LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 13/09
Bible Reading of the
day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 1,14-20. After John had been
arrested, Jesus came to Galilee proclaiming the gospel of God:
This is the time of fulfillment. The kingdom of God is at hand. Repent, and
believe in the gospel. As he passed by the Sea of Galilee, he saw Simon and his
brother Andrew casting their nets into the sea; they were fishermen. Jesus said
to them, "Come after me, and I will make you fishers of men."
Then they abandoned their nets and followed him. He walked along a little
farther and saw James, the son of Zebedee, and his brother John. They too were
in a boat mending their nets. Then he called them. So they left their father
Zebedee in the boat along with the hired men and followed him.
Vatican Council II
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church in the Modern World «Gaudium et Spes»,
§41,45
"This is the time of fulfillment. The kingdom of God is at hand"
Modern man is on the road to a more thorough development of his own personality,
and to a growing discovery and vindication of his own rights. Since it has been
entrusted to the Church to reveal the mystery of God, Who is the ultimate goal
of man, she opens up to man at the same time the meaning of his own existence,
that is, the innermost truth about himself. The Church truly knows that only
God, Whom she serves, meets the deepest longings of the human heart, which is
never fully satisfied by what this world has to offer. She also knows that man
is constantly worked upon by God's spirit, and hence can never be altogether
indifferent to the problems of religion. The experience of past ages proves
this, as do numerous indications in our own times. For man will always yearn to
know, at least in an obscure way, what is the meaning of his life, of his
activity, of his death. The very presence of the Church recalls these problems
to his mind. But only God, Who created man to His own image and ransomed him
from sin, provides the most adequate answer to the questions, and this Ho does
through what He has revealed in Christ His Son, Who became man. Whoever follows
after Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more of a man... For God's Word,
by whom all things were made, was Himself made flesh so that as perfect man He
might save all men and sum up all things in Himself. The Lord is the goal of
human history, the focal point of the longings of history and of civilization,
the center of the human race, the joy of every heart and the answer to all its
yearnings.
Free
Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
A Plan for Gaza: Demilitarization
and Internationalization. By: Dr. Walid Phares 12/01/09
New
resistance group vows to take fight to Jewish state-By
Andrew Wander/Daily
Star
12/01/09
Is There a Lebanese-Syrian
Divergence?By: Abdullah Iskanda/Al-Hayat/12.01.09
Livni squanders the IDF's
achievement-By:JEFF BARAK/Jerusalem Post 12/01/09
Arabs
won't prosper - or democratize - until they have real private sectors-The
Daily Star 12/01/09
Israel's victories in Gaza make up for its
failures in Lebanon. By: Ari Shavit,
Ha'aretz 12/01/09
The Gaza Crisis:
Regional Consequences.By: Riad Kahwaji.SUSRIS.org
12/01/09
What Israel Learned
from the 2006 Lebanon War. By Jamie Glazov/FrontPageMagazine 12/01/09
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for January 12/09
Mideast black hole of diplomacy awaits Obama-International
Herald Tribune
Death
toll in Gaza onslaught approaches 900-(AFP)
Iranian
firms 'still evading' US sanctions-(AFP)
Egypt reports progress in truce talks with Hamas-International
Herald Tribune
Fadlallah calls for 'three Islamic poles' to offset Israel's power-(AFP)
Gaza
protests come in several colors, shapes and sizes-Daily
Star
Hizbullah warns Israel against using rockets as pretext to attack Lebanon-Daily
Star
NLP
kicks off campaign for 2009 elections-Daily
Star
Dear
President-elect Obama-Compiled
By Daily Star Staff
Beirut receives bids to run cellular grids for one year-Daily
Star
LOG
says members' cars torched near Tyre-Daily
Star-Daily Star
Gaza
aid ship awaits repairs two weeks after Israelis rammed it-Daily
Star
New
resistance group vows to take fight to Jewish state-Daily
Star
Chavez
lashes out as Zionist state as 'murder arm' of United States-(AFP)
UNRWA
mocks accusation of infiltration by Hamas-(AFP)
Aoun: I Won't Back Anyone Who Can't Be Head of
Municipality-Naharnet
Efforts to Bring Together Jumblat, Raad Resume-Naharnet
Parliament Session on Saturday to Hear Ban Speech-Naharnet
Report: National Dialogue
Postponed for Few Days-Naharnet
Progress Made in Probe
Into Rocket Attack on Israel-Naharnet
Reds Demonstrate in Beirut-Naharnet
Obama Promises to Confront
Tehran for 'Exporting Terrorism Through Hizbullah'-Naharnet
Fire From Syria at Israeli
Troops in Golan-Naharnet
Assaad's Supporters in
Tyre Attacked-Naharnet
Hizbullah: Washington
Would Fail in Gaza-Naharnet
Fadlallah Wants 'Islamic
Poles' to Cooperate-Naharnet
Kuwait Forms New Cabinet
with Little Change-Naharnet
A Plan
for Gaza: Demilitarization and Internationalization
by Walid Phares, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist
It may be too early to discuss both a comprehensive solution for the future of a
Palestinian state and to anticipate an end to the global War on Terror at the
same time, but here goes. In any discussion of peace in the Middle East it's
important to remember the intentions of the Iranian and Syrian regimes and their
proxy, Hezbollah when we think about saving the civilian population of Gaza from
war, shielding the Israeli populations from rockets and avoiding an escalation
of violence that could engulf the entire region. The Iranian and Syrian regimes
and their ally Hezbollah will always oppose the peace process and try to sink
it.
