is little doubt that ejecting Hamas from its Gaza perch would benefit not only Israel but Arab states that have signed peace treaties with Israel. Yet the Palestinian Authority, the ruling power in the West Bank that was violently ousted by Hamas from Gaza in 2007, is unlikely to return to power there — especially not at the end of an Israeli gun, or in this case, a missile.
Replacing Hamas with Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Authority, for all its corruption and other shortcomings, however, is a goal shared by Israel’s most strategically important neighbor — Egypt. “We warned you again and again that a rejection of the cease fire will bring an Israeli attack,” said Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, angrily wagging his finger at Hamas during a press conference on Tuesday. Mubarak was furious that Hamas declined to extend the six-month cease fire that Cairo had brokered between Israel and Hamas last June.
Ignoring a torrent of Arab abuse, Mubarak said his government would not fully open its border crossing at Rafah into Gaza unless Abbas’ Palestinian Authority was back in control of the border post. Egypt, the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, is not taking this stance for Israel’s sake. Hamas would like nothing better than to see the Mubarak regime toppled by the militant Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and only significant opposition force in Egypt. So in backing Israel in this struggle with Hamas, President Mubarak is pursuing his own, as well as Egypt’s strategic interests.
But what can Israel accomplish by continuing its aerial assault or escalating it into a ground war? The Israelis are running out of targets to bomb. Killing Hamas’s leaders, who quickly went underground in Gaza, is impossible without putting boots on the ground, analysts agree. But Israeli’s foray into Lebanon showed this is a politically risky and perhaps strategically ill-fated mission.
So far Israel is holding firm. On Wednesday, it rejected a French proposal for a 48-hour cease fire, but said it would allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza. And after a Cabinet meeting this afternoon, departing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that Israel “did not begin the Gaza operation in order to finish it with rocket fire continuing like it did before,” suggesting a ground invasion may be the next step if Hamas does not agree to a truce that it will now respect. The decision to continue its offensive in Gaza, he said, was made by his “kitchen cabinet,” which includes Defense Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Livni, both of whom hope to succeed him as Prime Minister in national elections in February.
This is a tricky course of action for them and for Israel. So far, most Israelis have supported the bombing of Gaza. But should Israel soldiers begin dying in a ground offensive, unity could evaporate. Egypt and neighboring Jordan, which has also quietly supported the retaliatory air raids, could well succumb to Arab pressure. And just as worrisome, Israel’s northern border might also erupt.
So far, notes David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hezbollah has not fired a single rocket into Israel in defense of Palestinians. Yes, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has denounced the Jewish state, called for rallies to support the Palestinians and for Egyptians to rise up against President Mubarak. But Hezbollah is likely to remain on the sidelines, Schenker argues, unless there is a change on the ground. Sending Israeli soldiers into Gaza might be too much even for Hezbollah, or its patron, Iran. “If the Israeli air campaign against Hamas persists and evolves into ground operations,” Hezbollah, “at the encouragement of its Iranian patrons — could be pressed to enter the fray.”

Defining Victory for Israel
By Michael Gerson/Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/01/AR2009010101782.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
Friday, January 2, 2009; Page A15
There is no question -- none -- that Israel's attack on Hamas in Gaza is justified. No nation can tolerate a portion of its people living in the conditions of the London Blitz -- listening for sirens, sleeping in bomb shelters and separated from death only by the randomness of a Qassam missile's flight. And no group aspiring to nationhood, such as Hamas, can be exempt from the rules of sovereignty, morality and civilization, which, at the very least, forbid routine murder attempts against your neighbors.
Israel's response has been criticized as "disproportionate," which betrays a misunderstanding of proportion's meaning. The goal of military action, when unavoidable, is not to take one life in exchange for each one unjustly taken; this is mere vengeance. The goal is to remove the conditions that lead to conflict and the taking of life. So far, Israel's actions have been proportionate to this objective. And the convoys of fuel, medical supplies and food sent by Israel into Gaza show an appropriate concern for Palestinian suffering, even during a broad assault on Hamas forces.
Israel's immediate goal is simple: to stop missile barrages by Hamas on southern Israel. But it is not a coincidence that this action was taken by the primary sponsors of the peace process in Israeli politics. The Israeli public will not accept any further risks for peace as long as Hamas missiles fly. Those missiles are a daily symbol that Israeli territorial concessions result in the strengthening of committed enemies and the death of Israeli citizens. The removal of this threat is not an obstacle to the peace process. It is the prerequisite for the resumption of the peace process.
