WHAT TO DO ON LEBANON: THE FUTURE OF LEBANON-ISRAEL RELATIONS?
During the first decades of Israel’s existence and until the late 1970s, many Israelis felt Lebanon would be the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. This belief was based on the fact that during this period, Lebanon was dominated by the Maronite community, whose foremost goal at that time was believed by many Israelis to be the preservation of Lebanon’s Christian and generally Western character. Thus, in the view of many Israelis, it followed that the Maronites in Lebanon would not only be prepared, but even eager to establish peaceful relations with Israel, which they presumably saw as a kind of natural ally in face of the Muslim Arab world surrounding both states.
Yet contrary to the expectation of many Israelis that Lebanon
would manifest goodwill toward the Jewish state, until the late
1970s, Lebanon generally showed itself to be hostile or, at the
very least, unwilling to establish ties with Israel. Hopeful
Israelis explained the anti-Israel stance taken by Lebanon as
the result of the Maronites’ fear of how Lebanon’s Muslim
population would respond to improved relations with the Jewish
state, and of how the Arab states in general might respond.
Lebanon was, after all, dependent on trade with those states for
its economic survival. Therefore, the conclusion drawn in Israel
was that while Lebanon could not take the lead in the Arab world
in making a settlement with Israel, once Israel had signed a
peace treaty with another Arab state, Lebanon would quickly
follow and become the second Arab state to make peace.
Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Jordan did
so in 1994. Yet regarding Lebanon, it is commonplace among
Israelis to assume that Lebanon will be the last Arab state to
take this step for two reasons: first, the feelings of
resentment in light of the belligerent Israeli-Lebanese
relations of recent decades; and second, the dominance of
Hizballah in Lebanese life. Hizballah, after all, absolutely
rejects any recognition of or negotiations with Israel, and
consequently any prospect of a peace treaty.
However, there is a third reason, which is perhaps the main one,
accounting for Lebanon’s refusal to make peace with Israel--the
fact that nearly 400,000 Palestinian refugees now reside in
Lebanese territory. Most Lebanese do not want these people to
remain in their country. Indeed, this issue is one of the few
upon which there is a consensus cutting across the communal
lines and ideological commitments that divide the country so
sharply. Even Hizballah supporters are part of this consensus,
which makes the removal of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon
and their resettlement either in Israel or in the expected
Palestinian state a necessary condition for any future
settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Israel’s dilemma regarding its Lebanese policy became sharply
apparent once more in the wake of the June 7, 2009 Lebanese
elections. The elections yielded a number of surprises, mostly
positive for Israel and perhaps the region as a whole. The first
surprise was Hizballah’s failure to obtain a majority in the
Lebanese parliament. Still, the election results did not change
the situation in Lebanon in any fundamental way. The challenges
facing Israel thus remain more or less the same.
THE JUNE 7, 2009 LEBANESE ELECTIONS: INITIAL THOUGHTS
The parliamentary elections held in Lebanon on June 7, 2009 came
exactly four years after the previous balloting, which had
heralded the major change of course that became known as the
“Cedar Revolution.” On February 14, 2005, former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated in the heart of
Beirut. His death evoked a political storm in the country, which
was manifested in a great wave of public demonstrations directed
mainly against Syria, whose leaders were perceived by those in
Beirut as being behind Hariri’s murder. Within a month, the
demonstrations led to the expulsion of the Syrian forces that
had been stationed on Lebanese soil for many long years. As
early as March 5, 2005, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad declared
his intention to remove the Syrian troops from Lebanon, and by
the end the month, the Syrians had fully retreated. During May
and June 2005, still under the shadow of the storm raised by
Rafiq al-Hariri’s murder, parliamentary elections were held in
Lebanon. The results completed the change of direction begun by
the public demonstrations that followed Hariri’s assassination.
The results showed a clear victory for the so-called “March 14
camp.” This bloc was an anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian coalition,
led by Sunni leader Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, who were joined by a number of Maronite partners. The
name “March 14” came from the huge demonstration in support of
the camp’s ideas that took place in Beirut on that date in 2005.
