LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
November 21/09

Bible Reading of the day
John 8/52-59 Then the Jews said to him, “Now we know that you have a demon. Abraham died, and the prophets; and you say, ‘If a man keeps my word, he will never taste of death.’ Are you greater than our father, Abraham, who died? The prophets died. Who do you make yourself out to be?” Jesus answered, “If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing. It is my Father who glorifies me, of whom you say that he is our God. You have not known him, but I know him. If I said, ‘I don’t know him,’ I would be like you, a liar. But I know him, and keep his word. Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day. He saw it, and was glad.” The Jews therefore said to him, “You are not yet fifty years old, and have you seen Abraham?” Jesus said to them, “Most certainly, I tell you, before Abraham came into existence, I AM.” Therefore they took up stones to throw at him, but Jesus was hidden, and went out of the temple, having gone through their midst, and so passed by. /Naharnet

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Canada Welcomes UN Resolution on Iranian Human Rights Situation/November 20/09
Nidal Hasan and Fort Hood, A Study in Muslim Doctrine/By: Raymond Ibrahim/November 20/09
Opening the doors to state legitimacy/The Daily Star/ November 20/09
Lebanon's history awaits its textbook/By Dalal Mawad/November 20/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for November 20/09
Gemayel: Jumblat-Hizbullah Dialogue Established Stability /Naharnet
Ministerial Policy Statement Committee Begins Sixth Session in Baroud's Absence/Naharnet
Abu Faour: Hizbullah Arms Issue Needs No Discussion, But Political Decision /Naharnet
ISF-Police Dispute Cools Down for Time Being, Frustrated Baroud Not Going to Office Today /Naharnet
Mitri: Ministerial Statement will not be done by Independence Day/Now Lebanon
Williams hopes cabinet confirms commitment to Resolution 1701/Now Lebanon
'Netanyahu wants Syria talks without delay, preconditions'/Jerusalem Post
Hassan Nasrallah re-elected as Hezbollah leader/The Associated Press
Report: Lebanon arrests another suspected Israel spy/Ha'aretz
Lebanon: UN force commander confers with prime minister on security in south/UN News Centre
Hassan Nasrallah re-elected as Hiz bullah leader/Jerusalem Post
Iraqi FM Zibari's Interview With 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat' – Key Points/MEMRI
Hariri for Encouraging Private Sector Initiatives as Part of Euro-Med Partnership/Naharnet
Nasrallah re-elected as Hizbullah chief for 6th term/Daily Star
Political details on Cabinet statement expected soon/Daily Star
Tebnine teacher admits to Israel spying charges/Daily Star
Graziano vows to continue efforts to preserve calm/Daily Star
Number of credit, debit cards reach 1.6 million in Lebanon/Daily Star
Hariri seeks new economic order to create perpetual prosperity/Daily Star
econd annual AFED conference kicks off in Beirut/Daily Star
STL prosecutors visit Lebanon to meet lawyers, academics/Daily Star
Independence Day to witness traffic measures/Daily Star
Body of stabbed man found in car park near Byblos/Daily Star
ISF arrests kidnapping, car-theft mastermind/Daily Star
Lawsuit filed against highway-shooting suspect/Daily Star
Indonesia bolsters UNIFIL contingent/Daily Star
Poisoning suspected as Metn family found dead/Daily Star
Lebanese pilgrims head for Mecca with luggage, wishes, prayers/Daily Star
Restaurants, bars skeptical about going smoke-free/Daily Star
Lebanon child protection garners UNICEF commendation/Daily Star
Abu Faour: Hizbullah Arms Issue Needs No Discussion, But Political Decision/Naharnet
ISF-Police Dispute Cools Down for Time Being, Frustrated Baroud Not Going to Office Today/Naharnet
Mother Confesses to Poisoning Herself, 3 Daughters/Naharnet
Hizbullah Arms Issue Delays Cabinet Policy Statement/Naharnet
Jumblat-Aoun Reunion Confirmed/Naharnet
Collett to Return Home after 27 years of Mystery over His Kidnapping/Naharnet
Lebanon Hands Over 6 Alleged Terrorists to Saudi Arabia/Naharnet
Report: Israel 'Mentally' Preparing Pilots to Deal with Hizbullah Surface-to-Air Missiles/Naharnet

Canada Welcomes UN Resolution on Iranian Human Rights Situation
(No. 352 - November 20, 2009 - 12:30 p.m. EST) The Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement welcoming the adoption of a resolution on the human rights situation in Iran, following a vote earlier today at the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly:
“The adoption of this resolution is another clear signal of the international community’s concern for the human rights of people in Iran. It sends a message of hope to the victims of violations, and to the human rights defenders who seek to effect positive change in Iran. The resolution calls on Iran to address the egregious abuses against its own citizens. The international community has spoken, and human rights obligations must be respected in law and in practice.
“With this resolution, and those presented in previous years, international attention has been drawn to the unacceptable human rights situation in Iran, and the Government of Iran has been forced to account for its actions. We continue to invite the Iranian government to take meaningful steps to respect the human rights of all people in Iran.”

Nasrallah re-elected as Hizbullah chief for 6th term
Friday, November 20, 2009/Naharnet
BEIRUT: Lebanon’s Hizbullah announced on Thursday that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has been re-elected as the Shiite Muslim group’s leader for a sixth term. A Hizbullah statement did not say when the group’s top officials voted to re-elect Nasrallah, who has held the post since an Israeli helicopter gunship killed his predecessor, Sheikh Abbas Mousawi. No one ran against Nasrallah.Naim Qassem also has been re-elected as Nasrallah’s deputy, according to the statement. Hizbullah’s leadership elections are usually held every three years but they were last held in 2004. A Hizbullah official said the two-year delay was caused by internal Lebanese differences and the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel war. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media. Nasrallah, 49, is a strong critic of the United States which lists his group as a terrorist organization. Under his leadership, Hizbullah became active in internal Lebanese politics and the group now has two Cabinet ministers and holds 11 of Parliament’s 128 seats. Founded in 1982, Hizbullah gained notoriety in the West when it was linked to the kidnapping of Western hostages and a series of bombings against Western targets. Hizbullah has over the years grown to run a network of interests including; clinics, schools, a TV station and a weekly newspaper. – AP, with The Daily Star