It is also not a coincidence that the Israeli attack took place in the last days of a reliably favorable Bush administration -- for which the president-elect, above all, should be grateful. If Israel concludes the main phase of its Gaza operations by Inauguration Day -- as it seems to want to do -- this will allow Obama to renew a peace push with a fresh start and a large obstacle (hopefully) removed.
But the risks are considerable. A repeat of Israel's 2006 experience in Lebanon would be a massive blow to the Jewish state -- a demonstration of impotence in the face of mortal threats. The Lebanon campaign did not fail because of international pressure and criticism. It failed because Hezbollah terrorists could credibly claim the victory of survival -- confirmed by a cease-fire that allowed their rearmament. Syria and Iran were strengthened -- not because of Israel's attack on Hezbollah but because Israel didn't prevail.
The Israelis have an advantage this time around. In Lebanon, Hezbollah received a flood of weapons and support from bordering Syria. In Gaza, arms smuggling has been a problem, but neighboring Egypt is not pro-Hamas. Israeli air raids have been effective in destroying Hamas infrastructure, weapons stockpiles and smuggling tunnels.
Israel recognizes that Hamas will claim victory no matter how badly it is damaged. But the real determination of winners and losers will come six months after a cease-fire. And there are two objective criteria of Israeli success: an end of rocket and mortar attacks on Israel and an end of large-scale arms smuggling to Hamas.
What would be the shape of such a victory? That is not yet clear. Israel could reoccupy Gaza, overthrow Hamas and enforce its terms. But Israeli leaders, by most accounts, don't prefer this massive exertion, which also would imply that Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was a mistake. It is more likely that a ground invasion, if it comes, would last a matter of days. In this case, Israel would reserve the right to resume attacks in Gaza at any time after the conclusion of a cease-fire -- responding to every tunnel that is dug and every missile that is fired. And Hamas could, of course, finally observe a cease-fire that doesn't involve random attacks on Israeli families.
In this crisis, Israel faces a test of its wisdom and competence: Would its leaders really have undertaken such a high-risk operation without a clear endgame?
America, in turn, faces a test of its moral judgment. This conflict is not a contest between shades of gray in mist and fog. It is a matter of distinguishing between murderers and victims -- and of supporting an ally until a clear victory against terrorism is achieved.
michaelgerson@cfr.org

Arabs should be flexible at U.N. over Gaza - Egypt
Thu 1 Jan 2009,
By Alaa Shahine
CAIRO, Jan 1 (Reuters) - Arabs should avoid unbalanced language that just blames Israel for the attacks on Gaza if they want the U.N. Security Council to act to end the violence, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said. Aboul Gheit, in an interview with the Dubai-based Al Arabiya television, also renewed his attacks on Iran, accusing Tehran of trying to control vital Arab interests and use this influence as leverage in any talks with the new U.S. administration.
Arab diplomats submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council seeking an end to the Israeli offensive and describing it as "excessive" and "disproportionate".
The council adjourned without a vote on Wednesday. Western delegates described the resolution as imbalanced and focusing almost entirely on Israel's actions.
"In such an extremely difficult situation we should show some flexibility to convince others of our demands," Aboul Gheit said in the interview on Thursday.
A one-paragraph draft resolution demanding an immediate halt of Israeli military operations and Palestinian rocket attacks was better than condemning the Jewish state's raids. Arab foreign ministers on Wednesday, agreed to send a delegation to lobby the Security Council into taking action to end the Israeli onslaught that has killed more than 400 people.
Amr el-Choubaki, an Egyptian political analyst, said Arabs with close ties with the United States may try to convince the West that inaction over the violence may boost the popularity of radicals, which threatens to destabilise the oil-rich region. "This led sometimes to (U.S.) pressure on Israel," he told Reuters. "The Arabs could play this card." Israel says the offensive is designed to end rocket attacks by Hamas from Gaza.
The crisis has deepened the divide between anti-Israeli Islamist groups backed by Iran and Syria, and authoritarian governments with friendly ties with the United States, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It has also worsened tensions between the Sunni Muslim Arab allies of the United States and Shi'ite Iran, which has criticised Arab states for their lack of response to the Israeli raids.