During the four years following the 2005 elections, the March 14
camp ruled the country. In order to maintain political
stability, however, it was willing to compromise its ideas and
even cooperate with the forces headed by Hizballah that opposed
its path.
The forces constituting the opposition to the March 14 camp were
given the name “March 8,” in reference to the huge demonstration
organized by Hizballah and its allies in Beirut on that date in
2005 in order to express solidarity with Syria. Hizballah’s
junior partners in the March 8 opposition bloc were the Shi'i
Amal movement, led by Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih
Berri, and the Free Patriotic Movement, led by the Maronite
General Michel Aoun.
The tension between these two camps--the Sunni and Druze-led
March 14 camp on the one side, and the Shi`i camp led by
Hizballah on the other--stemmed not only from Lebanon’s internal
situation, but also from Sunni-Shi'a tensions throughout the
region, as well as the tensions engendered by the division of
the Arab states into those favoring a pro-Western line and those
labeled the “axis of evil” (Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas).
In recent years, it seemed the “axis of evil” was gaining power
and that the U.S. failures in Iraq were opening the way for it
to exercise great influence over the region. People were
concerned about Iran in particular, due to its hegemonic
aspirations over the entire region, from the Iran-Iraq border to
the shores of the Mediterranean.
In light of these factors, the heightened interest manifested by
the other states of the region in the course of the Lebanese
elections and their results was understandable. Observers tended
to view the balloting as a reflection of the power struggles
bedeviling the entire region, speculating the results might
provide an indication of the balance of forces between the
moderate and radical axes. In this regard, no observer could
ignore the deep involvement of two other states in the region in
the Lebanese balloting: on the one side, Saudi Arabia, which
threw all its weight behind Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri and his camp,
and on the other side, Iran, which supported its local client,
Hizballah. With both states investing large sums of money in
hopes of advancing the cause of their Lebanese supporters, to a
certain extent, the campaign had become a Saudi-Iranian struggle
for prestige.
The forecasts on the eve of the voting predicted a very close
race, with the March 8 opposition camp appearing to be the
victors. However, when the votes were counted during the night
of June 7, 2009, it turned out that the March 14 camp had won.
Thus, in the view of many, the “camp of the good guys” had
defeated the “camp of the bad guys.” The expectations of an
opposition victory were based mainly on reports and forecasts
publicized in Lebanese and foreign media outlets generally
identified with the opposition. The main source was the Qatari
television channel Al Jazeera, which in recent years had thrown
its full support behind Hizballah and the radical camp in the
Arab world in general.
Yet the Lebanese people gave the victory to the March 14 camp,
which won 71 of the 128 parliamentary seats. The March 8
opposition camp (Hizballah, with Amal and Michel Aoun) won only
57 seats.
Political forecasts in Lebanese elections are complicated even
at the best of times. The country’s electoral system is founded
on the principle of religious community affiliation, with the
seats in the parliament allotted in advance according to a
religious community key. Thus the voting for candidates is based
upon considerations of communal affiliation. In addition, there
exists a division of the seats by regions, that is, the voting
is on a regional, and not national, basis. For purposes of
analysis, therefore, each region must be examined separately,
since as a rule, the residents are heavily influenced by local,
familial, religious, and communal considerations in their
voting.
Nonetheless, the June 2009 election results yielded the
following conclusions:
First, the voting was indeed clearly and heavily influenced by
communal considerations. Thus, for example, nearly all the Shi'a
(92 percent, according to estimates) voted for the Shi'i
parties, Amal and Hizballah; the vast majority of the Sunnis
voted for Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri’s party, the Mustaqbal movement;
the Druze voted for Walid Jumblatt and his supporters; and the
members of the Maronite community were split between Michel Aoun
and his opponents, with Aoun evidently having received most of
their votes. Despite the general’s alliance with Hizballah, and
perhaps precisely because of it, his supporters still view him
as the unquestionable leader of the Maronites in Lebanon as
well.