Political details on Cabinet statement expected soon
Ministers set to tackle economic issues friday
By Nafez Qawas /Daily Star correspondent
Friday, November 20, 2009
BEIRUT: The ministerial committee tasked with drafting the policy statement for Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s newly formed government is holding extensive meetings to finalize its mission before Independence Day on November 22. However, the issue of Hizbullah’s arms seems to be the main topic of contention, which is delaying the finalization of the political section of the statement. Other problematic topics, such as Lebanese-Syrian ties and Palestinian arms inside and outside of camps, have been agreed upon. Speaking to reporters ahead of the committee’s meeting on Thursday, State Minister for Administrative Reform Mohammad Fneish said that there was an effort to finalize the ministerial statement “as soon as possible.”
Well-informed ministerial sources told The Daily Star that Thursday’s meeting was expected to lay the final touches on the political section of the statement, while Friday’s meeting will tackle the economic details. The sources added that Hariri, who heads the committee’s meetings, had insisted the political part of the statement be concluded Thursday.
State Minister Wael Abu Faour said the ministerial statement was incapable of solving all long-term problems in Lebanon, adding that certain controversial issues should be referred to the National Dialogue sessions. He also called on all political forces to be “humble” in order to speed up the drafting of the statement.
Social Affairs Minister Selim Sayegh described the general atmosphere during meetings as “positive.” Echoing Abu Faour, Sayegh said problematic issues ought to be referred to National Dialogue sessions. Earlier on Thursday, Sayegh called for the ministerial statement to voice support to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, adding that Lebanon should implement the convention and make it part of the country’s law. In other news, Lebanese Forces (LF) bloc MP Antoine Zahra expressed fears that the issue of abolishing political sectarianism “might lead politicians to overlook a series of controversial issues.” Speaker Nabih Berri said on Wednesday that a “long-term solution” toLebanon’s problem would be to get rid of political sectarianism. “We cannot favor this issue over others, because it will give an extremely negative message to the Lebanese, who are scared of … a plan that would lead to one group dominating another in Lebanon or adopting a majority democracy through deception,” Zahra told Al-Sharq radio station Thursday. The LF lawmaker also welcomed any meeting that would take place between the opposing political parties, praising President Michel Sleiman’s recent efforts to reconcile the Progressive Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblatt and Marada Movement leader MP Sleiman Franjieh at the Baabda Palace on Wednesday. Minister of the Displaced Akram Shehayeb said both Jumblatt and Franjieh had a “common wish” to meet. Shehayeb told Voice of Lebanon radio Thursday that there was a local desire to reach a consensus on most issues, adding that the regional situation has “helped sooth the political atmosphere in the country.” Jumblatt on Thursday met with a delegation from the Armenian Tashnag Party. A similar meeting between Jumblatt and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader MP Michel Aoun is also likely to take place soon. However, talks about a possible meeting between Aoun and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir were unfounded, according to FPM sources

Collett to Return Home after 27 years of Mystery over His Kidnapping
Naharnet/DNA test results showed that the body that was recently recovered by a British team in eastern Lebanon was that of U.K. journalist Alec Collett, As-Safir newspaper said Friday. It said the team left Aita al-Fukhar on Thursday after having concluded their mission to find remains of Collett. Collett was kidnapped in Lebanon in 1985 during the peak of the civil war and was reported to have been killed a year later. Sixty-four years old at the time, he was on assignment in refugee camps for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) near Beirut airport when taken hostage. Fatah-Revolutionary Council, a militant Palestinian group better known as the Abu Nidal Organization, claimed responsibility for the abduction and killing. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 11:31

Report: Israel 'Mentally' Preparing Pilots to Deal with Hizbullah Surface-to-Air Missiles
Naharnet/The Israel Air Force plans to conduct special seminars to prepare pilots and ground crews for future conflicts amid a growing anti-aircraft and ballistic missile threat against the Jewish state, Israeli daily The Jerusalem Post reported. The seminar will first be held for pilots who, in a future conflict with Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria or Iran, could deal with an unprecedented number of surface-to-air missiles, most of them Russian-made, said the report. Hamas is believed to have a number of shoulder-to-air missiles. Hizbullah is also known to have such missiles and Israel is concerned that Syria may transfer advanced missile systems to the Shiite group, said The Jerusalem Post. The mental preparation will not be limited to pilots, according to the report, which said that the seminar will also be held for ground crews stationed at Air Force bases, which all currently fall within the range of Hizbullah and Hamas missiles. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 09:03

Hizbullah Arms Issue Delays Cabinet Policy Statement
Naharnet/The controversial issue of Hizbullah arms is likely to delay announcement of a Cabinet policy statement, press reports said Friday. They said a fifth meeting held Thursday under Prime Minister Saad Hariri failed to find a settlement to the dispute between the Opposition and the majority which voiced concerns regarding Hizbullah weapons. A sixth session will be held on Friday, this time to discuss the economic aspect of the statement. A date for the meeting to debate the political aspect of the policty statement, however, has not been set. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 10:46

Jumblat-Aoun Reunion Confirmed
Naharnet/President Michel Suleiman will host a reunion at Baabda Palace on Wednesday between Druze leader Walid Jumblat and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, press reports said Friday. FPM member Alain Aoun told OTV that the reconciliation will take place next week. Jumblat has hailed efforts by Suleiman aimed at achieving national reconciliation.
Suleiman on Wednesday hosted a reunion between Jumblat and Marada Movement leader Sueliman Franjieh. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 09:12

ISF-Police Dispute Cools Down for Time Being, Frustrated Baroud Not Going to Office Today
Naharnet/A possible confrontation between the leaderships of the Internal Security Forces and Police has been averted when political leaders from both the majority and the Opposition took steps to resolve the conflict – but the dispute could reignite any time. The squabble subsided after midnight when a deal was concluded between Internal Security Forces commander Maj. Gen. Ashraf Rifi, who enjoys majority support, and Opposition-backed Police Chief Brig. Gen. Antoine Shakkour. The agreement came after several hours of efforts by President Michel Suleiman, Interior Minister Ziad Baroud as well as political leaders from the March 14 coalition and the Opposition. It stipulated that Shakkour would approve a memorandum from Rifi authorizing the reassignment of two senior officers – one from Beirut and another from south Lebanon -- to the Presidential Palace. Rifi, in turn, would take back his decision to suspend Shakkour from his duties for 15 days. The ISF-police crisis was discussed during a meeting late Thursday of the Ministerial Committee tasked with drafting of the Cabinet policy statement when Baroud was informed of Rifi's decision to suspend Shakkour for failing to obey orders. Baroud was said to have expressed frustration over what happened and decided not to show up at his office today. But beyond that, questions are raised about who bears responsibility for this behavior that nearly led a crisis within the new government, the daily An-Nahar wrote. Will similar decisions in the future lead to a shake-up in the ISF establishment or another security or military institution or perhaps in the government itself? An-Nahar asked.
Will the dispute reignite? As-Safir newspaper said senior Opposition leaders were summoned for a meeting Thursday evening during which they considered Rifi's decision against Shakkour "a dangerous precedent that we cannot stay quiet about."They also believed that Rifi's measure was "against the entire Lebanese Opposition," As-Safir said. It quoted an Opposition official as saying that contacts between the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah, AMAL and Marada Movement resulted in a common stance that the Opposition will inform all concerned of its decision to stand by Shakkour. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 08:36

Abu Faour: Hizbullah Arms Issue Needs No Discussion, But Political Decision
Naharnet/State Minister Wael Abu Faour said Friday that the majority of issues under the ministerial policy statement have been agreed upon except that of Hizbullah arms.
"Hizbullah arms are no longer an issue that requires exchange of ideas, but rather needs a political decision," Abu Faour told LBC TV. He said Prime Minister Saad Hariri was aware of that and will pursue contacts aimed at resolving this issue. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 13:11