Arab analysts say Iran is fighting proxy wars with the United States through its influence over Syria, Hamas and the Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon and Iraq.
"There is a country like Iran outside the Arab world that wants to hold as many (Arab) cards to tell the coming U.S. administration 'if you want to talk about issues like the security of the Gulf or the nuclear file you should talk to us'," Aboul Gheit said. Washington and Tehran are at odds over Iran's nuclear programme which the West says is aimed at building a nuclear bomb, a charge Iran denies.
Aboul Gheit added: "We should keep the hands of non-Arabs off the Palestinian issue, and some of the Arab hands as well," he added in an apparent reference to Syria, which he said was trying to bolster Hamas against Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority. (Writing by Alaa Shahine; Editing by Giles Elgood) © Reuters 2008. All Rights Reserved. | Learn more about Reuters

Rockets are again at the heart of a Mideast war
By HAMZA HENDAWI – 15 hours ago
CAIRO, Egypt (AP) — Most of the Hamas rockets targeted at Israel are rudimentary, cobbled together in small metal shops in densely populated Gaza. But a growing number are more sophisticated, longer-range weapons, believed made from parts thought to originate in Syria or Iran and smuggled in through tunnels from Egypt. Despite that new capacity, Hamas' missile arsenal is still much smaller than that of another anti-Israeli militant group, Hezbollah. The Lebanese group, also supported by Syria and Iran, is not fettered by a tight border blockade and finds it easier to obtain arms.
Hamas' homemade rocket, known informally as the Qassam, is grossly imprecise, carries a small warhead of about 22 pounds of explosives. They have caused casualties but more often just spark panic.
The imported missiles, Katyushas, are better guided, travel farther and cause more damage because they have a warhead of up to 44 pounds, roughly the weight of a cannon shell from one of Israel's Merkava tanks.
Such rockets were at the heart of the monthlong war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. Hezbollah fired up to 4,000 rockets at Israeli towns even as Israel's warplanes pounded launch sites and its troops took large swaths of southern Lebanon.
Now, it's the turn of the Palestinian militants of Hamas. Israel's air assault in the Gaza Strip, which began Saturday, will be a major test of the military's ability to stop Hamas rocket fire into southern Israel.
Israel vowed to destroy Hezbollah's rocket capabilities in the 2006 war, but while it inflicted heavy losses on the movement's fighters, it couldn't stop missile firing. And Hezbollah's leaders boast the group has rebuilt its arsenal to some 30,000 rockets.
Israeli leaders were sharply criticized at home for failing to break the Shiite militant group in Lebanon. Failure to stop Hamas's rockets could have the same repercussions and leave Hamas more entrenched in Gaza.
Since its fighters violently seized control of the Gaza Strip 18 months ago, Hamas has shifted away from its hallmark suicide bombings of past years, likely because Israel's closure of the tiny territory's border and the West Bank separation barrier have made it hard for bombers to sneak into Israeli cities.
Hamas has taken up rockets as its main weapon because they make such walls irrelevant and enable it to cause casualties without sacrificing fighters in ground raids. Also, while rockets cannot match the firepower of Israel's military, they are highly effective in spreading fear among residents of Israel's southern cities.
Hamas has fired at least 5,500 rockets since seizing Gaza in 2007, killing four Israelis before the air campaign was launched, according to the Israeli military.
But the impact goes far beyond casualties. Fear of the rockets pervades Israeli border towns, constantly sending residents dashing to bomb shelters, hampering businesses, disrupting schools and causing stress-related disorders, like anxiety and bed-wetting. Experts say industries in Israel's south have lost up to $2 million a day because of disruptions from rockets.
Since Israel launched its Gaza offensive, the Hamas barrages have intensified, with hundreds fired, killing four more Israelis, including a soldier.
More significantly, the range of Hamas' rockets has increased, with Katyushas reaching as far as Beersheba, 22 miles from Gaza, nearly twice the range of the Qassams. Israeli officials say at least a tenth of the country's 7 million people and some of its largest cities are now in range of the missiles.
Even more of Israel is within reach of Hezbollah's rockets, but so far that group has stayed out of the conflict. It is widely thought to be reluctant to start hostilities with Israel because it does not want a repeat of the widespread damage to Lebanon from the 2006 war and because of its new place in Lebanon's unity government.