Second, even after the elections Lebanon has remained a
state--or perhaps more accurately a society--sharply split
between two camps of almost equal size. The worldviews of the
two camps conflict sharply, but what is more serious is their
division by communal differences. On the one side are the Sunnis
and the Druze, on the other are the Shi'a. It is interesting to
note at this juncture that the Maronites--who in the past ruled
Lebanon high-handedly, and who, in fact, were the main factor
behind the establishment of the state as an independent
political entity--now lag far behind in the political struggle,
with very little political influence or status. Worse, they are
sharply divided among themselves. On the one side is General
Michel Aoun’s faction, which joined forces with Hizballah; on
the other side are several factions, including the Phalangist
Party, the Lebanese Forces,
and a number of others, who joined the Hariri and
Jumblatt camp. It is also important to mention that immediately
following the elections, Walid Jumblatt signaled that due to
political considerations, he might remove himself from his
alliance with Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri and might even join the
Hizballah camp.
During the elections, determining which camp would win and which
would lose was based on the outcome of a very small number of
races. It was enough for just a few seats to shift from one camp
to the other in order to give the victory to the opposing camp.
Indeed, one could say that it was the voters in the
Zahla electoral district who
gave the victory to the March 14 camp. This is a mainly
Christian district, although the residents mostly Greek
Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian rather than Maronites.
Despite the expectations of a victory for the opposition
candidates, that is, members of the March 8 camp, it was the
ruling coalition’s candidates who emerged victorious, giving the
March 14 camp seven extremely valuable parliamentary seats.
However, things could have easily turned out differently. The
same local, family, and religious community considerations--and
perhaps even money such as that invested in the district by Sa`d
al-Din al-Hariri--could have brought the voters to choose the
other camp thus making it the overall winner in the elections.
Third, the elections gave a small but clear majority to the
March 14 camp--71 representatives in the parliament versus 57
for the opposition. Hizballah quickly claimed that because of
the communal character of the Lebanese voting system, the
results of the elections did not reflect the will of the voters.
If the proportional system of voting were employed, they said,
the opposition’s representation in the parliament would be much
greater. Indeed, according to the opposition’s data, its
candidates received about 66 percent of the votes while the
other side received only about 33 percent.
It would seem that there is some truth in Hizballah’s claim. The
religious community key upon which the Lebanese voting system is
based allots the seats in the parliament among the different
communities in the various districts in advance. Thus the
Maronites received 34 representatives, the Shi'a 27, the Sunnis
27, the Druze 8, and so on. As a result, the opposition actually
received many fewer seats than it would have received if the
elections were held according to the principle of
proportionality.
This issue, it would seem, is at the root of the controversies
and power struggles troubling Lebanon today. When the Lebanese
state was established by the French Mandate authorities in
September 1920, the Christians of various denominations
constituted about 55 percent of the country’s population. The
Maronites alone constituted 29 percent of the general population
and were thus the largest single community. The members of the
various Islamic communities together constituted only 45 percent
of the Lebanese population, with the Sunnis, the largest Islamic
group--22 percent of the general population--the Shi'a 18
percent, and the Druze just 5 percent.
Yet according to recent unofficial estimates in Lebanon, the
Christians constitute only 25-30 percent of the overall
population, while the Muslims have clearly become the majority,
constituting about 75 percent of the population. It is assumed
that this majority will only grow. Furthermore, the ratios
between the different communities has also changed. The
Maronites have become the third largest group, while their place
has been taken, surprisingly, by the Shi'a, who, now make up
about 35 percent of the Lebanese population, if not more. The
Sunnis trail a bit behind the Shi’a, and seem to be about 30
percent of the population.
Therefore it is no wonder that the Shi'a are demanding the
status and rights warranted by their position as the largest
community in the state. However, the Ta’if Agreements of 1989,
which brought the Lebanese Civil War to an end, granted the
senior position in the Muslim camp to the Sunnis.
