LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 18/09
Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 6:1-6.16-18. (But) take
care not to perform righteous deeds in order that people may see them;
otherwise, you will have no recompense from your heavenly Father. When you give
alms, do not blow a trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues
and in the streets to win the praise of others. Amen, I say to you, they have
received their reward. But when you give alms, do not let your left hand know
what your right is doing, so that your almsgiving may be secret. And your Father
who sees in secret will repay you. When you pray, do not be like the hypocrites,
who love to stand and pray in the synagogues and on street corners so that
others may see them. Amen, I say to you, they have received their reward. But
when you pray, go to your inner room, close the door, and pray to your Father in
secret. And your Father who sees in secret will repay you. When you fast, do not
look gloomy like the hypocrites. They neglect their appearance, so that they may
appear to others to be fasting. Amen, I say to you, they have received their
reward. But when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, so that you may
not appear to be fasting, except to your Father who is hidden. And your Father
who sees what is hidden will repay you.
Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special
Reports
Ahmadinejad’s Crises: The Internal
Uprising.By:
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
17/06/09
Iran’s Deceiving Elections.By Dr.
Hamad Al-Majid 17/06/09
Press Release From ICC: Egyptian Court Refuses to Recognize Christian Man's
Conversion 17/06/09
Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections.
By: Amir Kulick 17/06/09
Latest
News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June
17/09
March
14 Urges Judiciary Not to Succumb to Political Influences-Naharnet
Aoun:
Berri Is Our Candidate for Parliament Speaker-Naharnet
Franjieh Won't Name Hariri Prime Minister-Naharnet
Hariri for a Government
that Represents All Sections of Society-Naharnet
Berri for a Unity Cabinet
That Doesn't Distinguish between March 8 and 14-Naharnet
Gemayel Demands Hizbullah
to Give Safety Guarantees for Citizens-Naharnet
Chertoff: Hizbullah Could Surpass Qaida as Most Serious Long-Term Threat to the
U.S-Naharnet
Pilot Hanna's Killer Freed on
Bail-Naharnet
Berri
for a Unity Cabinet That Doesn't Distinguish between March 8 and 14-Naharnet
Sleiman: I was victim of a
political campaign. Future News
Beydoun: 1960 electoral law,
increased Sunni Shiite division. Future News
Swine
Flu Cases Rise to 12-Naharnet
Abi Nasr: The Church should play an
embracing role.
Future News
Lebanon on U.S. State
Department's Human Trafficking Watchlist-Naharnet
Christian Reservations
over Berri's Re-Election, Massive Support for Hariri's Premiership-Naharnet
Jumblat Fears Israeli
Attack on Lebanon-Naharnet
Masked Gunman Kills Fatah
Member in Ain el-Hilweh-Naharnet
Turkish Government Asks
for One-Year Extension of its UNIFIL Troops-Naharnet
Sender of Booby-Trapped
Parcel Arrested-Naharnet
Hariri Says Netanyahu's
'Road Map' Shatters Peace Efforts, Endangers Region-Naharnet
Murr Throws Metn Election
Results into Doubt-Naharnet
Explosives-laden Car Found
at Entrance to Ain el-Hilweh Camp-Naharnet
Report: Riashi Leaves for
The Hague as STL Judge-Naharnet
Gemayel: Diverging
Positions among March 14 Leaders on Berri's Reelection-Naharnet
Egypt, Lebanon push trade initiatives-Middle
East Times
Syria plays down uranium find by UN nuclear
agency-The
Associated Press
President Obama, the Iranian protests are not about democracy
...OneNewsNow
Ramifications of a Possibly Armed Muslim
Brotherhood-Counterterrorism
Blog
Israel to Russia: No arms to Iran, Syria-United
Press International
US troops ask Syria to thwart al-Qa'ida
offensive-Independent
Press Release From ICC: Egyptian Court Refuses to
Recognize Christian Man's Conversion
http://www.persecution.org/suffering/newssummpopup.php?newscode=10289&PHPSESSID=11289f2986f01a584ad3243ed8af0ca3
WASHINGTON, D.C. (June 16, 2009) - ICC has learned that on June 13, an Egyptian
administrative court rejected a lawsuit by a Christian convert from Islam who
wants to be recognized as a Christian on his government-issued ID.
Maher al-Moatassem Bellah al-Gohary converted from Islam to Christianity in
1973, but was still treated as a Muslim because he never requested that his
religious affiliation be altered on his ID. Because Egyptian authorities follow
Islamic laws, they never recognize the conversion of a Muslim to any other
religion. Thus converts rarely, if ever, request official recognition of their
conversion. Gohary is only the second person to ask for his conversion to be
officially recognized, though there are other Egyptian Christian converts from
Islam.