Hariri for Encouraging Private Sector Initiatives as Part of Euro-Med Partnership
Naharnet/Prime Minister Saad Hariri urged European and southern Mediterranean countries on Friday to cooperate in facilitating the initiatives of the private sector for a stronger Euro-Med partnership. "The private sector has become the vital impetus for any trade and economic integration … That's why it is our duty as Mediterranean and European governments to provide the legal and institutional framework to facilitate the initiatives of the private sector in each other's countries," Hariri told the General-Assembly of the Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The prime minister told the assembly at al-Kassar building in Jnah that the private sector could play an important role in consolidating the partnership between the European Union and southern Mediterranean countries. Hariri said Lebanon welcomes the new initiative for the Mediterranean Union launched in 2008 and will be a real partner and make efforts for the success of the initiative. The PM also said Lebanon hasn't been able to implement an economic, social and developmental program that meets the demands of the Lebanese as a result of the difficult circumstances that the country went through. However, he was confident that Lebanon has "a new opportunity to build its national economy …, improve the living conditions of the citizen and guarantee all of his economic and social rights." Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 13:11

Mother Confesses to Poisoning Herself, 3 Daughters
Naharnet/A mother confessed on videotape that she had poisoned herself and her three young daughters because her husband has been working in Bahrain for the past 10 years and she "cannot take this anymore." LBC TV on Friday said investigators uncovered that Grace Jalakh, 40, killed herself and her three daughters – Melissa, 13, Madison, 10 and Alfreda, 7 -- at her apartment in the Metn town of Bhorsaf after eating four dishes of processed fruit mixed with poison. The bodies were discovered Thursday night when Grace's husband, Paul -- who works as a horse trainer -- had just returned from a six-day trip to the Gulf. When no one answered the door, he broke into the house only to find his wife's and daughter's dead bodies. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 12:05

Lebanon Hands Over 6 Alleged Terrorists to Saudi Arabia
Naharnet/The Lebanese judiciary handed over to Saudi Arabia six Saudis allegedly involved in terrorist activities in Lebanon, the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat reported Friday.
The newspaper quoted informed sources as saying that the six men belong to the al-Qaida terror network and Fatah al-Islam group which fought bloody gunbattles with the Lebanese army at the northern Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in 2007. The sources told the newspaper that Saudi authorities have sent a letter to Lebanon requesting it to hand over the alleged terrorists. They said Riyadh pledged to return the men to Lebanon within a period of 15 days. Al-Hayat said that a private jet took the suspects to the kingdom. Meanwhile, military examining magistrate Fadi Sawan questioned the 10 Fatah al-Islam suspects who have been charged with belonging to a terrorist group. Sawan questioned Fatah al-Islam member Fadi Ibrahim, known as Sikamo, for four hours and issued an arrest warrant against him. Sikamo received a second arrest warrant for monitoring UNIFIL activities and Palestinian organizations to shake security inside the Bourj al-Shamali refugee camp and planting a grenade in it. Beirut, 20 Nov 09, 10:12

Nasrallah Re-elected as Hizbullah Chief
Naharnet/Hizbullah concluded its General Conference which lasted for several months in the making, and endorsed a new political doctrine, the second of its kind after the "open letter" in 1985. Hizbullah issued a communique declaring that the party has endorsed "a number of organizational amendments that fit the new developing nature of its movement and path in the recent years on various aspects." The communique also announced the election of the party's Shura Council members and their designations for the new term as follows: Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary-General), Sheikh Naim Qassem (Deputy Secretary-General), Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek (Head of Sharia Committee), Sayyed Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed (Head of Political Bureau), Sayyed Hashim Safieddine (Head of Executive Council), Hussein Khalil (Secretary-General's Political Assistant), MP Mohammed Raad (Head of Loyalty to Resistance bloc).
The secretary-general will hold a press conference in the next few days to declare the new political doctrine, said Hizbullah's communique. Beirut, 19 Nov 09, 17:56

Tebnine teacher admits to Israel spying charges
Daily Star staff/Friday, November 20, 2009
BEIRUT: Internal Security Forces (ISF) arrested a Tebnine teacher on suspicion of spying for Israel, media reports said Thursday. The reports added that ISF had put the man under close watch for seven months prior to his arrest Wednesday afternoon. Al-Akhbar newspaper quoted sources at the ISF directorate as saying that the 54-year-old man admitted to spying for Israel, adding that he was recruited by a man who fled to Israel. A high-level security source told Al-Akhbar that the man had confessed during interrogation that the Israelis had asked him to stop his spying activities last April, following the discovery of several cells working for the Israeli Mossad in Lebanon. – The Daily Star

Graziano vows to continue efforts to preserve calm
Daily Star staff/Friday, November 20, 2009/BEIRUT: Commander of the UNIFIL Major General Claudio Graziano said the peacekeeping forces, in collaboration with the Lebanese Armed Forces, will continue its work to stop war provocations in south Lebanon. Speaking following a meeting with Prime Minister Rafik Hariri at the Grand Serail, he said there was “optimism and a general desire to keep the situation under control.” “Moving from a halt of war provocations to a cease fire surpasses UNIFIL’s mandate and should be worked on by the political authorities,” Graziano also said. – The Daily Star