It is an irony of fate that for a thousand years in the history
of the Mount Lebanon region, the nucleus and birthplace of the
Lebanese state, it was the Maronite Christians and the Druze who
fought an ongoing and bitter struggle over who would rule the
area and its institutions. World War I brought this struggle to
an end, when the French established the large Lebanese state
after the war as an entity with Maronite hegemony. However, a
new struggle immediately broke out, this time between the
Maronites--who sought to defend and secure their privileged
position in the state--and the Sunnis--who sought a larger part
in the rule of the country, as warranted by the size of their
community. This conflict reached its peak with the outbreak of
violence and civil war in Lebanon in 1975. The fighting in the
country raged until 1989. Hundreds of thousands of people were
killed and hundreds of thousands of others were wounded or fled.
The civil war was brought to an end by the compromise agreements
of Ta’if, which aimed at a fairer division of power between the
Maronites and Sunnis. However, just at that moment the Shi'a
burst forth as a new player at the center of the Lebanese
political arena and, like their predecessors, began demanding
their due.
The Shi'i political struggle is led by the Hizballah organization, which has become the most powerful factor in the Shi'i community. The organization has indeed come a long way since its establishment by Iran in 1982. While Hizballah engages in normal social, economic, and political activities, it also maintains a formidable and intimidating military arm that has become the strongest military force in the country, even stronger than the Lebanese army.
When Hizballah published its platform in 1985, it announced the
goal of turning Lebanon into an Islamic republic closely tied to
Iran. At the same time, Hizballah added a restrictive clause to
its struggle, saying that it would work to achieve its goal only
by means of peaceful persuasion and with the consent of the
Lebanese people. Indeed, in the spirit of this restraint, the
organization accepted the Ta’if Agreements and announced its
readiness to become integrated into Lebanon’s political life on
the basis of that agreement. Hizballah began electioneering and
in 2005 even joined the government of Fuad Siniora, who took
office in the wake of the Cedar Revolution. At the same time,
Hizballah did not hide its long-term aspiration of eventually
bringing about a change in the rules of the game as fixed at
Ta’if, which in Hizballah’s view allotted the seats in the
Lebanese parliament in a manner that discriminated against the
Shi'i community.
Following its occupation of Iraq in 2003, the United States
began instituting a democratic political system in that country.
That system enabled the Iraqi Shi'a, who constitute a majority
of the country’s population, to rise to power. Since then, the
leaders of Hizballah in Lebanon have been calling for the
establishment of such a genuine democratic system in their
country. Their calculation is clear. Fully democratic elections,
with no predetermined seats being allotted to the various
communities, would ensure a clear advantage to the Shi'a in any
election in the foreseeable future. Since Hizballah is the
leading organization in the Shi'i community, a Shi'i victory
would mean--at least for the time being--a Hizballah victory,
and this would be achieved without firing a shot or using the
organization’s military might at all.
On the eve of the June 7, 2009 parliamentary elections,
Hizballah had high hopes for a victory that would bring it
closer to its goal. The idea was to move forward step by step,
introducing gradual changes into the Lebanese system that would
ultimately lead to a complete transformation and a Hizballah
takeover through democratic means. For example, Hizballah hoped
that it would achieve an electoral advantage enabling it to
change the election laws and reduce the voting age. This would
allow large masses of young Shi'a to become new voters and exert
their electoral influence. Later Hizballah could hope to change
the distribution of parliamentary seats among the religious
communities in favor of the Shi'a. The ultimate goal would be to
replace the balloting based on a religious community key with a
proportional elections system.
However, Hizballah’s expectations of an electoral victory for
itself and its allies were not met. It failed in its effort to
take over the Lebanese government through democratic means. This
circumstance will undoubtedly place a difficult choice before
the organization: Should it exercise patience and rely upon
democratic means or should it employ the instruments of violence
at its disposal? If Hizballah reconciles with the results of the
recent elections, it is hard to see how it could take power in a
democratic fashion in the foreseeable future. It will have to
remain an opposition force on the margins of the Lebanese
political scene. On the other hand, it could try to break
through the glass ceiling blocking its rise to power through its
military might. Hizballah attempted this in May 2008 and
succeeded in forcing the ruling coalition to accept its
representatives into the government, where they were given veto
power over governmental decisions.