The main reason Gohary is now requesting such recognition is to save his
daughter from forced Islamization. His daughter, Dina Maher Ahmad Mo'otahssem,
is being raised as a Christian, but she cannot be recognized as such as long as
her father's ID indicates his religion as Islam. At 16, she will be issued an
Islamic ID, effectively forcing her to live as a Muslim.
According to Al Arabiya, Gohary also asked the court to recognize his new name
as Peter Ethnasios.
Gohary was baptized at an Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The church issued him a
certificate indicating his conversion. Gohary produced this certificate as well
as another issued to him by Egypt's Coptic Church. The court ruled that the
documentary evidence he presented was invalid.
ICC's Regional Manager for Africa and the Middle East, Jonathan Racho, said,
"The ruling by the Egyptian court to reject Gohary's conversion from Islam to
Christianity is unacceptable. Not only is the ruling unconscionable but it also
clearly contravenes the international standard of religious freedom. We call
upon the international community to hold Egypt accountable for failing to honor
its commitment to respect freedom of religion."
Please go to www.house.gov to find the information for your elected officials
and alert them to this unjust ruling in Egypt. Ask your representatives to put
pressure on Egypt to reverse the ruling.
Chertoff: Hizbullah Could Surpass Qaida as Most Serious
Long-Term Threat to the U.S.
Naharnet/Hizbullah could surpass al-Qaida as the most serious long-term threat
to the United States, the former head of homeland security Michael Chertoff is
to warn in a book published later this year. Chertoff -- who for four years
headed efforts to prevent a repeat of the attacks of September 11, 2001 --
alleges Hizbullah is better equipped, better trained and better politically
positioned than Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida. "Al-Qaida and its network are our
most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term
threat," Chertoff writes in a book to be published in September, a draft of
which was obtained by Agence France Presse.
"Having operated for more than a quarter-century, (Hizbullah) has developed
capabilities that al-Qaida can only dream of, including large quantities of
missiles and highly sophisticated explosives."Chertoff says the group, whose
Arabic name means the "Party of God," also has "uniformly well trained
operatives, an exceptionally well-disciplined force of nearly 30,000 fighters,
and extraordinary political influence." According to Chertoff, the group was
behind a suicide bombing that killed 200 U.S. marines in Beirut in 1983 and the
1996 bombing of the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, which killed more than 20
people. Hizbullah has denied involvement. Despite its defeat in elections
earlier this month, Hizbullah and its allies remain a major force in Lebanese
politics. It is this power, along with Hizbullah's military weight and ties with
Iran that are worrying, according to Chertoff.
"Hizbullah shows what an ideologically driven terrorist organization can become
when it evolves into an army and a political party and gains a deeply embedded
degree of control within a state, as Hizbullah has done in Lebanon's democratic
infrastructure," he warns. Chertoff argues Hizbullah poses a growing threat in
the Western Hemisphere, despite limited attacks on U.S. targets. "While
Hizbullah may not have carried out attacks in the United States itself, it has
developed a presence in the Western Hemisphere, specifically in South America,"
Chertoff says, alleging that the group carried out bombings of Jewish and
Israeli targets in Buenos Aires. "These acts disturbingly underscore Hizbullah's
reach into the hemisphere, notably the tri-border areas at the margins of
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay."(AFP) Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 08:11
Jumblat Fears Israeli Attack on Lebanon
Naharnet/Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat warned against an
Israeli attack on Lebanon in light of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu's speech
which focused on the growing Iranian threat. Netanyahu's speech "could mean an
aggression on Lebanon under the slogan of 'thwarting the Iranian threat.'"
Netanyahu said in his foreign policy speech that Israel currently faces three
tremendous challenges: The Iranian threat, the financial crisis, and the
promotion of peace. "The Iranian threat still is before us in full force, as it
became quite clear yesterday. The greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East,
and to all of humanity, is the encounter between extremist Islam and nuclear
weapons," Netanyahu said. He said that he had discussed this issue with U.S.
President Obama during his visit to Washington, and that he will be discussing
it next week with European leaders. "I have been working tirelessly for many
years to form an international front against Iran arming itself with nuclear
armaments," Netanyahu added. Jumblat called on Lebanese to "put aside the drama
of the thrill of election victory that was achieved by March 14 forces and gear
up to face the challenges ahead of us and the great Israeli threat that was
clearly reflected by Netanyahu's speech." Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 11:59
Pilot Hanna's Killer Freed on Bail
Naharnet/Less than a year after Mustafa Hassan Muqdim shot and killed army
helicopter pilot Samer Hanna "accidentally," the military court released him on
LL 10 million bail.