So is there a plan to bring peace to the southern shores of the Levant? In an
interview with Al Jazeera, Israeli President Shimon Peres said his country will
stop military operations when the strikes by Hamas and its allies will come to
an end. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said his Palestinian Authority (PA)
is ready to assume responsibility for the sake of his people. Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah said their governments are ready to
solve the crisis in Gaza if the PA is part of it. The United States, the
European Union and the United Nations all affirmed that everything has to be
done to end the war in Gaza. Excellent.
If all the players listed above are ready to stop the violence, end the war and
save Palestinian and Israeli civilians from bloodshed, then the plan seems to be
clear: demilitarization and internationalization of Gaza.
Establishing a fully-fledged U.N. sponsored and managed security system in the
enclave has precedents across the planet: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and to
some extent in Lebanon and possibly in the near future, Darfur.
When an area slips under the control of a militia which is not bound by a peace
treaty, or operating under international law, and when a population comes under
fire from any party because of the military actions of such a militia, and until
a recognizable and recognized sovereign state becomes responsible for such an
enclave, the U.N. Security Council must step in and apply Chapter 7 of the
charter, that is to bring peace to civilian populations.
In this case, the United Nations has a duty to seize Gaza and manage its peace
until an internationally recognized and responsible Palestinian state rises
again in that province. How will this be accomplished?
1. The Security Council meets and declares Gaza as an area under U.N. emergency
management and vote, under Chapter 7, for a strong multinational force (MNF) to
enter the enclave in coordination with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
2. The MNF should not include forces whose governments are in a state of war
with Israel or with the Palestinian Authority and must have diplomatic relations
with both, for the purpose of peace building.
3. The MNF proceeds with the disarming of Hamas and all other militias first.
Gaza should be demilitarized fully. Israeli forces would withdraw to the lines
of demarcation fully.
4. The MNF would reestablish police centers and remit them to a reformed and
transparent PA.
5. The MNF would protect the civilian population, in coordination with the PA
units.
6. The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference would provide
all needed expenses for the MNF and the PA security forces. A consortium of oil
producing governments from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) would
grant Gaza's U.N.-sponsored local administration $10 billion or so to end the
economic crisis, fund new schools, hospitals and basic infrastructure.
7. The Arab League would commit to grant Gaza residents visas to visit all Arab
countries and work permits if they wish so.
8. Israel commits to allow Gaza workers to travel to the West Bank and vice
versa.
9. The final security and economic arrangements would be integrated in the final
status negotiations between the PA and Israel.
10. The PA and Israel would resume their direct negotiations for a peace
settlement.
This 10-point plan can, first and foremost, bring peace and security to the
Palestinian population in Gaza, the Israeli civilians in the surrounding areas,
and also engage the responsibility of the United Nations, the European Union,
the Arab League and the OIC in peace making.
Evidently, such a plan will never see the light of day as long as any party to
the conflict thinks they can only count on a military solution – and
particularly as long as Hamas is instructeed by Tehran and Damascus to sink the
peace process. Sadly as long as democracy is not on the rise in Iran and Syria
we cannot predict the end of the War on Terror.
Is There a Lebanese-Syrian Divergence?
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 11/01/09//
The repercussions of the Israeli offensive on Gaza have so far spared Lebanon.
The official and popular reactions have been limited to condemning and
denouncing the Israeli war crimes in the Strip, in total solidarity with the
Palestinian people in the face of the Israeli killing machine. The rockets fired
two days ago at Nahariya from South Lebanon offered the Lebanese government, the
political parties, the UN and the states contributing to the UNIFIL an
opportunity to confirm the need not to embroil Lebanon in any field
confrontation with the Israeli troops, as this will jeopardize the country, the
Security Council Resolution 1701 and the UNIFIL missions.
Even though Hezbollah has attributed its ambiguous stance to the nature of its
strategy in confronting Israel, the cabinet - of which it is part - has
consensually declined to see South Lebanon turn into a battlefield in the
current confrontation. As such, the official stance has prevailed over field
neutrality, with the parties to the government, including Hezbollah, supporting
the measures taken by the army in cooperation with the UNIFIL to prevent any
party from opening the Lebanese front in light of the assault on Gaza. Such a
party has been repeatedly identified as the Damascus-based armed Palestinian
factions with bases in Lebanon.
The rockets launched from the South were described by many as a message to the
Lebanese State. But most importantly, the content of this message must be
well-understood, not to mention its impact on the situation in Lebanon.
This message does not target the status quo in the South nor does it threaten to
blow it up. Lebanon, Israel, the countries of the region, and influential
capitals all know that such a step is impossible without a Hezbollah decision.
