LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 28/09

Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 8:5-17. When he entered Capernaum, a centurion approached him and appealed to him, saying, "Lord, my servant is lying at home paralyzed, suffering dreadfully." He said to him, "I will come and cure him." The centurion said in reply, "Lord, I am not worthy to have you enter under my roof; only say the word and my servant will be healed. For I too am a person subject to authority, with soldiers subject to me. And I say to one, 'Go,' and he goes; and to another, 'Come here,' and he comes; and to my slave, 'Do this,' and he does it." When Jesus heard this, he was amazed and said to those following him, "Amen, I say to you, in no one in Israel have I found such faith. I say to you, many will come from the east and the west, and will recline with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob at the banquet in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom will be driven out into the outer darkness, where there will be wailing and grinding of teeth." And Jesus said to the centurion, "You may go; as you have believed, let it be done for you." And at that very hour (his) servant was healed. Jesus entered the house of Peter, and saw his mother-in-law lying in bed with a fever. He touched her hand, the fever left her, and she rose and waited on him. When it was evening, they brought him many who were possessed by demons, and he drove out the spirits by a word and cured all the sick, to fulfill what had been said by Isaiah the prophet: "He took away our infirmities and bore our diseases."  

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Lebanon's Minority delusions/future News 27.06.09
Iran: Heart of the crisis, Wilayat Al-Faqih. Future News 27.06.09
NYPD: Qaeda and Hizbullah biggest terrorist threats. UPI 27.06.09
Silence Has Consequences for Iran. By JOSé MAR& IACUTE;A AZNAR 27/06/09
Chris Zambelis: Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao/Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 18June 25, 2009
Chris Zambelis: Hezbollah in Egypt: The Politics of Conspiracy and Resistance. Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 16June 12, 2009
Iran and the Syrian Gambit. By: Howard Schweber/Huffington Post 27/06/09
UN secretary general calls for united front against drug abuse and illicit trafficking.By Ban Ki-moon  27/06/09
Jackson's death a lesson in meaning of 'international'- The -Daily Star 27/06/09
Welcome to the Middle East, Mr. Obama, your pains can begin.By David Ignatius 27/06/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 27/09
Premier-Designate Hariri Vows to Form 'Homogeneous' Cabinet-Naharnet
Paris Welcomes Hariri's Designation, Calls for Consolidating Calm-Naharnet
Saad Hariri: Political Novice Turned Premier-Naharnet
With Hariri Poised to Become Next PM, Various Scenarios For New Cabinet Formation-Naharnet
Jumblat: Cabinet Statement Should Address Hizbullah Qualms-Naharnet
'Change and Reform' Bloc Wants Justice Ministry-Naharnet
Williams: Syria to Return Shebaa to Lebanon Once it Signs Peace With Israel-Naharnet
Nasrallah-Hariri Meeting Preliminary to be Continued Following Hariri's Designation-Naharnet
Hariri Poised to Become Next Premier after First Day of Consultations-Naharnet
Riyadh Presented Damascus With List of Lebanese Requests Most Dealing With National Dialogue-Naharnet
Riachi Formally Declared Vice President of International Tribunal-Naharnet
Jerusalem Post: UNIFIL Finds 20 Katyushas Ready for Launch in the South-Naharnet
Iran election violence "outrageous," says Obama-Reuters
Obama OKs plan to normalize US ties with Syria-World Tribune
G8 denounces Iran election violence, calls on Tehran to resolve conflict-Daily Star
Lebanon rivals discuss shaping new government-AFP
Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao-Jamestown Foundation
Where do the two June elections leave Hezbollah?The People's Voice
Iran's Arab allies relieved to see crisis easing-Reuters
Political crisis in Iran to likely affect Hezbollah's strategy-Trend News Agency
Obama, the Neocons and Iran-Wall Street Journal
Israel Doubts Unrest Will Transform Iran-Washington Post
Iran and the Syrian Gambit-Huffington Post
UNIFIL refutes Israeli reports it found 20 rockets in Lebanon-Daily Star
Hariri gets 67 votes for PM on first day of consultations-Daily Star
Hariri's success will hinge on reconciliation-Daily Star
Fadlallah accuses Western media of exploiting Iran crisis-Daily Star
Political, religious leaders condemn celebratory gunfire-Daily Star
Rival Christian leaders raise the stakes ahead of imminent cabinet formation-By Inter Press Service
Laurent tours community building programs in north Lebanon-Daily Star
Lebanon sees 28 percent rise in government revenues-By Regional Press Network (RPN)
World Bank lowers Lebanon growth forecast to 2.5 percent-Daily Star
Five new swine flu patients raise number of cases in Lebanon to 35-Daily Star
Judge Riachy elected deputy president for Special Tribunal-Daily Star
Nationwide campaign highlights dangers of substance abuse-Daily Star

Premier-Designate Hariri Vows to Form 'Homogeneous' Cabinet
Naharnet/Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri vowed on Saturday to form a homogeneous and consensus government that is able to function away from obstruction.
We "will safeguard the constitution, (state) institutions, sovereignty, independence and the project of the building of the Lebanese state," Hariri told reporters at Baabda palace after President Michel Suleiman designated him Lebanon's premier and tasked him with forming a new cabinet. He vowed to form a "homogeneous" and "consensus" government that is able to remain united and "make achievements away from obstruction" in cooperation with the president. Hariri also promised to keep strife and "foreign and economic" dangers away from Lebanon. Suleiman on Saturday designated Hariri Lebanon's premier after the majority of parliamentarians nominated the politician to the post.
"According to the constitution and after the president consulted with the speaker of parliament and parliamentarians, he (Suleiman) summoned Saad Hariri and tasked him with forming a new government," a presidential statement said. The decree issued by Suleiman came after Hariri received 86 votes of approval by lawmakers following two days of consultations. Hariri got the approval of 71 MPs from his own majority alliance, plus Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and his bloc of 12 legislators and two Armenian MPs.
This would be Hariri's first designation to the premiership following the June 7 legislative elections in which the March 14 coalition won 71 out of the 128 seats in parliament.
The 39-year-old is to succeed outgoing Prime Minister Fouad Saniora, a member of Hariri's al-Mustaqbal movement. From Baabda palace, Hariri headed to downtown Beirut and prayed at his father's graveside along with Saniora and other members of his bloc. Hariri now faces the difficult task of negotiating with other political factions to form a government. The process can take days or even weeks. On Sunday, he will visit former prime ministers and kick off consultations with parliamentary blocs on cabinet formation on Monday
As news broke up about his nomination, celebratory gunfire shook Beirut and its suburbs. However, Hariri urged citizens in a statement not to fire in the air.
Around 12 people were injured from celebratory gunfire on Thursday, when parliament reelected Berri. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 14:47

Paris Welcomes Hariri's Designation, Calls for Consolidating Calm
Naharnet/French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner welcomed on Saturday the appointment of Saad Hariri prime minister-designate and called for consolidating calm in Lebanon.
Kouchner "wished (Hariri) success" in a letter sent by the foreign ministry to the premier-designate. "The international community and all of Lebanon's friends welcomed the perfect organization of the legislative elections in June," the French foreign minister told Hariri in the letter. "There is a need to consolidate the atmosphere of calm prevailing" in the country, Kouchner said. He added that he would be happy to meet Hariri during his visit to Beirut next month. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 19:12

Saad Hariri: Political Novice Turned Premier
Naharnet/Saad Hariri, who was propelled into the heart of Lebanese politics following the assassination of his former prime minister father four years ago, was himself named to the top job on Saturday. After the murder of his popular father, Rafik, in a 2005 bomb blast, the young tycoon took center stage in the anti-Syrian opposition, and now has two parliamentary election wins under its belt. Three weeks after Hariri's March 14 alliance clinched 71 out of parliament's 128 seats in the June 7 poll, President Michel Suleiman tasked Hariri with forming a new government. The Saudi-born Hariri initially attributed his political success to the sympathy vote for his father and five-time ex-premier, who founded al-Mustaqbal movement that his 39-year-old son now leads. Already a success of his own in the business world, Hariri was chosen to continue the "national and political mission" of his father, who was credited with rebuilding Lebanon after the devastating 1975-1990 civil war. Forbes magazine put Saad Hariri's net worth at 1.4 billion dollars in its 2009 list of the world's billionaires, down from 3.3 billion last year. Hariri was one of the main negotiators in the formation of the unity government in May 2008, bringing to an end a political crisis that had brought Lebanon to the brink of civil war.
Hariri is a business graduate of Georgetown University in Washington, and heads his late father's Saudi-based construction firm, Saudi Oger. One of the largest companies in the Middle East, it employs around 35,000 people. The Hariri empire, which Saad has managed since 1996, also spans banking, real estate and media through companies such as Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi Research and Marketing Group and Future Television. He also has his own real estate company. Saad Hariri, who also holds Saudi nationality, was born April 18, 1970, Rafik Hariri's second son by his first Iraqi wife. He is married to Lara Bashir al-Adem, who hails from a prestigious Syrian family, and the couple has two children.(AFP) Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 15:52

Iran election violence "outrageous," says Obama
Fri Jun 26,By Parisa Hafezi
TEHRAN (Reuters) - President Barack Obama on Friday praised the bravery of Iranians who protested against a disputed election in the face of "outrageous" violence, while a hardline Iranian cleric called for the execution of leading "rioters." Iran's top legislative body, which had said it found no major violations in the presidential election which set off the worst unrest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, said 10 percent of ballot boxes would be recounted. Authorities have rejected a call for annulment of the vote by reformist former prime minister Mirhossein Mousavi who led mass protests after he was declared a distant second behind President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the poll two weeks ago. Obama, whose administration along with major powers is locked in a row with Iran over its nuclear program, said hopes for U.S. dialogue with Iran would be affected by the post-election crackdown.
"There is no doubt that any direct dialogue or diplomacy with Iran is going to be affected by the events of the last several weeks," Obama told a White House news conference, adding: "We don't yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran." Iranian authorities have used a combination of warnings, arrests and the threat of police action to drive mass rallies off Tehran's street since Saturday with smaller gatherings dispersed with tear gas and baton charges.
Authorities have accused Mousavi of responsibility for the bloodshed, while he says the government is to blame. State media have said 20 people were killed in the violence.
ISLAMIC LAW
Ahmad Khatami, a member of the powerful Assembly of Experts, said the judiciary should charge leading "rioters" as "mohareb" or one who wages war against God.
"I want the judiciary to ... punish leading rioters firmly and without showing any mercy to teach everyone a lesson," Khatami told worshippers at Tehran University on Friday.
"They should be punished ruthlessly and savagely," he said. Under Iran's Islamic law, punishment for people convicted as "mohareb" is execution.
Obama, who said Mousavi had "captured the imagination" of people who want to open up to the West, hailed Mousavi supporters at the news conference.
"Their bravery in the face of brutality is a testament to their enduring pursuit of justice. The violence perpetrated against them is outrageous," Obama said.
The U.S. president said he did not take seriously Ahmadinejad's call for him to apologize for criticizing Tehran, "particularly given the fact that the United States has gone out of its way not to interfere with the election process in Iran."
Washington had been hoping to convince Tehran to drop what it suspects are plans to develop nuclear bombs, while also seeking its cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. The government says its nuclear program is to generate power.
"Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will trigger an arms race in the Middle East that would be bad ... for the security of the entire region," said Obama, adding:
"So even as we clearly speak out in a unified voice in opposition to the violence that's taken place in Iran, we also have to be steady in recognizing that the prospect of Iran with a nuclear weapon is a big problem." Group of Eight powers on Friday deplored violence stemming from the disputed presidential election in the world's fifth biggest oil exporter but held open the door for Tehran to take part in talks on its nuclear program. "We sincerely hope that Iran will seize this opportunity to give diplomacy a chance ...," the G8 statement said.
The row over the election has exposed an unprecedented public rift within Iran's ruling elite. Abbasali Kadkhodai, spokesman for the Guardian Council, said that to remove all ambiguities over the vote, 10 percent of all ballot boxes would be recounted in the presence of senior officials representing government and opposition.
Political and religious figures should send election-related questions to the council and the defeated candidates had 24 hours to present their representatives for the recount, he told the students' news agency ISNA. The 12-man Guardian Council's statement leaves little scope for more legal challenges to the election result, short of an attack on the position of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has expressed strong support for Ahmadinejad. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a Mousavi ally, chairs the Assembly of Experts which has the constitutional power to depose Khamenei. The assembly has never tried to do so and Rafsanjani is seen as unlikely to take such a radical step. Mousavi said he was determined to keep challenging the election results despite pressure to stop.(Writing by Philippa Fletcher and Peter Millership)

Controversy shakes March 8
Date: June 26th, 2009 /Future News
As Lebanon went smoothly beyond the decisive entitlement of electing House Speaker Nabih Berry which will inevitably have a positive impact on the state institutions, differences between Speaker Nabih Berry and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun surfaced.
The recent rhetoric of Berry and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah that denies any instance on being given veto powers in the new cabinet contradicts that of Aoun and Marada leader Sleiman Frangieh that calls for refraining from participation in the government without attaining veto powers. This controversy between opposition poles might deprive the country of the opportunity of attaining stability and economic prosperity.
Yet, Hizbullah is trying to reach a compromise between its FPM ally and its inclination toward accepting the guarantees intended to be given to the party in the cabinet’s statement.
In fact Hizbullah seems to have decided to go with the two options in a parallel way. It is trying to mend the apparently shattered relation between the opposition poles on the one hand and is preparing for a meeting between Nasrallah and Almustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri to establish consensus on the participation of the opposition in the new cabinet without attaining veto powers.
A source close to the opposition said that the meeting intended to be held between Nasrallah and Aoun to lay the basis for consensus had been delayed because the two sides have not agreed yet on the conditions for such an accord.
Political figures entitled to find common grounds between the two divergent orientations suggest that Nasrallah meets Hariri before he meets Aoun on the one hand and that Aoun Meets Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt before he meets Nasrallah on the other.
The idea behind the suggestion is that Jumblatt might give Aoun a new option that convinces him to relinquish his demand of being given veto powers as a precondition to participate in the new cabinet. Moreover, the meeting between Hariri and Nasrallah is likely to lead the latter to exert more effort to convince Aoun to let go of his precondition because the cooperation and harmony within the cabinet is far more important to all factions than Aoun’s demands.
Nevertheless, Berry was liberated of the sense of guilt he had toward Aoun because he had paid the price for his alliance with the FPM leader when he lost the three Jezzine seats in his favor. Thus Berry will go on with the next stage out of his own vision of the country’s interests without taking Aoun’s reserves into consideration.

Iran: Heart of the crisis, Wilayat Al-Faqih
Date: June 27th, 2009 /Future News
The crisis in the Iranian Republic still lingers. The calm and tranquility in the streets do not necessarily mean that the political situation is sound, nor does it mean that Ahmadinejad and his supporters won the elections.
Following the closure of the ballot boxes on 12 June, Iran was placed in front of a crisis. The tremendous and dangerous changes in the Islamic Republic in Iran were because the roots of the crisis were in fact very deep and went beyond electing president of the Republic to unveil the true purpose of the conflict between the leaders inside the Republic.
The crisis continued to shoot up because none of the two disagreeing parties in Iran -Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with followers of Ahmadinejad on one hand and the reformists led by Mir Hussein Mousavi on the other- had the intention to back away from their stances. Losing ground would be considered a total failure resulting in a coup.
Khamenei, who is supposedly the higher authority of all Muslims in Iran, lost his role when he took sides in the elections and was prejudiced to Ahmadinejad and his followers. He interfered in the elections believing in his ability to influence the opinion of Iranians being their absolute authority.
On the other hand, if the reformists represented by Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi give away their positions, that would mean slaughtering the basic purpose of the battle to abolish the state’s absolute supreme authority.
The demand to eradicate the higher authority was not something new, furthermore was not presented bluntly by the demonstrators. Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montaziri who was Imam Khumeinei’s partner in developing this theory, called many years ago to cancel it and introduce the state of supervision instead of irrevocable leadership.
The absolute jurisdiction of Wilayat Al-Faqih was transformed into a curtain to hide the domination of the Revolutionary Guard on the political and economic authorities in Iran, which frightened many.
Another fear the Iranians face is the emergence of a new group led by Mosbah Yazdi, aiming to abolish the Republican regime and endorsing an Emirate similar to the one in Taliban Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad was believed to be a supporter.
Everyone in Iran can see that the situation bears no delay. The problem is in finding a solution. Hashemi Rafsanjani who is still a powerful figure in Iranian politics as he heads two of the regime's most powerful bodies: Expediency Council (which adjudicates disputes over legislation) and the Assembly of Experts (which appoints, and can theoretically replace, the Supreme Leader) returned from the shadows to run the game and find a solution for the crisis.
In the city of Qom, the Ahvazi authorities were also trying to find a solution mainly because the Extremist Conservatives did not agree on Ahmadinejad’s policy. They translated their condemnation by not participating in the ceremony to congratulate Ahmadinejad.
One of the solutions put forward is to bring back the post of prime ministry with more powers to control Nejad’s lack of restrictions, implement wide range of economic reforms and control the dialogue with Washington outside the provocative language adopted by Ahmadinejad.
Another solution is to allow the Council of Experts, led by Rafsanjani, to resume its constitutional authorities by law and control the absolute jurisdictions of the Supreme leader. This would bring Rafsanjani back to power side by side with the Supreme leader.
If solutions were reached to, Mousavi’s destiny is open to discussion on whether he would accept them after he became a popular leader. Would he accept the solutions and give up his demand to cancel the presidential elections, and what would be the fate of his mass supporters who demonstrated, fell dead and wounded? Would they accept the outcome or would they resort to violence under the banner of ‘despair for change’?
The demonstration, which spilled millions of Iranians to the Azadi square, reflected the Iranians’ rejection to steel their free decisions and choices. The demonstrations brought together all kinds of segments from the Iranian society; the path of the demonstration was no coincidence.
The Republicans led by Mousavi believed in what Ayatollah Hussein Montaziri once said, that Iran gained independence through the revolution but the Iranians did not gain the liberty which forms an essential part of the slogan of the revolution.
Then, how and when will the Iranians get hold of their freedom?

NYPD: Qaeda and Hizbullah biggest terrorist threats
Date: June 26th, 2009 Source: UPI
Vice-Commissioner of New York Police Department for combating terrorism Richard Volkenrath said Friday “the biggest terrorist threat against New York City is Al Qaeda organization and the second biggest threat is Hizbullah.” “Al-Qaeda’s threat is derived from its antagonism against the United States, while Hizbullah’s threat is derived from its ability to launch attacks outside the Lebanese territories”, he said. In a lecture he delivered about combating terrorism organized by the Washington Research Center, Volkenrath said the Qaeda’s continuous efforts and its obvious intention to attack the US have failed during the last few years. Volkenrath said “despite Hizbullah’s strategic decision not to attack the US, this reality might change if the US attacked the Lebanese Shiite party or its Iranian guardian.”The NYPD officer ruled out the possibility of “a mass destruction attack” against the US; however he warned that “these weapons (mass destruction) have become more accessible than they were in the last decade.”He added that the threat of “inside terrorism” is growing; pointing that NY is “the first target of terrorism given the city’s symbolic significance and the destructive consequences of any successful attack.”