The daily An Nahar said that despite the objection from Judge Saqr Saqr, the
military court under President Judge Brig. Gen. Nizar Khalil agreed on Tuesday
to release Muqdim, 23, accused of "unintentionally killing" Hanna Aug. 28, 2008
when he mistook the Lebanese army helicopter Hanna was flying for an Israeli
aircraft.
An Nahar said Muqdim's release drew criticism, mainly from MP Butros Harb, the
Hanna family's attorney.
Harb described Muqdim's freedom as a "scandal." "What has happened is awkward,
particularly since it (release) took place less than a year after the killing of
the officer," Harb told An Nahar. Muqdim's release is "neither justified
by tradition nor by the law," Harb stressed, vowing to follow up on the issue
"which has led the court to order the release of a suspect who bluntly admitted
to the shooting of officer Samer Hanna."
The MP also said after holding talks with Premier Fouad Saniora at the Grand
Serail on Wednesday that he will propose a draft law that cancels extraordinary
courts, particularly the military court. The draft law, according to Harb, would
only give the military court the authority to look into issues related to
military personnel.
Muqdim, who is a member of Hizbullah's military wing, told the court on Friday
that he was in a room when he heard a chopper and gunshots in Sujud hills in
southern Lebanon on Aug. 28, 2008. He said he went outside thinking the
helicopter was Israeli and fired five rounds from his Kalashnikov rifle from a
distance of 250-300 meters.
"Then I saw people heading towards the helicopter and I stopped shooting," the
man told the 10-minute hearing. "We were three in the room when the chopper
came. My friends did not take part in the shooting because they didn't have
guns."Muqadim said he didn't see the Lebanese flag on the chopper and the sun's
rays possibly blurred his vision. Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 08:17
Berri for a Unity Cabinet That Doesn't Distinguish between March 8 and 14
Naharnet/Speaker Nabih Berri on Wednesday called for a national unity cabinet
that doesn't distinguish between March 8 and 14 saying controversial issues
should be discussed at the dialogue table. "I am seeking since the end of the
elections to have a national government that doesn't distinguish between March 8
and 14 forces," Berri said. He also said after meeting President Michel Suleiman
that state institutions should be allowed to work for the citizen's interest
based on the Taef accord. The speaker told reporters at Baabda palace that he
nominated MP Saad Hariri for the premier's post, adding that the speakership is
a constitutional responsibility governed by law. "A date for the election of the
speaker cannot be set before midnight Saturday," Berri said. Asked about Free
Patriotic Movement leader Gen. Michel Aoun's demands for proportional
representation in cabinet, Berri said: "He will participate and this is a
positive step. Everything is solved through dialogue." Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 13:06
Lebanon
on U.S. State Department's Human Trafficking Watchlist
Naharnet/The Obama administration on Tuesday put Lebanon on the watchlist of
countries suspected of not doing enough to combat human trafficking. "Women from
Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia who travel to Lebanon legally to work
as household servants often find themselves in conditions of forced labor
through withholding of passports, non-payment of wages, restrictions on
movement, threats, and physical or sexual assault," the State Department's
annual "Trafficking in Persons Report," the first released since President
Barack Obama took office, said. According to the report, some employers have
kept foreign domestic workers confined in houses for years. It said several NGOs
indicate that 15 percent of those workers encounter physical abuse from their
employers.
On the Lebanese government's "artist" work permit program, the Department said
that such moves, which lead to the entry of women from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union to work in the adult entertainment industry, facilitate sex
trafficking. "Some women are reportedly held in debt bondage, receiving little
or no income until the employer has forced the women to repay fraudulently
imposed debts allegedly associated with the cost of their recruitment,
transportation, and employment," the report said.
About child trafficking, the Department said Lebanese children are trafficked
within the country for the purposes of forced labor, mostly street vending, and
sexual exploitation.
It added that the Lebanese government does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking despite some efforts to do so.
According to the report, Lebanon made modest but insufficient efforts to
prosecute or punish trafficking offenses and minimal efforts to prevent
trafficking in persons over the last year.
It recommended criminalizing all forms of trafficking in persons, investigating
and prosecuting trafficking offenses under existing law and convicting and
punishing trafficking offenders.
The State Department also called for developing and instituting formal
procedures to identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations.
"With this report, we hope to shine the light brightly on the scope and scale of
modern slavery so all governments can see where progress has been made and where
more is needed," Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said as she released
the 320-page document.