Lebanon's history awaits its textbook
By: Dalal Mawad
Friday, November 20, 2009/Daily Star
Recently, I saw four boys sitting at lunch near Bliss Street. They were talking about politics and student elections before moving to a conversation about civil war. Though only about 20 years of age, they discussed violence with a sense of normalcy, their debate echoing confessional odium and distrust.
The boys represented a sample of Lebanon’s younger generation, one with no collective memory of the 15-year Civil War. That’s because Lebanon’s modern history is buried in a locked book with the key nowhere to be found. But how can we build a common future when our youths ignore their past? How can we achieve reconciliation and civil peace when the history we know remains exclusive and when facts serve ideology, not truth?
Under the 1989 Taif Accord ending the Civil War, Lebanon was supposed to unify its history text books and civics curriculums. Yet two decades later the state still gives schools the freedom to choose their own history books. These do not deal with post-1950 history and each presents a different perspective of historical events. For instance, some books demonize the French Mandate
while others do the contrary. Schools usually select their text book in line with their religious and political affiliation.
There have been many new calls in recent years for the adoption of a common history book. In 1997, a committee was formed to institute a unified history book and program. This went nowhere. The main argument used to explain the absence of a common history book is the fact that communal differences have still not been resolved and that there is no consensus between Lebanon’s religious communities over interpreting their past. Simply put, the Lebanese cannot agree on one story. We need to change our approach in writing a common history book. However, seeking to impose a shared reading of history and using the conventional method of imposing a single interpretation of events that would represent “The Truth” is unrealistic in the Lebanese context. Each of the different communities in Lebanon is attached to its own culture, memory and martyrs. Political parties have their own reading of history. Why look for one story in a country whose history has been crafted by the stories of different cultures and communities? Wouldn’t that represent a negation of Lebanon’s pluralistic identity?
What we can do, however, is work on a non-political, non-ideological book compiling a chronology of facts, figures and events: “Get your facts first and then you can distort them as much as you please,” Mark Twain once wrote. The facts, their cause, and their consequences could then be described using evidence and sources from the different communities or groups involved in any given episode. Such a history book would use a comparative approach, placing one view of an event next to others. The presentation of different narratives of events would shed light on similarities, differences, and contradictions left for student analysis and discussion. Students would then be able to engage in a constructive learning process, distancing themselves from ideologies and emotions and building an independent sense of criticism toward what happened. The multiple perspectives ensuing would enable students to enrich their grasp of reality and encourage them to respect diversity and understand the distortions and stereotypes they were previously encouraged to adopt.
This approach in teaching history has been used in some European countries. One example is the Southeast European Joint History Project. A group of historians and researchers from the Balkans sought to encourage intercultural understanding to do away with widespread stereotypes and nationalist-ethnocentric historical interpretations. They produced four history books introducing material and perspectives from the 11 countries of the region. In April 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on “stability and prosperity in the Western Balkans” calling for the relevant educational authorities to adopt the books of the project. Greece has authorized the use of these books in its secondary schools.
The “how” is as important as the “what” when teaching history. As Robert Stradling has written in his book “Multiperspectivity in History Teaching: A Guide for Teachers: “The extent to which these various problems can be resolved, particularly the potential learning difficulties associated with multiperspectivity, will depend on the teachers’ overall approach to history and on how they prepare the students.”
History teachers should be trained in how to handle the multiperspective historical approach, manage sensitive topics, provide valuable reading sources like press articles and clippings offering the different perspectives, engage students in debates, and promote critical inquiry. Using multiple perspectives in history can be a complex task. The methodology used to select the events, number of perspectives and sources without crowding a Lebanese national history text book would require a lengthy article on its own. Yet in a country like Lebanon, seeking truth is a dynamic process of continuing dialogue, of communities opening up to each other and sharing their stories. Multiperspectivity in the teaching of history is the right approach to start building a collective memory, whereby our children can read the different stories, turn the page, but without forgetting the contents of the chapter.
**Dalal Mawad is a Lebanese freelance journalist. She has published articles in The Palestine Chronicle, Now Lebanon and L’Orient-Le Jour, and is youth coordinator and executive board member of the Green Party of Lebanon. She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

A loud grumble shakes the Aounist jungle
Michael Young , November 20, 2009
Daily Star/Former deputy prime minister Issam Abu Jamra has publically criticized his party’s leader, MP Michel Aoun. (AFP)
There is discontent in the Aounist household. In an interview on Wednesday with Al-Mustaqbal, the former deputy prime minister, Issam Abu Jamra, a senior official in the Free Patriotic Movement, stated that he had sent a written complaint to Michel Aoun after Aoun appointed only one member from the movement, Gebran Bassil, to a cabinet post.
Aside from the fact that Abu Jamra reported his objection in a mouthpiece belonging to his political adversaries, he also noted that “all options [were] on the table” if he received no response to it.
Precisely what Abu Jamra can or will do is unclear. Aoun has treated his followers with considerable disregard over the years – openly favoring his son-in-law, Bassil, over all others, ensuring that none of his parliamentarians becomes too prominent, and running the FPM with a firm hand – and he’s done so because he knows they have little political weight without him. However, Abu Jamra’s move is significant, because it appears to be the first public salvo in a fight over the future of the Aounist movement, now that Michel Aoun has lost all the major battles that had allowed him to impose unity on his fractious flock.
The reality is that in the past four and a half years, Aoun has failed to capitalize on the considerable political advantages that he successively accumulated. He emerged as the most dominant Christian from the 2005 elections, but was unable to leverage that into his election as president in 2007. Had Aoun remained neutral in the confrontation between March 8 and March 14, he would inevitably have become head of state. No one, on either side of the political divide, would have mobilized against Aoun had he remained on good terms with both the majority and opposition.
Instead, Aoun sided with Hezbollah and Syria’s allies, in the hope that their power of intimidation would bring him into office. But in so doing, he only ensured that the March 14 majority would take any and all steps to block him, which they did by supporting Michel Sleiman, someone whom they initially mistrusted as being a Syrian creation.
The Doha Agreement, which endorsed Sleiman as president, was the first nail in Aoun’s political coffin, and it was followed by the parliamentary elections last June. Even though the general emerged with a larger parliamentary bloc, it was a Pyrrhic victory. He was unable to bring in a majority, as he and his allies had promised. Indeed, the fact that Aoun had become so polarizing a figure, in large part due to his partnership with Hezbollah, mobilized many more Christians against him, handing March 14 its new majority. That was the second nail in Aoun’s coffin.
The third appeared to be general’s abysmal performance in the negotiations over the government. From the outset, Aoun’s only acute concern seemed to be Bassil’s return as a minister, so that he bore a major responsibility for keeping the state on hold in the interest of nepotism. He rejected Saad Hariri’s first cabinet proposal on that basis. Recall that Alain Aoun and Farid al-Khazen had been named ministers in the lineup, one no worse than what Aoun ultimately accepted. But the general cared little that those two figures were among the more respected of his partisans; all his anxieties were focused on the son-in-law.
And if that was not enough, who could avoid noticing that a final agreement on the cabinet came when Bassil returned from Damascus, having heard from the Syrians that it was time for Aoun to be flexible. The general spent a decade and a half denouncing other Lebanese politicians for allowing their decisions to be taken in Damascus, only to fall into that nasty habit himself, and with a family member as errand boy.
As Aoun gets older, those under him are preparing for what comes afterward, accumulating cards. The general’s big battles are over. He’s not president, he failed to spearhead an opposition win, he takes orders from Syria, and he’s willing to throw caution to the wind in order to guarantee that Bassil succeeds him as head of the Aounist pack. That gamble, too, is likely to fail, and there are those around the general, his old comrades first, who this time don’t want to pay the price for his setbacks if it loses them their one chance of making it themselves.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