In turn, this decision is not linked to enthusiastic impulses but to a series of
regional calculations. Most probably, this message was addressed in light of
Lebanon's participation in the Arab ministerial delegation to the UN and its
Foreign Minister's involvement in the Saudi-led efforts to reach the Security
Council Resolution 1860 on a ceasefire in Gaza. Fawzi Salloukh is said to
represent the opposition in the national unity government.
As such, Lebanon's approach to the offensive differs from Syria's. Following his
meeting with his French counterpart, Nicolas Sarkozy, who arrived in Syria to
promote the Egyptian initiative, Syrian President Bashar Assad called for an
Arab Summit even if unattended by all member states. The aim was to reject the
initiative that became a goal to attain in the Resolution 1860. In turn, Syria's
foreign minister branded as "short-sighted" the Arabs' referring the case to the
Security Council. For this reason, the Syrian diplomacy rejected the efforts by
the delegation, including Salloukh's who hailed their results. As for Tishreen
newspaper, it described the Resolution 1860 as "tailored to Israel's
conditions."
Amidst the prevailing Arab divisions, the Lebanese diplomacy has adopted a
stance different than Syria's in a matter of paramount importance to Syria.
Lebanon has not opposed Syria's policy in this respect nor has it rallied behind
a particular Arab axis. But at the very least, it has not taken Syria's
considerations into account. This takes place for the first time since the Taef
Agreement in the late 80s and the policy of the concomitance of tracks.
The question has to do now with this conflict; how it will impact the bilateral
relations in the next stage and Lebanon's ability to uphold such a conflict -
especially when the Israeli killing machine stops in Gaza, accounts are made,
and prices are demanded. Moreover, there is the issue of the Syrian approach to
Lebanon in light of the unhurried exchange of ambassadors, which was supposed to
take place before the end of 2008. The issue is also related to the effects it
will have upon the allies of Damascus in Lebanon and their conduct in Parliament
until the coming parliamentary elections scheduled for next June. Moreover,
there is the relation with President Michel Suleiman, who enters into a
political atmosphere that is different than the one produced by the Doha
agreement, which had led to his election
Livni squanders the IDF's achievement
By JEFF BARAK
Jerusalem Post
While Operation Cast Lead has shown that the IDF, under the cautious and
calculated leadership of Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of General Staff
Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, has learned the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, it
is becoming depressingly clearer that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has not.
Livni did not measure up to the job in the Second Lebanon War when she failed to
temper Ehud Olmert's rash enthusiasm for a military clash with Hizbullah and was
unable to persuade the cabinet of the need for a quick, diplomatic exit from
Lebanon. This time, in one of the strangest reversal of roles seen around an
Israeli cabinet table, the foreign minister is ignoring the defense
establishment's ability to provide the government with reasonable exit points
from a military operation, thereby ensuring the fighting continues.
In the wake of the Second Lebanon War, the government determinedly set low goals
for Operation Cast Lead. Thankfully, instead of choosing the sound
bite-attractive but difficult-to-achieve policy of regime change and the
toppling of Hamas, which as the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
shown is not always the best way forward, it rightly declared that its sole aim
was to stop Hamas' firing of rockets from Gaza. Even the return of captured IDF
soldier Gilad Schalit was not mentioned as a war aim.
Now, two weeks after the fighting started, this declared aim has been achieved.
True, rockets may still be falling, but this is because as long as the fighting
officially continues, Hamas will continue firing even though it knows it has
lost. After more than 850 Palestinians have been killed, dozens of smuggling
tunnels destroyed and Hamas offices bombed into oblivion, Hamas, like Hizbullah
before it, has learned its lesson the hard way of assuming that Israel would
never react. A cease-fire, on terms favorable to Israel, is there for the
reaching.
IN ACHIEVING this point, with low Israeli casualties, Barak has proved his
worth. First, he was right to delay the operation and to proceed with the
six-month truce with Hamas. Not only did this give the residents of the South a
much-needed respite from the daily rocket fire from Gaza, it gave the IDF more
time to prepare for a military operation should it be needed, even at the cost
of allowing Hamas to develop and smuggle in its longer-range rockets. More
importantly, the six-month quiet also gave Jerusalem the moral legitimacy when
the time eventually came to launch its counterattack.
Despite the growing international criticism, which was inevitable once innocent
Palestinian civilians became increasingly the victims of the response, it is
important to remember that at the beginning of Operation Cast Lead, Israel
received a free hand from the international community to respond to Hamas'
breach of the six-month cease-fire. Given that the Arab world was also
surprisingly acquiescent at the beginning of the operation, it is fair to say
that the initial quiet international support was not simply a result of the
Christmas holiday period.
Secondly, Barak and Ashkenazi structured the IDF's campaign to give the
government a chance to declare victory at a number of convenient exit points,
all designed to avoid the need of reoccupying the Gaza Strip and becoming
entrenched there just as the country was bogged down in the First Lebanon War.
That war was initially launched as a short-term campaign to remove the North
from the threat of Palestinian terrorism and ended up as a two-decade occupation
of southern Lebanon and the creation of Hizbullah as a new enemy.