This year, the Department placed 52 countries and territories -- mainly in
Africa, Asia and the Middle East -- on the watchlist. That number is a 30
percent jump from the 40 countries on the list in 2008. Inclusion on the
watchlist means those countries' governments are not fully complying with
minimum standards set by U.S. law for cooperating in efforts to reduce the rise
of human trafficking -- a common denominator in the sex trade, coerced labor and
recruitment of child soldiers. If a country appears on the list for two
consecutive years, it can be subject to U.S. sanctions. Seventeen nations, up
from 14 in 2008, are now subject to the trafficking sanctions, which can include
a ban on non-humanitarian and trade-related aid and U.S. opposition to loans and
credits from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The penalties can
be waived if the president determines it is in U.S. national interest to do so.
Those 17 countries include traditional U.S. foes like Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, North
Korea, Sudan and Syria, but also American allies and friends such as Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait.
Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 09:19
Christian Reservations over Berri's Re-Election, Massive Support for Hariri's
Premiership
Naharnet/With Speaker Nabih Berri the only candidate for the position, it will
remain to be seen how the various parliamentary blocs will deal with his
nomination. Meanwhile, support for MP Saad Hariri's premiership is reportedly
rising. The daily As Safir on Wednesday said, however, Berri was comfortable
since he is certain he will win another term in office with a 70-vote majority
(57 from the opposition, 11 from Walid Jumblat's Democratic Gathering bloc, two
from Najib Miqati's and Michel Murr's bloc).
And if MPs Mohammed Safadi, Qassem Abdel Aziz, Michel Faraon and Nicola Fattoush
cast their ballots in favor of Berri, then the votes would rise to 74.
Those bluntly objecting to Berri's reelection are Amin Gemayel's Phalange Party
and the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea along with their Christian allies MP
Butros Harb and National Liberal Party leader Dori Chamoun. Votes from Hariri's
parliamentary bloc would ensure Berri's re-election by nearly 100 votes. On the
premiership issue, the only candidate seemed to be Hariri whose nomination would
be confirmed within the coming 48 hours. As Safir said consultations were
near complete with Hariri almost certain to obtain 110 votes and even more,
including votes from Berri's Development, Liberation bloc and Hizbullah's
Loyalty to the Resistance and Change and Reform bloc headed by Gen. Michel
Aoun.On the shape of the new government, the paper said the opposition did not
yet reach a final decision with regards to the power-sharing Cabinet,
particularly in view of Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh's insistence
that the opposition will not take part in a new government that does not grant
it veto power. The daily pointed to consultations with Riyadh and Damascus which
accompanied Hariri's visit to Saudi Arabia. Al Akhbar newspaper, for its part,
said one thing is certain: The opposition's decision to take part in the
government. Beirut, 17 Jun 09, 10:34
Report: Riashi Leaves for The Hague as STL Judge
Naharnet/Judge Ralph Riyashi has moved to The Hague permanently to assume his
duties as one of the magistrates in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, al-Mustaqbal
website reported Tuesday quoting sources from the justice ministry. As an
international judge, Riashi was removed from the government's payroll starting
May 1, the sources said. At The Hague, Riashi will review case files
submitted by the international investigation commission in charge of probing the
2005 assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri, they added. Beirut, 16 Jun
09, 16:03
Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections
By INSS Wednesday, June 17, 2009
- Amir Kulick
Canada Free Press
The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on June 7, 2009 featured two main
electoral camps. One, the “March 14 alliance,” comprised the Sunnis, represented
by the al-Mustaqbal (“Future Movement”) Party headed by Sa’ad al-Hariri; the
Druze – the Progressive-Socialist Party headed by Walid Jumblatt; and various
Christian elements, among them the Phalangists and the Lebanese Forces. Opposing
them was the “March 8 alliance,” composed of the Shiites – Hizbollah and Amal;
“The Free Patriotic Movement,” the party of the Christian Maronite politician
Michel Aoun; and other small factions such as Sleiman Franjieh’s Christian party
from northern Lebanon.
The March 14 coalition won the elections, earning 69 seats, compared with the 57
won by the March 8 coalition; these and the two independent representatives
total 128 parliamentary representatives. Despite early assessments of a close
race, the March 14 candidates won by a landslide in a number of provinces. Thus
in the 1st voting district in Beirut, March 14 candidates won every seat (of the
7 in contention); similar results were found in Zahle (5) and Kura (3).
Hizbollah and Amal even saw a reduction of their parliamentary power: 25
representatives in the new parliament compared with 29 in the outgoing.