Israeli defense officials estimate that Hamas had 3,000 rockets before the fighting began Saturday and that around 1,000 of those have been either fired or destroyed by Israeli airstrikes.
"Rockets have come to symbolize asymmetrical warfare, but they are more about just symbolism in the Arab world," said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a Hezbollah expert in Lebanon. "They are not designed to defeat the enemy, just to wear it down."
Israel has been focused on protecting itself from long-range missiles — particularly from Iran — and has put in place an elaborate defense system to intercept and neutralize missiles before they hit.
But Israel's high-tech army has yet to find an effective way to deal with the Hamas and Hezbollah rockets, which have shorter trajectories and are fired by small teams, able to dart into an area, fire and run. Since they are in the air for only seconds, they are almost impossible to stop
The Israelis are working on a defense system called "Iron Dome" that would be deployed in southern and northern Israel to shoot down rockets. The system, according to Israeli media reports, may be operational by 2010.
In past days, Gaza residents have seen Hamas fighters firing rockets from inside Gaza City. When the fighters shoot off one of the 6-foot-long Qassams, the rocket visibly wobbles and shakes as it ascends, but 9-feet-long Katyushas fly fast and straight.
"There is no doubt that Hamas has increased its capacity and its expertise in manufacturing and storing missiles and this has been a function of Hamas' total control of Gaza," said Michael Hanna, a Middle East expert at the Century Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank.
Since seizing Gaza, Hamas has sought to build up its military capabilities, including acquiring mortars, anti-tank missiles, roadside bombs and longer-range rockets, according to Israel's Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a research body thought to be close to the Israeli military.
The center says the buildup was backed by Iran and Syria and made possible by the smuggling tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border, which Israeli jets have repeatedly bombed since last weekend.
There has been no sign Hezbollah is shipping rocket parts to Hamas, perhaps because Iran is arming the Palestinians directly. Iran openly gives millions of dollars and has provided training to some Hamas police, but it denies supplying weapons.
Israeli ballistics experts say they have identified Iranian origins of missile components from paint, tool work and Latin lettering on rocket fragments, some of which have been shown to the public. But it hasn't publicly released clear evidence proving Iranian involvement.
An Israeli army spokeswoman, Maj. Avital Leibovich, said Thursday that Hamas' Katyusha rockets originated in Iran and were being smuggled into Gaza. An average of 100 tons of explosives a year is being smuggled in, compared to three or four tons in 2006, she said, saying some of the explosives are used to arm Hamas' rockets.
Israeli military officials say the Katyushas carry an anti-personnel warhead that is small enough to smuggle easily through tunnels and spews out small pellets designed to injure large numbers of people.

The Gaza Conundrum
By LESLIE SUSSER
Cover story in Issue 20, January 19, 2009 of The Jerusalem
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1230733125283&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull
On the third day of Hanukkah, Ehud Barak finally lost his patience. For five days, since December 19, when Hamas declared an end to a six-month truce or tahadiyeh and stepped up its rocket fire on Israeli civilians, the defense minister had resisted enormous pressure to hit back hard. But after more than 70 Qassam rockets and Iranian-supplied 120 mm mortars slammed into cities, towns, villages and kibbutzim in the Gaza perimeter in a single day, Barak decided the time had come to act.
Hamas, he warned, was about to pay "big-time." At his request, the cabinet convened for the second time in five days and approved a detailed operational plan, leaving its precise scope and timing to Barak and the Israel Defence Forces. As tanks and infantry brigades took up positions around the Gaza Strip and air force fighter-bombers warmed their engines, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert issued a last minute appeal for quiet. Speaking on the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite TV station, which is widely watched in Gaza, he urged Gazans to stop Hamas firing at innocent civilians or face the consequences. "I'm not here to declare war… But Hamas must be stopped, and this will happen," he warned.
Two days later, on the Sabbath, air force planes and helicopters started bombing Hamas installations in Gaza. In two waves, some 80 fighter-bombers and helicopters hit over 100 targets, killing more than 200 Hamas militiamen and about 20 civilians. In the first wave, which lasted three minutes and forty seconds, nearly all of Hamas's military compounds, command and control centers and symbols of government were reduced to rubble.