An additional conclusion can be drawn from the recent
parliamentary elections. The results intensified the already
existing tensions and widened the gap between the March 14 camp
and Hizballah along with its allies. Again, the March 14 camp is
pro-Western and opposed to the policies and political line of
Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. Hizballah, meanwhile, still has at
its disposal its militia, which is the strongest military force
in the country today and can do nearly whatever it wishes. With
this in mind, some observers quickly concluded that the
elections did not change anything, since, despite its electoral
failure, Hizballah was still able to act as it pleased. It could
heat up the Lebanese-Israeli border or choose to continue to
maintain the calm and quiet that has reigned there since the end
of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
As aforementioned, the Hizballah organization is putting forth
certain legitimate aspirations of the Lebanese Shi'i community.
One such aspiration is the demand for fair representation in the
country’s political structure in accord with the community’s
demographic strength. However, this problem is complicated
greatly by the fact that the struggle between the Shi'a and the
rest of the Lebanese communities is taking place in the shadow
of Shi'i-Sunni tensions affecting the entire region, and even
more significantly, in the shadow of Iran’s mounting power, to
the point where that state has become a regional superpower with
pretensions to hegemony over the whole Middle East. Thus, Iran’s
intervention in Lebanon’s internal affairs only serves to
complicate an already complex dispute and to exacerbate
tensions.
The results of the Lebanese elections thus have significance
extending beyond their local implications in the Lebanese arena.
As noted above, until a short time ago many people in the region
were under the impression that Iran had the upper hand, that the
“axis of evil”--the coterie made up of Iran, Hizballah, Hamas,
and Syria--was constantly gaining in strength, and that it was
doubtful that it could ever be stopped in its quest for control
of the Middle East. However, the “axis of evil’s” victorious and
self-assured image has been tarnished somewhat in recent years,
and the Lebanese elections are part of that development.
During the Second Lebanon War, Hizballah suffered a severe blow,
even if this fact and the significance of the war for the
organization only became clear after some time. Later, at the
beginning of 2009, the Hamas organization suffered a severe blow
in Gaza at Israel’s hands. Then, in early June 2009, Hizballah
suffered defeat in the Lebanese elections. Next, in mid-June
2009, the regime of the ayatollahs in Iran was struck by mass
public demonstrations and unrest that broke out in Teheran after
the presidential elections. In this regard, the Lebanese
elections sent an important message to the entire region,
namely, that the “axis of evil” could be stopped, that it is not
all-powerful or invincible. This message has enormous
significance, in particular in light of U.S. President Barack
Obama’s efforts to create a moderate and pragmatic axis in the
Middle East as a counterweight to the radical axis.
It should be noted that in the extensive discussions regarding
Lebanon during 2009 in Israel, the region, and throughout the
world, Syria has all but been forgotten. This is significant,
since just a decade ago Damascus had complete control over
Lebanon. However, the ensuing years--marked by Syrian President
Hafiz al-Asad’s death in June 2000 after a thirty-year reign,
and the expulsion from Lebanon in March 2005 of the Syrian
military forces--have seen a steady decline in Syria’s influence
over its smaller neighbor. Many observers in Israel and the West
are convinced that Damascus is likely to return to Beirut.
However, it is a fact that Damascus played only a small role in
the June 2009 Lebanese elections, by its own decision, but also
as a result of the constraints it is faced with. Furthermore, it
seems as if the balance of power within the “axis of evil” has
shifted and Syria has lost ground to its partners, Iran and
Hizballah.
ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE JUNE 2009 ELECTIONS
The Lebanese election results were good news for Israel. There
were those in Jerusalem who had looked forward to a Hizballah
victory. Based on “worse is better”
reasoning, they thought that such a victory would serve Israel’s
interests, since it would reveal Lebanon’s true face and show
that the distinction made between Hizballah and the Lebanese
government and army was an artificial one. This separation of
the two entities has had a significant impact on Israeli policy.