Nevertheless, in practice, the power of the opposition has increased somewhat,
now numbering two more representatives (57 compared with 55 in the outgoing
parliament), while the power of the coalition has waned somewhat (69
representatives compared with 72).
Lebanon and the world were surprised by the results: the prevalent expectations
were that Hizbollah and its allies would win. These assessments were backed by
opinion polls, which predicted a slim majority for the March 8 camp. Moreover,
it seemed that the victory of these factions was a natural development given the
spirit of the times: the weakening of the status of the United States and its
Arab allies, compared with the strengthened influence of Iran and its allies –
Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas. The West’s failure to root out the Taliban;
American’s Iraqi quagmire; the disintegrating international pressure on Syria;
Iran’s continued progress towards a nuclear capability; Hamas’ victory in the
Palestinian parliamentary elections; and Hizbollah’s relative success in the
Second Lebanon War formed a smooth backdrop for a Hizbollah victory in the
Lebanese elections. And yet the elections resulted in a victory for the
pro-Western camp. How can this development be explained and what are its
ramifications?
It seems that several factors are behind Hizbollah’s weaker showing. One of the
main sources for the surprise lies in the assessment that the success of the
March 14 camp in the previous elections incorrectly reflected the true balance
of power in the Lebanese political system, as they were held shortly after the
assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 and the ensuing public
outrage at Syria’s allies in Lebanon – Hizbollah and the March 8 camp. It was
suggested that the balance of power between the vying blocs was actually even,
perhaps slightly favoring the March 8 camp, and the 2009 elections were supposed
to restore the political order to its correct alignment.
A second factor may lie in the Lebanese system itself. At the center of this
explanation stands Michel Aoun’s failure to enlarge his power base in the
Christian sector. Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, was the surprise of
the previous elections. Just before those elections, he had returned to Lebanon
from an extended exile in Europe, yet managed to win 18 seats in the parliament.
(In practice, his party was apparently bigger because it earned the support of a
number of independents.) Different estimates, especially those within his own
close circle, maintained that in the current elections his power would grow
significantly because most of the Christian sector ostensibly stood behind him.
There were even projections that the party would double its power and win 30 or
more seats. The changes in the voting districts made under Hizbollah pressure in
the Doha Agreement of May 2008 were supposed to help Aoun attain this goal. In
practice, Aoun failed to garner additional support, and his party even lost one
mandate. In this sense, the gap between the expectations of the Free Patriotic
Movement with Aoun at its head and the actual results is significant.
A third factor behind Hizbollah’s poor showing – at least compared to
expectations – was its inability to reach beyond the borders of the Shiite
community and become a national political establishment acceptable to large
segments of the Lebanese public. While in the Shiite strongholds in the south
and in the Lebanon Valley (the Baalbek and al-Hakmal regions), Hizbollah and
Amal candidates won most of the seats allotted to the Shiite sector, in other
districts where Hizbollah ran candidates running (especially in Beirut) they
failed. Hizbollah’s inability to become a national power accepted by all other
communities is likely found in the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and no less so in
the events of May 2008. Following the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone in
May 2000, Hizbollah enjoyed great popularity among the Lebanese public. The
resistance was seen as an historic Lebanese achievement, and Hizbollah seemed
poised to become a political entity that to a great extent would rise above
sectarian differences of opinion. The 2006 war rendered a severe blow to this
image. The kidnapping of IDF soldiers and the subsequent war were seen by large
segments of the Lebanese public as a colossal mistake motivated by external
interests. Hizbollah was considered an Iranian tool in Tehran’s war on the
United States and Israel. The “Weapon of Resistance,” Hizbollah’s independent
military wing, which until then was seen as an asset, suddenly seemed a burden
that was dangerous to Lebanon’s wellbeing.
This suspicion was validated further by the events of May 2008. As a result of
the disagreement with the government about Hizbollah’s attempt to set up an
independent communications network and install cameras at Beirut’s airport,
violent confrontations between Hizbollah fighters and government supporters
erupted. Within a few days, Hizbollah conquered neighborhoods in West Beirut, as
well as areas in the north and east of the country. Eighty civilians were killed
in the fighting. Following Qatari mediation, a compromise agreement was signed
in Doha whereby Hizbollah and its ally Michel Aoun scored noteworthy political
gains. Nonetheless, it seems that the May 2008 violence significantly damaged
the organization’s national image and demonstrated to the Lebanese public – the
Sunnis and the Christians – that the Weapon of Resistance is no less dangerous
to the Lebanese than to Israel.