The timing and the intensity of the air strike took Hamas by surprise. Barak's apparent hesitancy, his opening of the border to send in a large convoy of food and medicine the day before, and statements to the effect that the government would reconvene in a few days to discuss a military operation had lulled Hamas into a false sense of security. As a result, many militiamen were caught going about their normal business in the compounds when the air force hit.
In the new war in the south, Barak and the country's military planners face a two-fold military problem: how to stop the Qassams and how to restore Israeli deterrence region-wide. The devastating opening salvo they chose was based on what many military analysts see as Israel's most effective operation in the 2006 Lebanon War: the bombing of the Hizballah command and control center in Beirut's Dahya district in the first few days of the fighting.
Reducing the Dahya to rubble had a profound shock effect on Hizballah and other leaders across the Middle East, and is seen as one of the main reasons for the current quiet on the Israel-Lebanon border. Now Israeli military planners hope what they call the "Dahya effect" will sink in in Gaza too and eventually deter Hamas from rocketing Israeli civilians.
The air strike was only the first act in a rolling air, sea and ground operation authorized by the cabinet. After each stage, Israel's military leaders have been empowered to decide, on the basis of the Hamas response, whether or not to launch the next phase. In the cabinet, there were differences over the operation's ultimate goal: Kadima's Foreign Minister Livni and Haim Ramon spoke about toppling the Hamas regime; Barak, backed by Olmert, pressed successfully for the more modest aim of stopping the rockets by sending Hamas a clear message that continuing the barrages would cost them dearly.
In a news conference on the first night of the fighting, Olmert spelled out the war's aims: To create a new security reality in the south, in which Israeli civilians can live without fear of rocket or terror attacks.
But while the balance of military power is clearly in Israel's favor, the military options are not without problems. Heavy air or ground attacks that exact a large civilian toll could draw international condemnation and pressure on Israel to call off its operation long before its goals are achieved; ground operations against rocket launchers or capturing territory from which rockets are launched could put Israeli troops at risk in the heart of Palestinian territory; a large-scale ground operation might neutralize the rockets, but it would require a sophisticated exit strategy or leave Israel in Gaza, responsible for the daily needs of around 1.5 million Palestinians.
There was a strong sense of déjà vu as the renewed hostilities in the south recalled the 2006 Lebanon war in more ways than one. The Dahya-like air strike, and the way Hamas, like Hizballah, responded by firing dozens of rockets at Israeli population centers, were almost carbon copies. In both cases there were also captive Israeli soldiers involved. Indeed, the current operation could put the life of Gilad Shalit, the IDF corporal held by Hamas for more than 900 days, at risk, or create conditions for a prisoner exchange to secure his release. Some Israeli leaders, including Livni, say Shalit's release should be an Israeli condition for any future ceasefire.
But there were also important differences between July 2006 and December 2008, mainly as a result of the fact that the politicians and the generals have spent the past two years studying the gaping flaws in the way the Lebanon war was conducted. For example, in 2006 the IDF launched hostilities with little preparation in anticipation of a quick victory; this time the generals and the politicians say they spent months planning every detail of the rolling operation and the anticipated political aftermath. Moreover, whereas in 2006 Hizballah kept up the rocket fire on civilian population centers for 34 days, Hamas, with an estimated 2000 rockets at its disposal, some of which were hit in the first air force strikes, is not expected to be able to match that.
Still, Barak, determined not to make the mistakes of under-preparation and overconfidence that characterized Israel's military leadership in 2006, warned at the outset that the fighting could go on for some time.
And in announcing the relatively modest war aims, he and a chastened Olmert were careful to avoid any trace of bombast, arrogance or euphoria.
On the second day of the war, Israeli planes destroyed some 40 tunnels along the Gaza-Egyptian border used by Hamas to bring in supplies and weapons. Laboratories for developing and producing more sophisticated rockets were also hit. But as Palestinian casualties mounted, so did international criticism of the ferocity of the Israeli attack. Israel's Arab and more outspoken Western critics accused it of war crimes; others, like U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, expressed concern at a looming humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza as civilian systems collapsed.