With Hariri Poised to Become Next PM, Various Scenarios For New Cabinet Formation
Naharnet/Now that MP Saad Hariri is poised to be designated Lebanon's next Prime Minister, conflicting scenarios were presented by the parliamentary minority in regards to the composition of the future cabinet. Informed sources told the daily As-Safir on Saturday al-Mustaqbal Movement leader MP Saad Hariri presented his outlook of the new cabinet to Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah during their last meeting. He proposed a cabinet composed of 30 ministers, whereby the parliamentary majority would have 16 ministers, 10 ministers would represent the parliamentary minority and 4 ministers would be designated to the president. The Hizbullah leadership announced that the parliamentary minority continues to hold to obtaining veto power in cabinet, according to As-Safir. High level and well-informed sources within the al-Mustaqbal movement affirmed to the daily that Hariri had indeed presented a formula of 16+10+4 with his political allies prior to meeting Nasrallah. Sources added that his political allies approved Hariri's proposal since the parliamentary majority continues to reject providing the opposition with veto power. As-Safir quoted Christian sources close to the presidency expressing their reservations against the 16+10+4 formula preferring a 15+10+5 equation that would provide the president with 5 rather than 4 ministers in cabinet. The daily al-Akhbar on Saturday spoke to informed official sources close to the president saying President Suleiman prefers a 14+9+7 formula [14 to the parliamentary majority, 9 to the opposition and 7 ministers to the president]. According to the same sources this would enable the president to be more effective in balancing the equilibrium between the parliamentary majority and minority. President Suleiman is expected to officially designate Hariri on Saturday. Hariri's majority bloc insists it will only accept a unity government if the Hizbullah alliance surrenders the veto powers it enjoys in the outgoing cabinet. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:15

'Change and Reform' Bloc Wants Justice Ministry
Naharnet/Sources from the 'Change and Reform' parliamentary bloc said that the bloc is seeking to name one of its members to head the ministry of justice. Sources affirmed that one such candidate is MP Ibrahim Kanaan. The bloc is seeking to represent the Metn region in cabinet with a leading figure from this region. Outgoing Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar represents the Lebanese Forces in this post. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:46

Williams: Syria to Return Shebaa to Lebanon Once it Signs Peace With Israel
Naharnet/U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams said that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem personally told him that Syria considers the Shebaa Farms Lebanese territory, meaning Syria would turn the farms over to Lebanon within days once it signs a peace accord with Israel.
Williams expressed his admiration of Lebanese institutions mainly the ministries of the interior and defense as well as the Lebanese military on June 7 [parliamentary election day] the daily An-Nahar on Saturday, adding, "The formation of the Constitutional Council prior to the elections was also good."
The U.N. Special Coordinator said: "I routinely speak to Hizbullah and they have informed me of their stance regarding various international resolutions. Discussions are healthy and strong and I am not at all surprised to see criticism made by ministers from time to time from Hizbullah or any other party. This is very normal and healthy."
Williams is scheduled to review and discuss the implementation of UNSC resolution 1701 at the United Nations Security Council on July 7.
Regarding Hizbullah arms Williams said that what the Lebanese decide [on the subject] is important saying, "Historical experiences reveal that such issues are better solved within a national political framework only." As per the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [STL], Williams explained, "there can be no trial without a prisoner, and no prisoner without a list of charges. I don't know what will happen with the STL because the investigation is confidential, if they need more time so be it, this better than failing." Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:38

Nasrallah-Hariri Meeting Preliminary to be Continued Following Hariri's Designation
Naharnet/Thursday's meeting between al-Mustaqbal Movement leader MP Saad Hariri and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was preliminary for discussing the formation of the next cabinet. However, the meeting is to be followed later on once Hariri is designated by President Suleiman to form Lebanon's next cabinet.
The daily As-Safir said on Saturday that Thursday's meeting is to be followed up on the same level or would take place between Hariri and MP Hajj Hussein Hassan who is also Nasralla's political aide. Sources close to Hizbullah denied the presence of extreme negative or positive atmosphere in the country to the daily An-Nahar on Saturday following the Thursday evening meeting between Hariri and Nasrallah. "There is an opinion that the meeting lost must of its distinctiveness once it included more aides to it. The meeting would have been more effective had it remained bilateral." Following Thursday's meeting Hariri's media bureau issued a statement saying both leaders reviewed local developments in light of the June 7 parliamentary elections and the proposed options for forming Lebanon's next cabinet. The statement affirmed that both sides agreed to continue their discussions praising the option of dialogue, cooperation and openness. The meeting was attended by Hizbullah's aide to the secretary-general MP Hajj Hussein Hassan and Mustafa Nasser and Nader Hariri. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 10:08

Riyadh Presented Damascus With List of Lebanese Requests Most Dealing With National Dialogue
Naharnet/Riyadh has presented Damascus with a list of Lebanese requests most dealing with articles agreed to at the national dialogue sessions in 2006, concerning Lebanese-Syrian relations, border demarcation and settling and organizing the issue of Palestinian arms outside and inside Palestinian refugee camps. The daily As-Safir said on Saturday that the Syrian side removed itself from discussing any issue not related to official bilateral relations including that of Hizbullah's arms. According to the paper Syria left such issues to the Lebanese parliamentary opposition to freely discuss with the political parliamentary majority, in light of the recent stance by Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in which he said that the resistance is better protected by its own Lebanese people and is in no need of any guarantees from anyone. The daily al-Akhbar on Saturday hinted that Saudi-Syrian negotiations are not progressing when it comes to details regarding Lebanon. Sources added to the paper efforts have been focused on removing obstacles standing in the way of designating Hariri to form Lebanon's next cabinet. Informed sources told al-Akhbar that the Syrians would benefit from Hariri's premiership, as this would remove the after effects of the 2005 assassination of his father rafik. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is expected to visit Damascus sometime this year, reports said. According to one source, one obstacle is the demarcation of borders remains. The Saudis want that process to begin with the Shebaa Farms and the call for canceling the Higher Lebanese-Syrian Council. The Syrians want this request made by the Lebanese authorities alone. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 10:40

Riachi Formally Declared Vice President of International Tribunal
Naharnet/Lebanese Judge Ralph Riachi has been officially appointed vice president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, it said in a statement Friday. "Judge Ralph Jacque Riachi has been acting as vice president on a full time basis since June 8, 2009," the STL said. Riachi served as head of the criminal court of cassation in Lebanon from December until June 2009. The STL's head, Antonio Cassese, described Riachi's expertise in the Lebanese legal system as "invaluable and even crucial for the success of our work." The U.N. Security Council created the tribunal in 2007 -- at the request of Lebanon -- to find and prosecute those responsible for the 2005 assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri. The tribunal has no suspects in custody since ordering the release in April of four pro-Syrian generals held by Lebanon for nearly four years without charge.(Naharnet) Beirut, 26 Jun 09, 21:35

Jumblat: Cabinet Statement Should Address Hizbullah Qualms
Naharnet/"Democratic Gathering' parliamentary bloc leader MP Walid Jumblat said he understands the well known Hizbullah's qualms and concerns adding that the cabinet statement should address them as it does with the concerns of others. In statements to the daily As-Safir on Saturday Jumblat said he was not privy to Thursday's meeting between al-Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri with Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The paper added that Jumblat is to announce a stance on Monday calling on the Lebanese government to forfeit the Arab seat at the United Nations Security Council in 2010 "because Lebanon will be facing a major trap and an impossible mission." Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 13:15

Jerusalem Post: UNIFIL Finds 20 Katyushas Ready for Launch in the South
Naharnet/U.N. peacekeepers have found around 20 Katyusha rockets that were ready for launch in southern Lebanon, Israel's Jerusalem Post reported Friday. The newspaper said that UNIFIL has increased its operations in southern Lebanon and begun entering villages in search of Hizbullah weapons caches in an effort to prevent a flare-up along the border with Israel. According to the Israeli army, Hizbullah has deployed most of its forces and weaponry - including Katyusha rockets - inside homes in southern villages. The Post also said that UNIFIL has recently succeeded in thwarting attacks that were planned against its own personnel. UNIFIL's increased activity comes amid concerns in Israel that Hizbullah will launch an attack along the border to avenge the assassination of its military commander Imad Mughniyeh in a Damascus car bombing last year. The newspaper quoted foreign sources as saying that Hizbullah was behind a thwarted attempt earlier this year to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan. According to the daily, the group has also tried using Palestinian proxies for attacks within Israel, without success. "These frustrations, Israel fears, might lead the group to try a retaliatory attack against the northern border, which would be easier operationally."
Beirut, 26 Jun 09, 14:19

Obama makes the right move on Syria
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Marshall News Messenger
http://www.marshallnewsmessenger.com/news/content/news/stories/2008/08/062509_editorial_2.html
President Barack Obama is doing exactly the right thing in sending an ambassador to Syria after four years of a vacancy of that position that was ignored by former President George W. Bush. The move helps Washington make yet another connection in the Arab world, something we believe is important.
It is always better to have a working relationship, even with people with whom you disagree.
And sending an ambassador does not, in any way, indicate that the United States approves of Syria's government or its actions. Having a diplomat does, however, give us at least the opportunity to have some impact on them. We have ambassadors in many nations where we have fundamental disagreements with governments. For that matter, some of our allies are nations with whom we have many basic conflicts. Saudi Arabia instantly comes to mind. The question is not simply one of erasing our differences, though. It is in finding areas where we have common goals. We don't exactly know where those lie with Syria, but we are sure there are some. Without a doubt, Syria has often not been a responsible player in the world scene. We're sure they have caused much deadly mischief in Iraq, especially early in that war. But the direction of nations can, and does, change. We are much more likely to push the change in a positive direction if we have an active diplomatic presence than we are being absent from the scene entirely.

Obama OKs plan to normalize U.S. ties with Syria
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/ss_syria0505_06_25.asp
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama has approved a State Department plan to send an ambassador to Damascus after a four-year absence. ShareThis
On June 23, officials said, the State Department notified the Syrian ambassador to Washington, Imad Mustapha, of the U.S. decision to restore full diplomatic relations with Damascus. Earlier, Mustapha hailed Obama as representing a change in U.S. relations with Damascus and the Arab world. Officials said the envoy would probably arrive in the Syrian capital by September 2009 as part of a U.S. effort to restore security cooperation with the regime of President Bashar Assad.
"We are prepared to move forward with Syria to advance our interests through direct and continuing dialogue," State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said on June 24.
"Today, there is real optimism because the two parties realize the importance of improving bilateral relations in order to achieve global peace," Syria's official daily, A-Thawra, said.
Officials said the State Department has sent a team of experts to determine the security requirements for the embassy in Damascus. They said the embassy could relocate in an effort to reduce its visibility and avoid violent anti-U.S. demonstrations. Kelly said the State Department informed the Syrian embassy in Washington and the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus of the U.S. decision to return its ambassador. The official did not say when the ambassador would arrive in Syria. "This decision reflects the administration's recognition of the important role Syria plays in the region," Kelly said. "And of course, we hope that they will continue to play such a constructive role to promote peace and stability in the region."
In 2005, Washington recalled its ambassador to Syria in wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The Assad regime has been linked to the car-bombing in Beirut that killed the pro-U.S. Lebanese politician. In mid-June, Syria and the United States conducted their first military cooperation talks in at least five years. A delegation from U.S. Central Command discussed security along the Iraqi-Syrian border. "I know that they have played a positive role in addressing some of our very real concerns about foreign fighters crossing from Syria," Kelly said. "We've had some good discussions with them in those four different visits that we had to Damascus."
Officials said the return of the U.S. ambassador would also facilitate any renewal of Israeli-Syrian peace talks. They said U.S. envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, urged Obama to quickly restore diplomatic relations with Damascus in an effort to advance American proposals for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, captured in the 1967 war.
"On an immediate level, the announcement to return an ambassador is tied to Syria's agreement on Iraq security and intelligence sharing," the authoritative blog, Syria Comment, reported.

Silence Has Consequences for Iran
The less we protest, the more people will die.
By JOSé MARÍA AZNAR
The Wall Street Journal 26/06/09
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124605649582063489.html
If there hadn't been dissidents in the Soviet Union, the Communist regime never would have crumbled. And if the West hadn't been concerned about their fate, Soviet leaders would have ruthlessly done away with them. They didn't because the Kremlin feared the response of the Free World.
Just like the Soviet dissidents who resisted communism, those who dare to march through the streets of Tehran and stand up against the Islamic regime founded by the Ayatollah Khomeini 30 years ago represent the greatest hope for change in a country built on the repression of its people. At stake is nothing less than the legitimacy of a system incompatible with respect for individual rights. Also at stake is the survival of a theocratic regime that seeks to be the dominant power in the region, the indisputable spiritual leader of the Muslim world, and the enemy of the West.
The Islamic Republic that the ayatollahs have created is not just any power. To defend a strict interpretation of the Quran, Khomeini created the Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, which today is a true army. To expand its ideology and influence Iran has not hesitated to create, sustain and use proxy terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. And to impose its fundamentalist vision beyond its borders, Iran is working frantically to obtain nuclear weapons.
Those who protest against the blatant electoral fraud that handed victory to the fanatical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are in reality demanding a change of regime. Thus, the regime has resorted to beating and shooting its citizens in a desperate attempt to squash the pro-democracy movement.
This is no time for hesitation on the part of the West. If, as part of an attempt to reach an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, the leaders of democratic nations turn their backs on the dissidents they will be making a terrible mistake.
President Obama has said he refuses to "meddle" in Iran's internal affairs, but this is a poor excuse for passivity. If the international community is not able to stop, or at least set limits on, the repressive violence of the Islamic regime, the protesters will end up as so many have in the past -- in exile, in prison, or in the cemetery. And with them, all hope for change will be gone.
To be clear: Nobody in the circles of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or Ahmadinejad is going to reward us for silence or inaction. On the contrary, failing to support the regime's critics will leave us with an emboldened Ahmadinejad, an atomic Iran, and dissidents that are disenchanted and critical of us. We cannot talk about freedom and democracy if we abandon our own principles.
Some do not want to recognize the spread of freedom in the Middle East. But it is clear that after decades of repression -- religious and secular -- the region is changing.
The recent elections in Lebanon are a clear example. The progressive normalization of Iraq is another. It would be a shame, particularly in the face of such regional progress, if our passivity gave carte blanche to a tyrannical regime to finish off the dissidents and persist with its revolutionary plans.
Delayed public displays of indignation may be good for internal political consumption. But the consequences of Western inaction have already materialized. Watching videos of innocent Iranians being brutalized, it's hard to defend silence.
*Mr. Aznar is the former prime minister of Spain (1996-2004).

Political crisis in Iran to likely affect Hezbollah's strategy
26.06.09 09:00
http://news-en.trend.az/important/exclusive/1494379.html
Azerbaijan, Baku, June 25 /Trend News, U.Sadikhova/
The Iranian opposition's protests against victory of the incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the elections will not lead to political problems in Lebanon, but may affect the strategy of Iran's ally - the Hezbollah organization.
"Developments in Iran will affect the entire region [Middle East], but primarily the Hezbollah," Analyst of the Lebanese Program of the British Chatham House Institute for Foreign Relations Nadim Shehadi told Trend News in a telephone conversation from London. "Hezbollah is a key ally of Iran's Revolutionary Guardians, so any change [in Iran] will have the impact on them."
Powerful opposition riots broke out in Tehran after announcing the results of the presidential elections held on June 12. The incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the elections, garnering 66 percent of the vote, the Iranian Central Election Commission (CEC) said. One of the loser candidates is reformer Mir-Hossein Mousavi who has accused the authorities of fraud in the results of voting and encouraged people to hold protests.
The election resulted in a wave of opposition's mass protests, which became the most extensive since the Islamic revolution in 1979 in which the Shah regime was overthrew. Iran has accused the Western media of inciting riots in the country.
European countries and the United States condemned the crackdown of demonstrators in Iran, which led to death of 150 people, according to unofficial figures.
Arab countries urged not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.
Analysts exclude that the unrest in Iran may move to Lebanon, but they may affect the strategy of the main military and political ally of Tehran - the Hezbollah party.
So far, no one in Lebanon, which today has held the election of the parliamentary speaker and will hold the elections to the government next week, commented on the political unrest.
Observers believe the unrest in Tehran that affects the security of the Middle East may have an impact on Lebanon where there is a conflict between Hezbollah and anti-Coalition "March 14" which is the majority in the parliament has repeatedly led to military clashes.
Analyst on the Lebanese politics Salem Zuheir believes despite the fact that Lebanon is experiencing a stage of the national unity, it is impossible to eradicate Iran's influence in this country.
"It is impossible to separate Lebanon from Iran and Syria, as it is impossible to separate this from France," Head of Arab Orient Centre for Strategic and Civilisation Studies told Trend News in a telephone conversation from London.
He said now there is a political tranquility in Lebanon because of the dialogue between pro-Western Sunni movement Al-Mustaqbal led by Saad al-Hariri, son of slain Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and the opposition bloc 8 March, the core of which is Hezbollah, an ally of Damascus and Tehran.
Shehadi said that if there will be changes in Iran's leadership, it will lead to a change in strategy of Hezbollah which is closely linked to the revolutionary command in Iran.
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 based on the ideology of the first Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini.
"It is too early to talk about change [in Iran and Lebanon], because the events in Iran are developing in different directions," Shehadi said. "But if we view Hezbollah as an ally of the revolutionary command in Iran, then any change in Tehran's policy will impact it."
However, Anis Naggash, a Lebanese political analyst, believes that Iran's policy towards Lebanon will remain the same and Hezbollah military power will not let the party weaken.
"Hezbollah's good military organization, an independent policy and strategy is unlikely to lead to weakening of the party's forces in Lebanon," Naggash said to Trend News over telephone from Tehran. "Hezbollah spoke openly about its own interests, so it knows how to do it and what to do."
Naggash said the problems in Lebanon might arise in establishing a national unity government, but this can happen because of the internal contradictions of political parties in Lebanon, but not because of Iran's influence.
Political expert on Middle East policy Awad Chamas said Egypt and Saudi Arabia enjoy greater influence in Lebanon.
"Anxiety in Iran will not affect the political situation in Lebanon, [the election of prime minister] because he [Prime Minister] is elected under the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt," head of the European Center for Research on Mediterranean Shamas told Trend News over telephone from Brussels.
He also excluded possibility of a new wave of concern in Lebanon because of the political crisis in Tehran, because Hezbollah is not interested in new clashes with pro-Western parties of the country.
Leader of the party Nasrallah accepted defeat in parliamentary elections in June and congratulated Al-Hariri on victory despite the fact that differences between 14 March and Hezbollah in May last year led to military clashes in Beirut.
Shamas added despite the forecasts about launch of a new civil war in Lebanon after the elections, Hezbollah acknowledged defeat and therefore the political crisis in Iran will not impact domestic policy in Lebanon.
Do you have any feedback? Contact our journalist at trend@trend.az