She was loved
November 19, 2009
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=127475
Now Lebanon/Two events in four days have highlighted the mixed emotions of the families of those who remain unaccounted for from Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. On Sunday, Lebanese watched the funeral procession for Johnny Nassif, a soldier fighting for then interim-Prime Minister General Michel Aoun. His body was uncovered in 2005 in a mass grave in Yarze next to the Defense Ministry, the scene of Aoun’s 1990 last stand against the Syrian army. It was only last week, even after DNA testing, that Nassif’s mother conceded that the remains were in fact those of her son. Until that point she was convinced he was still alive in a Syrian jail. The military funeral was a moving affair, and the news pictures could not have failed to send a message of hope to those whose loved ones are still missing, even if the motives behind the coffin-draped flag and honor guard were undoubtedly political.
Two days later however, events in the Eastern Bekaa saw a different scenario unravel. On a dusty, shrub-ridden stretch of land near Aita al-Fakhar in the district of Rashaya, a British forensics team reported the discovery of two corpses, one of which they are certain is Alec Collett, a British journalist missing in Lebanon since 1985.
The other remains were deemed, according to media reports, to belong to a woman “killed” 20 years ago. Of no consequence to the Collett case, she was reburied in the same spot.
So there we have it. Two bodies, one given a sendoff fit for a national servant; the other left to “rest” a meter under where she had met her no-doubt violent end. Two bodies, one, the circumstances of death allowing for dignified closure, the other, too messy, and potentially too embarrassing, for an investigation.
The “owner” of the bones in Aita al-Fakhar is probably personified in a browning photograph somewhere, maybe in a frame or folded into a wallet. The woman was a daughter, possibly a wife, probably a sister, maybe even a mother. The various ways she could have been linked to people – niece, aunt, friend, confidant, lover – are numerous. She had a childhood, she played, she went to school, she had dreams. But more importantly, she was loved. She probably meant the whole world to someone, and at some point that world fell apart and has very probably never been rebuilt. For 20 years, a family somewhere is living in a screaming void. A bereavement is bad enough, but not knowing is a living death.
Surely, the least the state could have done is perform DNA testing on the remains and invite those who think she might have been part of their world to step forward and give their own samples to see if they match. It would be a long shot – or maybe not – but at least it would offer hope, not just to those who suspect she may be theirs, but to all those Lebanese families who live every day wondering where their son, daughter, mother, father, brother or sister may be right now, still clinging onto a feeble thread of hope that they are still alive.
And while the state is at it, why not consider a monument to the disappeared? Surely such an edifice would resonate much more in modern Lebanon than, say, the Martyr’s Square statue. They can be no more noble or worthy endeavor than to create a constant reminder of the futility of hate.