THE FIRST exit point came immediately after the successful air assault on Gaza
and the French suggestion for a 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire. This diplomatic
proposal was supported by Barak but immediately shot down by Livni. The then
inevitable deployment of ground forces, which has been accompanied by the first
IDF combat fatalities as well as the killing of scores of civilians, created the
second exit point, with the UN Security Council resolution at the end of last
week calling for an immediate cease-fire, a resolution which notably was not
vetoed by the US, despite Olmert's last-minute pleas to President George W Bush.
The government's rejection of this resolution increases the chances of Operation
Cast Lead turning into the operation it did not want: an all-out war against
Hamas and reoccupation of the Gaza Strip. Livni, who unlike Barak and Olmert has
spent the whole of the IDF campaign in front of the cameras and microphones in
what seems to be a desperate attempt to impress next month's voters of her
relevance, told The Washington Post this weekend that the government opposes the
UN call for a cease-fire because it grants Hamas legitimacy and places the
organization on the same level as Israel.
The Security Council resolution is indeed unsatisfactory. First of all, it fails
to place the blame for the current round of fighting, as it should, on Hamas. If
Hamas were not firing rockets, the IDF would have had no need to launch
Operation Cast Lead. Moreover, the cease-fire call does not address the vital
issue of how to prevent the future smuggling of rockets into Gaza via the
tunnels under its border with Egypt and neither does it call for returning the
Strip to the control of the Palestinian Authority and for the disarming of Hamas
and other terror groups there.
But had the foreign minister been more effective in building up an international
coalition of diplomatic support for Israel's position, both during the six-month
cease-fire and the first days of the conflict, then a more favorable UN
resolution could have been crafted. The army has done its job; Livni so far has
squandered the opportunity the IDF has created.
**The writer is a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post
Israel's victories in Gaza make up for its failures in Lebanon
By Ari Shavit, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 13:50 12/01/2009
The war on Hamas is a war for the sovereignty of Israel. It was launched due to
repeated rocket attacks from Gaza following Israel's disengagement from the
coastal strip.
No country in the world would put up with a situation in which its sovereignty
is being undermined and its citizens are being threatened. Given its small
geographical territory and many enemies, Israel can not put up with this
situation.
Therefore, it is up to every decent person who wants Israel to strive for peace
and end its occupation and return to its original borders to support its fight
for sovereignty.
The war on Hamas has bred a humanitarian crisis. Hundreds of Palestinian
civilians have been killed, thousands have been wounded, and over a million have
been left homeless and despairing.
There is no denying that Israel should have done much more to prevent the
enormity of this crisis from transpiring. But the international community -
which openly supports a war against the Taliban that has taken the lives of
hundreds of innocent people - can not, and must not, condemn this war.
Over the past two weeks, Israel has behaved obtusely and insensitively. But
waging war is not a crime. It is yet another chapter in this tragic saga that
must come to an end.
Since launching its attack on Gaza on December 27, Israel has achieved most of
its goals: Hamas was served a harsh blow, Israel regained its deterrence
capabilities, and there is a tangible chance of brining to a halt the rocket
fire on southern Israel.
A right diplomatic move may now put an end to the smuggling of arms from Egypt,
as well as undermine the Palestinian extremists. If this is indeed the case,
Israel could achieve its desired overall goal: peaceful coexistence with a
weakened and deterred Hamas.
In many respects, the war in Gaza has compensated for the shortcomings of the
Second Lebanon War. This time around, the decision to launch the offensive was
calculated and reasoned, and the army has exhibited impressive capabilities.
It is therefore only fair to determine that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who is
to blame for the botched war in Lebanon, is the same person who now stands
behind Israel's achievements.
But in order to maintain these achievements, Israel must not expand its
operation in Gaza. On the contrary. The relative success should be used to forge
a swift diplomatic agreement - one that would stop the fire, halt the killings
and bring the soldiers back home.
Olmert should abide by his own mantra: Enough is enough.
What Israel Learned from the 2006 Lebanon War
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, January 12, 2009
Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Dr. Michael Widlanski, a research fellow at
the Shalem Center. A Schusterman Visiting Professor at Washington University in
St. Louis for 2007-8, he teaches at Hebrew University. He has also served as a
special advisor to Israeli delegations to peace talks in 1991-1992 and as
Strategic Affairs Advisor to the Ministry of Public Security, editing secret PLO
Archives captured in Jerusalem.
FP: Dr. Widlanski, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Widlanski: Thank you.
FP: I would like to focus our discussion today on the lessons Israel learned
from its 2006 Lebanon war and how it has applied those lessons in Gaza today.
So let’s begin with this question: What has Israel been conscious of this time
around in the context of the Lebanon experience?
Widlanski: Israeli officials and officers have had a conscious eye on what
Israel did wrong in 2006 in Lebanon. In both conflicts, Iranian-aided terrorists
exploited ceasefires to rearm and build up their underground networks and
supplies. And in both, terror groups, using rockets as their main weapon, fought
from inhabited areas, deliberately using human shields, hoping for an "Israeli
atrocity" that would stop Israeli combat in its tracks.