Where do the two June elections leave Hezbollah?
June 26th, 2009 9:40:08 AM
Franklin Lamb,
Dahiyeh
Some Legmen for the US Israeli lobby, and even some here in Lebanon appear barely able to contain themselves, such is their felt glee over the Lebanese and Iranian election results. Some supporters of Israel see this election as two recent victories while others calculate that Israel is scratching for some good news given that polling data from Israeli surveys show that more than 50% of its population favors bombing Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Another survey, late last month, found that nearly one third of Israelis polled said they would leave Israel if Iran gets a nuclear weapon which it likely will have-if it decides to-within the next 18 months according to estimates by the Israeli Defense Ministry. Meanwhile US visa applications have broken records, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv for three out of the past five months..
One, election Israel hoped would help it maintain its occupation of Palestine was the June 7th Lebanese election (which the Hezbollah led opposition actually won by nearly ten percent of the popular vote.) But it may have to look elsewhere for solace because rather than being defeated and weakened, Hezbollah is currently stronger in Lebanon than it has ever been. The Party is dominating the construction of the next Lebanese government, as it negotiates the terms of its support for Saad Hariri as Prime Minister. Hezbollah’s popular support has increased due it its post election sportsmanlike acceptance of the results and its conduct and efforts at accommodation with its political adversaries.
Yesterday witnessed Hezbollah's ally, the Shia Amal leader, Nabih Berri being elected to his fifth term as the politically powerful position of Speaker of Parliament. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Christian ally Michel Aoun, who also increased his popular vote in the election, picked up more seats for a total of 27. He is now demanding 7 cabinet posts (3 more than in the previous government) for his Free Patriotic Movement while renewing the Oppositions call for proportional representation in the new 128 seat Parliament. There are now 13 political blocks and 11 independent MPs many of whom seek good relations with Hezbollah while curtailing their pre-election complaints about Resistance weapons.
One reason is that the Lebanese public, once more eying Israeli provocations and a military buildup along the blue line have come increasingly to agree that until the Lebanese Army is up to the task it makes sense to have a strong deterrence to the Netanyahu government projects.
The post June 7 election Hezbollah led opposition appears united and ready to reach out to the newly named Lebanon First group (previously known as March 14). Some have suggested that March 8 change its designation to Lebanon Always, but Hezbollah prefers to maintain, at least for now, its Loyalty to the Resistance title.
Hezbollah’s second in command Sheikh Naim Qassem said yesterday that the nomination of the new prime minister ( likely Saad Hariri) must be "an inseparable part" of an agreement on a new government and added it remained unsure who the next premier will be:.
"So far, the identity of the premier-designate is unclear in anticipation of the outcome of(parliamentary) deliberations.”
Qassim said the opposition will decide on "how to approach the new government based on the designated premier's proposition". This observer interpreted his comments to mean that Hezbollah will support Saad Hariri for Prime Minister but that there must be some clearly agreed benefits for the Resistance, perhaps legitimizing Hezbollah's weapons explicitly or at least adopting the current conciliatory position of Walid Jumblatt who spent hours with Hasan Nasrallah last week and is said to no longer believe Hezbollah weapons are a serious domestic problem.
"Right now, we do not have a specific candidate as we wait for the outcome of the deliberations and the allocations agreement on the government's structure and the distribution of ministries” Qassem coyly added.
The Iranian election
The June 12 Iranian election also initially created some joy in Israel. However, whatever changes may come to Iran from the election results, they appear more evolutionary than revolutionary and are unlikely to affect either that country’s support for Palestine, expressly mandated by the Iranian constitution, or its commitment to the Lebanese National Resistance led by Hezbollah.
One imagines that no one outside Iran, with Hezbollah perhaps being one of the few exceptions, really knows what is going on across the large diversified country with many power centers and with those reporting from inside tending naturally to report to outsiders developments through their individual political prisms.
Assuming that there is to be a serious ongoing power struggle between an Ahmaddinejad/Khameni group and a Mousavi/Rafsanjani faction, and one prevails over the other, rather than the more likely dialogue, some reshuffling of portfolios, and surface accommodation and slow transformation, many Hezbollah officials doubt it will affect the Party or its agenda partly because support for such groups as Hezbollah and Hamas is ingrained in Iran's ideology, which sees the Islamic republic as a counter to Egypt, Jordan and others that have recognized Israel.
On the subject of finances, this observer has frequently been advised that Iran gives Hezbollah much less aid than if usually reported in the Western media and that Hezbollah's existence is no longer dependent on Iran.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran started with its birth and has deepened since. Virtually all the leadership in Iran is said by Hezbollah to have close ties with it. Iran, and increasingly other countries in the Region and beyond, share Hezbollah’s goals and have pledged to maintain its relationship with its resistance paradigm as well as with its alley Hamas.
According to Hezbollah, the extent of Western and American involvement in Iran's internal affairs is now clear and it blames the US and Britain for some of the recent violence.
Hezbollah's Naim Qassim argues that what is going on in Iran is not a simple protest against the results of the presidential election. "There are riots and attacks in the streets that are orchestrated from the outside in a bid to destabilize the country's Islamic regime.”."
Consequently, according to Qassim, while Hezbollah is open to talks with representatives of all Western governments this does not currently include the United States even though several U.S.officials have asked to speak with Hezbollah but have been refused. This will likely be its position until the Obama administration removes it from the US Terrorism list.
" According to Qassim: "It is useless to have any dialogue with the Americans since they regard us as terrorists. The Europeans for their part have a role to play, especially as they are taking a different approach from the Americans.”
Hezbollah believes that it will not be affected by the events Tehran and members claims that Hezbollah has nothing to do with Iran's internal affairs and that it does not take sides in internal matters and that the June 12 election was solely an internal Iranian issue.
"What is happening there has nothing to do with our situation," Qassim told the Beirut media on June 25, 2009. "We have our own Lebanese identity and popularity, and these events don't concern us.” adding that Hezbollah believes that the situation in Iran will soon return to normal and that the “Islamic republic has succeeded in overcoming this plot from overseas aimed at destabilizing the internal situation,"
There also has been a hope that Israel could more easily make a case for international acceptance of Israeli action to bomb Iran and increase sanctions. Netanyahu has pressed the point on his trip to Europe this week, trying to persuade countries such as Italy, which are among Iran's more important trading partners, to reduce their economic ties.
According to EyalZisser, head of the department of Middle Eastern and African History at TelAviv University, “The Iranian election is a disturbing signal for Syria and Hezbollah. The weaker the regime is, the less it can provide support for Hezbollah."
Eldad Pardo, a Hebrew University professor and Iran specialist, agrees, stating that “It is an extremely heavy blow for Iran's power and image and I would even daresay to Islamic radicalism in general."
David Menashri, head of the Center of Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University believes that the system in Iran could be so deeply rattled that it will register among Syrian officials and Iran's other allies including Hezbollah..
"The legitimacy of the Iran regime and those it supports has been harmed," Menashri said. "This is an opportunity to crack some heads and start solving some problems.”
Others view this position as Israeli bombast aimed at shoring up its increasingly fatigued population who are witnessing an international increase in support for Palestine and for ending Israel's occupation.
Near term, neither the recent elections or events in Iran appear unlikely to fundamentally affect Hezbollah. Neither inside Lebanon's new government or internationally.
-###-
Franklin Lamb is doing research in Lebanon and can be reached at fplamb@sabrashatila.com
Franklin P. Lamb, PhD
Director, Americans Concerned for
Middle East Peace, Wash.DC-Beirut
Acting Chair, the Sabra-Shatila Memorial Scholarship Program Laptop Initiative
Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp
fplamb@SabraShatila.org

UN secretary general calls for united front against drug abuse and illicit trafficking
By Ban Ki-moon
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Daily Star
This year marks the centenary of drug control - 100 years since the Opium Commission met in Shanghai to stop an opium epidemic. In more recent years, United Nations conventions have helped to address the challenge of drug abuse and reduce its terrible toll on individuals, families and communities.
Drug abuse can be prevented, treated and controlled. I urge member states to upgrade their preventive interventions and integrate drug treatment into public health programs. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continue to work with governments and other partners to scale up drug treatment world-wide.
I also urge full implementation of the United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. These instruments can help in the effort to prevent and control drug-related crime that is posing a serious security threat in many parts of the world.
Greater development assistance and a strengthening of the rule of law are needed in countries that are vulnerable to the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Absent these essentials, these states risk instability and will face even greater challenges in reaching the Millennium Development Goals.
On this International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, let us join together to help people suffering from drug addiction and to reduce the number of dangerous places on this planet where drugs are produced, trafficked and consumed.
**Ban Ki-moon is the secretary general of the United Nations
 

Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 18June 25, 2009 06:
By: Chris Zambelis
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35183&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=6689061369
Security forces during the crack down in Bekaa Valley in April
Mystery continues to surround Hezbollah’s alleged links to the seventeen suspects arrested on drug trafficking charges on the Dutch Caribbean island of Curacao on April 28. According to Curacaon authorities, approximately 250 law enforcement officials took down a major drug trafficking and money laundering ring led by a criminal network that shipped and sold cocaine and other contraband from Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe and the Middle East. In a significant twist, Curacaon authorities announced that the suspects had ties to international organized crime networks linked to Hezbollah in Lebanon; the suspects are accused of, among other things, having funneled part of their proceeds to Hezbollah through informal banking mechanisms (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; Netherlands Info Services News, April 30; AP, April 29). Four Lebanese nationals were among those arrested in addition to an unspecified number of Colombians, Venezuelans, Cubans, Curacaons, and Surinamese (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30). Curacaon authorities reported that officials from the Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States aided in the investigation (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30).
The suspects are reported to have specialized in exporting Colombian cocaine that they obtained from smugglers who transported the drugs to Curacao using speedboats and ocean-going cargo ships that embarked from Venezuela. The drug ring is also reported to have imported arms, ammunition and hashish from the Netherlands to Curacao. Sources in Curacao reported that the suspects established an elaborate scheme to launder their illicit profits. Among other things, the smugglers purchased property in Curacao, Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon. The Curacaon-based contingent of the drug ring, for instance, operated legitimate businesses on the island that served as front companies for their illicit activities (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30).
On the surface, these events may appear to validate the concerns of many observers regarding the nexus between international organized crime and radical Shiite Islam in Latin America and the Caribbean. A closer examination of this case, however, indicates that other factors may be at play.
A Smuggler’s Paradise
Curacao’s geographic proximity to the Venezuelan coast makes it an ideal transshipment point for narcotics - especially Colombian cocaine - arms, and other contraband originating in Latin America and other parts of the Caribbean destined for international markets. Local- and foreign-based smugglers are also known to exploit the island’s direct air traffic links to the Netherlands and close European ties to ship their wares. The free-trade zone (FTZ) and state-of-the-art shipping and port facilities that have made Curacao a key hub in legitimate global trade and passenger cruise ship traffic are also conducive to smuggling and other illicit activities. While Curacao’s oil industry has traditionally served as one of the island’s main sources of revenue (Venezuela’s state-run Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. [PDVSA] runs major oil refining operations at Curacao’s Isla refinery), it is also a major offshore banking and financial services center. The offshore banking and financial services industry, an industry which represents an intrinsic part of the political-economy of the Caribbean, is often associated with money laundering, tax evasion, and international organized crime. Due to the scenic island’s reputation as a tourist paradise for European and North American vacationers, however, this dark side of Curacao is often overlooked. Yet it is important to point out that Curacao is not alone in the region in this regard; much of Latin America and the Caribbean are beset by corruption, weak institutions, porous borders, and poverty, leaving them susceptible to international organized crime.
While Curacao enjoys autonomy in its domestic affairs, all matters related to foreign policy and national defense remain the responsibility of the Dutch government. The Dutch armed forces maintain a permanent presence on the island. In addition, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) forces have, since 2000, utilized Curacao and fellow Dutch Caribbean island Aruba as Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to support its mission in the region. U.S. surveillance aircraft, for instance, depart from Curacao’s Hato International Airport to conduct counter-narcotics detection and monitoring missions. U.S. investigators, security officials, and military personnel also operate from the FOL in concert with local and regional partners. In spite of its strategic importance and the attention it receives from the United States and the Netherlands, Curacao remains a smuggler’s paradise. This reality is emblematic of the scale of the challenges posed by international organized crime in the region.
Unanswered Questions
Allegations linking Hezbollah to drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean surface periodically (The National [Abu Dhabi], March 22). While Hezbollah continues to receive financial and material support from Iran, the group is known to boast an impressive independent fundraising capability. Donations from its supporters and sympathizers across the globe (including the sizeable Arab diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean), proceeds from legitimate business interests managed by the organization and illicit activities such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and related activities are widely assumed to help sustain the organization’s social service, political, and military wings.
In spite of reports linking Hezbollah to the crime ring in Curacao, no details regarding the exact nature of Hezbollah’s alleged involvement in the drug smuggling and money laundering operation were provided by Curacaon authorities or by the other parties involved in the investigation. In a similar incident, U.S. and Colombian authorities took down a major drug trafficking ring headed by Lebanese nationals in Colombia in October 2008 that was accused of maintaining ties to Colombian drug cartels and right-wing paramilitaries. The suspects detained in Colombia were alleged to have channeled part of their funds back to Hezbollah’s coffers (El Espectador [Bogota], March 9). Similarly, details to explain the precise Hezbollah link to that criminal enterprise failed to emerge. In another case, Colombian and Ecuadorian officials collaborated in June 2005 to take down a drug smuggling ring with global reach that was said to be linked to Hezbollah. According to Ecuadorian officials, the suspects, who included Lebanese, Syrians, Ecuadorians, Colombians, Algerians, Nigerians and Turks, are reported to have transferred 70% of their profits to Hezbollah. The ringleader of the group, Rady Zaiter (a.k.a. David Assi Alvarez and Almawla Fares), was a Lebanese national wanted on drug trafficking charges in France (CRE Satelital [Guayaquil], June 21, 2005). Zaiter’s arrest and extradition to France led to further arrests of alleged accomplices involved in his drug operation in Brazil and the United States (Le Temps [Switzerland] June 27, 2005). As in the previous cases, no concrete details explaining the exact Hezbollah link to Zaiter’s criminal activities ever emerged. Not surprisingly, Hezbollah has denied any involvement in the drug trade. Hezbollah describes attempts to link the group to the drug trade as an effort by its enemies to tarnish the reputation it has cultivated as a Lebanese nationalist movement and a legitimate player in Lebanese politics (Al-Manar TV [Beirut], October 23, 2008).
Hezbollah is also implicated in the drug trade in the Middle East, including the trade inside the borders of its archenemy Israel, one of the region’s largest markets for recreational drugs. During the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli activists went so far as to call for hashish smokers in Israel to boycott the product based on the premise that proceeds from the sale of hashish on Israeli streets funded Hezbollah (The Forward [New York City], August 11, 2006). In addition to profiting from Israeli drug consumption, Hezbollah is also alleged to have used the drug trade to infiltrate the Israeli defense and security establishment by luring corrupt military, police, and intelligence officers into profitable drug trafficking schemes in exchange for intelligence information. While most reports of Hezbollah’s intelligence activities in Israel point to the group’s ties to members of Israel’s Arab minority and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Hezbollah successfully recruited a Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli army who directed his own drug operation in Israel; Hezbollah operatives supplied the Israeli officer with hashish and heroin in exchange for intelligence information. And there are more cases like this one (Haaretz [Tel Aviv], April 1, 2008; Christian Science Monitor, April 15).
Lebanese Organized Crime
In light of reports linking Hezbollah to the drug trade in the Americas and beyond, observers concerned with this topic should also consider the role of Lebanese organized crime networks in Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the situation on the ground in Lebanon as it relates to the relationship between Hezbollah and organized crime networks and drug trafficking suggests that a more complex dynamic is at work (The National, April 14; Christian Science Monitor, April 15).
Lebanese organized crime networks that traffic drugs and engage in other illicit activities have international connections that extend to the substantial Lebanese diaspora in the Americas and to other ethnic-based criminal organizations. Likewise, drug gangs based in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, including networks led by powerful Shi’a clans, are routinely linked to Hezbollah. Lebanon’s impoverished Bekaa Valley, a region where Hezbollah has traditionally drawn strong support, has long been a center for the cultivation of cannabis for the production of hashish, the drug of choice for most recreational drug users in the Middle East. Drug gangs in the Bekaa Valley also cultivate poppy crops used to produce opium and heroin. According to some sources, upwards of 50 heavily-armed drug kingpins, each with their own stake in the drug trade, operate in the Bekaa Valley alone (AFP, October 4, 2008). Beirut and Hezbollah have traditionally turned a blind eye to the drug trade and other illicit activities in the Bekaa Valley to ensure the loyalty of the powerful Shi’a clans in the region who derive their livelihoods from the drug trade (al-Jazeera [Doha], April 14). Shi’a-led clans, however, are not the only groups involved in the global drug trade. When the Syrian army controlled most of Lebanon, Syrian officers regularly engaged in drug trafficking and other illicit activities for both monetary and political gains. Many of these networks remain in place in some form. During the Lebanese Civil War, Christian, Sunni, Palestinian and Leftist militias smuggled narcotics and engaged in other illicit activities on a global scale to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. [1] Following the conflict, many militias eventually morphed into full-fledged criminal organizations spanning the globe. The outward emigration of Lebanese and other Arab communities fleeing the conflict in the Levant to Latin America and the Caribbean provided Lebanese organized criminal networks with an opportunity to make international inroads in a manner analogous to the methods other ethnic-based organized criminal networks use to establish themselves among their kin across the globe.
A spate of recent incidents in Lebanon help shed light on the complex interplay between Hezbollah, Lebanese-based organized crime groups in the Bekaa Valley, and allegations that implicate Hezbollah in a series of major drug cases in the Americas, including the recent case in Curacao. While Hezbollah has often turned a blind eye to drug and criminal activities in areas under its control, a marked expansion of the drug trade, a rash of car thefts, and bold attacks against Lebanese security services by Shi’a crime networks in recent months have raised tensions in the Bekaa Valley and have placed Hezbollah in a precarious position (al-Jazeera April 14). Tensions escalated further when thieves linked to local organized crime networks attacked the son of the late Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh and then stole his car near a small village in the Bekaa Valley. When the son of the revered Hezbollah commander mentioned to his assailants who he was and that he himself was an active member of the group, the thieves continued with their assault and took his car anyway. In response to this affront, Hezbollah gave Beirut the go-ahead to deploy security forces in the Bekaa Valley to crack down on Shi’a gangs that are accustomed to operating unhindered (The National, April 14; Christian Science Monitor, April 15). These events are telling; the recent tensions between the organized crime networks and Hezbollah are indicative of the strength and influence of criminal gangs in Lebanon. Most importantly, these incidents also demonstrate the independence of these groups and their willingness to challenge Hezbollah (and the state) through violence when they see their interests being threatened.
Conclusion
Detailed evidence regarding Hezbollah’s supposed involvement in the Curacao drug case has yet to emerge. The nature of Hezbollah’s alleged connection to the detainees in the Curacao drug case may eventually surface, but in the meantime, serious researchers concerned with these issues should factor in the potential role of Lebanese organized crime networks that may be linked to Hezbollah through their contacts and connections in the Bekaa Valley, but who are motivated by profits, not politics. It is also possible that independent members of Lebanese organized crime networks operating in the Americas and elsewhere are contributing portions of their proceeds to Hezbollah out of sympathy for the group. Hezbollah, after all, remains popular among many Lebanese, particularly the Shi’a, but also among other sects within the Lebanese diaspora. Political motivations intended to harm Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanese politics may be behind many of these accusations. At the very least, the recent events in the Bekaa Valley indicate that Hezbollah’s connection to the drug trade in Lebanon and beyond is far more complex than is often reflected in the sweeping generalizations characteristic of much of the media coverage of the topic.
Notes
1. Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), p. 138, 143; also see Georges Corm, “The War System: Militia Hegemony and Reestablishment of the State” in Deirdre Collings (ed.), Peace for Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 217-18.
 