The devastating Israeli attacks sparked fierce protests and demonstrations across the Arab and Muslim world, in European capitals and among Israeli Arabs. But while Israel was widely criticized in the streets and in the international media, governments across the world did little to stop the fighting. And despite their public posture criticizing Israel's "barbarity," some moderate Arab leaders were not sorry to see Hamas taking a beating.
Indeed, the Israeli-Hamas clash reflected in microcosm the regional struggle between the pro-Western moderates led by Egypt, and the radicals led by Iran. Both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority (PA), while strongly condemning the Israeli operation, highlighted the fact that they had urged Hamas leaders to renew the tahadiyeh and warned them what would happen if they didn't. As a result, Egypt and the PA became targets of criticism, mainly from their radical Iran-affiliated Muslim foes. Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah even called for an uprising in Egypt, which he accused of collaborating with Israel. Others accused the PA of collaboration, suggesting that the operation was part of a conspiracy to restore the PA to power in Gaza after the war.
Indeed, the renewed fighting raises several questions. Why did Hamas, so clearly outgunned by Israel, risk a confrontation that could cost it its hold on power?
Conversely, from Israel's point of view, will air strikes and limited ground operations be enough to end the rocket attacks for any length of time? There are also major strategic issues. Once a new ceasefire is achieved, what is there to stop Hamas from rearming with even longer-range and heavier rockets? To obviate the threat, Israeli hard-liners propose toppling Hamas and/or reoccupying all or part of Gaza, while pragmatists in and out of the government talk about ways of finding a new modus vivendi with the fundamentalists, based on long-term accommodation and/or deterrence.
According to Yohanan Tzoreff, an expert on Palestinian society at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Hamas leaders assumed that with the approaching election in Israel, the IDF would mount only limited operations, which they would be able to weather, and then, from a position of strength, negotiate a new truce on more favorable terms. "Hamas heard Israeli leaders saying they had no intention of carrying out a major invasion and sinking into the Gaza quagmire. And they thought if Israel does something limited, they would be able to absorb it and then negotiate an improved tahadiyeh with open border-crossing points," he explains.
Tzoreff says that for the Hamas government the status quo ante, without a steady supply of food and at least one open crossing point for people to go in and out of the Strip, was intolerable. "It put them in a very poor light as failing to provide basic needs and lacking genuine trappings of sovereignty. Therefore, they want a new ceasefire that will give them open border-crossing points and the same kind of international recognition and standing as their secular Fatah rivals on the West Bank," he tells The Report. But Hamas may have miscalculated. Given its unpopularity among moderate Arab and Western leaders, Israel may be allowed the leeway to hit the fundamentalists much harder than they expected.
Even so, Tzoreff doubts whether Hamas can be toppled. It has wide grass-roots support in Gaza and from Muslim radicals throughout the region. In other words, after the fighting, Hamas will still be around. And, looking to the future, Tzoreff says Israel should encourage, not oppose, cooperation in the Palestinian arena between Fatah and Hamas. "Any agreement we reach with the Palestinians that ignores this group with its large following among the Palestinians and in the Arab world will be inherently unstable," he declares.
The government, however, has more modest aims. It seeks to achieve a new ceasefire regime under which Hamas would have to commit to no more rocket fire, no terror, no explosive charges near the border and no more weapons' smuggling. One of the aims of the current operation is to demonstrate to Hamas the high price-tag for violation. The understandings would be achieved through third party, probably Egyptian, mediation, and kept in place through Israel's waving of a big deterrent stick.
Israeli strategists on the right, however, argue that any ceasefire without significant changes on the ground will be a major strategic blunder: They say it won't stop the rockets and will allow Hamas to conduct a major military buildup for the next round. Military thinkers like Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of research in the IDF's intelligence branch, have little faith in the new deterrent balance Barak is trying to create in the south. "There are only two ways to stop the Qassams: to give in to Hamas's new ceasefire demands, or to reoccupy Gaza," he argues.
The model for Amidror, outgoing chairman of the public council of the new Orthodox Bayit Hayehudi (Jewish Home) Party, is the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, after which the IDF reoccupied parts of the West Bank and stamped out the terror of the second intifada. "People should ask themselves, why don't the Palestinians fire rockets at Kfar Saba from Kalkilya 700 meters away? Because we reoccupied the West Bank and instituted effective IDF control on the ground. If we do the same thing in Gaza, admittedly at a heavy cost to ourselves and to the civilian population there, there will be quiet," he tells The Report.