Nidal Hasan and Fort Hood, A Study in Muslim Doctrine
by Raymond Ibrahim
Pajamas Media
November 18, 2009
http://www.meforum.org/2512/nidal-hasan-fort-hood-muslim-doctrine
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One of the difficulties in discussing Islam's more troubling doctrines is that they have an anachronistic, even otherworldly, feel to them; that is, unless actively and openly upheld by Muslims, non-Muslims, particularly of the Western variety, tend to see them as abstract theory, not standard practice for today. In fact, some Westerners have difficulties acknowledging even those problematic doctrines that are openly upheld by Muslims — such as jihad. How much more when the doctrines in question are subtle, or stealthy, in nature?
Enter Nidal Malik Hasan, the psychiatrist, U.S. Army major, and "observant Muslim who prayed daily," who recently went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, killing thirteen Americans (including a pregnant woman). While the media wonders in exasperation why he did it, offering the same old tired and trite reasons — he was "picked on," he was "mentally unbalanced" — the fact is his behavior comports well with certain Islamic doctrines. As such, it behooves Americans to take a moment and familiarize themselves with the esotericisms of Islam.
Note: Any number of ulema (Muslim scholars) have expounded the following doctrines. However, since jihadi icon and theoretician Ayman Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number two, has also addressed many of these doctrines in his treatises, including by quoting several authoritative ulema, I will primarily rely on excerpts from The Al Qaeda Reader (AQR), for those readers who wish to source, and read in context, the following quotes in one volume.
Wala' wa Bara'
Perhaps best translated as "loyalty and enmity," this doctrine requires Muslims to maintain absolute loyalty to Islam and one another, while disavowing, even hating (e.g., Koran 60:4), all things un-Islamic — including persons (a.k.a. "infidels"). This theme has ample support in the Koran, hadith, and rulings of the ulema, that is, usul al-fiqh (roots of Muslim jurisprudence). In fact, Zawahiri has written a fifty-page treatise entitled "Loyalty and Enmity" (AQR, p. 63-115).
One of the many Koranic verses on which he relies warns Muslims against "taking the Jews and Christians as friends and allies … whoever among you takes them for friends and allies, he is surely one of them" (Koran 5:51), i.e., he becomes an infidel. The plain meaning of this verse alone — other verses, such as 3:28, 4:144, and 6:40 follow this theme — and its implications for today can hardly be clearer. According to one of the most authoritative Muslim exegetes, al-Tabari (838-923), Koran 5:51 means that the Muslim who "allies with them [non-Muslims] and enables them against the believers, that same one is a member of their faith and community" (AQR, p. 71).
Sheikh al-Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), takes the concept of loyalty one step further when he tells Muslims that they are "obligated to befriend a believer — even if he is oppressive and violent towards you and must be hostile to the infidel, even if he is liberal and kind to you" (AQR, p. 84).
In ways, Hasan's life was a testimony to loyalty and enmity. According to his colleague, Dr. Finnell, Hasan "was very vocal about the war, very upfront about being a Muslim first and an American second." If his being "vocal about the war" is not enough to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to Islam, his insistence that he is first and foremost a Muslim is. Other evidence indicates that the primary factor that threw him "over the edge" was that he was being deployed to a Muslim country (Afghanistan) — his "worst nightmare."
According to a fellow Muslim convenience store owner who often spoke with Hasan, the thought that he might injure or kill Muslims "weighed heavily on him." Hasan also counseled a fellow Muslim not to join the U.S. Army, since "Muslims shouldn't kill Muslims," again, showing where his loyalty lies. Tabari's exegesis comes to mind: the Muslim who "allies with them [non-Muslims] and enables them against the believers, that same one is a member of their faith and community," i.e., he too becomes an infidel (AQR, p. 71).
Another source who spoke with Hasan notes that "in the Koran, you're not supposed to have alliances with Jews or Christian or others, and if you are killed in the military fighting against Muslims, you will go to hell."
At any rate, surely none of this should come as a surprise. In April 2005, another Muslim serving in the U.S. Army, Hasan Akbar, was convicted of murder for killing two American soldiers and wounding fourteen in a grenade attack in Kuwait. According to the AP, "he launched the attack because he was concerned U.S. troops would kill fellow Muslims in Iraq."
Taqiyya
This doctrine, which revolves around deceiving the infidel, is pivotal to upholding loyalty and enmity wherever and whenever Muslim minorities live among non-Muslim majorities. In fact, the Koran's primary justification for deception is in the context of loyalty: "Let believers [Muslims] not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with God — unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions" (Koran 3:28). In other words, when necessary, Muslims are permitted to feign friendship and loyalty to non-Muslims, or, in the words of Abu Darda, a pious companion of Muhammad, "We grin to the faces of some peoples, while our hearts curse them" (AQR, p. 73). Taqiyya's importance for upholding loyalty and enmity is evidenced by the fact that, just three pages into his treatise, Zawahiri has an entire section called "The Difference Between Befriending and Dissembling." There he shows that, while sincere friendship with non-Muslims is forbidden, insincere friendship — whenever beneficial to Muslims — is not.
Again, Zawahiri quotes that standard reference, Tabari, who explains Koran 3:28 as follows: "Only when you are in their [non-Muslims'] power, fearing for yourselves, are you to demonstrate friendship for them with your tongues, while harboring hostility toward them. But do not join them in the particulars of their infidelities, and do not aid them through any action against a Muslim" (AQR, p. 74).
And therein lies the limit of taqiyya: when the deceit, the charade begins to endanger the lives of fellow Muslims — whom, as we have seen, deserve first loyalty — it is forbidden. As Zawahiri concludes, the Muslim may pretend, so long as he does "not undertake any initiative to support them [non-Muslims], commit sin, or enable [them] through any deed or killing or fighting against Muslims" (AQR, p. 75).
Again, we are reminded that the "moment of truth" for Hasan, who seems to have led something of a double life — American major and psychiatrist by day, financial supporter of jihadi groups and associate of terrorists by night — is the fact that he was being deployed to Afghanistan, i.e., he would have been aiding non-Muslim Americans against fellow Muslims (remember, he was "a Muslim first and an American second"). He tried to prevent this, getting a lawyer, to no avail. Thus, since he had taken deceit to its doctrinal limit and was now being placed in a position where he would have to actually demonstrate his loyalty to Americans against Muslims, it appears he decided to take it to the next level (see doctrine below).
Incidentally, we also find that "he [Hasan] was going to be kind of the caretaker for [American] Muslim soldiers. Sometimes Muslim soldiers have a rift between what they're doing and their faith," according to Major Khalid Shabazz, an Army Muslim chaplain. "That person who is a leader needs to quell some of those fears and help them through that process."
This all sounds well and good, but what, precisely, does it mean? If, as we have seen, Islam clearly forbids Muslims from aiding infidels against fellow Muslims, and if being in the U.S. Army requires American Muslims to fight non-American Muslims now and again, how was Hasan — or any other observant Muslim — going to "quell some of those fears and help through that process"? How, if not by merely instructing them in the centuries-old arts of taqiyya?
Jihad
Amongst learned infidels, jihad is the most recognized and notorious of all Muslim doctrines. Literally meaning to "struggle" or "strive," jihad can take on any form, though its most native and praiseworthy expression revolves around fighting, and killing, the infidel enemy — even if it costs the Muslim fighter (the mujahid) his life: "Let those who would exchange the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the path of Allah; whoever fights in the path of Allah — whether he dies or triumphs — we shall richly reward him" (Koran 4:74). And "Allah has purchased from the faithful their lives and possessions, and in return has promised them the Garden. They will fight in the path of Allah, killing and being killed" (Koran 9:111).
The hadith also has its fair share of anecdotes advocating the "one-man jihad." Zawahiri's treatise, "Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents," (AQR p. 137-171), spends much time justifying the desperate solo jihad — otherwise known as the "martyrdom operation" — including by offering the following hadith: "A Muslim asked Muhammad, O Messenger of Allah! If I plunge myself into the ranks of the idolaters and fight till I am killed — what then, to heaven? He [Muhammad] said yes. So the man plunged himself into the ranks of the idolaters, fighting till he was slain" (AQR, p. 153).
The learned ulema agree. According to al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), "There is no wrong for a man to singlehandedly attack a mighty army — if he seeks martyrdom — provided he has the fortitude." Others indicate that one of the reasons making the one-man jihad permissible is that it serves to "terrify the foe" (AQR, p. 155).
And there it is: When all else failed, when Hasan's forthcoming deployment into Muslim land forced him to expose where his true loyalty (wala') lies, pretense (taqiyya) gave way to full-blown struggle (jihad). Hasan, who sacrificed many years to become a psychiatrist and a U.S. Army major, in the clear words of the Koran "exchange[d] the life of this world for the Hereafter." Evidence also indicates that he believed "martyrdom operations" were not only valid but laudable acts of courage, writing "YOUR INTENTION IS THE MAIN ISSUE" (capitals in original). Zawahiri puts it more articulately: "The deciding factor is … the intention." Is the mujahid killing himself "to service Islam [laudable martyrdom], or is it out of depression and despair [forbidden suicide]?" (AQR, p. 157).
(Unfortunately and, no doubt, much to Hasan's chagrin, infidel medics ensured his failure to achieve martyrdom.)
The greatest proof that, at least in his own mind, Hasan was waging a jihad is the fact that he utilized that immemorial jihadi war cry — Allahu Akbar! — which has served to terrify the infidel denizens of the world for centuries. Here's an example from Muslim history (circa the early 8th century): "The [non-Muslim] inhabitants of eastern Anatolia were filled with terror the likes of which they had never experienced before. All they saw were Muslims in their midst screaming 'Allahu Akbar!' Allah planted terror in their hearts. … The [non-Muslim] men were crucified over the course of 24 km" (from Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk).
Indeed, while the takbir (the formal term for "Allahu Akbar") can be used in various contexts, it is by far primarily used in a jihadi context, past and present. Nearly 1,400 years ago, Muhammad and the early Muslims cried "Allahu Akbar" immediately before attacking their infidel neighbors; eight years before the Fort Hood massacre, Mohamed Atta cried "Allahu Akbar" immediately before crashing a hijacked plane into one of the Twin Towers on 9/11. Even Bukhari, the most authoritative hadith compiler, has an entire chapter titled "The Recitation of Takbir [i.e., Allahu Akbar] in War."
Yet confusion abides. An AP report writes: "As if going off to war, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan cleaned out his apartment, gave leftover frozen broccoli to one neighbor, and called another to thank him for his friendship — common courtesies and routines of the departing soldier. Instead, authorities say, he went on the killing spree that left thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas, dead." Contrary to the tone of this excerpt, Hasan's actions were far from contradictory. After all, he was "going off to war."
Wala' wa bara,' taqiyya, and jihad all help explain Hasan's actions. Even so, other lesser-known aspects of Islam lend their support to the view that he was acting from an Islamist framework.
Sakina
Several people who encountered Hasan before, and even during, the time he went a-jihading note that he evinced an almost unnatural amount of calmness — certainly for one getting ready to go on a killing spree. No doubt, many will point to this as a sign that he was suffering from some sort of schizophrenic episode.
Yet the fact remains: according to jihadi lore, a feeling of tranquility and calmness is supposed to descend on the mujahid, especially during the most stressful moments of combat (see Koran 9:26 for confirmation). This is known as sakina (calmness, tranquility). Osama bin Laden himself often describes his experience of sakina during the Afghan-Soviet war: "Once I was only thirty meters away from the Russians and they were trying to capture me. I was under bombardment, but I was so peaceful in my heart that I fell asleep. Before a battle, Allah sends us sequina [sakina] — tranquility." Of course, whether Hasan experienced "true" sakina, or whether he was merely affecting to himself, is irrelevant. Rather, the point here is that, once again, that which appears inexplicable or indicative of "mental instability" can be explained through an Islamic paradigm.