Hezbollah in Egypt: The Politics of Conspiracy and Resistance
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 16June 12, 2009
By: Chris Zambelis
The timing of Egypt’s April 8 announcement of its arrest of 24 men—allegedly linked to Hezbollah—on Egyptian soil in November and December 2008 upped the ante in the already tense relationship between Cairo and the Lebanese Islamist resistance movement and, by extension, Hezbollah’s supporter, Iran (al-Jazeera [Doha], April 11; al-Arabiya [Dubai], April 11). Cairo’s allegations regarding the suspects and their motives, however, have been fraught with inconsistencies that say more about the factors shaping the trajectory of contemporary geopolitics in the Middle East than any alleged conspiracy.
A Web of Conspiracy
The nature and targets of Cairo’s allegations of a Hezbollah-led plot in Egypt shed light on the underlying issues at play. Egyptian authorities initially accused the suspects, which included Egyptians, Lebanese, and Arab citizens of Israel, of funneling funds to Hamas in the Gaza Strip from Egyptian territory (al-Jazeera, April 10). Cairo then shifted its account and claimed that the 24 suspects were part of a 49-member Hezbollah cell that was preparing to execute attacks against Egyptian targets and Israeli tourists in Egypt. The suspects were also accused of engineering a coup at the behest of Iran to overthrow the government of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and spreading Hezbollah’s brand of Shia Islam in Egypt (al-Hayat [London], April 17; al-Arabiya, April 16).
The suspects are also reported to have attempted to recruit Egyptians and others in the country to monitor shipping traffic traversing the Suez Canal and in other locations near the Sinai Peninsula (al-Jazeera, April 10). The alleged cell was also said to have mapped out the terrain and demographics of a number of Egyptian towns and villages in Sinai, situated adjacent to Israel and Gaza. Egyptian sources stated that Hezbollah aimed to gauge the utility of these towns and villages for infiltrating Gaza and Israel proper to support the Palestinian resistance, groups such as Hamas in Gaza and possibly members of Israel’s Arab minority (al-Jazeera, April 9). Members of the alleged cell are also accused of planning to smuggle arms and ammunition by ship from Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan into Sinai, presumably to sustain their operations in Egypt and also to bolster the Palestinian resistance (al-Jazeera, April 13). Subsequent reports citing official sources in Cairo later claimed that the suspects intended to mount suicide attacks against unspecified targets in Tel Aviv (Press TV [Tehran], April 16). Egyptian security officials also reported that they uncovered explosive materials, including suicide belts, during the arrests of the suspects (al-Jazeera, April 13). The remaining 25 members of the alleged cell, which according to Egyptian officials include an unspecified number of Sudanese, remain at large (Daily Star [Cairo], April 13).
In addition to implicating Hezbollah and Iran in a web of conspiracy, official Egyptian media sources named Syria, Hamas, Qatar and its al-Jazeera satellite network, and Egypt’s banned Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), as being party to a plot against Egypt (al-Jazeera, April 18). Egypt’s citing of Damascus stems from Syria’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. Similarly, Cairo sees Hamas as a threat due to the example it sets for Egypt’s embattled Islamist opposition, as well as its alliances with Syria and Iran. Cairo is also threatened by Qatar’s rise as a diplomatic heavyweight in the Gulf, where it has emerged as a new voice for Arab causes (in spite of its close strategic relationship with Washington) and an alternative to the pro-U.S. Egyptian- and Saudi-led consensus in the region, a role bolstered by its natural gas and oil riches and ownership of al-Jazeera. Qatar and Syria were first to call for an emergency meeting of Arab League members and a ceasefire during Israel’s invasion of Gaza from December 2008-January 2009. Qatar also welcomed exiled leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups to Doha to meet with Arab League members and urged all Arab countries to immediately cut ties and negotiations with Israel in a show of solidarity with the Palestinians. In contrast, Egypt and Saudi Arabia boycotted the event. Qatar’s assertiveness during the crisis humiliated Egypt (and Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Egypt and other autocratic regimes in the Middle East consider al-Jazeera a threat because it provides opposition forces a venue to voice their opinions. The network’s allotment of airtime to critics of Egypt’s stance during the Gaza conflict also did not sit well in Cairo.
Egypt’s claim that the Ikhwan, the moderate, democratic reform-minded Islamist movement that represents the main opposition to Mubarak’s rule, was active in the alleged scheme suggests an effort on the part of Cairo to tarnish the group’s reputation domestically and internationally (al-Jazeera, April 18). The Ikhwan denied any involvement with or knowledge of the alleged cell, although they did support any attempts to help the besieged Palestinians in Gaza (al-Jazeera, April 11). At the same time, the Ikhwan highlighted the importance of defending Egyptian national security and criticized attempts by foreigners to violate the country’s sovereignty on any grounds (al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], April 23-29).
Hezbollah’s Threat to Egypt
Cairo’s official portrayal of Hezbollah’s threat to Egypt obscures the true nature of the Hezbollah threat. Egypt accuses Hezbollah of, among other things, religious fanaticism, terrorism and, most importantly, serving as a spearhead of Iranian expansionism. The true threat Hezbollah poses to Egypt and, for that matter, other U.S.-backed autocracies in the Middle East, however, is its ability to inspire popular dissent and resistance. Hezbollah’s impressive performance against Israel in combat during the years of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the Summer 2006 war are cases in point. Popular displays of solidarity with Hezbollah across Arab cities such as Cairo and Amman with predominantly Sunni populations during the July 2006 war, for instance, are also indicative of Hezbollah’s popularity. Significantly, Sunni Islamist opposition movements such as the Ikhwan in Egypt were among Hezbollah’s most vocal supporters during the July 2006 war (see Terrorism Focus, August 8, 2006). Hezbollah’s Shi’a Islamist pedigree is irrelevant in this context. In fact, Hezbollah secretary general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is widely regarded as a hero in the Arab and greater Muslim world. Many Arabs see Iran in a favorable light due to Tehran’s vocal opposition to the United States and Israel, not to mention the pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East. In spite of repeated warnings out of Cairo and other U.S.-friendly Arab capitals of the rise of an aggressive Iran that is bent on regional domination, the Arab public continues to identify the United States and Israel as posing the greatest threats by large margins. [1] As a result, Egypt, along with U.S.-backed autocracies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia that comprise the core of the so-called “moderate regimes,” has been vocal in playing up the specter of what it sees as an Iranian-led conspiracy to dominate Egypt and the Middle East. It is against this background that Hezbollah plays an integral role in the threat of a “Shi’a Crescent” first defined by Jordan’s King Abdullah II in December 2004 to describe Iran’s growing influence from Iraq to the Levant.
Hostilities between Egypt and Hezbollah have reached a fever pitch since Hezbollah accused Egypt of colluding with Israel’s invasion of Gaza (al-Manar [Beirut], April 10). During Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, Hezbollah also accused Egypt, along with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, of tacitly supporting Israel (see Terrorism Focus, August 8, 2006). While largely ignored in the U.S. and Western press, the regional fallout from Israel’s invasion of Gaza and the escalating human cost on the Palestinians continues to weigh heavily on Egypt and the wider Middle East. For its part, Cairo remains on the defensive domestically and in the wider Arab arena for the role it played in the latest war in Gaza and for its support of the Israeli blockade against the Palestinians that was instituted after Hamas emerged victorious in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections (al-Jazeera, April 13).
Hezbollah’s Response
Hezbollah’s political, information, and social service wings operate relatively transparently in the mainstream of Lebanese politics and society. In contrast, the group’s military and intelligence wings are shrouded behind a cloak of secrecy that rivals—if not exceeds—the behavior of state actors. This shroud of secrecy extends to all matters related to Hezbollah’s membership. But in a move atypical of the ultra secretive organization, Nasrallah acknowledged in a lengthy response to Cairo that one of the men in Egyptian custody, Sami Chehab, was in fact a member of Hezbollah operating in Egypt. Nasrallah admitted that Chehab was providing logistical assistance to the Palestinians along the Egyptian-Gaza border: “Our brother Sami, is a member of Hezbollah, we do not deny this…” (al-Manar, April 10). Egyptian authorities detained Chehab, a Lebanese citizen, in Egypt on November 19, 2008 (Press TV, May 1).
Nasrallah, however, vehemently denied Cairo’s allegations that Hezbollah intended to mount attacks against Egypt or foreign targets on Egyptian soil. He also rejected the charges that Hezbollah was planning to orchestrate a coup at the behest of Iran against the Mubarak regime or to cause any problems for the Egyptian people. Regarding Cairo’s allegations, he stated, “The aim here is to agitate the Egyptian people and to defame Hezbollah's pure and bright image. This aims to only please the Americans and Israelis, for the Egyptian regime has failed by all means” (al-Manar, April 10). Nasrallah also admitted that Hezbollah was actively supporting the Palestinians in Gaza and that Hezbollah’s sole concern was countering Israeli threats to Lebanon (al-Manar, April 9; April 10).
In a reflection of Nasrallah’s confidence in light of the serious allegations Egypt leveled against his organization, he also mentioned: “If aiding the Palestinians is a crime, then I am proud of it" and that “the Egyptian regime should be charged and condemned for besieging Gaza" (al-Manar, April 10). Nasrallah’s bold response was intended for ordinary Egyptians, as well as a wider Arab and Muslim public—Sunni and Shi’a alike—the vast majority of whom deeply resent Egypt’s stance on Gaza and the larger Palestinian question. Moreover, Nasrallah makes it apparent that Cairo’s attempt to accuse Hezbollah of plotting terrorist attacks against Egypt represents a sign of desperation on the part of Egypt to divert attention away from its unpopular stance regarding Gaza and the Palestinians.
The Irony of the Iranian Threat
In an ironic twist, adherents of the most extreme strains of radical Sunni Islam (namely violent Salafi militants who subscribe to al-Qaeda’s brand of radicalism) along with U.S.-backed autocracies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and Israel all identify Iran as a serious threat. Naturally, each of these unlikely bedfellows defines the perceived threat from Iran differently. For reasons discussed earlier, pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes, themselves the original targets of radical Islamist ire long before radical Islamists turned their sites on the United States, also identify Iran as a threat in political, ideological, and military terms. The United States and Israel also harbor deep concerns about Iran stemming from Tehran’s nuclear aspirations to the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Radical Salafi extremists despise the revolutionary brand of Shi’a Islam propagated by Tehran, and see Shi’a believers overall as heretics and apostates. Given its Shi’a Islamist credentials and ties to Iran, Salafi extremists view Hezbollah’s presence and influence in Lebanon and the wider region in an adversarial, sectarian context. The spread of Iranian influence and the marked rise of Shi’a political power in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad also helped feed Salafi conspiracy theories that the United States, Iran and Hezbollah are secretly colluding to undermine Sunni Islam across the globe. Yet al-Qaeda’s brand of radicalism has never been able to gain a widespread following; not even close, in fact, to the popular following and respect enjoyed by Iranian-sponsored groups such as Hezbollah across the region. To undermine their enemies, Iran and Hezbollah will continue to reach out to Arab and Muslim publics through a non-sectarian resistance narrative that resonates deeply with those concerned with the plight of the Palestinians, domestic political opposition in the Middle East, social justice, and related themes.
Conclusion
In spite of the media hype, the apparent defeat of the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance in Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary elections will do little to stymie Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese politics and beyond. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s defeat at the polls will inevitably be described in Cairo—as well as in Riyadh, Amman, Washington, and Tel Aviv—as a major setback for Iran. On the contrary, Hezbollah’s loss at the polls represents a blessing in disguise for the organization; Hezbollah is able to preserve its role as a symbol of resistance, a role strengthened by its position as a powerful opposition force in Lebanese politics, without assuming the myriad of burdens that come with being the dominant political power in Beirut.
Notes:
[1] See University of Maryland (w/ Zogby International), “2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” May 2009, www.brookings.edu/events/2009/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf.

Iran and the Syrian Gambit
By: Howard Schweber/Associate Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
*Huffington Post
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-schweber/iran-and-the-syrian-gambi_b_221505.html
The U.S. has three key interests with respect to Iran: containing its nuclear program, limiting its reach in the Middle East and, quite possibly, extending Iranian influence in Afghanistan in cooperation with the U.S. These three interests have to be pursued against the ever-shifting backdrop of the protests. At this point, what looks like the most likely outcome of the protests over the election provide both encouraging and cautionary signals. The challenge for Obama has been to recognize both and to respond appropriately while keeping his eye on all three of these balls at once. For this week, at least, Obama and his State Department get an A. Maybe even an A+, but the week is not over yet.
First, where do things stand with the protests? The government's repressive measures appear to be increasingly effective in suppressing the movement to the streets. At the same time, however, there is word that Rafsanjani may have collected enough anti-Khamenei votes in the Assembly of Experts to force a compromise, possibly in the form of a run-off election between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. At the same time, it seems unlikely that Rafsanjani has the votes to have Khamenei removed outright. The outcome, in other words, looks increasingly like something like a power-sharing agreement between the clerics allied around Rafsanjani and the militarist/nationalists (including plenty of clerics) around Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, in which Khamenei will remain Supreme Leader but the orthodox clerics will get some concessions -- possibly starting with the rumored run-off election -- and will insist on a greater say in how things are done from here on out.
Understanding the fact that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are political rather than religious figures -- and that their opponents, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, speak for the religious voice in Iran's leadership -- is directly relevant to thinking about Iran's nuclear program. The fact that Ahmadinejad is on the less religious end of the spectrum helps explain why his government might be pursuing a nuclear weapons program despite years of statements by Iran's leading religious authorities that nuclear weapons are an offense against God. One positive outcome of a power-sharing arrangement might be a government that is more willing to bend on issues relating to its nuclear program.
That's the first U.S. concern, and it is why a careful and cautious wait-and-see attitude is exactly what has been needed. Nothing -- absolutely nothing -- could be less helpful at the moment than for Obama to start making the kinds of fire-breathing statements that neocons and progressives alike keep calling for. On the nuclear issue the U.S. has to hope for a change or partial change in leadership that will result in a government more favorable to negotiation, not that anti-nuclear sentiment will somehow bubble up out of a popular movement toward revolt. To start aligning the U.S. directly with the protesters now risks energizing the nationalists at the expense of the Islamists. That is exactly what happened in 2002. It was Bush's idiotic Axis of Evil speech that propelled Ahmadinejad to power in the first place. After 9/11 Iran provided crucial support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan; with that speech, many Iranians suddenly feared that their country was next on the list for invasion. Ahmadinejad rode that fear to power, and his supporters continue to beat that nationalist drum, exemplified by statements from government officials and pro-government clerics like Ahmed Khatami referring to leaders of the protests as "supported by the U.S. and Israel." Obama's careful avoidance of anything that could be construed as belligerence has been exactly the right strategy to give Rafsanjani and his supporters move to maneuver.
The second key U.S. concern is Iranian influence in the Middle East. On this score, events in Iran proper are not the only story to be watching this week. There have also been a series of extremely lethal bombings in Iraq, all of them aimed at killing Shiites: 78 dead in Baghdad on Wednesday, 73 in Shiite Turkmen town of Taza Khurmatu, at least 13 dead in Baghdad on Friday. A new Iranian government that includes a greater representation of religious orthodox clerics is unlikely to watch as their fellow Shiites are attacked by Suni extremists bent on destabilizing Iraq by fomenting inter-ethnic conflict. (It's hard to see how anyone could argue that the Iranian government should stand by in that situation, actually, particularly for conservatives who support Israel and clamor about the need for the U.S. to take action in response to the persecution of Christians in Africa.) So it is unlikely that the government that emerges out of these protests will be less prone to extending its influence into Iraq, particularly after the U.S. troops are gone.
But Iran's interests in Iraq are not our only concern. Our bigger long-term concern is with Iran's role in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This week two things were announced. First, the U.S. is sending an ambassador to Damascus. Second, Jimmy Carter -- working with Egypt and Syria -- may have worked out terms for the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier whose capture by Hamas was one of the triggering events of Israel's invasion of Gaza. HaAretz reports that Shalit's release will take place within a few days as part of a prisoner exchange, and that the initial proposal was floated by Carter during a visit to Damascus and Gaza last year.
These stories may very well be connected, and they point to the almost incredible possibility that the U.S. may finally be ready to have a serious foreign policy in the Middle East. For what it's worth, I have been saying for many years that relations with Syria are the key. Here's just one reason: if Syria can be brought on board with a peace effort, Iran no longer has direct supply lines into Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syria has itself been supporting Hamas in Gaza (hence its role in negotiating the release of Shalit) as well as meddling in Lebanon. But while Syria has been notoriously difficult to deal with in the past, there is no reason in principle why progress cannot be made. Assad is an opportunist, not a mad ideologue, and certainly not a religious fanatic. (The single stupidest neocon phrase -- against some pretty tough competition! -- has to be "the Shiite Crescent," an arc of states comprising Iran, Syria and Lebanon that are supposed to represent the religiously defined threat to American interests. Since Syria is less than 5% Shiite and is ruled by an Alawite minority, it was never terribly clear what this was supposed to mean.)
What Syria wants is simple: they want the Golan Heights back. Which is where the U.S. comes in. There have been repeated points at which Israel and Syria came close to substantive negotiations on the issue of the Golan, only to see those efforts fail. But there has never been a sustained and substantive American presence in the dialogue. If Assad can be persuaded that Syria has more to gain by engagement with the West than by an alliance with Iran, that immediately improves the situation in Lebanon, improves the security of Israel's northern border, and improves the situation in Western Iraq. Syria's participation in arranging the release of Shalit -- even if that ultimately doesn't happen -- is a powerful and positive sign that Assad is open to the possibility.
Then there is the third U.S. interest and a tantalizing possibility: that Iran might resume its cooperation with U.S. operations in Afghanistan. As this piece from Stratfor nicely explains, Iran's 500-plus mile border with Afghanistan, strong ethnic connections to Afghan Pashtuns, and available ports make it an ideal partner. In other words, at the very same time that the U.S. has a strong interest in limiting Iran's reach to the West beyond Iraq, we may have another strong interest in encouraging Iranian engagement to the East. The Sunni attacks against Shiites in Iraq are part of the larger conflict between Sunni radicals -- think Taliban -- and Shiite Iran.
So the Obama administration has had to play a very careful hand: do nothing to repeat the stupidity that helped launch Ahmadinejad to the presidency; develop the opening that Jimmy Carter has helped develop and initiate an engagement with Syria in the hope of isolating Iran to the West; and at the same time look ahead to the role that the version of the Iranian regime that emerges out of a compromise in the Assembly of Experts might play in Afghanistan. This week, Obama and his State Department have done all three brilliantly.
*Huffington Post

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 28/09

Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 8:5-17. When he entered Capernaum, a centurion approached him and appealed to him, saying, "Lord, my servant is lying at home paralyzed, suffering dreadfully." He said to him, "I will come and cure him." The centurion said in reply, "Lord, I am not worthy to have you enter under my roof; only say the word and my servant will be healed. For I too am a person subject to authority, with soldiers subject to me. And I say to one, 'Go,' and he goes; and to another, 'Come here,' and he comes; and to my slave, 'Do this,' and he does it." When Jesus heard this, he was amazed and said to those following him, "Amen, I say to you, in no one in Israel have I found such faith. I say to you, many will come from the east and the west, and will recline with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob at the banquet in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom will be driven out into the outer darkness, where there will be wailing and grinding of teeth." And Jesus said to the centurion, "You may go; as you have believed, let it be done for you." And at that very hour (his) servant was healed. Jesus entered the house of Peter, and saw his mother-in-law lying in bed with a fever. He touched her hand, the fever left her, and she rose and waited on him. When it was evening, they brought him many who were possessed by demons, and he drove out the spirits by a word and cured all the sick, to fulfill what had been said by Isaiah the prophet: "He took away our infirmities and bore our diseases."  