Israel has been very conscious of not giving any gifts to Hamas the way it did
to Hezbollah in 2006. For instance, this time around there has been no lack of
Israeli civil defense preparation, infantry training and proper communication
and re-supply logistics. There has not been a headlong pursuit into hostile
territory that makes it easy to blow up Israeli tanks and vehicles with
landmines, explosive tunnels and road-side satchel charges. There has also not
been an open discussion of Israeli maneuvers and goals, making it difficult for
Hamas to prepare or respond. And this time around, there is also no incompetent
and arrogant leadership at the highest levels of the Israeli civilian and
military command.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Israeli Army (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi
have given few statements of any kind, and they have given very few details of
the goals. Olmert, who made two or three major speeches at the beginning of the
Lebanon War, has made very short remarks during the Gaza conflict. Ashkenazi has
almost not appeared at all in public. He has gone back to the classic role of
the fighting general, as opposed to Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, the air force commander
who was overall IDF chief of staff in 2006.
Ashkenazi is a graduate of the Golani infantry brigade, and he prefers to let
his fighting speak for him, as opposed to the talkative Dan Halutz, a voluble
fighter pilot who believed Israel's military objectives could mostly be achieved
from the air.
The Israeli war effort is also helped by the fact that the defense minister is
another seasoned combat soldier, Ehud Barak. He is a former army chief of staff
and is much better prepared for this war than Amir Peretz, the trade union
leader who was Labor Party leader and Defense Minister in 2006. Barak, however,
has been hobbled by his own tendencies toward hesitation and bad communication
which have surfaced at many times in his career, especially when he mishandled
fighting against Yasser Arafat in 2000.
Barak has had lots of time to dwell on his own inadequacies, and he has
carefully prepared for the conflict. This has improved his personal standing in
the public's eyes and the standing of his Labor Party, but he was not eager for
this conflict. He and Olmert mainly reacted.
FP: Can you expand a bit on why Israel has not declared any clear goals?
Widlanski: Yes, Israel has only really stated something along the lines of
acting "to change the situation in the south" and/or "diminish rocket fire."
These goals are vague for several reasons. First, if you don't have clear goals,
then it is harder to say that you failed. The Winograd Investigatory Commission
into the Lebanon War criticized the Olmert Government for misstating and
changing goals many times. Not stating goals is also another way of keeping
Hamas off-balance. One clear, though largely unstated, goal of the warfare is to
improve the credibility of Israel's deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria
and Iran and any other potential foes. Israel emerged from the last nine years
of conflicts with Palestinians and Shiite with its deterrent posture impaired.
Formally, Israeli leaders have only hinted at the goal of reaching a new
ceasefire with reduced rate of rocket fire, but some Israeli officials (UN
Ambassador Gabi Shalev and Foreign Minister Tzippy Livni) have hinted at greater
goals. These include, perhaps, cleaning out Hamas so that Abbas, the successor
to Arafat, can try to return to Gaza.
FP: But there are some serious problems here. Cleaning out Hamas is by no means
easy and the return of Abbas presents all kind of more and the same.
Widlanski: Indeed, Hamas has 16,000 to 20,000 fighters, and cleaning them out is
a lot harder than cleaning house before Passover or New Year's. Abbas and his
forces in Gaza under Muhammad Dahlan were chased out or killed in 2007 because
they were weak and corrupt, and that has not changed. So all the high talk from
Livni and Olmert about re-instituting the "road map" or "The Annapolis Formula"
by handing territory to Abbas and his PLO colleagues is about as realistic as
making Bernie Madoff the head of economic recovery efforts in the United States.
FP: So how is the war in Gaza going for Israel?
Widlanski: Unlike Hezbollah, which instigated the fighting in warm weather,
killing and kidnapping Israeli soldiers in June 2006, Hamas began escalating its
attacks on Israel in November, during the wet weather. Indeed, the war began
towards the end of the Hanukah holiday and just after Christmas, during the
rainy season, and this is a distinct advantage to Hamas, which has been trying
to bog down and blow up Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers, while
inhibiting or downing Israeli fighter jets and helicopters.
During the first week of fighting, this seasonal advantage certainly helped
Hamas, although Israel correctly did not try to "force the issue" by launching
its ground operation too early. However, the aerial assault and early ground
fighting went better than Israel originally anticipated, and by January 3-4,
Israeli Defense Minister Barak was already toying with the idea of an early
ceasefire over a chastened Hamas. But his colleagues, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
and Foreign Minister Tzippy Livni, wanted to continue fighting at least a bit
longer. But these positions appear to have switched.
As Raviv Drucker has reported, Olmert supports an end to the war with a formal
agreement involving the US and Egypt, guaranteeing the status of Gaza. Livni
seeks the end of the war quickly and even without an agreement. She is more
interested in arriving at a general understanding from Egypt that it will act on
stopping arms smuggling. Barak, meanwhile, wants the war to end with an improved
ceasefire. He distrusts any deal which involves the Egyptians and the transfer
of Gaza to Abbas’s control. As Pinhas Inbari has reported, he would rather deal
unofficially with a weakened Hamas which, in his view, can at least control its
inner workings and the behaviour of Islamic Jihad, while Abbas has no control
over anything.