Da'wa
According to Sharia law, Muslims are not permitted to voluntarily reside in non-Muslim nations, such as America, except under certain circumstances. One of these is if the Muslim is actively engaged in da'wa, that is, proselytizing; another is if he fights in the path of Allah, jihad. Both serve the same purpose: empowering Islam by numbers and territory, respectively. Merely living in infidel territory out of choice, however, because it offers a "better life," is forbidden. (To get an idea of how serious a matter it is for Muslims to reside in non-Muslims nations, see some online fatwas.)
Accordingly, we find that the observant Hasan, prior to his jihadi spree, was engaged in da'wa for years. In fact, he aggressively pursued it to the point that he was reprimanded by the authorities. Nor did he cease trying to proselytize — that is, trying to validate his living with infidels — until the day before he went on his rampage, when he gave his neighbor a copy of the Koran. Of course, many Westerners will project their notions of proselytism onto Hasan and see only a God-fearing man "altruistically" concerned for the souls of others. Unfortunately, even the business card he included with his Koran gifts is indicative of violence, as it stealthily introduces him as a "soldier of Allah." Moreover, the "altruistic" interpretation fails to take into account the sort of legalism observant Muslims such as Hasan often adhere to: if he literally believed he was "exchanging this life for the Hereafter," he most likely also believed that he had to justify his voluntary dwelling with infidels, hence the da'wa.
* * *
Soon following the Fort Hood massacre, FBI agent Brad Garrett explained Hasan's behavior as follows: "It's one of those things that he obviously went to kill a lot of people [jihad] and commit suicide [martyrdom]. Maybe in his own mind that he's saving future lives [Muslim loyalty]." Read with the bracketed concepts I supplied, Hasan's actions become logical and consistent — again, from an doctrinal point of view, that is, from a point of view the West, especially its leaders, are loath to explore and alacritous to ignore.
For example, "U.S. Rep. Andre Carson, an Indiana Democrat who is one of two Muslims serving in Congress, cautioned against focusing on the alleged shooter's religion [and thus its doctrines] and instead said the discussion should be about mental health issues."
Flagrant obfuscations aside, the facts remain: loyalty to Muslims and enmity for infidels (wala' wa bara'), a secretive double life (taqiyya), violence in the name of Allah (jihad) — all these can easily explain Hasan's violent rampage in Fort Hood.
The ultimate lesson? So long as Muslim doctrines are downplayed in the West, so long will warning signs, even concrete intelligence, be ignored, so long will such seemingly inexplicable incidents occur, so long will the media continue grasping for straws and Americans be "completely blindsided," so long will "Muslim grievance" be the default answer, so long will appeasement and concessions (domestically and internationally) be the only solution, so long will jihadis and Islamists grow emboldened and contemptuous, expecting more. Ad infinitum.
Conversely, if the Fort Hood massacre causes Americans to begin taking Islam's doctrines more seriously, the thirteen slain, while dying tragically, will not have died in vain.
Originally published at: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/nidal-hasan-and-fort-hood-a-study-in-muslim-doctrine-part-1/ and http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/nidal-hasan-and-fort-hood-a-study-in-muslim-doctrine-part-2/
Raymond Ibrahim is the associate director of the Middle East Forum and the author of The Al Qaeda Reader, translations of religious texts and propaganda
Related Topics: Muslims in the United States, Radical Islam, Terrorism | Raymond Ibrahim
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Arab World: A democratically elected puppet?
By ZVI MAZEL
Jerusalem Post 20.11.09
It would seem that Syria suffered a major defeat last week with the formation of a Lebanese national unity government.
Syria has for years fought long and hard to keep Lebanon under its thumb, but in 2004, with the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, its influence took a big hit. At the time, the murder was attributed to pro-Syrian elements, and subsequent universal condemnation from Western and Arab powers alike forced Damascus to pull its troops from Lebanese soil.
Five years later, on June 7, 2009, Saad Hariri, the son of the slain prime minister, won a clear victory in the Lebanese elections.
And now, five months after that success, Hariri was finally able to form a "national unity government," albeit only after intense international pressure and lengthy negotiations succeeded in bringing together representatives of the majority and opposition parties.
Is Beirut slipping away from Damascus? The truth is not that simple and not that rosy.
Opposition parties will have 10 ministers in the new government, or a third of the total. Two of these ministers belong to Hizbullah, an organization taking its orders from Iran. Though the organization is legal, per se, its militia is not, and should have been disbanded long ago as demanded by the Taef agreements which put an end to the Lebanese civil war.
Hizbullah has resisted all calls for disarmament, and is in fact doing the exact opposite by steadily building up its strength. It is trying to obtain new weapons which would tip the delicate regional balance, such as ground-to-air missiles with the capacity of downing planes, and it has already acquired some 40,000 missiles which could reach nearly all of Israel. Armament and ammunition are still streaming in over the porous Syrian border, and the Lebanese army has yet to confront the action for fear of clashes with Syria or Hizbullah.
All of the above is, of course, a flagrant violation of resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
Even before Hizbullah was officially included in the most recent Lebanese cabinet, Israel stated repeatedly that the responsibility for any attack on its territory carried out by the organization would rest squarely on that government, and that Lebanon as a whole would suffer the consequences.
WHAT, IF anything, will the new government be able to do to change this dangerous state of affairs? It is true that the June elections were fair and democratic, and that the Sunni-Christian-Druze coalition won 71 of the 128 seats of parliament, with the remaining 57 falling to the Shi'ite Hizbullah and Amal, and a breakaway Christian faction led by Michel Aoun. However, Hizbullah made it clear that it would oppose - by force if necessary - any government in which the opposition would have no part.
The group also issued significant demands. A third of the ministers must come from the ranks of the opposition, Hizbullah insisted, and the opposition must be granted veto power over all decisions. These stipulations would have given Hizbullah and its allies control over all important actions, as well as preventing the government from disarming the organization, investigating its links with Iran and the presence of revolutionary guards in Lebanon, cooperating with the international tribunal set up to probe the murder of Rafik Hariri, and more.
Saad Hariri is well aware of the fact that the Lebanese army is no match for Hizbullah, which took over west Beirut in 2008 in order to force then prime minister Fuad Saniora to set up a national unity government in which the opposition had a third of the seats. He also knows the problems of a country where a mosaic of communities and religions is kept in a state of fragile equilibrium. Were the Shi'ite community - the largest in Lebanon - not to be represented in the government, he would not have a moment's peace.
Therefore, when President Michel Suleiman asked him to form the new government, Hariri immediately declared that he would do his utmost to include the opposition. He added, however, that he would not grant the veto power they wanted - hence the need for long and difficult negotiations. The first compromise left the majority parties with only 15 ministers while granting the opposition 10, with the remaining five seats being appointed by president Suleiman, who, although very sympathetic to Syria, is generally considered to be fairly neutral.
Thus Hariri, who had a parliamentary majority but only 50% of the ministers, would not be able to affect major change, which would require a two-third majority.
And still opposition parties were not satisfied. Despite their victory, they kept demanding not only veto power but also the right to choose their portfolios and to name the ministers. Hariri refused to yield to what he perceived as unreasonable conditions posed by parties which had, after all, lost the elections.
Matters came to a head when Michel Aoun insisted that his son-in-law - who had failed to get himself elected - be given the ministry of communications. This ministry is of special importance because Hizbullah has set up a network of its own, which the ministry is expected to try and regulate.
Further complicating the situation, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a key ally of Hariri, decided to take his party out of the coalition. He stated, however, that he would not act against the new government, but would rather take part in it while not necessarily guaranteeing his automatic support.
At that point the situation seemed hopeless. Outside intervention was clearly needed. Together with moderate Arab countries, the world rallied to the cause, attempting to convince Syria to pressure its Lebanese allies to tone down their demands. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who had shunned Syria since Rafik Hariri was murdered, invited Bashar Assad to visit his country, and later visited Damascus himself; France and the United States sent emissaries to Syria; and finally, the emir of Qatar made a special trip to Teheran and, according to unconfirmed reports, convinced the Iranians to agree to the proposed list of ministers, thus paving the way to the formation of a government while keeping veto power out of the hands of the opposition.
WHO OR what finally clinched the deal? It's hard to say. What is clear is that Hizbullah - aided and abetted by Syria and Iran - blocked for five months the formation of a government which had the majority support of a parliament elected in free and democratic elections. Such was the way two countries belonging to the so-called, "Axis of Evil" were able to decide the fate of Lebanon, regardless of the will of the people.
Saad Hariri has won an important battle, but he is under no illusion as to where the real power lies. In his speech announcing the formation of the government, he emphasized the need for national unity in order to deal with the country's pressing social and economic problems. Lebanon is still wrestling with the aftermath of the civil war of the '70s, as well as with the repercussions of the Second Lebanon War. Hariri added that while his country would stand firm against Israel, he would not let an operation initiated by Hizbullah and its supporters spark another war.
The new government made the formulation of its political program its first priority, but will that program include ridding Hizbullah of its weapons? Observers believe that there will be nothing to provoke a crisis with the organization. Most probably, the government will state that "resistance movements" - a euphemism for Hizbullah - have the right to defend the country against foreign aggression (i.e. Israel), but that the subject of the organization's arms will be discussed within the framework of the "national dialogue," as was done in the past.
However, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was speaking at the same time as Hariri, warned the government not to tackle issues endangering national unity. He also threatened to destroy Israel's army, but declared he had no intention of starting a war. He talked at length about Israel, and about relations with Iran and with Turkey - which he congratulated for the distinctly cooler tone used against Israel. His remarks were a blatant interference by the leader of an illegal militia in affairs better left to the government.
In another sign of lingering Syrian influence, as soon as Hariri announced that he had formed a government, Michel Suleiman - without waiting for the formal ratification by the parliament - traveled to Damascus. It is expected that Hariri himself will do the same after that formal ratification.
Hariri will have to govern wisely in order to initiate much needed economic reforms, but how free will he be? Can he ignore the troubled political situation in his country and in the region? What about UN Security Council's resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 demanding that Hizbullah give up its weapons? What about the continued flow of arms to the organization coming from Syria? And what of the organization's not-so-secret intention to attack Israel, yet again, no matter what the cost for Lebanon?
While the new prime minister is tackling local problems, he may discover yet that decisions taken in Damascus or Teheran will make a mockery of his efforts and wreak havoc upon Lebanon.
**The writer is the former Israeli ambassador to Egypt and Sweden.