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Lebanon's Minority delusions/future News 27.06.09
Iran: Heart of the crisis, Wilayat Al-Faqih. Future News 27.06.09
NYPD: Qaeda and Hizbullah biggest terrorist threats. UPI 27.06.09
Silence Has Consequences for Iran. By JOSé MAR& IACUTE;A AZNAR 27/06/09
Chris Zambelis: Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao/Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 18June 25, 2009
Chris Zambelis: Hezbollah in Egypt: The Politics of Conspiracy and Resistance. Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 16June 12, 2009
Iran and the Syrian Gambit. By: Howard Schweber/Huffington Post 27/06/09
UN secretary general calls for united front against drug abuse and illicit trafficking.By Ban Ki-moon  27/06/09
Jackson's death a lesson in meaning of 'international'- The -Daily Star 27/06/09
Welcome to the Middle East, Mr. Obama, your pains can begin.By David Ignatius 27/06/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 27/09
Premier-Designate Hariri Vows to Form 'Homogeneous' Cabinet-Naharnet
Paris Welcomes Hariri's Designation, Calls for Consolidating Calm-Naharnet
Saad Hariri: Political Novice Turned Premier-Naharnet
With Hariri Poised to Become Next PM, Various Scenarios For New Cabinet Formation-Naharnet
Jumblat: Cabinet Statement Should Address Hizbullah Qualms-Naharnet
'Change and Reform' Bloc Wants Justice Ministry-Naharnet
Williams: Syria to Return Shebaa to Lebanon Once it Signs Peace With Israel-Naharnet
Nasrallah-Hariri Meeting Preliminary to be Continued Following Hariri's Designation-Naharnet
Hariri Poised to Become Next Premier after First Day of Consultations-Naharnet
Riyadh Presented Damascus With List of Lebanese Requests Most Dealing With National Dialogue-Naharnet
Riachi Formally Declared Vice President of International Tribunal-Naharnet
Jerusalem Post: UNIFIL Finds 20 Katyushas Ready for Launch in the South-Naharnet
Iran election violence "outrageous," says Obama-Reuters
Obama OKs plan to normalize US ties with Syria-World Tribune
G8 denounces Iran election violence, calls on Tehran to resolve conflict-Daily Star
Lebanon rivals discuss shaping new government-AFP
Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao-Jamestown Foundation
Where do the two June elections leave Hezbollah?The People's Voice
Iran's Arab allies relieved to see crisis easing-Reuters
Political crisis in Iran to likely affect Hezbollah's strategy-Trend News Agency
Obama, the Neocons and Iran-Wall Street Journal
Israel Doubts Unrest Will Transform Iran-Washington Post
Iran and the Syrian Gambit-Huffington Post
UNIFIL refutes Israeli reports it found 20 rockets in Lebanon-Daily Star
Hariri gets 67 votes for PM on first day of consultations-Daily Star
Hariri's success will hinge on reconciliation-Daily Star
Fadlallah accuses Western media of exploiting Iran crisis-Daily Star
Political, religious leaders condemn celebratory gunfire-Daily Star
Rival Christian leaders raise the stakes ahead of imminent cabinet formation-By Inter Press Service
Laurent tours community building programs in north Lebanon-Daily Star
Lebanon sees 28 percent rise in government revenues-By Regional Press Network (RPN)
World Bank lowers Lebanon growth forecast to 2.5 percent-Daily Star
Five new swine flu patients raise number of cases in Lebanon to 35-Daily Star
Judge Riachy elected deputy president for Special Tribunal-Daily Star
Nationwide campaign highlights dangers of substance abuse-Daily Star

Premier-Designate Hariri Vows to Form 'Homogeneous' Cabinet
Naharnet/Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri vowed on Saturday to form a homogeneous and consensus government that is able to function away from obstruction.
We "will safeguard the constitution, (state) institutions, sovereignty, independence and the project of the building of the Lebanese state," Hariri told reporters at Baabda palace after President Michel Suleiman designated him Lebanon's premier and tasked him with forming a new cabinet. He vowed to form a "homogeneous" and "consensus" government that is able to remain united and "make achievements away from obstruction" in cooperation with the president. Hariri also promised to keep strife and "foreign and economic" dangers away from Lebanon. Suleiman on Saturday designated Hariri Lebanon's premier after the majority of parliamentarians nominated the politician to the post.
"According to the constitution and after the president consulted with the speaker of parliament and parliamentarians, he (Suleiman) summoned Saad Hariri and tasked him with forming a new government," a presidential statement said. The decree issued by Suleiman came after Hariri received 86 votes of approval by lawmakers following two days of consultations. Hariri got the approval of 71 MPs from his own majority alliance, plus Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and his bloc of 12 legislators and two Armenian MPs.
This would be Hariri's first designation to the premiership following the June 7 legislative elections in which the March 14 coalition won 71 out of the 128 seats in parliament.
The 39-year-old is to succeed outgoing Prime Minister Fouad Saniora, a member of Hariri's al-Mustaqbal movement. From Baabda palace, Hariri headed to downtown Beirut and prayed at his father's graveside along with Saniora and other members of his bloc. Hariri now faces the difficult task of negotiating with other political factions to form a government. The process can take days or even weeks. On Sunday, he will visit former prime ministers and kick off consultations with parliamentary blocs on cabinet formation on Monday
As news broke up about his nomination, celebratory gunfire shook Beirut and its suburbs. However, Hariri urged citizens in a statement not to fire in the air.
Around 12 people were injured from celebratory gunfire on Thursday, when parliament reelected Berri. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 14:47

Paris Welcomes Hariri's Designation, Calls for Consolidating Calm
Naharnet/French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner welcomed on Saturday the appointment of Saad Hariri prime minister-designate and called for consolidating calm in Lebanon.
Kouchner "wished (Hariri) success" in a letter sent by the foreign ministry to the premier-designate. "The international community and all of Lebanon's friends welcomed the perfect organization of the legislative elections in June," the French foreign minister told Hariri in the letter. "There is a need to consolidate the atmosphere of calm prevailing" in the country, Kouchner said. He added that he would be happy to meet Hariri during his visit to Beirut next month. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 19:12

Saad Hariri: Political Novice Turned Premier
Naharnet/Saad Hariri, who was propelled into the heart of Lebanese politics following the assassination of his former prime minister father four years ago, was himself named to the top job on Saturday. After the murder of his popular father, Rafik, in a 2005 bomb blast, the young tycoon took center stage in the anti-Syrian opposition, and now has two parliamentary election wins under its belt. Three weeks after Hariri's March 14 alliance clinched 71 out of parliament's 128 seats in the June 7 poll, President Michel Suleiman tasked Hariri with forming a new government. The Saudi-born Hariri initially attributed his political success to the sympathy vote for his father and five-time ex-premier, who founded al-Mustaqbal movement that his 39-year-old son now leads. Already a success of his own in the business world, Hariri was chosen to continue the "national and political mission" of his father, who was credited with rebuilding Lebanon after the devastating 1975-1990 civil war. Forbes magazine put Saad Hariri's net worth at 1.4 billion dollars in its 2009 list of the world's billionaires, down from 3.3 billion last year. Hariri was one of the main negotiators in the formation of the unity government in May 2008, bringing to an end a political crisis that had brought Lebanon to the brink of civil war.
Hariri is a business graduate of Georgetown University in Washington, and heads his late father's Saudi-based construction firm, Saudi Oger. One of the largest companies in the Middle East, it employs around 35,000 people. The Hariri empire, which Saad has managed since 1996, also spans banking, real estate and media through companies such as Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi Research and Marketing Group and Future Television. He also has his own real estate company. Saad Hariri, who also holds Saudi nationality, was born April 18, 1970, Rafik Hariri's second son by his first Iraqi wife. He is married to Lara Bashir al-Adem, who hails from a prestigious Syrian family, and the couple has two children.(AFP) Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 15:52

Iran election violence "outrageous," says Obama
Fri Jun 26,By Parisa Hafezi
TEHRAN (Reuters) - President Barack Obama on Friday praised the bravery of Iranians who protested against a disputed election in the face of "outrageous" violence, while a hardline Iranian cleric called for the execution of leading "rioters." Iran's top legislative body, which had said it found no major violations in the presidential election which set off the worst unrest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, said 10 percent of ballot boxes would be recounted. Authorities have rejected a call for annulment of the vote by reformist former prime minister Mirhossein Mousavi who led mass protests after he was declared a distant second behind President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the poll two weeks ago. Obama, whose administration along with major powers is locked in a row with Iran over its nuclear program, said hopes for U.S. dialogue with Iran would be affected by the post-election crackdown.
"There is no doubt that any direct dialogue or diplomacy with Iran is going to be affected by the events of the last several weeks," Obama told a White House news conference, adding: "We don't yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran." Iranian authorities have used a combination of warnings, arrests and the threat of police action to drive mass rallies off Tehran's street since Saturday with smaller gatherings dispersed with tear gas and baton charges.
Authorities have accused Mousavi of responsibility for the bloodshed, while he says the government is to blame. State media have said 20 people were killed in the violence.
ISLAMIC LAW
Ahmad Khatami, a member of the powerful Assembly of Experts, said the judiciary should charge leading "rioters" as "mohareb" or one who wages war against God.
"I want the judiciary to ... punish leading rioters firmly and without showing any mercy to teach everyone a lesson," Khatami told worshippers at Tehran University on Friday.
"They should be punished ruthlessly and savagely," he said. Under Iran's Islamic law, punishment for people convicted as "mohareb" is execution.
Obama, who said Mousavi had "captured the imagination" of people who want to open up to the West, hailed Mousavi supporters at the news conference.
"Their bravery in the face of brutality is a testament to their enduring pursuit of justice. The violence perpetrated against them is outrageous," Obama said.
The U.S. president said he did not take seriously Ahmadinejad's call for him to apologize for criticizing Tehran, "particularly given the fact that the United States has gone out of its way not to interfere with the election process in Iran."
Washington had been hoping to convince Tehran to drop what it suspects are plans to develop nuclear bombs, while also seeking its cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. The government says its nuclear program is to generate power.
"Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will trigger an arms race in the Middle East that would be bad ... for the security of the entire region," said Obama, adding:
"So even as we clearly speak out in a unified voice in opposition to the violence that's taken place in Iran, we also have to be steady in recognizing that the prospect of Iran with a nuclear weapon is a big problem." Group of Eight powers on Friday deplored violence stemming from the disputed presidential election in the world's fifth biggest oil exporter but held open the door for Tehran to take part in talks on its nuclear program. "We sincerely hope that Iran will seize this opportunity to give diplomacy a chance ...," the G8 statement said.
The row over the election has exposed an unprecedented public rift within Iran's ruling elite. Abbasali Kadkhodai, spokesman for the Guardian Council, said that to remove all ambiguities over the vote, 10 percent of all ballot boxes would be recounted in the presence of senior officials representing government and opposition.
Political and religious figures should send election-related questions to the council and the defeated candidates had 24 hours to present their representatives for the recount, he told the students' news agency ISNA. The 12-man Guardian Council's statement leaves little scope for more legal challenges to the election result, short of an attack on the position of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has expressed strong support for Ahmadinejad. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a Mousavi ally, chairs the Assembly of Experts which has the constitutional power to depose Khamenei. The assembly has never tried to do so and Rafsanjani is seen as unlikely to take such a radical step. Mousavi said he was determined to keep challenging the election results despite pressure to stop.(Writing by Philippa Fletcher and Peter Millership)

Controversy shakes March 8
Date: June 26th, 2009 /Future News
As Lebanon went smoothly beyond the decisive entitlement of electing House Speaker Nabih Berry which will inevitably have a positive impact on the state institutions, differences between Speaker Nabih Berry and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun surfaced.
The recent rhetoric of Berry and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah that denies any instance on being given veto powers in the new cabinet contradicts that of Aoun and Marada leader Sleiman Frangieh that calls for refraining from participation in the government without attaining veto powers. This controversy between opposition poles might deprive the country of the opportunity of attaining stability and economic prosperity.
Yet, Hizbullah is trying to reach a compromise between its FPM ally and its inclination toward accepting the guarantees intended to be given to the party in the cabinet’s statement.
In fact Hizbullah seems to have decided to go with the two options in a parallel way. It is trying to mend the apparently shattered relation between the opposition poles on the one hand and is preparing for a meeting between Nasrallah and Almustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri to establish consensus on the participation of the opposition in the new cabinet without attaining veto powers.
A source close to the opposition said that the meeting intended to be held between Nasrallah and Aoun to lay the basis for consensus had been delayed because the two sides have not agreed yet on the conditions for such an accord.
Political figures entitled to find common grounds between the two divergent orientations suggest that Nasrallah meets Hariri before he meets Aoun on the one hand and that Aoun Meets Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt before he meets Nasrallah on the other.
The idea behind the suggestion is that Jumblatt might give Aoun a new option that convinces him to relinquish his demand of being given veto powers as a precondition to participate in the new cabinet. Moreover, the meeting between Hariri and Nasrallah is likely to lead the latter to exert more effort to convince Aoun to let go of his precondition because the cooperation and harmony within the cabinet is far more important to all factions than Aoun’s demands.
Nevertheless, Berry was liberated of the sense of guilt he had toward Aoun because he had paid the price for his alliance with the FPM leader when he lost the three Jezzine seats in his favor. Thus Berry will go on with the next stage out of his own vision of the country’s interests without taking Aoun’s reserves into consideration.

Iran: Heart of the crisis, Wilayat Al-Faqih
Date: June 27th, 2009 /Future News
The crisis in the Iranian Republic still lingers. The calm and tranquility in the streets do not necessarily mean that the political situation is sound, nor does it mean that Ahmadinejad and his supporters won the elections.
Following the closure of the ballot boxes on 12 June, Iran was placed in front of a crisis. The tremendous and dangerous changes in the Islamic Republic in Iran were because the roots of the crisis were in fact very deep and went beyond electing president of the Republic to unveil the true purpose of the conflict between the leaders inside the Republic.
The crisis continued to shoot up because none of the two disagreeing parties in Iran -Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with followers of Ahmadinejad on one hand and the reformists led by Mir Hussein Mousavi on the other- had the intention to back away from their stances. Losing ground would be considered a total failure resulting in a coup.
Khamenei, who is supposedly the higher authority of all Muslims in Iran, lost his role when he took sides in the elections and was prejudiced to Ahmadinejad and his followers. He interfered in the elections believing in his ability to influence the opinion of Iranians being their absolute authority.
On the other hand, if the reformists represented by Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi give away their positions, that would mean slaughtering the basic purpose of the battle to abolish the state’s absolute supreme authority.
The demand to eradicate the higher authority was not something new, furthermore was not presented bluntly by the demonstrators. Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montaziri who was Imam Khumeinei’s partner in developing this theory, called many years ago to cancel it and introduce the state of supervision instead of irrevocable leadership.
The absolute jurisdiction of Wilayat Al-Faqih was transformed into a curtain to hide the domination of the Revolutionary Guard on the political and economic authorities in Iran, which frightened many.
Another fear the Iranians face is the emergence of a new group led by Mosbah Yazdi, aiming to abolish the Republican regime and endorsing an Emirate similar to the one in Taliban Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad was believed to be a supporter.
Everyone in Iran can see that the situation bears no delay. The problem is in finding a solution. Hashemi Rafsanjani who is still a powerful figure in Iranian politics as he heads two of the regime's most powerful bodies: Expediency Council (which adjudicates disputes over legislation) and the Assembly of Experts (which appoints, and can theoretically replace, the Supreme Leader) returned from the shadows to run the game and find a solution for the crisis.
In the city of Qom, the Ahvazi authorities were also trying to find a solution mainly because the Extremist Conservatives did not agree on Ahmadinejad’s policy. They translated their condemnation by not participating in the ceremony to congratulate Ahmadinejad.
One of the solutions put forward is to bring back the post of prime ministry with more powers to control Nejad’s lack of restrictions, implement wide range of economic reforms and control the dialogue with Washington outside the provocative language adopted by Ahmadinejad.
Another solution is to allow the Council of Experts, led by Rafsanjani, to resume its constitutional authorities by law and control the absolute jurisdictions of the Supreme leader. This would bring Rafsanjani back to power side by side with the Supreme leader.
If solutions were reached to, Mousavi’s destiny is open to discussion on whether he would accept them after he became a popular leader. Would he accept the solutions and give up his demand to cancel the presidential elections, and what would be the fate of his mass supporters who demonstrated, fell dead and wounded? Would they accept the outcome or would they resort to violence under the banner of ‘despair for change’?
The demonstration, which spilled millions of Iranians to the Azadi square, reflected the Iranians’ rejection to steel their free decisions and choices. The demonstrations brought together all kinds of segments from the Iranian society; the path of the demonstration was no coincidence.
The Republicans led by Mousavi believed in what Ayatollah Hussein Montaziri once said, that Iran gained independence through the revolution but the Iranians did not gain the liberty which forms an essential part of the slogan of the revolution.
Then, how and when will the Iranians get hold of their freedom?

NYPD: Qaeda and Hizbullah biggest terrorist threats
Date: June 26th, 2009 Source: UPI
Vice-Commissioner of New York Police Department for combating terrorism Richard Volkenrath said Friday “the biggest terrorist threat against New York City is Al Qaeda organization and the second biggest threat is Hizbullah.” “Al-Qaeda’s threat is derived from its antagonism against the United States, while Hizbullah’s threat is derived from its ability to launch attacks outside the Lebanese territories”, he said. In a lecture he delivered about combating terrorism organized by the Washington Research Center, Volkenrath said the Qaeda’s continuous efforts and its obvious intention to attack the US have failed during the last few years. Volkenrath said “despite Hizbullah’s strategic decision not to attack the US, this reality might change if the US attacked the Lebanese Shiite party or its Iranian guardian.”The NYPD officer ruled out the possibility of “a mass destruction attack” against the US; however he warned that “these weapons (mass destruction) have become more accessible than they were in the last decade.”He added that the threat of “inside terrorism” is growing; pointing that NY is “the first target of terrorism given the city’s symbolic significance and the destructive consequences of any successful attack.”