It is still too early to pinpoint the likely implications of the election
results on the Lebanese political system and the regional arena. To judge by
statements issued by Hassan Nasrallah and his spokesmen, in the short term
Hizbollah will seek to make sure that the new government will not act against
Hizbollah’s military wing and make any decisions that breach the status quo. In
order to achieve this, the organization will probably attempt to establish
partnerships in the government or at least receive some kind of political
guarantees. For the long term, it seems that the elections clarified for
Hizbollah the limitations imposed on it by the principle of sectarian division
in the Lebanese confessional political system. According to the confessional
system, each community is awarded a set number of seats in parliament (64
Christian, and 64 Muslim divided into 27 Sunnis, 27 Shiites, 8 Druze, and 2
Alawis). Similarly, senior political positions are divided on a community basis
(a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, and a Shiite speaker of
parliament). Therefore, the results of the elections will likely underscore for
both Hizbollah decision makers and Iran that in order to realize their strategic
goals regarding Lebanon, the political system in the country must be organized
in a more egalitarian way to realize the Shiites’ growing demographic weight.
How this change is to be achieved – whether through the Weapon of Resistance or
through political compromise – remains an open question for the moment. Yet in
any event, the most recent elections, despite their importance, are no more than
a milestone in a long term struggle for the character of Lebanon, or as
Nasrallah phrased it, a station on the road to fulfilling “a great program of
reforms at all levels – political, security, economic, and social.” When and how
that program is to be fulfilled is not clear, but the Shiites’ demographic
growth and the military might of Hizbollah constructed under the aegis of Iran
and Syria are definitely liable to ensure that at the end of this reform Lebanon
will look very different.
President Obama, the Iranian protests are not about
democracy; they are about legitimacy
by Crane Durham
Nothing to lose…the protests in Iran may not be a clear cut case for legitimate
elections, rather they an opportunity to end the Iranian regime without the use
of military force. Freedom is a messy enterprise and when people get a dose of
it; they do not let it go peacefully. The Iranian elections were a sham for the
start. In Iran, the candidates are selected by Supreme Leader Khomeini regime.
So, in order to qualify a candidate can’t really be a reformer. Even if there is
a candidate that is less of a hard liner; the opaqueness of the system allows
for government to simply manipulate results (cheat) as they did 2006. So what is
going on in Iran today; why if the system is already rigged are people
protesting the results?
The Iranian people are young (70% under 30), educated (literacy rate 80%) and
westernized. What about crowds of cheering Iranians when Ahmadinejad says: death
to Israel? Well Dorothy, this is not Kansas; it is a brutal totalitarian state
where people are arrested, tortured and killed for opposing the regime. Just
because the likes of Kruschev and Brezhnev got 99% of the vote did not mean that
the majority of the Soviet Union’s citizens truly supported their enslavement;
they just wanted to survive. Three years ago to the day, Natan Sharansky
(architect of Bush Democracy Plan) explained: “in a fear society, there are
three categories of people: 1) true believers who believe in the ideology; 2)
dissidents who don’t believe in the ideology and speak openly against it; and 3)
the overwhelming majority of people who are double thinkers. Over time, the
tougher the dictatorship and the longer it exists, the number of double
thinkers—people who don’t accept or believe in this ideology, but who feel that
they are not strong enough to speak against it because they are afraid of
punishment—grows all the time.”(1)
Today, the people of Iran are crossing the line into the second category. They
are doing it because it is a time when the world is watching. They have chosen
to protest the election, not because they believe elections are legitimate.
Rather, they provide an opportunity to get their message out; they want freedom.
Professor, Author and Iranian expert Dr. Walid Phares: “The massive
demonstrations against Ahmadinejad were (and are) conducted by real opposition
masses. Students, young people, men and women have been emulating the Tiananmen
Square uprising, as well as Eastern Europe’s awakening against the Soviets and
going beyond the electoral dispute. In reality, the people clashing with the
regime’s militia aren’t solely Mousavi’s supporters. Most of them are
anti-Khomeini protesters who are seizing the opportunity of the election fraud
to show the world how disenfranchised they are.”(2)
Most Americans take their freedom for granted; we have forgotten how we achieved
as well as how much sacrifice it takes to keep it. Also, we ignore that every
human being desires it. I have heard that the people of the Middle East are
incapable of handling freedom; they don’t want to be free…President Bush was
continuously mocked for statements: “On a individual level believe that God has
planted in every heart the desire to live in freedom.”… “They hate what we see
right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders
are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each
other.” For the record, we cannot overlook the doctrine of Islam as the
foundation of the philosophical rationalization for Osama’s vision of a
worldwide caliphate. Yet, we also cannot turn a blind eye to this simple fact:
dictatorial regimes hate threats to their power, and those who would advocate
freedom are a direct threat. Again, President Bush firmly understood this:
“Everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear.” How long will Islamic
Theocracy last in a free society not forced to bow down to its intellectual
thuggery?