Question: "What are the different English Bible versions?"
Answer: Depending on how one distinguishes a different Bible version from a revision of an existing Bible version, there are as many as 50 different English versions of the Bible. The question then arises: Is there really a need for so many different English versions of the Bible? The answer is, of course, no, there is no need for 50 different English versions of the Bible. This is especially true considering that there are hundreds of languages into which the entire Bible has not yet been translated. At the same time, there is nothing wrong with there being multiple versions of the Bible in a language. In fact, multiple versions of the Bible can actually be an aid in understanding the message of the Bible.
There are two primary reasons for the different English Bible versions. (1) Over time, the English language changes/develops, making updates to an English version necessary. If a modern reader were to pick up a 1611 King James Version of the Bible, it would be virtually unreadable. Everything from the spelling, to syntax, to grammar, to phraseology is very different. Linguists state that the English language has changed more in the past 400 years than the Greek language has changed in the past 2000 years. Several times in church history, believers have gotten “used” to a particular Bible version and become fiercely loyal to it, resisting any attempts to update/revise it. This occurred with the Septuagint, the Latin Vulgate, and more recently, the King James Version. Fierce loyalty to a particular version of the Bible is illogical and counterproductive. When the Bible was written, it was written in the common language of the people at that time. When the Bible is translated, it should be translated into how a people/language group speaks/reads at that time, not how it spoke hundreds of years ago.
(2) There are different translation methodologies for how to best render the original Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek into English. Some Bible versions translate as literally (word-for-word) as possible, commonly known as formal equivalence. Some Bible versions translate less literally, in more of a thought-for-thought method, commonly known as dynamic equivalence. All of the different English Bible versions are at different points of the formal equivalence vs. dynamic equivalence. The New American Standard Bible and the King James Version would be to the far end of the formal equivalence side, while paraphrases such as The Living Bible and The Message would be to the far end of the dynamic equivalence side.
The advantage of formal equivalence is that it minimizes the translator inserting his/her own interpretations into the passages. The disadvantage of formal equivalence is that it often produces a translation so woodenly literal that it is not easily readable/understandable. The advantage of dynamic equivalence is that it usually produces a more readable/understandable Bible version. The disadvantage of dynamic equivalence is that it sometimes results in “this is what I think it means” instead of translate “this is what it says.” Neither method is right or wrong. The best Bible version is likely produced through a balance of the two methodologies.
Listed below are the most common English versions of the Bible. In choosing which Bible version(s) you are going to use/study, do research, discuss with Christians you respect, read them for yourself, and ultimately, ask God for wisdom regarding which Bible version He desires you to use.
King James Version (KJV)
New International Version (NIV)
New American Standard Bible (NASB)
New King James Version (NKJV)
English Standard Version (ESV)
New Living Translation (NLT)
Holman Christian Standard Bible (HCSB)
New Revised Standard Version (NRSV)
New Century Version (NCV)
New English Bible (NEB)
American Standard Version (ASV)
Good News Bible (GNB) / Today’s English Version (TEV)
Amplified Bible (AMP)
Today’s New International Version (TNIV)
New English Translation (NET)
Revised Standard Version (RSV)
Contemporary English Version (CEV)
God’s Word Translation (GW)
New International Readers Version (NIrV)
Easy-To-Read Version (ERV)
Complete Jewish Bible (CJB)
Bible in Basic English (BBE)
21st Century King James Version (KJ21)
World English Bible (WEB)
Revised English Bible (REB)
Jerusalem Bible (JB)
New American Bible (NAB)
The Living Bible (TLB)
The Message (MSG)

Recommended Resource: How to Choose a Translation for All Its Worth: A Guide to Understanding and Using Bible Versions by Gordon D. Fee & Mark L. Strauss.