With Hariri Poised to Become Next PM, Various Scenarios For New Cabinet Formation
Naharnet/Now that MP Saad Hariri is poised to be designated Lebanon's next Prime Minister, conflicting scenarios were presented by the parliamentary minority in regards to the composition of the future cabinet. Informed sources told the daily As-Safir on Saturday al-Mustaqbal Movement leader MP Saad Hariri presented his outlook of the new cabinet to Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah during their last meeting. He proposed a cabinet composed of 30 ministers, whereby the parliamentary majority would have 16 ministers, 10 ministers would represent the parliamentary minority and 4 ministers would be designated to the president. The Hizbullah leadership announced that the parliamentary minority continues to hold to obtaining veto power in cabinet, according to As-Safir. High level and well-informed sources within the al-Mustaqbal movement affirmed to the daily that Hariri had indeed presented a formula of 16+10+4 with his political allies prior to meeting Nasrallah. Sources added that his political allies approved Hariri's proposal since the parliamentary majority continues to reject providing the opposition with veto power. As-Safir quoted Christian sources close to the presidency expressing their reservations against the 16+10+4 formula preferring a 15+10+5 equation that would provide the president with 5 rather than 4 ministers in cabinet. The daily al-Akhbar on Saturday spoke to informed official sources close to the president saying President Suleiman prefers a 14+9+7 formula [14 to the parliamentary majority, 9 to the opposition and 7 ministers to the president]. According to the same sources this would enable the president to be more effective in balancing the equilibrium between the parliamentary majority and minority. President Suleiman is expected to officially designate Hariri on Saturday. Hariri's majority bloc insists it will only accept a unity government if the Hizbullah alliance surrenders the veto powers it enjoys in the outgoing cabinet. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:15

'Change and Reform' Bloc Wants Justice Ministry
Naharnet/Sources from the 'Change and Reform' parliamentary bloc said that the bloc is seeking to name one of its members to head the ministry of justice. Sources affirmed that one such candidate is MP Ibrahim Kanaan. The bloc is seeking to represent the Metn region in cabinet with a leading figure from this region. Outgoing Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar represents the Lebanese Forces in this post. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:46

Williams: Syria to Return Shebaa to Lebanon Once it Signs Peace With Israel
Naharnet/U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams said that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem personally told him that Syria considers the Shebaa Farms Lebanese territory, meaning Syria would turn the farms over to Lebanon within days once it signs a peace accord with Israel.
Williams expressed his admiration of Lebanese institutions mainly the ministries of the interior and defense as well as the Lebanese military on June 7 [parliamentary election day] the daily An-Nahar on Saturday, adding, "The formation of the Constitutional Council prior to the elections was also good."
The U.N. Special Coordinator said: "I routinely speak to Hizbullah and they have informed me of their stance regarding various international resolutions. Discussions are healthy and strong and I am not at all surprised to see criticism made by ministers from time to time from Hizbullah or any other party. This is very normal and healthy."
Williams is scheduled to review and discuss the implementation of UNSC resolution 1701 at the United Nations Security Council on July 7.
Regarding Hizbullah arms Williams said that what the Lebanese decide [on the subject] is important saying, "Historical experiences reveal that such issues are better solved within a national political framework only." As per the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [STL], Williams explained, "there can be no trial without a prisoner, and no prisoner without a list of charges. I don't know what will happen with the STL because the investigation is confidential, if they need more time so be it, this better than failing." Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 09:38

Nasrallah-Hariri Meeting Preliminary to be Continued Following Hariri's Designation
Naharnet/Thursday's meeting between al-Mustaqbal Movement leader MP Saad Hariri and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was preliminary for discussing the formation of the next cabinet. However, the meeting is to be followed later on once Hariri is designated by President Suleiman to form Lebanon's next cabinet.
The daily As-Safir said on Saturday that Thursday's meeting is to be followed up on the same level or would take place between Hariri and MP Hajj Hussein Hassan who is also Nasralla's political aide. Sources close to Hizbullah denied the presence of extreme negative or positive atmosphere in the country to the daily An-Nahar on Saturday following the Thursday evening meeting between Hariri and Nasrallah. "There is an opinion that the meeting lost must of its distinctiveness once it included more aides to it. The meeting would have been more effective had it remained bilateral." Following Thursday's meeting Hariri's media bureau issued a statement saying both leaders reviewed local developments in light of the June 7 parliamentary elections and the proposed options for forming Lebanon's next cabinet. The statement affirmed that both sides agreed to continue their discussions praising the option of dialogue, cooperation and openness. The meeting was attended by Hizbullah's aide to the secretary-general MP Hajj Hussein Hassan and Mustafa Nasser and Nader Hariri. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 10:08

Riyadh Presented Damascus With List of Lebanese Requests Most Dealing With National Dialogue
Naharnet/Riyadh has presented Damascus with a list of Lebanese requests most dealing with articles agreed to at the national dialogue sessions in 2006, concerning Lebanese-Syrian relations, border demarcation and settling and organizing the issue of Palestinian arms outside and inside Palestinian refugee camps. The daily As-Safir said on Saturday that the Syrian side removed itself from discussing any issue not related to official bilateral relations including that of Hizbullah's arms. According to the paper Syria left such issues to the Lebanese parliamentary opposition to freely discuss with the political parliamentary majority, in light of the recent stance by Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in which he said that the resistance is better protected by its own Lebanese people and is in no need of any guarantees from anyone. The daily al-Akhbar on Saturday hinted that Saudi-Syrian negotiations are not progressing when it comes to details regarding Lebanon. Sources added to the paper efforts have been focused on removing obstacles standing in the way of designating Hariri to form Lebanon's next cabinet. Informed sources told al-Akhbar that the Syrians would benefit from Hariri's premiership, as this would remove the after effects of the 2005 assassination of his father rafik. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is expected to visit Damascus sometime this year, reports said. According to one source, one obstacle is the demarcation of borders remains. The Saudis want that process to begin with the Shebaa Farms and the call for canceling the Higher Lebanese-Syrian Council. The Syrians want this request made by the Lebanese authorities alone. Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 10:40

Riachi Formally Declared Vice President of International Tribunal
Naharnet/Lebanese Judge Ralph Riachi has been officially appointed vice president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, it said in a statement Friday. "Judge Ralph Jacque Riachi has been acting as vice president on a full time basis since June 8, 2009," the STL said. Riachi served as head of the criminal court of cassation in Lebanon from December until June 2009. The STL's head, Antonio Cassese, described Riachi's expertise in the Lebanese legal system as "invaluable and even crucial for the success of our work." The U.N. Security Council created the tribunal in 2007 -- at the request of Lebanon -- to find and prosecute those responsible for the 2005 assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri. The tribunal has no suspects in custody since ordering the release in April of four pro-Syrian generals held by Lebanon for nearly four years without charge.(Naharnet) Beirut, 26 Jun 09, 21:35

Jumblat: Cabinet Statement Should Address Hizbullah Qualms
Naharnet/"Democratic Gathering' parliamentary bloc leader MP Walid Jumblat said he understands the well known Hizbullah's qualms and concerns adding that the cabinet statement should address them as it does with the concerns of others. In statements to the daily As-Safir on Saturday Jumblat said he was not privy to Thursday's meeting between al-Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri with Hizbullah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The paper added that Jumblat is to announce a stance on Monday calling on the Lebanese government to forfeit the Arab seat at the United Nations Security Council in 2010 "because Lebanon will be facing a major trap and an impossible mission." Beirut, 27 Jun 09, 13:15

Jerusalem Post: UNIFIL Finds 20 Katyushas Ready for Launch in the South
Naharnet/U.N. peacekeepers have found around 20 Katyusha rockets that were ready for launch in southern Lebanon, Israel's Jerusalem Post reported Friday. The newspaper said that UNIFIL has increased its operations in southern Lebanon and begun entering villages in search of Hizbullah weapons caches in an effort to prevent a flare-up along the border with Israel. According to the Israeli army, Hizbullah has deployed most of its forces and weaponry - including Katyusha rockets - inside homes in southern villages. The Post also said that UNIFIL has recently succeeded in thwarting attacks that were planned against its own personnel. UNIFIL's increased activity comes amid concerns in Israel that Hizbullah will launch an attack along the border to avenge the assassination of its military commander Imad Mughniyeh in a Damascus car bombing last year. The newspaper quoted foreign sources as saying that Hizbullah was behind a thwarted attempt earlier this year to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan. According to the daily, the group has also tried using Palestinian proxies for attacks within Israel, without success. "These frustrations, Israel fears, might lead the group to try a retaliatory attack against the northern border, which would be easier operationally."
Beirut, 26 Jun 09, 14:19

Obama makes the right move on Syria
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Marshall News Messenger
http://www.marshallnewsmessenger.com/news/content/news/stories/2008/08/062509_editorial_2.html
President Barack Obama is doing exactly the right thing in sending an ambassador to Syria after four years of a vacancy of that position that was ignored by former President George W. Bush. The move helps Washington make yet another connection in the Arab world, something we believe is important.
It is always better to have a working relationship, even with people with whom you disagree.
And sending an ambassador does not, in any way, indicate that the United States approves of Syria's government or its actions. Having a diplomat does, however, give us at least the opportunity to have some impact on them. We have ambassadors in many nations where we have fundamental disagreements with governments. For that matter, some of our allies are nations with whom we have many basic conflicts. Saudi Arabia instantly comes to mind. The question is not simply one of erasing our differences, though. It is in finding areas where we have common goals. We don't exactly know where those lie with Syria, but we are sure there are some. Without a doubt, Syria has often not been a responsible player in the world scene. We're sure they have caused much deadly mischief in Iraq, especially early in that war. But the direction of nations can, and does, change. We are much more likely to push the change in a positive direction if we have an active diplomatic presence than we are being absent from the scene entirely.

Obama OKs plan to normalize U.S. ties with Syria
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/ss_syria0505_06_25.asp
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama has approved a State Department plan to send an ambassador to Damascus after a four-year absence. ShareThis
On June 23, officials said, the State Department notified the Syrian ambassador to Washington, Imad Mustapha, of the U.S. decision to restore full diplomatic relations with Damascus. Earlier, Mustapha hailed Obama as representing a change in U.S. relations with Damascus and the Arab world. Officials said the envoy would probably arrive in the Syrian capital by September 2009 as part of a U.S. effort to restore security cooperation with the regime of President Bashar Assad.
"We are prepared to move forward with Syria to advance our interests through direct and continuing dialogue," State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said on June 24.
"Today, there is real optimism because the two parties realize the importance of improving bilateral relations in order to achieve global peace," Syria's official daily, A-Thawra, said.
Officials said the State Department has sent a team of experts to determine the security requirements for the embassy in Damascus. They said the embassy could relocate in an effort to reduce its visibility and avoid violent anti-U.S. demonstrations. Kelly said the State Department informed the Syrian embassy in Washington and the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus of the U.S. decision to return its ambassador. The official did not say when the ambassador would arrive in Syria. "This decision reflects the administration's recognition of the important role Syria plays in the region," Kelly said. "And of course, we hope that they will continue to play such a constructive role to promote peace and stability in the region."
In 2005, Washington recalled its ambassador to Syria in wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The Assad regime has been linked to the car-bombing in Beirut that killed the pro-U.S. Lebanese politician. In mid-June, Syria and the United States conducted their first military cooperation talks in at least five years. A delegation from U.S. Central Command discussed security along the Iraqi-Syrian border. "I know that they have played a positive role in addressing some of our very real concerns about foreign fighters crossing from Syria," Kelly said. "We've had some good discussions with them in those four different visits that we had to Damascus."
Officials said the return of the U.S. ambassador would also facilitate any renewal of Israeli-Syrian peace talks. They said U.S. envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, urged Obama to quickly restore diplomatic relations with Damascus in an effort to advance American proposals for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, captured in the 1967 war.
"On an immediate level, the announcement to return an ambassador is tied to Syria's agreement on Iraq security and intelligence sharing," the authoritative blog, Syria Comment, reported.

Silence Has Consequences for Iran
The less we protest, the more people will die.
By JOSé MARÍA AZNAR
The Wall Street Journal 26/06/09
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124605649582063489.html
If there hadn't been dissidents in the Soviet Union, the Communist regime never would have crumbled. And if the West hadn't been concerned about their fate, Soviet leaders would have ruthlessly done away with them. They didn't because the Kremlin feared the response of the Free World.
Just like the Soviet dissidents who resisted communism, those who dare to march through the streets of Tehran and stand up against the Islamic regime founded by the Ayatollah Khomeini 30 years ago represent the greatest hope for change in a country built on the repression of its people. At stake is nothing less than the legitimacy of a system incompatible with respect for individual rights. Also at stake is the survival of a theocratic regime that seeks to be the dominant power in the region, the indisputable spiritual leader of the Muslim world, and the enemy of the West.
The Islamic Republic that the ayatollahs have created is not just any power. To defend a strict interpretation of the Quran, Khomeini created the Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, which today is a true army. To expand its ideology and influence Iran has not hesitated to create, sustain and use proxy terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. And to impose its fundamentalist vision beyond its borders, Iran is working frantically to obtain nuclear weapons.
Those who protest against the blatant electoral fraud that handed victory to the fanatical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are in reality demanding a change of regime. Thus, the regime has resorted to beating and shooting its citizens in a desperate attempt to squash the pro-democracy movement.
This is no time for hesitation on the part of the West. If, as part of an attempt to reach an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, the leaders of democratic nations turn their backs on the dissidents they will be making a terrible mistake.
President Obama has said he refuses to "meddle" in Iran's internal affairs, but this is a poor excuse for passivity. If the international community is not able to stop, or at least set limits on, the repressive violence of the Islamic regime, the protesters will end up as so many have in the past -- in exile, in prison, or in the cemetery. And with them, all hope for change will be gone.
To be clear: Nobody in the circles of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or Ahmadinejad is going to reward us for silence or inaction. On the contrary, failing to support the regime's critics will leave us with an emboldened Ahmadinejad, an atomic Iran, and dissidents that are disenchanted and critical of us. We cannot talk about freedom and democracy if we abandon our own principles.
Some do not want to recognize the spread of freedom in the Middle East. But it is clear that after decades of repression -- religious and secular -- the region is changing.
The recent elections in Lebanon are a clear example. The progressive normalization of Iraq is another. It would be a shame, particularly in the face of such regional progress, if our passivity gave carte blanche to a tyrannical regime to finish off the dissidents and persist with its revolutionary plans.
Delayed public displays of indignation may be good for internal political consumption. But the consequences of Western inaction have already materialized. Watching videos of innocent Iranians being brutalized, it's hard to defend silence.
*Mr. Aznar is the former prime minister of Spain (1996-2004).

Political crisis in Iran to likely affect Hezbollah's strategy
26.06.09 09:00
http://news-en.trend.az/important/exclusive/1494379.html
Azerbaijan, Baku, June 25 /Trend News, U.Sadikhova/
The Iranian opposition's protests against victory of the incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the elections will not lead to political problems in Lebanon, but may affect the strategy of Iran's ally - the Hezbollah organization.
"Developments in Iran will affect the entire region [Middle East], but primarily the Hezbollah," Analyst of the Lebanese Program of the British Chatham House Institute for Foreign Relations Nadim Shehadi told Trend News in a telephone conversation from London. "Hezbollah is a key ally of Iran's Revolutionary Guardians, so any change [in Iran] will have the impact on them."
Powerful opposition riots broke out in Tehran after announcing the results of the presidential elections held on June 12. The incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the elections, garnering 66 percent of the vote, the Iranian Central Election Commission (CEC) said. One of the loser candidates is reformer Mir-Hossein Mousavi who has accused the authorities of fraud in the results of voting and encouraged people to hold protests.
The election resulted in a wave of opposition's mass protests, which became the most extensive since the Islamic revolution in 1979 in which the Shah regime was overthrew. Iran has accused the Western media of inciting riots in the country.
European countries and the United States condemned the crackdown of demonstrators in Iran, which led to death of 150 people, according to unofficial figures.
Arab countries urged not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.
Analysts exclude that the unrest in Iran may move to Lebanon, but they may affect the strategy of the main military and political ally of Tehran - the Hezbollah party.
So far, no one in Lebanon, which today has held the election of the parliamentary speaker and will hold the elections to the government next week, commented on the political unrest.
Observers believe the unrest in Tehran that affects the security of the Middle East may have an impact on Lebanon where there is a conflict between Hezbollah and anti-Coalition "March 14" which is the majority in the parliament has repeatedly led to military clashes.
Analyst on the Lebanese politics Salem Zuheir believes despite the fact that Lebanon is experiencing a stage of the national unity, it is impossible to eradicate Iran's influence in this country.
"It is impossible to separate Lebanon from Iran and Syria, as it is impossible to separate this from France," Head of Arab Orient Centre for Strategic and Civilisation Studies told Trend News in a telephone conversation from London.
He said now there is a political tranquility in Lebanon because of the dialogue between pro-Western Sunni movement Al-Mustaqbal led by Saad al-Hariri, son of slain Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and the opposition bloc 8 March, the core of which is Hezbollah, an ally of Damascus and Tehran.
Shehadi said that if there will be changes in Iran's leadership, it will lead to a change in strategy of Hezbollah which is closely linked to the revolutionary command in Iran.
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 based on the ideology of the first Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini.
"It is too early to talk about change [in Iran and Lebanon], because the events in Iran are developing in different directions," Shehadi said. "But if we view Hezbollah as an ally of the revolutionary command in Iran, then any change in Tehran's policy will impact it."
However, Anis Naggash, a Lebanese political analyst, believes that Iran's policy towards Lebanon will remain the same and Hezbollah military power will not let the party weaken.
"Hezbollah's good military organization, an independent policy and strategy is unlikely to lead to weakening of the party's forces in Lebanon," Naggash said to Trend News over telephone from Tehran. "Hezbollah spoke openly about its own interests, so it knows how to do it and what to do."
Naggash said the problems in Lebanon might arise in establishing a national unity government, but this can happen because of the internal contradictions of political parties in Lebanon, but not because of Iran's influence.
Political expert on Middle East policy Awad Chamas said Egypt and Saudi Arabia enjoy greater influence in Lebanon.
"Anxiety in Iran will not affect the political situation in Lebanon, [the election of prime minister] because he [Prime Minister] is elected under the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt," head of the European Center for Research on Mediterranean Shamas told Trend News over telephone from Brussels.
He also excluded possibility of a new wave of concern in Lebanon because of the political crisis in Tehran, because Hezbollah is not interested in new clashes with pro-Western parties of the country.
Leader of the party Nasrallah accepted defeat in parliamentary elections in June and congratulated Al-Hariri on victory despite the fact that differences between 14 March and Hezbollah in May last year led to military clashes in Beirut.
Shamas added despite the forecasts about launch of a new civil war in Lebanon after the elections, Hezbollah acknowledged defeat and therefore the political crisis in Iran will not impact domestic policy in Lebanon.
Do you have any feedback? Contact our journalist at trend@trend.az