FP: Hamas rockets and the frequency of launches?
Widlanski: The rate of rockets has been 20-70 a day, which is clearly below what
Hamas had hoped: 200-300, especially when it began the fighting with 40,000
rockets in hand.
And although Hamas has successfully struck the port of Ashdod, forcing Israel to
suspend port activities, Hamas has not been able to disrupt activities in
southern Israel the way Hezbollah disrupted northern Israel in 2006. Although
Hamas has gotten one or two mortar rounds or rockets near military bases, it has
not seriously affected them or airfields or strategic installations such as
power plants or refineries. The Ashkelon power plant run by the Palestinian
Jews—that is to say, Israel--supplies electricity to the Palestinian Arabs of
Gaza, and Hamas is still trying to hit it.
Hamas has successfully shelled Beersheva and Ashkelon with long-distance Grad
rockets, which are Chinese and Iranian modified versions of long-range 122-mm
Katyusha rockets. Some of these are deliberately manufactured like the bombs
carried by Hamas suicide bombers. The rocket warheads carry metal ball bearings
the size of large m and m's which are released at terrific velocity when the
rocket lands. If you get hit with one of them in the upper part of your body,
the wound is serious and often fatal. One of these rockets landed in Gadera, a
small township or moshava where my in-laws live. The rocket fell on the street
where my mother-in-law's doctor lives. Gadera was established in 1882, even
before there was a Palestinian Mandate. How this qualifies as "resistance to
Occupation" escapes me.
FP: Casualties on both sides and the propaganda war surrounding them?
Widlanski: As for Israeli soldiers, there have been relatively few casualties,
but since the infantry and artillery fighting increased on Jan 3-4, casualties
have increased, including four soldier deaths caused apparently by "friendly
fire" in the fierce house-to-house fighting in the refugee camps and serpentine
alleys of the unfamiliar terrain of Gaza.
At the end of the first week, there were said to be over 500 Palestinians
killed, and the number has now risen above 600, with several thousand wounded.
Several Palestinian "spokesmen, spokeswomen and legal advisors" are claiming
that the disproportionate casualty rate shows that Israel has used
"disproportionate power."
But as New York mayor Michael Bloomberg said here a few days ago, we would
always want the police to have a disproportionate edge over criminals, and we
would not want even one police officer wounded.
Like Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas is not allowing a detailed account, claiming most
victims were civilians. The Israelis claim more than 400 were Hamas fighters or
their immediate families, and I believe this is correct. Israel has released
pictures of more than 40 key Hamas field commanders, along with their
"biographies"—which bus bombings or rocket attacks they commanded or planned.
Members of UNWRA—the United Nations relief agency that deals only with
Palestinian Arab refugees for 60 years—claim that one-quarter of casualties are
"civilians." Before taking this figure at face value, one should remember that
most UNWRA employees are Palestinians and that the UN organization is infamous
for its day-to-day corruption and phony population figures. There are tens of
thousands of dead Palestinians whose refugee rations arrive every month in
Jabalya, Bureij and Shaja'iyya camps in Gaza. One should also remember that UN
officials have regularly allowed Hamas and Hezbollah gun emplacements in their
camps and schools in Gaza and Lebanon, and this dovetails with the policies of
Hezbollah and Hamas to manufacture "atrocities." We know that Hamas senior
commanders are running around in Gaza holding young children in their hands so
they can act as human shields. Hamas has consciously put mortar launchers and
rockets on roofs of schools and inside the homes of civilians.
We have just witnessed a horrid example of Hamas’s use of human shields. The
Palestinians, for instance, have charged that more than 40 civilians taking
shelter in a UN school were killed by Israel. But the Israelis were responding
to a Palestinian mortar attack from the school, and there has been no
independent verification of the Palestinian charges. Israel has shown video
footage of Hamas gunner using mortars from the roof of the school.
The Arab claims have weakened Israel, which has allowed daily three-hour
cease-fires in Gaza in order to allow civilians to stock up on food or go to
hospitals. But it is feared that some of the Hamas terrorists will exploit the
humanitarian efforts so that they can escape, re-arm and re-organize. Israeli
intelligence officials, for instance, have reported that a significant portion
of the Hamas leadership has taken shelter in the basement of the Shifa Hospital
in Gaza.
FP: What are Hamas’s goals in this war and in general?
Widlanski: Like Hezbollah, Hamas has a primary goal: to survive and to show that
it, unlike Arab states, has not suffered a defeat. But Hamas clearly has other
goals which dominate its refusal to extend the previous ceasefire and instead to
move to fighting now and which induced it to escalate fighting—by Islamic Jihad
and by Hamas's own units—beginning in late October 2008. Hamas wants to gain
formal recognition from the world, especially from the Arab League, of it rule
in Gaza. It wants to gain informal Israeli recognition of its rule in Gaza,
along with a formal opening up of civilian and military re-supply from Sinai and
from Israel, thereby guaranteeing the Hamas regime's survival. It seeks to
demonstrate that it has a longer strategic reach, not just to the border area of
Sderot (one to seven kilometers and 20,000 to 40,000 people) but also covering
the southern sixth of Israel's population –1,000,000 people in Ashkelon, Ashdod,
Beersheva, Gadera and perhaps even Rehovot.