Yes, the people of the Middle East want to be free. At great risk, the Iranian
people are marching for this freedom. They should be supported, at very least,
rhetorically. President Obama clearly is unwilling to use force against the
Iranian regime; he would be wise to embrace the Iranian people by acknowledging
the corruption of the election, and more importantly, the illegitimacy of their
government. Unfortunately, he seems willing to play Khomeini’s game: “I have
always felt that, as odious as I feel some of President Ahmadinejad's statements
(are), as deep as the differences that exist between the United States and Iran
on a range of core issues, that the use of tough hard headed diplomacy,
diplomacy without illusions about Iran and the nature of the differences between
our two countries, is critical when it comes to pursuing a core set of our
national security interests. Specifically making sure that we are not seeing a
nuclear arms race by Iran getting a nuclear Iran. ... We will continue to pursue
a tough direct dialogue between our two countries and we'll see where it takes
us.”
The people of Iran are protesting for change. By focusing on moving forward with
negotiations, President Obama fails to deliver it…
1 Sharansky, Natan Is Freedom for Everyone? Heritage Foundation Lecture # 960
June 15, 2006
2 Phares, Dr. Walid Iran’s Elections — A National Show Designed to Delay
Democracy Fox News June 15, 2009.
Ramifications of a Possibly Armed Muslim Brotherhood
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)/Counterterrorism
June 17/09
An Egyptian newspaper claims the Muslim Brotherhood may have constituted a
large, well-armed wing, with perhaps thousands of operatives, and its purpose is
to engage in terrorist operations.
The report, published May 27 in Egypt's Al-Masry Al-Youm, carried the headline,
"Why is Security Silent About the Secret Armed Organization of the Brotherhood?"
A potential mission for this Muslim Brotherhood armed division would be to send
10,000 trained fighters to south Lebanon (Hezbollah territory) and to Gaza to
attack Israel. Author Hussaneyn Kuroum notes there are some Muslim Brotherhood
leaders who refute the existence of an armed wing, but the current Secretary
General (Guide) Mahdi Akef, has made statements clearly indicating that the
organization has such an armed element. The article questions what the Egyptian
security services may or may not know about this unit.
Kuroum cites an interview in a separate Egyptian publication with Brotherhood
opponent Wahid Hamid, who argues Akef's brash talk has meaning:
"He said that he is prepared to send to South Lebanon tens of thousands of
fighters. Will he send them with clubs and swords? Or will they be armed in a
modern fashion, besides there being trained to fight? Mahdi Akef also said, 'I
am prepared to send fighters to Gaza.' Good. He'll send them with what and how?
Sure, armed and trained. The matter is clear. It can be easily concluded."
The public suggestion in a respected, privately-owned Egyptian media source that
the Muslim Brotherhood has a significant armed branch should be of keen interest
to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If this is true, it should
put to rest any consideration by U.S. officialdom to engage the Muslim
Brotherhood in substantial dialogue. It would seemingly weigh in favor of
designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
Iran’s Deceiving Elections
16/06/2009
By Dr. Hamad Al-Majid
Asharq Al- Awsat,
Somewhere between the tufts of blonde hair that creep out of the Hijab at one of
Mir Hossein Mousavi’s political rallies and the chador that covers other Iranian
women from head to toe at a rally for the victorious Ahmadinejad, we can
summarize the non-fundamental differences between the Iranian presidential
candidates.
In reality, it is a conflict between a hard-line religious current and one that
is less hard-line; between Ahmadinejad’s highly intensified ideology and
Khatami’s less intense ideology.
They have all been fed the morals of the Iranian revolution and its Khomeinist
features. They have fought for it and because of it, and nobody wants an
alternative; they seek to spread its ideology to other countries and villages.
They all want Iran to be the most powerful state in the region, and the most
influential, and to have the most key political players of our inflamed region.
They all want Iran to play a role and stick its nose into other countries’
affairs. They all want to frighten regional states with the nuclear scarecrow.
In other words, the regime’s selection of presidential candidates makes it
impossible for somebody to take part in the competition unless that person has
an acceptable amount of absolute loyalty to the revolution. This is why the
filtering process reduced the number of presidential candidates from 400 to
four.