Where do the two June elections leave Hezbollah?
June 26th, 2009 9:40:08 AM
Franklin Lamb,
Dahiyeh
Some Legmen for the US Israeli lobby, and even some here in Lebanon appear barely able to contain themselves, such is their felt glee over the Lebanese and Iranian election results. Some supporters of Israel see this election as two recent victories while others calculate that Israel is scratching for some good news given that polling data from Israeli surveys show that more than 50% of its population favors bombing Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Another survey, late last month, found that nearly one third of Israelis polled said they would leave Israel if Iran gets a nuclear weapon which it likely will have-if it decides to-within the next 18 months according to estimates by the Israeli Defense Ministry. Meanwhile US visa applications have broken records, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv for three out of the past five months..
One, election Israel hoped would help it maintain its occupation of Palestine was the June 7th Lebanese election (which the Hezbollah led opposition actually won by nearly ten percent of the popular vote.) But it may have to look elsewhere for solace because rather than being defeated and weakened, Hezbollah is currently stronger in Lebanon than it has ever been. The Party is dominating the construction of the next Lebanese government, as it negotiates the terms of its support for Saad Hariri as Prime Minister. Hezbollah’s popular support has increased due it its post election sportsmanlike acceptance of the results and its conduct and efforts at accommodation with its political adversaries.
Yesterday witnessed Hezbollah's ally, the Shia Amal leader, Nabih Berri being elected to his fifth term as the politically powerful position of Speaker of Parliament. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Christian ally Michel Aoun, who also increased his popular vote in the election, picked up more seats for a total of 27. He is now demanding 7 cabinet posts (3 more than in the previous government) for his Free Patriotic Movement while renewing the Oppositions call for proportional representation in the new 128 seat Parliament. There are now 13 political blocks and 11 independent MPs many of whom seek good relations with Hezbollah while curtailing their pre-election complaints about Resistance weapons.
One reason is that the Lebanese public, once more eying Israeli provocations and a military buildup along the blue line have come increasingly to agree that until the Lebanese Army is up to the task it makes sense to have a strong deterrence to the Netanyahu government projects.
The post June 7 election Hezbollah led opposition appears united and ready to reach out to the newly named Lebanon First group (previously known as March 14). Some have suggested that March 8 change its designation to Lebanon Always, but Hezbollah prefers to maintain, at least for now, its Loyalty to the Resistance title.
Hezbollah’s second in command Sheikh Naim Qassem said yesterday that the nomination of the new prime minister ( likely Saad Hariri) must be "an inseparable part" of an agreement on a new government and added it remained unsure who the next premier will be:.
"So far, the identity of the premier-designate is unclear in anticipation of the outcome of(parliamentary) deliberations.”
Qassim said the opposition will decide on "how to approach the new government based on the designated premier's proposition". This observer interpreted his comments to mean that Hezbollah will support Saad Hariri for Prime Minister but that there must be some clearly agreed benefits for the Resistance, perhaps legitimizing Hezbollah's weapons explicitly or at least adopting the current conciliatory position of Walid Jumblatt who spent hours with Hasan Nasrallah last week and is said to no longer believe Hezbollah weapons are a serious domestic problem.
"Right now, we do not have a specific candidate as we wait for the outcome of the deliberations and the allocations agreement on the government's structure and the distribution of ministries” Qassem coyly added.
The Iranian election
The June 12 Iranian election also initially created some joy in Israel. However, whatever changes may come to Iran from the election results, they appear more evolutionary than revolutionary and are unlikely to affect either that country’s support for Palestine, expressly mandated by the Iranian constitution, or its commitment to the Lebanese National Resistance led by Hezbollah.
One imagines that no one outside Iran, with Hezbollah perhaps being one of the few exceptions, really knows what is going on across the large diversified country with many power centers and with those reporting from inside tending naturally to report to outsiders developments through their individual political prisms.
Assuming that there is to be a serious ongoing power struggle between an Ahmaddinejad/Khameni group and a Mousavi/Rafsanjani faction, and one prevails over the other, rather than the more likely dialogue, some reshuffling of portfolios, and surface accommodation and slow transformation, many Hezbollah officials doubt it will affect the Party or its agenda partly because support for such groups as Hezbollah and Hamas is ingrained in Iran's ideology, which sees the Islamic republic as a counter to Egypt, Jordan and others that have recognized Israel.
On the subject of finances, this observer has frequently been advised that Iran gives Hezbollah much less aid than if usually reported in the Western media and that Hezbollah's existence is no longer dependent on Iran.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran started with its birth and has deepened since. Virtually all the leadership in Iran is said by Hezbollah to have close ties with it. Iran, and increasingly other countries in the Region and beyond, share Hezbollah’s goals and have pledged to maintain its relationship with its resistance paradigm as well as with its alley Hamas.
According to Hezbollah, the extent of Western and American involvement in Iran's internal affairs is now clear and it blames the US and Britain for some of the recent violence.
Hezbollah's Naim Qassim argues that what is going on in Iran is not a simple protest against the results of the presidential election. "There are riots and attacks in the streets that are orchestrated from the outside in a bid to destabilize the country's Islamic regime.”."
Consequently, according to Qassim, while Hezbollah is open to talks with representatives of all Western governments this does not currently include the United States even though several U.S.officials have asked to speak with Hezbollah but have been refused. This will likely be its position until the Obama administration removes it from the US Terrorism list.
" According to Qassim: "It is useless to have any dialogue with the Americans since they regard us as terrorists. The Europeans for their part have a role to play, especially as they are taking a different approach from the Americans.”
Hezbollah believes that it will not be affected by the events Tehran and members claims that Hezbollah has nothing to do with Iran's internal affairs and that it does not take sides in internal matters and that the June 12 election was solely an internal Iranian issue.
"What is happening there has nothing to do with our situation," Qassim told the Beirut media on June 25, 2009. "We have our own Lebanese identity and popularity, and these events don't concern us.” adding that Hezbollah believes that the situation in Iran will soon return to normal and that the “Islamic republic has succeeded in overcoming this plot from overseas aimed at destabilizing the internal situation,"
There also has been a hope that Israel could more easily make a case for international acceptance of Israeli action to bomb Iran and increase sanctions. Netanyahu has pressed the point on his trip to Europe this week, trying to persuade countries such as Italy, which are among Iran's more important trading partners, to reduce their economic ties.
According to EyalZisser, head of the department of Middle Eastern and African History at TelAviv University, “The Iranian election is a disturbing signal for Syria and Hezbollah. The weaker the regime is, the less it can provide support for Hezbollah."
Eldad Pardo, a Hebrew University professor and Iran specialist, agrees, stating that “It is an extremely heavy blow for Iran's power and image and I would even daresay to Islamic radicalism in general."
David Menashri, head of the Center of Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University believes that the system in Iran could be so deeply rattled that it will register among Syrian officials and Iran's other allies including Hezbollah..
"The legitimacy of the Iran regime and those it supports has been harmed," Menashri said. "This is an opportunity to crack some heads and start solving some problems.”
Others view this position as Israeli bombast aimed at shoring up its increasingly fatigued population who are witnessing an international increase in support for Palestine and for ending Israel's occupation.
Near term, neither the recent elections or events in Iran appear unlikely to fundamentally affect Hezbollah. Neither inside Lebanon's new government or internationally.
-###-
Franklin Lamb is doing research in Lebanon and can be reached at fplamb@sabrashatila.com
Franklin P. Lamb, PhD
Director, Americans Concerned for
Middle East Peace, Wash.DC-Beirut
Acting Chair, the Sabra-Shatila Memorial Scholarship Program Laptop Initiative
Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp
fplamb@SabraShatila.org

UN secretary general calls for united front against drug abuse and illicit trafficking
By Ban Ki-moon
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Daily Star
This year marks the centenary of drug control - 100 years since the Opium Commission met in Shanghai to stop an opium epidemic. In more recent years, United Nations conventions have helped to address the challenge of drug abuse and reduce its terrible toll on individuals, families and communities.
Drug abuse can be prevented, treated and controlled. I urge member states to upgrade their preventive interventions and integrate drug treatment into public health programs. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continue to work with governments and other partners to scale up drug treatment world-wide.
I also urge full implementation of the United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. These instruments can help in the effort to prevent and control drug-related crime that is posing a serious security threat in many parts of the world.
Greater development assistance and a strengthening of the rule of law are needed in countries that are vulnerable to the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Absent these essentials, these states risk instability and will face even greater challenges in reaching the Millennium Development Goals.
On this International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, let us join together to help people suffering from drug addiction and to reduce the number of dangerous places on this planet where drugs are produced, trafficked and consumed.
**Ban Ki-moon is the secretary general of the United Nations
 

Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in Curacao
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 18June 25, 2009 06:
By: Chris Zambelis
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35183&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=6689061369
Security forces during the crack down in Bekaa Valley in April
Mystery continues to surround Hezbollah’s alleged links to the seventeen suspects arrested on drug trafficking charges on the Dutch Caribbean island of Curacao on April 28. According to Curacaon authorities, approximately 250 law enforcement officials took down a major drug trafficking and money laundering ring led by a criminal network that shipped and sold cocaine and other contraband from Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe and the Middle East. In a significant twist, Curacaon authorities announced that the suspects had ties to international organized crime networks linked to Hezbollah in Lebanon; the suspects are accused of, among other things, having funneled part of their proceeds to Hezbollah through informal banking mechanisms (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; Netherlands Info Services News, April 30; AP, April 29). Four Lebanese nationals were among those arrested in addition to an unspecified number of Colombians, Venezuelans, Cubans, Curacaons, and Surinamese (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30). Curacaon authorities reported that officials from the Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States aided in the investigation (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30).
The suspects are reported to have specialized in exporting Colombian cocaine that they obtained from smugglers who transported the drugs to Curacao using speedboats and ocean-going cargo ships that embarked from Venezuela. The drug ring is also reported to have imported arms, ammunition and hashish from the Netherlands to Curacao. Sources in Curacao reported that the suspects established an elaborate scheme to launder their illicit profits. Among other things, the smugglers purchased property in Curacao, Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon. The Curacaon-based contingent of the drug ring, for instance, operated legitimate businesses on the island that served as front companies for their illicit activities (St. Maarten Island Times, May 2; NIS News, April 30).
On the surface, these events may appear to validate the concerns of many observers regarding the nexus between international organized crime and radical Shiite Islam in Latin America and the Caribbean. A closer examination of this case, however, indicates that other factors may be at play.
A Smuggler’s Paradise
Curacao’s geographic proximity to the Venezuelan coast makes it an ideal transshipment point for narcotics - especially Colombian cocaine - arms, and other contraband originating in Latin America and other parts of the Caribbean destined for international markets. Local- and foreign-based smugglers are also known to exploit the island’s direct air traffic links to the Netherlands and close European ties to ship their wares. The free-trade zone (FTZ) and state-of-the-art shipping and port facilities that have made Curacao a key hub in legitimate global trade and passenger cruise ship traffic are also conducive to smuggling and other illicit activities. While Curacao’s oil industry has traditionally served as one of the island’s main sources of revenue (Venezuela’s state-run Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. [PDVSA] runs major oil refining operations at Curacao’s Isla refinery), it is also a major offshore banking and financial services center. The offshore banking and financial services industry, an industry which represents an intrinsic part of the political-economy of the Caribbean, is often associated with money laundering, tax evasion, and international organized crime. Due to the scenic island’s reputation as a tourist paradise for European and North American vacationers, however, this dark side of Curacao is often overlooked. Yet it is important to point out that Curacao is not alone in the region in this regard; much of Latin America and the Caribbean are beset by corruption, weak institutions, porous borders, and poverty, leaving them susceptible to international organized crime.
While Curacao enjoys autonomy in its domestic affairs, all matters related to foreign policy and national defense remain the responsibility of the Dutch government. The Dutch armed forces maintain a permanent presence on the island. In addition, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) forces have, since 2000, utilized Curacao and fellow Dutch Caribbean island Aruba as Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to support its mission in the region. U.S. surveillance aircraft, for instance, depart from Curacao’s Hato International Airport to conduct counter-narcotics detection and monitoring missions. U.S. investigators, security officials, and military personnel also operate from the FOL in concert with local and regional partners. In spite of its strategic importance and the attention it receives from the United States and the Netherlands, Curacao remains a smuggler’s paradise. This reality is emblematic of the scale of the challenges posed by international organized crime in the region.
Unanswered Questions
Allegations linking Hezbollah to drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean surface periodically (The National [Abu Dhabi], March 22). While Hezbollah continues to receive financial and material support from Iran, the group is known to boast an impressive independent fundraising capability. Donations from its supporters and sympathizers across the globe (including the sizeable Arab diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean), proceeds from legitimate business interests managed by the organization and illicit activities such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and related activities are widely assumed to help sustain the organization’s social service, political, and military wings.
In spite of reports linking Hezbollah to the crime ring in Curacao, no details regarding the exact nature of Hezbollah’s alleged involvement in the drug smuggling and money laundering operation were provided by Curacaon authorities or by the other parties involved in the investigation. In a similar incident, U.S. and Colombian authorities took down a major drug trafficking ring headed by Lebanese nationals in Colombia in October 2008 that was accused of maintaining ties to Colombian drug cartels and right-wing paramilitaries. The suspects detained in Colombia were alleged to have channeled part of their funds back to Hezbollah’s coffers (El Espectador [Bogota], March 9). Similarly, details to explain the precise Hezbollah link to that criminal enterprise failed to emerge. In another case, Colombian and Ecuadorian officials collaborated in June 2005 to take down a drug smuggling ring with global reach that was said to be linked to Hezbollah. According to Ecuadorian officials, the suspects, who included Lebanese, Syrians, Ecuadorians, Colombians, Algerians, Nigerians and Turks, are reported to have transferred 70% of their profits to Hezbollah. The ringleader of the group, Rady Zaiter (a.k.a. David Assi Alvarez and Almawla Fares), was a Lebanese national wanted on drug trafficking charges in France (CRE Satelital [Guayaquil], June 21, 2005). Zaiter’s arrest and extradition to France led to further arrests of alleged accomplices involved in his drug operation in Brazil and the United States (Le Temps [Switzerland] June 27, 2005). As in the previous cases, no concrete details explaining the exact Hezbollah link to Zaiter’s criminal activities ever emerged. Not surprisingly, Hezbollah has denied any involvement in the drug trade. Hezbollah describes attempts to link the group to the drug trade as an effort by its enemies to tarnish the reputation it has cultivated as a Lebanese nationalist movement and a legitimate player in Lebanese politics (Al-Manar TV [Beirut], October 23, 2008).
Hezbollah is also implicated in the drug trade in the Middle East, including the trade inside the borders of its archenemy Israel, one of the region’s largest markets for recreational drugs. During the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli activists went so far as to call for hashish smokers in Israel to boycott the product based on the premise that proceeds from the sale of hashish on Israeli streets funded Hezbollah (The Forward [New York City], August 11, 2006). In addition to profiting from Israeli drug consumption, Hezbollah is also alleged to have used the drug trade to infiltrate the Israeli defense and security establishment by luring corrupt military, police, and intelligence officers into profitable drug trafficking schemes in exchange for intelligence information. While most reports of Hezbollah’s intelligence activities in Israel point to the group’s ties to members of Israel’s Arab minority and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Hezbollah successfully recruited a Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli army who directed his own drug operation in Israel; Hezbollah operatives supplied the Israeli officer with hashish and heroin in exchange for intelligence information. And there are more cases like this one (Haaretz [Tel Aviv], April 1, 2008; Christian Science Monitor, April 15).
Lebanese Organized Crime
In light of reports linking Hezbollah to the drug trade in the Americas and beyond, observers concerned with this topic should also consider the role of Lebanese organized crime networks in Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the situation on the ground in Lebanon as it relates to the relationship between Hezbollah and organized crime networks and drug trafficking suggests that a more complex dynamic is at work (The National, April 14; Christian Science Monitor, April 15).
Lebanese organized crime networks that traffic drugs and engage in other illicit activities have international connections that extend to the substantial Lebanese diaspora in the Americas and to other ethnic-based criminal organizations. Likewise, drug gangs based in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, including networks led by powerful Shi’a clans, are routinely linked to Hezbollah. Lebanon’s impoverished Bekaa Valley, a region where Hezbollah has traditionally drawn strong support, has long been a center for the cultivation of cannabis for the production of hashish, the drug of choice for most recreational drug users in the Middle East. Drug gangs in the Bekaa Valley also cultivate poppy crops used to produce opium and heroin. According to some sources, upwards of 50 heavily-armed drug kingpins, each with their own stake in the drug trade, operate in the Bekaa Valley alone (AFP, October 4, 2008). Beirut and Hezbollah have traditionally turned a blind eye to the drug trade and other illicit activities in the Bekaa Valley to ensure the loyalty of the powerful Shi’a clans in the region who derive their livelihoods from the drug trade (al-Jazeera [Doha], April 14). Shi’a-led clans, however, are not the only groups involved in the global drug trade. When the Syrian army controlled most of Lebanon, Syrian officers regularly engaged in drug trafficking and other illicit activities for both monetary and political gains. Many of these networks remain in place in some form. During the Lebanese Civil War, Christian, Sunni, Palestinian and Leftist militias smuggled narcotics and engaged in other illicit activities on a global scale to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. [1] Following the conflict, many militias eventually morphed into full-fledged criminal organizations spanning the globe. The outward emigration of Lebanese and other Arab communities fleeing the conflict in the Levant to Latin America and the Caribbean provided Lebanese organized criminal networks with an opportunity to make international inroads in a manner analogous to the methods other ethnic-based organized criminal networks use to establish themselves among their kin across the globe.
A spate of recent incidents in Lebanon help shed light on the complex interplay between Hezbollah, Lebanese-based organized crime groups in the Bekaa Valley, and allegations that implicate Hezbollah in a series of major drug cases in the Americas, including the recent case in Curacao. While Hezbollah has often turned a blind eye to drug and criminal activities in areas under its control, a marked expansion of the drug trade, a rash of car thefts, and bold attacks against Lebanese security services by Shi’a crime networks in recent months have raised tensions in the Bekaa Valley and have placed Hezbollah in a precarious position (al-Jazeera April 14). Tensions escalated further when thieves linked to local organized crime networks attacked the son of the late Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh and then stole his car near a small village in the Bekaa Valley. When the son of the revered Hezbollah commander mentioned to his assailants who he was and that he himself was an active member of the group, the thieves continued with their assault and took his car anyway. In response to this affront, Hezbollah gave Beirut the go-ahead to deploy security forces in the Bekaa Valley to crack down on Shi’a gangs that are accustomed to operating unhindered (The National, April 14; Christian Science Monitor, April 15). These events are telling; the recent tensions between the organized crime networks and Hezbollah are indicative of the strength and influence of criminal gangs in Lebanon. Most importantly, these incidents also demonstrate the independence of these groups and their willingness to challenge Hezbollah (and the state) through violence when they see their interests being threatened.
Conclusion
Detailed evidence regarding Hezbollah’s supposed involvement in the Curacao drug case has yet to emerge. The nature of Hezbollah’s alleged connection to the detainees in the Curacao drug case may eventually surface, but in the meantime, serious researchers concerned with these issues should factor in the potential role of Lebanese organized crime networks that may be linked to Hezbollah through their contacts and connections in the Bekaa Valley, but who are motivated by profits, not politics. It is also possible that independent members of Lebanese organized crime networks operating in the Americas and elsewhere are contributing portions of their proceeds to Hezbollah out of sympathy for the group. Hezbollah, after all, remains popular among many Lebanese, particularly the Shi’a, but also among other sects within the Lebanese diaspora. Political motivations intended to harm Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanese politics may be behind many of these accusations. At the very least, the recent events in the Bekaa Valley indicate that Hezbollah’s connection to the drug trade in Lebanon and beyond is far more complex than is often reflected in the sweeping generalizations characteristic of much of the media coverage of the topic.
Notes
1. Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), p. 138, 143; also see Georges Corm, “The War System: Militia Hegemony and Reestablishment of the State” in Deirdre Collings (ed.), Peace for Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 217-18.
 