The advantages of reoccupation would be higher grade intelligence, operational freedom to act against terror on a daily basis and the capacity to keep heavy weaponry from Iran out of the Strip. The downside would be exposing Israeli soldiers to a never-ending terrorist war of attrition and absorbing a heap of international opprobrium, even from Israel's friends. Amidror, however, is unfazed. "It is soldiers' duty to fight…and people in the international community should ask themselves what they would do if their cities were targeted this way," he expostulates.
Mainly because of the international constraints and the responsibility it would entail for the day-to-day lives of 1.5 million Gazans, most right-wingers stop short of calling for total reoccupation. The Likud's Yuval Steinitz, former chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, for example, advocates a partial reoccupation to create a buffer between Gaza and Egypt to prevent arms smuggling.
Steinitz sees two problems in the current situation that need to be solved: the immediate rocket threat to Israeli civilians and the longer-term danger to Israel's national security that a massive military buildup in Gaza would pose. An effective ceasefire could ameliorate the first problem, but would exacerbate the second. "If we were to have a total ceasefire now for two or three years, we will soon see al-Fatah and al-Fajar rockets in Gaza capable of hitting Tel Aviv. Hamas could also bring in anti-aircraft batteries and threaten IAF flights over the Negev. And after that we could see 100 meter high Iranian intelligence antennae monitoring all Israeli military movements in the Negev.
Maybe we would get peace for a year or two, but the price would be a devastating blow to Israel's national security," Steinitz maintains.
His solution: after the IDF finishes dealing a crippling blow to Hamas's current military capabilities, it reoccupies the 14 kilometer-long Philadelphi route on the border between Egypt and Gaza to block the influx of weaponry and prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military power. The problem with this is that the relatively small number of soldiers needed to man the route would be isolated and vulnerable to terror attacks in hostile Palestinian territory. Steinitz, however, claims there are new methods to prevent them from being sitting ducks, which, for obvious reasons, he says he cannot divulge.
Left-wing and centrist thinkers rule out any reoccupation of Gaza as counterproductive. And some, like former Mossad Chief Efraim Halevy, propose reaching a long-term legally binding agreement with Hamas, which has benefits for both sides. Halevy argues that although Hamas would like to destroy Israel, and Israel would like to topple the Hamas government in Gaza, neither has the power to do so.
He also detects among some more pragmatic Hamas leaders a realization that their dream of destroying Israel is unattainable at least for the foreseeable future and a readiness for the establishment of a Palestinian state with temporary borders along the 1967 lines. "On that basis there is room to examine how it might be possible to reach an agreement with the Palestinians in which both Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, are partners in the final product," he says.
Halevy, now head of the Hebrew University's Shasha Center for Strategic Studies, says that on the tactical level, Israel will try to limit the damage Hamas can cause it, and will be partly successful. But, despite the pounding it has taken, Hamas won't disappear and regime change is not likely. "Even Tzipi Livni and [Likud leader Benjamin] Bibi Netanyahu, who are calling for regime change, don't really believe they can pull it off. If they could, they would have done it long ago. I think we have to accept the fact that Hamas is part of the equation," he tells The Report.
Halevy dismisses as absurd notions that the mainly Fatah Palestinian police in the West Bank will be able to march into Gaza on the back of the Israeli operation and take over from Hamas. And if, as seems likely, achieving a wider agreement acceptable to both Palestinian factions proves elusive for now, Israel should cut a long-term deal with Hamas that, unlike past ceasefires, clearly spells out the terms and conditions for a modus vivendi in the south. "Since Hamas is not about to disappear, we should consider reaching a legally binding document. When you don't even have a common paper and work on the basis of unwritten understandings, everyone is free to give their own interpretation, and that is not a good formula for an easing of the situation," he says.
Where Halevy sees only "conflict management," left-wingers see in a weakened Hamas a chance for conflict resolution. Gadi Baltianski, director general of the Geneva Initiative, agrees that Israel should first negotiate a truce agreement with Hamas. Then it should go for a final peace deal with Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas, which would have to be ratified by the Palestinian people as a whole in a referendum or new elections. But there should be no attempt to overthrow Hamas by force. "Abu Mazen (Abbas) can't go into Gaza on the IDF's bayonets and rule. He would look like a collaborator. Hamas must be weakened and maybe removed from power, but by peaceful means. For example, if you present the Palestinians with an attractive peace package as the alternative to Hamas that is something that can fly, because the people of Gaza will want to be part of the new Palestinian state and not part of a Hamas rump regime," he declares.