Hamas also has clear but informal goals for its leadership in Gaza and in
Damascus:
1] To prevent the Fatah and PLO forces under the supposed control of Mahmoud
Abbas from coming back to Gaza. This is a goal of Hamas-Gaza and Hamas-Damascus
equally.
2] To prevent Abbas and Fatah from extending Abbas's term as chairman of the
Palestinian Authority (PA), and, instead to force elections in the West Bank
(and perhaps in Gaza, too) where Hamas would win. Again, this is a goal shared
by Hamas-Gaza and Hamas-Damascus;
[3] Hamas was clearly hoping to copy Hezbollah in "bloodying Israel's nose" in
pitched infantry battles in closed zones. It also hoped and is hoping to blow up
one or more tanks immediately and even taking more Israeli soldiers hostage,
thereby forcing further morale damage on Israel while boosting Hamas by (a)
forcing a major Israeli release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners to Israel
and (b) getting Israel to attack a Hamas mosque or apartment building and
killing a large number of civilians, especially women and children, thereby
convicting Israel of committing an atrocity
Egypt has recently toughened some of its searches in Sinai and at the border.
These are not at the level of what Jordan does, nor anything close to what
Israel needs, but they discomfit Hamas a bit. So, Hamas is also hoping to get
Egypt to relax border controls in and out of Gaza, thereby allowing money
transfers and logistical re-supply
As in Lebanon in 2006, there is a great battle for the airwaves that parallels
the battle on the ground going on here, as in Lebanon in 2006. Apparently
Israel's blitz attack from the air on December 27 caught about 200 Hamas
operatives and mid-level field commanders in the open, killing them, and Hamas
is now trying to stop the Israeli attacks, as Hezbollah did, in 1996 and 2006,
with accounts of Israeli atrocities.
FP: And the war over the meaning of the war? The media war?
Widlanski: Hamas is basically falling back on Al-Jazeera Television to carry its
propaganda to the world, because Israel has successfully struck Hamas's own
broadcasting and internet facilities. But Hamas is also getting help from the
BBC, CNN and other Western media who prefer the easy and politically correct—but
factually inaccurate—story line of Palestinians as David and Israelis as
Goliath.
FP: Dr. Widlanski, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.
Widlanski: My pleasure.
----------------------------------
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in
History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and
wrote the introduction to David Horowitz’s Left Illusions. He is also the
co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of
Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University
Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous
symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at
jglazov@rogers.com.
The Gaza Crisis: Regional
Consequences
Riad Kahwaji
http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2009/ioi/090110-gaza-consequences.html
The division in the Middle East region between the so-called moderate
pro-western camp on the one side and the Iranian axis that includes Syria,
Hizballah and Hamas on the other was clear in the early reactions to the Israeli
military operation against Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia took the lead in the moderate camp in criticizing Hamas for giving Israel
the alibi to wage this devastating onslaught by cancelling the lull from its
side. Hizballah, Syria and Iran accused some moderate Arab countries, directly
and indirectly, of conspiring with the United States and Israel against Hamas.
Hence, not only Israel was on the defensive diplomatically, trying to justify
its actions to Arabs and the international community. Hamas also found itself on
the defensive, trying to explain why it did not do more to promote national
reconciliation and extend the lull with Israel. This was clear in news talk
shows on pan-Arab channels and media outlets affiliated with Saudi Arabia or
based in Dubai and Beirut.
But things quickly started to change. Images of dozens of scarred and dead
children in Gaza have unified Arabs in their anger over Israel's excessive use
of force against civilians. In the first week of the war, Arab public opinion
was split regarding who is more to blame--Hamas or Israel--for starting it, and
how it should be resolved. But the longer the conflict has gone on, the more
support Hamas has been gaining. Since the Israeli military is unable to
seriously weaken or decapitate Hamas in a timely manner, the majority of Arab
analysts and officials fear Israel will once again fail as it did against
Hizballah in the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006.
Therefore, many members of the moderate Arab camp are becoming more critical of
Israel and more sympathetic toward Hamas. One example is the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), where the leadership has gradually grown more critical of the
Israeli operation and the media has become more graphic and detailed in its
coverage of the suffering of civilians in the densely populated Gaza Strip. The
UAE leaders, moving in the footsteps of their Saudi counterparts, have ordered a
general fundraising campaign for war victims in Gaza. UAE Foreign Minister
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, like his Saudi counterpart, joined the Arab
League delegation to the United Nations Security Council to demand an immediate
ceasefire in Gaza.
As Hamas gains more public support, its allies, like Syria, grow stronger. The
Syrian leaders were quick to capitalize on this conflict by presenting
themselves as brokers. Being the host to the Hamas leadership-in-exile, Damascus
has received several senior officials from the region and the West seeking to
use Syrian influence with Hamas to gain more concessions from the movement and
bring about a ceasefire. Syria will make sure to gain credit for whatever deal
is negotiated with Hamas to end the current Gaza war. This situation has once
again reinforced Damascus' position in the region as a major player that cannot
be ignored by the international community. For the Syrians, being a member of
the Iranian axis could once again pay.