Hezbollah in Egypt: The Politics of Conspiracy and Resistance
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 16June 12, 2009
By: Chris Zambelis
The timing of Egypt’s April 8 announcement of its arrest of 24 men—allegedly linked to Hezbollah—on Egyptian soil in November and December 2008 upped the ante in the already tense relationship between Cairo and the Lebanese Islamist resistance movement and, by extension, Hezbollah’s supporter, Iran (al-Jazeera [Doha], April 11; al-Arabiya [Dubai], April 11). Cairo’s allegations regarding the suspects and their motives, however, have been fraught with inconsistencies that say more about the factors shaping the trajectory of contemporary geopolitics in the Middle East than any alleged conspiracy.
A Web of Conspiracy
The nature and targets of Cairo’s allegations of a Hezbollah-led plot in Egypt shed light on the underlying issues at play. Egyptian authorities initially accused the suspects, which included Egyptians, Lebanese, and Arab citizens of Israel, of funneling funds to Hamas in the Gaza Strip from Egyptian territory (al-Jazeera, April 10). Cairo then shifted its account and claimed that the 24 suspects were part of a 49-member Hezbollah cell that was preparing to execute attacks against Egyptian targets and Israeli tourists in Egypt. The suspects were also accused of engineering a coup at the behest of Iran to overthrow the government of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and spreading Hezbollah’s brand of Shia Islam in Egypt (al-Hayat [London], April 17; al-Arabiya, April 16).
The suspects are also reported to have attempted to recruit Egyptians and others in the country to monitor shipping traffic traversing the Suez Canal and in other locations near the Sinai Peninsula (al-Jazeera, April 10). The alleged cell was also said to have mapped out the terrain and demographics of a number of Egyptian towns and villages in Sinai, situated adjacent to Israel and Gaza. Egyptian sources stated that Hezbollah aimed to gauge the utility of these towns and villages for infiltrating Gaza and Israel proper to support the Palestinian resistance, groups such as Hamas in Gaza and possibly members of Israel’s Arab minority (al-Jazeera, April 9). Members of the alleged cell are also accused of planning to smuggle arms and ammunition by ship from Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan into Sinai, presumably to sustain their operations in Egypt and also to bolster the Palestinian resistance (al-Jazeera, April 13). Subsequent reports citing official sources in Cairo later claimed that the suspects intended to mount suicide attacks against unspecified targets in Tel Aviv (Press TV [Tehran], April 16). Egyptian security officials also reported that they uncovered explosive materials, including suicide belts, during the arrests of the suspects (al-Jazeera, April 13). The remaining 25 members of the alleged cell, which according to Egyptian officials include an unspecified number of Sudanese, remain at large (Daily Star [Cairo], April 13).
In addition to implicating Hezbollah and Iran in a web of conspiracy, official Egyptian media sources named Syria, Hamas, Qatar and its al-Jazeera satellite network, and Egypt’s banned Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), as being party to a plot against Egypt (al-Jazeera, April 18). Egypt’s citing of Damascus stems from Syria’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. Similarly, Cairo sees Hamas as a threat due to the example it sets for Egypt’s embattled Islamist opposition, as well as its alliances with Syria and Iran. Cairo is also threatened by Qatar’s rise as a diplomatic heavyweight in the Gulf, where it has emerged as a new voice for Arab causes (in spite of its close strategic relationship with Washington) and an alternative to the pro-U.S. Egyptian- and Saudi-led consensus in the region, a role bolstered by its natural gas and oil riches and ownership of al-Jazeera. Qatar and Syria were first to call for an emergency meeting of Arab League members and a ceasefire during Israel’s invasion of Gaza from December 2008-January 2009. Qatar also welcomed exiled leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups to Doha to meet with Arab League members and urged all Arab countries to immediately cut ties and negotiations with Israel in a show of solidarity with the Palestinians. In contrast, Egypt and Saudi Arabia boycotted the event. Qatar’s assertiveness during the crisis humiliated Egypt (and Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Egypt and other autocratic regimes in the Middle East consider al-Jazeera a threat because it provides opposition forces a venue to voice their opinions. The network’s allotment of airtime to critics of Egypt’s stance during the Gaza conflict also did not sit well in Cairo.
Egypt’s claim that the Ikhwan, the moderate, democratic reform-minded Islamist movement that represents the main opposition to Mubarak’s rule, was active in the alleged scheme suggests an effort on the part of Cairo to tarnish the group’s reputation domestically and internationally (al-Jazeera, April 18). The Ikhwan denied any involvement with or knowledge of the alleged cell, although they did support any attempts to help the besieged Palestinians in Gaza (al-Jazeera, April 11). At the same time, the Ikhwan highlighted the importance of defending Egyptian national security and criticized attempts by foreigners to violate the country’s sovereignty on any grounds (al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], April 23-29).
Hezbollah’s Threat to Egypt
Cairo’s official portrayal of Hezbollah’s threat to Egypt obscures the true nature of the Hezbollah threat. Egypt accuses Hezbollah of, among other things, religious fanaticism, terrorism and, most importantly, serving as a spearhead of Iranian expansionism. The true threat Hezbollah poses to Egypt and, for that matter, other U.S.-backed autocracies in the Middle East, however, is its ability to inspire popular dissent and resistance. Hezbollah’s impressive performance against Israel in combat during the years of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the Summer 2006 war are cases in point. Popular displays of solidarity with Hezbollah across Arab cities such as Cairo and Amman with predominantly Sunni populations during the July 2006 war, for instance, are also indicative of Hezbollah’s popularity. Significantly, Sunni Islamist opposition movements such as the Ikhwan in Egypt were among Hezbollah’s most vocal supporters during the July 2006 war (see Terrorism Focus, August 8, 2006). Hezbollah’s Shi’a Islamist pedigree is irrelevant in this context. In fact, Hezbollah secretary general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is widely regarded as a hero in the Arab and greater Muslim world. Many Arabs see Iran in a favorable light due to Tehran’s vocal opposition to the United States and Israel, not to mention the pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East. In spite of repeated warnings out of Cairo and other U.S.-friendly Arab capitals of the rise of an aggressive Iran that is bent on regional domination, the Arab public continues to identify the United States and Israel as posing the greatest threats by large margins. [1] As a result, Egypt, along with U.S.-backed autocracies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia that comprise the core of the so-called “moderate regimes,” has been vocal in playing up the specter of what it sees as an Iranian-led conspiracy to dominate Egypt and the Middle East. It is against this background that Hezbollah plays an integral role in the threat of a “Shi’a Crescent” first defined by Jordan’s King Abdullah II in December 2004 to describe Iran’s growing influence from Iraq to the Levant.
Hostilities between Egypt and Hezbollah have reached a fever pitch since Hezbollah accused Egypt of colluding with Israel’s invasion of Gaza (al-Manar [Beirut], April 10). During Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, Hezbollah also accused Egypt, along with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, of tacitly supporting Israel (see Terrorism Focus, August 8, 2006). While largely ignored in the U.S. and Western press, the regional fallout from Israel’s invasion of Gaza and the escalating human cost on the Palestinians continues to weigh heavily on Egypt and the wider Middle East. For its part, Cairo remains on the defensive domestically and in the wider Arab arena for the role it played in the latest war in Gaza and for its support of the Israeli blockade against the Palestinians that was instituted after Hamas emerged victorious in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections (al-Jazeera, April 13).
Hezbollah’s Response
Hezbollah’s political, information, and social service wings operate relatively transparently in the mainstream of Lebanese politics and society. In contrast, the group’s military and intelligence wings are shrouded behind a cloak of secrecy that rivals—if not exceeds—the behavior of state actors. This shroud of secrecy extends to all matters related to Hezbollah’s membership. But in a move atypical of the ultra secretive organization, Nasrallah acknowledged in a lengthy response to Cairo that one of the men in Egyptian custody, Sami Chehab, was in fact a member of Hezbollah operating in Egypt. Nasrallah admitted that Chehab was providing logistical assistance to the Palestinians along the Egyptian-Gaza border: “Our brother Sami, is a member of Hezbollah, we do not deny this…” (al-Manar, April 10). Egyptian authorities detained Chehab, a Lebanese citizen, in Egypt on November 19, 2008 (Press TV, May 1).
Nasrallah, however, vehemently denied Cairo’s allegations that Hezbollah intended to mount attacks against Egypt or foreign targets on Egyptian soil. He also rejected the charges that Hezbollah was planning to orchestrate a coup at the behest of Iran against the Mubarak regime or to cause any problems for the Egyptian people. Regarding Cairo’s allegations, he stated, “The aim here is to agitate the Egyptian people and to defame Hezbollah's pure and bright image. This aims to only please the Americans and Israelis, for the Egyptian regime has failed by all means” (al-Manar, April 10). Nasrallah also admitted that Hezbollah was actively supporting the Palestinians in Gaza and that Hezbollah’s sole concern was countering Israeli threats to Lebanon (al-Manar, April 9; April 10).
In a reflection of Nasrallah’s confidence in light of the serious allegations Egypt leveled against his organization, he also mentioned: “If aiding the Palestinians is a crime, then I am proud of it" and that “the Egyptian regime should be charged and condemned for besieging Gaza" (al-Manar, April 10). Nasrallah’s bold response was intended for ordinary Egyptians, as well as a wider Arab and Muslim public—Sunni and Shi’a alike—the vast majority of whom deeply resent Egypt’s stance on Gaza and the larger Palestinian question. Moreover, Nasrallah makes it apparent that Cairo’s attempt to accuse Hezbollah of plotting terrorist attacks against Egypt represents a sign of desperation on the part of Egypt to divert attention away from its unpopular stance regarding Gaza and the Palestinians.
The Irony of the Iranian Threat
In an ironic twist, adherents of the most extreme strains of radical Sunni Islam (namely violent Salafi militants who subscribe to al-Qaeda’s brand of radicalism) along with U.S.-backed autocracies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and Israel all identify Iran as a serious threat. Naturally, each of these unlikely bedfellows defines the perceived threat from Iran differently. For reasons discussed earlier, pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes, themselves the original targets of radical Islamist ire long before radical Islamists turned their sites on the United States, also identify Iran as a threat in political, ideological, and military terms. The United States and Israel also harbor deep concerns about Iran stemming from Tehran’s nuclear aspirations to the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Radical Salafi extremists despise the revolutionary brand of Shi’a Islam propagated by Tehran, and see Shi’a believers overall as heretics and apostates. Given its Shi’a Islamist credentials and ties to Iran, Salafi extremists view Hezbollah’s presence and influence in Lebanon and the wider region in an adversarial, sectarian context. The spread of Iranian influence and the marked rise of Shi’a political power in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad also helped feed Salafi conspiracy theories that the United States, Iran and Hezbollah are secretly colluding to undermine Sunni Islam across the globe. Yet al-Qaeda’s brand of radicalism has never been able to gain a widespread following; not even close, in fact, to the popular following and respect enjoyed by Iranian-sponsored groups such as Hezbollah across the region. To undermine their enemies, Iran and Hezbollah will continue to reach out to Arab and Muslim publics through a non-sectarian resistance narrative that resonates deeply with those concerned with the plight of the Palestinians, domestic political opposition in the Middle East, social justice, and related themes.
Conclusion
In spite of the media hype, the apparent defeat of the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance in Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary elections will do little to stymie Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese politics and beyond. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s defeat at the polls will inevitably be described in Cairo—as well as in Riyadh, Amman, Washington, and Tel Aviv—as a major setback for Iran. On the contrary, Hezbollah’s loss at the polls represents a blessing in disguise for the organization; Hezbollah is able to preserve its role as a symbol of resistance, a role strengthened by its position as a powerful opposition force in Lebanese politics, without assuming the myriad of burdens that come with being the dominant political power in Beirut.
Notes:
[1] See University of Maryland (w/ Zogby International), “2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” May 2009, www.brookings.edu/events/2009/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf.

Iran and the Syrian Gambit
By: Howard Schweber/Associate Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
*Huffington Post
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-schweber/iran-and-the-syrian-gambi_b_221505.html
The U.S. has three key interests with respect to Iran: containing its nuclear program, limiting its reach in the Middle East and, quite possibly, extending Iranian influence in Afghanistan in cooperation with the U.S. These three interests have to be pursued against the ever-shifting backdrop of the protests. At this point, what looks like the most likely outcome of the protests over the election provide both encouraging and cautionary signals. The challenge for Obama has been to recognize both and to respond appropriately while keeping his eye on all three of these balls at once. For this week, at least, Obama and his State Department get an A. Maybe even an A+, but the week is not over yet.
First, where do things stand with the protests? The government's repressive measures appear to be increasingly effective in suppressing the movement to the streets. At the same time, however, there is word that Rafsanjani may have collected enough anti-Khamenei votes in the Assembly of Experts to force a compromise, possibly in the form of a run-off election between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. At the same time, it seems unlikely that Rafsanjani has the votes to have Khamenei removed outright. The outcome, in other words, looks increasingly like something like a power-sharing agreement between the clerics allied around Rafsanjani and the militarist/nationalists (including plenty of clerics) around Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, in which Khamenei will remain Supreme Leader but the orthodox clerics will get some concessions -- possibly starting with the rumored run-off election -- and will insist on a greater say in how things are done from here on out.
Understanding the fact that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are political rather than religious figures -- and that their opponents, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, speak for the religious voice in Iran's leadership -- is directly relevant to thinking about Iran's nuclear program. The fact that Ahmadinejad is on the less religious end of the spectrum helps explain why his government might be pursuing a nuclear weapons program despite years of statements by Iran's leading religious authorities that nuclear weapons are an offense against God. One positive outcome of a power-sharing arrangement might be a government that is more willing to bend on issues relating to its nuclear program.
That's the first U.S. concern, and it is why a careful and cautious wait-and-see attitude is exactly what has been needed. Nothing -- absolutely nothing -- could be less helpful at the moment than for Obama to start making the kinds of fire-breathing statements that neocons and progressives alike keep calling for. On the nuclear issue the U.S. has to hope for a change or partial change in leadership that will result in a government more favorable to negotiation, not that anti-nuclear sentiment will somehow bubble up out of a popular movement toward revolt. To start aligning the U.S. directly with the protesters now risks energizing the nationalists at the expense of the Islamists. That is exactly what happened in 2002. It was Bush's idiotic Axis of Evil speech that propelled Ahmadinejad to power in the first place. After 9/11 Iran provided crucial support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan; with that speech, many Iranians suddenly feared that their country was next on the list for invasion. Ahmadinejad rode that fear to power, and his supporters continue to beat that nationalist drum, exemplified by statements from government officials and pro-government clerics like Ahmed Khatami referring to leaders of the protests as "supported by the U.S. and Israel." Obama's careful avoidance of anything that could be construed as belligerence has been exactly the right strategy to give Rafsanjani and his supporters move to maneuver.
The second key U.S. concern is Iranian influence in the Middle East. On this score, events in Iran proper are not the only story to be watching this week. There have also been a series of extremely lethal bombings in Iraq, all of them aimed at killing Shiites: 78 dead in Baghdad on Wednesday, 73 in Shiite Turkmen town of Taza Khurmatu, at least 13 dead in Baghdad on Friday. A new Iranian government that includes a greater representation of religious orthodox clerics is unlikely to watch as their fellow Shiites are attacked by Suni extremists bent on destabilizing Iraq by fomenting inter-ethnic conflict. (It's hard to see how anyone could argue that the Iranian government should stand by in that situation, actually, particularly for conservatives who support Israel and clamor about the need for the U.S. to take action in response to the persecution of Christians in Africa.) So it is unlikely that the government that emerges out of these protests will be less prone to extending its influence into Iraq, particularly after the U.S. troops are gone.
But Iran's interests in Iraq are not our only concern. Our bigger long-term concern is with Iran's role in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This week two things were announced. First, the U.S. is sending an ambassador to Damascus. Second, Jimmy Carter -- working with Egypt and Syria -- may have worked out terms for the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier whose capture by Hamas was one of the triggering events of Israel's invasion of Gaza. HaAretz reports that Shalit's release will take place within a few days as part of a prisoner exchange, and that the initial proposal was floated by Carter during a visit to Damascus and Gaza last year.
These stories may very well be connected, and they point to the almost incredible possibility that the U.S. may finally be ready to have a serious foreign policy in the Middle East. For what it's worth, I have been saying for many years that relations with Syria are the key. Here's just one reason: if Syria can be brought on board with a peace effort, Iran no longer has direct supply lines into Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syria has itself been supporting Hamas in Gaza (hence its role in negotiating the release of Shalit) as well as meddling in Lebanon. But while Syria has been notoriously difficult to deal with in the past, there is no reason in principle why progress cannot be made. Assad is an opportunist, not a mad ideologue, and certainly not a religious fanatic. (The single stupidest neocon phrase -- against some pretty tough competition! -- has to be "the Shiite Crescent," an arc of states comprising Iran, Syria and Lebanon that are supposed to represent the religiously defined threat to American interests. Since Syria is less than 5% Shiite and is ruled by an Alawite minority, it was never terribly clear what this was supposed to mean.)
What Syria wants is simple: they want the Golan Heights back. Which is where the U.S. comes in. There have been repeated points at which Israel and Syria came close to substantive negotiations on the issue of the Golan, only to see those efforts fail. But there has never been a sustained and substantive American presence in the dialogue. If Assad can be persuaded that Syria has more to gain by engagement with the West than by an alliance with Iran, that immediately improves the situation in Lebanon, improves the security of Israel's northern border, and improves the situation in Western Iraq. Syria's participation in arranging the release of Shalit -- even if that ultimately doesn't happen -- is a powerful and positive sign that Assad is open to the possibility.
Then there is the third U.S. interest and a tantalizing possibility: that Iran might resume its cooperation with U.S. operations in Afghanistan. As this piece from Stratfor nicely explains, Iran's 500-plus mile border with Afghanistan, strong ethnic connections to Afghan Pashtuns, and available ports make it an ideal partner. In other words, at the very same time that the U.S. has a strong interest in limiting Iran's reach to the West beyond Iraq, we may have another strong interest in encouraging Iranian engagement to the East. The Sunni attacks against Shiites in Iraq are part of the larger conflict between Sunni radicals -- think Taliban -- and Shiite Iran.
So the Obama administration has had to play a very careful hand: do nothing to repeat the stupidity that helped launch Ahmadinejad to the presidency; develop the opening that Jimmy Carter has helped develop and initiate an engagement with Syria in the hope of isolating Iran to the West; and at the same time look ahead to the role that the version of the Iranian regime that emerges out of a compromise in the Assembly of Experts might play in Afghanistan. This week, Obama and his State Department have done all three brilliantly.
*Huffington Post