On the third day of the war Barak addressed the Knesset. The war, he said, would not be easy and there would be complications. And, hinting at an imminent ground operation, he said the fighting would be widened until all its goals were achieved.
But as bombs and rockets continued to fall on both sides, and pillars of smoke billowed over the rubble in Gaza, it was far from clear how the IDF's military achievements in Gaza would translate into the government's stated goal: a normal life, free of terror, for Israeli civilians in the south. •
Cover story in Issue 20, January 19, 2009 of The Jerusalem Report.

Analysts: Hezbollah will not fight Israel over Gaza
Middle East On Line
Hezbollah expected to pursue policy of moral support only for Palestinian population under Israeli fire.
BEIRUT - Lebanon's Hezbollah will not use arms to rescue Gaza Strip Palestinians, analysts said on Friday.
The group will pursue its policy of moral support only, according to the analysts.
More than two years after the devastating conflict between the "Party of God" and the Hebrew state, "Hezbollah is not in a position that allows it to carry the burden of a second war," said Paul Salem of the Carnegie Centre for the Middle East.
Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has stepped up declarations of support for Hamas, whose policy of "resistance" to Israeli occupation he shares, but nothing in his words hints at possible military support.
Hezbollah expert Amal Saad-Ghorayeb said that while Hezbollah views Palestine as "a central cause" it would be naive to think that the Lebanese group is going to attack Israel in reprisal for the Israel’s offensive on Gaza which has killed at least 425 Palestinians.
"Even if it had the intention and means to do so, it is difficult for the movement to help Hamas directly, for logistic and geographical reasons," Salem said.
Having already shown itself capable of standing up to Israel, Hezbollah has "tripled its fire power" since their war in 2006, according to Israel. It estimates that the group has some 42,000 missiles which could reach the south of Israel.
Despite Nasrallah's statement on Sunday, a day after the Israeli offensive began, there are domestic reasons that Hezbollah is unlikely to be disposed to launch an adventure against Israel.
Hezbollah was the only armed group allowed to keep its weapons at the end of Lebanon's 15-year civil war in 1990.
"On the domestic level, Hezbollah does not want to antagonize its domestic foes. They don't want to ruin the dialogue table," Saad-Ghorayeb said.
Hezbollah particularly sees itself as Lebanon's defence against Israel and believes it must keep itself armed for this, she added.
If the Shiite group provokes a sudden escalation in the Middle East conflict, its rivals could use that to demand its disarmament, she added.
"However, Hezbollah can perfectly justify any action it takes in order to defend itself. An offensive action would be disastrous on all levels but it can defend itself if Israel provokes (it)," she said.
Some experts point out that Hezbollah does not lack reasons to launch military action -- such as seeking revenge for the assassination of leader Imad Moughnieh in 2008 which was widely blamed on Israel.
Another reason would be that Israel continues to occupy the Lebanese Shabaa Farms.
At present, Hezbollah is maintaining a policy of media attacks against Arab dictatorships supported by Washington. Nasrallah has accused some governments, and especially Egypt, of complicity with Israel after its offensive against Gaza.
Israel waged a bloody 34-day war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006 after Hezbollah fighters seized two Israeli soldiers in a deadly cross-border raid that aimed to free Lebanese soldiers from Israeli prisons. The bodies of the soldiers were returned in a prisoner swap earlier this year.
The war claimed the lives of more than 1,200 people in Lebanon, most of them civilians, and more than 160 Israelis, most of them soldiers.
Hezbollah, originally a resistance group formed to counter an Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, had forced the Israeli military out of Lebanon in 2000.
With huge public support in the Lebanese south, Hezbollah is poised to make stronger political gains in the upcoming elections in Lebanon.
Although Hezbollah may not resort to military means to help the Palestinian population in Gaza, the group remains highly respected by the majority of Arab populations.
Meanwhile, US-backed Arab dictators find themselves under criticism from their populations for not doing enough to save the Palestinian population and their democratically elected government Hamas from brutal and indiscriminate Israeli raids.