Thus, it may be recalled that during the Second Lebanon War
Israel refrained from attacking infrastructure targets in
Lebanon because of Western, and especially American, pressure.
The Americans insisted that the Lebanese state and pro-Western
government headed by Fuad Siniora, a March 14 camp leader and
loyalist of Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri, must be protected at all
costs, even as Hizballah was being attacked. This
constraint--based as it was and is on the differentiation made
in the West between Hizballah and the Lebanese
government--would, of course, lose its force if the Lebanese
government fell into the hands of the Shi'i organization. In
such an eventuality, Lebanon could then be likened to the Gaza
Strip, where the Hamas takeover turned the entire territory into
a legitimate target for Israel.
Nevertheless, contrary to this reasoning, the most important
thing for Israel is that the camp interested in a political
settlement, and eventually a peace agreement, with Israel
was victorious in Lebanon’s June elections. True, a Hizballah
electoral victory bringing the organization to power would
probably have compelled it to adopt a pragmatic and more
realistic approach to the issue of the conflict with Israel. If
this had happened, one can assume that Hizballah would have
continued to maintain the calm and quiet that has prevailed
along the Israeli-Lebanese border since the end of the Second
Lebanon War. However, from Israel’s point of view, the main
thing in that case would have been the fact that Lebanon had
become a hostile entity with which there could be no hope of
reaching a political settlement or peace treaty, and the best
that could be expected would have been preserving a tense quiet
along the border. Hizballah, after all, belongs to the radical
camp in the Middle East--along with Iran and Hamas--all of whose
members reject completely any possibility of recognizing Israel,
negotiating with it, or reaching any kind of peace agreement
with it.
On the other hand, the victory of the March 14 camp in the
Lebanese parliamentary elections has opened a window of
opportunity, narrow as it may be, for a better future. Israel
would do well, with the help of its allies in the region and
around the world, to take advantage of this. In the short run,
one can assume that the European
governments and the U.S. administration will increase their
pressure on Israel to implement a series of confidence-building
measures as gestures to the Lebanese government, for example,
withdrawal from the Shab'a Farms or from the northern part of
the village of Rajar and, of course, the cessation of
surveillance flights over Lebanon. Israel should not make these
concessions without receiving something appropriate in return.
However, the more important question is how to get Lebanon to
join the efforts being made to achieve an overall
regional settlement and peace with Israel, developments that
would, of course, be the best way to ensure the quiet along
Israel’s northern border.
In his speeches following the electoral victory of the March 14
camp, the bloc’s leader, Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri, emphasized that
the Lebanese government would not act to impair the “arms of the
resistance,” that is, Hizballah’s military forces, and it
certainly would not act to carry out any international
resolutions calling for disarming Hizballah and putting an end
to arms smuggling from Syria and Iran into Lebanon. However, at
the same time, al-Hariri declared Lebanon’s readiness under his
leadership to become involved in the peace process as a
participant in the Arab initiative that was formulated in Beirut
itself in 2002.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of advancing an Israeli-Lebanese peace was and
remains slim, and perhaps does not exist at all at the present
time. In the past there were those in Jerusalem whose assessment
was that the best course for Israel was to reach an agreement
with Syria, in the framework of which Lebanon would be turned
over to Damascus, and in return Damascus would commit itself to
ensuring calm and quiet along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
However, the weakening of Syria and its loss of influence in
Lebanon--together with the growing strength of Hizballah and its
patron, Iran--have removed this option from the table.
The Lebanese election results present a narrow opening that might enable Lebanon to take part in American efforts at advancing a regional process. Indeed, this would seem the only chance for advancing an Israeli-Lebanese understanding, which would also help stabilize Lebanon’s internal political situation. If, however, the efforts to follow this course fail, the only remaining option will be to continue to act in such a way as to preserve Israel’s deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis Hizballah, and thereby to try to preserve the calm and quiet along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
MERIA Journal Staff
Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry RubinAssistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
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