Iran has experienced the leadership of a reformist president such as former
president Mohammed Khatami as well as conservative presidents, most prominently
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, neither the Iranians nor the non-Iranians felt
that there was a difference between members of the two currents. Under the
leadership of reformists or conservatives, human rights records have been
appalling, and the abuse of ethnic and religious minorities is a feature of both
conservative and the reformist leadership. There are also political detentions,
assassinations of opposing figures for political or doctrinal reasons, cases of
torture and overcrowded prisons.
Interference in Muslim countries and unrest will not end unless the US
Republican Party’s policy differs to the Democratic Party’s policy with regards
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It is true that the conservatives in Iran are more offensive than the
reformists; Ahmadinejad was clever to cover up his economic failures by doubting
the Holocaust and threatening to wipe Israel off the map. The US is reassuring
Israel that Iran will not harm it, whereas the reformists are more patient and
farsighted. Apart from that, the reformist and the conservative trains are
heading towards the same station and the protest that we have witnessed thus far
will reflect nothing but the speed of the train and the kind of fuel on which it
runs.
At first, the fight for presidency in Iran was quite fascinating as there was a
real competition between effective candidates; real and exciting televised
debates; a record turnout and unpredictable results until the very last moment.
The final results for the victorious president were reasonable, as they were
certainly unlike the famous Arab 99 per cent [that Arab presidents sometimes
claim to win in elections]. But this is all merely the weak façade of a
distorted democracy.
Many supporters of the Iranian revolution would say that Arab countries could
not have a presidential election like the recent one in Iran. That is true but
it is also the case that Arab countries know that if they were to hold
presidential elections, this would just be a formality and for the media. We
should not be surprised at the negative human rights records that Arabs states
have.
But in the case of Iran, by conducting these presidential elections, it seeks to
conceal the negative way in which it dealt with the political opposition and
ethnic and ideological minorities. It is naïve to sum up democracy by
presidential elections where the competing parties are two sides of the same
ideological coin.
Ahmadinejad’s Crises: The Internal Uprising
17/06/2009
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
Asharq Al- Awsat,
The real surprise would have been if a presidential candidate other than Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad won the elections and became the new president of Iran.
Ahmadinejad’s second term victory was expected and is only natural in light of
the status quo. Vote rigging is the easiest thing to do for a security,
religious regime that does not believe in opportunities but believes that it is
its right [to rule]. It sees that winning the elections is a battle of destiny,
for which it is ready to fight as well as rig.
We should not pin hopes on the growing anger of the Iranian masses as the
confrontation between the government and the masses is failing and we already
know what the outcome will be. This is at least for the time being, but in the
future we should not ignore the fact that the bubble has burst. In spite of the
regime’s endeavours to cut internet cables and to end telephone calls to hinder
communication between members of the angry youth, the whole world is watching
the regime’s ordeal as it truly faces an internal uprising.
Until now, the uprising is internal, but the Tehran regime is very likely to use
the same methods as regimes that impose victory. Pushed beyond limits by its
confidence in an illusory victory, we will watch Ahmadinejad’s government move
its internal crisis abroad, in a similar way to Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
Dictatorship of the mind is a crisis that lives off other crises.
What we have seen so far of the Iranian elections is nothing but a domestic
conflict and, as usual, the party in control of the weapons ended up victorious.
I fear that the future will be far worse than just the rigging of votes as we
will witness people wanting to settle scores at a later stage on the pretext of
confronting conspiracies.
Perhaps the elections have brought about internal and external confrontations
quicker, which would mean that we are facing a new era in Iran’s modern history.
It is a decisive time for the regime, as it is the first time for thirty years
since the revolution that an internal uprising has erupted under the leadership
of ruling figures such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi
Karroubi.
There’s not much difference between today and the recent past; when Mohamed
Khatami was president, a position to which he held on tight and that he had won
in a fair manner, they made a mere puppet out of him, and the protests of his
supporters did not go beyond the university campuses. Whereas today, the leading
opposition figures are stronger and the demonstrations have gone beyond
universities and poured onto the streets of Tehran. Therefore, the regime’s
golden era, when the youth served as the pillar of the revolution, has come to
an end. The youth has now become a thorn in the side of revolutionists. The
regime is going down the same road as its predecessor; the Shah’s regime. The
Shah was not overthrown by armed battles, but by the growing angry masses until
the prisons and the streets became overcrowded with people.
There are no great expectations that the masses will bring about change
overnight because with an iron fist, the Revolutionary Guards controls all
aspects of the state, claiming that this is the people’s choice. Yet the regime
is facing a dangerous division with its people. Therefore, as I said at the
beginning, we might see Iran accuse its opponents of being traitors and resort
to external battles to consolidate its control.