As for Lebanon, what applies to Syria would to a certain extent apply to
Hizballah, which is widely credited for training and arming Hamas. Most Lebanese
have been concerned about the spillover of the Gaza war into Lebanon. The worry
expressed by the Lebanese president and prime minister as well as many others
and their wish to maintain stability along the border with Israel was reflected
in the quick decision to send military reinforcements to South Lebanon to assist
United Nations peacekeepers in policing the area and preventing any groups from
firing missiles into northern Israel.
Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah has been vague in recent speeches as to
whether his party would open another front from South Lebanon to help Hamas.
Most Lebanese analysts believe Hizballah would not risk sparking a war with
Israel just a few months before Lebanese general elections because this could
undermine its Christian allies' status at the polls by proving that the party's
weapons were not for defending Lebanon but were serving foreign interests.
Moreover, Iran seems to have been careful not to do anything provocative in the
last few weeks of the outgoing US administration of George W. Bush in order to
avoid being drawn into a large-scale military conflict.
Thus, the moderate Arab camp finds itself in a paradoxical situation: it cannot
afford to see the Iranian axis grow stronger, and at the same time cannot but
oppose Israel when the latter resorts to indecisive and bloody military
campaigns. By failing to get Israel to accept the Arab peace initiative or to
generate progress in the peace process, the moderate camp is weakened every time
Israel unsuccessfully engages any of Iran's allies.
Many Arab officials and analysts believe that, for a number of reasons, Israel
is unable to wage a decisive military campaign against Hamas or Hizballah.
Therefore, as long as Israel does not seriously pursue the peaceful route, the
moderate camp will become weaker and Iran stronger every time Israel resorts to
the military option. This time around, the majority is starting to believe
Israel will fail in Gaza and is worried about the consequences for Iran's status
in the region.- Published 8/1/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Riad Kahwahi is CEO of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA)
in Dubai.
Published Jan 8, 2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]
Edition 1 Volume 7 - January 08, 2009
New resistance group vows to take fight to Jewish state
But rhetoric dismissed as 'posturing'
By Andrew Wander
Daily Star staff
Monday, January 12, 2009
BEIRUT: A new resistance group based in Lebanon, which claims to have 3,000
members and advanced weapons to use against Israel, said on Sunday it had
conducted its first training maneuvers in the south and east of the country. The
Arab Islamic Resistance, an armed offshoot of the Islamic Arab Council, was set
up by Mohammad Ali al-Husseini as a rival to Hizbullah. He said that it had
carried out military exercises and first aid training at undisclosed locations.
In a statement, Husseini warned that his fighters will not "stand idly" while
Israel continues its bloody military offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
He said that the group's patience had run out and it would "carry out its duty
to defend the nation."
But Lebanese security sources have said they are not unduly concerned by the
group's threats. Speaking to The Daily Star, a security official said that its
emergence probably had more to do with upcoming elections than the situation in
Gaza.
"Their real intention is to raise their profile in light of the June 7
elections," the official said. "They are trying to establish a stronghold among
the Sunni people, especially in areas when they can exert this kind of
influence, such as Tripoli, Sidon and in areas of Beirut."
He said the prospect of violence from the group was unlikely. "They are not
going to start a revolution, they just want to establish their presence in the
political arena," he said. "They are just posturing, it's all talk. They will
not launch an attack on Israel or help Palestine in a combative sense."
Any attack on Israel from Lebanon is likely to draw an immediate military
response from the Jewish state. Last Thursday, militants fired Katyusha rockets
across the border, prompting Israel to fire artillery into southern Lebanon.
Israeli military sources have said they will respond to further attacks in a
similar way.
Husseini said last week's rocket attack was a "clear message" to Israel to stop
its offensive on Gaza. "Next time rockets will be fired to kill," he said.
But analysts say that some of the group's claims, which include a statement
announcing the invention of a new "Arabism rocket" that the group says it
manufactures itself, do not ring true.
Timur Goksel, a lecturer at the American University of Beirut and a former
adviser to UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, said it was unlikely that such a group
could have been set up and trained in secret.
"I find it a bit incredible that they could have trained 3,000 men without
anyone knowing about it. Lebanon is too small a country to train a force of that
size," he said.
But he warned that despite the "flowery rhetoric" employed by the new group's
leadership, there was some cause for concern. "There are some dangerous signs.
It's not just Lebanese, but it's Arab. That's a very risky situation, because
you can have people joining who don't have a stake in Lebanon."
The group's emergence comes at a time of heightened tension between Israel and
Lebanon following the Jewish state's invasion of the Gaza Strip. The offensive
has sparked fears of the conflict spreading to Lebanon's border with Israel, but
apart from last week's rocket attack, the situation in southern Lebanon has
remained calm.
Both UNFIL and the Lebanese Army have stepped up patrols in southern Lebanon to
prevent militants in the area from carrying out attacks on Israel in revenge for
ongoing violence in Gaza, and have called for "restraint" from both sides.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=98939&categ_id=1